Nato accepts delivery of fourth remotely piloted aircraft in Italy – Airforce Technology

]]]]]]>]]]]>]]> Nato has accepted delivery of the fourth RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft at the Italian AFB in Sigonella, Italy. Credit: Falk Plankenhorn.

Sign up here for GlobalData's free bi-weekly Covid-19 report on the latest information your industry needs to know.

Natos Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) Force has received the fourth RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft at the Italian Air Force Base (AFB) in Sigonella.

After taking off from Edwards AFB in California, US, the aircraft landed at Sigonella following a 22-hour journey.

The arrival marks another step towards the completion of Nato AGS Forces fleet of five total aircraft.

The third RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft was delivered less than two weeks ago.

Nato AGS Force Commander Brigadier General Houston Cantwell said: The arrival of the fourth aircraft enhances our capabilities with greater redundancy and flexibility.

The Nato AGS Force continues our advance in becoming Natos key provider of regional indications and warning information to members of the Nato Alliance.

The AGS System was procured by the Nato AGS Management Agency (NAGSMA).

Movement of the aircraft from California to Italy was controlled by industry pilots at the AGS Forces Main Operating Base in Sigonella.

The first three aircraft were transported similarly.

Following arrival, the remotely piloted system will be handed over to the force after the NAGSMA and the Italian Airworthiness Authorities finalise the required documentation.

The Agency general manager Brigadier General Volker Samanns said: Having now four out of five Nato AGS aircraft in SIGONELLA demonstrates the commitment and ability of the AGS procuring nations and of NAGSMA to deliver the Nato AGS system while increasing our flexibility in testing the system.

It also provides the Nato AGS Force additional equipment for familiarisation and training.

See the article here:

Nato accepts delivery of fourth remotely piloted aircraft in Italy - Airforce Technology

What hurts NATO the most is not the troop reductions. It’s the divisive approach to Europe. – Atlantic Council

US President Donald Trump and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel hold a bilateral meeting at the sidelines of the NATO summit in Watford, Britain, December 4, 2019. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

11,900. That was the number European analysts had been waiting for with bated breath. On July 29, US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper confirmed that the United States would reposition 11,900 of the 36,000 military personnel stationed in Germany.

Changes in the United States force posture are always followed with heightened attention. This time, however, it is different. Coming after months of acrimonious debate about Germanys defense spending, tweets by US President Donald Trump, and mounting pressure by Congress and think tanks, the new European force posture is not just about troop numbersits a political statement, and a piece in the debate about the value of alliances.

Diving into numbers, the reduction of the US presence in Europe is not as stark as it appears. The figures are higher than many expected. However, about half of the troops pulled out of Germany (5,600) will remain stationed in Europe, albeit in different countries. Of the 6,400 soldiers going back the United States, a good part will return to the European continent on a rotational basis. Moreover, there is some amount of repackaging, such as suspending the relocation of the KC 135 squadron from the UK to Germany, which had already been postponed to 2027 anyway.

Looking at the details, the new force posture is a mixed bag. Some of the moves are not necessarily bad ideas. Shifting the 480th Fighter Squadron South to provide greater flexibility on the Southern flank and the Black Sea region makes sense. These are, after all, areas of renewed tension. Others are more questionable, such as recalling the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to the United States, which had been specifically upgunned to face armor in higher intensity settings, and replacing it with a rotation of other Stryker units.

Of course, European security is not just about the number of troops in Europe. Reactivityunderpinned by military mobilitythe ability to counter hybrid threats, or the robustness of arms control arrangements are just as important. Greater clarity on the type of units returning to the United States, the status of prepositioned stocks, or the organization of the rotations is needed to fully assess the impact of the new force posture.

Subscribe for news and events on NATO

Sign up for updates from the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative, covering the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Zooming out, the United States re-evaluating its force posture in Europe is not, by itself, an issue. It makes sense for the Pentagon to take into account the lessened operational tempo in the Middle East (though ISIS is not yet fully defeated) or the greater focus on the Asia Pacific. This logically flows, after all, from the US National Defense Strategy.

Europeans by now should have realized that they need to step up to bear a greater share of the burden of collective defensethe writing has been on the wall long enough. The reduction of the US presence on European soil is part of a long-term trend, though partly reversed in the last few years.Washingtons exhortations on burden sharing have been relatively consistent over the last two decades.

As all Combatant Commands are undergoing a review, there is a need for a deeper reflection about the architecture of burden sharing. What kind of capabilities is the United States expected to deploy abroad? Should it focus on key enablers to allow partners to carry on the fight, as is currently the case in Africa? How much can it realistically expect allies to do? Does the Pentagon favor a geographic vision of burden sharing (i.e. Europeans handle their immediate neighborhood while Washington focuses on increases its focus on Asia) or is it about allies acting together at a global level?

What hurts the Alliance the most is the divisive rhetoric embodied in the new posture. President Trump has been relatively clear that this is about punishing Germany, claiming on July 29 that were reducing the force because theyre not paying their bills. Its very simple. Most of changes in the force posture vindicate this reading: they are essentially about moving troopsor even EUCOM itselfto another European country.

Framed in such a transactionalist way, the new force posture appears less like the result of careful strategic planning and more like a political message, designed to extract concessions from a partner. Worst, the Pentagons presentationhighlighting who among Italy, Belgium, or the United Kingdom gets the spoils of the relocationsand President Trumps press conference with Polish President AndrzejDuda in June, are staging a competition among allies for the White Houses favors.

This divisive approach to Europe is what really hurts European security. At the end of the day, the strength of the Alliance lies less in the number of troops deployed than in the trust among allies. American troops matter to Europeans. Trust in the United States benevolence and willingness to be there in a crisis matters even more to their security. Rebuilding that trust should be the main task of those who care about transatlantic relationsand the first step might be restoring the predictability of American foreign policy.

Olivier-Rmy Bel is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as a European Affairs staffer to the French Minister of Defence as well as head of the EU desk at the Ministrys Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

Wed, Jun 24, 2020

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has warned that the US President Donald J. Trump administrations planned withdrawal of 9,500 American troops from her countrya move announced by the US president earlier this monthmust not send Russia the signal that the US is less interested in Europe.

New AtlanticistbyLarry Luxner

Original post:

What hurts NATO the most is not the troop reductions. It's the divisive approach to Europe. - Atlantic Council

NATO: Russia has significantly increased number of frigates and submarines in Black Sea – MENAFN.COM

(MENAFN - UkrinForm) Russia has lately significantly increased the number of its frigates and newest submarines in the Black Sea.

Commodore Jeanette Morang, Commander Surface Forces NATO made this statement on the air of Ukrainian DOM TV channel.

According to her, the Black Sea is of great value for international trade and, therefore, freedom of navigation and access to trade routes and coastal infrastructure remains an urgent need of the Black Sea countries and a necessary condition for their economic well-being. "As you probably know, about 80% of all trade operations are carried out by sea, and our goal is to ensure that every nation has a right to free access to the sea," Morang added.

At the same time, she noted, the Black Sea has its own peculiarities. "First of all, it should be mentioned that the passage of vessels is regulated by the Montreux Convention. Pursuant to the Convention, the countries lacking access to the Black Sea cannot remain in it for more than 21 consecutive days. Another feature is Russia's desire to change existing borders and rapidly build up its military presence in the region. The Russian Federation has lately significantly increased the number of its frigates and newest submarines in the Black Sea. This activity came as no surprise to the Alliance. We are convinced that it is important to strengthen our presence in the region as well," Commander Surface Forces NATO said.

She added that the Alliance stood for stability in the region and the economic well-being of the countries bordering the Black Sea. NATO is convinced that all countries of the Black Sea region share these views, Morang stressed.

ol

MENAFN3007202001930000ID1100566868

See the rest here:

NATO: Russia has significantly increased number of frigates and submarines in Black Sea - MENAFN.COM

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) | Founders, Members …

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), military alliance established by the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) of April 4, 1949, which sought to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in central and eastern Europe after World War II. Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Joining the original signatories were Greece and Turkey (1952); West Germany (1955; from 1990 as Germany); Spain (1982); the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); and Montenegro (2017). France withdrew from the integrated military command of NATO in 1966 but remained a member of the organization; it resumed its position in NATOs military command in 2009.

Britannica Quiz

World Organizations: Fact or Fiction?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization began in medieval times.

The heart of NATO is expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the signatory members agree that

an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in 2001, after the September 11 attacks organized by exiled Saudi Arabian millionaire Osama bin Laden destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City and part of the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., killing some 3,000 people.

Article 6 defines the geographic scope of the treaty as covering an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America. Other articles commit the allies to strengthening their democratic institutions, to building their collective military capability, to consulting each other, and to remaining open to inviting other European states to join.

After World War II in 1945, western Europe was economically exhausted and militarily weak (the western Allies had rapidly and drastically reduced their armies at the end of the war), and newly powerful communist parties had arisen in France and Italy. By contrast, the Soviet Union had emerged from the war with its armies dominating all the states of central and eastern Europe, and by 1948 communists under Moscows sponsorship had consolidated their control of the governments of those countries and suppressed all noncommunist political activity. What became known as the Iron Curtain, a term popularized by Winston Churchill, had descended over central and eastern Europe. Further, wartime cooperation between the western Allies and the Soviets had completely broken down. Each side was organizing its own sector of occupied Germany, so that two German states would emerge, a democratic one in the west and a communist one in the east.

In 1948 the United States launched the Marshall Plan, which infused massive amounts of economic aid to the countries of western and southern Europe on the condition that they cooperate with each other and engage in joint planning to hasten their mutual recovery. As for military recovery, under the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the United Kingdom, France, and the Low CountriesBelgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourgconcluded a collective-defense agreement called the Western European Union. It was soon recognized, however, that a more formidable alliance would be required to provide an adequate military counterweight to the Soviets.

