Sketching augmented challenges posed to NATO and its eastern flank | Daily Sabah – Daily Sabah

With the world facing the perils of the COVID-19 pandemic, one cant turn away from the fact that a new set of security challenges might pop up following the crisis. The pandemic could also impact the dynamics within NATO as it holds the potential to augment the vulnerabilities of the Euro-Atlantic bloc, especially along the front line of the alliances eastern flank.

In the wake of increasing military threats from Russia, it is imperative for NATO to understand and access the upcoming threats and beef up its preparedness pertaining to the augmented challenges at hand.

What has unified the allies of NATO in the contemporary scenario has been Russias illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. These actions have called for an expansion of the alliance's defense mechanisms in order to protect its member states from the external threats that in todays world have expanded beyond the military domain to also include threats related to cybercrime, black propaganda and much more, which in unified form pose challenges that require a hybrid defense.

In all these years, ever since its foundation in 1949 with 12 member states, NATO has proved its relevance on all frontiers. However, disunity among member states, especially related to putting more focus on strengthening the alliances eastern or southern frontiers, has caused several disagreements and, from time to time, threatened the unity and integrity of NATO. It is imperative for all member states to understand that only as a unified whole could NATO significantly challenge the status quo posed by Russia along the eastern flank.

Russias aggression in 2014 resulted in NATO member states agreeing to double the Rapid Reaction Force, create an even faster Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and increase defense budgets to 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2024. In recent years, so as to strengthen the eastern flank, member states of NATO, especially the U.S., have called for increased implementation of the 2014 deals. It is discouraging to note that only five member states, namely Poland, Romania, Greece, Latvia and Estonia, have lived up to this commitment of increasing defense expenditure to 2% of the GDP so far. Lithuania and Turkey come close to the 2% mark with 1.98% and 1.89%, respectively. To solve the logistical and infrastructural challenges in moving troops, tanks and equipment across Europe to the eastern flank, it is important for NATO members to agree to the establishment of a military Schengen.

When viewed across the canvas of augmented vulnerabilities, there is no denial of the fact that the Russian forces consider the nations along NATOs eastern flank, mostly the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as the Achilles heel of NATO, thus increasing the need for member states to calculate the potential subversions that could take place either directly in terms of military engagement with Russia or by buying their goodwill through medical diplomacy.

Russias military presence in the Black Sea poses similar threats as its Baltic Sea military capabilities. Black Sea countries like Ukraine and Georgia could be encouraged to join NATO by invoking Article 10 which provides for the enlargement of the alliance. Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are already member states.

With differences of opinion among NATO member states, especially pertaining to analyzing Russian threats, there has been shift in countries that are the nucleus of attention of NATO. Many member states think that Russia will not engage in any direct confrontation as it would then invoke Article 5 of NATO, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on them all.

Russia's Kaliningrad military buildups are seen as a counter to the eastern flank military deployment. Keeping in view the contemporary challenges, presenting a stronger deterrence is the need of the hour, focused on strengthening the military capabilities along the eastern flank and providing all assistance required to the nations along the front line of NATO's eastern frontier. It is even more imperative to present a unified picture of the NATO member states that especially calls for greater participation of the European family to augment their stature as being part of the alliance.

In contemporary times, Poland has significantly supplanted West Germany to become the centerpiece of NATOs anti-Russia defense and host to hundreds of thousands of U.S. and allied forces that have returned to Europe after Russias annexation of Crimea in 2014. Troops are placed on a rotational basis and not permanently. Currently, NATO has enhanced forward presence (EFP) in Estonia led by the U.K., in Latvia led by Canada, in Lithuania led by Germany, and in Poland led by the U.S. The return of the military troops closer to Russia projects the strengthened attitude of NATO.

Despite the difference, what has held member states together is the common political consensus that the eastern flank needs to be defended. Resilience to hybrid threats on several fronts, including the military domain and the cyber realm, is critical to strengthen NATOs preparedness to face the challenges of the contemporary era. In the wake of the realization that Russia is not to give up its toughened view against NATO and will continue its hybrid warfare, it is imperative for NATO to maintain unity and increase its deterrence on the eastern flank.

In order to brace themselves to be resilient to the challenges of the 21st century, which have been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO members must adopt the principles of unity, prevention and resilience to strengthen their approach toward the eastern flank.

*Politician from Poland, Former vice-president of European Parliament, Minister of European Affairs and Minister in Prime Minister Office

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Sketching augmented challenges posed to NATO and its eastern flank | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

Trump’s troop drawdown from Germany will take ‘years,’ says Inhofe – DefenseNews.com

WASHINGTON and COLOGNE, Germany U.S. President Donald Trumps goal to withdraw 10,000 American troops from Germany will take years to execute, according to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla.

Inhofes disclosure, after he was briefed by Pentagon officials on the plans, suggests there wouldnt be the hasty pullout critics feared, but a more drawn-out approach. The troops are potentially a quick-reaction force against Russia and can be deployed rapidly to the Middle East and Africa.

It is clear to me that this concept will take months to plan, and years to execute, Inhofe said in a statement after the briefing Wednesday. Rigorous planning and deliberate implementation of this concept is the best way to give our military families a measure of certainty and ensure they receive the care and support they deserve.

Trump administration officials have been planning for the last two months to begin a major drawdown of troops from the NATO ally, to include shifting at least 9,500 personnel to other bases overseas or in the United States, and to cap the total number of U.S. troops stationed there at 25,000. The total is almost 35,000 now, and the troop cap is 50,000.

Officials have suggested the move is designed to reduce the U.S. footprint in a single overseas allied country and instead spread out American response forces some farther east for more strategic flexibility. Critics say the move would undermine Americas commitment to the NATO alliance and risk a key hub for training and staging forces.

Trump initiated the move in part because he believes Germany isnt spending enough on national defense, and that European countries are taking advantage of American military might.

Lowering the troop cap as the administration plans would significantly undermine the capacity to rotate in U.S. forces for reinforcement or training, according to former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder, now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The decision, overall, appeared to be driven by presidential pique, he said, and not an assessment of how to achieve Americas national security goals.

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Where was the interagency process that led to this decision, Daalder said. Its the way this administration operates, which is they say lets do this, and then they figure it out.

A staunch ally of the president, Inhofe appeared to part with other hawkish Republicans in announcing his support for the presidents sound approach to realigning U.S. military posture in Europe. Inhofe has said he supports a lily-pad approach to basing and mentioned Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania as other locations to consider.

But Inhofe also hedged by emphasizing military families, whose lives would be upended by a rapid withdrawal.

We need to maintain a strong presence in Europe to deter Russia, sustain a flexible platform for projecting power into other theaters like Africa and minimize the impact of these changes on military families who already sacrifice so much for our country, he said.

Still, the matter is expected to be a friction point in talks between the Senate and the House to reconcile their annual defense policy bills. The House-passed version included bipartisan language rebuking the withdrawal plans, while the Senate did not take up a similar, bipartisan amendment led by Sen. Mitt Romney, R-Utah.

Both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill have expressed concerns about the plan. Twenty-two GOP members of the House Armed Services Committee sent a letter to Trump last month stating that the current troop levels in Germany have helped make America safer.

The Senate-approved bill included a requirement that the Pentagon report to Congress on allies annual military spending, based on an amendment from Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah. The annual report would have to cover the common defense contributions of NATO countries and other allies, including Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

The House and Senate bills also express a sense that Congress wants the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to model NATO allies in terms of burden sharing, and the two pieces of legislation encourage the U.S. to pursue a coordinated plan for those countries continued security.

The House-passed State Department spending bill includes $11.4 million each in foreign military financing for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with $115 million for Ukraine and $35 million for Georgia.

Meanwhile, leaders in Berlin seem to have made peace with the idea that the White House may actually go ahead with a repositioning of U.S. troops out of Germany, as U.S. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy has called the move.

Officials in Europe initially shrugged off the drawdown rhetoric, first reported in the United States in early June, simply because the Trump administration had left them completely in the dark. The fear now is that a reconfiguration of the U.S. footprint on the continent could effectively lead to a net decrease of troops, whether in Germany or elsewhere.

The decisive question for Europe and NATO is whether these troops will be removed from Europe or not, German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said during a trip to Bratislava, Slovakia, at a July 17 event organized by the Globsec think tank.

Were not exactly happy when our American friends leave us, she said. Thats the one thing. But it wont lead to German security collapsing.

She stressed that Germany and Poland, which has been mentioned as a potential host for the forces slated to leave Germany, should be speaking with one voice as Pentagon leaders finalize their plans. Polish leaders have made clear that any plus-ups of Americans in their country would be undesirable if the price is a drawdown in another part of the alliance, she added.

Therefore, the issue is not a drag on our bilateral relations, Kramp-Karrenbauer said of the Berlin-Warsaw rapport.

Leo Shane III contributed to this report.

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Trump's troop drawdown from Germany will take 'years,' says Inhofe - DefenseNews.com

Emmanuel Macrons EU army dream crushed as nonsense plan – Who would be in charge? – Daily Express

Speaking to Express.co.uk, the fomer SNP deputy leader claimed a European army will always remain a dream and would never become reality for French President Emmanuel Macron. The Brexiteer argued that in the construction of an EU army, member states would not even manage to agree on who would be in charge of the military operation. Mr Sillars argued the project could never mimic NATO as it would lack a key member state like the US powerful enough to fund it.

He said: "I think the elite will use every problem to argue for further integration towards the United States of Europe, and I think that's inevitable because it has been the elite's objective ever since the treaty of Rome was saying that back in the 1950s.

"But I'm not sure that they will accomplish it in the way that it would be necessary for Macron's idea of a European army.

"I don't think in reality that the member states would be willing to actually pay for a European army that could project force in the world domain.

