Atheism and Agnosticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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First published Tue Mar 9, 2004; substantive revision Mon Aug 8, 2011

The main purpose of this article is to explore the differences between atheism and agnosticism, and the relations between them. The task is made more difficult because each of these words are what Wittgenstein called family resemblance words. That is, we cannot expect to find a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their use. Their use is appropriate if a fair number of the conditions are satisfied. Moreover even particular members of the families are often imprecise, and sometimes almost completely obscure. Sometimes a person who is really an atheist may describe herself, even passionately, as an agnostic because of unreasonable generalised philosophical scepticism which would preclude us from saying that we know anything whatever except perhaps the truths of mathematics and formal logic.

Atheism means the negation of theism, the denial of the existence of God. I shall here assume that the God in question is that of a sophisticated monotheism. The tribal gods of the early inhabitants of Palestine are of little or no philosophical interest. They were essentially finite beings, and the god of one tribe or collection of tribes was regarded as good in that it enabled victory in war against tribes with less powerful gods. Similarly the Greek and Roman gods were more like mythical heroes and heroines than like the omnipotent, omniscient and good God postulated in mediaeval and modern philosophy. As the Romans used the word, atheist could be used to refer to theists of another religion, notably the Christians, and so merely to signify disbelief in their own mythical heroes.

The word theism exhibits family resemblance in another direction. For example should a pantheist call herself an atheist? Or again should belief in Plato's Form of the Good or in John Leslie's idea of God as an abstract principle that brings value into existence count as theism (Leslie 1979)? Let us consider pantheism.

At its simplest, pantheism can be ontologically indistinguishable from atheism. Such a pantheism would be belief in nothing beyond the physical universe, but associated with emotions of wonder and awe similar to those that we find in religious belief. I shall not consider this as theism. Probably the theologian Paul Tillich was a pantheist in little more than this minimal sense and his characterising God as the ground of being has no clear meaning. The unanswerable question Why is there anything at all? may give us mystical or at any rate dizzy feelings but such feelings do not differentiate the pantheist from the atheist. However there are stronger forms of pantheism which do differentiate the pantheist from the atheist (Levine, 1994). For example the pantheist may think that the universe as a whole has strongly emergent and also mind-like qualities. Not emergent merely in the weak sense that a radio receiver's ability to receive signals from distant stations might be said to be emergent because it is not a mere jumble of components (Smart 1981). The components have to be wired together in a certain way, and indeed the workings of the individual components can be explained by the laws of physics. Contrast this with a concept of emergence that I shall call strong emergence. C. D. Broad in his Scientific Thought (Broad 1923) held that the chemical properties of common salt could not even in principle be deduced from those of sodium and chlorine separately, at the very time at which the quantum theory of the chemical bond was beginning to be developed. Though the mind has seemed to some to be strongly emergent from its physical basis, it can be argued that developments in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience favour weak emergence only.

One strong form of pantheism ascribes mental properties to the cosmos. If the weak sense of emergence was adopted we would be faced with the question of whether the universe looks like a giant brain. Patently it does not. Samuel Alexander asserted, rather than argued, that mentality strongly emerged from space-time, and then that at some future time there will emerge a new and at present hardly imaginable level which he called deity (Alexander 1927). It is hard to tell whether such an implausible metaphysics should be classified as as pantheism or as theism. Certainly such a deity would not be the infinite creator God of orthodox theism. A. N. Whitehead, too, had a theory of an emergent deity, though with affinities to Platonism, which he saw as the realm of potentiality and therefore he connected the atemporal with the contingent temporal deity (Whitehead 1929). Such views will not deliver, however implausibly, more than a finite deity, not the God of core theism. God would be just one more thing in the universe, however awesome and admirable.

The weak form of pantheism accepts that the physical universe is all and eschews strong emergence. Sometimes the weak form of pantheism is rhetorically disguised as theism, with God characterised as absolute depth or some equally baffling expression, as by Paul Tillich. At any rate, whether or not we accept pantheism as a sort of theism, what we mean by atheism will vary according to what in the dialectical situation we count as theism.

