At present, an estimated 20 US B61 nuclear bombs are stored at the Buchel Airbase in western Germany. Mr Stoltenberg in a piece published by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote: Around the world, terrorism continues, authoritarian regimes challenge liberal democracies, and we see the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries like North Korea, as well as the continuing aggressive actions by Russia." The NATO chief warned Moscow was making developments significantly in its military capabilities, and especially in its nuclear arsenal"

He added that this is occurring while NATO views its own nuclear deterrent as a political tool, Russia has firmly integrated its nuclear arsenal into its military strategy.

He then pointed out that Moscow has placed nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, just 500km from Berlin".

The General added: "Russia has threatened Allies such as Denmark, Poland, and Romania with nuclear strikes.

He explained that NATOs nuclear sharing amongst member countries "is a multilateral arrangement that ensures the benefits, responsibilities, and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared among allies."

He wrote in his op-ed: Politically, this is significant. It means that participating allies, like Germany, make joint decisions on nuclear policy and planning, and maintain appropriate equipment.

The threat from Moscow was elevated after Vladimir Putin tested a new Russian hypersonic missile on a new type of strategic bomber.

The Russian air force recently tested the new hypersonic aircraft missile that is being modified for a version of the Tu-22M3M bomber aircraft.

A source told TASS news: "Recently, a new hypersonic missile was tested on the Tu-22M3.

"The missile will be part of the armament range of the upgraded Tu-22M3M along with a number of other latest aviation weapons."

The Russian defense industry has recently developed two types of aircraft hypersonic missiles.

READ MORE:Coronavirus Russia deaths: How many coronavirus cases in Russia?

See the rest here:

Nato warns of Russian threat if nuclear weapons are removed from Germany - Express.co.uk

Greek General Konstantinos Floros held two teleconferences with NATO officials in which he made it clear that Turkeys provocations in the Aegean and at Evros on the Greek-Turkish land border, will lead with mathematical precision to an accident with unforeseen consequences.

Turkeys daily aggression against Greece are obviously well known in NATO, which systematically covers it up and protects them from international scrutiny.

The danger of an accident caused by the Turkish violations in the Aegean and more broadly by Ankaras attitude towards Greece, was pointed out by Floros when he said the risk of an accident and the serious consequences that such a thing will bring is real.

More specifically, Floros held two teleconferences on Thursday.

One was at the request of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Sir Stuart Peach, as part of the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Military Committee to be held on May 14, 2020.

The other was with the Deputy Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, General Tim Radford, at his request and in the context of his recent assumption of office.

A number of issues were raised, such as the coronavirus and military issues.

Floros referred to the recent escalation caused by the immigration crisis in Evros and in the Aegean, that was orchestrated by Turkey.

He also discussed with the two NATO heads about Turkeys delinquent behaviour in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as seen by the daily air traffic violations of Greeces national airspace, including overflights at Evros and on the islands, as well as the illegal marine surveys and drilling in Greeces maritime space, and the violation of the UN-imposed arms embargo on Libya, in addition to other provocative actions.

Floros also referred to the harassment of a Greek helicopter by Turkey, which was transporting him and Minister of Defence, Nikos Panagiotopoulos, as reported by Greek City Times.

Read more:

Greek General to NATO: "There will be an accident if Turkey continues its actions" - Greek City - Greek City Times

NATO warships return to the icy Barents Sea for the first time in a generation

May 10th 2020

THE BARENTS SEA is not a hospitable place for visitors. Frequent snow storms ... blotted out the land for hours on end, wrote an unlucky British submariner sent there to snoop around during the cold war. We faced the beastliness of spray which turned to ice even before it struck our faces. It is no surprise, then, that American warships have kept away from the sea since the mid-1980suntil they returned last week.

Their presence is part of a steady northward creep by NATO naval forces. In 2018 the alliance, joined by Sweden and Finland, held Trident Juncture, its largest exercise since the end of the cold war, in Norway. That involved the first deployment of an American aircraft-carrier in the Arctic Circle for three decades. Western warships have been frequent visitors since. On May 1st a surface action group of two American destroyers, a nuclear submarine, support ship and long-range maritime patrol aircraft, plus a British frigate, practised their sub-hunting skills in the Norwegian Sea.

Such drills are not unusual. But on May 4th some of those ships broke off and sailed further north into the Barents Sea, along with a third destroyer. Although American and British submarines routinely skulk around the area, to spy on Russian facilities and exercises covertly, surface ships have not done so in a generation. On May 7th Russias navy greeted the unwelcome visitors by announcing that it too would be conducting exercises in the Barents Sealive-fire ones, in fact. On May 8th, having celebrated VE Day in Russias backyard and completed several days of high-end, sustained operations, the NATO vessels departed.