By this time Britain, Canada, and the United States had already engaged in secret exploratory talks on security arrangements that would serve as an alternative to the United Nations (UN), which was becoming paralyzed by the rapidly emerging Cold War. In March 1948, following a virtual communist coup dtat in Czechoslovakia in February, the three governments began discussions on a multilateral collective-defense scheme that would enhance Western security and promote democratic values. These discussions were eventually joined by France, the Low Countries, and Norway and in April 1949 resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Spurred by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 (see Korean War), the United States took steps to demonstrate that it would resist any Soviet military expansion or pressures in Europe. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the leader of the Allied forces in western Europe in World War II, was named Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) by the North Atlantic Council (NATOs governing body) in December 1950. He was followed as SACEUR by a succession of American generals.

The North Atlantic Council, which was established soon after the treaty came into effect, is composed of ministerial representatives of the member states, who meet at least twice a year. At other times the council, chaired by the NATO secretary-general, remains in permanent session at the ambassadorial level. Just as the position of SACEUR has always been held by an American, the secretary-generalship has always been held by a European.

NATOs military organization encompasses a complete system of commands for possible wartime use. The Military Committee, consisting of representatives of the military chiefs of staff of the member states, subsumes two strategic commands: Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACO is headed by the SACEUR and located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Casteau, Belgium. ACT is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, U.S. During the alliances first 20 years, more than $3 billion worth of infrastructure for NATO forcesbases, airfields, pipelines, communications networks, depotswas jointly planned, financed, and built, with about one-third of the funding from the United States. NATO funding generally is not used for the procurement of military equipment, which is provided by the member statesthough the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, a fleet of radar-bearing aircraft designed to protect against a surprise low-flying attack, was funded jointly.

Originally posted here:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) | Founders, Members ...

What Is NATOs Article 5? – HISTORY

Article 5 is the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)andstates that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members. But despite its importance, NATO has only invoked Article 5 once in its historyin response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

NATO and Article 5 were established in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II when communist movements supported by the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to democratically elected governments all over a devastated Europe. In 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia overthrew that nations democratic government, while in Germany, Soviet authorities blockaded the Allied-controlled section of Berlin in an attempt to strengthen their position there.

The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. and British planes carried food, fuel and other vital supplies to the isolated citizens of West Berlin, marked an early victory for the West in the Cold War. And with the launch of the Marshall Plan, which provided economic aid to the war-ravaged countries of Europe, the United States had decisively abandoned its earlier policy of isolationism.

But at such a vulnerable time, it seemed clear that Europe required not just economic aid, but also military support, in order to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union, prevent the revival of nationalist military movements (such as Nazism) and allow for political development along democratic lines.

VIDEO: The Formation of NATO

Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in the formation of key alliances that would endure throughout the Cold War.

In April 1949, representatives from 12 nationsthe United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Iceland, Italy and Portugalgathered in Washington, D.C. to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.

Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny, President Harry S. Truman declared at the signing ceremony. They can choose slavery or freedomwar or peaceIf there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace.

The treatys key provision was Article 5, which began: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all While this commitment to collective defense lay at the heart of NATO, it was left to the judgment of each member state to decide how exactly it would contribute.

On September 12, 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, committing its members to stand by the United States in its response to the attacks. In a four-paragraph resolution that passed unanimously, the organization reflected its understanding that the threats to global security had changed radically in the 52 years since the alliance was founded.

AUDIO: NATO Offers Aid to United States Following 9/11 Attacks

On October 2, 2001, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson holds a press conference to discuss the events of September 11, and pledges support of the 18 NATO allies in the campaign against international terrorism.

The commitment to collective self-defence embodied in the Washington Treaty was entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, the statement read. But it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism.

In addition to participation in the war in Afghanistan, NATOs response to the 9/11 attacks under Article 5 included Operation Eagle Assist, in which NATO aircraft helped patrol the skies over the United States for seven months between 2001 and 2002, and Operation Active Endeavour, in which NATO naval forces were sent to perform counterterrorism activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Active Endeavour, which began in October 2001 and later expanded to the entire Mediterranean region, didnt conclude until 2016.

Though Article 5 has only been officially invoked once, NATO has taken collective defensive measures in other situations, including deploying missiles on the border of Turkey and Syria in 2012. Russias annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the rise of ISIS in recent years led the organization to implement a huge increase in its collective defenses, including tripling the size of the NATO Response Force. In 2014, NATO member states agreed to try and spend 2 percent of their GDPs on defense, although most member states fail to meet this non-binding goal.

President Trump has been highly critical of NATO, calling it obsolete and criticizing other NATO members for not spending enough on defense. But he also affirmed U.S. commitment to Article 5 in June 2017, during a news conference with the president of Romania: Im committing the United States to Article 5, and certainly we are there to protect, and certainly thats one of the reasons that I want people to make sure we have a very, very strong force by paying the kind of money necessary to have that force.

Despite this commitment, Trump appeared to question U.S. responsibility to defend the newest of NATOs 29 member states, under Article 5 during a Fox News interview in July 2018. In response to a question about whether US forces should respond if Montenegro were attacked, Trump said that the tiny nations very aggressive people might end up drawing NATOs members into a war with Russia.

See the original post here:

What Is NATOs Article 5? - HISTORY

NATO Defense Ministers Discuss Alliance’s COVID-19 Response …

NATO defense ministers have reviewed the alliance's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and agreed upon the next steps to take, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said.

Stoltenberg held a virtual news conference in Brussels today after an online meeting of alliance defense ministers. Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper attended the defense ministers meeting from his Pentagon office.

Alliance members are cooperating in reacting to the pandemic just as if an enemy had attacked a NATO member, the secretary general said. "COVID-19 represents an unprecedented challenge to our nations," he added. "It has a profound impact on our people and our economies, and it is imposing historic shocks on the international system, which could have long-term consequences."

Allied officials planned against the pandemic and looked to the lessons that can be taken from the reaction to the viral plague, Stoltenberg said. He noted that in each country, the military is playing a key role in support of civilian efforts against the pandemic. "And using NATO mechanisms, allies have been helping each other to save lives," he added.

The NATO command led by the supreme allied commander for Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters was tasked with coordinating military support among the 30 allies. The general briefed the defense ministers on the NATO response.

"Military forces from across the Alliance have flown more than 100 missions to transport medical personnel, supplies and treatment capabilities, facilitated the construction of 25 field hospitals, added more than 25,000 treatment beds and deployed over 4,000 military medical personnel in support of civilian efforts," Stoltenberg said. "Today, I encouraged all allies to make their capabilities available so General Wolters can coordinate further support."

He said the pandemic is in different stages of infection in different NATO nations. This means that effectively coordinating resources makes a real difference, he said.

The pandemic is not the only concern for the NATO leaders, as missions of deterrence and defense must continue, Stoltenberg said.

"The bottom line is that security challenges have not diminished because of COVID-19," he said. "On the contrary, potential adversaries will look to exploit the situation to further their own interests. Terrorist groups could be emboldened."

The security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq remain fragile, and Russia continues its pace and threats, Stoltenberg noted.

"We must maintain our deterrence and defense because our core mission remains the same: to ensure peace and stability," the secretary general said. "While we continue to take all the necessary measures to protect our armed forces, our operational readiness remains undiminished, and our forces remain ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat."

The alliance also is actively guarding against state and nonstate disinformation stemming from the pandemic. U.S. officials said that Russia has been using the crisis to its own ends and wants the United States to abandon NATO and weaken the alliance.

"We are countering these false narratives with facts and with concrete actions," Stoltenberg said. "We are also working even closer with allies and the European Union to identify, monitor and expose disinformation, and to respond robustly."

The defense ministers also looked at the long-term implications of the coronavirus, as the geopolitical effects of the pandemic could be significant, Stoltenberg said.

"Some may seek to use the economic downturn as an opening to invest in our critical industries and infrastructure, which in turn may affect our long-term security and our ability to deal with the next crisis when it comes," he said.

It is still early to draw conclusions from these long-term discussions, Stoltenberg said, and discussions about them will continue. The defense ministers did agree, however, on a set of recommendations to strengthen the alliance's resilience.

Alliance members will update existing baseline requirements for civil preparedness, based on the lessons from the crisis. They also pledged to work even closer with international partners, Stoltenberg said.

NATO has adapted to change throughout its history and will continue to do so, Stoltenberg said. NATO was laser-focused on countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but adapted to the change once that threat dissolved. It changed again in response to the Balkan crisis and to the attack on the United States by terrorists in 2001. It changed yet again when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and continues to wage war in eastern Ukraine.

The pandemic is another enemy, he said, and the alliance will adapt. But that doesn't mean the alliance will be the first responder for the crisis.

"We should support the civilian efforts to fight this health crisis," the secretary general said. "We see around the whole world and across all NATO allies that military personnel are playing a key role in the fight."

Military airlift has been essential in the fight against the coronavirus, and military personnel are doing everything from disinfecting public spaces to controlling border crossings. NATO is helping to mobilize and coordinate support to NATO allied countries.

The main lesson so far is "a close link between the civilian efforts to fight the health crisis and the ability of the military to support those efforts," the secretary general said. "That's exactly what we also have to look into how we can do even better when the next crisis hits us," he added.

NATO cannot change its core responsibility to defend member states, but there are good reasons to look into how to further strengthen the cooperation between the civilian society combating a health crisis and military capabilities providing support to those civilian efforts, he said.

See the rest here:

NATO Defense Ministers Discuss Alliance's COVID-19 Response ...

Nearly 12,000 US Troops To Be Pulled From Germany, Pentagon Says – NPR

Defense Secretary Mark Esper, pictured earlier this month, announced a drawdown of U.S. troops in Germany on Wednesday. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Defense Secretary Mark Esper, pictured earlier this month, announced a drawdown of U.S. troops in Germany on Wednesday.