"And I think that's one of the dreams of Macron that will not come true. And if you look at how you would construct a European army, you run into an immediate problem: who would be the chief of staff?

"Well, it wouldn't be someone from Greece because, you know, France wouldn't have that.

"It wouldn't be someone from Italy because French and Germany wouldn't have that.

READ MORE:Macron suffers bitter failure as French President attacked over EU

"France may go along with the Germans but would the Germans go along with other nations?

"What about Poland? The more you think of the attempt to construct a European army, what a nonsense it is.

"And if you take that by comparison with NATO, why does NATO manages to operate as a single organisation made up of a number of countries?

"It is because they have one supreme organisation in it that handles the big money and takes control of the logistics and the command.

"That's the United States. You couldn't have a mimicked image of NATO inside the European Union.

"So I say it's dream times for Macron and not realistic times."

Officials in the trade bloc have long spoken of a European army in order to push Brussels geopolitical position in the world. Funding for a European Defence Fund has also been included in the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

Earlier this month, Germany's CDU and SCU parliamentary groups foreign policy spokesman, Jurgen Hardt insisted the EU must be more capable of action.

He said: It is important that the EU itself becomes more capable of action and that it cannot only respond effectively to crises in its own neighbourhood, but also act preventively.

Our American friends expect the same from us.

They are less and less willing to play a part in order to regulate regions that they consider to be far away, but which are immediate neighbourhoods for us.

We have to build our own civil-military leadership structure that can control EU operations.

We have to divide the tasks even more clearly among the EU member states, which makes the use of resources more efficient.

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And we have to build interoperable weapon systems.

We want to gradually integrate the armed forces of the EU member states so that we create a European army in the long term through an army of Europeans.

The defence scheme would receive 8billion (7.1billion) in the mammoth 1.1trillion MFF.

This came before and despite the EU facing a severe financial crisis following the coronavirus pandemic.

Mr Hardt, however, indicated any European army would be to supplement NATO rather than replace it.

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Emmanuel Macrons EU army dream crushed as nonsense plan - Who would be in charge? - Daily Express

NATO Chief believes movies should release in theaters despite the pandemic – JoBlo.com

The head of the National Theatre Owners Association, John Fithian, declares that theaters need to stay open and he believes that studios delaying films in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic is not helping matters.

Movie theaters initially closed their doors back in March and recently things have gradually begun to change. Theaters in China have reopened recently but this was after opening after some believed was a bit too early which resulted in their closure again before opening again last weekend. Of the 5,000 or so theaters in the States, about 1200-1500 have reopened, with mostly drive-ins bringing in most of the business. More theaters were on their way to reopening but as the nation continues to hit record-breaking numbers in terms of cases and deaths due to the coronavirus, many states have forced the closure of theaters and other public venues. It's a very messy situation that has led to films like Christopher Nolan's TENET, delaying its release indefinitely.

John Fithian became the latest person to add fuel to this debate and it was sparked when he was asked by "Variety" about Warner Bros.' decision to move TENET from its August 12 release date to a presumed later date in 2020. Fithian emphasized that until a coronavirus vaccine is found, theaters cannot open to 100% capacity and he believes this is the reason that studios and theaters should begin to deal with the "new normal" and just open and release films as planned:

On the one hand, I think he has a point. It seems like the studios are waiting for some kind of miracle where the big box office markets open up again and they can make the necessary money off their expensive tentpole releases. They're patiently waiting for Los Angeles and New York City to give approval for their theaters to open but that has yet to be the case, which is why TENET delayed its release again and will be likely why other releases will follow suit. It seems as if Fithian is saying that bringing in some money is better than bringing in no money so studios and theaters should maintain their dates and just adjust to whatever money can make until things gradually get back to normal again. Is this financially feasible for a studio to do this? Probably not but the longer they wait to open films, it's going to kneecap the theaters out there that are waiting to distribute these releases. AMC, Regal, and Cinemark seemto be banking on films like TENET in order to get back into the game but studios are clearly focusing their efforts on the markets that will make them the most money and with Los Angeles and New York City out of play as of now, they don't want to seem to budge until these players are part of the box office conversation again.

Do YOU agree that studios should maintain release dates and open films in theaters that happen to be open or is it smart to wait it out?

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NATO Chief believes movies should release in theaters despite the pandemic - JoBlo.com

NATO MMU cleared to begin training ops – IHS Jane’s 360

20 July 2020

by Gareth Jennings

NATO has been cleared to begin training operations on its first recently received Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft, the Multinational Multirole Tanker Transport Unit (MMU) announced on 20 July.

The first of eight A330 MRTT aircraft that NATO members Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway are to operate as a joint fleet under the MMF initiative was formally delivered on 29 June. The MMU that operates the fleet is now cleared to commence training operations. (Airbus)

With the first of eight aircraft now at the MMUs main operating base (MOB) at Eindhoven airbase in the Netherlands, the receipt of the required airworthiness certification from the Dutch Military Aviation Authority has now cleared the way for the commencement of training.

The Multinational Multi-Role Tanker and Transport Fleet (MMF) is operated by the MMU on behalf of NATO members Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Managed by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) with support from the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the capability will provide the six participating nations pooled access to aerial refuelling (hose-and-drogue and boom/receptacle) strategic passenger and cargo airlift, as well as aero-medical evacuation (medevac) capabilities.

With aircraft MMF1 now in the hands of NATO, MMF2 is ready for delivery shortly. As previously noted, MMF3 and MMF4 are currently undergoing military conversion at Airbus facility in Getafe, Spain, and are due to be delivered in October and early 2021 respectively.

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Turkish spy agency MIT surveilled critics in Canada, a NATO ally – Nordic Research and Monitoring Network

Abdullah Bozkurt

Turkeys spy agency (Milli Istihabarat Tekilat, or MIT) has collected intelligence on critics and opponents of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoan in Canada, a NATO ally, secret documents have revealed.

According to the secret intelligence report, sent to the prosecutors office in Ankara with a cover letter from the agency and bearing the signature of the MIT legal counsellor on behalf of the intelligence chief, about two dozen people, Canadian nationals and residents, were spied on. The MIT document, which confirms for the first time the spy agencys activities targeting critics in North America, was submitted on January 16, 2020 to Birol Tufan, the public prosecutor in the counterterrorism unit of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutors Office.

The information collected [about people targeted in Canada] as a result of the intelligence is presented in the annex, the letter, signed on behalf of agency head Hakan Fidan by mit Ulvi Canik, the legal counsellor, stated. The attached 10-page report, also classified as secret, provided detailed information on 15 people as well as the spouses of some. All of them were accused of being involved with the Glen movement, a group that is highly critical of Erdoan for a variety of reasons, from pervasive corruption in the government to Turkeys aiding and abetting of armed jihadist groups in Syria.

Secret document from Turkish intelligence agency MIT that confirms spying activities in Canada:

The report listed what appears to be the legitimate activities of Canadian nationals and residentsas if they amounted to terrorist activity, which is not surprising given the fact that Turkeys rulers often abuse the criminal justice system, especially counterterrorism laws, to prosecute and imprison critical journalists, human rights defenders, dissidents and others en masse. The report shows that Turkish intelligence also profiled the spouses, parents, siblings and in-laws of people who were put under surveillance on Canadian soil.

The intelligence report was shared with the prosecutors office after Tufan wrote a letter to the intelligence agency on December 13, 2019, asking the agency to forward the intelligence collected on 15 Canadian nationals and residents, almost all of Turkish origin. It is not clear how the prosecutors office managed to get these names in the first place as there is no paper trail to explain it. However, as in other spying activities abroad targeting the Glen group, the list most likely originated in the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa when diplomats were asked by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to profile Erdoan critics.

It is not surprising to see multiple lists with similar names sincethe Turkish intelligence agents who were deployed in Canadian territory either under the disguise of diplomats or as independent operatives whoblendin with the diaspora file their reports directly with the headquarters in Ankara, not through the Foreign Ministry, which has its own intelligence department under the name of the Security and Research Directorate. The public prosecutors letter reveals similar people were spied on and profiled by multiple agencies of the Turkish government.

All 15 names listed in the prosecutors document were listed as suspects in a terrorism investigation,and case file No. 2018/224693 was assigned, meaning that the investigation into them was launched in the year 2018 and is still ongoing. The MIT intelligence gathered on these people was incorporated as criminal evidence against them although no violent or terrorist activity is included in any document.

The 10-page MIT report has a warning printed on both the top and bottom of each page, cautioning that the intelligence must be used without identifying the source. It also highlighted that intelligence notes cannot be used as legal evidence in a court of law, a stipulation of the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMUK). But in practice such notes have often been used in prosecutions in recent years since the government started to intensify its crackdown on critics and opponents in a blatant abuse of the criminal justice system. Under the CMUK, at least on paper, any evidence presented to the court must be obtained legally and authorized and reviewed by a court, and prosecutors must use only law enforcement agencies such as the police, not intelligence units, when they investigate.

The secret 10-page report details the information collected by the Turkish spy agency. (Redactions done by Nordic Monitor.):

The police, the main law enforcement agency in Turkey, was also involved in the investigation of these 15 people and their relatives. On February 14, 2019, prosecutor Tufan wrote to counterterrorism unit of the Ankara Police Department asking the police to investigate the 15 people listed in the letter. He even provided 10 criteria for them to look at such as membership in Glen-linked unions, NGOs and foundations, subscriptions to critical media outlets, participation in protests, the posting of messages on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, their foreign travels and use of the ByLock encrypted messaging application.

