Ethics: Ethical Egoism and Utilitarianism – Bartleby.com

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Normative egoism has the individual making claims about what should be done to do the "right" thing, rather than what one does Ethical egoism requires that for an action to be moral it must maximize one's own self interest Rational actions are moral actionsEthical egoism puts the self in front of all others in finding moralityEssentially, the argument follows that each of us is most familiar with our own wants and needs. We do not know the wants and needs of others in the same way, nor are we equipped to always follow in others' best interests. It is then more efficient and logical to pursue our own needs and look out for ourselves so that others do not have to. This view also assumes that the individual is more able to provide for their own needs and also has that responsibility. Therefore, because the onus is on the self, society can be free to work for the betterment of larger projects that benefit everyone as opposed to taking care of individuals (Feinberg, 2008, pp. 520-3).At times, ethical egoism can benefit the larger group, as in a doctor in a rural town with free rent and a captive audience. The city provides the rent, the doctor the care, but all benefit.UtilitarianismAct Utilitarianism is the view that the

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Ethical egoism – RationalWiki

Ethical egoism is the consequentialist philosophy which states that morality should be based on self-interest. It is the philosophical basis for many libertarians and (so they claim) Randroids but also got support from Thomas Hobbes.[1]. Some egoists that do not believe in the existence of ethics call themselves rational egoists, because they want to be selfish, but do not want to support metaphysical ideas like ethics and morals.

Ethical egoism is based on three arguments:

It is the polar opposite of ethical altruism, the belief that one ought to live for others, and is contrasted with utilitarianism, which is objective. Egoism is subjective, meaning that its implications and conclusions change from person to person and nothing is objectively ethical. This is interesting considering that some of the most vocal proponents of ethical egoism are so-called Objectivists.[2]

Egoism is very appealing to some because it philosophically justifies selfishness, even at the expense of others, and therefore reduces feelings of guilt after acting like a heartless jerk. Also, being a jerk is their moral equivalent of being nice and vice versa.

Ethical egoism is seen as arbitrary because it values the selfish individual more than other people and there are no objective grounds for this. Similarly racism values one race more than others arbitrarily.[1]

Contrary to many strawmen arguments, egoism does not mean that you should never act in the interest of another, even if it does not benefit you. Instead, it is acting to benefit yourself, regardless of whether it harms or benefits another. Another way of saying this is that intentions are always selfish. Results may vary, whether they are good for others or not. This is because those who selfishly refuse to help others later find others will not return favours since they received none. If some misfortune arises and the egoist now needs the unselfish help of another, and if everyone is a consistent egoist, the egoist may or may not get the help he needs. So in the interests of self-interest, an egoist must act altruistically, at least sometimes, even if intentions are only about personal gain, thus why it is a relativistic philosophy. There are three types of egoism: universal (everybody should act for their own self-benefit), personal (the egoist is an egoist, but other people can be altruistic or utilitarian), and individual (everybody acts for one individual's self-benefit, which is completely unrealistic).

Alternatively, many egoists are also Individualists, like Stirner and Nietzsche, who would say that those that require the help of others do not deserve the help of others.[3] Incidentally normal people who are not sociopaths would likely lose self respect and become less happy if they only helped others at such times[4] Ethical egoism, like all exclusively subjective philosophies, is prone to constant self-contradiction because it supports all individuals' self interests. It also can lead to conclusions such as choosing not to intervene in a crime against another. Egoists have difficulty caring about anything that does not deal with themselves, which is one reason why ethical egoism is so impractical for people who are very aware of the world. The very legitimacy of the theory is often called into question because it prevents its own adherents from taking reasonable stances on major political and social issues and cannot in itself solve these issues, without resorting to popular choice.[3]

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Ethical Egoism Essay – 1596 Words – studymode.com

Love Your Neighbor As Yourself: Response to Ethical EgoismPHIL-12222 March 2013

We are often taught at an early age that when struggling to make a decision to let our consciences be our guides. Conscience can be defined as our adherence to moral principles, or our considerations of fairness and justice. The word consideration is used because every individual has their own standards for what they feel to be morally right versus what they feel to be morally wrong, however this concept is not as black and white as it may seem.

We accredit our moral considerations to many external and internal factors. An example of an external factor is government laws because they are predetermined rules about behavior and action that have been societally deemed as morally wrong. Laws are based on sociological mores, which follow a cultures commonly shared and widely observed moral behavior, therefore breaking a law implies going against the proper code your society. Prison also has an external influence on our decision making because it serves as a threat for the negative consequences of disobeying laws, such as the loss of our freedom. Internal factors are our own self-value and personal virtues as well as our sense of selfishness and our concerns of morality.

Ethical egoism is the philosophical belief that moral agents ought to do what is in their own self-interest because that is the rational way to live. It contrasts with the theory of ethical altruism, which holds thats it is our moral obligation to help others. A philosopher and avid supporter of ethical egoism named Ayn Rand however saw ethical altruism in a different way. She viewed altruism as self-sacrifice, and as a state of mind absent from the reality of the life and worth of a human being. Rand was the creator of the property of ethical egoism known as objectivism, or the philosophy that the proper life for rational beings is the pursuit of happiness, and that altruism is incompatible with rational morality. She asked, Why is it moral to serve the happiness of others but not our own?

Rand was a promoter of self-value and believed that, our lives belong to us and therefore it is our moral obligation to live it in the most personally satisfying way as possible. She wrote, You have been taught that morality is a code of behavior imposed on you by whim, the whim of a supernatural power or the whim of society, to serve Gods purpose on your neighbors welfare, to please an authority beyond the grave or else next door- but not to serve your life or pleasure. Your pleasure, you have been taught, is to be found in immorality, your interests would best be served by evil, and any moral code must be designed not for you, but against you, not to further your life, but to drain it. (Rand, 532)

Rand saw our existences as having one of two options: to live or not to live. She viewed the world as a competitive place where the strong and knowledgeable dominated survival simply by using their minds as their protection. A mans mind is his basic tool of survival. Life is given to him, survival is not. (Rand, 533) Unlike the organs inside our bodies that automatically function without our aid, our minds require us to think and use logic to obtain their benefits, and therefore those who choose to abstain from thinking and logical reasoning are deprived of one of their two defense mechanisms.

In relation to our ability to reasons are our values and virtues, because we need a code of values to guide our actions, and our virtues are our actions themselves. Value is that which one acts to gain and keep, virtue is the action by which one gains and keeps it. (Rand, 533) Rand believed that all virtues and values derive from our desire to exist or to diminish and that the three most crucial values to survival are reason, purpose, and self-esteem and the most important virtue to be that of pride. Reason can only be produced through our willingness...

Bibliography: Pojman, Louis P. Egoism and Altruism: A Critique of Ayn Rand The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature. Louis P. Pojman & Lewis Vaughn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.Rand, Ayn. In Defense of Ethical Egoism The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature. Louis P. Pojman & Lewis Vaughn. New York: Oxford University Press,2011.

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Egoism | philosophy | Britannica.com

Egoism, (from Latin ego, I), in philosophy, an ethical theory holding that the good is based on the pursuit of self-interest. The word is sometimes misused for egotism, the overstressing of ones own worth.

Egoist doctrines are less concerned with the philosophic problem of what is the self than with the common notions of a person and his concerns. They see perfection sought through the furthering of a mans own welfare and profitallowing, however, that sometimes he may not know where these lie and must be brought to recognize them.

Many ethical theories have an egoist bias. The hedonism of the ancient Greeks bids each man to seek his own greatest happiness; in the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes, a Materialist, and Benedict de Spinoza, a Rationalist, held in different ways that self-preservation is the good; and those who stress the tending of ones own conscience and moral growth are likewise egoists in this sense. In contrast with such views is an ethics that is governed more by mans social aspects, which stresses the importance of the community rather than that of the individual. Under this head come such theories as Stoic cosmopolitanism, tribal solidarity, and utilitarianism, which are all forms of what the positivist Auguste Comte called altruism. The distinction, however, cannot always be neatly drawn.

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The Differences Between Utilitarianism & Ethical Egoism

Consequentialism is a moral theory that states that the consequences of one's actions are the basis for any morality or judgment toward that action. Both utilitarianism and ethical egoism are theories within consequentialism that focus on the outcome of conduct as the primary motivation of that action and any critique of whether or not that conduct is ethical. The major difference between utilitarianism and ethical egoism is where those acts are directed.

Utilitarianism focuses on the idea of the greater good. Essentially, this ethical theory intends to maximize good for the the most people. The moral worth of any action is judged by how much good results for all sentient beings. While some individuals may suffer from these actions, utilitarianism holds that the conduct may still be ethical if it does more good for a greater number of people than it harms.

Ethical egoism, also known simply as egoism, holds that moral conduct ought to be judged through self-interest. Egoism states that the good consequences for the individual agent outweigh the consequences placed upon others. In egoism, actions could be considered ethical for the individual if the one taking the action is benefited, while any benefit or detriment to the welfare of others is a side effect and not as important as the consequences for the individual.

The primary differences between these two theories, keeping in mind that there are numerous sub-theories within each branch of thought, is the value placed between the individual and others. In utilitarianism, the most ethical action may be that which harms the individual agent but maximizes the positive impact for the most people overall, essentially placing the emphasis on the whole as opposed to the individual. In egoism, the individual has a greater value than others, thus it is ethical to act in one's own self-interest even if it may potentially harm others.

Utilitarianism seeks to maximize good by minimizing harm to all while egoism seeks to maximize good by keeping the individual happy. In utilitarianism, actions must be judged on the amount of people (or beings) that benefit from the action as opposed to how many the same action may potentially harm. Proponents argue that utilitarianism results in a greater sum of benefit to its harm, based upon outcome and not intention. However, critics of utilitarianism argue that following the interest of the greater good may result in tremendous harm to a large number of individuals.

Meanwhile, egoists argue that acting in self-interest can result in position action because the individual knows best how to benefit his own self, and if everyone were to act in the interest of others, then the general welfare of all would decrease as they are never working for their own good. Egoists trust that others will act in their own interests, thus making it unnecessary to take action solely for their benefit.

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Ethical Egoism, Essay Sample – essaybasics.com

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The pursuit of own self-interest describes ethical egoism. This moral intuition dictates that people ought to do what they perceive as morally right. Thus, acts whose results benefit the doer qualifies to be ethical. It represents a true contrast with ethical altruism that advocates for helping others. Despite acting on ones interest, ethical egoism cautions against harming the wellbeing of others. Ethical egoism is further divided into three categories which include personal, individual and universal ethical egoism. Personal ethical egoism stipulates that an act arises from the self-interest motive with no regard to other motives. Individual ethical egoism upholds that people should serve ones self-interest. On the other hand, universal ethical egoism dictates that all persons have the right to pursue own interests in exclusivity.

The best approach to promoting the general good arises from allowing people to pursue their own self-interest. In most instances, as individuals gratify their insatiable desires they unintentionally benefit the society through an invisible hand. In fact, all persons are better off if each follows their own interest.

Coercing individuals to sacrifice their moral interest for the large society implies denying them their fundamental value of personal decision-making. Nonetheless, ones well-being is a moral concern for that person that calls for non-interference from other sources. Also, an act should be motivated by the benefits one derives from it. One ought to only care for oneself.

The concept of ethical egoism promotes admirable virtues like rationality, productivity, and personal responsibility. These virtues are crucial for personal development and growth. Therefore, allowing external influence hinders cognitive independence.

Traditional morality embraces the fact that the well-being of people forms part of ones jurisdiction or act. Caring for others is a warranted concern without which, it leads to egoist radicalization. Radical ethical egoist will care less about causing harm or pain to others so long as they receive their benefit. In essence, ethics exist to limit harms while maximizing benefits arising from peoples actions.

It lacks a moral basis through which people can amicably resolve conflicts. It never suggests a resolution amidst conflicting interest yet individuals are encouraged to serve their interests. Without a moral obligation to compromise or sacrifice for another, radical egoists will never have a common ground. Unlike egoism, altruism dictates the need to sacrifice ones good for the benefit of other people.

The occurrence of interpersonal decisions may transcend an egoists opinion. Self-denial sets in due to the intersection of interpersonal benefits. Thus, it is difficult for an ethical egoist individual to advise others as it creates self-contradiction.

Ethical egoism fails to uphold the impartiality principle. It acknowledges preferential treatment to oneself instead of discouraging discrimination. Under morality, a fundamental principle exists that stipulates that we should treat others equal and never make exceptions of ourselves. The human race is rich in diversity and rarely can one act in the similar capacity as another.

In conclusion, the virtue of selfishness does not count in egoism. Self-sacrifice is not a virtue but a detrimental aspect to egoists. Ethical egoism promotes individualism leading to a drawback on the observation and adherence to societal morals by individuals. Unfortunately, egoism operates in a society where people constantly interact. Therefore, ignoring the actions, reactions and influence of other people on ones life and decisions are hardly inevitable. Nonetheless, meeting personal interests sometimes requires the sacrifice of other self-interests to create a balance in life. This is to quantify the fact that ethical egoism may not function in a vacuum but requires the intervention of other ethical standings.

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Ethical Egoism Essay – 1537 Words | Bartleby

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That is their essential ethical principle. Finally, there is the hypothetical egoist, who argues that all individuals ought to pursue their own interests if they are looking for coming to a specific end. In a way, that type of egoist is not an actual egoist; he is rather a utilitarian who believes that happiness for all can be enhanced if each person looks out after his own self. A true ethical egoist would argue against the hypothetical egoist. He would not look to increase the happiness of others, only that of himself. A true ethical egoist must not become a hypothetical egoist, because then he is no longer an egoist. Nor should he become an individual egoist, because it would not be ethical. In addition, the truest ethical egoist must not publicize, or even try to persuade, others of his own policy. When an individual advocates his own doctrine upon others, he is then persuading them to do the same. Hence, each person would begin to pursue his or her own interest and thus it would not be to the persuaders advantage, for it will harm his own interest. A true ethical egoist would convince people to do otherwise, and in return, this will serve the individuals greatest interests. What is meant by my own good? David P. Gauthier, author of Morality and Rational Self-Interest, says that Either that the thing I get is good, or that my possessing it is good. What he is stating is that good can differ in

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Ethical Theories Summarized & Explained: Consequentialism …

The purpose of this article is to explain different ethical theories and compare and contrast them in a way thats clear and easy for students to understand. There are three major categories of ethical systems that students typically learn about in philosophy classes: consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. I will describe all of them briefly, then describe each one of them in more detail, pointing out their defining features and major variants. Ill then discuss the nature of Objectivist Ethical Egoism and how it compares and contrasts with each of these types of ethics.

The Ethical Theories: Brief Summary

Consequentialism names a type of ethical theory that judges human practices, like actions or rules, based on their consequences. Human practices that produce good consequences are morally right, while ones that produce bad consequences are morally wrong. Roughly speaking, a consequentialist says that you should do certain things, because those actions produce good consequences. By far the most common historical variantof consequentialism is Classic Utilitarianism. Classic Utilitarianism was advocated by such philosophers as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Deontology names a type of ethical theory that judges human practicesbased on whether they are consistent with certain duties that the theory holds as intrinsically moral. Consequences are irrelevant to a fully deontological theory. Deontological theories tend to focus on the motives of actions, and whether a given action was motivated by duty or something else. In many deontological theories, motivation by moral duty itselfrather than other factors, like self-interestis essential to an actions being morally right. An advocate of deontology says that you should do certain things, just because those things are the right things to do, (they align with duty.)The originator of deontology as a formal theoretical framework was the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Later advocates have included W.D. Ross, Robert Nozick and Christine Korsgaard.

Virtue ethics names a type of ethical theory that takes virtues of character, rather than individual actions or rules, as the most fundamentalethical concepts. Moral virtues like honesty, courage, integrity, temperance and generosity are takento be inherently good first, then actions are evaluated based on whether they express those virtues. That is, do the actions match what a virtuous person would do in those circumstances? Basically, a virtue ethicist says that you should do certain things, because they are examples of good character. Modern virtue ethics takes inspiration from the moral theories of Ancient Greek philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, (especially Aristotle.) Prominent advocates include Christine Swanton, Rosalind Hursthouse and Alasdair MacIntyre.

Objectivist Ethical Egoism, unlike the other terms here, names one specific theory. It takes human life as the abstract or general standard of moral evaluation. Roughly speaking, that which promotes human life is the good, that which damages or destroys it is the bad. Because Objectivism, the whole philosophy from which this ethics springs, views human life as fundamentally individualneeding to be lived, maintained and enhanced by each individual through his own actionObjectivist Ethical Egoism (OEE) takes each individuals own life as his own effective standard of value. That which promotes the individuals own life overall is the good for him, that which damages or destroys his own life is the bad for him.

But OEE does not simply say that actions that end up promoting your life are moral, and actions that end up damaging it are immoral. Objectivism holds that the fundamental job of morality is to guide human choices in the context in which they aremade. Objectivism accepts the obvious truth that humans are not omniscient, and so cannot predict all the exact consequences of their actions in advance. It says that the way humans gain general or conditional knowledgeknowledge thatcan be applied to predict future consequencesis by forming rational principles from empirical observation and experience. In the field of morality, this means derivingrational moral principles from experience. These principles are general statementsof fact that are then applied to particular situations to determine a proper course of action. Thus, OEE says that a chosen action is moral, if and only if it represents a proper application of a life-promoting moral principle to the acting individuals current circumstances.

Among the principles that OEE holds as true are the idea that the rational self-interests of individuals do not conflict, and that initiating force against others (murder, slavery, theft, etc.) is destructive not only to the victims lives, but also to the perpetrators.

Basically, Objectivist Ethical Egoism says that you should do certain things, because those things actually support and/or enrich your own life.OEE is Ayn Rands highly distinctive theory that is widely misinterpreted by academic philosophers and the general public. It has been advocated and explained by such philosophers as Leonard Peikoff, Tara Smith, Allan Gotthelf and Gregory Salmieri.I will discuss OEEs relationship with the three ethical categories, and whether it can be considered a memberof any of them, when I discuss it in more detail later in this essay.

Consequentialism

Jeremy Bentham

Consequentialism is a category that includes those ethical theories that judge human practices as morally right or wrong based on their consequences. (Practice here is used very broadly to includea specific action, a rule guiding actions, a motive guiding actions, or a virtue of character.) Consequentialist theories say that morally right practicesare those that tend to increase or maximize whatever is inherentlymorally good. (1) If apractice tends to produce more moral goodness than any alternative practicewould have, then it is a morally right practice. Consequentialist philosophers differ on whether practices that tend to increase that which is morally good, but increase it less than an available alternative practice, can be called morally right. Are practices that produce less goodness wrongpractices, or merely sub-optimal but permissible rightpractices? In any case, for a pure consequentialist, the practice that tends to maximize moral goodness is the morally best practice.

There are many different types of consequentialism that people can adopt. Consequentialist theories can be divided into types in threemajorways. The first way is in what exactly it is about human practices that is being morally evaluated. A theory can evaluate individual actionsthis is called act consequentialism. Or a theory can evaluate the rules by which someone actsthis is called rule consequentialism. Or a theory can evaluate the motives by which someone actsthis is called motive consequentialism. Or a theory can evaluate the character traitsone demonstrates when one actsthis is called virtue consequentialism.

The secondmajor way consequentialist theories can be divided is by whose consequences count as morally relevant. That is, what beings are directly morally relevant in evaluating the consequences of a practice.Is it all conscious creatures? Is it all humans? Is it a subgroup of humans? Is it only the agent? Or is it all humans except the agent? Respectively, these choices among beneficiaries can be called broad consequentialism, human-centered consequentialism, group chauvinism, consequentialist egoism, and consequentialist altruism. (2)

The thirdmajor way of dividing consequentialist theories, as far as I can tell, only makes sense when applied to act consequentialism. Act consequentialist theories can be dividedby the sort of consequences that are relevant to the evaluation of an act. Are actual consequences the relevant factor? Or is it the consequences that analysis would show are most probable at the time of the decision to act?Or is it the consequences that the acting person (the agent) actuallyforesaw at the time he acted? Or is it the consequences that were reasonably foreseeable by the agent? Or is it the consequences that the agent intended to occur? (These different sorts of consequences could be called different epistemic statuses.)

