A bottle of prescription drugs. The Daily Digest has recently announced the University of Connecticuts Drug Free Schools and Campuses Act, this act, however, does not do much good for struggling addicts. Photo byKevin BidwellfromPexels

For the past few weeks, the Daily Digest has published anannouncementaboutthe University of ConnecticutsDrug Free Schools and Campuses Actwhich is shared this way biannually. While it includes some information about the risk of using various drugs and the schools philosophy on the matter, the document is mostly an affirmation of the schools compliance with federal drug laws, as is reflected by ourStudent Code. In this way, campus and local police enforce the criminalization of a host of substance use and possession for UConn students.

Whatever their opinion about it, this policy isnt ouradministrationsdesign. Colleges around the United States owe this stance on mind-altering substances to Congress1989Drug Free Campus and Communities Act, which mandates universitiestoadminister policy symmetric with federal drug laws. School enforcement of these laws has become tied to university funding from the Department of Education and fines in cases of noncompliance. As a result of this, drug policy at most American universities mirrors drug policy nationally.

Drug policy in the United States has deep andfundamental ties to white supremacy and social control in general. Launching the War on Drugs in 1971, Richard Nixon empowered and expanded federal drug control agencies, increased funding and weapons of police forces and generally doubled-down on the criminalization of drug users of all kindsother than alcohol, cigarettes and prescription opioids of course. Former Nixon aide,John Ehrlichman is famously quoted saying the administration knew we couldnt make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.

TheDrug Free Schools and Campuses Actinherits this legacy and is equally unrelated to helping those struggling with abuse. A drug free policy of any kind ignores the reality that drugsincluding alcohol in the United Statescan beintegral to many cultures, thatcriminalization and incarceration have always been tools for identity-based violence and most importantlythat people addicted to drugs arenot deterred by the threat of punishment. Then again, as stated in the 2021 DFSCA, perhaps helping those struggling with substance abuse is secondary to The Universitys principal role[which]is to engage in education that leads to high standards, respectful conduct and a healthy,productiveenvironmentwhen those are compromised, the University will take disciplinary action against organizations and individuals violatingThe Student Code.

Treatment available for those struggling with addiction at UConn is limited in some ways. The UConn Recovery Community offers important student care and resources to continue life here in supportive environments free from drugs and alcohol, andStudent Health and Wellnessoffers important screening and intervention resources. But professional treatment is still neither free nor on-demand;it is not in unlimited supply, and the same stigma and criminalization that drives sick peopleawayfrom seeking help exists atUConnas it does in every similar environment.

Furthermore, there are many barriers to recovery that have nothing to do with the accessibility of treatment. Simply put, a miserable life is one of the greatest barriers to overcoming addictions, and widespread among college students arefood and housing insecurity,poverty,social isolation,sexual violenceandmental health concernsin general. AtUConn,the worst of these unaddressed problems have literally deadly consequences.

Whether its about care accessibility or another concern of quality of life for those who may be struggling, were discussing a question of limited funding and resources which every administrative body must decide where to allocate. This is why,if governments including the UConn administration are concerned firstly with helping those struggling with substance abuse, they will redirect all resources currently used for the criminalization and punishment of users toward free, on-demand,no-questions-asked treatment in cases of abuse or addiction.

The great expenditure on this criminalization is most obvious within the UConn Police Department who makesarrests on campus and confersthose who violate laws to local and state legal systems. Asnoted bythecommunity movement Defund UCPD, in 2019 UCPD spent $121,021 per crime, 78% of which were instances of drug and alcohol conduct. If78%percent of UCPDs$18,000,000budget were redirected into treatment, education and other community institutions rather than policing,how many more therapists andcounselorscould UConnafford? How many people could be saved from addiction?

Even if criminal charges for substance use or possession as a college student are limited to a fine or a mark on ones record, these add up.Theirgreatest effect in the case of those struggling with addiction is decreasing the individuals access to treatment. In general, the main outcome of charges or penalties for the use of drugs is a nuisance or worse,preventingpeoplefrom leading comfortable lives and independently developing a healthy relationship with mind-altering substances. There is nothingthathelps the community in general.

We need to hold the UConn administration accountable for the harmful misallocation of resources to institutions focused on criminalizing members of our community from ones which save lives. We need to consider the humanity of those struggling with substance abuse. We need to develop well-funded treatment avenues which arent means-tested or linked to insurance but available to all community members. Most importantly, we need to decriminalize drug use and possession, and begin treatment of drug addiction as a mental health illness.

Original post:

UConn will never be drug free - UConn Daily Campus

Drug overdoses dramatically rose during the pandemic to make 2020 our deadliest year so far.

Overdoses claimed the lives of81,000 Americansin the 12 months up to May 2020. In San Francisco, for example, fatal overdoses killedthree timesas many people as the coronavirus. The overdose crisis is an epidemic, and we must invest in proven life-saving solutions.

And this crisis is requiring us to bring new thinking to drug policy.

President Joe Bidencommittedto end incarceration for drug use, explaining that no one should be imprisoned for the use of illegal drugs alone.

As a former prosecutor and a public health researcher, we agree with this starting point, having seen that incarcerating people for drug use doesnt make communities safer or healthier.

In lieu of incarceration, Biden has embraced drug courts and other forms of coerced or forced drug treatment to address the mounting crises of overdose and addiction in the United States. Although we agree with the presidents diagnosis, we part company with his prescription.

Drug courts are part of a failed system that presumes we can punish our way out of addiction. Instead, research shows that people who use drugs need community-based harm reduction and treatment services, not the threat of criminal sanction.

If we want to move beyond the discredited War on Drugs and save lives, we must abandon the fixation on drug courts, invest in proven solutions, and let healthcare professionals not lawyers and judges guide treatment.

Drug courts arent new. For the last 30 years, the primary way the criminal justice system has attempted to connect people with substance use disorders to healthcare is via drug courts. In drug courts, people undergo court-monitored inpatient or outpatient treatment, often featuring frequent drug testing and stepped sanctions for noncompliance, such as failing a drug test or missing a court date, generally in exchange for a reduction or dismissal of charges.

Stepped sanctions can range from extra court appearances for periods of incarceration and the process of graduating from drug court may take six months to two years or more.

Many of the over3,000drug courts across the U.S. are supported by substantial federal spending. Some $40 million is invested in drug courts and drug court technical assistance every year by the federal government and president Biden haspledgedto increase that funding.

But that investment address neither the evidence nor the needs of our communities.

Drug courtsclaim to reduce recidivism when operating according to best practices, but the research supporting these claims warrants closer scrutiny. The evidence is highly skewed by the common practice of cherry-picking individuals most likely to succeed and excluding those most in need of care.

For example, a study found that although over half of the 907 individuals who died from overdoses in Philadelphia in 2016 had prior contact with the criminal legal system in the last two years,only ninewere deemed eligible to participate in drug court.

Additionally, many drug courtsarentrun according to best practices, juvenile drug courts in particular appear to actuallyincreaserecidivism, and some research shows that when individuals dont succeed in drug court they becomemorelikelyto be rearrested than if theyd just had their case handled conventionally.

And most importantly, reducing recidivism isnt the same as ending the criminalization of drug use, improving the health of people who use drugs, or improving community welfare and thoseshould be our primary goals when it comes to drug policy.

The evidence is clear that drug courts dont decrease incarceration rates.

While drug courts reduce initial sentences, that reduction in incarceration isoffsetby the time participants spend behind bars for sanctions as well as lengthier sentences imposed on people who fail to graduate from drug courts.

And studies have found that people who fail drug court programs receive sentences up totwo to five times longerthan conventionally sentenced defendants facing the same charges.

Many practitioners similarly have observed that drug courts expand the footprint of the justice system. Well-intentioned prosecutors or judges may sweep lower levels of cases into the drug court in the interest of forcing people into the intensive treatment drug courts entail, even when the burden of drug court is out of proportion with the offense they committed.

Meanwhile, drug courts are run by judges, not doctors, and that means they can befar from clinically sound, particularly when prosecutors or judges deny participants access to lifesaving opioid substitution therapies like methadone.

Jail sanctions arent treatment.

In fact, incarceration is linked with higher rates of suicide, the worsening of co-morbid mental health conditions, lower life expectancy, blood-borne virus transmission and the initiation of intravenous drug use.

Few drug courts even measuretheir impact on health outcomes like overdoses and mortality illustrating that improving health is not their primary concern.

There are multiple other criticisms that drug courts have facedfrom their fines and fees to the ethics of coerced treatment as a whole. We should invest in proven strategies and devote resources to live-savingharm reduction services, like street outreach, overdose prevention sites, and alternative first responders.

We need free easily accessible methadone and buprenorphine. And when people do come into contact with the criminal legal system, we need off-ramps from incarceration models thatdeflectpeople out of the legal system and into appropriate services, ensuring people receive evidence-based care without criminalizing them.

In the immediate future, drug courts remain a political reality. Theyre popular with judges, and sometimes have strong community buy-in because they offer a satisfying, if illusory, narrative of redemption.

There arethings prosecutors can doto make existing drug courts better, like ensuring they comport with best practices, incorporating harm reduction principles, and avoiding using them to punish drug use alone.

But in the longer term, drug courts arent the solution to reducing drug-related incarceration or saving lives. Criminal justice leaders must look at the evidence, and embrace a public health approach to drugswe urge the new administration to follow suit.

America deserves better. Weve lost too many lives already.

Miriam Krinsky is a former federal prosecutor and executive director ofFair and Just Prosecution.Leo Beletsky is a professor of law and health sciences and the faculty director of Northeastern University School of LawsHealth in Justice Action Lab.

Original post:

Why It's Time to Abandon Drug Courts - Crime Report

Nathan Crabbe| Opinion editor

Americas longest war needs to finally come to an end.

No, not the war in Afghanistan, although U.S. military involvement there has thankfully been winding down after nearly two decades.

Im referring to another massively expensive and ultimately futile effort by the federal government. Nearly 50 years ago, President Richard Nixon declared an all-out offensive on drug abuse that would come to be called the "war on drugs."

The declaration ushered in an era of mass incarceration that failed to prevent drug abuse, instead devastating communities that it was supposed to help. In recent years reformers have thankfully moved to decriminalize drug possession and properly treat addiction like a public health issue.

Reforms have been made to marijuana laws across the country, with marijuana fully legal for adults in 11 states and legal for medical purposes in 34 states. Now Oregon is going further with a drug decriminalization measure that voters passed in November and took effect Feb. 1.

The measure reclassifies the possession of small amounts of drugs including cocaine and heroin as a civil violation punishable by a $100 fine, which offenders can avoid by agreeing to a health assessment. It also directs more funding to drug treatment.

At the same time, the federal government appears poised to change its approach as well. The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill in December to decriminalize marijuana on the federal level, which leaders of the newly Democratic Senate recently indicated they support.

Here in Florida, similar changes are unlikely (unless voters force the issue, like they did in legalizing medical marijuana by passing a 2016 ballot measure). The state Legislature did legalize industrial hemp in 2019, which had the unintended consequences of causing prosecutors to drop marijuana cases because labs and drug-sniffing dogs couldnt tell the difference.

Alachua County and Gainesville commissioners have long advocated for local reforms, with mixed success. Former State Attorney Bill Cervone pushed back against their attempts to decriminalize pot possession and instead created his own pre-arrest deflection program, which allows his office to keep certain low-level offenses out of the criminal justice system.

But Cervone and the city of Gainesville were unable to agree on a memorandum of understanding on the program, leaving the task to his successor, Brian Kramer. After city commissioners expressed frustration about the situation at a recent meeting, Kramer wrote a letter questioning why the agreement has been held up and saying that he was open to expanding the program.