This brings us naturally to the question of what we might consider to be an adequate concept of God, whether or not we wish to argue for the existence of such a being. Some profound remarks were made on this by J. N. Findlay in his article (Can God's Existence be Disproved? (Findlay 1949). The heathen may worship stocks and stones but does not see them as merely stocks and stones. More and more adequate conceptions of God still portray God as limited in various respects. A fully adequate conception of God, Findlay said, would see God as not only unlimited in various admirable properties but also as a necessarily existing being. Thus There is one and only one God would have to be a logically necessary truth. Now logic, he held, is tautologous and without ontological commitment. So God's necessary existence would have to be something different from logical necessity. The trouble is how to see what this could be.

It might be replied that there are non-trivial necessary existential propositions in mathematics, such as There are infinitely many primes which implies of course the number 7 exists. (We can ignore the unhelpful Something exists which is allowed by standard first order logic purely for convenience as few would need to apply logic to discourse about an empty universe for which in any case there are separate rules for determining validity or otherwise.) It is well known that Frege in his Foundations of Arithmetic claimed to reduce arithmetic to logic. However in effect he was using a free logic without ontological commitment. Claims to reduce set theory (and so analysis) to logic are of course even more problematic. Would it help towards an adequate conception of God if we said that God has the sort of existence or non-existence that prime numbers have? One might say not much. In any case it is dangerous to talk of types of existence because it treats existence as though it was a property. At the time that he wrote his article Findlay was following the logical positivist line that logic and mathematics are alike tautologous. In the case of mathematics this can be seriously questioned. Also most theists would say that prime numbers are too abstract to be compared to God, though perhaps not John Leslie who has argued that God is a principle that brings value into existence (Leslie 1979 and 1989). We are still left with Findlay's challenge as to what a conception of God as a necessary being could be.

One thing that will not differentiate the theist from the atheist is to say that God, if he exists, is necessary in the sense of not being dependent on anything else for his existence. The atheist will say that the universe fits this bill because the universe contains everything that there is and so is not caused by anything else. It is indeed hard to see what an adequate conception of God and his necessary existence could be. For the purposes of this article, let us explore what the relations and lack of relations between atheism and agnosticism could be. Here we shall neglect the requirement of necessary existence and in a later section we shall consider the case of a posteriori arguments for the existence of a mind-like creator of the universe. Of course without the requirement of necessity it raises the intelligent child's question Who made God? Still, this might be regarded as inevitable but excusable in an a posteriori argument in which the hypothesis of a purposive creator is put forward and claimed to be justified much in the manner of any scientific hypothesis.

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Atheism and Agnosticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Plantar Fasciitis Now Being Treated With Stem Cells

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Plantar fasciitis, a chronic pain condition involving the sole of the foot, is now being treated using regenerative medicine like stem cell therapy, and offering the first form of real relief for many sufferers.

Plantar fasciitis affects millions of Americans, and is a condition in which the plantar fascia the thick tissue covering the sole of the foot is inflamed, causing severe pain on the bottom of the foot, and impeding activities such as running and walking.

The plantar fascia tissue is what connects the heel bone to the toes, thus creating the arch of the foot.

Traditional treatments for the debilitating injury have offered some relief in recent years through the use of physical therapy, NSAIDS, and steroid injections. However, these types of pain relief develop slowly over time, and are not an effective way to truly treat the problem. Stem cell therapy is going beyond these typical treatments, treating the root cause of the issue, and are often able to alleviate pain more quickly and with longer-lasting results.

Clinics in Arizona and California are just two examples of offices now offering stem cell injections of adult bone marrow and both fat- and amniotic-derived materials. Board certified pain management doctors at the Arizona Pain Stem Cell Institute, in Phoenix, and TeleHealth, in southern California, are giving patients suffering from the condition a low risk, outpatient alternative to corrective surgery.

Many other U.S. states now have pain treatment centers offering the plantar fasciitis stem cell therapy, as well.

Main image courtesy Nevit Dilmen via Wikimedia Commons.