The prosecutor also noted that if needed, search and seizure and arrest warrants could be secured through his office and asked the police to take the suspects statements and refer them to his office for further interrogation. Although no indictment was filed at this stage, arrest warrants were most likely issued for the listed individuals in absentia. The Turkish government would eventually seek the extradition of these people and file Interpol notices for them.

The investigation of Canadian nationals and residents on false terrorism charges will have far-reaching repercussions. They risk arrest if they travel to Turkey as well as the loss of their assets located there. They may also get stuck in a third country when they travel if the Turkish government manages to get them on the Interpol database. The most notorious example of Turkeys abuse of the Lost and Stolen Documents/Passports database in the Interpol system took place when NBA star player Enes Kanter, a Turk, was stranded in Romania on such a notice until the US government intervened and freed him before he was deported to Turkey.

Those who also have Turkish nationality would be denied consular services such as passport renewal, notary, power of attorney and birth registry offered by the Turkish consulates and embassy in Canada. Since they were already flagged by Turkish intelligence and other government agencies, further surveillance and tracking of their movements is quite possible.

Turkish prosecutors letter to MIT:

Erdoan, incriminated in a major corruption scandal in 2013 that exposed secret kickbacks in money laundering schemes involving Iranian sanctions buster Reza Zarrab, blamed the Glen movement for the graft investigations into his family members and business and political associates. He branded the group as a terrorist entity although no violent action has ever been associated with it, and launched a major crackdown on the group, jailing and/or purging tens of thousands of government employees, unlawfully seizing their assets, shutting down schools, universities, NGOs, media outlets, hospitals and others that were owned or operated by people associated with the movement.

The Erdoan government accused 79-year-old Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Glen, leader of the eponymous movement, who has been living in self-imposed exile in the US since 1999, of attempting to overthrow the government in 2016. Glen has repeatedly and strongly denied the accusations, and the Erdoan government has failed to present any evidence linking Glen to the abortive putsch. The US Department of Justice said the evidence presented by Turkey to secure his extradition would not stand up to US court scrutiny.

Canada has been a destination for critics, especially Glenists, who had to flee the Turkish government crackdown on rights and freedoms.

Turkish prosecutors letter asking the police to investigate Canadian nationals and residents:

According to the MIT report, Turkish intelligence surveilled the following persons in Canada: E.K.K., a member of the Turkish-Canadian Chamber of Commerce (TCCC); F.K.K., a teacher at the non-profit Turkish Community Center in Ottawa, his wife S.K., his father M.Z.K., his mother M.K. and his mother-in-law S.D.; .P., a member of the Canadian-Turkish Friendship Community (CTFC) and TCCC; A.A., an administrator at the Northern Lights Educational Services; .B., a teacher at the Nile Academy and his wife. E.B., a manager at the Intercultural Dialogue Center; S.U., a member of the Dicle Islamic Society; E.S., who was involved with the Intercultural Dialogue Institute, the CanadaTurknews outlet and the Circle blog, and his wife, S.S., who is also affiliated with the Intercultural Dialogue Institute; B.B., a member of the Manitoba Fellowship Organization (MFO) and the Edmonton Nebula Foundation; M.F.Y., who was affiliated with the Intercultural Dialogue Institute-Greater Toronto Area (IDI-GTA) and the Anatolian Heritage Federation(AHF), his wife, A.Y., who also works for IDI-GTA; his brother M.K. and his father I.B.Y.; M.B., coordinator at the Intercultural Dialogue Institute; H.Y., a writer and editor with CanadaTurk and the Canatolian news outlets; A.A., the former manager of the Beam Education Community Center (BECC); his wife, E.A. also involved with BECC; E.B.. of the Canadian-Turkish lslamic Foundation, her father M.., her mother .. and her sister Z..; and .K., a member of the TCCC and CTFC.

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Turkish spy agency MIT surveilled critics in Canada, a NATO ally - Nordic Research and Monitoring Network

An American vessel arrived in Greece 3 thousands of Marines in NATO exercise – FREE NEWS

The American transport vessel Endurance Vehicles Carrier delivered 3,000 Marines, military vehicles and equipment to Greece to participate in the NATO exercise Atlantic Resolve 2020, the website reported kranosgr.com. The message was posted on Twitter by US Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt.

The ship is on the roadstead of the port of Alexandroupolis in northern Greece.

This is one of the largest transports of the American armed forces, which participates in the NATO exercise Atlantic Resolve 2020, the publication writes.

The exercises will be held in Romania, and the equipment will be sent there by rail.

The transportation of troops and military equipment will begin on Thursday, July 23, in the presence of national defense Minister Nikos Panayotopoulos, US Ambassador to Athens Geoffrey Pyatt and chief of the General staff Lieutenant General Konstantinos Floros, who will arrive in Alexandroupolis on Board a military plane, the newspaper reports.

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An American vessel arrived in Greece 3 thousands of Marines in NATO exercise - FREE NEWS

Germany urged to return to the discussion of Russia’s accession to NATO – FREE NEWS

It is necessary to return to the discussion of Russias accession to NATO, which was seriously discussed in the 1990s, said Christian Schmidt, a member of the German Bundestag from the CDU/CSU faction.

I have held various political positions for 30 years. In my opinion, this was the mayor of [Moscow, Yuri] Luzhkov, if I am not mistaken, the previous Moscow mayor, he once did not even rule out Russias joining NATO. This was seriously discussed. Then the NATO-Russia Founding act was signed. This all needs to be discussed again, the German politician said.

Schmidt, during the VI youth forum Potsdam meetings, noted that the entire security architecture created since 1975 in Europe had been destroyed. We just took it and lost it. And it affects everyone. Now we need to discuss together how we can build a security architecture after Helsinki (Meeting on security and co-operation in Europe in Helsinki on August 1, 1975-see note). We still need mechanisms for disarmament, arms control, and the balance of armed forces. I think that such a discussion will benefit Europe, and Europe should play an important role in it, the politician added.

Christian Schmidt was the Minister of food and agriculture from 2014 to 2018 and led the Ministry of transport and digital infrastructure from 2017 to 2018.

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Germany urged to return to the discussion of Russia's accession to NATO - FREE NEWS

Georgian Foreign Minister held a meeting with NATO and EU Officials – The FINANCIAL

The Georgian Foreign Minister, David Zalkaliani met with the Deputy NATO Secretary General Mircea Geoan and EU Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi. Discussing the irreversible process of Georgias integration with NATO, the Alliances support and Georgias successful steps on this path, the sides highlighted Georgias important role in ensuring regional and global security, including through its active engagement in projects aiming at enhancing Black Sea security and in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

Meeting of Davit Zalklaiani with the EU and NATO officials was held in Brussels on July 13-14, making it his first foreign visit amid the coronavirus pandemic. At the NATO Headquarters on Tuesday, Georgias top diplomat met with the Deputy Secretary-General of the Alliance for an exchange of views on cooperation between NATO and Georgia and on Georgias Euro-Atlantic integration and reform efforts, local media civil.ge reported.

The sides welcomed the steps taken by the Georgian Government towards strengthening democracy, including by adopting constitutional amendments, and electoral system reforms.

Special attention was focused on the difficult security situation in Georgias occupied territories, which was particularly exacerbated over the recent period due to the fact that occupation forces, even amid the pandemic, increased their illegal activities and provocations. The sides expressed their concern over the incident on 11 July when the occupation forces wounded and detained a citizen of Georgia. The NATO delegation reaffirmed its strong support for Georgias sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Georgian Governments fight against the pandemic was appraised as one of the most effective both in Europe and globally. During the meeting, David Zalkaliani introduced Victor Dolidze, Georgias new Ambassador to NATO, who presented his credentials to Mircea Geoan.

"Highly appreciate our partners commitment at NATO-Georgian Commission to continue supporting Georgias aspiration to NATO. Allies recognize the progress on reforms Georgia has made and condemn Russias occupation of, and continued pattern of illegal activities in, our regions," David Zalkaniani wrote on Twitter.

The Deputy Secretary General and the Georgian delegation expressed their readiness to continue active cooperation leading to Georgias membership of NATO, both by strengthening practical instruments and enhancing political support.

Earlier this month, The European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar and Georgian Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani discussed the security and humanitarian situation in the Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. Minister Zalkaliani referred to increasing number of Russia-orchestrated provocations, the so-called borderisation process, closure of the occupation line and restrictions imposed on free movement amid the coronavirus pandemic, local news website agenda.ge wrote.

Also,The Chair of the EU Integration Committee, David Songulashvili held the online meeting with the First Vice-President of the European Parliament from the Fine Gael (Ireland) Party, Mairead McGuinness to discuss the political processes in the country and the economic challenges. D. Songulashvili stressed the ongoing democratic reforms in Georgia, including the adopted Constitutional Changes and the new Election Code, which were positively estimated by the parties. He informed Mme. McGuinness about the pandemic preventive measures by the Georgian Government. The parties touched upon the EUAA implementation by Georgia, the Committee activity and the future plans, and underlined even more intensive representation of Georgian business to the EU market.

European Parliament salutes the strengthening of EU-Georgia relations

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Georgian Foreign Minister held a meeting with NATO and EU Officials - The FINANCIAL

Keeping the Americans In, the Russians Out and the Chinese in Check: Germany’s Future Strategy – RUSI Analysis

Thirty years into Germanys reunification, the most fundamental, if unspoken, question Berlins allies are asking is: are you ready to defend freedom? Globally challenged by powerful strongmen whose self-confidence has fed off democracies self-doubt about the future, the latter have betrayed a tendency to fatalism in their likeliness to prevail in the 2020s.

Looking ahead, Germanys future leaders need to deliver their new narrative to the public by showing how it responds to their international vision of the future. Addressing the evolving power and ideological struggle of the 2020s, Germanys future chancellor will need to provide, most crucially, a clear sense of direction as to which fundamental challenges are threatening the Western way of life. In fact, by adapting NATOs vision of 1949 keeping the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down Berlins new vision needs to be geared atkeeping the Americans in, the Russians out and the Chinese in check.