No one should be jailed or face other criminal penalties for possessing small amounts of drugs. Expanding the local pre-arrest program is a good step, as long as determining who is eligible is being done equitably.

But local, state and federal officials need to go even further and ensure that addiction is treated as a public health matter rather than a criminal justice issue. The war on drugs has wasted enough money and lives.

Nathan Crabbe is The Suns opinion and engagement editor.

See the original post:

End the failed war on drugs - Gainesville Sun

On January 31, 2021, Sen. Ronald Bato dela Rosa told the press that he was optimistic he will soon have a new US visa.

A year earlier, he confirmed to the media that his US visa was canceled. Neither he nor the US embassy in Manila said why and when it happened. The senator surmised that his role in Pres. Rodrigo Dutertes drug war may have been the reason behind it.

In pique, or so he made it appear, President Duterte abrogated the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US -- a decision that has not really taken effect since he eventually backtracked and suspended the termination of the VFA.

Dela Rosa was Dutertes chief of the Philippine National Police when drug-related killings reached unprecedented scale. That Duterte has almost thrown away a key security agreement in defense of his former PNP chief, speaks not only of the closeness of Dela Rosa and Duterte but of how invested this presidency is in the PNP chief in waging war on drugs.

Table 1. Summary of drug-related killings per PNP Chief.

Since the start of the Duterte administration in July 2016, five PNP chiefs have taken their turn in leading Dutertes war on illegal drugs: Dela Rosa, Oscar David Albayalde, Archie Francisco Gamboa, Camilo Cascolan, and Debold Sinas.

On average, these are the numbers of those killed in the drug war during each PNP chiefs term: under dela Rosa, three every day, under Albayalde, two; under Gamboa, one; under Cascolan, one; and under Sinas, as of December 2020 at least, two a day. This is from the data gathered for the project, Violence, Human Rights, and Democracy in the Philippines by the UP Third World Studies Center and the Department of Conflict and Development Studies of the University of Ghent. These averages are a conservative count that are based on media reports that rely mostly on the police as the primary source of information.

But there appears to be a significant number of drug-related killings the media were not able to report. The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, on January 30, 2021 reported that from July 1, 2016 to December 31, 2020 there were 6,011 persons who died during anti-drug operations. The project, on the other hand, recorded 3,470 drug-related killings.

Each PNP chief made his own calculations on how best to conduct Dutertes war on drugs. What remains clear is that, based on our data, the number of minor players (pushers and users) killed far outnumbers those designated as high-value targets. The ratio stands at 1:5.

Other important details: out of the 3,470 killings, 2,511 of the victims were killed by law enforcers either in official or unplanned anti-drug operations. There were 54 victims of non-state agents, 752 were killed by unidentified assailants, and 153 by unknown assailants.

Figure 1. Summary of drug-related killings during Ronald Bato Dela Rosas term as PNP Chief.

Of the five PNP chiefs that served Duterte, Dela Rosa, to date, served the longest: 656 days. His ties with Duterte go back to their Davao days, when Dela Rosa served as the citys police chief from January 2012 to October 2013. He implemented the prototype of Oplan Tokhang, then called Oplan TukHang, alongside Duterte as mayor. This operation sought to stop the illegal drug problem in the city by knocking at the house of each known drug suspect and pleading with them to surrender. In a Rappler report, dela Rosa, who staunchly believes that illegal drugs are the root of heinous crimes, claimed that it was a success. He said drugs in the city went down by 60 percent. This claim is put in doubt by a 2016 Philippine Star report that designated Davao CIty as the countrys murder capital from 2010 to 2015.

In the first month of Tokhangs implementation, with the PNP under Dela Rosas command, 310 persons were reported killed in official anti-drug operations and vigilante-style killings in the country. It remains the highest number of drug-related killings reported in a month.

In fact, one has reason to believe that drug killings committed by law enforcers intensified with the release of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2016 for Operation: Lawmen. It institutionalized rewards for law enforcers who conducted successful anti-drug operations.

Throughout Dela Rosas term, changes were made to refine Project Double Barrel. For instance, on October 26, 2016, Oplan Double Barrel Alpha was instituted as a reinvigorated anti-drug drive supposedly targeting high-value targets particularly in the entertainment and government sectors. Of those killed in the drug war during Dela Rosas term, six percent were identified as high-profile targets.

While this development in the PNPs operational plan does acknowledge 1,725 drug suspects killed in the preceding months, these served less a starting point for measures to prevent further killings. Instead, in an Inquirer report on the revitalized Double Barrel project, PNPs then Director for Operations Camilo Cascolan, who also later became PNP chief, restarted the casualty count on October 26. He said this will give the drug war a fresh start and for enforcers to do their best again just like from the start.

A lot have happened in between Double Barrel Alpha and its succeeding iteration Double Barrel Reloaded. For one, South Korean businessman Jee Ick Joo was kidnapped and killed by members of the PNP inside the police national headquarters. This prompted Duterte to suspend Tokhang operations for a month and a half (January 30, 2017 - March 16, 2017).

Dela Rosa told the public safety and order committee of the House of Representatives on March 14, 2017 that Reloaded will be less bloody by rooting out what he called scalawags cops using the campaign to kill drug peddlers who might expose their involvement in the drug trade.

By the end of Dela Rosas term as PNP chief on April 17, 2018, at least 1,864 individuals were killed in official anti-drug operations and vigilante-style killings.

Information on the victims drug involvement often comes from police investigations, and inclusion in a drug watchlist is treated as evidence of links to illegal drugs. Under Dela Rosa, the police used 1,711 sources of information regarding the victims ties to the drug trade prior to the killing. In many cases, there were multiple sources, hence the total exceeds the number of victims slain by the police. Fifty-three percent or 914 were sourced from prior or ongoing investigations on the victim. Twenty-three percent or 398 came from a drug watchlist. The rest were gathered from records of previous arrests, convictions, or surrenders in drug-related crimes, as well as from an informant or from unidentified sources. Links of 280 victims to the illegal drug trade were unreported.

This staggering record of drug-related killings under Dela Rosas watch as PNP Chief, especially those where police were involved, has raised concerns from local and international human rights groups and media about the integrity of the police to spearhead the anti-drug campaign.

Dela Rosa should have left office on January 21, 2018 as he reached the mandatory retirement age of 56. However, Duterte ordered him to stay indefinitely, citing problems still to be solved inside PNP. Dela Rosas term lasted until April 18, 2018. He was then assigned to head the Bureau of Corrections, to supposedly put a stop to the drug trafficking inside national prisons. He then ran and won as senator in the 2019 elections.

Figure 2. Summary of drug-related killings during Oscar David Albayaldes term as PNP Chief. Percentages are rounded and 0 pertains to a value greater than 0 but less than 0.5.

Dela Rosa personally recommended to Duterte then National Capital Region Police (NCRPO) Chief Oscar Albayalde to be his successor. They were batchmates and both belonged to the Philippine Military Academy Sinagtala Class of 1986. Albayade was reportedly chosen because he was tough and strict--just what the police needed according to Duterte. It was during his term as NCRPO chief that the whole Caloocan police was sacked for the murder of 17-year-old student Kian delos Santos and other unsolved killings.

On the day of his appointment as the new PNP chief, Duterte reminded Albayalde to further promote the governments war on drugs.

During his term from April 18, 2018 to October 13, 2019, a total of 1,096 drug-related killings were recorded -- a number comparable to figures recorded during Batos term. This is in spite of the PNPs release on January 29, 2018 of new Tokhang implementing guidelines that appear to ensure that the propensity to kill is suppressed, and cops who abuse their power are held accountable.

Its key provisions include: complying with the rule of law and human rights; the participation of representatives from the barangay council, human rights group, or the religious sector; encouraging use of body cameras; and for Tokhang teams to not engage hostile suspects. Furthermore, in a Sunstar report, PNP spokesperson Dionardo Carlos said that a one-strike policy will be observed, meaning a single violation of the guidelines by a Tokhang team would result in their precinct commander being relieved from his post.

Still an overwhelming 90 percent or 987 of the reported killings were committed by law enforcers. Cases involving the PNP as assailant make up 968 cases or 88 percent of those killed.

Of those killed by the police under Albayaldes term, a little over 99 percent or 963 were reportedly involved in drugs. In the five or less than one percent that were not reportedly involved, these include the deaths of Gian Habal and Kateleen Myka Ulpina, age six and three respectively, who were caught in the crossfires of police operations.

To establish the victims drug involvement, 1,105 sources were tapped. Eighty percent or 883 of these sources were prior or ongoing investigations on the victim, while 12 percent or 135 were drug watchlists. The rest were drawn from records of previous arrests, convictions, or surrenders for drug-related offences, reports from informants or unidentified sources. In 70 cases, it was not reported how the police determined the victims drug links.

Albayaldes supposed strict and strong leadership, however, apparently did not apply to men close to him. During a police anti-drug operation in 2013, when he was still the provincial chief in Pampanga, police officers dubbed as ninja cops, engaged in bribery with drug suspects and took more than 200 kilos of shabu. Albayalde was allegedly aware of this practice but even gave those involved in the anomalous raid favorable positions inside the agency. He, however, repeatedly denied these allegations in the Senate probe of the said incident.

Albayalde resigned as PNP chief on October 14, 2019, a few days before the end of his term on October 29, 2019. He went on a non-duty status until his mandatory retirement age at 56 on November 8, 2019. On January 16, 2020, he and the 12 police involved in the recycling of drugs in Pampanga were charged with graft.

This issue further tainted the PNPs reputation, and placed immense pressure on the next PNP chief to clean their name while still ardently putting the fight against illegal drugs at the forefront of operations.

Figure 3. Summary of drug-related killings during Archie Francisco Gamboas term as PNP Chief. Percentages are rounded and 0 pertains to a value greater than 0 but less than 0.5.

To fill the vacuum in leadership, the PNPs deputy chief of administration, Lt. Gen. Archie Francisco Gamboa was named officer-in-charge on October 14, 2019. Duterte officially appointed him as PNP chief on January 20, 2020. Gamboa is a lawyer who belongs to same PMA class as the other 3 appointed PNP chiefs under Duterte. He is also known as one of the Davao cops and a close friend of Dela Rosa.

Gamboa said as the PNP chief and as a lawyer, he wanted that everything shall be above board and compliant with the requirements of due process, human rights, transparency, and public accountability. Like the other PNP chiefs, he vowed to intensify the war against drugs even amidst a pandemic. He was quoted as saying he would like to focus on high-value targets.

Reports would still show, however, that pushers comprise a large majority of the casualties --195 victims or 72 percent. Only 11 percent.or 29 victims were high-profile targets. Nonetheless, the drug war numbers under Gamboas watch seem to back his words. Compared to his two predecessors, a higher ratio of high-profile targets to pushers were killed during his term. The number of high-value or high-profile targets killed reached 11 percent compared to his predecessors six percent.

Information against the victims were gathered from 329 sources. Eighty-one percent or 265 of these were prior or ongoing investigations on the victim. Sixteen percent or 50 of these were a drug watchlist, three percent were their records of previous drug arrests, convictions, or surrenders.

Majority of the cases were recorded while the country was under the government-imposed lockdown to curb the spread of COVID-19. In a previous Vera Files report, we recorded 53 drug-related killings from March 15 to May 5, 2020. Human Rights Watch reported a 50 percent rise in drug-related deaths in the country during lockdown from April to July 2020 compared to December 2019 to March 2020, based on the #RealNumbersPH data. Drug-related killings continue to press on as lockdowns ceaselessly get extended.

On September 2, 2020, Gamboa retired from his post. Many parts of the country remained under community quarantine then.

Figure 4. Summary of drug-related killings during Camilo Cascolans term as PNP Chief.