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Plantar Fasciitis Now Being Treated With Stem Cells

Comets Lose in Final Minutes

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December 28, 2013 - Major Indoor Soccer League (MISL) Missouri Comets INDEPENDENCE, MO - After a very physical, penalty-filled game, the Missouri Comets end up with only their second loss of the season. The Syracuse Silver Knights scored the game winning goal on a shootout after a controversial call late in the fourth quarter. A crowd of 4,122 fans watched Missouri's Leo Gibson and Vahid Assadpour net hat tricks, but it wasn't enough as Kenardo Forbes had two three-point goals to lead the Silver Knights to the 18-15 win.

The first quarter featured more penalty minutes for the Comets than shots on goal. Brian Harris, Vahid Assadpour, Robert Palmer and Ramone Palmer each saw the inside of the penalty box. Syracuse took full advantage, scoring three goals on the man-advantage and taking a 7-2 lead into the first break. Leo Gibson's goal six minutes into the game was the only score for Missouri in the quarter.

The second quarter saw a complete reversal. Gibson completed his hat trick with two goals and Assadpour scored his first two goals in the period. The Comets were able to stay out of the penalty box, with the exception of a delay of game penalty to Coady Andrews, and led at halftime 12-11

After a lively halftime exhibition from local media personalities set the mood for an exciting end to the match. The Comets jumped out to a two goal lead after Assadpour completed his hat trick two minutes into the third period. Syracuse crawled back into the lead on the strength of Forbes' second three-point goal of the night. Byron Alvarez regained the advantage for the Comets in the fourth quarter, but a series of controversial calls gave the Silver Knights the advantage they had waited for.

Ten minutes into the final frame, The Comets' John Sosa and Syracuse's Neto were tangled up outside the Comets defensive arc. As both players tugged each other to the floor, referee Ron Cory awarded a Power Play to Syracuse by sending John Sosa to penalty box for holding. Goalkeeper Danny Waltman made the save on the ensuing shooutout attempt, but again the referees blew a whistle, this time declaring a hand ball foul on Danny Waltman. Nelson Santana converted the second shootout attempt and Forbes added a goal against the sixth attacker in the final minutes to complete the Syracuse win, 18-15.

The Comets hit the road for games on January 1st at the Rochester Lancers at 2:00p.m. CT and January 3rd against the Baltimore Blast at 6:35p.m. CT. The team will return home for their fourth game in eight days against the Rochester Lancers on Sunday January 5th at 7:35p.m.

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Comets Lose in Final Minutes

Super Bowl’s weatherman tracks chance for snow on Feb. 2

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JENNIFER BROWN/SPECIAL TO THE RECORD

When I heard the Super Bowl would be held here, I knew we had to do something weather-related, said David Robinson, state climatologist and a Tenafly resident.

David Robinson grew up in Tenafly, harbors a rooting interest in football and is a trained climatologist.

Robinson saw those three unrelated threads of his life geography, sports and weather woven uniquely together when the National Football League decided to hold Super Bowl XLVIII at MetLife Stadium on Feb. 2, 2014 the first-ever outdoor, cold-weather site for the game.

Given the heightened interest about game-day conditions for this Super Bowl, Robinson, a Rutgers University professor and New Jerseys state climatologist, has launched a website to help satiate fans curiosity about all things Feb. 2 climatologically speaking. The site, designed by Robinsons research assistant, Dan Zarrow, is at biggameweather.com.

When I heard the Super Bowl would be held here I knew we had to do something weather-related, Robinson said. We started piecing the data together this past fall.

Then the New Jersey State Police contacted Robinson and asked him to prepare a report on what they might expect from the weather. Robinson and his team at Rutgers gathered data looking at weather for the week leading up to the game day as well as Feb. 2. Reliable data stretch back more than 80 years. Robinsons team generated about 50 pages of data, which he used to brief the state police.

Some of the data have been rendered into colorful bar graphs, pie charts and line graphs on Robinsons weather site.

Robinson is quick to note that while meteorology has made significant improvements in recent years, it is impossible to predict the weather for a particular day with any accuracy more than a week or so away from that date. Maybe a week ahead you can start to see a potential storm threat, and only a couple of days out at best can you zero in on what the actual conditions are likely to be, he said.

His site shows what has historically occurred on Feb. 2, using data for Newark Liberty International Airport, which is close enough to MetLife Stadium to be representative.

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Super Bowl's weatherman tracks chance for snow on Feb. 2