Such persuading of German and European publics may only succeed if framed by a realistic understanding of todays strategic landscape. For one, President Donald Trumps disregard for global leadership has opened up a power vacuum which others have exploited, at the expense of the West. Therefore, European allies need to make keeping the Americans intheir strategic priority.

In this new vision, the Wests economic and military power needs to be joint to safeguard the one core value that sets it apart from China and Russia: freedom. Clearly, neither Europe nor the US alone can successfully take on the strategic challenge posed by China, as it may outgrow them individually. But together they can. The fundamental strategic question is, therefore, whether the West wants to continue to economically feed the dragon.

As the total decoupling of economic exchanges is currently not intended (but a last resort), Europeans need to muster their immense economic power, as strength is the ultimate prerequisite for the establishment of a partnership of equals. Not least, Beijing depends on open global markets and access to technology much more than the West. Moreover, the EU needs to ensure that its weaker members can withstand the temptation to be lured into the marsh of Chinas realm. The lattersexploitationof Italy and Greeces moments of national weakness caused by the coronavirus pandemic made it conspicuously clear that President Xi Jinping understands all too well how to identify, and manipulate, the weakest links in the EU chain. Here, Berlin needs to display leadership that signals to the US that Western unity, as opposed to Trumps disregard for the European project, is the most effective way ofkeeping China at arms length.

Simultaneously, it is vital to recognise the reverberations triggered by the dynamic interplay between Chinas gargantuan economic growth and the scope of Russias military threats and blackmailing of Europe. Chinas continued rise has structurally affected the USs strategic outlook on Europe: the more China grows (and the less prudent it goes about finding its future place in the world), the more it absorbs US capabilities away from Europe. In turn, this dynamic has already somewhat altered the psychological balance of power in President Vladimir Putins favour. A war in East Asia, to take this argument to its extreme, would create a much-desired opportunity for Russias leader. In the event of such an opportunity, Putin would see a Europe that, in his view, would be freed for the first time in 70 years from the iron fist that the US has demonstrated. It is not at all inconceivable, therefore, that his ambitions would be much less rational than many of those who have welcomed rapprochement or simply believe Russia is materially too weak to fight would think.

It is precisely in this strategic context that the West needs to reinvent itself. Thus, listening to French President Emmanuel Macronsspeechon Europes nuclear deterrence in February 2020, it should be clear from the outset that his goal of a rapprochement with Russia is flawed. Russia understands perfectly well that the West needs it so that the US has its back safe to turn more comprehensively on China. And, while Russias increasingly strong Eurasian leanings might make it altogether impossible to decouple it from China, there can be no doubt that Putin would want a significant prize if he did.

Against this backdrop, Germanys next chancellor ought to offer a new vision of a future grand bargain for NATO. In contrast to the previous 15 years, such a vision needs to be predicated on the notion of power, understood as the defining element of international affairs. It must also be based on the related understanding that the current struggle over the future international order is, at its core, a ruthless power struggle, in which major challengers need to be economically weakened, militarily balanced and their suppression of liberty exposed. This must be achieved before they become sufficiently emboldened to employ non-diplomatic means of strategy in their strife for power.

In particular, as the USs strategic focus will unabatedly be centred on China, regardless of who will enter the White House on 20 January 2021, such a NATO bargain must start with fresh thinking about how the future of keeping the Americans inmay be ensured. Crucially, this would command all European states, guided by the UK, France, Germany and Poland, to do five things:

After all, convincingly demonstrating to China that the US can rely on Europe will ensure that keeping the Chinese at arms lengthworks. The US, in turn, will then be more likely to reassure the Europeans of the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence.

The vital side effect of such a new German model for Western burden-sharing is that, should Putin not turn out to be the benign partner that Macron appears to imagine, it would nonetheless deter Russia effectively. Keeping the Russians in checkwould, thus, be a deliverable prospect. As a worst case, should the USs relationship with China dramatically deteriorate and the formers unilateralist instincts come to guide it, those European safety valves would properly protect Europes NATO members against Russian aggression.

To the USs strategic advantage as a global sea power, such a European contribution to NATOs provision of international stability would thereby help sustain the USs taken-for-granted reliance on friendly coasts connecting the Atlantic and safeguard itsinvestments in Europe, which amount to approximately $500 billion. In essence, propelled forward by Berlin, this could serve as Europes answer to James Mattiss matter-of-factadmissionmade in early 2017 that the US could not fight two major wars at the same time.

Ultimately, for the West to prevail in economic and military terms, European leaders including Germanys future leader need to rally their people, with passion and determination, to remind them of the unique value bonding them with the US: the defence of freedom.

Maximilian Terhalle(@M_Terhalle) is Senior Research Fellow at Kings College London and Adjunct Professor at Potsdam University. His most recent book,Strategy as Vocation, was published in May 2020. He is currently co-authoring a book on Germany and the future of Western security.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE:Courtesy ofniroworld / Adobe Stock.

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Keeping the Americans In, the Russians Out and the Chinese in Check: Germany's Future Strategy - RUSI Analysis

Limits of a US-India military alliance amidst a growing challenge from China – Observer Research Foundation

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In the wake of the ongoing military stand-off between India and China there is considerable debate about the possibility of deeper engagement between New Delhi and Washington. While a deeper strategic relationship is highly probable as result of Chinese military conduct to unilaterally shift the Line Actual Control (LaC), it could fall well short of the Americans fighting alongside Indian forces in a Sino-Indian war. Therefore, whatever optimists about the US-India strategic partnership may conclude, the Modi-led government would be well advised to temper its expectations about an alliance and prepare itself for the worst.

There are fundamentally two problems associated with a US-India alliance. Here the author is defining a military alliance to cover US military fighting alongside Indian forces in the event of a Sino-Indian boundary war. Firstly, the United States domestic governing architecture restricts the extent to which it can militarily support New Delhi if there were escalation between China and India, notwithstanding the Trump administrations offers of deeper defence cooperation and to mediate, which was politely declined by New Delhi and Beijing not just rejected, but even rebuked Washingtons offer. Irrespective of objective realities of American power, both in form of its economic strength and military force projection capabilities, Washington is likely to be fettered in its alignment with India. To be sure, the Modi government might not be wedded to the view that Washington will come to Indias aid militarily in the event of a wider Sino-Indian military conflagration.

Nevertheless, New Delhi must be served a reminder that it should not proceed on the expectation and assumption that American military support is automatic in the event of a wider Sino-Indian war. There are some key reasons to remain cautious about the degree of American military aid for New Delhi, despite a difficult military challenge for India to restore the status quo ante in Ladakh. Indeed, India may be compelled to resort to force to secure the restoration of the status quo ante irrespective of American support. A weakened Republican President Trump, let alone the US Congress with the House of Representatives under the control of the Democrats in the middle of an election year, will be hard pressed to extend significant assistance in the event India pursues an escalatory response to Chinese territorial seizures in Ladakh.

Secondly, another the key factor that will constrain the US are its social conditions and institutional realities. Its social conditions relate to its ambivalence about the continued exercise of military power, which renders the public support system too weak for sustained and protracted military campaigns. Even if a prospective Sino-Indian military conflict is not prolonged, it could be costly and risky which Americans might be resistant to incurring. The empirical and historical record through the course of American history over that last seventy years does suggests a lack of sustained resolve and motivation. The US defeat at the hands of Vietnam is the most glaring example of American limitations in the exercise of military power. In case of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 that involved the overthrow of Saddam Husseins regime and the US subsequent eight-year occupation of that country, even if some analysts and experts might declare it a victory, it was a pyrrhic one.

A final factor is the United States inability to successfully deliver on its interests. As a former Indian envoy to the United States, albeit about a different triangular relationship involving India, US and Pakistan observed not very long ago, The US has not been able to get Pakistan to deliver where its own interests are involved. The US has not been able to get Pakistan to deliver on the Taliban. The US has not been able to get Pakistan to deliver on the Haqqani network. Hence the most glaring recent example of American limitations in prosecuting a military campaign successfully is its defeat at the hands of Afghan Taliban with the explicit backing of the Pakistani state. Indeed, the near unconditional withdrawal or rather capitulation of Washington as part of an agreement reached between the Trump Administration and the Taliban in February 2020 should clearly settle and dash any segment of Indias strategic establishment hopes that Washington can actually come to the aid of India militarily in the event of an outbreak of military hostilities or hot war between China and India.

Thus, whatever the extent of the current US-India engagement, will at most come in the form of continued and increased intelligence assistance, provision of military supplies including during active hostilities with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Here too there are no guarantees and preserving diversity of military supplies must remain a priority for the Government of India. Yet American support will fall short of actively participating in hostilities. Historically, post-independence India has never had ironclad guarantees of military support. Take for instance the case of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation concluded between the Soviet Union and India, which never per se provided mutual military guarantees in the event of an attack against one of the two parties by a third party requiring each side party to the Treaty to deploy military forces to fight alongside the other. The closest that the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty came regarding the extension of military assistance was enshrined in article 9 of the Treaty, which stated: Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to and attach or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries. The Soviets after all did not deploy their forces for joint action with Indian forces, when the latter invaded East Pakistan in 1971, and nor did New Delhi do the same when the Soviets eight years later invaded Afghanistan.