Because of his age, Gen. Camilo Cascolan served as PNP chief for only about two months before reaching mandatory retirement age on November 10, 2020. He took over from Gamboa on September 3, 2020. He was also part of the PMA Sinagtala Class of 1986.

Cascolan said that he will not allow human rights violations in the implementation of the anti-drug campaign under his watch, and that they will focus on high profile targets, in line with Oplan Double Barrel. He admitted that Oplan Tokhang, when it was implemented by some officers of the Philippine National Police became problematic, thats why there are a lot of cases that we are having right now against those PNP personnel who have violated the rule of law and human rights. Given his two-month term, Cascolan focused on building the capacities of drug enforcement units to collar high value targets as well as mitigate the abuse of power.

Under his watch, drug-related killings persisted as a result of both official anti-drug operations and vigilante-style killings. In two months, 66 drug-related killings were recorded, 74 percent or 49 of which were committed by the PNP, sometimes hand-in-hand with other agencies.

Fifty-nine sources of information were used to determine their drug links. Seventy-eight percent or 46 cited prior or ongoing investigations, 10 percent or six drew from records of previous arrests, convictions, and surrenders, 8 percent or five were drug watchlists, and three percent or two were reports from informants.

Figure 6. Summary of drug-related killings from the start of Debold Sinas term as PNP Chief to December 31, 2020.

Succeeding Cascolan, President Duterte appointed then Metro Manila police chief Gen. Debold Sinas; a decision that has confounded and angered many due to his involvement in a controversy on May 8, 2020. Metro Manila cops held a birthday party for Sinas, effectively violating the ban on large gatherings they are tasked to enforce under quarantine.

His background would reveal an even more insidious legacy. Before becoming Metro Manilas police chief, he held the same position in Central Visayas from July 18 to October 2019. Under his term, the Commission of Human Rights office in that region was alarmed at the rise in drug-related killings in the area. His performance in carrying out Dutertes war on drugs apparently was a decisive factor in his appointment as the PNPs new police chief.

In an interview with DZMM Teleradyo on November 11, 2020, Interior and Local Government Secretary Eduardo Ao relayed Duterte's orders for the new police chief: The President gave emphasis to the war on illegal drugs and on the CPP/NPA/NDF. According to a report by CNN Philippines on November 5, 2020, Sinas leadership intends to use the drug war to target illegal drug sources instead of small-time users. Like previous chiefs who vowed to achieve a similar goal, Sinass current figures point to a different story. Alarmingly, the numbers hint at a situation similar to what his leadership had wrought in Central Visayas.

From his appointment until the end of 2020, a mere month and a half into his term, we have recorded 82 drug-related killings. Police accounted for 78 percent or 64 of these killings, which were sometimes carried out alongside the AFP or PDEA.

While data confirms high-profile targets were killed more than users, given that no drug user was reportedly killed yet, small-time pushers at the lower level of the drug trade still outnumber high profile targets killed by about four to one. Pushers compose 64 percent or 41 of the killings involving the police under Sinas while high-profile targets make up 17 percent or 11 of these cases.

As for the sources of prior information on their involvement, 82 sources were referred to in total. Prior or ongoing investigations on the victims compose 73 percent or 60 of these. Ten percent or eight were records of previous arrests, convictions, or surrenders for illegal drug activities, nine percent or seven were acquired from drug watchlists, and another 9 percent or seven were unreported sources.

Table 2. Summary of drug-related killings committed by non-state agents and unidentified assailants.

Four and half-years into Dutertes six-year term and five PNP chiefs later, hardly mentioned as a problem that must be solved were the killings reported to have been committed by non-state agents and unidentified assailants. The PNP chiefs, past and present, may swear to police their rank, to focus on high-value targets, but the still significant number of those killed in the drug war other than by armed state agents portrays the PNP leadership as ineffectual.

As worrisome is the data that most of the fatalities were known to the police as they have been previously investigated for involvement in the drug trade. This lends credence to a number of investigative reports alleging the PNP is contracting out the killings of drug personalities.

After four and a half years, the monthly and yearly tally of those killed in the drug war have indeed decreased. But the drop in fatalities seem to have no impact on the class of people getting killed. Despite repetitive pledges by PNP chiefs to get the bigger fishes of the illegal drug trade, low-level pushers still bear the greater brunt of this lethal campaign.

Link:

The PNP Chiefs' Scorecard on the War on Drugs; Bato Tops in the Number of Kills - Vera Files - Vera Files

For more than 50 years, America has been fighting the war on drugs, an endeavor that began under the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, who had the avowed purpose of arresting and incarcerating as many Blacks and other minorities as possible, especially for simple possession of marijuana.

The war on drugs has been a failure by any measure. Not only have we spent hundreds of billions of dollars on failed law enforcement efforts both in this country and around the globe, directly leading to the destabilization of many nations that has had profound effects both for those countries and ours, but it is fair to say that the drug war has destroyed the lives of more individuals, families, and communities than the drugs themselves.

Thanks to the war on drugs, the prison population in the United States exceeds every other nation on earth, both in terms of sheer numbers and based on population.

At long last, after 50 years of fruitless and costly failure, things are about to change.

Voters in the State of Oregon recently approved a ballot question that decriminalizes the possession of illegal drugs. Instead of throwing people in jail, the state will view drug use as a health issue, offering addicts treatment instead of prison time.

In Portugal, this approach has been used for 20 years. The result has been stunning. Drug overdose deaths and HIV and other drug-related infections have decreased dramatically. In addition, the removal of criminal penalties did NOT increase the rate of drug use.

The time has come for our society to acknowledge that the war on drugs, which was based on racism to begin with, must come to an end.

Oregon is leading the way and change is coming none too soon.

More:

Oregon Leads the Way On Drugs - Charlestown Patriot Bridge

We, in India, are debating one health crisis by bringing science and research to the foreground and, strangely, throwing science out of the window while debating another health-related disaster.Bring up the topic of the Covid-19 pandemic and the debate immediately shifts to the vaccine, the speed at which it has been developed and whether enough science has gone into it to make it safe. But bring up drug abuse in the country, and the focus immediately shifts to Sushant Singh Rajput, who was responsible for his untimely death and how many more film stars are likely to be questioned for smoking ganja. We dont ask how serious the drug problem is nationally, which states are worst affected, and whether we have adopted the right approach to fighting the menace.

If you believe that drug abuse cant be compared to the Covid-19 pandemic, do browse through Indias first-ever large-scale, nationwide survey of drug abuse, published in 2019 just before Covid-19 reached India. The Magnitude of Substance Abuse in India report by AIIMS Delhis National Drug Dependence Treatment Centre has established that there are roughly 63 lakh people in the country addicted to heroin and 25 lakh to pharmaceutical opioids. Another 50 lakh people are addicted to cannabis and 40 lakh to bhang.

And we havent even come to alcohol, which has roughly 5.7 crore people who have problems related to drinking while 2.9 crore who are dependent on it. Keep in mind that these numbers represent only the addicted and those with related problems. The actual number of drug and alcohol users is much higher.

By comparison, the Covid-19 pandemic has seen roughly 1.05 crore cases so far. Most of these people have recovered with the number of active cases till mid-January 2021 being a little more than two lakh across India. In sheer numbers, the drug abuse problem in India is worse than Covid-19. But the intention here is not to undermine the severity of pandemic. It is to highlight the fact that we have a serious drug abuse problem on our hands and to find a solution, we will need more than just a momentary emotional outburst over a film stars death.

Talk to authors of the AIIMS report and they will tell you some home truths. One, attempts to stop supply of drugs with brute policing have failed spectacularly around the world. The US War on Drugs is the best example. Trying to cut drug supply lines only led to a dramatic increase in the street price of drugs, encouraging smugglers to pump in greater quantities of deadlier drugs into the US.

This could be happening in India as well. Findings indicate that despite the existence of strict drug control laws and a multitude of agencies working towards drug supply control, a wide variety of the controlled drugs are being used and a sizeable number of Indians suffer from addiction to these drugs, the AIIMS report says. Results also indicate a shift in demand for psychoactive substances, from traditional, low-potency, plant-based products (opium) to more potent and processed products (heroin).

Instead, the focus should be on reducing drug demand. Countries like Portugal have decriminalised drug consumption. People caught with drugs for personal use are not sent to jail. Instead, they are counselled and provided mental health care support. It has led to a reduction in addicts.

Two, governments often get bogged down with the total number of people using drugs. Instead, they should focus on drug use disorders. Taking drugs is not as much a problem as addiction is.

And three, governments must categorise various drugs by the problems they cause and then devise a plan. Chasing ganja users is a waste of time. The AIIMS survey shows that the major drug problem category for India is opioids, and among opioids heroin is the biggest concern. In fact, many experts feel that Indias drug supply control measures are disproportionately geared towards seizing minor drugs and jailing petty users rather than catching the big fish smuggling deadly heroin. As one expert told this writer in Hindi, Ye chindi chor pakadne wali baat hai (we are only catching small fry).

The AIIMS report also points to the severe paucity of treatment facilities for drug and alcohol addicts in the country and the need for regional strategies for prevention and treatment. Just one single national level plan may not help. The drug problem in Punjab may differ from Mizoram.

As a first step in this, AIIMS experts have helped the Union government kickstart the Nation Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction. But, this is just the beginning of the fight. Real change will come when we, the citizens, will discuss drug demand reduction like we are discussing the merits and demerits of Covishield and Covaxin.

Views expressed above are the author's own.

END OF ARTICLE

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Drug abuse affects more people than Covid yet we bury the issue - The Times of India Blog

Psilocybin mushrooms, an entheogenic plant, growing wild in Redding, California. (Photo: D.C.Atty via Flickr)

There was an easy win Monday in support of following the decriminalization of marijuana with decriminalizing entheogenic plants, which include such things as mushrooms, cacti and ayahuasca all natural substances that can be used recreationally as drugs, but also as treatment for medical conditions and addictions.

The City Council agreed 8-1 with an order written by councillor Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler that the city make arresting adults with such substances amongst the lowest law enforcement priority (and that the city should call on the Middlesex County District Attorney to stop related prosecutions) and that no money or resources should go into such law enforcement efforts. Instead, the order calls for use and possession to be looked at in the context of public health.

The holdout was councillor Tim Toomey, who didnt offer his thoughts on the matter. But in offering approval, Mayor Sumbul Siddiqui and councillor Dennis Carlone said they were grateful for how educational the motion had been.

Though entheogenic plants and substances have been used for hundreds of years for spiritual purposes, research has shown they have benefits for conditions such as PTSD, depression and for treating addictions to heroin and other opioids, which are on the rise during the pandemic, Sobrinho-Wheeler said.

The city, of course, cant legalize any drugs on our own thats up to the state and the federal government. But the city can deprioritize enforcement. The Department of Justice has made very clear that municipalities have this power, Sobrinho-Wheeler said, noting that Somerville had recently passed a similar measure with the support of its mayor and legal department. For this resolution, I reached out to [our] city manager, the solicitor and the police commissioner, and none had objections.

Science, psychotherapy and industry

Several people spoke during public comment about the move all in favor, and often on a scientific and financial basis.

The field of biotechnology itself owes a great deal to psychedelic-inspired scientific creativity, said Nicholas White, of Boston-based Ginkgo Bioworks, citing the double-helix structure of DNA, the invention of polymerase chain reaction and even the PCR test being used to test for Covid-19 infections. He said the industry had spent more than $500 million in 2019 on related work: engineering cannabinoids that produced bacteria. The Cambridge community in general will benefit, and then the biotech community specifically.

Francis Guerriero, a psychotherapist, said he had extensive experience in drug-related therapies and saw benefits and no detriments for his patients, while Boston resident Mike Overstreet said he knew two people in research trials with entheogenic drugs who had seen great results for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.