The reason philosophers may want to consider the alternatives to actual consequences as the relevant type, is that people are not omniscient and cant predict the future consequences of actions perfectly. So it doesnt necessarily seem right to morally judge a decision, that was made at a given time and with a limited state of knowledge, by all of the actual consequences that followed. It would seem that one is saying that a person whose action produced bad consequences due to factors outside his possible knowledge was acting immorally. So, with actual consequentialism, people will sometimes be judged as acting immorally because they are not infalliblepredictors of the future. This tends to go against common-sense ideas of what morality demands.

Once we select an option from each of the three above lists, we have a pretty good idea of what sort of consequentialist theory were discussing. But we still havent narrowed our selection down to a single theory. For that we need a separate theory of moral goodness, more technically called a value theory or axiology.

The ethical approachof consequentialism depends on the notion of producing morally good consequences. But the consequentialist approach, by itself, does not answer the question of what the moral good is. So specificconsequentialist theories are partly defined by what they believe to be morally good.

Moral goodness may be identified with pleasure, preference satisfaction, justice, beauty, knowledge, wisdom, honor, peace, etc. Or, in the case of what is called negative consequentialism, moral goodness may be associated with the lack of something. This could be pain, injustice, ugliness, etc.

Historically, the most common version of consequentialism wasClassic Utilitarianism. Classic Utilitarianism (CU) defines moral goodness as pleasurespecifically, the aggregate pleasure of all sentient creatures. This pleasure is also called subjective happiness. So a common statement encapsulating utilitarianism is that it advocates for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In this theory, pain is held to be a negation of pleasure, so it would be counted as subtracting fromaggregate pleasure. This function of pleasure minus pain is generally called utility.

Classic Utilitarianism is a form of act consequentialism, soit is a persons individual actions that are judged morally as good or bad, according to whether their consequences tend toincrease or decrease utility. CU also takes the actual consequences for net utility as the morally relevant kind, rather than probable, foreseen, or intended consequences at the time of the action. And it clearly takes universal consequences as the relevant kind, since it evaluates actions according to their effects on aggregate human and animalutility.

Classic utilitarianism was advocatedwith some variationsby philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick. (It should be noted that the distinction between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism was not well defined at the time these philosophers were active. So they were not explicit nor necessarily perfectly consistent about choosing one over the other.)

Act Consequentialism Table

Rule Consequentialism Table

Virtue Consequentialism Table

Motive Consequentialism Table

If we alter one parameter of CU, we can get a different theory. Instead of aggregate utility of all sentient creatures, we could count only the utility of the agent as morally relevant. This would generate a theory we could call Classic Utility Egoism.(As well see in more detail, this form of egoism is very different from Objectivist Ethical Egoism.)

If we also switch act consequentialism for virtue consequentialism, we get a category we could call Virtue Utility Egoism. The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus would fit into this category rather nicely, since he regarded the pleasure of the agent as the good, and virtue as instrumental to that pleasure.

If we switch Classic Utilitarianism from act consequentialism to ruleconsequentialism, while keeping its other categories and its axiology, we get a theory that could be referred to as Classic RuleUtilitarianism.

Finally, if we take CU and only change its axiology, we get a different theory. If we no longer consider classic utility (pleasure minus pain) to be morally good, but instead consider the satisfaction of the preferences of conscious organisms to be good,we get an approximation of Peter Singers contemporary preference utilitarianism. (Peter Singer is a well-known Australian moral philosopher who teaches at Princeton University. It should be noted that he was a preference utilitarian prior to 2014, when he announced that he had switched to Classic Utilitarianism. See Footnote (3).)

It should be noted that different forms of consequentialism can be categorized and distinguished based on other criteria that I have not mentioned here. Most of these criteria can be considered part of the theories axiologiestheir varying explanations of what ismorally good. There are pluralistic theories, that hold that moral goodness cannot be reduced to one factor, like utility, but that it consists of more than one irreducible component. And there are also theories that attempt to hybridize different types of consequentialism with each other, or hybridize consequentialism with other types of ethical theories. For more detail on the various forms of consequentialism, you can see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry on Consequentialism.

Deontology

Immanuel Kant

A deontological theory judges human practices as morally right or wrong based on whether they are consistent with certain duties that the theory holds as intrinsically moral.

As a classof formal ethical theories, deontology has its origins in the ethical approach of the 18th-Century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant described two types of ethical rules or imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. Hypothetical imperatives are rules that you follow in order to attain some goal. For example, if you always tell the truth to good people in order to have authentic, healthy, win-win relationships with them, this would be a hypothetical imperative: a policy for the sake of a goal. On the other hand, a categorical imperative is a rule thats followed for the sake of no other goal. It is followed just because a moral law commands it. For example, if you never lie to anyone, simply because its the right thing to do, regardless of any consequencesgood or badthat might follow, then you would be acting on a categorical imperative.

Kant believed that only categorical imperatives could properly be considered part of morality. And he argued that there was one and only one such imperative that could be rationally justified, which, in Kants philosophy, is called the Categorical Imperative. Kant first stated this rule as: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. This moral law, according to Kant, was supposed to prohibit murder, theft, lying to others, cheating, suicide, etc. Those acts that could be seen to violate the Categorical Imperative were morally prohibited, regardless of any good consequences that might be gained from committing them, or any bad consequences that might be avoided by committing them. (4) Kant held that, in order to have moral worththat is, to be good and praiseworthy from a moral standpointactions must be motivated by obedience to the moral law, (duty.) If someone does something in accordance with the moral lawsay telling the truthbut is motivated by the desire to have good relationships or to avoid being convicted of fraud, the action is not a morally rightaction. The action must be performed not merely according to duty, but from duty.

Some early followers of Kant, such as Friedrich Schiller, as well as many later critics up through the mid-20th Century, interpreted Kant as holding that actions must be motivated purely by duty to be unambiguously morally worthy or right. Most commentatorsfound this requirement implausible and overly austere. Starting around 1980, the dominant interpretation shifted, following an influential paperby Barbara Herman. It is more typical now to interpret Kant as saying that an action having other motives can have moral worth, if the persons motive of duty would be sufficient in itself to produce the proper action, and thus stands ready to override all other motives when they would produce an action not in accordance with the Categorical Imperative.

Theorists of deontology since Kant have taken his basic approachi.e. treating categorical moral duties as fundamental to normative ethicsand adaptedit to formulate their ownmoral theories. In the early-to-mid-20th Century, W.D. Ross developed a moral theory that, instead of appealing to one categorical imperative, appealed to five irreducibledeontic principlesthat were supposed to govern a persons obligations. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, these are:

a duty of fidelity, that is, a duty to keep our promises; a duty of reparation or a duty to act to right a previous wrong we have done; a duty of gratitude, or a duty to return services to those from whom we have in the past accepted benefits; a duty to promote a maximum of aggregate good; and finally a duty of non-maleficence, or a duty not to harm others.

Ross supplemented his duty to promote a maximum of aggregate good with statements of what he considered to be intrinsic goods:virtue, knowledge, justice, and the pleasure of others, (not of oneself.) So this makes his ethical system a sort of combination of deontology and consequentialism: deontology at the base, with consequentialism added on as one of the duties.

SinceKants deontology includes only one irreducible categorical imperative, it can be called monist. Rosss deontology, in contrast, has more than one irreducible (basic) categorical imperative, so it can be called pluralist. (5)

Kants and Rosss ethical theories are both deontological theories that focus on the general obligations of the agent as a moral agent. (This means that individuals have duties to themselves based ontheir own agency.) These are called agent-centered deontological theories. On the other hand, some philosophers have theorized that human rights can be based on deontological imperatives. They see an agents rights as irreducible moral constraints on the actions of others toward that agent. (So this means thatindividuals have duties to others based on the agency of those others.) These sorts of theories are called patient-centered deontology.This sort of deontology is most oftendiscussedand advocated by academic libertarians, both right and left. Notable sourcesincludeRobert Nozick, Eric Mack,Michael Otsuka, and Hillel Steiner.

On the level of particular duties, bothagent-centered and patient-centered dutiesduties based on ones own agencyand duties based on the agency of othersare generally understood as being in the Kantian tradition, and are oftencontained together in deontologicaltheories. The difference between the two types of theories lies in where the overallfocus of the theory is: duties to self or duties to others. Typically, agent-centered theories like Kants include patient-centered duties, while patient-centered theories like Nozicks often dont include agent-centered duties.

Virtue Ethics

Aristotle

Instead of focusing primarily on the consequences of actions or duty fulfillment, virtue ethics takes virtuesqualities of moral characteras fundamental to the ethical life.

Modern virtue ethics got its start when Elizabeth Anscombe wrote her article, Modern Moral Philosophy in 1958. In this article, Anscombe expressed dissatisfaction with the utilitarian and deontological ethical theories of her day. She suggested that the ethical theories of the Ancient Greeks, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, could bethe most plausible and satisfactory ones, once they were more theoretically developed.

In the academic revival of virtue ethics that followed, Aristotles ethics became the most popular model for the basic concerns of the virtue ethicists. So to understand modern virtue ethics, it will help tremendously to understand Aristotles ethical views.

For Aristotle, a virtue is an excellence of a persons functioning in a certain area of life. It is a stable character trait that governs a persons actions in some respect. It is not a superficial habit or routine, but permeates every aspect of a persons character, including his emotions, desires and intuitions. The Greek term for such a virtue or excellence of character is arete, and this term is still sometimes used by virtue ethicists today.

Aristotle holds that every virtue is a meanan average or middle groundbetween two extremes which are both vices. So, for example, Aristotle believed that courage was a virtue and was a mean between the vices of cowardice and rashness. The virtue of courage consists of having the proper amount of the quality of confidence in ones character. Too little confidence, and the person is a coward. Too much confidence, and he is rash and foolish. In the practice of indulging in pleasures, temperance is the right amount of indulgence, where licentiousness is too much and insensibility is too little. Other qualities that Aristotle considers virtues, include truthfulness, magnanimity, modesty, and pride. (Pride meansactually being deserving of great things and knowing that one is, not unjustified arrogance.)

So how does one know the boundaries between too much or too little and the right amount? Well, Aristotle didnt think that ethics was an exact science, so he didnt think ethics could answer this directly. Aristotle thought that, in order to act within the boundaries of arete, a personneeds practical wisdom. The Greek term for this faculty isphronesis. (6)

A person who achieves virtue orarete in all the various areas of life, arrives at a condition often called happiness or flourishing. The Greek term for this condition is eudaimonia. Though eudaimonia is sometimes translated as happiness, it does not merely denote an emotional state or subjective feeling.A person in a state of eudaimonia is, according to Aristotle, living in a way that fulfills his natural potentialas a human being. He is living in harmony with his essential nature as a rational animal. Thus, eudaimonia is supposed to be a holistic condition of a person, potentially observable by others. (That is, eudaimonia is supposed to be an objective condition that encompasses both mindand body.)

Virtue ethicists today generally take this basic approach to ethics and make modifications. For virtue ethicists, eudaimonia is not a logically distinct consequence of being virtuous, but in fact consists of being virtuous. Anyone who thought eudaimonia could be treated as a distinct consequence ofarete, would not be a true virtue ethicist, but a virtue consequentialist, with eudaimonia as the moral good. So when a true virtue ethicist is asked what eudaimonia is, their full answer must include their favoredvirtues as being at least partially constitutive of it. This makes eudaimonia a moralized or value-laden concept, according to virtue ethicists, which must be derived from the virtues. Here, the virtues cannot be derived as the causal means toeudaimonia, because eudaimoniajust is the exercise of all the virtues, (perhaps with other conditionsadded.)

Virtue ethical theories can be divided into those thatare universalist and those thatare culturally contextualist. Universalist theories see virtues as applicable in the same basic form to all human beings, regardless of culture. These theories are like Aristotles in this respect. Proponents of universalist theories include Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Cultural contextualist theories see virtues as taking different forms depending oncultural tradition. Even if the virtues in different cultural contexts have the same name, like honesty or justice, they may well be different in theiressential content. The main proponent of this sort of theory has been Alasdair MacIntyre. (7)

There are various different views within virtue ethics about what the exact nature and meaningof the virtues is, and there are sometheorists whotakeinspiration for their theories from Plato and other ancients. Modern virtue ethics is a relatively young movement in the modern academic world. So it hasnt been explored, labeled and categorized to the degree that consequentialism and deontology have.

Objectivist Ethical Egoism

Objectivist Ethical Egoism (OEE) holds that human life is the abstract standard of value in morality. For each individual, who is making moral decisions and acting, this means his own life is his own standard of right and wrong.

OEE was developed by Ayn Rand, and further explicated by philosophers such as Leonard Peikoff, Harry Binswanger, Tara Smith, Darryl Wright, Allan Gotthelf and Gregory Salmieri.

OEE arises in the context of the whole fundamental philosophy that is Objectivism: that is, the Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. OEE is the application of Objectivist epistemology to the fundamental problem of how to live as a human being in reality as it is.

Principles, Human Nature, and Morality

Objectivist epistemology holds that, in order to successfully predict the future (not exactly, but within certain parameters) human beings must observe the world with their senses and develop principles by reasoning on the basis of those observations. This holds whether the prediction is made in the fieldof the natural sciences, the humanities, or morality.

Rational principles are not mere rules. They are general statements of fact that, when combined with a situation and a goal, yield a normative guideline. So, for example, if I have a person on the surface of theEarth, the Newtonian principle of gravity tells me that I can put that person into a circular Earth orbit by launching him to a certain height at a certain speed and in a certain direction. If my goal is to do this, then I have my basic normative guideline: I should launch him at that height, speed and direction.

If you recall the section on deontology, you should recognize this sort of normative guideline as a hypothetical imperative, in Kants terminology: a normative guideline followed for the sake of a goal. According to Objectivism, all genuinely normative guidelinesthat is, all normative guidelines based in realityare hypothetical. This holds whether the normative guideline is in morality or some other field. Objectivism rejects categorical imperatives altogether as baseless.

As with physics and space flight, principles of chemistry normatively guide individuals action for successful chemical synthesis and characterization, principles of psychology guide action in the pursuit of mental health, principles of electronics guide action in the making of televisions and computers, etc. So what do principles of morality guide action in achieving? According to Objectivism, principles of morality guide action in the maintenance and promotion of ones own life, as a human being.

I hasten to addthat life, as it is used here, is not equivalent to being biologically living by having a beating heart, and promoting my life does not mean striving to maximize the length of time myheart is beating. Being comatose or in a vegetative state until one dies is not life in the relevant sense, and it cannot be sustained beyond a few days without the intervention of other humans, who are actually living and sustaining themselves as humans. The life as a human being for which moral principles are required, is a life of conscious value pursuit: that is, it is the deliberate choosing and thoughtful pursuit of goals that sustain oneself.

Humans cant survive like plants do, by rooting themselves into the ground and drawing nutrients from the soil. Nor can they survive by sheer emotions, drives and instincts, like other animals do. To survive for any significant length of time, humans have to think, plan, and obtain what they need using their minds. At the most rudimentary level, this can mean making tools and weapons, hunting animals and gathering fruit and vegetables. Or, atincreasingly advanced stages, it can mean subsistence farming, or producing and trading artisanal goods, meat and farm produce, or it can mean a modern industrial society with a division of labor between industrial farmers, steel producers, car manufacturers, transportation services, etc.

Humans survive by pursuing and achievingobjective values. Objective here does not mean mind-independent or agent-independent. It means based on facts of reality and not a matter of faith, personal whim or arbitrary convention. Objectivism understands that values are relational to each individual, but also that the relationship is a matter of fact, not a matter of faith or whims.

So, as a simple example, food is valuable to the person who is hungry. It only directly supports his life if he is the one to eat it. Food is not valuable in itself, apart from the needs of the hungry person. Yet it is not a matter of faith, whims, or convention that people need to eat to live; it is a matter of fact. (SeeValues Are Relational, But Not Subjective for a more detailed explanation of this point.)

The characteristic and necessary mode of human survival, which is self-sustaining action (i.e. pursuit of objective values) on the basis of thought, is the foundation of an objective account of human happiness, in Objectivism. This happiness is not merely a subjective assessment of ones own psychological state, but a state of consciousnessthat is the psychological aspectof living ones life as a human being. It is the experience of living well as a human being which can be called flourishing or, using Aristotles terminology, eudaimonia.

So here we see that Objectivism identifies eudaimonia with successful and sustainable life. It provides a solid theoretical foundation for Aristotles ultimate good. It clearly explains what eudaimonia means and gives it content in a way that is not dependent on assorted virtues of character as its irreducible foundation. It thus avoids the logical circle of: What are the virtues? The character traits that combine under auspiciousconditions to produce eudaimonia. What is eudaimonia? The state that is the combination of the virtues under auspicious conditions. For Objectivism, happiness is the mental experience of eudaimonia, which is surviving as a human, par excellence. It is the mental experience of engagingto the fullest of ones capacityin the sorts of actions that enable humans to survive and be healthy in the long term.

At this point, lets take a moment to observe an important issue:Earlier, I said that principles of morality guide action in the maintenance and promotion of ones own life. Yet all true principles can potentially be helpful in supporting and enhancing an individuals life. Principles of physics and electronics can enable the development of life-saving medical technology, the deployment of satellites for instant long-distance communication, etc. Principles of chemistry can enable the development of life-saving and life-enhancing pharmaceuticals. Principles of psychology can be used to improvea persons psychological health and help them lead a more fulfilled life. Etc.

So what actually differentiates moral principles from the principles of other fields? The Objectivist answer is first to note that moral principles are one subcategoryofphilosophical principles. Then we say that what differentiates philosophical principles is that, unlike the principles of other fields, the principles of philosophymust be utilized in some capacity by every human being, in the course of living a full human life. Morality is the branch of philosophy that deals withall freely chosen human actions. Basic moral principles apply to every free choice of action any person might make. So while principles of physics may be inapplicable and useless for a psychologist treating a patient, and principles of chemistry may be inapplicable for a student studying music, moral principles are applicable for everyone in virtually every waking moment, in every aspect of life where they are not being coercedby others. (8)

Moral principles are the principles that apply to all freely chosen actions as such, not just actions in the particular field of applied physics, or of music composition, or of applied psychology. Notice here that Im saying that normative morality is analogous to the applied fields of knowledge: applied physics, applied music theory, and applied psychology, but on a broader scale of application in ones life. So what is the field of knowledge that morality applies? The field of knowledge is fundamental human nature, which, in Objectivism, is understood to be a branch of metaphysics. In Objectivism, morality is applied metaphysics. It is the application of metaphysics to the chosengoal of living ones own flourishing, happy life. (9)

It was principles of fundamental human naturemetaphysicsthat I was discussing when I was explaining the concept of life and how humans cant survivelike plants or other animals, but must use their minds to live.

So now that we have a general idea of the nature of morality, in the Objectivist view, and moralitysconnection to Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology, lets discuss the content of Objectivist Ethical Egoism in more detail.

The Cardinal Values

So what does an individual need in order to engage in the sorts of actions that enable survival as a human in thelong-term? Objectivism holds that three cardinal values are needed by everyone in every waking moment: reason, purpose and self-esteem. The fundamental need of reason should be clear from what wasdiscussed earlier about human nature. It is the most basic value required for human life. One should do things that improve ones ability to reason, such as gaining knowledge and learning how to think. One should not do things that destroy ones ability to reason, such as abusing drugs or alcohol, or accepting things on sheer blind faith. One should avoid contradictions in ones thinking, since holding contradictory beliefs is the violation of reason.

Purpose is an aspect of reason, properly conceived. Holding it as a value emphasizes the need to treat reasoning as a means to goals, and not merely as an end in itself. Reasoning that is purely idle contemplation, with no further life-serving goal in view, is a detriment to life. (Please note here that intellectual goals can serve ones life in very indirect ways, as in many cases of increasing ones knowledge of highly abstract, theoretical topics.) In the Objectivist view, reasoning must be directed toward the production of knowledge that is ultimately used in reality in some fashion, in order to be worthwhile and genuine. All human thought and actions must be organized around some sort of reality-based purpose.