In a slap at a longtime ally frequently reviled by President Trump, Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced Wednesday that the U.S. plans to withdraw roughly a third of the 36,000 American forces stationed in Germany.

Nearly 5,600 of the 11,800 troops to be removed from Germany would be sent to other NATO allies in Europe, including Poland. Another 6,400 would return to the U.S., although they or similar units would be redeployed to other European countries on what Esper described as a "rotational" basis.

"Our aim is to implement these moves as expeditiously as possible," Esper told reporters at the Pentagon. "We could see some moves begin within weeks; others will take longer."

The Pentagon chief cast the decision to cut U.S. forces in Germany as the result of a months-long review of American deployments in Europe aimed at bolstering defense.

"These changes will achieve the core principles of enhancing U.S. and NATO deterrence of Russia, strengthening NATO, reassuring allies and improving U.S. strategic flexibility," Esper said, even as he made clear that the repositioning of U.S. forces remains tentative. "I want to note that this plan is subject to and likely will change to some degree as it evolves over time."

Trump, for his part, has characterized the troop drawdown as a reprisal for what the American president considers to be a refusal by Germany to spend a greater share of its gross domestic product on defense.

In 2014, members of NATO agreed to increase their defense spending to at least 2% of their GDP by 2024. Germany last year spent $49.3 billion on defense, or 1.38% of its GDP, according to German state broadcaster DW.

"Germany's delinquent. They haven't paid their fees, they haven't paid their NATO fees," Trump told Wednesday reporters outside the White House, even though no such "fees" exist for members of NATO. "Germany owes billions and billions of dollars to NATO. And why would we keep all of those troops there?"

Asked at the Pentagon whether the troop reduction was Trump "basically sticking it to Germany," Esper said the president had simply "accelerated" the decision to draw down forces there.

"Let's be clear. I think Germany is the wealthiest country in Europe. Germany can and should pay more to its defense," Esper said. "It should certainly meet the 2% standard, and I would argue go above and beyond that."

Reaction to the move has been decidedly mixed.

After a briefing last week by Pentagon officials on the force drawdown, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee praised the decision.

"I believe the concept for realigning U.S. military posture in Europe, as the President has approved, is sound," said Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., despite noting that any changes may be slow in coming. "It is clear to me that this concept will take months to plan, and years to execute."

But another Senate Republican slammed the decision to cut troops in Germany as "weak."

"U.S. troops aren't stationed around the world as traffic cops or welfare caseworkers they're restraining the expansionary aims of the world's worst regimes, chiefly China and Russia," Sen. Ben Sasse, R-Neb., a member of the upper chamber's intelligence committee, said in a statement. "The President's lack of strategic understanding of this issue increases our response time and hinders the important deterrent work our servicemen and women are doing. Maintaining forward presence is cheaper for our taxpayers and safer for our troops."

In an interview Wednesday on NPR's Here & Now, Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., called the move to cut U.S. forces in Germany "terrible."

"It undermines the credibility of the NATO alliance, it calls into question our commitment to our NATO allies," Van Hollen said. "This is exactly the kind of thing that will cause Vladimir Putin to pop his champagne or vodka bottles in Moscow."

Twenty-two of the of the House Armed Services Committee's 26 Republican members wrote Trump in June warning against the proposed troop cuts.

"The forward stationing of American troops since the end of World War II has helped to prevent another world war and, most importantly, has helped make America safer," the GOP lawmakers wrote in a letter signed by the panel's ranking member, Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas. "In Europe, the threats posed by Russia have not lessened, and we believe that signs of a weakened U.S. commitment to NATO will encourage further Russian aggression and opportunism."

Among the moves Esper said are being planned:

A former commander of the U.S. European Command blasted those moves in a series of tweets Wednesday.

"What is obvious to me having served 12 years in Germany and having participated in the last force structure change from 2004-2011, this is not a 'strategic' move," retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling wrote on Twitter. "It is specifically a directed personal insult from Trump to our great & very supportive ally Germany."

Hanging over Wednesday's announcement is the presidential election in November and the time it would take to implement the changes.

Given the extended timeline for troop repositioning in Europe that Esper estimates would cost several billion dollars, it's not clear whether any of it will happen before Trump's first term as president ends in January.

Continued here:

Nearly 12,000 US Troops To Be Pulled From Germany, Pentagon Says - NPR

The U.S. should value NATO now more than ever | Opinion | – The Philadelphia Inquirer

President Trump continues to attack our allies and cozy up to dictators, which impacts all of us. He has attacked Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Yet, he has praised dictators such as Putin, Duterte, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Erdogan. Due to these actions, our allies are losing faith. The backlash is evident in situations like our European allies resisting American request to reject technology from the Chinese company Huawei in 5G networks. In an interview, the retiring French Ambassador to the United States said, The current president doesnt care about the West. He is a nationalist. He is America alone. This is not what we want for our country. It is our allies and alliances like NATO that deter mutual security threats ranging from Russian expansion to global terrorism. We cant and shouldnt go it alone as Trump urges.

Go here to see the original:

The U.S. should value NATO now more than ever | Opinion | - The Philadelphia Inquirer

Will NATO still be relevant in the future? – Atlantic Council

NATO flag flutters during the celebration of the 15th anniversary of Lithuania's membership in NATO in Vilnius, Lithuania March 30, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

As NATO faces increasing criticismincluding from US President Donald Trumpthat the military alliance is a drain on American taxpayers and no longer serves Washingtons defense needs, two former US ambassadors have come to its defense.

On July 21, John Herbst, director of the Atlantic Councils Eurasia Center, and Alexander Vershbow, a distinguished fellow at the Councils Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, made the case for NATOs continued relevance in the face of Russian belligerence led by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Yet China, not Russia, is the real threat today, argued John Mearsheimer, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, and Dr. Sara Moller, an assistant professor of international security at Seton Hall University in New Jersey.

The four took part in a one-hour virtual debateIs NATO still relevant?that was moderated by Dr. Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute.

Absolutely it is, said Vershbow, a former US envoy to Russia and South Korea who also served four years as NATOs deputy secretary general in Brussels.

NATO remains essential to deter Russian aggression, which is a real threat. Its also a standing coalition of like-minded democracies that the United States can still call upon to defend shared interests and project stability beyond NATOs borders, he said.

Herbst, who was US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006, noted that Europe has enjoyed seventy-five years of peace and unprecedented prosperity thanks to the strong transatlantic relationship.

Foreign policy is more effective, more realistic, and less risky when you have allies, and NATO is the premier alliance, he said, adding that not since the 1956 Suez crisiswhen Washington opposed the joint British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt following that countrys nationalization of the Suez Canalhave internal disputes been that dramatic. You also had major ally differences with the deployment of Pershings in the 1980s. Despite that, NATO was essential to defeat the Soviet Union, and NATO is essential today.

Herbst added: China is the big problem, but Russia remains a major threat. Putins activities are truly destabilizing; the fact is that he launched a war in Europethe first time since World War II. We need him to stop, and NATO is the way to do it.

Mearsheimer, however, argued that Putin, aggressive as he may be, is not Washingtons biggest headache at the moment.

It boils down to whether or not the United States should remain militarily committed to NATO, whether we should keep large-scale military forces in Europe, said Mearsheimer. My answer to that is no.

The professor, who has published six books on international affairs, said the Pentagons chief priority right now is containing China.

Three areas of the world matter strategically to the United States: Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. For the United States, the key question is whether or not theres a potential hegemon in one of those regions, Mearsheimer said. One of the reasons we stayed in Europe during the Cold War was because the Soviet threat was concentrated in Europe. The fact is, there is no regional hegemon in Europe todayor on the horizon, and indeed there is a regional hegemon: China. That means the US should concentrate all its military might in East Asia. That is what really matters. Europe does not matter very much at all.

Mearsheimer further argued that the US and its alliesand specifically NATOcreated the Russian threat in the first place, and that NATO, which was formed in 1949, has pushed Russia into the arms of the Chinese.

In November 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron told The Economist that NATO was effectively brain dead due to Trumps frequent complaints that many members were not spending at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.

Subscribe for the latest on NATO

Sign up for updates from the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative, covering the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

In fact, all NATO membersincluding Germany, Europes most populous nationbegan increasing their defense budgets following Putins 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Even so, Moller, whos written extensively on NATO, the Middle East, and nuclear weapons, said the thirty-member alliance could soon become irrelevant because it lacks strategic focus.

A club whose members cant agree on the purpose of the club [is] a club that is in trouble, she said. During the Cold War, it had a very clear and defined purpose: it was to deter and defend against the Soviet Union. Since the 1990s, NATO has been engaged in never-ending transformations. The result has been mission creep; it gets into the peacekeeping business, the counterterrorism nation-building business, security sector reform, counterpiracy, fighting illegal immigration. The result is that members want and expect different things from NATO. They no longer see eye to eye.

For example, she said, NATO member Turkey is purchasing advanced weapons systems from Russia while the French government is exploring rapprochement with Moscow.

This lack of consensus jeopardizes its future relevancy, Moller said, adding that the strategic deficit NATO faces today predates President Trump and his administration, so its a mistake to assume that come January 2021 if theres a change in occupancy in the White House, that NATO can just go back to business as usual. I dont see that happening.

Vershbow called for a new transatlantic bargain on burden-sharing, in which by 2030, Europe would pay for 50 percent of the critical capabilities now provided mainly by Washington.

This would equip them to handle most crises without US support, and allow us to shift more of our assets from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, he said.

Yet Mearsheimer quickly dismissed that idea.

Were not going to get any military assistance from our NATO allies in containing China. Its going to be done by our Asian allies and the United States, he said. The Europeans dont spend enough money on defense, and they have remarkably little power projection capabilities.