We all know that the war on drugs has been a complete and utter failure, with policies that needlessly put police in harms way and doesnt just ruin lives, but ruins households and neighborhoods for generations to come, Overstreet said.

Also, Overstreet said, this really looks like its gonna be the next industry, following cannabis.

This post was updated Feb. 5, 2021, to correct that the biotechnology had investedmore than $500 million in 2019 on work related to entheogenic, not any specific company.

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War on use of mushrooms, cacti and ayahuasca has been called off in Cambridge by council order - Cambridge Day

Channeling the spirit of America's entry into World War II, President Joe Biden has promised a mass mobilization of people and resources to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. But if defeating a virus is like waging a war, several important historical lessons and caveats should be kept in mind.

PRINCETON US President Joe Biden started his term with a beautifully crafted speech that caught the spirit of a country exhausted by Trumpism and COVID-19. Biden has promised a full-scale, wartime effort against the pandemic. But hasnt our tired world already been in the trenches for a year now?

On March 19, 2020, when Donald Trump belatedly started to act as though the coronavirus might be serious, he referred to our big war and promised to continue our relentless effort to defeat the Chinese virus. Similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping on February 6, 2020, declared a peoples war against the virus.

Of course, Trumps war quickly went off the rails, as have previous US attempts to deploy the war analogy outside of a military or diplomatic context. In June 1971, President Richard Nixon, calling drug abuse public enemy number one, launched the war on drugs, which President Ronald Reagan expanded. Fifty years later, this mobilization is almost universally recognized as having failed.

Likewise, the war on terror, declared by President George W. Bush following the attacks of September 11, 2001, succeeded merely in preventing a precise repetition of that event. Not only were there plenty of other attacks elsewhere, but terror proliferated, becoming a tool for groups like US white nationalists and Trump supporters. The warriors against terror were fighting a tactic, not a target.

So, what does it take to win a war? For starters, victory requires a complete mobilization of people and resources. We cannot even hope to succeed against COVID-19 unless we marshal the contributions of many different individuals most of them low-paid, disadvantaged workers in health, transportation, logistics, and other critical sectors.

Historically, wars have been waged with the promise that those who fought them would be rewarded. World War II was transformative in the sense that not only was the enemy defeated, but a better world was built in its aftermath. Health care, education, and infrastructure were extended to the benefit of society at large.

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Victory also depends on great logistics, as a spokeswoman for the courier and freight service UPS pointed out during a White House event early in the crisis. But great logistics hasnt happened. Instead, COVID-19 test results are still routinely held up for the oddest reasons, and the United States has scarcely even bothered with virus monitoring or contact tracing.

Without sound logistics management, everything else can fall apart. In World War I, Czarist Russia produced more than enough grain to feed its population, but the big cities endured terrible starvation. Officials blamed the inadequate rail system. In fact, there were plenty of railcars to transport grain, but they were in the wrong place. Rail workers had no shoes, and thus could not turn up for work.

Pandemics, like wars, produce shortages of critical resources, whereupon decentralized procurement can trigger bidding wars, with local and state agencies pushing up the prices of protective equipment, medical supplies, or vaccines. Disputes about prioritizing vaccination are likely to create tension between organized groups, from pensioners and medical providers to teachers and other essential workers. In wars that are waged successfully, the management of supplies is centralized to prevent their diversion to inefficient or undesirable uses.

Wars also give rise to international competition, which can fuel anger of the kind expressed by European Union citizens who see vaccinations proceeding faster in the United Kingdom and Israel than in their own countries. The companies that produce vaccines Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Moderna, Novavax, and Sanofi have facilities in many countries. But they need to be able to operate worldwide without worrying about how production will affect pricing strategies in segmented markets.

Another issue for suppliers is transient demand. Vaccine manufacturers face a problem analogous to that of armament manufacturers before and during wars: if they invest in gigantic production plants, they will end up with massive unused facilities when the war is over. Hence, there needs to be more clarity (and creativity) about how the infrastructure used against COVID-19 can be repurposed. At least the novel techniques used in the mRNA vaccines will be useful to combat a wide range of diseases and disorders in the future.

Wars also need to be paid for. In the past, countries facing the prospect of a massive war bill assumed that in victory they could impose the costs on the defeated power. The Trump administration tried this approach when it insisted that China should pay a big price for its role in the pandemic, especially considering that it had already returned to economic growth before the end of 2020. In any case, even friends and allies will squabble over the settling of war debts. In the case of COVID-19, the only realistic scenario is that no one else is going to pay; demands for reparations will merely poison international diplomacy.

Finally, the war on COVID-19 has involved massive fiscal and monetary stimulus, far beyond the levels in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. As such, it is important that governments start preparing long-term stabilization programs to prevent bottlenecks, shortages, and price increases when the emergency is over.

This may sound like attempting to square a circle. The key is to focus precisely on the need of the moment, while accepting that many other needs cannot be easily determined. We need instruments for today that can also be used in different ways tomorrow. And while we look ahead to a better future, we also should prepare for higher taxes.

There is a model for managing such temporal dilemmas. The post-WWII vision relied on a surge of economic dynamism that provided a bridge from war to peace. Without strong, shared growth, the burden of the war would have been unbearable. Only a transformative vision of a generally healthier society can help us overcome todays dismal reality.

See more here:

What's in a War? by Harold James - Project Syndicate

Legislation that decriminalizes the possession of all illegal drugs goes into effect in Oregon on Monday.

Approved by voters in November, the measure says the state will fine offenders and offer addiction treatment instead of prison time. By addressing drug use as a public health issue rather than a crime, this historic change takes a sledgehammer to the war on drugs, says Kassandra Frederique, executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance.

Drug users need help, not punishment, she says, yet drug possession is the most common reason for arrest in the U.S. This legislation disrupts the relationship between getting help and getting in trouble.

As someone who was a social worker, I recognize that people make different choices when they want to make those choices, she says. Punishing people has never been an effective deterrent when it's come to complex human behavior.

People dealing with addiction have limited treatment options in jail or prison, she says, whereas remaining part of their community helps folks maintain dignity and sovereignty to make better choices.

Under Oregons new legislation, decriminalizing all drugs includes substances such as heroin, cocaine and meth. Opponents argue that by removing a major disincentive to do drugs, the law could fuel more drug use.

With more Americans dying from drug overdoses than ever before, Frederique says treatment and community resources need to be funded. Decriminalizing drugs sends a message to Oregonians that help is available, she says.

There's been so much cognitive dissonance about what the message is. Is it tough love or is it love? she says. And what I say is love is not supposed to hurt.

And Oregon isnt alone: Vermont, Colorado, Washington, California and Virginia are also looking into decriminalizing drugs.

I think more people are looking at this than people realize because everyone recognizes that we cannot arrest our way out of this problem, she says. So let's stop investing in that and let's actually start investing in community well-being.

Julia Corcoranproduced and edited this interview for broadcast withTodd Mundt.Allison Haganadapted it for the web.

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'A Sledgehammer To The War On Drugs': Oregon Decriminalizes Illegal Drugs - Here And Now

In the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon addressed the nation in a televised broadcasta speech that would have repercussions for decades to come.

Americas public enemy number one in the U.S. is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, he said, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.

And with those words began the War on Drugs. At least, officially.

Nearly 50 years later, this offensive has seeped into our policing culture. From broken windows model of policing and the advent of stop and frisk to no-knock warrants and the militarization of local police departments, the so called War on Drugs has led to the targeting of communities of color.

With over 2 million people behind bars, the United States is the worlds most carceral country. A large number of those serving time are for crimes related to drugs possession and activity.

Advocates for reform have long argued that punitive policies have not reduced the flow of drugs across the country. In fact, they have strengthened illicit drug markets, creating risky and unhealthy conditions for drug users by focusing on the criminal element of substance use instead of seeing it through a lens of healthcare access and social justice.

Meanwhile, more than 70,000 people died last year alone as a result of drug overdoses.

In this episode of Latino USA, Maritza Perez, Director of the Office of National Affairs at the Drug Policy Alliance in Washington, D.C., breaks down the racial history behind the War on Drugs spanning back into the 1800s and why decriminalization may be the only way to end the persecution of people of color under the guise of drug enforcement.

Photo courtesy of Maritza Perez.

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Decriminalizing The War On Drugs - Latino USA

The war on COVID-19 has a lot in common with the war on drugs. Just as it is unrealistic to believe we can ever achieve a drug-free society, it is unrealistic to believe we can achieve a COVID-free society. While case numbers seem to be ebbing right now, and vaccinations are revving up, the risk remains that new, more virulent and contagious strains will emerge, resistant to the vaccines and to the immunity derived from having already been infected. Humans are social animals, and as people resume the in-person interactions they psychologically need and crave, new outbreaks are prone to occur.

This pandemic has a way to go before it runs its course. Even then, we can expect COVID-19 to remain a part of life for the foreseeable future.

It is time to embrace a strategy long advocated by reformers who deal with risky substance use and addiction: harm reduction. Harm reduction is nonjudgmental. It focuses on reducing the harm associated with the use of certain drugs and away from an abstinence-based approach that so often fails. Harm reduction is not a difficult concept for medical practitioners to grasp. When doctors prescribe medications to overweight, borderline diabetic, hypertensive patients who are unable or unwilling to make the necessary lifestyle adjustments to correct their health problems, they are practicing harm reduction.

In the case of substance use, harm reduction uses methods such as needle exchange or syringe services programs, safe consumptions sites, anonymous drug testing for contaminants and potency, and medication-assisted treatment for dependency or addiction with drugs such as methadone, buprenorphine, or even pharmaceutical-grade heroin to prevent withdrawal and stabilize life.

It is unrealistic to believe COVID-19 can be eradicated. Only one virus that infects humans has ever been eradicatedsmallpoxand that took 200 years. The likelihood is that COVID-19 will become endemic, making oscillating or seasonal appearances. Dealing with this reality via oscillating lockdowns is unsustainable.

We have already seen some of the harms resulting from the abstinence-based approach to the pandemic. These harms are not only economic, though poverty is a social determinant of health. Children are losing out on developing critical social and cognitive skills due to school closures, and poor children in inner cities have been hit the hardest. Children and adults are experiencing mental health deterioration. Suicides are increasing, as are drug overdoses. Many illnesses are going undiagnosed that will lead to increases in late-stage cancer and other medical problems in coming years. Income disparities are widening. Pockets of rebellion against pandemic policies are multiplying and respect for public health and governmental institutions is fading.

We need to move away from an abstinence-based approach and adopt measures that allow us to return to as much of a normal life as possible.

A key harm reduction tactic is vaccination. Even as new variants develop, the immunity derived from vaccination or from previous infection means that a recurrent COVID-19 infection is much less likely to be severe or require hospitalization. Vaccination also reduces spread by moving the population toward herd immunity. As vaccinations increase, it becomes reasonable for people to resume dinner parties, home gatherings, and other social activities providing all involved have been immunizedeither with a vaccine or by having survived infection.

Coexisting with the virus means mask-wearing will still make sense in dense crowds with unknown people who might be carrying the virus. And we should keep our distance from vulnerable friends or family members when outbreaks occur. It also means frequent hand-washing. This might be a good time to abandon the handshake for good.

A centrally planned, one-size-fits-all approach will be inequitable and ineffective. Government should provide updated and accurate information so that individuals and private organizations can devise their own best practices. Restaurants, theaters, shops, and other places of business should have leeway to develop their own evidence-based safety measures, free of micromanagement from governmental authorities. The consuming public will reward or punish these establishments based on results. The same goes for protecting the most vulnerable, such as those in nursing homes. Public health agencies should provide useful guidance but should minimize micromanagement.