Thus, the Indo-Soviet friendship did not provide any watertight guarantees or automaticity in military assistance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Article 5 does, under which an military attack against one member state is deemed an attack against all member states. Since India enjoys no automatic or unconditional military guarantees from the US or any other country and if there are individuals within the Modi-led dispensation or outside who subscribe to the view that Washington will jump to Indias assistance, must be instantly disabused of such a possibility for the aforementioned reasons. If anything, New Delhis approach in the present crisis with China specifically and against Pakistan and China together should be one that unflinchingly follows the age old dictum: Hope for the best and prepare for the worst.

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Limits of a US-India military alliance amidst a growing challenge from China - Observer Research Foundation

Can the Quad rise to be an Asian NATO? – BusinessLine

The Asia-Pacific, or rather the Indo-Pacific, is worried with the Middle Kingdom that, under Ruler Xi Jinping, is increasingly turning expansionist. So much so that when the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, tried to resurrect his 2007 idea of a Quad or a democratic Asian security diamond, it found resonance.

The Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, involves besides Japan, the US, Australia and India, all of which see an increasingly economically and militarily powerful China flexing its muscle in the region and beyond. They want to keep the sea lanes from the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific free. But can the Quad form the kernel of a larger Asia-Pacific alliance like the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)?

In 1947, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the UK and France signed a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance to ward off any attack by Germany or the Soviet Union. A year later, this alliance was opened to Benelux and it became the Brussels Treaty Organization. Soon enough, talks expanded for a military alliance that would also include North America.

Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by Western European nations plus the US, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

Then, all the Western economies, except the US, were more or less in the same boat, trying to recover from the devastations of the War. Crucially, none of them looked to, leave alone being dependent on, the nation they saw as their key adversary the Soviet Union.

But fast-forward to today. Not just most of Asia even the Quad members are dependent on Chinese supply chains. This alters the equation considerably.

Though the US and Japan should be able to reduce the dependence on China in some time, it will take a while for Australia and far longer for India, which actually has the most to gain from a NATO-like alliance. The other Asian nations are more acutely dependent on Chinese trade, and will need really persuasive arguments to come on board.

If indeed the US wants to create an alliance to counter, if not take on, China, it must first work to wean away Asian nations from dependence on China by, perhaps, sharing technology, shifting its supply chains out of China to other destinations, and opening its market to other nations.

Recall that Washington had opened both the political and economic doors wide to China. The epochal visit of President Richard Nixon in 1971 opened the political door. President Bill Clinton opened the economic door wider through the US-China Relations Act of 2000. These are the two key reasons for the rise and rise of the Middle Kingdom.

And it is necessary for Japan and Australia, with their technology advantage, to aid in this initiative. India, too, must help in the areas it has an edge such as IT/ITeS. Once the economic front is secure, Asian nations may feel more confident about the alliance and its leadership.

The Quad can even consider taking over the Indo-Japanese Africa Asia Growth Corridor (AAGC). This is a multi-pronged initiative to enhance capacity and skills, infrastructure and development projects, and people-to-people partnership. It can well dovetail with a plan to wean countries, especially in Asia, away from China. It will provide a credible, and democratic, alternative to Chinas Belt and Road Initiative.

While India, Japan and Australia feel most threatened by China and will be anxious to get an alliance going, the US must make clear its plans for the region and take the lead. It, after all, remains the most powerful country in the world and none of the other Quad members has the heft to shape events in the region. The US stationing two carrier groups in South China Sea is indication that Washington is taking the Chinese threat seriously. Quad can build on that.

And, only if the Quad members act in concert and with a purpose will Beijing take them seriously. As will the Asean, which wields considerable influence in the region. The Association of South-East Asian Nations will need to be roped in if the alliance is to become a reality first, and a force multiplier subsequently, in the shape of a NATO-like body.

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Can the Quad rise to be an Asian NATO? - BusinessLine

US distances itself from Turkey over naval incident with France | | AW – The Arab Weekly

PARIS--Despite Ankaras attempts to portray Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as working closely on Libya with US President Donald Trump, Washington distanced itself Wednesday from Turkish military moves in the Mediterranean that are directly related to the conflict in the North African nation.

Trumps national security adviser said the US is very sympathetic to France in its dispute with Turkey over a naval standoff in the Mediterranean Sea between the two NATO allies, which was blamed by Paris on the Turkish navys aggressive behaviour.

The festering row between France and Turkey has exposed NATOs struggle to keep order among its ranks, and its diminished US leadership under Trump. It has also shown Turkey to be trying to take advantage of NATO divisions and of Washingtons mixed signals to try to impose its diktat in the Mediterranean and intensify its military intervention in Libya without regard for European concerns.

NATO allies shouldnt be turning fire control radars on each other. Thats not good, national security adviser Robert OBrien told reporters in Paris on Wednesday. He said Trump is available to help defuse tensions, thanks to his personal relationships with Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron.

OBriens statements were interpreted by experts as a sign of emerging discomfort in Washington about Ankaras abrasive behaviour vis-a-vis Europe over Libya, oil and gas drilling and the Hagia Sophia episode.

The Turkish presidency said Tuesday that Erdogan and Trump had agreed during a phone call to cooperate more closely, as allies, to promote lasting stability in Libya.

According to French accounts of the June 10 incident, the frigate Courbet was illuminated by the targeting radar of a Turkish warship that was escorting a cargo ship.

France said it was acting on intelligence from NATO that the civilian ship could be involved in trafficking arms to Libya in violation of the UN embargo. The Courbet was part of the alliances Operation Sea Guardian, which helps provide maritime security in the Mediterranean.

Turkeys foreign minister accused France of lying, and Turkeys ambassador to France said the French navy was harassing the Turkish convoy.

We are very sympathetic to the French concerns, OBrien said, while acknowledging differing accounts of what happened. Were taking it very seriously.

Macron has also accused Turkey of flouting its commitments by ramping up its military presence in Libya and bringing in jihadists and mercenaries from Syria.

The United States is by far the most influential of the NATO allies but has played a less prominent role under Trump, who has publicly berated European members and Canada for not spending enough on defence budgets. Trump has threatened to take US troops out of Germany without consulting allies and has pulled out of multiple international agreements that Europeans regard as important to their security.

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US distances itself from Turkey over naval incident with France | | AW - The Arab Weekly

Not Necessarily Done When You’ve Won: On Kicking a Great Power When It’s Down – War on the Rocks

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson,Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018)

Editors Note: This is an excerpt fromBook Review Roundtable: Rising Titans, Falling Giantsfrom our sister publication, theTexas National Security Review.Be sure to check out thefull roundtable.

Backed up by exhaustive research in primary and secondary sources, Rising Titans, Falling Giants undermines large areas of conventional wisdom in security studies. In this scholarly tour de force, Joshua Shifrinson argues that the optimal strategy for a rising great power vis--vis a declining peer is to crush it, or at least weaken it, if it can do so without risking its own security and if the target is not needed for dealing with challenges from other great powers. Friendlier strategies are called for only when those conditions are not met. According to Shifrinson, leaders of a rising great power would be foolish to weaken a declining peer if it could help contain, divert, or otherwise weaken a more pressing great-power challenge. Hence, the United States and the Soviet Union each attempted to bolster the faltering British Empire in the immediate wake of World War II, in hopes that it could prove helpful against the other. Only when London opted clearly for the U.S. camp did Moscows dominant strategy shift to weakening Britain.

But, Shifrinson warns, it would be equally foolish for a great power perhaps out of a surfeit of caution or in an effort to come to some great-power concert arrangement to pass up the chance to cut down a declining peer if the circumstances were ripe. This is a strong claim that runs against much of international relations scholarship. Shifrinson is saying that even though the peers decline is increasing the rising great powers security, and even if the decliner is cooperative, that is no reason not to grab even more relative power so long as the decliner cannot help against other great powers and lacks the ability to resist. When the Soviet Union declined in the 1980s, it could be of no use to the United States in battling other great powers because there werent any. According to Shifrinsons predation theory, Washingtons optimal response to this strategic setting was to weaken the Soviet Union as much as it could in view of Moscows inability to fight back. When the Soviet Unions capability to credibly use force in Central Europe waned in 198990, U.S. leaders were therefore right to ramp up from the mainly covert and generally ineffectual weakening strategies they had deployed for most of the Cold War, for want of more potent alternatives, to measures truly meant to push Russian power back east of the Elbe. But when the Soviet Union itself began to come apart, Washington sagely restrained itself from intense weakening strategies due to the credibility of Russian power so close to home.

Shifrinsons book forces scholars to think about rise-and-decline dynamics in a new way, one not fixated on power transitions. It shows how great powers strategies can vary from predatory to cooperative with a novel power-centric explanation that appears to outperform competing explanations in key cases. Shifrinsons admirably rigorous research sheds new light on lesser known aspects of the Cold War, especially the Soviet Unions relatively supportive policies toward the British Empire in the early post-World War II period and Americas predatory policies toward the Soviet Union in 198991.

The Realist Logic Behind NATO Expansion

But the biggest piece of conventional wisdom that Shifrinson undermines is one that he does not talk about: the popular notion among realist security studies scholars that America ought to have abandoned its leadership role or primacy in post-Cold War Europe. I hardly need to remind readers of this publication of the hugely influential arguments presented by the likes of Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, Harvey Sapolsky, Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, Chris Layne and many other luminaries in the field of security studies that once the Soviet Union declined the United States no longer had a national interest in preserving its primary role in European security via NATO. With a theory that is born of familiar realist roots, Shifrinson reaches the opposite conclusion.

The key practical divergence between predation theory and the theories deployed by advocates of NATO abandonment is the threshold for a U.S. onshore presence in Europe. The conventional wisdom among Come Home, America scholars is that the United States needs to be in Europe only if there is a credible threat of military hegemony in the region. The very stimulus that such theories argue should trigger the United States to pull back Soviet decline and the corresponding evaporation of the threat of hegemony is what predation theory sees as a reason for expanding U.S. commitments. If you want to weaken Moscows power, as predation theory says you should, you dont pull back; you dont even stand on the defense by merely preserving NATO as a hedge. No, you lean forward and expand NATO to sweep up former Soviet allies in Central Europe.