Mearsheimer added: I dont dislike NATO, but we live in a completely different world. For most of my life, Europe was the most important area of the world. Thats no longer the case. The distribution of power has changed. Asia is the area that really matters the most to the United States today. The question is, what can Europe do [about China]? What can NATO do? My argument is it can do hardly anything. We have to wake up and smell the coffee.

But Vershbow insisted that NATO gives the United States something that its adversaries lack: a team of ready-made partners. Having allies and institutions like NATO gives us an extraordinary advantage over Russia, China, and other adversaries, he said. There are often disagreements between the members, he conceded, and keeping the allies together is a 24/7 job, but allies usually find a way to resolve their differences, because alliance unity is too important to put at risk.

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa and Latin America.Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Mon, Jun 8, 2020

On June 8, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg laid out his plans for a new period of reflection on the Alliances mission and structure over the next ten years. At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated certain security threats to member states, including unabated Russian military activity, the spread of disinformation and propaganda, and the disruptive ascendance of China, NATO must stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach globally, he stated.

New AtlanticistbyDavid A. Wemer

Read the original post:

Will NATO still be relevant in the future? - Atlantic Council

NATO Defense Ministers Discuss Alliance’s COVID-19 …

NATO defense ministers have reviewed the alliance's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and agreed upon the next steps to take, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said.

Stoltenberg held a virtual news conference in Brussels today after an online meeting of alliance defense ministers. Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper attended the defense ministers meeting from his Pentagon office.

Alliance members are cooperating in reacting to the pandemic just as if an enemy had attacked a NATO member, the secretary general said. "COVID-19 represents an unprecedented challenge to our nations," he added. "It has a profound impact on our people and our economies, and it is imposing historic shocks on the international system, which could have long-term consequences."

Allied officials planned against the pandemic and looked to the lessons that can be taken from the reaction to the viral plague, Stoltenberg said. He noted that in each country, the military is playing a key role in support of civilian efforts against the pandemic. "And using NATO mechanisms, allies have been helping each other to save lives," he added.

The NATO command led by the supreme allied commander for Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters was tasked with coordinating military support among the 30 allies. The general briefed the defense ministers on the NATO response.

"Military forces from across the Alliance have flown more than 100 missions to transport medical personnel, supplies and treatment capabilities, facilitated the construction of 25 field hospitals, added more than 25,000 treatment beds and deployed over 4,000 military medical personnel in support of civilian efforts," Stoltenberg said. "Today, I encouraged all allies to make their capabilities available so General Wolters can coordinate further support."

He said the pandemic is in different stages of infection in different NATO nations. This means that effectively coordinating resources makes a real difference, he said.

The pandemic is not the only concern for the NATO leaders, as missions of deterrence and defense must continue, Stoltenberg said.

"The bottom line is that security challenges have not diminished because of COVID-19," he said. "On the contrary, potential adversaries will look to exploit the situation to further their own interests. Terrorist groups could be emboldened."

The security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq remain fragile, and Russia continues its pace and threats, Stoltenberg noted.

"We must maintain our deterrence and defense because our core mission remains the same: to ensure peace and stability," the secretary general said. "While we continue to take all the necessary measures to protect our armed forces, our operational readiness remains undiminished, and our forces remain ready, vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat."

The alliance also is actively guarding against state and nonstate disinformation stemming from the pandemic. U.S. officials said that Russia has been using the crisis to its own ends and wants the United States to abandon NATO and weaken the alliance.

"We are countering these false narratives with facts and with concrete actions," Stoltenberg said. "We are also working even closer with allies and the European Union to identify, monitor and expose disinformation, and to respond robustly."

The defense ministers also looked at the long-term implications of the coronavirus, as the geopolitical effects of the pandemic could be significant, Stoltenberg said.

"Some may seek to use the economic downturn as an opening to invest in our critical industries and infrastructure, which in turn may affect our long-term security and our ability to deal with the next crisis when it comes," he said.

It is still early to draw conclusions from these long-term discussions, Stoltenberg said, and discussions about them will continue. The defense ministers did agree, however, on a set of recommendations to strengthen the alliance's resilience.

Alliance members will update existing baseline requirements for civil preparedness, based on the lessons from the crisis. They also pledged to work even closer with international partners, Stoltenberg said.

NATO has adapted to change throughout its history and will continue to do so, Stoltenberg said. NATO was laser-focused on countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but adapted to the change once that threat dissolved. It changed again in response to the Balkan crisis and to the attack on the United States by terrorists in 2001. It changed yet again when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and continues to wage war in eastern Ukraine.

The pandemic is another enemy, he said, and the alliance will adapt. But that doesn't mean the alliance will be the first responder for the crisis.

"We should support the civilian efforts to fight this health crisis," the secretary general said. "We see around the whole world and across all NATO allies that military personnel are playing a key role in the fight."

Military airlift has been essential in the fight against the coronavirus, and military personnel are doing everything from disinfecting public spaces to controlling border crossings. NATO is helping to mobilize and coordinate support to NATO allied countries.

The main lesson so far is "a close link between the civilian efforts to fight the health crisis and the ability of the military to support those efforts," the secretary general said. "That's exactly what we also have to look into how we can do even better when the next crisis hits us," he added.

NATO cannot change its core responsibility to defend member states, but there are good reasons to look into how to further strengthen the cooperation between the civilian society combating a health crisis and military capabilities providing support to those civilian efforts, he said.

Continued here:

NATO Defense Ministers Discuss Alliance's COVID-19 ...

U.S. To Move Troops From Germany, In Shift That Esper Says Will Strengthen NATO Against Russia – Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty

WASHINGTON -- The United States will move almost 12,000 troops out of Germany, relocating some of them to Belgium and Italy, in a strategic shift the Pentagon says will help deter Russia.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on July 29 that the repositioning will strengthen NATO, enhance deterrence against Russia, and improve U.S. strategic and operational flexibility.

Of the 34,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in Germany, some 6,400 will be sent home, while nearly 5,600 will be repositioned to other NATO countries.

U.S. President Donald Trump in June announced plans to accelerate a repositioning of troops from Germany, a longtime hub for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.

The decision came as Trump repeatedly criticized Europes richest country for failing to meet its NATO commitment to spend 2 percent of economic output on defense.

Trumps announcement came as a surprise to the German government, suggesting there was a lack of coordination with a key NATO ally.

Esper said the scattered U.S. troop presence in Germany will be consolidated at other locations in Europe, including at NATO bases in Belgium and Italy.

Repositioning air assets to Italy will move them closer to the Black Sea region, while moving U.S. command structures to Belgium will help improve coordination with the NATO command, Esper said.

The troop relocation out of Germany is tied to an agreement announced last year to move more than 1,000 U.S. troops to Poland.

Esper said some troops could also go to the Baltic states.

We are moving forces out of Central Europe, Germany, where they had been since the Cold War. We are following in many ways the boundary east, where our newest allies are in the Black Sea region, Poland, and the Baltics, Esper said, addressing larger questions of strategy.

Even as about 6,400 troops will return to the United States, Esper said these units or similar ones will conduct continuous rotational deployments in Europe in the Black Sea region to enhance deterrence and reassure allies along NATOs southeastern flank.

Esper did not provide a timeline for the troop repositioning but said some changes could happen within weeks, while others will take more time.

There has been some resistance in the U.S. Congress against any troop withdrawals from Germany, even from some Republicans who say the move would be a gift to Russia and a threat to U.S. national security.

Its also unclear whether the Trump administrations plan will survive if the president is not reelected in November.

Earlier this month, the premiers of four German states housing U.S. bases urged members of Congress to block the withdrawal plans. The letter said that U.S. forces in Germany -- with their bases, military hospitals, and other infrastructure -- form "the backbone of the U.S. presence in Europe and NATO's ability to act."

Here is the original post:

U.S. To Move Troops From Germany, In Shift That Esper Says Will Strengthen NATO Against Russia - Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty

Why U.S. Engagement in Libya Is Critical for Strengthening NATO – The National Interest

A French naval vessel enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya was nearly involved in a skirmish with the Turkish navy on June 10. The French frigate Courbet sought to pull over a cargo vessel it suspected of smuggling arms into Libya; Paris claims that Turkish ships then targeted the Courbet with their weapon systems. Though both Turkey and France are NATO members, they exchanged heated criticism over the incident, highlighting how the fight for the future of Libya has strained the seventy-one-year-old alliance. It is unlikely that any NATO member other than the United States can correct this dangerous coursean effort that will require pushback against the ambitions of individual NATO members, particularly Turkey.

Ironically, NATO leaders once lauded the 2011 UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya as a demonstration of the alliances new role in the postCold War era. Then-Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen praised the operation as offering a template for future NATO missions, while U.S. Admiral James G. Stavridis, then serving as NATOs top commander, opined that the intervention in Libya demonstrated that the alliance remains an essential source of stability. Things quickly soured after 2011, however, and Libya, once a potentially unifying and reaffirming chapter for NATO, now threatens to tear it apart.

From the fall of Muammar el-Qaddafi onwards, Libya devolved into a civil war, and the country is now torn between the opposing forces of the UN-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli and General Khalifa Haftars self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya. The proxy nature of the conflict makes it even more complicated. Russia, Egypt, and the UAE back the LNA, while Qatar bankrolls the GNA as Turkey provides significant military support. The role of Turkey does not enjoy NATO sponsorship and is further complicated by Frances subtle backing of Haftar, which plays out through diplomatic support for the LNA while calling for a cease-fire in a bid to remain relevant in the region. Italy, meanwhile, a critical NATO player in the Mediterranean region, has taken the diplomatic side of Turkey and the GNA.

Absent from the discussion of Libyas future is the United States, which might explain the divisions within NATO. Just as NATO intervened in Libya at the behest of Washington, it is unlikely that the quagmire of alliances and rivalries can be fixed without Washingtons help.