As hospital wards and intensive care units begin to decompress and the number of newly confirmed cases heads down, this is a good time to think about how to live in a world in which COVID-19 is endemicone in which viral flare-ups are inevitable. If we look at the future through the lens of harm reduction then hopefully these flare-ups will mean just a temporary inconvenience from a flu-like or cold-like illness for the overwhelming majority of us.

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What the War on Drugs Can Teach Us About Fighting COVID-19 - Reason

For more than 50 years, Americahas been fighting the war on drugs, an endeavor that began under the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, who had the avowed purpose of arresting and incarcerating as many Blacks andother minorities as possible,especially for simple possessionof marijuana.

The war on drugs has been a failure by any measure. Not only have we spent hundreds of billions of dollars on failed law enforcement efforts both in this country and around the globe, directly leading to the destabilization of many nations that has had profound effects both for those countries and ours, but it is fair to say that the drug war has destroyed the lives of more individuals, families, and communities than the drugs themselves.

Thanks to the war on drugs, the prison population in the United States exceeds every other nation on earth, both in terms of sheer numbers and based on population.

At long last, after 50 years of fruitless and costly failure, things are about to change.

Voters in the State of Oregon recentlyapproved a ballot question that decriminalizes the possession of illegal drugs. Instead of throwing people in jail, the state will view druguse as a health issue, offering addicts treatment instead of prison time.

In Portugal, this approach has beenused for 20 years. The result has been stunning. Drug overdose deaths and HIV and other drug-related infections have decreased dramatically. In addition, the removal of criminal penaltiesdid NOT increase the rateof drug use.

The time has come for our society to acknowledge that the war on drugs, which was based on racism to begin with, must come to an end.

Oregon is leading the way and changeis coming none too soon.

Continued here:

Oregon Leads the Way on Drugs - Everett Independent

A new documentary on Netflix

In this new Netflix documentary, a timeline of events unfold during the period of the crack epidemic which began in the early 1980s in US cities.

The documentary builds on archive footage and interviews with former drug dealers, users and journalists to paint a picture of what crack meant for black neighborhoods.

It also focuses on the politics of the war on drugs begun by president Ronald Reagan.

Anti-drug rhetoricthe infamous Just Say No campaign for instancepaid little genuine regard for the black people whose lives and neighbourhoods were torn apart by crack.

At the beginning cops largely ignored what was happening and in fact actively took part in drug dealing and other forms of corruption.

They later went on to target and arrest black people, ending in mass incarceration.

An important part of the film focuses on the experience of black women and the myth of crack babies.

This was a moral panic hyped up by the media claiming that pregnant women were causing addictions in their babies.

There was never scientific evidence to back up this claim.

The documentary also highlights the shady role of the CIA and the military in ignoring or actively facilitating drug smuggling

It formed part of their secret involvement in supporting right wing militias and using the proceeds from drug deals to fund a right wing coup in Nicaragua.

Ordinary people were secondary to the needs of the USs interests in controlling South America.

Crack is an indictment of the hypocrisy and racism at the heart of the US establishment.

Read more from the original source:

Crack: Cocaine, Corruption & Conspiracythe truth about the war on drugs - Socialist Worker

A new coalition of progressive groups is calling on New Jersey officials to decriminalize drugs in a bid to redirect funds used on policing and incarceration back to communities.

Abolish The Drug War New Jersey the coalition founded by a bevy of progressive groups, including New Jersey Policy Perspective, the New Jersey Harm Reduction Coalition, the Latino Action Network, Fair in New Jersey and the state branch of the ACLU, among otherswants to strip criminal penalties from drug use and focus those funds toward local groups in communities of color.

Criminalization of drugs has only served to increase police violence, stigmatize drug use, and limit future opportunities through criminal penalties, which disproportionately impact Black and brown people. To achieve meaningful racial and social justice in New Jersey, we must take a public health and restorative justice approach in addressing drug possession and use, ACLU-NJ Executive Director Amol Sinha said.

State lawmakers in December approved a bill reducing penalties for possession of hallucinogenic mushrooms and are jockeying over bills to decriminalize and legalize recreational marijuana use. Gov. Phil Murphy has yet to sign the mushrooms bill.

The coalition hopes to enable programs to reduce harm in such communities and help release inmates held on drug crimes that have historically disproportionately targeted Black and Brown residents.

New Jersey lawmakers must understand that, for decades, oppressive drug laws have dehumanized and harmed the very communities they are sworn to serve, New Jersey Policy Perspective President Brandon McKoy said. The people of this state support decriminalization efforts as we saw most recently in Novembers election. Now its time for Trenton to step up to the plate and build a system that addresses drug use with humanity, compassion, and restoration.

View original post here:

New coalition looking to end the War on Drugs - New Jersey Globe | New Jersey Politics

From: Sarah Ventura

Mass incarceration is a bipartisan issue and a human rights abuse. Solutions to mass incarceration draw on common values shared by both the political left and right.

The evidence that our country has a problem is clear. Since 1970, the number of people incarcerated in jails, prisons, and juvenile detention centers has increased by 700 percent so that the U.S. now incarcerates more people (both in absolute numbers and per capita) than any other country in the world.

Mass incarceration has shown a minimal impact on reducing crime rates and is costly at both a federal and local level. Mass incarceration disproportionately abuses people who are Black and brown and people who are poor.

If you doubt any of this, dont take my word for it. Dig into the research, see what you find.

The War on Drugs and the War on Crime hasnt worked unless the true purpose of each is social control via federal and state violence. Either mass incarceration is highly misguided, highly ineffective, and highly costly, or its straight-up evil perpetrated by big government.

Either way, it directly assaults the claimed values of both the left and the right.

Two well-researched books to read on this issue are The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness by Michelle Alexander and Drug Use for Grown-Ups: Chasing Liberty in the Land of Fear by Dr. Carl Hart. This is an issue we need to wrestle with together, as a local community, whether you want to defund the police, you back the blue, youre unsure, or youre somewhere in-between.

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The war on us - Winona Post

The last few weeks have been trying for the U.S.-Mexican relationship. They have called into question the principle of shared responsibility that underpins the joint effort to counter drug-fueled violence threatening citizens on both sides of the border, in the words of the 2008 Merida Initiative agreement, under which billions of dollars flowed to the Mexican military and judiciary. However, even if the Mexican government is now calling for nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty, regional challenges such as drugs, guns, and disease cross borders. And when the general formerly responsible for overseeing shared efforts to combat them is arrested on one side of the border on drug and money-laundering charges, then repatriated and exonerated, the repercussions are also shared.

Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda served as Mexicos national defense secretary during the Pea Nieto administration, from 2012 to 2018. On Oct. 15, 2020, Cienfuegos was arrested at the Los Angeles airport on drug trafficking and money laundering charges, making him the highest ranked official arrested in the United States on accusations of working with criminal groups, but not the only general in the Mexican army accused of helping drug traffickers. His arrest caused a media storm in Mexico and the United States because, among other reasons, apparently nobody within the Mexican government had been notified of the investigation or the impending arrest. It also put the small state of Nayarit and the criminal organization H-2 (the group alleged to have bribed Cienfuegos, whom they referred to as El Padrino, or the godfather, into helping move narcotics) on the map, both of which seldom feature in discussions of violence in Mexico.

For those who had followed the trial of Joaqun Guzmn Loera, also known as El Chapo, in New York, the impending legal proceedings against Cienfuegos promised an equal parade of colorful witnesses who would provide details on the relationship between organized crime and high-level Mexican officials. More importantly, while prosecution would not necessarily redress victims of the futile war on drugs, it would at least bring to justice a perpetrator who had abused his position within government for personal gain at the expense of Mexican lives.

It also had the potential of bringing to the fore significant vetting failures in the United States, and of helping improve vetting mechanisms for both countries. Cienfuegos was a close U.S. collaborator and even received in 2018 the William J. Perry Award for Excellence in Security and Defense Education given by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies based at the National Defense University. Recipients of the award are individuals or organizations that advanced a cooperative international security environment, and/or promoted sustainable institutional capacity in the Americas.

This was not to be. To the dismay of observers and victims of violence, charges against Cienfuegos were dismissed in the United States in November and he was exonerated in Mexico on Jan. 15. From the moment his repatriation was announced, observers believed Cienfuegos had little to fear. A serious investigation by Mexicos attorney generals office would likely unleash significant infighting within the government, and history suggests it would have been unlikely to lead to conviction and punishment. When Cienfuegos was repatriated to Mexico, the attorney generals office had not issued a warrant for his arrest. Even before being exonerated, Cienfuegos was, in nearly every sense, a free man. To date, Cienfuegos guilt or innocence remains to be demonstrated in the court of law.

According to some sources, his repatriation was the result of a negotiation heavily influenced by the Mexican army. It is important to note that unlike the United States, where the Department of Defense oversees the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in Mexico the army and the navy are separate secretariats with no authority like the Pentagon overseeing their activities. As a bargaining chip, the Mexican government apparently promised to prosecute Cienfuegos and continue to allow the operation of U.S. agents on Mexican soil in exchange for Cienfuegos return. Mexico failed on both accounts. On Dec. 15, the Mexican Congress approved changes to the 2005 National Security Law. The changes include the addition of paragraphs that regulate and control activities by intelligence agencies of foreign countries in Mexican territory. For some of us who follow and study the U.S.-Mexico relationship, these legal changes are, unfortunately, expected to severely hinder cooperation and hurt the relationship for years to come. This comes at a lethal time for the region, when COVID-19, homicides, and overdoses have killed Mexicans and Americans in record numbers.

Is Mexicos exoneration of Cienfuegos the end of the saga? Hardly.

A New Aggravation in the U.S.-Mexican Relationship

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is an agency with long-term memory. Enrique Kiki Camarena, a DEA special agent who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in Mexico in the 80s, has become an integral part of the DEAs mythology, and to this day his murder is used as a rallying cry for the organization. Rafael Caro Quintero, one of the perpetrators of Camarenas murder, remains on the DEAs Most Wanted Fugitives list, and the organization offers $20 million for information leading to his arrest. As explained by the DEA on its 40th anniversary, the Camarena case was

a turning point internally and externally. [The] DEA went to war with the government of Mexico about the kidnapping of Kiki Camarena. We didnt have many persons behind us. DEA overseas depends upon the integrity of the police with whom they work. That trust, that honor failed completely in Mexico with the loss of Kiki Camarena. It took the loss of Camarena for the nation to realize that we had to get serious about corruption in Mexico. And so, it was a telling moment for the Drug Enforcement Administration. [B]ut more importantly, I think, [it] established that a murder or kidnapping of a DEA agent or any federal official overseas is a crime against the laws of the United States no matter where in the world it takes place.

Given that the indictment against Cienfuegos was built on evidence provided by the DEA, the dismissal of his charges and his return to Mexico are bound to infuriate more than one special agent. This will only be exacerbated now that Mexico has exonerated Cienfuegos and President Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador accused the DEA of fabricating the charges against him. But whatever Lpez Obradors feeling towards the DEA, the agencys intelligence is key for Mexican law enforcement. Last year, for example, intelligence the DEA shared with Mexicos Financial Intelligence Unit led to blocking approximately 2,000 bank accounts linked to the Crtel Jalisco Nueva Generacin criminal organization. Operation Agave Azul, as it was named, remains to date the most aggressive action by the Lpez Obrador administration against money laundering by criminal groups. Not long ago, the director of Mexicos Financial Intelligence Unit, Santiago Nieto, publicly thanked the DEA on his Twitter account for the intelligence that led to it.

To be sure, no government agency on either side of the border should be more important than the relationship. But without prosecution against Cienfuegos plus the law restricting U.S. agents, including those from the DEA, from operating in Mexico there is a new aggravation within the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship. Cienfuegos will become part of the call to arms used by the DEA to push for punitive and criminalizing drug policies (as opposed to a focus on public health) and a thorn in the relationship for years to come.