Self-esteem is the judgmentof ones own life and self as valuable. On the most basic level, humans need some amount of self-esteem for purposeful, life-sustaining action. This self-esteem is acquired through the judgmentexplicit or implicitthat one is capable of achieving happiness, and the knowledge that one fully intends to pursue that goal. A fuller self-esteem is gained as one actually achievesrational goalsand develops good character.

The Objectivist Virtues

According to Objectivism, these values are the fundamental goals one should pursue. They encompass many particular careers, hobbies, relationships and lifestyles. The fundamental means by which an individual pursues these goals are virtues. According to Objectivism, virtues are not fundamentally traits of character, (as virtue ethicists hold.) They are intellectual principles guiding action. If an individual consistently applies these principles in his life, then they can be automatized and can be said to form a basic part of the individuals character.

There is one fundamental virtue, according to Objectivism: rationality. Rationality is acting in accordance with ones reasoning to the best of ones ability. Being rational does not mean that an individual will be infallible. A fully rational individual may make mistakes in regard to facts, as well as in regard to methods of thinking (logic.) (10) An irrational person is one who doesnt consistently strive to be correct in every issue significant to his life. Irrationality is willfully turning away from facts and logic as ones guides to action. This may be done openly, through an appeal to something other than reason as a guide, such as faith, sheer intuition, emotion, or instinct, or it may be hidden by rationalizations, (thinking processes corrupted by emotionalism and/or dogma.)

The virtue of rationality, on its own, is very general, and so doesnt give people a lot of guidance in how to live moral lives. Thus, Objectivism breaks rationality down into six component virtues: honesty, independence, productiveness, integrity, justice and pride. Ayn Rand described each of these virtues as the recognition of certain fundamental facts about reality, human consciousness, and ones own nature as a human being:

Independence is your recognition of the fact that yours is the responsibility of judgment and nothing can help you escape itthat no substitute can do your thinking, as no pinch-hitter can live your life

Honesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can have no value, that neither love nor fame nor cash is a value if obtained by fraudthat an attempt to gain a value by deceiving the mind of others is an act of raising your victims to a position higher than reality, where you become a pawn of their blindness, a slave of their non-thinking and their evasions, while their intelligence, their rationality, their perceptiveness become the enemies you have to dread and flee

Integrity is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness, just as honesty is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existencethat man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, and that he may permit no breach between body and mind, between action and thought, between his life and his convictions

Justice is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature

Productiveness isyour recognition of the fact that you choose to livethat productive work is the process by which mans consciousness controls his existence, a constant process of acquiring knowledge and shaping matter to fit ones purpose

Pride is the recognition of the fact that you are your own highest value and, like all of mans values, it has to be earned

(Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, (50th Anniversary Ed.) p. 932-934)

Of course, when Rand says you cannot fake she does not mean that its impossible to attempt to fake. She means that you cannot fake and hope to live fully as a human being. Faking puts you on a path to self-destruction. The applicability of the virtues, as with all of morality, depends on an individual making the choice to live, in some form, explicit or implicit. The alternative to the choice to live, according to Objectivism, is to slip into self-destruction. Such self-destruction may be very slow, very fast, or somewhere in between, but if one does not choose to livethat is, to pursue self-sustaining values rationally, keeping ones own life as the ultimate goal of ones actionsthe decay toward death is inevitable:

Man has been called a rational being, but rationality is a matter of choiceand the alternative his nature offers him is: rational being or suicidal animal. Man has to be manby choice; he has to hold his life as a valueby choice; he has to learn to sustain itby choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtuesby choice. A code of values accepted by choice is a code of morality.

(Ayn Rand, The Objectivist Ethics in The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 23)

Lets look at a hypothetical example to see how the Objectivist virtues are necessary means tothe achievement of values.Lets say theres a young woman who has studied Objectivism and who wants to become an architect. She attends college atanarchitectural school.

She is honest and doesnt cheat, since this would undermine her competence as an architect and expose her to the risk of being caught and discredited and/or punished. Shestudies diligently to follow through with her plans, so she exhibits integrity. She is working toward a self-supporting life as an architect, so she exemplifies productiveness.Shes ambitious in her coursework, she doesnt try to skate by with the minimum, and she doesnt apologize for her excellence to others who may resent her for making them look bad. So she demonstratespride. She doesnt try to muddle throughby imitating or copying others, or by relying on them to do all the work in group projects. So she shows independence. She selects her study partners according to their ambition and ability in the class, rather than their need for help. To the extent she can, she selects her instructors according to her best judgment of their teaching abilities. So she acts onjustice.

Now if we contrast this woman with one who exhibits the opposite qualities, it should be fairly apparent who will tend to become an architect in a sustainable way, (what we would typically call a successful architect.) Someone who lacks the above virtues may be granted the temporary illusion of success by making friends and going along with a certain social crowd. But regardless of any false esteem granted by others, the reality will be that a continually dishonest, lazy and unambitious person will not actually be a successful architect.

The Harmony of Rational Interests

Objectivism holds that there are no conflicts of interests among rational individuals. The interests of rational individuals do not consist of short-range, out-of-context desires (whims.) Rather, they consist of goals that are the result of careful thought and planning. This means that rational interests cannot be served by pursuing self-contradictory goals, or effects without the requisite causes.

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Ethical Theories Summarized & Explained: Consequentialism ...

Egoism: Examples and Definition | Philosophy Terms

I. Definition

You may think you already know egoism; but youre probably thinking of egotismself-importance, or self-centeredness. In contrast, egoism is the philosophical view that human beings do, or should, always act for their own benefit. Both words are derived from the Latin word for I ego.

Egoism and egotism are quite different. For example, egotists often talk about themselves a lot, not listening to otherswhich makes people dislike them. In contrast, egoists might act very humbly, and pay attention to othersbecause its in their best interests to make people like them and want to treat them well. Egotism is a character trait; egoism is a philosophy.

Even so, you might think that egoists must secretly be egotistsand a lot of philosophers would agree with you. But the point is that egoism does not necessarily violate our usual notions of what is right and wrong. We will return to this questionof whether egoism implies immoralityin other sections.

In fact, some of our highest ideals in the Western worldindividual rights, freedom, and democracydepend on ideas similar to egoism. All of these philosophies depend on the idea that humans normally do or should pursue their own welfare and happiness. The problem, of course, is when your welfare conflicts with someone elsesanother point well discuss below.

But whether you think egoism is right or wrong depends a lot on what kind of egoism youre talking about. The two main kinds of egoism are quite different; descriptive egoism just claims that human being do always act for their own benefit; while normative egoism claims that we should always act for our own benefit.

The most popular variety of descriptive egoism is psychological egoism, which simply claims that whatever a human being does, the ultimate aim is self-benefit. If psychological egoism is correct, it means that even when people appear to act for others benefit, with no concern for themselveswhich is called altruismtheyre actually doing it for their own sake. It doesnt mean that anyone is necessarily trying to be deceptive, or pretending, to help others (although thats a possibility of course). Psychological egoists would say that people may act altruistically because it will be good for them in the long run, or because it makes them feel good when they do it.

There are at least two main categories of psychological egoismdesire-based and objective. The first says that humans are always doing what they desire. For example, even if you say you dont want to do your homework, you do choose to do it; you have the option to not do it, and suffer the consequences. So, you do desire to do your homeworkjust not for its own sake.

But, this kind of psychological egoism seems to be trivially true; it doesnt say why we make what choices we do.

Other kinds of psychological egoism are called objective because they claim that we are always pursuing certain objectives. Some say we always act for pleasure. Others argue that we always pursue whatever we think will bring us the most benefit.

But most philosophers have rejected psychological egoism. For one thing it is probably unprovable because it is a theory about our deepest motivationswhich are private. How could anyone prove whether you help an old lady across the street only for her sake, or because it makes you feel good about yourself? You may not be sure yourself which it is!

But that kind of example is another reason most philosophers reject psychological egoismbecause human beings really do sometimes act for the benefit of others without expecting to any reward for themselves. Altruism; well come back to this debate in section III.

Normative egoism is not about what humans do, but about what they should do. Two kinds of normative egoism are well known:

Ethical egoists may argue that you cannot know what is best for anyone but yourselfand so it is immoral to try. If you try to act in reference to other peoples interests, rather than your own, you can easily do things those people wouldnt want, mess up other peoples lives, or just violate their right to decide what happens to them, which would be immoral. Ethical egoists also might argue that human beings are dependent on one another for survival, so therefore, it is your moral obligation to take care of yourself first, so that others dont have toand so that you have the ability to take care of them. In other words, whats in your best interests is ultimately in everybodys best interests.

Which brings us to rational egoism, which assumes that we should act rationally, which is egoistically. The most famous rational egoist, the writer Ayn Rand, argued strongly against sacrificing ones own interests for others. She argued that not taking full advantage of ones own freedom is immoral because it opposes the natural fulfilment of human potential, which is the best thing for everyone in a society. For example, if I dont work as hard as possible for my own personal success, then I might fail to accomplish many things that would be good for the world.

Nevertheless, many philosophers feel that rational egoism cannot provide a basis for ethical behaviorthat it is, rather, a justification for amorality (no morality), which could be very dangerous.

In the big picture, its worth noting that egoism has been a characteristically Western philosophy since at least Aristotle. Although there were a few ancient Chinese thinkers who had egoistic ideas, in general, egoism is much harder to justify in Eastern thought, where the ego (the personal self) is an illusion that one should try to get over!

In the west, Aristotle is cited for his early contribution to egoism, in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he points out that one must act for ones own benefit in order to be a good friend, or a good citizenbecause you cant do any good for other people if youre not in good condition yourself. However, Aristotle was not really an egoist, because he believed that it was the primary value of helping others that justified helping oneself.

The main ideas of psychological egoism started popping up in Europe during the Reformation (17th century) such as in the writings of philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (see next section for a quote). Hobbes (and others) argued that all voluntary actions are, by definition, egoisticbecause they are voluntary. So, humans are always acting for their own sakes, whether they think so or not.

Many philosophers shared this view during the 18th century, supported by the rationalism of the time. But David Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix IIOf Self Love), set forth some well-known arguments against it. Hume said that psychological egoism denied the reality of such important human feelings as friendship, love, compassion, and gratitude. He also argued that there was no reason to try to reduce the diversity of human motivations to one simple thing. And he pointed out, as many have, that both humans and animals have been observed to act, instinctively for others sakes.

Early normative egoism is often associated with the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche whose ideas about freedom, the will, and the superman, certainly seem to support egoism, and have been used that way, but Nietzsche himself rejected egoism because, he said, being an egoist would have the opposite of the desired effect; it would set other people against you, which is bad for your own success.

The first philosophers to consider themselves egoists were Max Stirner and Henry Sidgwick in the 19th Century. But probably the most popular and controversial spokesperson for egoism was Ayn Rand, who set forth her arguments in The Virtue of Selfishness, and in novels such as Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. Adapting some of Nietzsches rhetoric, Rand focused on rational egoism as a rejection of the sacrificial ethics of Christianity; she argued that it is wrong to sacrifice ones own interests for others because it is irrational: the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest. Thus, to her, ethical and rational egoism go together. Her perspective owes a lot to Nietzsches rejection of traditional morality and glorification of the individual will.

Over the past 30 years or so, egoism has faced stronger opposition than before because of scientific research showing that (a) humans and animals do have altruistic instincts, (b) selfish decisions are often not in your best interests, and (c) that altruistic behavior is consistent with evolution. When we were evolving, living in small tribes, most people lived around their many relatives, so doing things for others benefitaltruismcould actually spread ones own genes!

Egoism has always been a controversial theory, and we have sketched some of its debates in the previous sectionssuch as whether it can be moral or not, and whether it needs to be.

Another challenge to egoism is whether its even logically possible. Several philosophers have pointed out that it leads to self-contradictions and irresolvable conflicts. For example, Joseph Butler writes that it may be necessary to act un-selfishly in order to receive benefits, which makes egoism self-contradictory. However, we can get around this paradox by just saying that egoism is acting for long-term benefit.

A bigger problem for psychological egoism is that some behavior just doesnt seem egoistic in any sense. Say a soldier throws himself on a grenade to prevent others from being killed. Its hard to say how that could be in the soldiers selfish interests! Hes not going to benefit from it in the long run, or even be able to enjoy the feeling of being a good person. Egoists might argue that the soldier is deceiving himself if he thinks he acted selflessly; perhaps he was sub-consciously motivated to avoid feeling guilty if he didnt sacrifice himself. But then again, feeling that kind of guilt depends on having non-egoistic motivations, doesnt it? An egoist could also argue that since the soldier made a free decision to jump on the grenade, he was, by definition, following his own desires. However, that argument seems like a cop-out; it avoids resolving the question of why the soldier did it.

The major controversy about normative (ethical or rational) egoism is, of course, whether it can be truly ethical at all, since almost all people agree that an ethical system must encourage us to act for the benefit of other human beings. The main points of debate are whether it is desirable or possible to act selflessly, and whether rational selfishness is or is not really the best thing for others. The answers to these questions depend on answers to many other questions: how interdependent are human beings? Is individual freedom more important than social stability? Is individuality an illusion? So, this debate will doubtless not soon be settled!

Ethics has to recognize the truth, recognized in unethical thought, that egoism comes before altruism. The acts required for continued self-preservation, including the enjoyments of benefits achieved by such arts, are the first requisites to universal welfare. Unless each duly cares for himself, his care for all others is ended in death, and if each thus dies there remain no others to be cared for. Herbert Spencer

In this argument for ethical egoism, Herbert Spencer, a 19th century British philosopher, seems to echo Aristotles original justification for some degree of egoismthat a person needs to take care of their own needs and happiness before they can take care of others. Often accused of inconsistency, Spencer was an egoist who also believed that human beings have a natural sense of empathy and should care for each other, although at the same time, he believed that altruism was a relatively recent development in humans.

What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death [the childs], from the slavery of that attendance? David Hume

Hume, a famous opponent of psychological realism, here gives an example that demonstrates several of his arguments against egoism. Hume pointed out that human beings have certain innate non-egoist instincts, such as the compulsion of a mother to sacrifice herself for her children. And even if she does so, selfishly, in order to feel good herself, that doesnt explain why she dies of grief after her child dies.

Altruism is the opposite of egoism the motivation or practice of doing things to benefit others, without expecting any benefit for oneself. However, most of the debates about egoism and altruism are not about whether its good to benefit others or not, which almost everyone agrees on, but whether egoism or altruism are actually beneficial, or even possible.

Just as psychological egoism could be rejected on the basis that its impossible to prove peoples motivations, many philosophers have questioned whether it is possible to prove altruistic motivations either. As descriptions of human nature, egoism and altruism seem to compete on equal grounds; you can pretty much always argue that any action was really motivated by egoism or really altruism, but you cant prove it.

As normative philosophies, about what people should do, most philosophers agree that ethical behavior is behavior which is good for people in generalso you might assume that altruism should win automatically. But there are some pretty good arguments that altruistic action depends on egoist motivations; you might not help that old lady cross the street if you didnt care about feeling good about yourself. And egoists may argue that its immoral to decide whats in other peoples best interests.On the side of altruism is the universal belief that morality means being good to others and the evidence that empathy, compassion, and altruism are natural instincts.

Many popular films feature egoist villainssociopaths who pursue their own gain without regard for others. But Heath Ledgers Joker in Christopher Nolans Dark Knight goes further. Late in the movie he actually sets up a version of The Prisoners Dilemmaa scenario from game theory which philosophers have used to explore the egoism versus altruism debate. The Joker intends to prove to all that his view of human naturepsychological egoismis true. He believes that one or both boats will try to blow up the other one in order to save their own lives, according to the Jokers rulesbut they refuse to cooperate, seemingly proving that humans are not entirely egoistic. Throughout the film, the Joker represents the egoist view as he repeatedly exploits his enemies egoism. But in the end, Batman supposedly demonstrates that altruism is real by taking the fall for a politician he doesnt even likefor the good of the people of Gotham.

Both of the Star Trek films featuring Khan, Captain Kirks worst enemy, explore the consequences of egoist versus altruist views. In Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, we learn that Khans murderous anger towards humanity is partly a result of Captain Kirks earlier action of marooning Khan and his people on a then hospitable planetwhich later suffered an environmental disaster killing most of Khans people. This is a clear illustration of the ethical egoists claim that trying to act in others interests may be immoral. Furthermore, Kirks failure to check up on Khan on the planet suggests that Kirk was not really acting altruistically, but rather egoistically, supporting the views of psychological egoism. Meanwhile, Khan believes that he has a natural right to dominate, based on his superior intellect and strength, a view commonly associated with rational egoism and Ayn Rand. Of course in the end, Mr. Spock demonstrates altruism by sacrificing himself to save the rest of the Enterprise crew, repeating an idea clearly meant to prove that altruism is more rational than egoismthe needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.

Continued here:

Egoism: Examples and Definition | Philosophy Terms

Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The field of ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. Normative ethics takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Finally, applied ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war.

By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"

The term "meta" means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. It covers issues from moral semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent: (1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans, and (2) psychological issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct.

Metaphysics is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks; and perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions. There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take, one other-worldly and one this-worldly.

Proponents of the other-worldly view typically hold that moral values are objective in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human conventions. They also hold that they are absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are universal insofar as they apply to all rational creatures around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic example of this view is Plato, who was inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them. Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles together under the heading of "eternal law" which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects. 17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like relationships rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a spirit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality is divine commands issuing from God's will. Sometimes called voluntarism (or divine command theory), this view was inspired by the notion of an all-powerful God who is in control of everything. God simply wills things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills human life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe that God wills moral principles, such as "murder is wrong," and these exist in God's mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.

The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status of moral values. Technically, skeptics did not reject moral values themselves, but only denied that values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since been called moral relativism. There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is individual relativism, which holds that individual people create their own moral standards. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value system of the masses. The second is cultural relativism which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval of one's society - and not simply in the preferences of individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time and throughout the world. They frequently attempt to defend their position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to another, such as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice.

A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral judgments and conduct, particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore this subject by asking the simple question, "Why be moral?" Even if I am aware of basic moral standards, such as don't kill and don't steal, this does not necessarily mean that I will be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some answers to the question "Why be moral?" are to avoid punishment, to gain praise, to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with society.

One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating to charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing power over other people. This view is called psychological egoism and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called psychological hedonism which is the view that pleasure is the specific driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century British philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is called psychological altruism and maintains that at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence.

A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role of reason in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make the statement "abortion is morally wrong," am I making a rational assessment or only expressing my feelings? On the one side of the dispute, 18th century British philosopher David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all the reasons we want, but that alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement. Reason might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions." Inspired by Hume's anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example, although the statement "it is good to donate to charity" may on the surface look as though it is a factual description about charity, it is not. Instead, a moral utterance like this involves two things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying "Hooray for charity!" This is called the emotive element insofar as I am expressing my emotions about some specific behavior. Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am essentially giving the command, "Donate to charity!" This is called the prescriptive element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific behavior.

From Hume's day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these emotive theories of ethics (see non-cognitivism in ethics) and instead argued that moral assessments are indeed acts of reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a case in point. Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier (1958), was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone's car, then I should be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith's car is wrong since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in support of one course of action versus another.

A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in the psychological differences between men and women. Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can be shaped into a value theory. According to many feminist philosophers, traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following, and more spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within that context. This stands in contrast with male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.

Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits.

The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.

Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics, however, places less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stresses the importance of developing good habits of character, such as benevolence (see moral character). Once I've acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative traditions in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.

Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19th century with the rise of alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special attention from philosophers who believed that more recent ethical theories were misguided for focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre (1984) defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.

Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are sometimes called deontological, from the Greek word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to not care for our children even if it results in some great benefit, such as financial savings. There are four central duty theories.

The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds:

Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts:

Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts:

Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is the duty is to keep one's promises.

A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a "right" is a justified claim against another person's behavior - such as my right to not be harmed by you (see also human rights). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights of one person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights theory is that of 17th century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by governments. Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I cannot hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery.

A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that we have, for example, "If you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to college." By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal desires, such as "You ought to do X." Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty.