The United States absence in Libya means that NATO members not only lack unity but quarrel with each other. France had particularly scathing words for Turkey following the Courbet incident in June. Although the incident passed without any fighting, France commented that it cant pretend there isnt a Turkey problem at NATO, and opted to suspend its critical role in enforcing the arms embargo on Libya.

The French are correct, even if their actions are not above criticism: Turkey is the greatest obstacle to restoring NATO unity on Libya. Recep Tayipp Erdogans support for the GNA stems mainly from his increasingly militant and Islamist foreign policy and his rivalry with Egypt, not any interest in promoting democracy. Rather than calm the situation, Ankaras conduct in Libya has caused a dramatic increase in drone warfare alongside the export of Syrian Islamist troops to Libya, some of whom are child soldiers.

If the United States is to use its influence to unify NATO around a common purpose in Libya, then it will require curtailing Ankaras efforts to call the shots. Erdogans democracy-busting actions at home should give pause to any observer when considering what kind of country he seeks to turn Libya into. Instead of granting Erdogan relative impunity for his misconduct as it has in Syria and Iraq, Washington and NATO must demand that Turkey conform to the values of the trans-Atlantic alliance before it gets more involved in Libya.

In addition to advocating for a unified NATO policy, Washington should also use its influence to sponsor a peace settlement in Libya. Aided by Americas unwillingness to get more involved in Libya, Ankara and Moscow have sidelined Washington and its Western allies and tried to broker Libyas future on their own terms. If Washington were to put its weight behind a peace settlement in Libya, then it could reaffirm its prowess in the diplomatic sphere and unify NATO around a single vision for the war-torn nation.

The inability of NATO members to find common ground in Libya is having ramifications that are only now being understood. The French retreat from the United Nations mission off of Libyas shores, known as Operation Sea Guardian, will diminish maritime security in the Mediterranean region. Meanwhile, Turkey is blocking the implementation of a critical Baltic defense project that it had already agreed to support last year. The project is a key element of NATOs strategy for countering Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Ankaras conduct not only risks alienating NATO members in Eastern Europe but also potentially threatens their security.

Should the Libya problem continue to go unresolved, there is no telling how much damage it will cause to the trans-Atlantic alliance. Washington must make its presence felt. Libya may be tearing NATO apart, but it also offers the alliance a chance to once again renew its purpose.

Philip Kowalski is a foreign affairs analyst based in Washington, DC. He currently works at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and has written essays on international affairs for the Washington Kurdish Institute, OZY and the Middle East Institute, where he was a research assistant in 2019. He completed his MA at the University of Londons School of Oriental and African Studies, with a thesis on Reurbanization in Post-Genocide Southeastern Turkey (19251940). Prior to attending graduate school, Philip lived in Turkey between 2012 and 2016. He holds a BA in History from the University of Cincinnati.

Image: Reuters

Originally posted here:

Why U.S. Engagement in Libya Is Critical for Strengthening NATO - The National Interest

U.S. Plans to Withdraw About 12,000 Troops From Germany – Bloomberg

Photographer: Christof Stache/AFP via Getty Images

Photographer: Christof Stache/AFP via Getty Images

The U.S. announced plans to withdraw about 12,000 troops from Germany, a shift that Defense Secretary Mark Esper said would bolster NATO and deter Russia but President Donald Trump signaled was largely about punishing Germany as a defense deadbeat.

Esper said Wednesday that about 5,600 troops would be redeployed to other nations in Europe, including Italy and Belgium, while 6,400 would return to the U.S. Even as Esper was pitching the strategic benefits of the shift at the Pentagon, Trump was at the White House undercutting the militarys case.

Theyve taken advantage of us for many years, Trump, who has frequently complained about German defense spending, told reporters. We dont want to be the suckers anymore.

Trump has long said Germany and other partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should quickly ramp up efforts to meet the alliances goal that all members spend at least 2% of gross domestic product on defense. Now, as Trump faces a tough re-election battle, the drawdown lets him begin fulfilling a 2016 campaign promise to bring American troops home, though it risks further rupturing a NATO alliance already frayed by the presidents America First policies.

A U.S. official said the process, which would leave about 24,000 forces in Germany, would probably take years.

Why NATO, at 70, Is Facing More Doubt and Criticism: QuickTake

Part of the shift will involve moving forces to Italy, Belgium and other nations, while some troops returning to the U.S. will still do rotations in Germany, Esper said.

Various United States headquarters will be consolidated in locations in Europe, outside of Germany, including in some cases co-locating at the same locations as their NATO counterparts in Belgium and Italy, Esper said. Other forces will do continuous rotations in the Black Sea region.

General Tod Wolters, commander of U.S. forces in Europe and NATOs supreme allied commander, said the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany, was among the operations likely to move elsewhere. About 1,500 personnel are based there.

Pressed about Trumps focus on political digs at Germany over the strategic benefits of the plan, Esper acknowledged the move reflects the presidents demands that some troops return to the U.S. But he also said he agrees that Germany could spend more than the 2% of GDP target for defense spending established by NATO.

Lets be clear, I think Germany is the wealthiest country in Europe, Esper said. Germany can and should pay more to its defense.

European allies, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, were stunned earlier this year by Trumps decision to proceed with a troop withdrawal without prior consultations. On Wednesday, Air Force General John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured reporters that consultations will take place as the withdrawal goes forward.

We are now at another one of those inflection points in NATOs history, Esper said. Im confident the alliance will be all the better and stronger for it.

With assistance by Chad Thomas, and Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou

(Updates with comments from Trump and Esper throughout)

Before it's here, it's on the Bloomberg Terminal.

Visit link:

U.S. Plans to Withdraw About 12,000 Troops From Germany - Bloomberg

Peering through the fog: The liberal international order in the real world – Atlantic Council

Lithuanian Military Academy students hold NATO membership states flags during the celebration of the 15th anniversary of Lithuania's membership in NATO in Vilnius, Lithuania March 30, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

The liberal world order can be a pretty easy target to slam, and Professor Patrick Porters piece in War on the Rocks does a colorful job depicting its shortcomings. But his skewering portrait, useful as a cautionary tale, doesnt show the way to a better alternative.

The phrase liberal world order functions more or less as a stand-in for the US-led system that emerged after World War II: a security system based on NATO in Europe and a set of US-led alliances in Asia; the European Union, which ended European nationalist rivalry (a union which, US President Donald J. Trumps claims notwithstanding, the United States supported from the beginning); multilateral institutions that created rules to support trade, finance, and development; and an elastic system that allowed for the rise of new powers after 1945: Germany, Japan, South Korea, and in principle, Mexico, Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and others. After 1989, the liberal system grew to embrace the newly self-liberated countries of Central Europe and offered post-Soviet Russia and rapidly-reforming China places in the system, though with mixed success.

The above description does nothing to convey the sense of confusion, improvisation, and anxiety that characterized the liberal world order even in its best years. The Good Old Days, much pined for today, seldom seemed that way at the time. Porters critique fairly points out the failures of the US-led system over the years; multiple examples of US hypocrisy as its steward (e.g. sometimes supporting dictatorships or holding itself exempt from its own rules); and US blunders, usually in the form of ill-considered military interventionsthe Iraq and Vietnam Wars come easily to mind.

Porter makes two deeper critiques: first, that the liberal order is inherently expansionist, seeking to impose its values on the world and causing endless tensions; and second, that the liberal order is so amorphous it actually has no real meaning other than as scaffolding for US arrogance and imposition of the countrys self-anointed role as world savior. He calls it fog. Porters strongest argument is his warning against hubris. Indeed, being realistic about obstacles, ones own assets, and the sheer complex nature of any problem you set out to fix, is a critical and needed piece of advice for the United States.

Porters argument loses strength, however, when he starts outlining his alternative, which goes beyond tactical realism to what I term doctrinal Realism, by which I mean a foreign policy view that national interests are defined as devoid of values while pursuit of values is dismissed as cant, cover, or simply unsustainable naivety. Tactical realism has its virtues, e.g., patience, and some of Porters suggestions have merittactical restraint, arms control, diplomatic openings to ones adversaries (he mentions Nixons opening to China), learning to live with some disorder, and other wise suggestions. But Porter also slips in some of doctrinal Realisms worst ideas, such as when he praises the United States for tacitly acknowledging the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

Hes right that the United States did exactly that, especially under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. But it doesnt look good in retrospect. What was realistic about assuming the Iron Curtain was forever and that a miserable system of tyranny and economic failure could be imposed forever upon 100 million unwilling Europeans? Realists at the time, Porters policy forebears, argued that US support for Polands Solidarity movement was futile and destabilizing and that Ronald Reagan was a warmongering simpleton for his talk of communisms ultimate failure. But the Iron Curtain fell, pulled down as US-supported democratic movements gained power in Central Europe. Freedom and prosperity expanded in Europeshock therapy economic reforms, that Porter criticizes, worked out well in Poland and the Baltic States. The Cold War ended on freedoms terms and, although Porter objects to NATOs enlargement, presumably because it violated the Kremlins sphere of influence that he oddly embraces, the twin enlargements of NATO and the EU helped create the most united, peaceful, and prosperous Europe in history.

Porter suggests that the liberal world order is inherently expansionist. But perhaps the rule of law, democracy, and freedom has an attractive power of its own, an inherent appeal. In that case, it is the Realists preferred system of spheres of influence that is actually unstable: tyrannies, like Vladimir Putins Russia and possibly Xi Jinpings China, exercise repression at home and in their spheres either because they cant deliver for their people or are made insecure by the example of democracy too close to home. And, partly for the same reason, they will always push to expand their spheres.

Yes, the United States was inconsistent and hypocritical in its years leading the free world. And, yes, the more extravagant promises of the liberal world order, e.g. to usher in Immanuel Kants era of perpetual peace between republics, fall apart when set against the messy realities of the real world.