Biden Administration Puts Away the Carrots and Brings out the Big Stick

In the short term, it pushes the incoming Biden administration into a tougher stance. As my colleague Vanda Felbab-Brown has explained, this includes options like economic tariffs, arresting and prosecuting other Mexican officials, or cutting development aid to Mexico. The United States can do this not only because of the asymmetry that defines the bilateral relationship but also because there is hardly a consolidated bureaucratic corps on security matters in Mexico that can play hardball with the United States. This problem is not new, but the Lpez Obrador administration has implemented several substantial changes that have weakened Mexicos bargaining position at a time it wants to (regrettably) play the sovereignty card.

Some of the changes include the dissolution of the Federal Police and the creation of the National Guard, which has yet to meet its recruitment goals. The administration also brought back the Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection, which was eliminated under the Pea Nieto administration. Furthermore, Martha Brcena, a career diplomat and Mexicos ambassador to the United States, announced her resignation in early December. Her replacement will be Esteban Moctezuma, current secretary of education, who has never served Mexico on a foreign policy assignment.

To say this is unfortunate would be an understatement. The bilateral relationship has been strained for a few years, starting with a slowdown during the Pea Nieto years, and worsened when the 2016 presidential candidate for the Republican Party referred to immigrants from the countrys southern neighbor as rapists, drug traffickers, and criminals. January 2021 presented an opportunity to steer the relationship back onto a productive course, allowing Mexico to bring to the table crucial issues like arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. However, the hostility perceived by the United States as a result of Mexican actions in the Cienfuegos case is shutting a window of opportunity to deepen cooperation that ultimately benefits citizens in the region.

The Real Winners of the Godfather Scandal

The ultimate beneficiary of this breakdown in communications are criminal actors in the United States and Mexico who continue their profitable cross-border collaborations.

Advocates of U.S.-Mexican cooperation recognize there are many aspects in which security cooperation could be improved, starting with an approach to drug use and violence that focuses on public health rather than punitive policies. While I do not believe poppy growers in rural areas of Mexico are directly responsible for the loss of American lives, activities like transnational drug trafficking will continue to displace and kill both Mexican and U.S. citizens. In the current state of affairs, it should surprise nobody if we continue to hear devastating stories of mothers searching for their loved ones and count record numbers of homicides and overdoses on both sides of the border. Yet again.

With willful negligence and active hostility, through the exoneration of Cienfuegos and modification of a law that undermines U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the Lpez Obrador administration has pushed the United States into a defensive stand. After Mexico unilaterally unsealed the information the U.S. government shared for the Cienfuegos investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice accused the Lpez Obrador administration of violating an international treaty by releasing confidential U.S. documents. Furthermore, the United States has reserved its right to prosecute Cienfuegos in the future.

As a baseball fan, Lpez Obrador may do well to remember that in Americas favorite pastime, and unlike in most other sports, it is the defense that has the ball.

Cecilia Farfn-Mndez is head of Security Research Programs at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at U.C. San Diego and co-founder of the Mexico Violence Resource Project.

Image: Office of the Mexican President

Originally posted here:

After Cienfuegos, Criminal Cross-Border Collaboration Continues; Governmental Collaboration Suffers - War on the Rocks

An employee holds a jar of marijuana on sale after it became legal in the state to sell recreational marijuana to customers over 21 years old in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Illinois begins the legal sale of marijuana on Jan 1, 2020.

Matthew Hatcher | Reuters

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and two other Democratic senators said Monday that they will push to pass this year sweeping legislation that would end the federal prohibition on marijuana, which has been legalized to some degree by many states.

That reform also would provide so-called restorative justice for people who have been convicted of pot-related crimes, the senators said in a joint statement.

"The War on Drugs has been a war on people particularly people of color," said a statement issued by Schumer, of New York, and Sens. Cory Booker, of New Jersey, and Ron Wyden, of Oregon.

"Ending the federal marijuana prohibition is necessary to right the wrongs of this failed war and end decades of harm inflicted on communities of color across the country," they said.

"But that alone is not enough. As states continue to legalize marijuana, we must also enact measures that will lift up people who were unfairly targeted in the War on Drugs."

The senators said they will release "a unified discussion draft on comprehensive reform" early this year and that passing the legislation will be a priority for the Senate.

The trio also said that in addition to ending the federal pot ban and ensuring restorative justice, the legislation would "protect public health and implement responsible taxes and regulations."

Schumer co-sponsored marijuana decriminalization legislation several years ago.

The statement comes as public support for legal marijuana has grown. A Gallup poll in November showed that 68% of Americans, a record high, favored marijuana legalization.

Every initiative that involved the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana on the ballot in 2020 passed.

Voters in New Jersey and Arizona chose to legalize marijuana for adult recreational use. Mississippi voted to legalize medical marijuana use, and South Dakota legalized the drug for both recreational and medical use.

So far, 15 states and the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for adult recreational use, and 36 states permit medical use of the drug.

Oregon is the first to have decriminalized hard drugs.

Read more here:

Democratic senators will push to pass pot reform bill this year - CNBC

Drugs and Power: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

By Gareth Rice

INTRODUCTION

Despite a significant counterinsurgency campaign since 2001, Afghanistan has transformed into a true narco-terror state. Providing the source of close to 90% of the worlds supply of heroin, Afghanistans narcotics trade has become interwoven in all aspects of Afghan society and has further compounded the countrys inability to achieve a peaceful end to hostilities. The Talibans relationship with this trade has slowly transformed from one of economic convenience to a dependency that sees it providing the largest source of their financing and significant political capital over large areas of the country. Moreover, that relationship has helped the group to control more territory than at any time since 2001.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) annual Opium Surveys have provided a stark depiction of the scale of this problem. In 2018, despite a drought in large areas of the country, Afghanistan cultivated the second largest area of opium on record, continuing the upward trend in cultivation since 2001. Indeed, in the last 30 years of the 20th Century, opium output increased in Afghanistan by 800%. As a global comparison, Columbian drugs at the height of their production never reached more than 5% of Columbias GDP, while Afghanistans drug trade accounted for 50% of its GDP by 2007. This figure declined to between 6-11% by 2018 (due mostly to the growth in the Afghan licit economy), although opium still surpassed the value of the countrys legal exports of goods and services.

There have been several barriers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in addressing this problem. Debate as to the extent of the Talibans relationship with this trade and the best methods to address the problem have contributed to some of the many reasons it has never featured as a key strategic issue. Similarly, the uncertainty of Taliban profit margins from the trade have resulted in a conflicting prioritisation of counter-narcotics efforts across the member nations of ISAF and provincial governors of GIROA. The drug trade in Afghanistan has simply proved to be insurmountable and its relationship to the insurgency too unclear to deserve greater attention.

This study seeks to understand the relationship between the drug trade and the insurgency to provide a better understanding of the interaction between counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency campaigns. Existing research on this topic has often focused on the socio-economic factors of the drug trade, criminal interactions or financing of terror groups; all of which fall short of providing constructive guidance to counterinsurgency campaigns. By exploring the economic, cultural and political dimensions that underpin this trade, this study will provide a greater understanding of not only how the insurgency continues to thrive but additionally, how this trade intersects with the Afghan society. In doing so, the study will demonstrate the economic motivations for entry into the insurgency and the drug trade, the cultural paradigm that ensures trust between actors and ultimately the political power that is derived from controlling an illicit drug trade. The importance of understanding these relationships has far reaching implications for counter-narcotics strategies and contemporary understanding of insurgent groups more broadly.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research paper provides a literature review with a counterinsurgency focus across the various intersecting fields of study relating to the Afghan drug trade. The counterinsurgency focus is unique because the trade in illicit narcotics are often seen as a policing or socio-economic issue. As such, there are few studies into illicit drug trades that are undertaken with the express purpose of aiding a counterinsurgency campaign. This in part explains the inconsistent approach to counter-narcotic programs that have been undertaken in Afghanistan. Further, when narcotics is discussed in relation to the insurgency, it is more often an analysis of insurgent financing which does not encompass the full impact of these trades on the conflict.

There was a lack of reliable, quantitative data to support an in-depth analysis of insurgent financing. Cultivation data produced by the UNODC was found to be the most reliable data on narcotics cultivation. However, corresponding data on other metrics of violence and insurgent behaviour were far less reliable. Utilising data on opium production and the deaths of western soldiers, Jo Lind, Karl Moene and Fredrik Willumsen provide one example of attempting to demonstrate a causal link between conflict and opium production. While the use of soldiers deaths is a questionable data metric, it was found by the authors to be the only reliable data available. As such, many of the findings of this paper are theoretical in nature and provide a framework from which to understand the insurgency.

There are a number of obstacles to conducting primary research into extremist groups. The ongoing violence in drug-cultivating areas is a significant disincentive for many researchers wishing to conduct field interviews. Similarly, the lack of modern financial infrastructure both within this region and utilised by the insurgency make it almost impossible to accurately track finances that are linked to this trade. As a result, it may well be impossible to accurately determine the level of insurgent finances derived from narcotic-related activities. It is not surprising then to see the significant debate on this topic as highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR):

the extent to which the Taliban participate in the trade of narcotics is debated. While the Taliban are believed to collect payments from those involved at each stage of the value chain in Afghanistan, the extent of their control over the processing, sale, and distribution of opiates is less clear.

Rather than contributing to the debate on insurgent finances, the focus of this research will expand on the intrinsic relationship between the insurgency and the drug trade. In doing so, it provides a framework for understanding how insurgent groups within this region operate and the often-convoluted relationship between criminal and extremist elements. More broadly, financing will always be a fundamental requirement for extremist groups to survive. Understanding how to dismantle these funding sources is therefore critical to defeating them. This research will demonstrate that narcotics is a particularly unique source of financing because of its ability to generate political capital for the group that ensures both its ongoing survival and the basis of its power.

Insurgent groups within Afghanistan operate under a number of different affiliations and with varying degrees of cooperation or competition. The most commonly understood insurgent affiliation is the Taliban, and to avoid confusion in this study all insurgent and terrorist groups connected to the drug trade will be referred to under this title. Further complicating this landscape, groups or cells within the Taliban do not always operate within a centralised, hierarchical structure. On the contrary, it is more common to see groups that are interconnected and responsible for their own finances and low-level operations. The same is true of the drug trade. Where some groups have almost no interaction with the drug trade, others have achieved significant control of the trade within their areas of operation. Consequently, the findings of this study may not apply to all insurgent actors in Afghanistan.

HISTORY OF NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN

Narcotics have played a role in Afghanistan since the days of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. Opium is believed to have been imported by Alexanders armies and it thrived in the Afghan climate, producing yields far higher than the global average and often in spite of scarce irrigation infrastructure. It is not surprising then to consider that opium has played a central role in Afghanistan for the past 40 years. Indeed, conflict and drugs have become a fundamental part of the Afghan state as both a crop of convenience for those seeking to survive a war-torn country and a commodity to be exploited for criminal gains.

Given its relationship with conflict, the drug trade has existed in its current form since the 1960s. The only variables that appear to have changed are the volume of drugs being produced and where the money from the trade is flowing. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, these variables would begin to change rapidly. Afghan farmers increasingly turned to opium as agricultural output declined, due in part to the deliberate destruction of irrigation infrastructure by the Soviets. When the Mujahideen required funding for their war against the Soviets, this crop also provided an easy source of revenue.