It is important to stress that even though Rising Titans, Falling Giants is about the end of the Cold War and thus concerns actions that predate the big debate about whether to come home or to expand NATO, Shifrinson shows that the die was already cast during this period:

[B]y March 1990, U.S. strategists began exploring ways of expanding NATO further in Eastern Europe and gaining influence over members of the rapidly dissolving Warsaw Pact; within months policymakers were debating whether and when to signal that Eastern European states could join the alliance. Dominance was the name of the game.

And that meant no coming home, no restraint, no offshore balancing, no concert of powers with Moscow as an equal player, and no new security architecture in Europe to replace NATO.

Given the centrality of NATO and Europe to U.S. grand strategy, predation theory is a novel entry into this longstanding debate. Typically, the Come Home, America position is contrasted with an array of arguments that, for lack of a better word, seem more defensive than the theory Shifrinson develops in Rising Titans, Falling Giants. They portray continued U.S. primacy in Europe as necessary for preventing the reemergence of security competition among European states, for warding off Yugoslavia-style wars of nationalism and irredentism, for hedging against a possible Russian resurgence, and for helping elicit European cooperation on a range of non-security matters such as economic policy. They generally have a broader conception of U.S. security requirements that go beyond great-power politics and greater sensitivity to non-security interests. Predation theory, by contrast, occupies the same turf as the Come Home, America arguments, but is focused like a laser beam on classical security interests and the great-power chessboard.

Predation theory strikes me as more akin to a carefully developed, contingent version of offensive realism, arguing that it makes sense for great powers to pursue security aggressively but not wantonly, choosing their peer victims carefully. Shifrinson notes this affinity with offensive realism but stresses the ways in which his approach can explain cooperative great-power strategies where offensive realism cannot. Needless to say, in naming it predation theory, Shifrinson also wants the more offensive implications of his argument to register. And they should register in this debate a debate from which offensive realist power-grabbing arguments have been largely absent.

Indeed, realist arguments in favor of abandoning U.S. primacy in Europe are so prominent that many people conflate realism with grand strategic restraint, forgetting that from the same basic school of thought one can derive arguments for the strategic sagacity of kicking great powers while they are down. And Shifrinsons extensive research documents decision-makers expressing precisely this kind of logic within the corridors of power, whatever reassuring liberal rhetoric they may have adopted for public consumption.

Overall, Rising Titans, Falling Giants offers a great deal of evidence that runs counter to popular realist portrayals of the causes of U.S. primacy-seeking. Scholars like Mearsheimer and Walt are puzzled by Americas post-Cold War expansionism and attribute it to motivations outside the security realm. But in the pages of Rising Titans, Falling Giants, Shifrinson offers deep and thorough research on the internal deliberations that resulted in the grand strategic choice to sustain and extend U.S. primacy in Europe. This copious documentation reveals U.S. decision-makers who are attuned to changes in the distribution of power and [who] privilege the resulting concerns and opportunities when shaping strategy. There is scant evidence here of the reckless liberal crusaders, drunk with power, who star in Mearsheimers The Great Delusion, or of the complacent, self-serving, bubble-dwelling denizens of the blob who feature in Walts The Hell of Good Intentions. Instead, we see, well, realists: leaders [who] recognized that preying on the Soviet Union improved the relative power of the United States, affording it advantages in peacetime negotiations and improving the odds of wartime victory. Sound like realism to you?

Probing the Prescriptive Power of Predation Theory

Now, as someone who is on record arguing against abandoning NATO and coming home, I might be suspected of deriving unwarranted implications from Rising Titans, Falling Giants. After all, as noted, Shifrinson himself does not tout the books implication for this hoary grand strategy debate. If I have misread the books implications for that debate, the format of this roundtable gives him the opportunity to correct the record. So, let me close with a discussion of two potential objections to the implications I have derived here.

First, Shifrinson does not use normative language, as I have done, instead writing about his theory in terms of prediction and explanation. But that is a distinction without a difference, for he posits that great powers are rational and driven first and foremost by the desire to secure themselves. If, as he writes, predation theory provides the most powerful and consistent account of rising state behavior, it follows that he is claiming that what the United States did to the Soviet Union as the Cold War wound down is what a rational rising great power interested in security should have done.

Second, it could be that predation theory and the theories that have yielded the Come Home, America argument converge in recommending that a less primacy-oriented U.S. strategy is needed for Europe as Russias decline and Chinas rise continue. If so, it would be a service to the grand strategy debate for Shifrinson to spell out this logic. Presumably, at some moment Chinas rise might become salient enough to raise Moscows strategic value as a counter to Beijing, and so predation theory might call for a total revamping of the U.S. position in Europe to bolster or even strengthen Russia. If so, one wonders when in this process the revamp should have occurred, according to the theory: When is China strong enough and Russia weak enough to warrant trading U.S. leadership in Europe for Moscows help versus Beijing? According to predation theory, when in the post-Cold War period if ever does Americas policy of sustaining primacy in Europe and keeping Russia out begin to undermine U.S. interests?

Rising Titans, Falling Giants presents its arguments and first-rate empirical research efficiently and with verve. Shifrinson proves that the classical explanatory architecture that we know as realism, which has been with us in one form or another for centuries, can, when wielded by a smart and hard-driving scholar, still deliver novel insights.

William Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, where he teaches in the Department of Government. His most recent books are America Abroad: The United States Global Role in the 21st Century (Oxford, 2016), with co-author Stephen G. Brooks, and The Oxford Handbook of International Security (Oxford, 2018), co-edited with Alexandra Gheciu. He is currently working on a book on subversion among great powers.

Image: George Bush Presidential Library (Photo by Susan Diddle)

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Not Necessarily Done When You've Won: On Kicking a Great Power When It's Down - War on the Rocks

NATO Group Catfished Soldiers to Prove a Point About …

The phony Facebook pages looked just like the real thing. They were designed to mimic pages that service members use to connect. One appeared to be geared toward a large-scale, military exercise in Europe and was populated by a handful of accounts that appeared to be real service members.

In reality, both the pages and the accounts were created and operated by researchers at NATOs Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, a research group that's affiliated with NATO. They were acting as a "red team" on behalf of the military to test just how much they could influence soldiers real-world actions through social media manipulation.

The group "attempted to answer three questions, Nora Biteniece, a software engineer who helped design the project, told WIRED. The first question is, What can we find out about a military exercise just from open source data? What can we find out about the participants from open source data? And, can we use all this data to influence the participants behaviors against their given orders?

The researchers discovered that you can find out a lot from open source data, including Facebook profiles and people-search websites. And yes, the data can be used to influence members of the armed forces. The total cost of the scheme? Sixty dollars, suggesting a frighteningly low bar for any malicious actor looking to manipulate people online.

StratCom published its findings last week in a new report, which Biteniece, her coauthor Sebastian Bay, and their fellow StratCom researchers presented Thursday at an event on social media manipulation at the United States Senate. The experiment underscores just how much personal information is free for the taking on social media, and, perhaps even more troubling, exactly how it can be used against even those of us who are the best positioned to resist it.

Were talking professional soldiers that are supposed to be very prepared, says Janis Sarts, director of NATO StratCom. If you compare that to an ordinary citizen it would be so much easier.

Many of the details about how the operation worked remain classified, including precisely where it took place and which Allied force was involved. The StratCom group ran the drill during an exercise with approval of the military, but service members weren't aware of what was happening. Over four weeks, the researchers developed fake pages and closed groups on Facebook that looked like they were associated with the military exercise, as well as profiles impersonating service members both real and imagined.

To recruit soldiers to the pages, they used targeted Facebook advertising. Those pages then promoted the closed groups the researchers had created. Inside the groups, the researchers used their phony accounts to ask the real service members questions about their battalions and their work. They also used these accounts to "friend" service members. According to the report, Facebook's Suggested Friends feature proved helpful in surfacing additional targets.

The researchers also tracked down service members' Instagram and Twitter accounts and searched for other information available online, some of which a bad actor might be able to exploit. We managed to find quite a lot of data on individual people, which would include sensitive information, Biteniece says. Like a serviceman having a wife and also being on dating apps.

Everybody has a button. The point is, whats openly available online is sufficient to know what that is.

Janis Sarts, director of NATO StratCom

By the end of the exercise, the researchers identified 150 soldiers, found the locations of several battalions, tracked troop movements, and compelled service members to engage in undesirable behavior, including leaving their positions against orders.

Every person has a button. For somebody theres a financial issue, for somebody its a very appealing date, for somebody its a family thing, Sarts says. Its varied, but everybody has a button. The point is, whats openly available online is sufficient to know what that is.

Members of the military happen to be particularly high-profile targets for scams like catfishing and sextortion. Recently, a group of inmates in South Carolina were busted for allegedly blackmailing 442 service members using fake personas on online dating services. Not only can these tactics hit service members' wallets, they may also represent a security risk if the victims have access to sensitive information.

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Why NATO Should Adopt a Tactical Readiness Initiative – War on the Rocks

In January 2018, the German news site Deutsche Welle released a bombshell report. It exposed, in excruciating detail, the degraded readiness of the German military. One year before assuming command of the NATO Very High Readiness Task Force, the alliances multinational immediate response force, the Bundeswehr was forced to admit it lacked basic equipment needed to fulfil its role: spare parts for armored vehicles, night-vision devices, body armor, and even winter clothes and tents. Subsequent investigations revealed similar readiness problems in the nations air and naval forces. In short, NATOs most important European member was not ready for war.