But does realitys messiness mean that the post-1945 international systemthe liberal world order that the United States ledwas meaningless? Was it nothing more than fog and cant, as Porter and many others charge? Lets peer through the fog. Lets instead compare the liberal world order not against the purity of its adherents most extravagant claims or against its critics abstract standards of unattainable perfection, but against the track record of its recent competition, Soviet Communism; the previous competitor of fascism; or against the pre-1914 system of imperialist balance of power. The liberal order gave the world generations of general great power peace and unprecedented prosperity. Stack that against the first half of the twentieth century.

Lets set the liberal world order, for all its faults, against its current challenger: neo-nationalism and might-makes-right, which appear to be the ultimate argument of this generations set of authoritarian challengers: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and others including, in some sense, Trump himself.

Restoring some imagined Golden Age is not the issue. The issue is whether the liberal world order can be fixed and reengineered to meet todays challenges. Thats akin to Roosevelts challenge of reengineering US capitalism from the pits of the Great Depression: its no fun, and well be hit as we try from left and right. But wed better get started.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration.Follow him on Twitter @AmbDanFried.

Tue, Jun 9, 2020

Many in the region expected the 100th anniversary of Trianon to be a blow up. It could be yet. But around the actual anniversary, it was a dog that did not bark: the significance was in what wasnt said, in nationalist pandering avoided and confrontation dodged, and positive gestures recognized.

New AtlanticistbyDaniel Fried

Tue, May 5, 2020

The United States needs to lead in devising both immediate and systemic responses to the coronavirus challenge, but not alone. Leadership means neither diktat nor incantation of old formulas. It means using American convening power to adapt tested principles to new challenges, crystalizing friends and alliestransatlantic, transpacific and not forgetting hemisphericaround a common agenda.

New AtlanticistbyAna Palacio and Daniel Fried

Fri, Feb 7, 2020

One lesson is that core values may have more viability than it seems, especially in the long term: for two generations after 1945, foreign policy professionals and scholars concluded that Roosevelts weak defense of Poland at and immediately after Yalta was pointless (or cynical) and that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were inapplicable east of the Iron Curtain. Soviet domination there, it was implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) accepted, was forever. But it turned out otherwise. The Yalta Conference failed but Yalta Europe was not forever. The strategic vision that Roosevelt spelled out in the Atlantic Charter and sought to realize at Yaltaeven if miserablynow seems the right one.

New AtlanticistbyDaniel Fried

Read more:

Peering through the fog: The liberal international order in the real world - Atlantic Council

Garevi Participates in UN’s Dialog for the Future | The Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies – BU Today

July 28, 2020

AmbassadorVeskoGarevi,Professor of the Practice of International Relations at theFrederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, participated in the second part of the Balkans regional United Nations (UN) program Dialogue for the Future (DFF).

On June 16, Garevi delivered a lecture about multilateralism in global affairs. The discussion revolved around the argument that the state-centric international system can not successfully address human-centric challenges, such as a pandemic or climate change. Garevi argued that global collaboration should go beyond common narratives about what worldwide threats are and should include mutually supportive and coordinated policies aimed at mitigating the consequences of any similar adversity.

On July 28, Garevi took part in a panel with Sinisa Vukovic, Lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, on the coronavirus infodemic. Infodemic refers to misinformation that has spread faster and more easily than the virus itself. Garevi and Vukovics remarks focused on the rapid and massive spread of disinformation surrounding COID-19, fake news, and the creation of the so-called post-truth societies.

DFF aims to create more space for constructive dialogue between various communities, between citizens and their highest elected leaders, thus promoting peaceful coexistence, increased trust, and genuine respect for diversity. Its goals include dialogue and collaborative action around jointly identified priorities, the emancipation of adolescents and youth for constructive engagement and leadership, nurturing inter-cultural dialogue; strengthening objective media reporting, empowering young girls and women for greater social activism. This peacebuilding initiative was launched in 2014 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During his diplomatic career, AmbassadorVeskoGarevidealt with issues pertinent to European security and NATO for almost 14 years. In 2004, he was posted in Vienna to serve as Ambassador to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He had been a Montenegros Ambassador to NATO from 2010 until 2014 and served as a Montenegros National Coordinator for NATO from 2015 until he joined the faculty at the Pardee School. Learn more about himhere.

Posted 12 hours ago on Tuesday, July 28th, 2020 Permalink

Continue reading here:

Garevi Participates in UN's Dialog for the Future | The Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies - BU Today

Russia and NATO are increasing their military activity in the Arctic – Business Insider – Business Insider

Russian and NATO forces have ramped up their activity in the Arctic, seeking to bolster their presence in a region set to grow as a venue for "great power competition" as receding ice and rising temperatures make it more accessible.

But increasing military activity by each side has worried the other. While the potential for conflict in the Arctic is considered low, the risk remains that a crisis elsewhere could spill over into conflict there, and both sides are making sure they can fight in harsh Arctic conditions.

Much of the recent activity has been in the European Arctic, where Russia and NATO members are in close proximity.

British navy frigate HMS Kent; US Navy guided-missile destroyers USS Roosevelt, USS Porter, USS Donald Cook; and supply ship USNS Supply in the Arctic Ocean, May 5, 2020. Royal Navy/LPhot Dan Rosenbaum

Exercise Trident Juncture in late 2018 saw a US aircraft carrier above the Arctic Circle for the first time since the 1990s, and US Navy ships have traveled into the high north several times since then most recently in May, when Navy surface ships sailed into the Barents Sea for the first time in over 30 years.

That exercise was "a show-and-tell game aimed at demonstrating credibility of access and operation in a potentially contested environment, as well as improving maritime domain awareness," Mathieu Boulegue, a research fellow at the UK's Chatham House think tank, said in late June.

Russia called the exercise "provocative" and held its own live-fire exercise days later, but overall its response was "tepid," Boulegue said, adding that Moscow may feel validated that "after years of remilitarizing the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the perceived threat of NATO and US deployments is 'finally' coming true."

US bombers have also ventured into the high north several times in late 2019 and continuedto do so during the first half of 2020, often exercising with NATO allies.

"The Arctic remains a key area for us to continue to best understand how we will operate up there, and key to me for that is how we operate with our partners," Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, commander of US Air Forces in Europe, told Insider during a Defense Writers Group event in June.

US airmen conduct a landing zone survey at Jan Mayen Airfield, Norway, November 19, 2019. US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Kyle Yeager

US airmen traveled to an island in the Norwegian Sea in late 2019 to see if military transport aircraft could land there, causing immediate alarm in Russia. Harrigian said it was "crystal clear" that US partners have the best understanding of the Arctic, "so our reliance on them, and the interaction, as demonstrated by our visit up there to learn from our partners, is really going to be key to our success."

Russia has deployed sophisticated defensive weaponry around the European Arctic, part of its defense of the "bastion" where it would want to deny access to opponents in a conflict. Russia's powerful Northern Fleet, based on the nearby Kola Peninsula, has also increased its operational tempo and range at sea and in the air.

Russia's Ocean Shield exercise in late 2019 saw 70 warships take part in drills across the Arctic and northern Europe, and Northern Fleet aircraft have also flown farther south than usual several times already this year, including a flight all the way to the Bay of Biscay, off the coast of France.

Those flights are a message, according to Tobias Ellwood, chair of the defense select committee in the British House of Commons.

Russian fighter aircraft during training in the Arctic. Russian Ministry of Defense

"My district is on the very south coast of the UK. We've seen these [Russian] aircraft do a full circle around Ireland and the UK ... and then fly all the way back," Ellwood said at another recent CSIS event. "So this is all a statement of intent, to say that, 'we are growing and growing, don't mess with us.'"

More recently, the Northern Fleet kicked off its largest exercise of the year. Vice Adm. Aleksandr Moiseev, the fleet's commander, said the drills "are defensive in nature and are not directed against anyone" but added that the "actions of our forces are planned taking into account the international situation."

The US-UK exercise in the Barents was "uncomparable" to the scale and nature of recent Russian exercises, Katrazyna Zysk, head of center for security policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, said at a recent CSIS event.

Russian aircraft have simulated attacks on Norway and Russia's neighbors have accused it of interfering with GPS. "There is not certainly about the intentions behind these kind of activities," Zysk said.

A US Air Force F-22s intercepts a Russian Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, March 9, 2020. NORAD

The Arctic north of the Pacific is generally less tense than the European Arctic and often sees US-Russian cooperation on issues like waterway management.

But Russia has pursued modernization there as well, upgrading runways and bases and opening new or refurbished facilities on nearby islands, according to Alexey Muraviev, a professor at Australia's Curtain University.

"They're effectively building up the radar shield but also intercept capability that would allow them to engage or deter any surprise aerial attacks," Muraviev said in late June. Wrangel Island, 300 miles from Alaska, has the easternmost radar in the "protective dome" of radars covering Russia's northern coastline.

While there don't appear to be plans to base sizable military units on the the Arctic perimeter, "what the Russians do is practice a lot of maneuver, so they've been staging naval deployments along the Northern Sea Route," and Russia's Pacific Fleet plans to stage a large-scale amphibious exercise in the Arctic later in the year, Muraviev said.

A strategic missile aircraft from the Russian Aerospace Forces takes off for a flight over the Chukotka, Bering and Okhotsk seas. Russian Ministry of Defense

US officials, with Russia in mind, have focused on Alaska as a prime vantage point and an important training area. Alaska is already home to ballistic-missile-defense systems, and the Air Force is ramping up the number of F-35s based there.

While the Far East is relatively calm, tensions elsewhere influence military activity there.

US and Canadian aircraft intercepted Russian aircraft entering the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone at least nine occasions in the first half of this year an increase from the average of six or seven intercepts a year since Moscow restarted long-range aviation patrols in 2007.