While the Mujahideen enjoyed significant foreign sponsorship during the Soviet-Afghan war, narcotics allowed them to gain financial independence and carry out more sophisticated attacks. With the help of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Mujahideen encouraged opium production and subsequently imposed a tax on its output. In what became a vicious debt cycle, farmers began to plant more poppy to pay for the tax and became victims to credit systems offered by an influx of drug merchants. The combination of (US led) foreign funding and an expanding opium harvest allowed the Mujahideen to sustain their insurgency until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

As Afghanistans opium production expanded from 100 tonnes per annum in the 1970s to 2,000 tonnes in 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), helping to coordinate the war, chose to ignore the drug trade in order to focus on defeating the Soviets. Indeed, at one point in the war, there were even plans to flood Soviet troops with heroin in an effort to undermine the militarys effectiveness highlighting the often conflicting approach to counter-narcotics. While the CIA appeared to quietly endorse the growth in narcotics, the ISI began to take a more direct role that helped contribute to a near twentyfold increase in output during the war. This period undoubtedly led to a transformation of many warlords into drug lords that would continue well after the war concluded.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan descended into a civil war that corresponded with another doubling in opium output. The opium trade would prove to be a popular market for an influx of returning refugees requiring employment and poor farmers seeking credit to sustain themselves between harvests. Opium would once again play a pivotal role in conflict as warlords sought to maximise their narcotics returns to fund their struggles for power. The political structures that many of these warlords created would eventually establish much of the framework for Afghanistans future. As the concept of a central political power became an increasingly distant reality, these warlords created their own cultural, economic and political structures of which opium would play a central role.

When the Taliban finally seized Kabul in 1996, they continued to encourage opium production and offered protection in exchange for taxes on production and refinement. Opium output increased by 25% in the year following the Talibans rise to power with 97% of this output coming from Helmand and Kandahar province where the Taliban held the most power. Despite earning significant profits, the Taliban had an inconsistent approach to the drug trade based on an ideological belief that it was un-Islamic, as well as a practical acknowledgement that foreign aid and political recognition would often be conditional on not supporting its continued cultivation.

Poppy Cultivation By Province (2018) and Historical Trafficking Routes

Figure 1

Notwithstanding their objections to the drug trade, the Taliban would (for the most part) chose their economic gains over any ideological or religious concerns. This relationship would continue until 2000 when the Taliban made the sudden decision to ban all opium cultivation in an apparent attempt to gain economic aid. Despite reducing opium output by 94%, it is speculated that the Taliban was able to offload significant stockpiles at now inflated prices while simultaneously receiving $US43 million in aid from the US. The Talibans ban on narcotics would, however, have serious ramifications for their political capital with the rural population and would contribute to their rapid removal from power following the US-led intervention. This is likely to be a lesson that the group remembered during the insurgency that would follow.

With the removal of the Taliban from power in 2001 and the exile of their senior leadership to Pakistan, motivations quickly turned to funding the new insurgency. The initial donors for this new movement were often drug smugglers. At the coalface, Taliban fighters quickly began adjusting battlefield tactics to focus primarily on protecting drug shipments of which they would receive a protection fee of as much as 20%. As the insurgency began to develop, the Taliban began to take on a more direct involvement in the drug trade at each stage of the value chain. From the outset of the insurgency it was clear that the drug trade was of vital importance to the Talibans ability to project power.

ECONOMIC POWER

The Afghan drug trade is most commonly understood in terms of the political economy that it generates to perpetuate the war. Loretta Napoleoni notes that war often creates alternative systems of power and profit that can be exploited by combatants and non-combatants alike. David Keen takes this notion further by extending Carl von Clausewitzs famous maxim of war as an extension of politics by other means, by observing that war is also an extension of economics by other means. In other words, it can be observed that war does not destroy an economy but rather transforms it to the benefit of certain groups. Those groups may not have caused the war but may well have strong motivations to keep it going. Therefore, we can see that war can be a rational economic pursuit for some, where ideological reasoning is not the primary motivation for hostilities.

Afghanistan provides an unfortunate example of this economic transformation. Following the Talibans removal from power in 2001, farmers quickly returned to opium production to exploit the lack of governing authority and recover losses from the Talibans year-long opium ban. This lack of governance corresponded with an influx of criminal elements comprised mostly of drug merchants and traffickers to Afghanistans rural areas. Despite commentary often suggesting Taliban coercion of farmers to grow opium, the initial motivations appear to have been almost exclusively for profit. This is significant because it recognises that the Taliban likely had little to do with emergence of the drug trade post 2001, but rather exploited its existence once it was established.

In 2003, a UNODC Survey found one third of the surveyed populace reported poverty as their principle driver for growing poppy. Subsequent Opium Surveys have consistently highlighted the potential profit margin as a central motivating factor for farmers. The UNODC has, however, separately argued the desire to grow poppy is driven more by greed than need. These findings are supported by the work of Lind et al. in their comprehensive study examining the relationship between illicit trades and conflict conditions. In doing so, they conclude that the opportunity to exploit conflict conditions for profit provide the primary motivation for individual farmers. The population engaged in this trade is therefore likely to be drawn to an insurgency that supports their cultivation, as the prospect of government control over the country would threaten the basis of the drug economy and by extension, their livelihoods.

Poppy is simply a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment according to Adam Pain and David Mansfield. The ease with which it is planted, stored and sold make it a highly attractive crop for the rural population. Perhaps the only down sides to this crop are its significant labour requirements at harvest and, of course, its illicit nature. Mansfield has therefore challenged the notion that opium is often a more profitable crop for farmers. On the contrary, he argues that like any elastic commodity it is subject to the law of supply and demand. If farmers are unable to secure sufficient economic return from the crop to feed their household, it becomes more likely that they will switch to a food crop such as wheat. This economic correction can be seen in the 2009/10 crop cycle (see table 1) in which opium production declined due in part to an oversupply of opium and an undersupply of wheat.

Potential Opium Production 1994-2018 ($US/Mt)

Table 1

The elasticity of this commodity would typically provide promise of the growth in opium cultivation declining once economic returns reach equilibrium. Yet while there is little evidence of farmers being coerced into growing opium by force, there is significant evidence to suggest that opium related credit provides this persuasion. Due to the lack of available credit in rural areas, drug traffickers have typically filled this void. The resulting debt traps that many farmers find themselves in has only been further exacerbated by the impact of drought, government eradication and predatory debt lending. This potentially contradicts Mansfields findings as farmers may be unable to grow alternative crops if they have promised to provide an agreed quantity of opium at harvest.

The reluctance of agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to offer alternative seeds and credit has provided little competition to the drug trade. In 2012, Rajiv Chandrasekaran argued that USAID refused to provide support to farmers switching to cotton, in part due to a US law prohibiting aid being used to assist foreign agriculture that might compete with US markets. This was partially addressed by the establishment of the Agricultural Development Fund in 2010, however, SIGAR has criticised the programs effectiveness in reaching rural populations with an ambitious goal of default rates below 5% in one of the worlds most volatile environments. Indeed the bulk of foreign aid to Afghanistan has failed to provide any viable economic alternatives to the drug trade despite 70% of the nation living in rural areas and 61% of households generating income from agriculture.

A significant portion of the Afghan labour market is now dependent on the production of narcotics. In 2009, it was estimated that nearly two million people (or 8.7% of the population) had some involvement in narcotics. By 2017, the market was providing the equivalent of 354,000 full-time jobs. Despite a perception that drug labs are owned and operated by Taliban or criminal enterprises, there are a significant number of small family-run laboratories throughout the country. This adds to the challenge of attempting to distinguish between the civilian, criminal and insurgent sectors of the population. Moreover, any alternative to the drug trade will need to replace the existing labour market or risk further alienating the rural population and creating further poverty. Considering the opium crop requires nine times as many workers to cultivate than wheat, this will not be an easy transition for the local economy.

The economic incentives for the Taliban to become connected with the drug trade are significant. With an annual export value in recent years of between $US1.5 - $US3 billion a year, the potential for the Taliban to secure even a small percentage of this trade would provide an attractive source of financing for their insurgency. Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately determine the Talibans profits from the drug trade due to distinct differences in how various regional nodes operate. Similarly, the difference in the price of opium as it moves along the value-chain from farmer to market varies greatly with fiat currency not always being the preferred exchange for goods and services.

The Talibans initial profits from this trade appear to have manifested from the imposition of a land tax on farmers and protection fees to drug traffickers. The imposition of a land tax is perhaps the simplest method of securing a profit from the illicit trade. As a global comparison, Yasser Arafat was able to negotiate a 10% tax on the drug trade within the Bekaa Valey of Lebanon, which resulted in an estimated net return of $US150 million per year. This method is also similar to what occurred when the Taliban held power before the war under the guise of a zakat. The question of what is provided in exchange for this tax will be explored in the next section.

US Forces-Afghanistan have estimated that the Taliban receives 20% of the annual narcotics revenue. While it may be impossible to determine the accuracy of this figure, understanding where and how the Taliban establishes their profit along the value-chain is of fundamental importance when attempting to disrupt their finances. To demonstrate this, consider the prevalence of interdictions within counter-narcotics strategies as opposed to eradication schemes (see figure 2). The prevalence of interdictions presumably occurs because traffickers and drug labs are seen as being more affiliated with the insurgency than farmers. Briefly ignoring the accuracy of this perception, it is difficult to see how interdictions would successfully reduce the Talibans finances if their primary source of income is achieved through a tax at the beginning of the value-chain.

US Counter-narcotics funding allocation 2002-2017 ($US Millions)

Figure 2

As a fragmented insurgent group, it is also important to establish that the drug trade does not appear to be controlled by a central element but rather multiple independent groups who coexist in a mutually supportive arrangement. Such arrangements are also by-products of economic power which is inherently decentralised and dispersed. If the trade is in fact controlled by multiple independent elements, that may make the problem more challenging to confront. If there are no large cartels to dismantle and no central drug figures to arrest, it may prove ineffective to target traffickers and labs exclusively in an effort to bankrupt the insurgency. Following the money is also difficult in a country that has no traditional banking system and relies heavily on the hawala financial system which offers little in the way of records.

The ideological motivations of the Taliban appear to have shifted over time, with economic rewards now providing the principle driver, as is often the case when encountering illicit trades. While often appearing as ethnic conflicts on the surface, economic and political motivations have historically always shaped group and individual behaviour in Afghanistan. Gretchen Peters argues that the drug trade has fundamentally transformed the Taliban into a drug enterprise which is devoid of much of its ideological origins. This is a view that is also indirectly supported by the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler whose greed and grievance theory argues that the profits from illicit trades provide little incentive for insurgencies to seek an end to hostilities.

Regardless of the extent of Taliban involvement in this trade, the existence of an illicit trade of this magnitude significantly increases the potential for widespread corruption. While there have undoubtedly been Western perceptions of corruption as a cultural issue within Afghanistan, such perceptions fail to acknowledge the negative views of Afghan people towards corruption and its propensity to drive support for the Taliban. Indeed, the initial rise of the Taliban movement was due in large part to the corruption of many Mujahideen factions. The paradox here is that despite the Talibans connection to the drug trade, they have been able to escape similar allegations of corruption which have consistently undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government. Whether the Taliban deliberately facilitate aspects of this corruption (or at least allegations of it) to support their narrative remains to be seen.

The economic interests of both combatants and non-combatants remains a powerful barrier to any peaceful end to hostilities. Further, to accept Peters description of the Taliban as a cartel devoid of its ideological inceptions, it must also be accepted that narcotics plays a central role within the insurgency. Yet, while the value of this commodity to the Taliban explains much of how the group has managed to survive and potentially even recruit, it does not explain how the Taliban has continued to exert such significant resistance against both GIROA and ISAF. An economic analysis on its own simply does not explain how individuals and groups can interact with an illicit trade or, how a source of funding can generate political capital for an extremist group.