In many ways, the NATO Readiness Initiative, first announced in June 2018 at a NATO defense ministers conference in Brussels, was a response to these issues of readiness across Europes national militaries. Often referred to as the Four Thirties, the initiative calls for NATO member states to collectively maintain 30 mechanized battalions, 30 naval ships, and 30 air squadrons ready for employment by NATO within 30 days of activation. This agreement was part of a package of U.S.-sponsored initiatives which aimed to further increase NATOs ability to rapidly respond to crises by improving military mobility across Europe and expedite the organizations political and military decision-making process. These changes signaled a much-needed realignment towards preparedness for high-intensity conflict against Russia.

Its adoption was hailed as a transformational moment in the alliance. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed that the initiative would create a culture of readiness. Others welcomed an initiative that measured readiness beyond spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, a metric that has become, at times, an unhelpful obsession in transatlantic defense.

However, two years after its adoption, it is still unclear if the NATO Readiness Initiative has had any effect. Despite its promise and potential, it may unfortunately remain more an expression of political will than an operational plan to rebuild readiness in the militaries of NATO member states.

To date, apart from a handful of nations announcing their contributions to the initiative, NATO has offered few additional details on this transformative effort. The alliance has not identified which nations are contributing forces which it does for other high-readiness battlegroups nor has it published any details on exactly how the readiness initiative works. Even the announcement of the success of the initiative, defined as contributing nations allocating all required forces to the initiative, was buried on an infographic in the 2019 NATO Secretary Generals report.

When first introduced two years ago, the readiness initiative lacked a clear definition of readiness, a means to evaluate individual units allocated to the initiative, and a routine mechanism to test the responsiveness of these forces. Since NATO defense ministers are still discussing the details of the initiative, it is likely that these fundamental gaps still exist. The initiative still has not been formally tested. Exercise Defender 2020, slated for June of this year, should have been an excellent opportunity to do so. However, the exercise was greatly reduced due to COVID-19, and it would have most likely been an inauspicious start for the alliances latest initiative. NATOs next opportunity will be Exercise Steadfast Defender in 2021, which gives NATO and states contributing forces to the initiative a little under a year to address these deficiencies and ensure the success of this important initiative.

As a first step, NATO should establish oversight on the readiness of national forces allocated to the Four Thirties. Then, the alliance should adopt additional strategies that support tactical readiness for these forces by standardizing training methodologies and establishing their wartime task organization before a crisis starts, not after. Given the challenges associated with NATOs land component, the alliance should start with member states armies rather than the other services.

Mind the Gaps

The NATO Readiness Initiative builds upon NATOs previous efforts to prepare the alliance to defend Europe against threats from Russia to the east and instability and terrorism to the south. However, the initiative differs from previous efforts in two ways: First, the readiness initiative focuses on the readiness of national forces, not those controlled by NATO. In the event of a crisis, NATO will need these forces to reinforce high-readiness spearhead units, with deployment timelines of less than a week, prior to the arrival of the larger, but slower to deploy, NATO Response Force. This multinational formation of nearly 40,000 troops drawn from across NATO member states packs a punch, but could take as long as 90 days before it can be employed. National forces will fill the gap between the two. Second, while past initiatives focused on deterrence through a forward-deployed defense posture to reassure Baltic allies most threatened by Moscow, the readiness initiative complements NATOs shift to a strategy of deterrence through military mobility. Investing in more mobile forces that can respond quickly to a crisis in Eastern Europe, rather than maintaining a large deployment of troops on NATOs eastern flank, lowers costs for member states and creates flexibility to respond to other threats to the alliance (e.g., terrorism).

Since the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO member states have made great strides towards improving military mobility. Likewise, military mobility has become an important political objective in the European Union. Moving NATO forces in a time of crisis from bases across Europe to potential hot-spots in the east and south is a monumental task that requires detailed planning, something NATO has learned from large-scale exercises such as Exercise Trident Juncture 2018. Since then, NATO and the EU have diligently put these lessons into practice, include reducing border controls and improving infrastructure such as ports, bridges and railways, often at significant cost to individual member states.

Mobility Is Important, but So Is Availability

However, NATO may be putting its proverbial cart before the horse. Military mobility is just one component to ensure collective defense. NATO should first ensure the availability of forces to mobilize. In a crisis, NATOs member states may not be able to generate these forces in the first place. Regrettably, nearly two years after the adoption of the readiness initiative, NATO still lacks operational oversight of forces who, at this very moment, are ostensibly available to NATO within thirty days. Without oversight on the process of force generation within contributing nations, these forces might not uphold their standards of readiness and, as a result, fail to meet the mission assigned to them. In peacetime, failing to meet NATOs readiness standards ends careers. In a crisis, it could make the difference between winning and losing a conflict with Russia. Just as NATO is addressing military mobility now, so too must it address in the lack of oversight and evaluation under the readiness initiative.

Not everyone agrees that NATO should have more oversight of national forces. After all, the alliances strategic framework states that tactical readiness is the purview of individual member states, not NATO. While true, this framework was a result of post-Cold War force generation policies that focused on making global stability operations sustainable for member states. While it functioned well for counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan or the Balkans, it is insufficient for maintaining readiness for high-intensity conflict.

In a way, NATO has needed to repurpose defense concepts that guided the alliance from the past. Under the Cold War strategy of flexible response, national forces held in a high state of readiness were essential to the security of the European continent. Because the threat of Soviet invasion was ever-present, these forces were closely monitored and evaluated frequently to ensure their preparedness. While individual member states were still responsible for the training of their national militaries, NATO ensured compliance through formal exercises and no-notice readiness evaluations, ensuring each nation was accountable for their contributions to the collective defense of Europe.

A Tactical Readiness Initiative for NATOs Ground Forces

To support the NATO Readiness Initiative, the alliance should establish a tactical readiness initiative for European ground forces that supports the alliances broader goal of strategic readiness. There are several reasons to begin with armies. In addition to the sheer size of the land component allocated under the NATO Readiness Initiative potentially up to 15,000 troops ground force readiness presents a unique challenge for NATO. First, while years of insufficient defense spending has affected all of Europes military components, cuts in funding for personnel, equipment acquisition, and maintenance have hit ground forces especially hard. Despite pressure from the United States to increase defense spending and modernization efforts, many European armies still face significant gaps in their conventional capabilities. These problems could limit the quality of forces assigned to the NATO Readiness Initiative. Second, there are issues of interoperability at the tactical level that challenge the ability of these forces to quickly integrate into a single fighting force during a crisis. Member states use different command and control systems, communications devices, and specialty equipment. Workarounds can be found, typically from ground-level soldier ingenuity, but it takes time.

European ground forces each employ their own individual tactics and techniques. Sometimes they are synchronized with their NATO allies, and sometimes they are not. While this may be a minor detail from a strategic perspective, interoperable procedures (e.g., how to mark friendly vehicles during conditions of low visibility) are incredibly important for a multinational forces, especially when a portion of the alliance still employs Russian-made vehicles.

A tactical readiness initiative for NATOs land forces can address these issues of readiness and interoperability by doing two things: First, it needs to establish a standardized system of training and evaluation for each battalion allocated by contributing nations to the NATO Readiness Initiative. NATO should require that they train to NATO standards and use NATO procedures during their nationally mandated training cycle. Similarly, the readiness of these battalions should be evaluated using NATO Land Forces Commands long-standing readiness criteria. This assures that all battalions are better prepared to integrate into multinational formations once their readiness is validated. National land forces already synchronize their major training events at the annual NATO Land Forces Command Combined Training Conference. Were NATO to adopt a tactical readiness initiative for land forces, this venue could be easily adapted to integrate discussions of fully standardizing training and evaluation for battalions allocated to the NATO Readiness Initiative.

Second, NATO should establish the wartime task organization for NATO Readiness Initiative forces in peacetime in other words, before a crisis starts assigning battalions to existing multinational headquarters under the NATO Command Structure. Though divisions will be largely administrative until they are activated, the early integration of these forces provide them the time to form important relationships and address challenges to technical and procedural interoperability. This can take the form of collaborative planning events, or even combined training exercises. Many of the national land force training centers used by NATO member states benefit from advancements in live-virtual training, so even geographically dispersed battalions and NATO division headquarters can train together without expensive deployments to a shared training area. These combined events have the added benefit of serving as routine touchpoints to ensure that battalions are maintaining their readiness.

Looking Ahead

NATO should establish a clear definition of readiness for forces allocated under the NATO Readiness Initiative and adopt organizational structures that allow these units to plan and train together regularly in peacetime doing this during a crisis would be too late. In doing so, NATO can ensure that when needed, the alliance has an interoperable force capable of unified action instead of thirty individual battalions struggling to integrate into the NATO Command Structure under fire.

The alliance should also consider what needs to be added to the NATO Readiness Initiative to fully address tactical readiness in the air and maritime domains. Similarly, additional initiatives may also be required for space and cyber, and for individual warfighting functions like intelligence. NATOs many centers of excellence could be an important asset in determining the details of these domain-specific tactical readiness initiatives before disseminating these standards across national militaries.

Steadfast Defender 2021, a continent-spanning exercise scheduled for next summer featuring tens of thousands of thousands of troops deploying to several different training areas, will be a critical moment for the NATO Readiness Initiative . It will provide the alliance an opportunity to properly test its strategic readiness. But NATO should first ensure a solid foundation of tactical readiness is in place.

Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Tom Goffus put it, NATOs strategic readiness requires, two things together, on the front end is having NATO command and control capability to move the chess pieces around the board, the second is having chess pieces that are ready to be moved. The alliances efforts towards improving military mobility have largely achieved the first objective; now NATO should focus on the second. Adopting a supporting initiative to the NATO Readiness Initiative that directly address the tactical readiness of national forces is the best way to ensure that, if the time comes, NATO will have all of its pieces on the board.