The uptick is a response to strained US-Russian relations, to Moscow's dismay over the collapse of major arms-control agreements, and, in part, to increased NATO military flights around the Baltic and Black seas, Muraviev said.

It's "an application of political-military pressure" by Moscow, Muraviev said. "What is happening in Russia's Western regions can get a mirror reflection [in] Russia's increased activity in the Far East."

"The Russians do flex their muscles in a variety of ways, and they certainly look at their strategic bomber force as a form of power projection, similar to naval capability," Muraviev added. "In fact, to some extent, they substitute a limited number of ocean-going vessels by increasing the operational tempo of their strategic bombers."

An underwater anti-sabotage detachment on combat duty at the Northern Fleet's main base in Severomorsk, on Russia's Kola Peninsula, February 1, 2019. Lev FedoseyevTASS via Getty Images

Russia announced in June that the Northern Fleet would become its own military district on January 1, 2021.

"The North Command (OSK Sever) was already half-autonomous in-between the Central and Western military districts," Boulegue said. "But now it's official: Russia will get its 5th military district, which means even more attention to anything Arctic."

There are a number of reasons Russia would want more military capability across the Arctic. It has the world's longest Arctic coastline and derives about one-quarter of its GDP from the region. Russian economic interests stretch across the region, especially the Northern Sea Route, which Moscow sees a valuable corridor for shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific.

Russia's military is also typically the best suited for operating in the harsh conditions in the Arctic, but its activity still worries the neighbors.

Russia's exercise tempo "has gone through the roof" without clarity about its goals, Heather Conley, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic at CSIS, said a recent event.

US soldiers sprint across a flight line toward their objective during an exercise in Deadhorse, Alaska, March 13, 2018 US Air Force/Airman 1st Class Isaac Johnson

"There is a lack of transparency. There's a lack of confidence-building measures. We don't ... completely understand Russia's interest and intentions," Conley added, arguing for a forum to discuss military issues in the region.

Russia, for its part, sees NATO military activity and other efforts to counter it as signs it's "being squeezed from the United States on the Alaska side [and by] NATO from the European side," Mike Sfraga, director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center think tank, said at an event in March.

Keeping track of what the US and NATO might be doing across the Arctic "is a significant concern" for the Russians, Sfraga added.

Adding military capabilities and infrastructure to secure economic interests is "quite rational," Sfraga said. "All good nations protect their assets and their interests."

"Our question is trying to get a handle on are there other motives, like any other nation, in terms of projecting force, influencing areas outside of their national boundaries, and that kind of thing," Sfraga said.

Read this article:

Russia and NATO are increasing their military activity in the Arctic - Business Insider - Business Insider

Greece Says ‘Illegal’ Actions of Turkey Threaten NATO Cohesion – The New York Times

ATHENS Greece's foreign minister on Tuesday said 'illegal' behaviour of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean was threatening the cohesion of NATO and Ankara's relations with the European Union.

Greece has long-running tensions with Turkey over a host of issues ranging from air and sea boundaries to ethnically-split Cyprus. Attempts by both Cyprus, a close ally of Greece, and Turkey at natural gas exploration in overlapping areas in the east Mediterranean have brought those disputes into sharper focus.

"The illegal and provocative behaviour of Turkey has a serious backlash not only to peace and stabiity in the Eastern Mediterranean but to the cohesion of NATO and to its relations with the European Union," Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias said after a meeting with his German counterpart Heiko Maas in Athens.

(Reporting By Michele Kambas)

Go here to read the rest:

Greece Says 'Illegal' Actions of Turkey Threaten NATO Cohesion - The New York Times

Maritime Security Issues in the Baltic Sea Region – Foreign Policy Research Institute

In June, NATO conducted a scaled down version of its annual BALTOPS naval drills in the Baltic Sea. But with a heavy emphasis on land-based deterrence since re-independence, the Baltic states and NATO alike have been largely plagued by what experts refer to as sea apathy or sea blindness. This has led to gaps in capabilities, strategy, and procurements, as well as vulnerabilities related to critical infrastructure under sea and onshore.

In the Baltic Sea Region, the maritime status quo favors Russia. Though its Baltic Fleet is not particularly impressive, Russia could use it to harass military and civilian activity at sea and take surprise offensive military action. In the case of the latter, there is very little that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could do to prevent Russia from projecting power into their port facilities, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, or other littoral areas. Likewise, in the event of grey zone activities (i.e., hostile activities which generally fall below the threshold of war) and/or surprise offensive military action, there is very little that the Baltic states or NATO could do to stop Russia. Combine that with Russias anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities based in Kaliningrad and the logistical chokepoint of the Suwaki Gap, and the strategic calculus for NATO in the Baltic theater becomes extraordinarily difficult.

The Baltic states face myriad hybrid and conventional threats from Russia in the maritime domain. NATO as a whole is unprepared for Russian aggression at sea. Given the economic and strategic importance of the Baltic Sea itself to the Baltic states and NATO, this situation must be remedied. By strategizing procurements, crisis response, and coastal defense, the long-standing condition of sea blindness can be reversed.

Map of the Baltic Sea highlighting narrow access, outlying islands and archipelagos, and jagged coastlines in some localities.

The Baltic Sea is a narrow, confined sea with many jagged shorelines, scattered islands, and other operational hazards. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, coasts are poorly marked and the waters along these coasts are unusually shallow. In relation to other seas, the Baltic is generally shallow, and low salinity results in further complicated conditions for sailors. Alongside the low salinity, salt pockets are common in the Baltic Sea. These pockets have a higher salinity than the surrounding water, creating spots where sound waves deflect. This causes problems for sensors and other navigational and surveillance equipment. Combined with cold winters, the low salt content in the Baltic Sea results in high levels of surface ice. Shipping is confined to channels through the Baltics bottlenecks and turns as a result of outlying islands and the unusual characteristics of the water itself.

Bottlenecks, such as the Danish Straits and the entrances to the Gulfs of Riga, Finland, and Bothnia, allow for easy and complete surveillance of the local maritime situation. Each of these routes is heavily traveled, and closely monitored and thoroughly surveyed. However, the geography of the many archipelagos and larger islands creates difficulties for permanent surveillance and provides opportunities to evade observation. As retired Swedish Navy Captain Bo Wallander noted, Its easy to hide if you are an aggressor here; there are short transit times and short reaction times, leaving defenders with little time to react. The islands, especially those belonging to Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Estonia thus hold critical strategic significance. They are ideal bases, supply hubs, staging areas, and jumping off points for special operations or surprise ambushes. Likewise, bottlenecks may also be blockaded and mined to establish local sea control or denial.

As of 2017, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet stationed in Kronstadt and Baltiysk features two tactical submarines, two destroyers, six frigates, 23 patrol and coastal combatant vessels, 12 mine warfare and mine-countermeasure vessels, four amphibious tank landing ships, and nine other smaller amphibious landing craft. This fleet has largely been neglected, but has seen modernization programs since 2007. Its Steregushchiy class corvettes are equipped with advanced stealth, radar and electronic warfare systems, and have missile systems that can strike targets on land with precision a capability new to the fleet. Likewise, the naval infantry brigade attached to the Baltic Sea Fleet has seen improvement and equipment modernization in recent years, and there are plans to increase Russias submarine presence in the region.

Though the Baltic Sea Fleet is the weakest of the Russian fleets, the geography of the Baltic Sea combined with Russian naval air force and missile capabilities in the region render the battlespace anything but easy for NATO. Further, the Baltic Sea Fleet is more than capable of surprise offensive action or hybrid warfare measures. As Russia has generally sought to economize the use of force and control the intensity of what it views to be an ongoing conflict with the West by hybrid means, it is critical to address the gaps Russia could exploit in the Baltic states and NATOs security posture in the Baltic Sea Region.

Air power, especially anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, are where Russia shines in the Baltic Sea Region. In the Western Military District, Russia maintains 27 combat air squadrons, six attack helicopter squadrons, and a division of airborne infantry. In terms of overall quantity and quality, NATO maintains superior air forces, but Russia maintains a local advantage, which is reinforced by its A2/AD systems. These include its surface-to-surface Iskander Ballistic Missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles, SA-21 Growler surface-to-air-missiles, and long-range integrated air defense S-400 systems. Likewise, Russia maintains the K-300 Bastion-P coastal defense system in Kaliningrad. According to the Center for International Maritime Security, this system is capable of searching, detection, tracking and classification of sea-surface targets by active radar; over-the-horizon detection, classification, and determination of the coordinates of radiating radars, using the means of passive radar detection and ranging.

Map: Effective ranges of Russian A2/AD missile systems. Illustration by Matthew Thomas, map by Cartographer of the United Nations, Creative Commons.

Additionally, Su-27 fighter aircraft and Su-24 attack aircraft may be called into action and scrambled to contest Baltic Sea access at a moments notice. Sea mines may also be used as a component of the broader A2/AD system, as Russia could take advantage of the bottlenecks and chokepoints in the Baltic Sea, and could do so relatively cheaply and with plausible deniability given the number of mines still buried from the world wars.

The Russian A2/AD systems can reach far flung destinations from Kaliningrad. All of Lithuania and nearly all of Poland and Latvia are in-range, as are parts of Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Estonia. However, as Michael Kofman of CNA and the Kennan Institute points out, Russian strategy generally prefers an offensive posture with a damage control defense, rather than developing purely defensive capabilities. This means that A2/AD will largely be used in an offensive capacity. This is generally well understood, but, as Russian strategic thinking generally views purely defensive capabilities as cost prohibitive, there are likely vulnerabilities in the systems which make up A2/AD. Thus, as Kofman argues, A2/AD may be defeatable. However, it is still a critical component of Russias posture in the Baltic Sea Region, and a major challenge to military logistics in the event of war in the Baltic theater. If Russia could quickly seal off access by land over the Suwaki Gap and complement this achievement by rendering the Baltic Sea closed to surface and air traffic, it could effectively isolate the Baltic states from the rest of NATO.