A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:

Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor's gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima facie duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun.

It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences:

Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable.

Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.

Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions. Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as she would be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her. On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action.

Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully developed systems of utilitarianism. Two features of his theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of each action we perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as act-utilitiarianism. Second, Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as hedonistic utilitarianism. Critics point out limitations in both of these aspects.

First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities doesn't seem reasonable. More significantly, according to act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be morally permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According to rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test only for the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is wrong." Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor's car, is judged wrong since it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone. John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism is rule-oriented.

Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable consequences are the only factors that matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or painful. For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this problem, G.E. Moore proposed ideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that fulfills our preferences.

We have seen (in Section 1.b.i) that Hobbes was an advocate of the methaethical theory of psychological egoismthe view that all of our actions are selfishly motivated. Upon that foundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as social contract theory, which is a type of rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules than one without moral rules. For without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other people's selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our neighbors' property once their guards were down. Each agent would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes us if we violate these rules.

Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an "applied ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.

The second requirement for an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment of the mentally impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business practices, public versus private health care systems, or energy conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy. The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.

In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue of abortion, for example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion produces greater benefit than disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for determining the morality of a specific issue. The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence lies.

Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism that might focus only on an action's short-term benefit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The following principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:

The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative principles and are derived from both consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The first two principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward others. The principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights.

An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982, a couple from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a baby with severe mental and physical disabilities. Among other complications, the infant, known as Baby Doe, had its stomach disconnected from its throat and was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely disabled child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant. Local courts supported the parents' decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor of corrective surgery derive from the infant's right to life and the principle of paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the best interests of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its quality of life would have been poor and in any case it probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent's perspective, Baby Doe's survival would have been a significant emotional and financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant, given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe's right to life was not clear given the severity of the infant's mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present. The issue here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied ethical discussions.

As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists today, some of which will be briefly mentioned here.

Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in clinical settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities, such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the mentally disabled. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

The field of business ethics examines moral controversies relating to the social responsibilities of capitalist business practices, the moral status of corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination, affirmative action, drug testing, and whistle blowing.

Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and medical issues. These include the rights of animals, the morality of animal experimentation, preserving endangered species, pollution control, management of environmental resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our obligation to future generations.

Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy versus polygamy, sexual relations without love, homosexual relations, and extramarital affairs.

Finally, there are issues of social morality which examine capital punishment, nuclear war, gun control, the recreational use of drugs, welfare rights, and racism.

James FieserEmail: jfieser@utm.eduUniversity of Tennessee at MartinU. S. A.

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Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

What are the strengths and weaknesses of ethical egoism?

The Sui Dynasty, founded by Sui Wendi, or Yang Jian, held its capital at Luoyang. Despite having a short lifetime, the Sui Dynasty accomplished many things. The Grand Canal was extended north from Hangzhou across the Yangzi to Yangzhou and then northwest to the region of Louyang. The internal administration also improved during this time, which is evident by several things; the building of granaries around the capitals, the fortification of the Great Wall along the northern borders, the reconstruction of the two capitals near the Yellow River, and building of another capital in Yangchow. Confucianism also began to regain popularity, as the nobles gained importance. The Sui rulers were interested in expanding their borders and, along with their public works projects, they began costly military campaigns. They were largely successful with their efforts at territorial expansion into the south. However, to the north, in Korea, they did not achieve much. They attacked Korea four times, and each time were met with defeat. These defeats in Korea led to an attack by the Khan of the eastern Turks who surrounded the emperor. Independent governments arose and for five years, China was again split into smaller states.

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What are the strengths and weaknesses of ethical egoism?

Ethical Egoism – Seven Pillars Institute

Ethical egoism is the moral doctrine that everyone ought to act to promote his or her own interests exclusively. In contrast to psychological egoism, ethical egoism makes a claim about how people should behave rather than how they actually behave. Perhaps the most notable advocates of ethical egoism were Ayn Rand and Max Stirner, each of whom argued (although in slightly different ways) that pursuit of ones self-interest should always be a persons primary goal.

Ethical egoism is often equated with selfishness, the disregard of others interests in favor of ones own interests. However, ethical egoism cannot be coherently equated with selfishness because it is often in ones self-interest to help others or to refrain from harming them. For example, Rand contends that it would be absurd to claim that a husband who spends a fortune to cure his wife of an illness does so entirely on her behalf.1 For an ethical egoist, the motivation to help family members and friends is ones personal connection to them and the distress that would be caused by their misfortune or suffering.

The kinds of deeds we perform for our friends and loved ones are not to be done for everyone, however. Rand describes such actions as a reward which men have to earn by means of their virtues and which one cannot grant to mere acquaintances or strangers.2 Complete strangers are not worthy of this special treatment. Nevertheless, Rand does advocate showing all people a generalized respect and good will which amounts to nonintervention; we should avoid arbitrarily doing harm to others, but our duties to aid them are also minimal.3

Although ethical egoism has some appeal (especially in its ability to smoothly reconcile morality and self-interest), the theory has been almost universally rejected as an acceptable ethical theory. One of the most basic criticisms is that ethical egoists typically misrepresent altruism, the doctrine that opposes ethical egoism and basis morality on a concern for others interests. If one embraces altruism, Rand claims that the individual must also embrace low self-esteem, a disrespectful attitude toward others, and a nightmare view of existence.4 Stirner marks a similar mischaracterization of altruism in his description of charitable actions: You love men, therefore you torture the individual man, the egoist; your philanthropy (love of men) is the tormenting of men.5 Stirner and Rand do not consider the benefits of helping others; they recognize altruism only as an impediment to ones individual goals. The problem with their view is that morality concerns all individuals, and the general welfare of others, even if it is not the exclusive focus of morality, is an indispensable component of any comprehensive ethical theory.

Arguments supporting ethical egoism, especially Rands, also tend to rely on a false dilemma. Altruism is considered the only alternative view to ethical egoism, and once it is dismissed, ethical egoism is endorsed. This analysis is insufficient because it omits discussion and refutation of a variety of other ethical theories. Establishing that extreme altruism is an undesirable ethical theory does not provide a sufficient basis for endorsing ethical egoism over all other alternatives.

These problems might be resolvable with further argumentation, but unfortunately, they are not the only difficulties with ethical egoism. Another is that an ethical egoist would not want ethical egoism to be universalized. If it were universalized, others would be deterred from acting altruistically toward the egoist, which would be against the egoists self-interests. Hence, it seems to be in ones interests to endorse the theory personally but not publicly, which leads to an intriguing conceptual problem: how can ethical egoism be considered morally binding if its advocates do not want it to be universally applied?

Another clear problem is that ethical egoism offers no means of resolving conflicts of interest. If ethical egoism were more widely followed, sooner or later, someones interests would conflict with anothers interests. In such a circumstance, it would be impossible for both to pursue their own interests simultaneously, but how does one decide whose interests take priority? Ethical egoism does not provide an answer.

A final and perhaps decisive objection to ethical egoism comes from James Rachels. He equates ethical egoism with racism in terms of its conceptual construction. Racists divide all people into groups and treat people differently based on the trait of ones race but have no justification for concluding that their own race is any better than others, rendering racism an arbitrary doctrine. Similarly, ethical egoists demand that we divide the world into two categories of peopleourselves and all the restand that we regard the interests of those in the first group as more important than the interests of those in the second group.6 The egoist can offer no justification for the distinction between the two groups. Hence, Rachels concludes that ethical egoism is an arbitrary doctrine and that others should be given the same moral consideration as ourselves because their merits and desires are comparable to our own.

Overall, ethical egoism is a widely-rejected ethical theory with few contemporary advocates. Developing ethical egoism into a coherent, functional ethical theory would require massive revision to the original principle.

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Ethical Egoism - Seven Pillars Institute

Difference Between Psychological and Ethical Egoism …

Psychologists and philosophers have long been searching for what the basis of human interactions is. Currently, there are many paradigms, theories, speculations and models, however, one stands out as the most commonly accepted theory, and that is the theory of egoism. There are two perspectives on egoism, the psychological psychological egoism, and the philosophical ethical egoism. Here, well discuss each one and their differences.

As I briefly mentioned above, psychological egoism is a descriptive theory (meaning a theory based on observation) that is largely regarded as the theory that best explains human behavior. Most psychologists believe that ones self-interest (or ego) is the foundation of all the interactions that person does.

For example, if you were to go to a store to buy some water or groceries, it would be because you felt thirsty or hungry. Similarly, if you went to a doctor, it would be because you were sick. In both these cases, your motivation for doing something arose from the fact that you wanted to do something that was in your best interest.

A thing to note here, though, would be that this theory doesnt state you do what you do for your own short-term satisfaction, quite the opposite you do it for your long term satisfaction and benefit. As an example, if you were in a store and saw something you really wanted but didnt have the money for, and you just wanted to experience short-term benefit, then you would steal that thing. This would, however, lead to you getting arrested, so, when looking at it long-term, you would most likely avoid stealing it if possible. And thats exactly what this theory states your behavior is led in a way that ensures your long-term satisfaction.

While psychological egoism is a scientific theory based on observation, ethical egoism, on the other hand, is just a philosophical viewpoint on the morality of actions driven by self-interest. Briefly explained, it states that any consequence that was caused by an action driven by self-interest, is necessarily ethical. People often confuse psychological and ethical egoism because they have similar definitions regarding a similar area. However, they are two fundamentally different things, and their differences will be discussed below.

As I just stated, psychological and ethical egoism are two fundamentally different things. Psychological egoism is a scientific theory that was based on years of observations and collected data, and, as such, it only tries to describe the behavior of people, by stating that its fundamentally led by their self-interest. This means that it doesnt in any way try to give those actions ethical or moral value, or judge them as right or wrong. It just tries to describe reality.

Ethical egoism is a completely different thing. Its not a scientific theory, and it doesnt try to explain anything. On the contrary, it tries to do what psychological egoism doesnt give ethical and moral values to actions (and consequences caused by those actions) that were driven by ones self-interest.

Many interesting moral dilemmas can be found on the Internet. If you take any one of them, and apply your knowledge of psychological egoism, youll find out how the protagonist of the dilemma should act, but youll still most likely feel like that might not exactly be the right choice no matter what the choice was (if it was a true moral dilemma, youll feel that way no matter what you choose). Ethical egoism comes into play here. As a philosophical standpoint, it can give an answer to which of the possibilities the protagonist can make is right and based on the fact that its the most moral choice.

Briefly covered, the differences would be:

Finally, one might wonder if one of the two egoisms shown above is more valid or important than the other. The short answer would be no. A longer explanation would be the following science, by definition, doesnt meddle with whats moral or ethical and whats not. Its purpose is to show how things are and why theyre like that, nothing more, and nothing less. However, in order to have a stable and healthy society, some moral and ethical norms are necessary, and thats where philosophy (or ethical egoism, as a special case), comes into play, providing an opinion on exactly that moral and ethical principles.

So neither is more important and both are necessary in order for society and humanity to grow and improve.

Dr. Howard is a Clinical Psychologist and a Professional Writer and he has been partnering with patients to create positive change in their lives for over fifteen years. Dr. Howard integrates complementary methodologies and techniques to offer a highly personalized approach tailored to each patient.

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Difference Between Psychological and Ethical Egoism ...

Ethics – Wikipedia

Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct.[1] The term ethics derives from Ancient Greek (ethikos), from (ethos), meaning 'habit, custom'. The branch of philosophy axiology comprises the sub-branches of ethics and aesthetics, each concerned with values.[2]

Ethics seeks to resolve questions of human morality by defining concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. As a field of intellectual enquiry, moral philosophy also is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory.

Three major areas of study within ethics recognized today are:[1]

Rushworth Kidder states that "standard definitions of ethics have typically included such phrases as 'the science of the ideal human character' or 'the science of moral duty'".[3] Richard William Paul and Linda Elder define ethics as "a set of concepts and principles that guide us in determining what behavior helps or harms sentient creatures".[4] The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy states that the word "ethics" is "commonly used interchangeably with 'morality'... and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group or individual."[5] Paul and Elder state that most people confuse ethics with behaving in accordance with social conventions, religious beliefs and the law and don't treat ethics as a stand-alone concept.[4]

The word ethics in English refers to several things.[6] It can refer to philosophical ethics or moral philosophya project that attempts to use reason to answer various kinds of ethical questions. As the English philosopher Bernard Williams writes, attempting to explain moral philosophy: "What makes an inquiry a philosophical one is reflective generality and a style of argument that claims to be rationally persuasive."[7] Williams describes the content of this area of inquiry as addressing the very broad question, "how one should live".[8] Ethics can also refer to a common human ability to think about ethical problems that is not particular to philosophy. As bioethicist Larry Churchill has written: "Ethics, understood as the capacity to think critically about moral values and direct our actions in terms of such values, is a generic human capacity."[9] Ethics can also be used to describe a particular person's own idiosyncratic principles or habits.[10] For example: "Joe has strange ethics."

The English word "ethics" is derived from an Ancient Greek word, thikos, which means "relating to one's character". The Ancient Greek adjective thikos is itself derived from another Greek word, the noun thos meaning "character, disposition".[11]

Meta-ethics asks how we understand, know about, and what we mean when we talk about what is right and what is wrong.[12] An ethical question fixed on some particular practical questionsuch as, "Should I eat this particular piece of chocolate cake?"cannot be a meta-ethical question. A meta-ethical question is abstract and relates to a wide range of more specific practical questions. For example, "Is it ever possible to have secure knowledge of what is right and wrong?" would be a meta-ethical question.

Meta-ethics has always accompanied philosophical ethics. For example, Aristotle implies that less precise knowledge is possible in ethics than in other spheres of inquiry, and he regards ethical knowledge as depending upon habit and acculturation in a way that makes it distinctive from other kinds of knowledge. Meta-ethics is also important in G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica from 1903. In it he first wrote about what he called the naturalistic fallacy. Moore was seen to reject naturalism in ethics, in his Open Question Argument. This made thinkers look again at second order questions about ethics. Earlier, the Scottish philosopher David Hume had put forward a similar view on the difference between facts and values.

Studies of how we know in ethics divide into cognitivism and non-cognitivism; this is quite akin to the thing called descriptive and non descriptive . Non-cognitivism is the claim that when we judge something as right or wrong, this is neither true nor false. We may, for example, be only expressing our emotional feelings about these things.[13] Cognitivism can then be seen as the claim that when we talk about right and wrong, we are talking about matters of fact.

The ontology of ethics is about value-bearing things or properties, i.e. the kind of things or stuff referred to by ethical propositions. Non-descriptivists and non-cognitivists believe that ethics does not need a specific ontology since ethical propositions do not refer. This is known as an anti-realist position. Realists, on the other hand, must explain what kind of entities, properties or states are relevant for ethics, how they have value, and why they guide and motivate our actions.[14]

Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking. Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because normative ethics examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts.[12] Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as the latter is an empirical investigation of people's moral beliefs. To put it another way, descriptive ethics would be concerned with determining what proportion of people believe that killing is always wrong, while normative ethics is concerned with whether it is correct to hold such a belief. Hence, normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive, rather than descriptive. However, on certain versions of the meta-ethical view called moral realism, moral facts are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.[15]

Traditionally, normative ethics (also known as moral theory) was the study of what makes actions right and wrong. These theories offered an overarching moral principle one could appeal to in resolving difficult moral decisions.

At the turn of the 20th century, moral theories became more complex and were no longer concerned solely with rightness and wrongness, but were interested in many different kinds of moral status. During the middle of the century, the study of normative ethics declined as meta-ethics grew in prominence. This focus on meta-ethics was in part caused by an intense linguistic focus in analytic philosophy and by the popularity of logical positivism.

In 1971, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, noteworthy in its pursuit of moral arguments and eschewing of meta-ethics.

Virtue ethics describes the character of a moral agent as a driving force for ethical behavior, and it is used to describe the ethics of Socrates, Aristotle, and other early Greek philosophers. Socrates (469399 BC) was one of the first Greek philosophers to encourage both scholars and the common citizen to turn their attention from the outside world to the condition of humankind. In this view, knowledge bearing on human life was placed highest, while all other knowledge was secondary. Self-knowledge was considered necessary for success and inherently an essential good. A self-aware person will act completely within his capabilities to his pinnacle, while an ignorant person will flounder and encounter difficulty. To Socrates, a person must become aware of every fact (and its context) relevant to his existence, if he wishes to attain self-knowledge. He posited that people will naturally do what is good if they know what is right. Evil or bad actions are the results of ignorance. If a criminal was truly aware of the intellectual and spiritual consequences of his or her actions, he or she would neither commit nor even consider committing those actions. Any person who knows what is truly right will automatically do it, according to Socrates. While he correlated knowledge with virtue, he similarly equated virtue with joy. The truly wise man will know what is right, do what is good, and therefore be happy.[16]:3233

Aristotle (384323BC) posited an ethical system that may be termed "virtuous". In Aristotle's view, when a person acts in accordance with virtue this person will do good and be content. Unhappiness and frustration are caused by doing wrong, leading to failed goals and a poor life. Therefore, it is imperative for people to act in accordance with virtue, which is only attainable by the practice of the virtues in order to be content and complete. Happiness was held to be the ultimate goal. All other things, such as civic life or wealth, were only made worthwhile and of benefit when employed in the practice of the virtues. The practice of the virtues is the surest path to happiness.

Aristotle asserted that the soul of man had three natures: body (physical/metabolism), animal (emotional/appetite), and rational (mental/conceptual). Physical nature can be assuaged through exercise and care; emotional nature through indulgence of instinct and urges; and mental nature through human reason and developed potential. Rational development was considered the most important, as essential to philosophical self-awareness and as uniquely human. Moderation was encouraged, with the extremes seen as degraded and immoral. For example, courage is the moderate virtue between the extremes of cowardice and recklessness. Man should not simply live, but live well with conduct governed by virtue. This is regarded as difficult, as virtue denotes doing the right thing, in the right way, at the right time, for the right reason.