POLITICAL POWER

The Political Capital Model is derived from the work of Vanda Felbab-Brown who argues that the true strength of insurgent involvement in drug trades is derived from the political capital that it creates. While the financing of any extremist group is fundamental to its survival, there is no other source of financing which also provides this degree of political capital. Due to the labour-intensive nature of the drug trade and the ease of entry into the market, narcotics involves a larger portion of the population than many other illicit trades. By providing either land, credit or security (or a combination of these factors), the Taliban is able to facilitate the market that is sustaining the rural populations livelihoods and, in the process, ensures their dependence on the existence of the insurgency.

Whether political capital was the initial motivation for the Taliban is uncertain and perhaps irrelevant. It is this influence over the rural population that ultimately allows the Taliban to survive. Notwithstanding the fact that drug revenue allows the Taliban to pay its fighters and carry out attacks against GIROA and ISAF, it is the population from which any insurgency (and indeed any government) draws its strength. Of note, both Australian and US military counterinsurgency doctrine focuses on the ideology of the insurgent which presumably allows it to derive its legitimacy and win the support of the people. While there is undoubtedly an ideological element to the Taliban movement that forms the basis of their recruitment, there is little evidence to suggest that it is widely supported by the Afghan populace.

The Political Capital Model is significant because it contradicts the popular notion that a population will withdraw support for the insurgency once it loses its ties with the ideological basis of its group. A 2018 survey of the Afghan population by the Asia Foundation would certainly support the view that the population has lost support for the Taliban and yet, the group continues to flourish in large parts of the country. While it could be argued that the population supports the Taliban out of fear rather than any other motivation, this does not provide a conclusive explanation for the Talibans continued survival. It is perhaps more likely that the rural population has formed a relationship of convenience with the Taliban born out of the illegality of the drug trade and the protection that it requires from both criminal elements and the government itself.

Dipali Mukhopadyays study of Afghan warlords provides a strong foundation for understanding the relationship between the governed and the governing authority in Afghanistan. Since political power in Afghanistan has rarely been centralised, the power of warlords at the periphery has often been the norm. These warlords have typically derived the origin of their power through an ethnic, religious or tribal affiliation; however, their ongoing legitimacy is projected through the protection that they provide rather than any ideological foundation. The importance of political legitimacy (often featured in counterinsurgency doctrine) is therefore seemingly rejected by Mukhopadhyay. She goes on to state that Predation and protection often go hand in hand, which reflects both the Taliban and many warlords control of rural populations.

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Drugs and Power: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - smallwarsjournal

The chief in charge of the Garda Drugs and Organised Crime Bureau has warned anyone tempted to take on a role in a drugs gang that they should be prepared to be locked up.

etective Chief Superintendent Angela Willis, who has overseen the Bureaus response to organised crime and, in particular, the dismantling of the Kinahan mafia, says nobody is outside its reach.

Whatever your role. If you are one of our targets you better be ready to go to prison. It doesnt matter what your role is, a group cant operate without all its components, she said.

There is nobody beyond reach. Once the right collaboration is there and dedication to targeting them is there, then I dont think there is anybody who is untouchable.

Last year, the Gardas tough crime-fighting unit seized 8 million in cash, 23 firearms and 36 million worth of drugs, and while it is still difficult to ascertain how Covid-19 has affected organised crime, it has presented opportunities for the force.

In a wide-ranging interview which will be broadcast on the Crime World podcast this week, Detective Chief Superintendent Willis reveals how her own career has spanned the emerging drug market.

She details how she started out as a rookie cop in Store Streets drug unit, working the north inner city, but now liaises with police departments across the world tackling Irish criminals.

She was part of the team that took on Tony Felloni, Roly Cronin and who policed others like Thomas the Boxer Mullen and Derek Maradona Dunne, who flooded the area with heroin.

Just last week, a report found that one in four people living in the area have experienced drug-related intimidation, but just one in five said they would report it to the authorities.

The report from the Drug-Related Intimidation Initiative found that fear, open drug dealing and intimidation have now become normal for many in the area.

Back in the 1990s, we could identify all our targets as there werent so many of them. It was mothers who were coming to us, mothers whose children were dying from heroin, and our targets were the suppliers that were causing the most misery.

The community came on board with us and have continued to support what we do. Without the support from communities we simply couldnt do our job.

We would have carried out about 500 searches a year but it was different because we were never overly concerned about firearms.

We were always mindful they could be there, but the amount of times we found them was minimal compared to today, when that is now the first consideration when we are doing any operation.

I was just straight out of Templemore when I was assigned to the north central divisional unit. I suppose I was just thrown into the middle of it, but we had a great unit and it was very effective. It was a small number of key targets that interested us.

The people came to us and told us who was most affecting their community and we went after them.

"Tony Felloni lived up in Dominic Street flats at the time with his children and extended family and we looked at him and his lifestyle and put surveillance around him and we got help from the community who could see the comings and goings, and through that we worked out the right time to search the place and find the heroin inside.

That was the strategy, hitting them at the right time. You have to catch them and have enough evidence to support a prosecution so they end up in prison and cant cause any further harm to the community. That is where you have a significant impact.

Times have changed since Felloni and his counterparts pushed their poison. Back then, a seizure of 100,000 worth of drugs would make a difference and could even cause a drought on the streets. Its not the same today as drug use and supply has grown to unprecedented levels.

When the Garda National Drugs and Organised Crime Bureau (DOCB) was set up in March 2015 it had a new strategy, and targeting entire gangs rather than individuals was top of the list.

While seizures are still important, the focus is more on dismantling the structures that facilitate large-scale dealing.

Since then, more than 200 million worth of drugs have been confiscated, 133 guns and more than 5,500 rounds of ammunition. In January alone, almost 3 million in cash, 1.2 million worth of drugs and a pistol has added to the stash.

Less than a year after its establishment, the focus of the DOCB was fixed firmly on events surrounding the Regency Hotel attack and the bloody feud that it kicked off.

In her interview, Detective Chief Superintendent Willis describes how a plan was formulated around dismantling the Kinahan organised crime gang and others.

I suppose nobody expected in broad daylight there would be a murder of such significance.

We had been formed before that and we were a well resourced part of the policing reform, so we were in a good position to put those resources into tackling that group and others, she said.

The jailing of nine members of one murder squad, who were stopped as they attempted to kill Patsy Hutch, was exactly the type of new policing used by the Bureau where everyone involved from top to bottom of the murder team were targeted.

They were all convicted for their individual roles in that attempt.

We were as focused that morning on the ones with the firearms, the lookout and the person who bought the sim cards for the mobile phones as they approached their target. We achieved the desired outcome.

A lot of our work is obviously in preventing murders, and I think that when you look at the numbers you can see that our strategy is working.

We have intervened and prevented murders 75 times since the Bureaus establishment. Some of those cases involved the same person multiple times.

In the last year, those figures were reduced to two.

It shows that many of the people who are willing to engage in that type of thing are serving time in prison.

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Meet the female Garda chief superintendent spearheading Ireland's five-year war on drugs and organised crime - Sunday World

Cannabis stocks rallied anew on Wednesday, spurred on by news of a $7 billion deal for the first company to win U.S. regulatory approval for a cannabis-based drug, a move thats expected to boost investor interest in the plant and its medical benefits.

GW Pharmaceuticals Ltd. GWPH, +44.53%, developer of Epidiolex, the drug that won U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval as a treatment for severe forms of childhood epilepsy in 2018, said earlier it is being acquired by Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC JAZZ, -3.87%, which specializes in sleep medications.

The news sent U.S.-listed shares of the U.K.-based GW Pharma up 46% in afternoon trading, and helped spark a broad-based rally among cannabis stocks. Jazz shares slipped 1.0%.

We dont think this is the last deal we will see in the sector, said Nawan Butt, portfolio manager of the Medical Cannabis and Wellness UCITS ETF CBDX, +9.77%.

The deal is a clear sign that the pharmaceutical industry is recognizing the value and future potential of cannabinoid based medicines, said Jason Wilson, cannabis and banking expert at ETF Managers Group, which manages the ETFMG Alternative Harvest ETF MJ, +9.80% with $1.5 billion in assets under management.

It is also another example that the cannabis industry is continuing to normalize and evolve beyond the traditional cultivation of flower, with potential well outside of our borders, said Wilson. For investors, the acquisition of GW Pharma is another reminder that investing in cannabis touches many verticals globally, requiring a diverse approach beyond traditional cannabis cultivation companies.

David Johnson, chief executive of Enveric Biosciences Inc. ENVB, +1.18%, a Nasdaq-listed biotech that works with cannabinoids to help patients suffering from the side effects of cancer treatment, agreed. The deal serves as further validation that thoroughly researched and developed medical cannabinoids have significant potential to address patients unmet medical needs, he said.

Kyle Detwiler, chief executive of Clever Leaves, a company with operations in Canada, Colombia, Germany, Portugal and the U.S., said the news will help signal that global private equity and institutional investors are increasing their focus on the cannabis space.

This is a sign pharmaceutical cannabis is here to stay, he said.

The deal comes at a time of growing optimism in the cannabis sector, coming just days after Democratic Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and two other Democratic Senators pledged to make reform legislation a key priority in the current Congress, bolstering hopes for an end to federal prohibition.

Schumer, along with Sens. Ron Wyden of Oregon and Cory Booker of New Jersey,said in a joint statement Monday that they would introduce legislation in the coming weeks that would include expunging records relating to past activity deemed criminal during the so-called War on Drugs.

The sector had already enjoyed a boost since the election of President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, who were expected to pursue an agenda of reforming the U.S.s strict cannabis laws,which continue to classify the substance as a Schedule I drug, alongside heroin.

That classification has hampered the development of the sector, which is confined to those states that have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use and kept companieslocked out of the federally insured banking system.

Other positive developments include Mexico recently publishing federal medical cannabis regulations and the United Nations vote to remove medical cannabis from its list of dangerous narcotics, said Wilson.

These recent catalysts occurred on the backdrop of strong global cannabis sales growth in 2020 (2020 global sales are expected to reach approximately $20 billion an increase of approximately 35% versus 2019 sales of $15 billion) and suggest that the industry will continue to see strong growth and continued expansion domestically and globally for the foreseeable future, he said.

See also:New York is finally expected to legalize cannabis in 2021 as Gov. Cuomo goes all in

The Cannabis ETF THCX, +9.40% jumped 10% Wednesday, with 25 of its 30 components trading higher. Among individual stocks, Organigram Holdings Inc. OGI, +21.03% climbed 20%, Aphria Inc. APHA, +12.62% APHA, +12.46% was up 14% and Tilray Inc. TLRY, +12.01%, with which it is merging, was up 14%.

Cronos Group Inc. CRON, +7.93% CRON, +8.06% was up 9%, Aurora Cannabis Inc. ACB, +8.27% ACB, +7.48% was up 8.7% and Canopy Growth Corp. CGC, +7.73% WEED, +8.10% was up 7%.

Among U.S. companies, Charlottes Web Holdings Inc. CWBHF, +7.14% CWEB, +6.98%, a maker of CBD-based products, rose 7%, while vape maker Greenlane Holdings Inc. GNLN, +5.10% was up 5.6% and cbdMD Inc. YCBD, +7.00% was up 4%. Curaleaf Holdings Inc. CURLF, +4.46% CURA, +3.00% was up 5% and Cresco Labs Inc. CL, +2.37% was up 3.8%. Green Thumb Industries Inc. GTII, -0.05% was up 4.3%. KushCo Holdings Inc. KSHB, +16.54%, which containers, packaging and other products for the cannabis industry, was up nearly 10%.

The S&P 500 SPX, +0.10% was up 0.3%.

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Cannabis stocks rally anew as $7 billion GW Pharma deal spurs interest in weed and its medical benefits - MarketWatch