As a broader institution, NATO does not maintain a forward presence at sea the way that it does on land. The Baltic states themselves operate very small navies with a primary focus on mine-hunting and clearing. While Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have built an extraordinary expertise in this area, they have done so without much attention to other capabilities beyond constabulary measures such as counter-smuggling. None of the Baltic states could deny Russia access, even if all their individual naval assets and sea-borne weaponry were combined. Poland has a moderately sized navy, but the serviceability of its combat ships is questionable. Germany has a substantial naval force in terms of quantity, but it operates well beyond the Baltic Sea. It, too, has been largely neglected and, like Poland, its combat ships may not be ready for action.

The Danish navy is perhaps the most prepared of the NATO member states along the Baltic Sea, but it is modestly sized and, like Germany, operates beyond the Baltic Sea as well. While Finland and Sweden are not NATO members, they are key partners in the region and would undoubtedly play a role in the battlespace should conventional conflict emerge. They have modest naval capabilities tailored to their environment, but Finlands forces are small and structural problems complicate cooperation between the Swedish navy and coast guard.

On the air side, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are deficient, but the NATO air-policing mission largely fills that gap for peacetime operations. Given the local air force presence within Russias Western Military District, however, even this would likely be inadequate in case of attack. The other Baltic littoral states, including Finland and Sweden, offer a decent range of tactical airpower, including a number of F-16s and F-18s, and Denmarks F-16 contingent has recent high-end operational experience in Iraq and Libya. Further, the US has demonstrated in the recent Spring Storm exercises an ability to quickly respond to a crisis scenario in the Baltics with airpower from the continental United States. Likewise, European NATO allies will also be able to respond quickly with airpower. Thus, the primary gaps for NATO and its partners Sweden and Finland are in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and the surface and subsurface domains in the Baltic Sea Region.

Individual states ISR capabilities vary, but the Baltic states, NATO, and their partner states Sweden and Finland do not have shared, integrated, and continuous awareness at sea. NATO first achieved a complete picture of the air, surface, and subsurface domains in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 2017, a basic condition which should be a continual reality. There are decent cooperative organizations for the objective of improving situational awareness, interoperability, and information sharing among members at the regional and EU level, but these have had varying levels of efficacy. Many are not well attuned to facing hybrid threats, and thus it is possible that Russia could exploit this weakness by using commercial or research vessels for mine laying or grey zone activities. Likewise, geographic factors hamper ISR. For example, Swedens radar capabilities are hindered by weather and in some regions, such as Stockholm, a complex archipelagic coast. In the case of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, there is both a lack of situational awareness and a lack of any coordinated means of processing and responding to threats. Reports also point to varying levels of success with information sharing. Given their security environment, these issues are critical. Throughout the region, there is a need for a unified picture of the air, surface, and subsurface domains, but currently this does not exist. The maritime domain contains major critical infrastructure components and this lack of awareness opens the door for Russian hybrid activity in the particularly vulnerable Baltic states.

The littoral areas of the Baltic Sea Region are home to a host of critical energy infrastructure. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, key gas interconnectors and facilities such as the Klaipda LNG terminal are located at sea or onshore and are poorly guarded, if at all. Likewise, the sea itself contains critical communications cables which are unburied and unhidden. If Russia could disrupt energy supply and communications, it could wreak havoc on societal resilience. By wearing down societys ability and willingness to resist aggression, Russia stands to have much to gain. Likewise, Russia has been known to harass civilian and military activity at sea and conduct military operations within other countries exclusive economic zones. Port and supply chains are also vulnerable to Crimea-esque little green men operations and, perhaps more likely, cyberattack. These vulnerabilities could be exploited to complement overt aggression or to simply cow political leaders into making policy decisions in line with the Kremlins objectives. As hybrid activities tend to fall below the threshold of war, they also challenge NATOs solidarity and commitment to Article V, which states that an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all.

For the Baltic states and NATO, the maritime domain is a critical component of the broader battlespace in the event of conflict with Russia. In terms of logistics, it is critical to maintain supply and communication lanes through the Baltic Sea. By attacking from both land and sea, Russia could attempt to put the Baltics in a chokehold, isolated from the rest of NATO. Likewise, it is a probable theater for hybrid activity full of vulnerabilities, which, if exploited, could complement overt offensive action or serve as a tool of political subversion and coercion. But, with a renewed focus on the maritime domain, problems addressed can be remedied or at least mitigated and managed. To improve security in the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea Region:

The current state of affairs in the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea Region is not ideal for NATO. Russia maintains a local advantage in both hybrid and conventional capabilities. In the event of conventional conflict, Russia could attack from both sides and use its A2/AD capabilities to cut off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO in a rapid, modern Anaconda Plan. Hybrid vulnerabilities can be put to the test at peacetime for subversion and coercion. (However, Russia does not view the current state of affairs to be peacetime, but rather a continuously fluctuating conflict, as seen through its perceptions of NATO and its activities in the grey-zone.) These could also be exploited to complement overt, conventional aggression to break down societal and governmental structures. But, by addressing critical gaps in procurements, capabilities, and strategy, this condition can be improved. If NATO seeks either to avoid war or come in as defenders rather than liberators, it is essential that the maritime domain finally receive the attention it deserves.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Read more here:

Maritime Security Issues in the Baltic Sea Region - Foreign Policy Research Institute

Five NATO ships entered the port of Odessa – FREE NEWS

Five NATO ships entered the port of Odesa as part of the Sea Breeze exercise. They will stay there until July 28, according to the local newspaper.

Commander of the Naval Forces of the Armed forces of Ukraine Alexey Neizhpapa on Monday said that the international exercise Sea Breeze-2020 has begun in the Black sea. In total, it was planned to involve about 2,000 people from nine countries, more than 20 ships, as well as planes and helicopters. In addition to Ukraine and the United States, the military of Bulgaria, Georgia, Norway, France, Romania, Spain, and Turkey participate in Sea Breeze 2020.

Early this morning, five NATO ships headed by the flagship of the SNMG2 group entered the port of Odesa. First, about 7 oclock (coincides with Moscow time), moored in the naval base South, which is in the Practical Harbor, corvettes-the Romanian Kontradmiral Sebastian (Board 264) and the Bulgarian Bodry (Board 14). By 9 oclock, the main sea Breeze strike force began to arrive at the port. Frigates Spanish (SNMG2 flagship) F101 Alvaro de Bazan, Turkish F243 Yildirim and Romanian F222 Regina Maria were moored at berths 18, 19 and 20, the newspaper writes.

It is noted that four ships, in addition to the Spanish one, have already visited Odessa.

Alvaro de Bazan is equipped with an analog of the American combat information and control system aegis. The ships primary strike weapon is the Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Also, it has 48 MK 41 vertical launch shafts for various missiles, torpedo launchers, and artillery weapons. Bazan carries one SH-60 Seahawk anti-submarine helicopter. The ships will stay in Odessa until July 28, the message reads.

Follow this link:

Five NATO ships entered the port of Odessa - FREE NEWS

QuickLink: NATO 2020: A Coalition of the Unwilling | OpEdNews

China's Economy - and Globalization - A Look into the Future by Peter Koenig (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Five Reasons Why Christians Should Feel UNcomfortable Voting for Trump in 2020 by Mike Rivage-Seul (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Person, Woman Man, Camera, TV, Treason, You Know The Thing.. by Rob Kall (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Sweden: the One Chart That Matters by Mike Whitney (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

It's Getting Uglier By the Day, A Timeline of US Aggression Against China by Jeff J. Brown (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Trump and US Foreign Policy -- What's Happened? by Arshad M Khan (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Venezuela's Oil Production Plunges as US Issues New Threats by Venezuelanalysis.com . (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Summary of the Corbett Report: "Who Cares What Celebrities Think" by Roger Copple (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

The Global Reset - Unplugged. "The Deep State" by Peter Koenig (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

First the National Security State Surged Baghdad, now it is Surging Portland and Seattle by Juan Cole (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

From Desolation Row with Dylan by Edward Curtin (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Mary Trump's Psychological Profile of Her Uncle Donald (REVIEW ESSAY) by Thomas Farrell (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Trump's Authoritarianism Is Ill-suited To A Pandemic by Jill Richardson (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Biology is not Physics by Josh Mitteldorf (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Protests can be so unseemly by Lisa Arnold (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

The More U.S. Imperialism Declines, the Closer the World Gets to a New Wave of Socialist Revolutions by Rainer Shea (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

This is What Collapse Looks Like by Kollibri terre Sonnenblume (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

GloboCap ber Alles by CJ Hopkins (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

In Relationship With An Abusive President, Will We Be Trauma Victims or Trauma Survivors? - Part 2: A Larger Context by Blair Gelbond (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Meat Industry Campaign Cash Flows To Officials Seeking To Quash COVID-19 Lawsuits by Lee Fang (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Hagia Sophia opens as mosque after 86 years as Saudi Arabia accuses Erdogan of misreading the history by Abdus-Sattar Ghazali (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Sino-India Standoff: Security Dilemma by Muhammad Irfan (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Black Lives Matter Chicago Sues to Prevent Occupation by Trump's Paramilitaries by Marjorie Cohn (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

In Post-Iraq Invasion World, It's Absolutely Insane to Blindly Believe the US Narrative on China by Caitlin Johnstone (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

The Ultimate Racial Fight: "Standard American English" by Philip Kraske (With membership, you can see # of pageviews)

Go To Top 50 Most Popular

The rest is here:

QuickLink: NATO 2020: A Coalition of the Unwilling | OpEdNews