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus posited that the greatest good was contentment and serenity. Peace of mind, or Apatheia, was of the highest value; self-mastery over one's desires and emotions leads to spiritual peace. The "unconquerable will" is central to this philosophy. The individual's will should be independent and inviolate. Allowing a person to disturb the mental equilibrium is, in essence, offering yourself in slavery. If a person is free to anger you at will, you have no control over your internal world, and therefore no freedom. Freedom from material attachments is also necessary. If a thing breaks, the person should not be upset, but realize it was a thing that could break. Similarly, if someone should die, those close to them should hold to their serenity because the loved one was made of flesh and blood destined to death. Stoic philosophy says to accept things that cannot be changed, resigning oneself to the existence and enduring in a rational fashion. Death is not feared. People do not "lose" their life, but instead "return", for they are returning to God (who initially gave what the person is as a person). Epictetus said difficult problems in life should not be avoided, but rather embraced. They are spiritual exercises needed for the health of the spirit, just as physical exercise is required for the health of the body. He also stated that sex and sexual desire are to be avoided as the greatest threat to the integrity and equilibrium of a man's mind. Abstinence is highly desirable. Epictetus said remaining abstinent in the face of temptation was a victory for which a man could be proud.[16]:3841

Modern virtue ethics was popularized during the late 20th century in large part as a response to G. E. M. Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy". Anscombe argues that consequentialist and deontological ethics are only feasible as universal theories if the two schools ground themselves in divine law. As a deeply devoted Christian herself, Anscombe proposed that either those who do not give ethical credence to notions of divine law take up virtue ethics, which does not necessitate universal laws as agents themselves are investigated for virtue or vice and held up to "universal standards", or that those who wish to be utilitarian or consequentialist ground their theories in religious conviction.[17] Alasdair MacIntyre, who wrote the book After Virtue, was a key contributor and proponent of modern virtue ethics, although MacIntyre supports a relativistic account of virtue based on cultural norms, not objective standards.[17] Martha Nussbaum, a contemporary virtue ethicist, objects to MacIntyre's relativism, among that of others, and responds to relativist objections to form an objective account in her work "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach".[18] However, Nussbaum's accusation of relativism appears to be a misreading. In Whose Justice, Whose Rationality?, MacIntyre's ambition of taking a rational path beyond relativism was quite clear when he stated "rival claims made by different traditions [] are to be evaluated [] without relativism" (p.354) because indeed "rational debate between and rational choice among rival traditions is possible (p.352). Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century[19] blended the Eastern virtue ethics and the Western virtue ethics, with some modifications to suit the 21st Century, and formed a part of contemporary virtue ethics.[19]

Hedonism posits that the principal ethic is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. There are several schools of Hedonist thought ranging from those advocating the indulgence of even momentary desires to those teaching a pursuit of spiritual bliss. In their consideration of consequences, they range from those advocating self-gratification regardless of the pain and expense to others, to those stating that the most ethical pursuit maximizes pleasure and happiness for the most people.[16]:37

Founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, Cyrenaics supported immediate gratification or pleasure. "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die." Even fleeting desires should be indulged, for fear the opportunity should be forever lost. There was little to no concern with the future, the present dominating in the pursuit of immediate pleasure. Cyrenaic hedonism encouraged the pursuit of enjoyment and indulgence without hesitation, believing pleasure to be the only good.[16]:37

Epicurean ethics is a hedonist form of virtue ethics. Epicurus "...presented a sustained argument that pleasure, correctly understood, will coincide with virtue."[20] He rejected the extremism of the Cyrenaics, believing some pleasures and indulgences to be detrimental to human beings. Epicureans observed that indiscriminate indulgence sometimes resulted in negative consequences. Some experiences were therefore rejected out of hand, and some unpleasant experiences endured in the present to ensure a better life in the future. To Epicurus, the summum bonum, or greatest good, was prudence, exercised through moderation and caution. Excessive indulgence can be destructive to pleasure and can even lead to pain. For example, eating one food too often makes a person lose a taste for it. Eating too much food at once leads to discomfort and ill-health. Pain and fear were to be avoided. Living was essentially good, barring pain and illness. Death was not to be feared. Fear was considered the source of most unhappiness. Conquering the fear of death would naturally lead to a happier life. Epicurus reasoned if there were an afterlife and immortality, the fear of death was irrational. If there was no life after death, then the person would not be alive to suffer, fear or worry; he would be non-existent in death. It is irrational to fret over circumstances that do not exist, such as one's state of death in the absence of an afterlife.[16]:3738

State consequentialism, also known as Mohist consequentialism,[21] is an ethical theory that evaluates the moral worth of an action based on how much it contributes to the basic goods of a state.[21] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BC, as "a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare".[22] Unlike utilitarianism, which views pleasure as a moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are... order, material wealth, and increase in population".[23] During Mozi's era, war and famines were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a harmonious society. The "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to basic needs like shelter and clothing, and the "order" of Mohist consequentialism refers to Mozi's stance against warfare and violence, which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability.[24]

Stanford sinologist David Shepherd Nivison, in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then more production and wealth... if people have plenty, they would be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically."[23] The Mohists believed that morality is based on "promoting the benefit of all under heaven and eliminating harm to all under heaven". In contrast to Bentham's views, state consequentialism is not utilitarian because it is not hedonistic or individualistic. The importance of outcomes that are good for the community outweigh the importance of individual pleasure and pain.[25]

Consequentialism refers to moral theories that hold the consequences of a particular action form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action (or create a structure for judgment, see rule consequentialism). Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right action is one that produces a good outcome, or consequence. This view is often expressed as the aphorism "The ends justify the means".

The term "consequentialism" was coined by G. E. M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, to describe what she saw as the central error of certain moral theories, such as those propounded by Mill and Sidgwick.[26] Since then, the term has become common in English-language ethical theory.

The defining feature of consequentialist moral theories is the weight given to the consequences in evaluating the rightness and wrongness of actions.[27] In consequentialist theories, the consequences of an action or rule generally outweigh other considerations. Apart from this basic outline, there is little else that can be unequivocally said about consequentialism as such. However, there are some questions that many consequentialist theories address:

One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the many types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to utilitarianism, a good action is one that results in an increase and positive effect, and the best action is one that results in that effect for the greatest number. Closely related is eudaimonic consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in material equality or political liberty instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. Whether a particular consequentialist theory focuses on a single good or many, conflicts and tensions between different good states of affairs are to be expected and must be adjudicated.

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that argues the proper course of action is one that maximizes a positive effect, such as "happiness", "welfare", or the ability to live according to personal preferences.[28] Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are influential proponents of this school of thought. In A Fragment on Government Bentham says 'it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong' and describes this as a fundamental axiom. In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation he talks of 'the principle of utility' but later prefers "the greatest happiness principle".[29][30]

Utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that the morally correct action is the one that produces the best outcome for all people affected by the action. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[31] Other noteworthy proponents of utilitarianism are neuroscientist Sam Harris, author of The Moral Landscape, and moral philosopher Peter Singer, author of, amongst other works, Practical Ethics.

There are two types of utilitarianism, act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. In act utilitarianism, the principle of utility applies directly to each alternative act in a situation of choice. The right act is the one that brings about the best results (or the least amount of bad results). In rule utilitarianism, the principle of utility determines the validity of rules of conduct (moral principles). A rule like promise-keeping is established by looking at the consequences of a world in which people break promises at will and a world in which promises are binding. Right and wrong are the following or breaking of rules that are sanctioned by their utilitarian value.[32]

Deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek , deon, "obligation, duty"; and -, -logia) is an approach to ethics that determines goodness or rightness from examining acts, or the rules and duties that the person doing the act strove to fulfill.[33] This is in contrast to consequentialism, in which rightness is based on the consequences of an act, and not the act by itself. In deontology, an act may be considered right even if the act produces a bad consequence,[34] if it follows the rule that "one should do unto others as they would have done unto them",[35] and even if the person who does the act lacks virtue and had a bad intention in doing the act.[citation needed] According to deontology, people have a duty to act in a way that does those things that are inherently good as acts ("truth-telling" for example), or follow an objectively obligatory rule (as in rule utilitarianism). For deontologists, the ends or consequences of people's actions are not important in and of themselves, and people's intentions are not important in and of themselves.

Immanuel Kant's theory of ethics is considered deontological for several different reasons.[36][37] First, Kant argues that to act in the morally right way, people must act from duty (deon).[38] Second, Kant argued that it was not the consequences of actions that make them right or wrong but the motives (maxime) of the person who carries out the action. Kant's argument that to act in the morally right way, one must act from duty, begins with an argument that the highest good must be both good in itself, and good without qualification.[39] Something is 'good in itself' when it is intrinsically good, and 'good without qualification' when the addition of that thing never makes a situation ethically worse. Kant then argues that those things that are usually thought to be good, such as intelligence, perseverance and pleasure, fail to be either intrinsically good or good without qualification. Pleasure, for example, appears to not be good without qualification, because when people take pleasure in watching someone suffer, they make the situation ethically worse. He concludes that there is only one thing that is truly good:

Nothing in the worldindeed nothing even beyond the worldcan possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.[39]

Associated with the pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and especially John Dewey, pragmatic ethics holds that moral correctness evolves similarly to scientific knowledge: socially over the course of many lifetimes. Thus, we should prioritize social reform over attempts to account for consequences, individual virtue or duty (although these may be worthwhile attempts, if social reform is provided for).[40]

Care ethics contrasts with more well-known ethical models, such as consequentialist theories (e.g. utilitarianism) and deontological theories (e.g., Kantian ethics) in that it seeks to incorporate traditionally feminized virtues and values thatproponents of care ethics contendare absent in such traditional models of ethics. These values include the importance of empathetic relationships and compassion.

Care-focused feminism is a branch of feminist thought, informed primarily by ethics of care as developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings.[41] This body of theory is critical of how caring is socially assigned to women, and consequently devalued. They write, Care-focused feminists regard womens capacity for care as a human strength, that should be taught to and expected of men as well as women. Noddings proposes that ethical caring has the potential to be a more concrete evaluative model of moral dilemma than an ethic of justice.[42] Noddings care-focused feminism requires practical application of relational ethics, predicated on an ethic of care.[43]

Role ethics is an ethical theory based on family roles.[44] Unlike virtue ethics, role ethics is not individualistic. Morality is derived from a person's relationship with their community.[45] Confucian ethics is an example of role ethics[44] though this is not straightforwardly uncontested.[46] Confucian roles center around the concept of filial piety or xiao, a respect for family members.[47] According to Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, "Confucian normativity is defined by living one's family roles to maximum effect." Morality is determined through a person's fulfillment of a role, such as that of a parent or a child. Confucian roles are not rational, and originate through the xin, or human emotions.[45]

Anarchist ethics is an ethical theory based on the studies of anarchist thinkers. The biggest contributor to the anarchist ethics is the Russian zoologist, geographer, economist, and political activist Peter Kropotkin.

Starting from the premise that the goal of ethical philosophy should be to help humans adapt and thrive in evolutionary terms, Kropotkin's ethical framework uses biology and anthropology as a basis in order to scientifically establish what will best enable a given social order to thrive biologically and socially and advocates certain behavioural practices to enhance humanity's capacity for freedom and well-being, namely practices which emphasise solidarity, equality, and justice.

Kropotkin argues that ethics itself is evolutionary, and is inherited as a sort of a social instinct through cultural history, and by so, he rejects any religious and transcendental explanation of morality. The origin of ethical feeling in both animals and humans can be found, he claims, in the natural fact of "sociality" (mutualistic symbiosis), which humans can then combine with the instinct for justice (i.e. equality) and then with the practice of reason to construct a non-supernatural and anarchistic system of ethics.[48] Kropotkin suggests that the principle of equality at the core of anarchism is the same as the Golden rule:

This principle of treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself, what is it but the very same principle as equality, the fundamental principle of anarchism? And how can any one manage to believe himself an anarchist unless he practices it? We do not wish to be ruled. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule nobody? We do not wish to be deceived, we wish always to be told nothing but the truth. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves do not wish to deceive anybody, that we promise to always tell the truth, nothing but the truth, the whole truth? We do not wish to have the fruits of our labor stolen from us. And by that very fact, do we not declare that we respect the fruits of others' labor? By what right indeed can we demand that we should be treated in one fashion, reserving it to ourselves to treat others in a fashion entirely different? Our sense of equality revolts at such an idea.[49]

The 20th century saw a remarkable expansion and evolution of critical theory, following on earlier Marxist Theory efforts to locate individuals within larger structural frameworks of ideology and action.

Antihumanists such as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and structuralists such as Roland Barthes challenged the possibilities of individual agency and the coherence of the notion of the 'individual' itself. This was a on the basis that personal identity was, at least in part, a social construction. As critical theory developed in the later 20th century, post-structuralism sought to problematize human relationships to knowledge and 'objective' reality. Jacques Derrida argued that access to meaning and the 'real' was always deferred, and sought to demonstrate via recourse to the linguistic realm that "there is no outside-text/non-text" ("il n'y a pas de hors-texte" is often mistranslated as "there is nothing outside the text"); at the same time, Jean Baudrillard theorised that signs and symbols or simulacra mask reality (and eventually the absence of reality itself), particularly in the consumer world.

Post-structuralism and postmodernism argue that ethics must study the complex and relational conditions of actions. A simple alignment of ideas of right and particular acts is not possible. There will always be an ethical remainder that cannot be taken into account or often even recognized. Such theorists find narrative (or, following Nietzsche and Foucault, genealogy) to be a helpful tool for understanding ethics because narrative is always about particular lived experiences in all their complexity rather than the assignment of an idea or norm to separate and individual actions.

Zygmunt Bauman says postmodernity is best described as modernity without illusion, the illusion being the belief that humanity can be repaired by some ethic principle. Postmodernity can be seen in this light as accepting the messy nature of humanity as unchangeable.

David Couzens Hoy states that Emmanuel Levinas's writings on the face of the Other and Derrida's meditations on the relevance of death to ethics are signs of the "ethical turn" in Continental philosophy that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Hoy describes post-critique ethics as the "obligations that present themselves as necessarily to be fulfilled but are neither forced on one or are enforceable" (2004, p.103).

Hoy's post-critique model uses the term ethical resistance. Examples of this would be an individual's resistance to consumerism in a retreat to a simpler but perhaps harder lifestyle, or an individual's resistance to a terminal illness. Hoy describes Levinas's account as "not the attempt to use power against itself, or to mobilize sectors of the population to exert their political power; the ethical resistance is instead the resistance of the powerless"(2004, p.8).

Hoy concludes that

The ethical resistance of the powerless others to our capacity to exert power over them is therefore what imposes unenforceable obligations on us. The obligations are unenforceable precisely because of the other's lack of power. That actions are at once obligatory and at the same time unenforceable is what put them in the category of the ethical. Obligations that were enforced would, by the virtue of the force behind them, not be freely undertaken and would not be in the realm of the ethical. (2004, p. 184)

Applied ethics is a discipline of philosophy that attempts to apply ethical theory to real-life situations. The discipline has many specialized fields, such as engineering ethics, bioethics, geoethics, public service ethics and business ethics.

Applied ethics is used in some aspects of determining public policy, as well as by individuals facing difficult decisions. The sort of questions addressed by applied ethics include: "Is getting an abortion immoral?" "Is euthanasia immoral?" "Is affirmative action right or wrong?" "What are human rights, and how do we determine them?" "Do animals have rights as well?" and "Do individuals have the right of self-determination?"[12]

A more specific question could be: "If someone else can make better out of his/her life than I can, is it then moral to sacrifice myself for them if needed?" Without these questions, there is no clear fulcrum on which to balance law, politics, and the practice of arbitrationin fact, no common assumptions of all participantsso the ability to formulate the questions are prior to rights balancing. But not all questions studied in applied ethics concern public policy. For example, making ethical judgments regarding questions such as, "Is lying always wrong?" and, "If not, when is it permissible?" is prior to any etiquette.

People, in general, are more comfortable with dichotomies (two opposites). However, in ethics, the issues are most often multifaceted and the best-proposed actions address many different areas concurrently. In ethical decisions, the answer is almost never a "yes or no", "right or wrong" statement. Many buttons are pushed so that the overall condition is improved and not to the benefit of any particular faction.

Bioethics is the study of controversial ethics brought about by advances in biology and medicine. Bioethicists are concerned with the ethical questions that arise in the relationships among life sciences, biotechnology, medicine, politics, law, and philosophy. It also includes the study of the more commonplace questions of values ("the ethics of the ordinary") that arise in primary care and other branches of medicine.

Bioethics also needs to address emerging biotechnologies that affect basic biology and future humans. These developments include cloning, gene therapy, human genetic engineering, astroethics and life in space,[50] and manipulation of basic biology through altered DNA, RNA and proteins, e.g. "three parent baby, where baby is born from genetically modified embryos, would have DNA from a mother, a father and from a female donor.[51] Correspondingly, new bioethics also need to address life at its core. For example, biotic ethics value organic gene/protein life itself and seek to propagate it.[52] With such life-centered principles, ethics may secure a cosmological future for life.[53]

Business ethics (also corporate ethics) is a form of applied ethics or professional ethics that examines ethical principles and moral or ethical problems that arise in a business environment, including fields like medical ethics. Business ethics represents the practices that any individual or group exhibits within an organization that can negatively or positively affect the businesses core values. It applies to all aspects of business conduct and is relevant to the conduct of individuals and entire organizations.

Business ethics has both normative and descriptive dimensions. As a corporate practice and a career specialization, the field is primarily normative. Academics attempting to understand business behavior employ descriptive methods. The range and quantity of business ethical issues reflect the interaction of profit-maximizing behavior with non-economic concerns. Interest in business ethics accelerated dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s, both within major corporations and within academia. For example, today most major corporations promote their commitment to non-economic values under headings such as ethics codes and social responsibility charters. Adam Smith said, "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."[54] Governments use laws and regulations to point business behavior in what they perceive to be beneficial directions. Ethics implicitly regulates areas and details of behavior that lie beyond governmental control.[55] The emergence of large corporations with limited relationships and sensitivity to the communities in which they operate accelerated the development of formal ethics regimes.[56][57]

In Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen conclude that issues in machine ethics will likely drive advancement in understanding of human ethics by forcing us to address gaps in modern normative theory and by providing a platform for experimental investigation.[58] The effort to actually program a machine or artificial agent to behave as though instilled with a sense of ethics requires new specificity in our normative theories, especially regarding aspects customarily considered common-sense. For example, machines, unlike humans, can support a wide selection of learning algorithms, and controversy has arisen over the relative ethical merits of these options. This may reopen classic debates of normative ethics framed in new (highly technical) terms.

Military ethics are concerned with questions regarding the application of force and the ethos of the soldier and are often understood as applied professional ethics.[59] Just war theory is generally seen to set the background terms of military ethics. However individual countries and traditions have different fields of attention.[60]

Military ethics involves multiple subareas, including the following among others:

Political ethics (also known as political morality or public ethics) is the practice of making moral judgements about political action and political agents.[61]

Public sector ethics is a set of principles that guide public officials in their service to their constituents, including their decision-making on behalf of their constituents. Fundamental to the concept of public sector ethics is the notion that decisions and actions are based on what best serves the public's interests, as opposed to the official's personal interests (including financial interests) or self-serving political interests.[62]

Publication ethics is the set of principles that guide the writing and publishing process for all professional publications. To follow these principles, authors must verify that the publication does not contain plagiarism or publication bias.[63] As a way to avoid misconduct in research these principles can also apply to experiments that are referenced or analyzed in publications by ensuring the data is recorded honestly and accurately.[64]

Plagiarism is the failure to give credit to another authors work or ideas, when it is used in the publication.[65] It is the obligation of the editor of the journal to ensure the article does not contain any plagiarism before it is published.[66] If a publication that has already been published is proven to contain plagiarism, the editor of the journal can retract the article.[67]

Publication bias occurs when the publication is one-sided or "prejudiced against results".[68] In best practice, an author should try to include information from all parties involved, or affected by the topic. If an author is prejudiced against certain results, than it can "lead to erroneous conclusions being drawn".[69]

Misconduct in research can occur when an experimenter falsifies results.[70] Falsely recorded information occurs when the researcher "fakes" information or data, which was not used when conducting the actual experiment.[70] By faking the data, the researcher can alter the results from the experiment to better fit the hypothesis they originally predicted. When conducting medical research, it is important to honor the healthcare rights of a patient by protecting their anonymity in the publication.[63] Respect for autonomy is the principle that decision-making should allow individuals to be autonomous; they should be able to make decisions that apply to their own lives. This means that individuals should have control of their lives. Justice is the principle that decision-makers must focus on actions that are fair to those affected. Ethical decisions need to be consistent with the ethical theory. There are cases where the management has made decisions that seem to be unfair to the employees, shareholders, and other stakeholders (Solomon, 1992, pp49). Such decisions are unethical.

Relational ethics are related to an ethics of care.[71]:6263 They are used in qualitative research, especially ethnography and autoethnography. Researchers who employ relational ethics value and respect the connection between themselves and the people they study, and "...between researchers and the communities in which they live and work." (Ellis, 2007, p.4).[72] Relational ethics also help researchers understand difficult issues such as conducting research on intimate others that have died and developing friendships with their participants.[73][74] Relational ethics in close personal relationships form a central concept of contextual therapy.

Animal ethics is a term used in academia to describe human-animal relationships and how animals ought to be treated. The subject matter includes animal rights, animal welfare, animal law, speciesism, animal cognition, wildlife conservation, the moral status of nonhuman animals, the concept of nonhuman personhood, human exceptionalism, the history of animal use, and theories of justice.