Josh Campbell is an active-duty U.S. Army officer currently enrolled at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not represent the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

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Why NATO Should Adopt a Tactical Readiness Initiative - War on the Rocks

US backs France in stand-off with Turkey over warships – WION

The White House national security advisor has said the US is "very sympathetic" toward France in its dispute with Turkey over a naval standoff in the Mediterranean Sea.

The row has also, in a way, exposed NATO's struggle to keep order among its ranks, demeaning US leadership under President Donald Trump.

"NATO allies shouldn't be turning fire control radars on each other. That's not good," national security adviser Robert O'Brien told reporters in Paris on Wednesday.

"We are very sympathetic to the French concerns," O'Brien said, while acknowledging differing accounts of what happened. "We're taking it very seriously."

He added Trump was available to help defuse tensions, thanks to his personal relationships with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron.

According to French accounts of the June 10 incident, the frigate Courbet was illuminated by the targetting radar of a Turkish warship that was escorting a cargo ship.

France said it was acting on intelligence from NATO that the civilian ship could be involved in trafficking arms to Libya. The Courbet was part of the alliance's operation Sea Guardian, which helps provide maritime security in the Mediterranean.

Turkey's foreign minister accused France of lying, and Turkey's ambassador to France said the French navy was harassing the Turkish convoy.

Macron has also accused Turkey of flouting its commitments by ramping up its military presence in Libya and bringing in jihadi fighters from Syria.

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US backs France in stand-off with Turkey over warships - WION

US backs France in standoff over Turkish targeting of warships – The National

The White House national security adviser says the United States is very sympathetic to France in its dispute with Turkey over a naval standoff in the Mediterranean between the two Nato allies.

The festering row has exposed Nato's struggle to keep order among its ranks, and its diminished US leadership under President Donald Trump.

Nato allies shouldnt be turning fire control radars on each other. Thats not good, National Security Adviser Robert OBrien told reporters in Paris on Wednesday. He said Mr Trump was available to help defuse tensions, thanks to his personal relationships with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron.

According to French accounts of the June 10 incident, the frigate Courbet was illuminated by the targeting radar of a Turkish warship that was escorting a cargo ship.

France said it was acting on intelligence from Nato that the civilian ship could be involved in trafficking arms to Libya. The Courbet was part of the alliances Operation Sea Guardian, which helps provide maritime security in the Mediterranean.

Turkeys foreign minister accused France of lying, and Turkeys ambassador to France said the French navy was harassing the Turkish convoy.

We are very sympathetic to the French concerns, Mr OBrien said, while acknowledging differing accounts of what happened. Were taking it very seriously.

Mr Macron has also accused Turkey of flouting its commitments by ramping up its military presence in Libya and bringing in extremist militias from Syria.

The United States is by far the most influential of the Nato allies, but has played a less prominent role under Mr Trump, who has publicly berated European members and Canada for not spending enough on defence budgets. Mr Trump has threatened to take US troops out of Germany without consulting allies, and has pulled out of multiple international agreements that Europeans regard as important to their security.

Updated: July 16, 2020 03:27 PM

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US backs France in standoff over Turkish targeting of warships - The National

Outgoing CNA-CNE chief Adm. James Foggo calls for new NATO …

July 17 (UPI) -- NATO needs a new naval strategy to counter Russia and China, the outgoing chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa said on Friday as he relinquished command.

In a change of command ceremony in Naples, Italy, Adm. James G. Foggo handed authority to Adm. Robert P. Burke, who now commands Joint Force Command Naples, as well as U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa, the Navy said.

Foggo noted, in an interview prior to the ceremony, that global naval security has changed in the nine years since NATO formalized a sea strategy, which he said currently takes no account of "the return, or the resurgence, of the Russian submarine force."

"It misses the rise of China as a great power, it misses completely the illegal annexation of Ukraine [in 2014]," Foggo said. "That's not a criticism of NATO. That's just something that, you know, I'm making my colleagues aware of. I think we need to do a refresh."

During the ceremony, held outdoors in the courtyard of JFC Naples headquarters with observed social distancing protocols and a reduced number of guests, Foggo's 39-year career, and nine years leading the Joint Forces, was praised.

"An incredible leader," said Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite. "I've watched Adm. Foggo -- over his 39 years -- lead from the front, taking care of his sailors. He is an incredible mentor. He set the example for what it was to be a United States naval officer."

Foggo is scheduled to retire during the summer.

"You've served with great distinction for the last three years in command, just as you have throughout your outstanding career," said Gen. Tod Wolters, NATO Supreme Allied Commander.

"Under your leadership, JFC Naples and NAVEUR [U.S. Naval Forces Europe] have taken readiness, deterrence, and defense to new heights," Wolters said. "From bringing carrier operations back above the Arctic Circle, to Trident Juncture, the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War, and with ever vigilant theater anti-submarine activity, you and the men and women of this command have made entries into the history books to be highlighted for generations."

Ahead of the ceremony, Foggo also on Wednesday received the St. George Cross medal, a military honor from the Portuguese Armed Forces, in a virtual presentation.

"Our theater is the most kinetic in the world," Foggo said during the change of command.

"We face four of the five challenges listed in the U.S. National Defense Strategy -- China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremist organizations," Foggo said. "We must be ready for an era of increasing geostrategic competition. It will be vital for us to reaffirm our commitment to Allies and partners. NATO is the bedrock of European and transatlantic security."

Burke, now with two commands, is expected to be a formidable voice if NATO follows Foggo's suggestion to revamp its naval strategy.

"Maritime forces are going to be key in this era of great power Competition," said Burke in a statement on Friday.

"They can be at the right place at the right time for the right purpose, whether providing assistance, training and exercising with allies and partners, or dissuading an adversary from making a grave miscalculation on any given day," Burke said.

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Outgoing CNA-CNE chief Adm. James Foggo calls for new NATO ...

An Islamic Republic of Turkey would be a threat to NATO – The Jerusalem Post

I remember an enjoyable evening several years ago in Tel Aviv with former Turkish foreign minister Yasar Yakis and one of the 70 or so founding members of the AKP, President Recep Erdogans ruling party. Yakis, who has had a long and distinguished political career in Turkish diplomacy, described how the AKP was formed, handpicking the founders, only a small percentage of whom were observant Muslims, let alone Islamist extremists. (The AKP become the Muslim Brotherhoods flagship ruling party.) Eight years later, Yakis would openly criticize Erdogans interventions in Syria and Libya which, for all intents and purposes, are shoring up extremist Islamist forces. Earlier this year, Yakis spoke about the Turkish intervention in the Mediterranean. Addressing the European Parliament, he drew parallels between Ankaras intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically gas exploration off the coast of Cyprus, and its military intervention in Libya. Yakis described the Libyan government as being controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and militias linked to terrorist organizations. Less than four months later, a Libyan asylum-seeker in the UK killed three innocent men in the English town of Reading. It just so happens that all the victims were gay. It also happens as the Washington-based media monitoring think tank MEMRI reported that an Istanbul-based Muslim Brotherhood television channel called for the murder of homosexuals. There is no evidence showing a link between the Turkish TV channel and the Reading terrorist, but this demonstrates what sort of a country Turkey has become under Erdogan. Turkey has moved from being the secular, enlightened NATO member to being the Islamic Republic of Turkey. It is the Sunni equivalent of Iran, with identical expansionist ambitions.Erdogan has learned from both the mistakes of other Islamists in Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While founding the AKP, he also learned from the mistakes of its predecessor, the Virtue Party, which was dissolved by Turkeys Constitutional Court due to its violation of the secular constitution of Turkey. ERDOGAN CHOSE non-Islamist founding members like Yakis and others and gradually spread the Islamist tentacles in sectors of the Turkish states. He effectively neutralized the Turkish state and ultimately, via the AKP, made it a vehicle for the global Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has now subsumed the ruling party of Turkey. The expansionist Turkish policies in Libya are an implementation of the global blueprint of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, namely, to establish a pan-national Islamist caliphate. Erdogan used the traditional relations the secular Turkish state had with the West, especially with NATO, to legitimate his expansionist moves in the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Europe. While Ruhollah Khomeinis revolutionaries stormed the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, Erdogan very patiently waited, making his interests seem almost aligned with those of NATO. His intervention in Libya is a major step in which his interests and those of the West irreconcilably diverge. France has already spoken out unequivocally against Turkeys moves in Libya, and other key states in the Mediterranean including Greece, Egypt, Israel and Cyprus are uneasy about it. It is now shaping up to be a battle between two forces: an expansionist Islamist movement with cells all over the world, including Europe, and nation-states.The Turkish takeover of Libya will pose a major threat to Europe on long-term economic and security fronts. Turkey is reportedly transporting Syrian fighters to Libya, and Yakis has warned that Turkeys intervention in Libya would create a new Syria. Erdogan previously threatened to flood Europe with refugees. By turning Libya into a new Syria, the Turkish president can carry out his threat not only from Europes eastern borders, but across the Mediterranean into France, Italy and Spain, and onto the United Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe. The gradual Islamization of Turkey now poses a direct threat to the West as a whole, as well as to the moderate states of the Middle East. The West, led by NATO, needs to adopt a united stance against Turkey, which no longer is the secular, pro-Western state that Erdogan inherited. Turkey under Erdogan is the wolf, and most of Europe is still acting like Little Red Riding Hood. The writer chairs Muslims against Antisemitism, and is the founder of Cornerstone Global Associates. Twitter@gnuseibeh.

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An Islamic Republic of Turkey would be a threat to NATO - The Jerusalem Post