Moral psychology is a field of study that began as an issue in philosophy and that is now properly considered part of the discipline of psychology. Some use the term "moral psychology" relatively narrowly to refer to the study of moral development.[75] However, others tend to use the term more broadly to include any topics at the intersection of ethics and psychology (and philosophy of mind).[76] Such topics are ones that involve the mind and are relevant to moral issues. Some of the main topics of the field are moral responsibility, moral development, moral character (especially as related to virtue ethics), altruism, psychological egoism, moral luck, and moral disagreement.[77]

Evolutionary ethics concerns approaches to ethics (morality) based on the role of evolution in shaping human psychology and behavior. Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as evolutionary psychology or sociobiology, with a focus on understanding and explaining observed ethical preferences and choices.[78]

Descriptive ethics is on the less philosophical end of the spectrum since it seeks to gather particular information about how people live and draw general conclusions based on observed patterns. Abstract and theoretical questions that are more clearly philosophicalsuch as, "Is ethical knowledge possible?"are not central to descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics offers a value-free approach to ethics, which defines it as a social science rather than a humanity. Its examination of ethics doesn't start with a preconceived theory but rather investigates observations of actual choices made by moral agents in practice. Some philosophers rely on descriptive ethics and choices made and unchallenged by a society or culture to derive categories, which typically vary by context. This can lead to situational ethics and situated ethics. These philosophers often view aesthetics, etiquette, and arbitration as more fundamental, percolating "bottom up" to imply the existence of, rather than explicitly prescribe, theories of value or of conduct. The study of descriptive ethics may include examinations of the following:

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Ethical Egoism – University of Colorado Boulder

Ethical Egoism

IV. Ethical Egoism

The rough idea behind ethical egoism isthat the right thing to do is to look out for your own self-interest.Weare morally required only to make ourselves as happy as possible.Wehave no moral obligations to others. Ayn Rand seems to endorsethis idea in the following passages:

"By the grace of reality and the nature of life, man -- every man -- is an end in himself, he exists for his own sake, and the achievement of his own happiness is his highest moral purpose" (Pojman, p. 74).

"Accept the fact that the achievement of your happiness is the only moral purpose of your life, and that happiness -- not pain or mindless self-indulgence -- is the proof of your moral integrity ... " (Pojman, 77).

Let's make these rough thoughts more clear;let's formulate a criterion of moral rightness based on Rand'sideas.

A. Formulating Ethical Egoism(EEh)

- Alternative: the alternatives that some agent has atsome time are the actions that are open to the agent at that time;they are her "options"; two actions are alternativesto one another when an agent can do either one of them, but notboth of them.- Consequences: the consequences of a given act are thethings that would happen "as a result" of the act, ifit were performed. Note that some subsequent event is a consequenceof an act whether it is near in space and time or far away; whetherit is something that the agent of the act could reasonably anticipateor not; whether it involves the agent of the act or some distantstranger.

Our version of egoism is going to be a formof consequentialism. A normative theory is a formof consequentialism insofar as it implies that facts about theconsequences determine the normative status of acts.

(This leaves open just what it is aboutthe consequences that determine an act's normative status.Ourversion of egoism will say that it is the pleasure and painthat befall the agent of the act that are relevant.Sowe need to say a few words about pleasure and pain.)

Some assumptions about pleasure and pain:- they are feelings, or sensations- each episode of pleasure or pain has an intensity anda duration; these factors determine the amountofpleasure or pain in the episode- the hedon is the unit of measurement of pleasure; thenumber of hedons in an episode of pleasure is determined by theintensity and duration of the episode of pleasure- the dolor is the unit of measurement of pain; the numberof dolors in an episode of pleasure is determined by the intensityand duration of the episode of pain- Pleasures and pains are "commensurable"; thatis, if some pleasure contains the same number of hedons as somepain contains dolors, then we can say that there is an much pleasurein the episode of pleasure as there is pain in the episode ofpain.(This assumption will enable us to add and subtractpleasure and pains, like the assets and liabilities on an accountant'sbalance sheet.)

We can now define hedonic agent utilityas the total number of hedons of pleasure that the agent of theact would feel as a consequence of the act if it were performed,minus the total number of dolors of pain that the agent of theact would feel as a consequence of the act if it were performed.

In more rough terms, to the hedonic agentutility of some alternative is how good the alternative wouldbe for the agent, pleasure-pain-wise.

The last concept is that of maximizing:we say that an act maximizes hedonic agent utility whenno alternative to that act has a higher hedonic agent utilitythan it has.

Finally, we can state the theory, EEh (EthicalEgoism, of a hedonistic sort):

EEh: An act is morally right if and only if it maximizes hedonic agent utility.

So this theory is saying that an act isright when there is nothing else the agent could do on that occasionthat would lead to a consequence that would be better for himin terms of pleasure and pain.

B. Common Misconceptionsabout Egoism

1.Immediate Gratification

Egoism is not the doctrine that we shouldindulge in as much pleasure we can in the short run, without acare for what happens to us in the long run.And EEhdoes not imply this because, in order to calculate the hedonicagent utility of an action, you need to figure in all the pleasureand pains that would result, no matter how down the line in thefuture.

2.No Altruism

Egoism also does not imply that we shouldnever act altruistically. Rather, it implies that we may act forthe benefit of others so long as that act also maximizes our ownhedonic utility. (See Feldman p. 83 for further discussion.)

3.Psychological Egoism

EEh is a doctrine in ethics, a theory aboutwhat we morally ought to do. However, there is another doctrine-- a doctrine in psychology -- that sometimes goes by the nameof "egoism". This other doctrine, "PsychologicalEgoism," is a view about how human beings happen to be setup, psychologically speaking. It is not a view at all about whatwe morally ought to do. Psychological Egoism says that we humanbeings in fact always pursue our own well-being. That is, we alwayschoose the act that we think will be best for us. We are motivatedonly by the desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain.

C. Arguments for EEh

1.Closet Utilitarian Argument

The Closet Utilitarian Argument (from Feldman, p. 86)(1) If people act in such a way as to maximize their own self-interest,then humanity will be better off as a whole.(2) People ought to act in whatever way will lead to the bettermentof humanity as a whole.(3) Therefore, people ought to act in such a way as to maximizetheir own self-interest; in other words, egoism is true.

Criticism of premise (1):- Feldman's case of the selfish art lover (pp. 85-86).- The "Tragedy of the Commons";the "Prisoner'sDilemma"

Criticism of premise (2):- See Feldman, p. 87.

D. Arguments Against EEh

1.Moore's; Baier's; The Promulgation Argument

(see Feldman, Ch. 6)

2.Feldman's Refutation of EEh

Feldman's Refutation of EEh1. If EEh is true, then it is morally right for the man to stealthe money from the pension fund.2. It is not right for the man to steal the money from the pensionfund.3. Therefore, EEh is not true.

Imagine a treasurer of large pension fund.He is entrusted with keeping track of and investing the retirementsavings of all the workers at a company. He discovers, however,that it would be possible for him to steal all the money in thefund and get away with it, leaving all the workers who workedhard to save their money out of luck. Suppose he does this andsucceeds, escaping to a South Sea Island to live out the restof his days indulging in idle pleasure (at the expense of theworkers he screwed back home).

Egoism implies that the fact that this actionscrews over the workers back home is irrelevant. All that is relevantis whether this action is most in the interests of the treasurer.Well, to see exactly what EEh will have to say about this case,we should fill in the details. Here are the treasurer's alternatives:

Theman's alternativeshedonicagent utilitya1: steal themoney+10,000a2: leave themoney where it is-3

Let's say these are his two main alternativesat the time. EEh implies that it would be morally acceptable forthis guy to steal the money. Why? -- because this act maximizeshedonic agent utility.That is, if he were to performit, he would get a greater balance of pleasure over pain thanhe would get if he were to do any of his alternatives.

So we get premise 1:

1.If EEh is true, then it is morally right for the man to stealthe money from the pension fund.

But this is clearly not right. EEh is mistakenin this verdict. This act is cruel and selfish. It is utterlyimmoral. Most everyone, I take it, would be prepared to condemnthis man for his actions; and we would think it would be appropriateto punish for his ruthless deeds. So we get premise 2:

2.It is not right for the man to steal the money from the pensionfund.

From these two premises, this follows:

3.Therefore, EEh is not true.

This argument is valid: the conclusion followslogically from the premises. The first premise is clearly true.I also think the second premise is true. I think people behaveimmorally when they do this. Maybe Ayn Rand is willing to acceptthis consequence. I myself cannot.Can you?

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Ethical Egoism - University of Colorado Boulder

Selfless Good Deeds? Psychological vs. Ethical Egoism …

Selfless Good Deeds? Psychological vs. EthicalEgoismAugust 19, 2008, 5:59 am Filed under: ethics, philosophy | Tags: altruism, ethical egoism, ethics, philosophy, psychological egoism, self interest, selfish, selfishness, selfless, selfless good deeds, social darwinism, survival of the fittest, thomas hobbes

You may have heard it argued that there is no such thing as a selfless good deed. This statement has served as the focal point of numerous books, lectures, and yes, even a Friends Episode (The One Where Phoebe Hates PBS) (I knowI draw from Friends a lotI digress.) However, there are two main schools of thought on the issue; psychological egoism and ethical egoism.

Psychological egoism proposes that the individual does not choose to be self-interested. Psychological egoists claim that the human is inherently self-interested, and therefore cannot help being as such.

Ethical egoism on the other hand, does not deny that the individual is self-interested, but rather, states that the individual chooses to be as such. Any action, even if seemingly altruistic can be traced to self-interested intentions.

Typically, when presented with the basic description of each position, many find themselves quickly aligning with one side or the other. We identify easily with the notion of self-interest. In every creature, there is an instinct of and for survival. Therefore the notion of being self-interested is biological. If one doesnt look out for their own interest, who will? If one wishes to survive, he/she must seek to benefit self, even at the risk of hurting others. Thomas Hobbes even stated that we would be fools if we didnt look after ourselves. Many may also conjure up parallels with social Darwinism and the survival of the fittest.

The ethical egoist may commit a seemingly altruistic act as well, however, the action is ultimately self-interested, in lines with the notion of what goes around comes around.

There are several major problems with the theory of psychological egoism. The first is that falsification is not possible. Psychological egoism always looks for selfish motivations and refuses to recognize any other kind. The nature of the theory cannot allow for any other motives. A good theory must allow for the possibility of counter-examples. The second problem is it does not take motivation into account. Doing something to benefit oneself is not always selfish. It must be taken into account, what it is that the person seeks to gain, rather than just the notion of seeking to gain. Changing language from unselfish to less selfish is incorrect. Lastly, if notions such as true love, and genuine friendship exist, psychological egoism cannot hold true.

Ethical egoism has problems as well. Ethical egoism seems to be self-contradictory. There cannot be a moral theory that says that ones duty should be something that conflicts with someone elses duty, so ethical egoism is therefore inconsistent. Few ethical egoists find the above refute of their theory convincing. Ethical egoists dont agree that we cant have a moral theory which gives the green light to different concepts of duty. Altruism is inconsistent with egoism.

So where do you fall? Is altruism impossible? Are we hard-wired for self-seeking behavior, even at the expense/inability to perform acts not in our best interest? Do we choose to commit selfish acts or do they run rampant through our brains without any control? Can we live in a world where selfless good deeds are a fairy tale? Do we want to? Perhaps if that is in our best interest.

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Egoism | Learning to Give

Dee Ann Sherwood

Definition

Ego means self; egoism can be thought of as self-ism. Egoism is a theory, in ethics, that human beings act or should act in their own interests and desires. Egoism is opposed to altruism, which asserts that human beings should act in ways that help others. Egoism is frequently associated with the early Greek hedonists, whose aim was pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain (The Columbia Encyclopedia 2002).

The assertion that people act in a purely egoist manner has several problems. Taken in the most literal sense, egoism can easily be proven false. People may be motivated by a myriad of feelings such as anger, fear, love, compassion, pride, a sense of justice, or a desire for knowledge. The theory assumes some ambiguity and fuses intentions and consequences. For example, a cigarette smoker acts on his desire to smoke; smoking causes health problems that are not in one's best interest. Oftentimes, one's desires can lead to behaviors and consequences that are not in one's best interest, though the initial action may have provided pleasure or avoided pain.

Modern psychologists have been challenged to reconcile the two seemingly mutually exclusive theories of altruism and egoism with the concept of an evolving self, a self that is enriched by a widening sphere of investments in others (Kegan 1982). Similarly, Maslow's actualized self is one whose more basic needs (ie., food, water, safety, belonging, esteem, and respect) have been met, propelling the self toward higher development and a concern for others.

Historic Roots

The concept of egoism is rooted in the tradition of Greek hedonism. The ancient Greek philosopher, Epicurus (342-270 B.C.E.) asserted that our life's aim should be fulfilling our moral obligation to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. In a letter to Menoeceus, he wrote:

We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as a standard by which we judge every good. (The Internet Encyclopedia 2002)

Epicurus denounced the pursuit of pleasure when seeking it produced pain. Rather, he thought that the less desires a person had, the easier it would be to find happiness. Yet, in the Middle Ages, Christian theologians "denounced Epicurean hedonism, which they believed was inconsistent with the Christian emphasis on avoiding sin, doing God's will, and developing the Christian values of faith, hope, and charity" (Ibid.).

Thomas More, in his Utopia (1516), revived interest in seeking pleasure, by claiming that God gives us desires for pleasure and He wants us to be happy. Over the years, philosophers and, more recently, psychologists have grappled with the issue of human motivation. Many people are familiar with the Freudian ego, the part of our mind that mediates impulses and desires (Wallach and Wallach 1983). Freud's theory is distinct from the forms of egoism discussed in this paper. For Freud, human behavior results from subconscious sexual desires.

Importance

Common sense and folk psychology assumes that people tend to act in their own interests. Today's culture reflects an interest in self-improvement, self-esteem, and self-gratification. The "X-generation" has also been called the "Me-generation," as rampant consumerism focuses young people on immediate gratification and reflects no example of community responsibility or consideration for others. In fact, the American market economy is founded on the assumption that self-interested, competing parties will produce the greatest good.

Yet, interestingly, our culture provides examples of both self- and other-centered paradigms. There are countless examples of people who act in the interests of others, sacrificing their own comfort and safety, to help fellow human beings, living creatures, or the physical environment. The acts of kindness, rescuing, generosity, self-sacrifice, and advocacy cover the spectrum of needs. Fire-fighters risked their lives, indeed some died, in the September 11, 2001, tragedy in the United States. In addition, a wave of financial gifts to victims and their families followed, as well as volunteers ready to help at the Ground Zero and Pentagon sites of devastation. Mother Teresa tended to the needs of the poor and sick in India - washing, feeding, bathing, and loving the least valued people in Calcutta's society. Princess Diana Spencer used her fame and status to advocate for the banning of land mines; she donated her clothing to raise funds for several social causes.

Ties to the Philanthropic Sector

Theories of egoism attempt to explain human motivation; understanding what motivates one toward serving the interests of others is key to understanding giving and philanthropic activity. The American spirit of giving has been expressed in concrete ways over the past two hundred years. "Major universities have been founded, hospital and medical centers have been built, and social change agencies have come into being" (Russo 1991, 1). Philanthropic gifts of time, talent, and treasure may result from complex motivations (ranging from the feeling of satisfaction that one has helped another to the tax-deduction gained from a financial contribution).

What is important to consider is that it does not have to be an either/or kind of proposition. People's behavior is not purely egoist or purely altruist. Actions can result from a blend of altruistic and egoist motives. Indeed our own American tradition has evolved from this apparent contradiction - we believe in individualism and serving the interests of self, and we have a tremendous history of giving to others in need.

Key Related Ideas

Ethics is a field of philosophy that is concerned with morality, recommending right and wrong behavior. Egoism is a philosophical theory in ethics, which has at least three subtypes, descriptive egoism, normative egoism and conditional egoism.

Descriptive egoism, also known as psychological egoism, contends that people always act in self-serving ways, though they may try to disguise their selfish motives. Normative egoism, also termed ethical egoism, claims people should act in self-serving ways because it is morally right. Modern philosophers have added a third, conditional egoism, which asserts that egoism is morally right and acceptable if it leads to morally acceptable ends; self-motivated actions can be considered morally acceptable, if they lead to the betterment of society and the public as a whole (The Internet Encyclopedia 2002).

Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations, offers an example of conditional egoism. Borrowing ideas from Mandeville's, Fable of the Bees, Smith wrote:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Ibid.)

Important People Related to the Topic

Thomas More (1478 - 1536) was a Renaissance philosopher. His Utopia, sanctioned pleasure on the religious grounds that "the chief part of a person's happiness consists of pleasure," God's wish is for human beings to experience pleasure and find happiness (Ibid.).

During the same era, Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) was born in Westport and educated at Oxford. In Leviathan, a political, philosophical, and ethical piece, Hobbes writes that life is "nasty, brutish, and short" and, therefore, people should above all value and pursue their own interests, under the sovereign authority of God (Ibid.).

During a time of great social upheaval and intellectual debate, that included a civil war and the execution of Charles I, David Hume (1711 - 1776) was forced to flee England (Baird 2000). Hume explored the moral theme of happiness and pleasure, in his renowned, A Treatise on Human Nature. Hume attended Oxford at the age of fourteen and thought that schooling was a waste of time. His position was controversial and brought him into conflict with Aristotelian authorities at Oxford.

Hume's Scottish friend, Adam Smith (1723 - 1790), expanded an application of egoism to include the economic sphere. The Wealth of Nations came to be regarded as the foundation for classical economics. In it, Smith asserts that if market forces were allowed to operate, unfettered by government interference, "an invisible hand" would guide the interests of the public and society at large would be served (The New American 1989). Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the work of German philosopher Max Stirner (1806 - 1856). In The Ego and His Own, Stirner asserts that "the individual must find his entire satisfaction in his own life" (Fleischman 1971, 14). For Stirner, the unique man is the center of the world; his will, in relation to his property, is an expression of his subjective interests. Stirner exalted self above the State, the law, and God (Honderich 1995).

Related Nonprofit Organizations

The Adam Smith Institute is "dedicated to introducing choice and competition, in extending the influence of markets, and giving ordinary people the chance to help frame their future by their choices, and in redesigning public services in ways that inject innovation and customer responsiveness into their delivery"

(The Adam Smith Institute 2002). Established in 1977, this British organization claims to have led the way in the development and evaluation of public policy.

The Values Institute, directed by Dr. Lawrence Hinman of the University of San Diego, is dedicated to the exploration and analysis of values, including egoism, as an ethical theory. Hinman purposes a four-quadrant framework, of opposing continua (representing degrees of altruistic and egoistic motivations) in order to understand human motivation and behavior.

Related Web Sites

The Adam Smith Institute Web site contains information with text and photos, related to the pursuit of self-interest in the American market economy, at http://www.adamsmith.org/.

The Ethics Update Web site, at http://ethics.sandiego.edu/ was founded in 1994, by Dr. Lawrence Hinman. It was designed to "provide updates on current literature, both popular and professional, that relates to ethics," primarily for faculty and students.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains text and links to information on egoism, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/.

The Values Institute Web site, at http://ethics.sandiego.edu/values/index.html, contains links to egoism information with text and photos. The Institute is "dedicated to thoughtful discussion of difficult moral issues."

Bibliography and Internet Sources

The Adam Smith Institute. [updated 1 October 2002; cited 8 October 2002]. Available from http://www.adamsmith.org.

Baird, Forrest. Philosophic Classics, Vol. III. New York: Prentice Hall, 2000.

The Columbia Encyclopedia, sixth ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

The Ethics Update. Psychological Egoism. [updated 7 October 2002; cited 12 October 2002]. Available from http://ethics.sandiego.edu/index.html.

Fleischman, Eugene. The Role of the Individual in Pre-Revolutionary Society: Stirner, Marx, and Hegel. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 0198661320.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hedonism. [cited 29 September 2002]. Available from http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/hedonism.

Kegan, Robert. The Evolving Self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

The New American Desk Encyclopedia. New York: Concord Reference Books, 1989.

Russo, Henry A. Achieving Excellence in Fund Raising. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991. ISBN: 1555423876.

Wallach, Michael, and Wallach, Lise. Psychology's Sanction for Selfishness. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman Company, 1983.

This paper was developed by a student taking a Philanthropic Studies course taught at the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. It is offered by Learning To Give and the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University.

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Egoism | Learning to Give

The Differences Between Utilitarianism & Ethical Egoism …

Consequentialism is a moral theory that states that the consequences of one's actions are the basis for any morality or judgment toward that action. Both utilitarianism and ethical egoism are theories within consequentialism that focus on the outcome of conduct as the primary motivation of that action and any critique of whether or not that conduct is ethical. The major difference between utilitarianism and ethical egoism is where those acts are directed.

Utilitarianism focuses on the idea of the greater good. Essentially, this ethical theory intends to maximize good for the the most people. The moral worth of any action is judged by how much good results for all sentient beings. While some individuals may suffer from these actions, utilitarianism holds that the conduct may still be ethical if it does more good for a greater number of people than it harms.

Ethical egoism, also known simply as egoism, holds that moral conduct ought to be judged through self-interest. Egoism states that the good consequences for the individual agent outweigh the consequences placed upon others. In egoism, actions could be considered ethical for the individual if the one taking the action is benefited, while any benefit or detriment to the welfare of others is a side effect and not as important as the consequences for the individual.

The primary differences between these two theories, keeping in mind that there are numerous sub-theories within each branch of thought, is the value placed between the individual and others. In utilitarianism, the most ethical action may be that which harms the individual agent but maximizes the positive impact for the most people overall, essentially placing the emphasis on the whole as opposed to the individual. In egoism, the individual has a greater value than others, thus it is ethical to act in one's own self-interest even if it may potentially harm others.

Utilitarianism seeks to maximize good by minimizing harm to all while egoism seeks to maximize good by keeping the individual happy. In utilitarianism, actions must be judged on the amount of people (or beings) that benefit from the action as opposed to how many the same action may potentially harm. Proponents argue that utilitarianism results in a greater sum of benefit to its harm, based upon outcome and not intention. However, critics of utilitarianism argue that following the interest of the greater good may result in tremendous harm to a large number of individuals.

Meanwhile, egoists argue that acting in self-interest can result in position action because the individual knows best how to benefit his own self, and if everyone were to act in the interest of others, then the general welfare of all would decrease as they are never working for their own good. Egoists trust that others will act in their own interests, thus making it unnecessary to take action solely for their benefit.

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The Differences Between Utilitarianism & Ethical Egoism ...

Psychological Egoism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Psychological egoism is the thesis that we are always deep down motivated by what we perceive to be in our own self-interest. Psychological altruism, on the other hand, is the view that sometimes we can have ultimately altruistic motives. Suppose, for example, that Pam saves Jim from a burning office building. What ultimately motivated her to do this? It would be odd to suggest that its ultimately her own benefit that Pam is seeking. After all, shes risking her own life in the process. But the psychological egoist holds that Pams apparently altruistic act is ultimately motivated by the goal to benefit herself, whether she is aware of this or not. Pam might have wanted to gain a good feeling from being a hero, or to avoid social reprimand that would follow had she not helped Jim, or something along these lines.

Several other egoistic views are related to, but distinct from psychological egoism. Unlike ethical egoism, psychological egoism is merely an empirical claim about what kinds of motives we have, not what they ought to be. So, while the ethical egoist claims that being self-interested in this way is moral, the psychological egoist merely holds that this is how we are. Similarly, psychological egoism is not identical to what is often called psychological hedonism. Psychological hedonism restricts the range of self-interested motivations to only pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Thus, it is a specific version of psychological egoism.

The story of psychological egoism is rather peculiar. Though it is often discussed, it hasnt been explicitly held by many major figures in the history of philosophy. It is most often attributed to only Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jeremy Bentham (1781). Most philosophers explicitly reject the view, largely based on famous arguments from Joseph Butler (1726). Nevertheless, psychological egoism can be seen as a background assumption of several other disciplines, such as psychology and economics. Moreover, some biologists have suggested that the thesis can be supported or rejected directly based on evolutionary theory or work in sociobiology.

While psychological egoism is undoubtedly an empirical claim, there hasnt always been a substantial body of experimental data that bears on the debate. However, a great deal of empirical work beginning in the late 20th century has largely filled the void. Evidence from biology, neuroscience, and psychology has stimulated a lively interdisciplinary dialogue. Regardless of whether or not the empirical evidence renders a decisive verdict on the debate, it has certainly enriched discussion of the issue.

Psychological egoism is a thesis about motivation, usually with a focus on the motivation of human (intentional) action. It is exemplified in the kinds of descriptions we sometimes give of peoples actions in terms of hidden, ulterior motives. A famous story involving Abraham Lincoln usefully illustrates this (see Rachels 2003, p. 69). Lincoln was allegedly arguing that we are all ultimately self-interested when he suddenly stopped to save a group of piglets from drowning. His interlocutor seized the moment, attempting to point out that Lincoln is a living counter-example to his own theory; Lincoln seemed to be concerned with something other than what he took to be his own well-being. But Lincoln reportedly replied: I should have had no peace of mind all day had I gone on and left that suffering old sow worrying over those pigs. I did it to get peace of mind, dont you see?

The psychological egoist holds that descriptions of our motivation, like Lincolns, apply to all of us in every instance. The story illustrates that there are many subtle moves for the defender of psychological egoism to make. So it is important to get a clear idea of the competing egoistic versus altruistic theories and of the terms of the debate between them.

Egoism is often contrasted with altruism. Although the egoism-altruism debate concerns the possibility of altruism in some sense, the ordinary term "altruism" may not track the issue that is of primary interest here. In at least one ordinary use of the term, for someone to act altruistically depends on her being motivated solely by a concern for the welfare of another, without any ulterior motive to simply benefit herself. Altruism here is a feature of the motivation that underlies the action (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 199). (Another sense of "altruism"often used in a fairly technical sense in biologyis merely behavioral; see 4a.) To this extent, this ordinary notion of altruism is close to what is of philosophical interest. But there are differences. For instance, ordinarily we seem to only apply the term altruism to fairly atypical actions, such as those of great self-sacrifice or heroism. But the debate about psychological egoism concerns the motivations that underlie all of our actions (Nagel 1970/1978, p. 16, n. 1).

Regardless of ordinary terminology, the view philosophers label psychological egoism has certain key features. Developing a clear and precise account of the egoism-altruism debate is more difficult than it might seem at first. To make the task easier, we may begin with quite bare and schematic definitions of the positions in the debate (May 2011, p. 27; compare also Rosas 2002, p. 98):

We will use the term desire here in a rather broad sense to simply mean a motivational mental statewhat we might ordinarily call a motive or reason in at least one sense of those terms. But what is an ultimate desire, and when is it altruistic rather than egoistic? Answering these and related questions will provide the requisite framework for the debate.

We can begin to add substance to our bare theses by characterizing what it is to have an altruistic versus an egoistic desire. As some philosophers have pointed out, the psychological egoist claims that all of ones ultimate desires concern oneself in some sense. However, we must make clear that an egoistic desire exclusively concerns ones own well-being, benefit, or welfare. A malevolent ultimate desire for the destruction of an enemy does not concern oneself, but it is hardly altruistic (Feinberg 1965/1999, 9, p. 497; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 229).

Similarly, despite its common use in this context, the term selfish is not appropriate here either. The psychological egoist claims that we ultimately only care about (what we consider to be) our own welfare, but this neednt always amount to selfishness. Consider an ultimate desire to take a nap that is well-deserved and wont negatively affect anyone. While this concerns ones own benefit, there is no sense in which it is selfish (Henson 1988, 7; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 227). The term self-interest is more fitting.

With these points in mind, we can characterize egoistic and altruistic desires in the following way:

Its important that the desire in some sense represents the person as oneself (or, as the case may be, as another). For example, suppose that John wants to help put out a fire in the hair of a man who appears to be in front of him, but he doesnt know that hes actually looking into a mirror, and its his own hair thats ablaze. If Johns desire is ultimate and is simply to help the man with his hair in flames, then it is necessary to count his desire as concerning someone other than himself, even though he is in fact the man with his hair on fire (Oldenquist 1980, pp. 27-8; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 214).

The reason for the focus on ultimate desires is that psychological egoists dont deny that we often have desires that are altruistic. They do claim, however, that all such altruistic desires ultimately depend on an egoistic desire that is more basic. In other words, we have an ulterior motive when we help othersone that likely tends to fly below the radar of consciousness or introspection.

Thus, we must draw a common philosophical distinction between desires that are for a means to an end and desires for an end in itself. Instrumental desires are those desires one has for something as a means for something else; ultimate desires are those desires one has for something as an end in itself, not as a means to something else (see Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 217-222). The former are often called extrinsic desires and the latter intrinsic desires (see e.g. Mele 2003 Ch. 1.8.). Desires for pleasure and the avoidance of pain are paradigmatic ultimate desires, since people often desire these as ends in themselves, not as a mere means to anything else. But the class of ultimate desires may include much more than this.

There are two important aspects to highlight regarding how psychological egoism and altruism relate to one another. First, psychological egoism makes a stronger, universal claim that all of our ultimate desires are egoistic, while psychological altruism merely makes the weaker claim that some of our ultimate desires are altruistic. Thus, the former is a monistic thesis, while the latter is a pluralistic thesis (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 228). Consequently, psychological egoism is easier to refute than the opposing view. If one were to successfully demonstrate that someeven just oneof a persons ultimate desires are altruistic, then we can safely reject psychological egoism. For example, if Thomas removes his heel from anothers gouty toe because he has an ultimate desire that the person benefit from it, then psychological egoism is false.

Second, the positions in the debate are not exactly the denial of one another, provided there are desires that are neither altruistic nor egoistic (Stich, Doris, & Roedder 2010, sect. 2). To take an example from Bernard Williams, a madman might have an ultimate desire for a chimpanzees tea party to be held in the cathedral (1973, p. 263). He does not desire this as a means to some other end, such as enjoyment at the sight of such a spectacle (he might, for example, secure this in his will for after his death). Assuming the desire for such a tea party is neither altruistic nor egoistic (because it doesnt have to do with anyones well-being), would it settle the egoism-altruism debate? Not entirely. It would show that psychological egoism is false, since it would demonstrate that some of our ultimate desires are not egoistic. However, it would not show that psychological altruism is true, since it does not show that some of our ultimate desires are altruistic. Likewise, suppose that psychological altruism is false because none of our ultimate desires concern the benefit of others. If that is true, psychological egoism is not thereby true. It too could be false if we sometimes have ultimate desires that are not egoistic, like the madmans. The point is that the theses are contraries: they cannot both be true, but they can both be false.

Philosophers dont have much sympathy for psychological egoism. Indeed, the only major figures in the history of philosophy to endorse the view explicitly are arguably Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. Some might also include Aristotle (compare Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 501) and John Stuart Mill (compare Sidgwick 1874/1907, 1.4.2.1), but there is some room for interpreting them otherwise. Hobbes explicitly states in Leviathan (1651/1991):

no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which, if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help. (Ch. XV, p. 47)

In a similar vein, Bentham famously opens his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781/1991) with this:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. (p. 313)

Here Bentham appears to endorse a specific version of psychological egoism, namely psychological hedonism. This view restricts the kind of self-interest we can ultimately desire to pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Unfortunately, Hobbes and Bentham dont offer much in the way of arguments for these views; they tend to just assume them.

One tempting argument for psychological egoism is based on what seem to be conceptual truths about (intentional) action. For example, many hold that all of ones actions are motivated by ones own desires. This might seem to directly support psychological egoism because it shows that we are all out to satisfy our own desires (compare Hobbes). In his famous Fifteen Sermons, Bishop Butler (1726/1991) anticipates such an argument for the universality of egoistic desires (or self-love) in the following manner:

[B]ecause every particular affection is a mans own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love. (Sermon XI, p. 366)

However, as Butler goes on to say, this line of argument rests on a mistake or at least a play on words. Many philosophers have subsequently reinforced Butlers objection, often pointing to two intertwined confusions: one based on our desires being ours, another based on equivocation on the word satisfaction. On the former confusion, C. D. Broad says it is true that all impulses belong to a self but it is not true that the object of any of them is the general happiness of the self who owns them (1930/2000, p. 65).

Similarly, the second confusion fails to distinguish between what Bernard Williams calls desiring the satisfaction of ones desire and desiring ones own satisfaction (1973, p. 261). The word satisfaction in the latter case is the more ordinary use involving ones own pleasure or happiness. If all actions are motivated by a desire for this, then psychological egoism is indeed established. But the basic consideration from the theory of action we began with was merely that all actions are motivated by a desire of ones own, which is meant to be satisfied. However, this employs a different notion of satisfaction, which merely means that the person got what she wanted (Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 496). The claim that everyone is out to satisfy their own desires is a fairly uninteresting one, since it doesnt show that we are motivated by self-interest. If Mother Teresa did have an altruistic desire for the benefit of another, it is no count against her that she sought to satisfy itthat is, bring about the benefit of another. This argument for psychological egoism, then, seems to rely on an obviously false view of self-interest as desire-satisfaction.

A major theoretical attraction of psychological egoism is parsimony. It provides a simple account of human motivation and offers a unified explanation of all our actions. Although actions may vary in content, the ultimate source is self-interest: doing well at ones job is merely to gain the favor of ones boss; returning a wallet is merely to avoid the pang of guilt that would follow keeping it; saying thank you for a meal is merely to avoid social reprimand for failing to conform to etiquette; and so on.

One might dispute whether psychological egoism is any more parsimonious than psychological altruism (Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 292-3). More importantly, however, it is no argument for a view that it is simpler than its competitors. Perhaps we might employ Ockhams Razor as a sort of tie-breaker to adjudicate between two theories when they are equal in all other respects, but this involves more than just simplicity (Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 293-5). As David Hume puts it, psychological egoism shouldnt be based solely on that love of simplicity which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy (1751/1998, p. 166). The heart of the debate then is whether there are other reasons to prefer one view over the other.

Perhaps the psychological egoist neednt appeal to parsimony or erroneous conceptions of self-interest. Bentham, after all, suggests that ordinary experience shows that we are ultimately motivated to gain pleasure or avoid pain (1781/1991, Ch. 3). Perhaps one could extrapolate an argument on behalf of psychological egoism along the following lines (Feinberg 1965/1999, sect. 4, p. 495). Experience shows that people must be taught to care for others with carrots and stickswith reward and punishment. So seemingly altruistic ultimate desires are merely instrumental to egoistic ones; we come to believe that we must be concerned with the interests of others in order to gain rewards and avoid punishment for ourselves (compare the argument in 5a).

This line of reasoning is rather difficult to evaluate given that it rests on an empirical claim about moral development and learning. Ordinary experience does show that sometimes its necessary to impose sanctions on children for them to be nice and caring. But even if this occurs often, it doesn't support a universal claim that it always does. Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence gathered by developmental psychologists indicating that young children have a natural, unlearned concern for others. There is some evidence, for example, that children as young as 14-months will spontaneously help a person they believe is in need (Warneken & Tomasello 2007). It seems implausible that children have learned at such a young agethat this behavior will be benefit themselves. On the other hand, such empirical results do not necessarily show that the ultimate motivation behind such action is altruistic. The psychological egoist could argue that we still possess ultimately egoistic desires (perhaps we are simply born believing that concern for others will benefit oneself). However, the developmental evidence still undermines the moral education argument by indicating that our concern for the welfare others is not universally learned from birth by sanctions of reward and punishment.

Another argument for psychological egoism relies on the idea that we often blur our conception of ourselves and others when we are benevolent. Consider the paradigm of apparently selfless motivation: concern for family, especially ones children. Francis Hutcheson anticipates the objection when he imagines a psychological egoist proclaiming: Children are not only made of our bodies, but resemble us in body and mind; they are rational agents as we are, and we only love our own likeness in them (1725/1991, p. 279, Raphael sect. 327). And this might seem to be supported by recent empirical research. After all, social psychologists have discovered that we tend to feel more empathy for others we perceive to be in need when they are similar to us in various respects and when we take on their perspective (Batson 1991; see 5b). In fact, some psychologists have endorsed precisely this sort of self-other merging argument for an egoistic view (for example, Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg 1997).

One might doubt, however, whether a self-other merging account is able to explain helping behavior in an egoistic way. For example, it would be quite implausible to say that we literally believe we exist in two different bodies when feeling empathy for someone. The most credible reading of the proposal is that we conceptually blur the distinction between ourselves and others in the relevant cases. Yet this would seem to require, contrary to fact, that our behavior reflects this blurring. If we think of the boundary between ourselves and another as indeterminate, presumably our helping behavior would reflect such indeterminacy. (For further discussion, see Hutcheson 1725/1991, pp. 279-80; Batson 2011, ch. 6; May 2011.)

Considering the arguments, the case for psychological egoism seems rather weak. But is there anything to be said directly against it? This section examines some of the most famous arguments philosophers have proposed against the view.

Bishop Joseph Butler provides a famous argument against psychological egoism (focusing on hedonism) in his Fifteen Sermons. The key passage is the following:

That all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another. (1726/1991, Sermon XI, p. 365)

Many philosophers have championed this argument, whichElliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) have dubbed Butlers stone. Broad (1930/2000), for example, writes that Butler killed the theory [of psychological egoism] so thoroughly that he sometimes seems to the modern reader to be flogging dead horses (p. 55).

Butlers idea is that the experience of pleasure upon attaining something presupposes (or at least strongly indicates) a desire for the thing attained, not the pleasure itself. After all, we typically do not experience pleasure upon getting something (like food) unless we want it.The pleasure that accompanies the fulfillment of our desires is often a mere byproduct of our prior desire for the thing that gave us pleasure. Often we feel pleasure upon getting what we want precisely because we wanted what gave us pleasure. Consider, for example, getting second place in a race. This would make a runner happy if she wants to get second place; but it would not if she doesn't want this at all (e.g. she only wants first place).

While Butler's version of the argument may be overly ambitious in various respects (Sidgwick1874/1907, 1.4.2.3;Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 278), the best version is probably something like the following (compare the"disinterested benevolence" argument in Feinberg1965/1999, c8):

The basic idea is that pleasure (or self-interest generally) cant be our universal concern because having it sometimespresupposes a desire for something other than pleasure itself.Many philosophers have endorsed this sort of argument, not only against hedonism but more generally against egoism (Hume 1751/1998, App. 2.12; Broad 1950/1952; Nagel 1970/1978, p. 80, n. 1; Feinberg 1965/1999).

Sober and Wilson, however, make the case that such arguments are seriously flawed at least because the conclusion does not follow from the premises (1998, p. 278).That is, the premises, even if true, fail to establish the conclusion. The main problem is that such arguments tell us nothing about which desires are ultimate. Even if the experience of pleasure sometimes presupposes a desire for the pleasurable object, it is still left open whether the desire for what generated the pleasure is merely instrumental to a desire for pleasure (or some other form of self-interest). Consider the following causal chain, using to mean caused (see Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 278):

Desire for food Eating Pleasure

According to Butler, the experience of pleasure upon eating some food allows us to infer the existence of a desire for food. This is all the argument gets us. Yet Butler's opponent, the egoist, maintains that the desire for food is subsequent to and dependent on an ultimate desire for pleasure (or some other form of self-interest):

Ultimate desire for pleasure Desire for food Eating Pleasure

This egoistic picture is entirely compatible with Butler's claims about presupposition. So, even if the premises are true, it does not follow that egoism is false.

Butler would need a stronger premise, such as: pleasurepresupposes an ultimate desire for what generated it, not for the resulting benefit. But this revision would plausibly make the argument question-begging. The new premise seems to amount to nothing more than the denial of psychological egoism: sometimes people havean ultimate desire for something other than self-interest. At the very least, the argument is dialectically unhelpfulit offers premises in support of the conclusion that are as controversial as the conclusion is, and for similar reasons.

Still, a general lesson can clearly be gained from arguments like Butler's. Psychological egoists cannot establish their view simply by pointing to the pleasure or self-benefit that accompanies so many actions. After all, often self-benefit only seems to be what we ultimately desire, though a closer look reveals benefits like pleasure are likely justbyproducts while the proximate desire is for that which generates them. As Hume puts it, sometimes "we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame or power, or vengeance without any regard to interest; and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections" (1751/1998, App. 2.12, emphasis added). Perhaps Butler's point is best seen as a formidable objection to a certain kind of argument for egoism, rather than a positive argument against the theory.

A simple argument against psychological egoism is that it seems obviously false. As Francis Hutcheson proclaims: An honest farmer will tell you, that he studies the preservation and happiness of his children, and loves them without any design of good to himself (1725/1991, p. 277, Raphael sect. 327). Likewise, Hume rhetorically asks, What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance? (1751/1998, App. 2.9, p. 167). Building on this observation, Hume takes the most obvious objection to psychological egoism to be that:

as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. [] And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. (1751/1998, App. 2.6, p. 166)

Here Hume is offering a burden-shifting argument. The idea is that psychological egoism is implausible on its face, offering strained accounts of apparently altruistic actions. So the burden of proof is on the egoist to show us why we should believe the view; yet the attempts so far have hitherto proved fruitless, according to Hume (1751/1998, App. 2.6, p. 166). Similarly, C. D. Broad (1950/1952) and Bernard Williams (1973, pp. 262-3) consider various examples of actions that seem implausible to characterize as ultimately motivated by self-interest.

Given the arguments, it is still unclear why we should consider psychological egoism to be obviously untrue. One might appeal to introspection or common sense; but neither is particularly powerful. First, the consensus among psychologists is that a great number of our mental states, even our motives, are not accessible to consciousness or cannot reliably be reported on through the use of introspection (see, for example, Nisbett and Wilson 1977). While introspection, to some extent, may be a decent source of knowledge of our own minds, it is fairly suspect to reject an empirical claim about potentially unconscious motivations. Besides, one might report universally egoistic motives based on introspection (e.g. Mercer 2001, pp. 229-30). Second, shifting the burden of proof based on common sense is rather limited. Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 288) go so far as to say that we have no business taking common sense at face value in the context of an empirical hypothesis. Even if we disagree with their claim and allow a larger role for shifting burdens of proof via common sense, it still may have limited use, especially when the common sense view might be reasonably cast as supporting either position in the egoism-altruism debate. Here, instead of appeals to common sense, it would be of greater use to employ more secure philosophical arguments and rigorous empirical evidence.

Another popular complaint about psychological egoism is that it seems to be immune to empirical refutation; it is unfalsifiable. And this is often taken to be a criterion for an empirical theory: any view that isnt falsifiable isnt a genuine, credible scientific theory (see Karl Poppers Falsificationism). The worry for psychological egoism is that it will fail to meet this criterion if any commonly accepted altruistic action can be explained away as motivated by some sort of self-interest. Joel Feinberg, for example, writes:

Until we know what they [psychological egoists] would count as unselfish behavior, we cant very well know what they mean when they say that all voluntary behavior is selfish. And at this point we may suspect that they are holding their theory in a privileged positionthat of immunity to evidence, that they would allow no conceivable behavior to count as evidence against it. What they say then, if true, must be true in virtue of the way they defineor redefinethe word selfish. And in that case, it cannot be an empirical hypothesis. (1965/1999, 18, p. 503; see also 14-19)

As we have seen (1b), psychological egoism neednt hold that all our ultimate desires are selfish. But Feinbergs point is that we need to know what would count as empirical evidence against the existence of an egoistic ultimate desire.

This objection to psychological egoism has three substantial problems. First, falsification criteria for empirical theories are problematic and have come under heavy attack. In addition its unclear why we should think the view is false. Perhaps it is a bad scientific theory or a view we shouldnt care much about, but it is not thereby false. Second, any problems that afflict psychological egoism on this front will also apply to the opposing view (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 290). After all, psychological altruism is a pluralistic thesis that includes both egoistic and altruistic motives. Third, and most importantly, a charitable construal of psychological egoism renders it falsifiable. As we have seen, psychological egoists have a clear account of what would falsify it: an ultimate desire that is not egoistic. While it may be difficult to detect the ultimate motives of people, the view is in principle falsifiable. In fact, it is empirically testable, as we shall see below.

Another popular objection to various forms of psychological egoism is often called the paradox of hedonism, which was primarily popularized by Henry Sidgwick (1874/1907, 2.3.2.3). It is usually directed at psychological hedonism, but the problem can be extended to psychological egoism generally.

When the target is only hedonism, the paradox is that we tend to attain more pleasure by focusing on things other than pleasure. Likewise, when directed at egoism generally, the idea is that we will tend not to benefit ourselves by focusing on our own benefit. Consider someone, Jones, who is ultimately concerned with his own well-being, not the interests of others (the example is adapted from Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 498, sect. 11). Two things will seemingly hold: (a) such a person would eventually lack friends, close relationships, etc. and (b) this will lead to much unhappiness. This seems problematic for a theory that says all of our ultimate desires are for our own well-being.

Despite its popularity, this sort of objection to psychological egoism is quite questionable. There are several worries about the premises of the argument, such as the claim that ultimate concern for oneself diminishes ones own well-being (see Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 280). Most importantly, the paradox is only potentially an issue for a version of egoism that prescribes ultimate concern for oneself, such as normative egoism (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 280). The futility of ultimate concern for oneself can only undermine claims such as We should only ultimately care about our own well-being since this allegedly would not lead to happiness. But psychological egoism is a descriptive thesis. Even if egoistic ultimate desires lead to unhappiness, that would only show that egoistically motivated people will find this unfortunate.

Despite its widespread rejection among philosophers, philosophical arguments against psychological egoism arent overwhelmingly powerful. However, the theses in this debate are ultimately empirical claims about human motivation. So we can also look to more empirical disciplines, such as biology and psychology, to advance the debate. Biology in particular contains an abundance of literature on altruism. But, as we will see, much of it is rather tangential to the thesis of psychological altruism.

The ordinary (psychological) sense of altruism is different from altruism as discussed in biology. For example, sociobiologists, such as E. O. Wilson, often theorize about the biological basis of altruism by focusing on the behavior of non-human animals. But this is altruism only in the sense of helpful behavior that seems to be at some cost to the helper. It says nothing about the motivations for such behavior, which is of interest to us here. Similarly, altruism is a label commonly used in a technical sense as a problem for evolutionary theory (see Altruism and Group Selection). What we might separately label evolutionary altruism occurs whenever an organism reduces its own fitness and augments the fitness of others regardless of the motivation behind it (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 199). Distinguishing the psychological sense of altruism from other uses of the term is crucial if we are to look to biology to contribute to the debate on ultimate desires.

Given the multiple uses of terms, discussion of altruism and self-interest in evolutionary theory can often seem directly relevant to the psychological egoism-altruism debate. One might think, for example, that basic facts about evolution show were motivated by self-interest. Consider our desire for water. We have this perhaps solely because it enhanced the evolutionary fitness of our ancestors, by helping them stay alive and thus to propagate their genes. And evolutionary theory plausibly uncovers this sort of gene-centered story for many features of organisms. Richard Dawkins offers us some ideas of this sort. Although he emphasizes that the term selfish, as he applies it to genes, is merely metaphorical, he says we have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth let us try to teach generosity and altruism because we are born selfish (1976/2006, p. 3).

But we should be careful not to let the self-centered origin of our traits overshadow the traits themselves. Even if all of our desires are due to evolutionary adaptations (which is a strong claim), this is only the origin of them. Consider again the desire for water. It might exist only because it can help propagate ones genes, but the desire is still for water, not to propagate ones genes (compare the Genetic Fallacy). As Simon Blackburn points out, Dawkins is following a long tradition in implying that biology carries simple messages for understanding the sociology and psychology of human beings (1998, p. 146). To be fair, in a later edition of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins recognizes his folly and asks the reader to ignore such rogue sentences (p. ix). In any event, we must avoid what Blackburn polemically calls the biologists fallacy of inferring the true psychology of the person from the fact that his or her genes have proved good at replicating over time (p. 147). The point is that we must avoid simple leaps from biology to psychology without substantial argument (see also Stich et al. 2010, sect. 3).

Philosopher Elliott Sober and biologist David Sloan Wilson (1998) have made careful and sophisticated arguments for the falsity of psychological egoism directly from considerations in evolutionary biology. Their contention is the following: Natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives (p. 12). To establish this, they focus on parental care, an other-regarding behavior in humans, whose mechanism is plausibly due to natural selection. Assuming such behavior is mediated by what the organism believes and desires, we can inquire into the kinds of mental mechanisms that could have evolved. The crucial question becomes: Is it more likely that such a mechanism for parental care would, as psychological egoism holds, involve only egoistic ultimate desires? To answer this question, Sober and Wilson focus on just one version of egoism, and what they take to be the most difficult to refute: psychological hedonism (p. 297). The hedonistic mechanism always begins with the ultimate desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The mechanism consistent with psychological altruism, however, is pluralistic: some ultimate desires are hedonistic, but others are altruistic.

According to Sober and Wilson, there are three main factors that could affect the likelihood that a mechanism evolved: availability, reliability, and energetic efficiency (pp. 305-8). First, the genes that give rise to the mechanism must be available in the pool for selection. Second, the mechanism mustnt conflict with the organisms reproductive fitness; they must reliably produce the relevant fitness-enhancing outcome (such as viability of offspring). And third, they must do this efficiently, without yielding a significant cost to the organisms own fitness-enhancing resources. Sober and Wilson find no reason to believe that a hedonistic mechanism would be more or less available or energetically efficient. The key difference, they contend, is reliability: Pluralism was just as available as hedonism, it was more reliable, and hedonism provides no advantage in terms of energetic efficiency (p. 323).

Sober and Wilson make several arguments for the claim that the pluralistic mechanism is more reliable. But one key disadvantage of a hedonistic mechanism, they argue, is that its heavily mediated by beliefs (p. 314). For example, in order to produce parental care given the ultimate desire for pleasure, one must believe that helping ones child will provide one with sufficient pleasure over competing alternative courses of action:

(Ultimate) Desire for Pleasure Believe Helping Provides Most Pleasure Desire to Help

Moreover, such beliefs must be true, otherwise it's likely the instrumental desire to help will eventually extinguish, and then the fitness-enhancing outcome of parental care wont occur. The pluralistic model, however, is comparatively less complicated since it can just deploy an ultimate desire to help:

(Ultimate) Desire to Help

Since the pluralistic mechanism doesnt rely on as many beliefs, it is less susceptible to lack of available evidence for maintaining them. So yielding the fitness-enhancing outcome of parental care will be less vulnerable to disruption. Sober and Wilson (p. 314) liken the hedonistic mechanism to a Rube Goldberg machine, partly because it accomplishes its goal through overly complex means. Each link in the chain is susceptible to error, which makes the mechanism less reliable at yielding the relevant outcome.

Such arguments have not gone undisputed (see, for example, Stich et al. 2010, sect. 3). Yet they still provide a sophisticated way to connect evolutionary considerations with psychological egoism. In the next section well consider more direct ways for addressing the egoism-altruism debate empirically.

Psychological egoism is an empirical claim; however, considerations from biology provide only one route to addressing the egoism-altruism debate empirically. Another, perhaps more direct, approach is to examine empirical work on the mind itself.

In the 20th century, one of the earliest philosophical discussions of egoism as it relates to research in psychology comes from Michael Slote (1964). He argues that there is at least potentially a basis for psychological egoism in behavioristic theories of learning, championed especially by psychologists such as B. F. Skinner. Slote writes that such theories posit a certain number of basically selfish, unlearned primary drives or motives (like hunger, thirst, sleep, elimination, and sex), and explain all other, higher-order drives or motives as derived genetically from the primary ones via certain laws of reinforcement (p. 530). This theory importantly makes the additional claim that the higher-order motives, including altruistic ones, are not functionally autonomous. That is, they are merely instrumental to (functionally dependent on) the egoistic ultimate desires. According to Slote, the basic support for functional dependence is the following: If we cut off all reinforcement of [the instrumental desire] by primary rewards (rewards of primary [egoistic] drives), then the altruistic desire actually does extinguish (p. 531). Thus, all altruistic desires are merely instrumental to ultimately egoistic ones; we have merely learned through conditioning that benefiting others benefits ourselves. That, according to Slote, is what the behavioristic learning theory maintains.

Like the moral education argument, Slote's is vulnerable to work in developmental psychology indicating that some prosocial behavior is not conditioned (see 2c). Moreover, behavioristic approaches throughout psychology have been widely rejected in the wake of the cognitive revolution. Learning theorists now recognize mechanisms that go quite beyond the tools of behaviorism (beyond mere classical and operant conditioning). Slote does only claim to have established the following highly qualified thesis: It would seem, then, that, as psychology stands today, there is at least some reason to think that the psychological theory we have been discussing may be true (p. 537); and he appears to reject psychological egoism in his later work. In any event, more recent empirical research is more apt and informative to this debate.

Philosopher Carolyn Morillo (1990) has defended a version of psychological hedonism based on more recent neuroscientific work primarily done on rats. Morillo argues for a strongly monistic theory of motivation that is grounded in internal reward events, which holds that we [ultimately] desire these reward events because we find them to be intrinsically satisfying (p. 173). The support for her claim is primarily evidence that the reward center of the brain, which is the spring of motivation, is the same as the pleasure center, which indicates that the basic reward driving action is pleasure.

Morillo admits though that the idea is "highly speculative" and based on "empirical straws in the wind." Furthermore, philosopher Timothy Schroeder (2004) argues that later work in neuroscience casts serious doubt on the identification of the reward event with pleasure.In short, by manipulating rats' brains, neuroscientist Kent Berridge and colleagues have provided substantial evidence thatbeing motivated to get something is entirely separable from "liking" it (that is, from its generating pleasure). Against Morillo, Schroeder concludes that the data are better explained by the hypothesis that the reward center of the brain can indirectly activate the pleasure center than by the hypothesis that either is such a center (p. 81, emphasis added; see also Schroeder, Roskies, and Nichols 2010, pp. 105-6.)

Other empirical work that bears on the existence of altruistic motives can be found in the study of empathy-induced helping behavior. Beginning around the 1980s, C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists addressed the debate head on by examining such phenomena.Batson (1991; 2011), in particular, argues that the experiments conducted provide evidence for an altruistic model, the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which holds that as empathic feeling for a person in need increases, altruistic motivation to have that persons need relieved increases (1991, p. 72). In other words, the hypothesis states that empathy tends to induce in us ultimate desires for the well-being of someone other than ourselves. If true, this entails that psychological egoism is false.

Batson comes to this conclusion by concentrating on a robust effect of empathy on helping behavior discovered in the 1970s.The empathy-helping relationship is the finding that the experience of relatively high empathy for another perceived to be in need causes people to help the other more than relatively low empathy. However, as Batson recognizes, this doesnt establish psychological altruism, because it doesnt specify whether the ultimate desire is altruistic or egoistic. Given that there can be both egoistic and altruistic explanations of the empathy-helping relationship, Batson and others have devised experiments to test them.

The general experimental approach involves placing ordinary people in situations in which they have an opportunity to help someone they think is in need while manipulating other variables in the situation. The purpose is to provide circumstances in which egoistic versus altruistic explanations of empathy-induced helping behavior make different predictions about what people will do. Different hypotheses then provide either egoistic or altruistic explanations of why the subjects ultimately chose to help or offer to help. (For detailed discussions of the background assumptions involved here, see Batson 1991, pp. 64-67; Sober & Wilson 1998, Ch. 6; Stich, Doris, and Roedder 2010.)

Several egoistic explanations of the empathy-helping relationship are in competition with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.Each one claims that experiences of relatively high empathy (empathic arousal) causes subjects to help simply because it induces an egoistic ultimate desire; the desire to help the other is solely instrumental to the ultimate desire to benefit oneself. However, the experiments seem to rule out all the plausible (and some rather implausible) egoistic explanations. For example, if those feeling higher amounts of empathy help only because they want to reduce the discomfort of the situation, then they should help less frequently when they know their task is over and they can simply leave the experiment without helping. Yet this prediction has been repeatedly disconfirmed (Batson 1991, ch. 8). A host of experiments have similarly disconfirmed a range of egoistic hypotheses. The cumulative results evidently show that the empathy-helping relationship is not put in place by egoistic ultimate desires to either:

Furthermore, according to Batson, the data all conform to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that empathic arousal induces an ultimate desire for the person in need to be helped (see Batson 1991; for a relatively brief review, see Batson & Shaw 1991).

Some have argued against Batson that there are plausible egoistic explanations not ruled out by the data collected thus far (e.g. Cialdini et al. 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998, Ch. 8; Stich, Doris, and Roedder 2010). However, many egoistic explanations have been tested along similar lines and appear to be disconfirmed. While Batson admits that more studies can and should be done on this topic, he ultimately concludes that we are at least tentatively justified in believing that the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true. Thus, he contends that psychological egoism is false:"Contrary to the beliefs of Hobbes, La Rochefoucauld, Mandeville, and virtually all psychologists, altruistic concern for the welfare of others is within the human repertoire" (1991, p. 174).

It seems philosophical arguments against psychological egoism arent quite as powerful as we might expect given the widespread rejection of the theory among philosophers. So the theory is arguably more difficult to refute than many have tended to suppose. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the theory makes a rather strong, universal claim that all of our ultimate desires are egoistic, making it easy to cast doubt on such a view given that it takes only one counter-example to refute it.

Another important conclusion is that empirical work can contribute to the egoism-altruism debate. There is now a wealth of data emerging in various disciplines that addresses this fascinating and important debate about the nature of human motivation. While some have argued that the jury is still out, it is clear that the rising interdisciplinary dialogue is both welcome and constructive. Perhaps with the philosophical and empirical arguments taken together we can declare substantial progress.

Joshua May Email: joshmay@uab.edu University of Alabama at Birmingham U. S. A.

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Psychological Egoism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

On Albert Einstein’s peaceful musings – The Livingston County News

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One of the smartest people that ever lived, Albert Einstein, wasnt just a scientific genius; he was also one of the 20th centurys strongest peace advocates.

Einstein believed that, if there had been a stronger alliance of countries against fascism in the 1930s, the World War of the 1940s would have been prevented. Because of this, Einstein was a strong advocate of the abolition of war through the creation of a world government composed of nations that shared their military forces in order to prevent nationalist nations from starting wars. What follows are excerpts from some of his writings about peace

Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding. You cannot subjugate a nation forcibly unless you wipe out every man, woman, and child. Unless you wish to use such drastic measures, you must find a way of settling your disputes without resort to arms.

If unrestricted egoism leads to dire consequences in our economic life, it is still worse as a guide in international relations. Only the absolute repudiation of war can be of any use here. Without disarmament there can be no lasting peace.

The opposition to this unquestionably necessary advance lies in the unhappy traditions of the people which are passed on like an inherited disease from generation to generation because of our faulty educational machines. Of course the main supports of this tradition are military training and the larger industries.

This topic brings me to that worst outcrop of the herd nature, the military system. That a man can take pleasure in marching in formation to the strains of a band is enough to make me despise him. He has only been given his big brain by mistake; a backbone was all he needed. How despicable and ignoble war is. It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of war is nothing but an act of murder. Is it not terrible to be forced by the community to deeds which every individual feels to be most despicable crimes? Only a few have had the moral greatness to resist; they are in the true heroes.

A new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move to higher levels. In the light of new knowledge, a world authority and an eventual world state are not just desirable in the name of brotherhood, they are necessary for survival. Today we must abandon competition and secure cooperation. Past thinking and methods did not prevent world wars. Future thinking must prevent wars.

Taken on the whole, I would believe that Gandhis views were the most enlightened of all the political men in our time. We should strive to do things in his spirit... not to use violence in fighting for our cause, but by non-participation in what we believe is evil.

The way to joyful and happy existence is everywhere through renunciation and self-limitation. Where can the strength of such a process come from? Only from those who have had the chance in their early years to fortify their minds and broaden their outlook through study. Only if the statesmen have, to urge them forward, the will to peace of a decisive majority in their respective countries, can they arrive at their important goal. It is not the task of the individual who lives in this critical time merely to await results and to criticize. He must serve this great cause as well as he can.

We have emerged from a world war in which we had to accept the degradingly low ethical standards of the enemy. But instead of feeling liberated from his standards, and set free to restore the sanctity of human life and the safety of noncombatants, we are in effect making the low standards of the enemy in the last war our own. Unless Americans come to recognize that they are not stronger in the world because they have the bomb, but weaker because of their vulnerability to atomic attack, they are not likely to conduct their policy in a spirit that furthers the arrival at an understanding.

Genesee Valley Citizens for Peace was established in 1972. For more information on the organization, go to http://www.gvcp.org. The preceding essay is the result of a collaboration among several GVCP members.

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On Albert Einstein's peaceful musings - The Livingston County News