It is a significant move. The deployment of destroyers which carry missile-defence systems and land-attack cruise missiles is especially assertive. After all, the area is the heart of Russian naval power, including the countrys submarine-based nuclear weapons. Russias Northern Fleet is based at Severomorsk on the Kola peninsula, to the east of Norways uppermost fringes.

Western navies are eager to show that covid-19 has not blunted their swords, at a time when America and France have each lost an aircraft-carrier to the virus. But their interest in the high north predates the pandemic. One purpose of the foray into the Barents Sea was to assert freedom of navigation, said Americas navy. Russia has been imposing rules on ships that wish to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR), an Arctic passage between the Atlantic and Pacific that is becoming increasingly navigable as global warming melts ice-sheets (see map). America scoffs at these demands, insisting that foreign warships have the right to pass innocently through territorial waters under the law of the sea. Although last weeks exercise did not enter the NSR, it may hint at a willingness to do so in the future.

On top of that, the Arctic is a growing factor in NATO defence policy. Russia has beefed up its Northern Fleet in recent years, adding air-defence systems, missile depots and new ships. Russian submarines remain outnumbered by American ones, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses. But they are increasingly busy. Russian submarine activity is at its highest level since the cold war, according to NATO commanders. Ten subs reportedly surged into the north Atlantic in October to test whether they could elude detection.

The Russian Navy is much more active today than it may have been in the 1990s and 2000s, but that return was inevitable given the dearth of activity and funding at that time, says Mr Kofman. Nevertheless the build-up troubles NATO planners. Russias new subs are quiet and well-armed. As a result, the alliances acoustic edgeits ability to detect subs at longer ranges than Russiahas narrowed dramatically, notes a recent paper by Nick Childs of the International institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a think-tank in London.

Russia primarily uses its attack submarines to defend a bastion, the area in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk where its own nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines patrol. But some NATO admirals worry that, in a conflict, some could pose a wider threat to the alliance. A separate Russian naval force known as the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI, in its Russian acronym) might also target the thicket of cables that cross the Atlantic.

The challenge is a familiar one. For much of the cold war, NATO allies sought to bottle up the Soviet fleet in the Arctic by establishing a picket across the so-called GIUK gap, a transit route between Greenland, Iceland and Britain that was strung with undersea listening posts. We will pass all of the imperialist sonar nets, and we will not be detected! declares Captain Ramius, commander of the Red October, the eponymous Soviet submarine of Tom Clancys debut novel in 1984.

The gap is now back in fashion and NATO is reinvesting in anti-submarine capabilities after decades of neglect. America has stepped up flights of P8 sub-hunting aircraft from Iceland, and Britain and Norway are establishing P8 squadrons of their own. The aim is to track and hold at risk Russian nuclear subs as early as possible, because even a single one in the Atlantic could cause problems across a large swathe of ocean.

But a defensive perimeter may not be enough. A new generation of Russian ship-based missiles could strike NATO ships or territory from far north of the GIUK gap, perhaps even from the safety of home ports. This technological development represents a dramatically new and challenging threat to NATO forces, concludes the IISS. Similar concerns led the Reagan administration to adopt a more offensive naval posture, sending forces above the gap and into the maritime bastion of the Soviet Union. Im struck by similarities with the 1980s, says Niklas Granholm of the Swedish Defence Research Agency, reflecting on the Anglo-American presence in the Barents Sea. A forward maritime strategy to get up close and personal with the Russian Northern Fleet, rather than meet them further south.

Correction (May 11th 2020): Our original map depicted the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as extending west into the Barents Sea and east into the Pacific Ocean. In fact, this depicted the North-east passage. The NSR comprises only a stretch of Russia's territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Read more:

America and Britain play cold-war games with Russia in the Arctic - The Economist

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 28 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean. The Alliance includesthe United States, most European Union members, Canada, and Turkey.

The United States contributes three-fourths of NATO's budget. During the2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump said other NATO members should spend more on their military. Only four countries reach the targeted spending of 2% of gross domestic product. They are the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Estonia.

At the July 11, 2018, NATO summit, President Trump requested that NATO nations increase their defense spending to 4% of their gross domestic product (GDP). To illustrate, the United States spent 4.5% GDP in 2017. That's $886 billion in military spending divided by $20 trillion in U.S. GDP.

Trump also criticized Germany for asking the United States to protect it from Russia while importing billions in natural gas from that supplier. He has accused NATO of being obsolete. He argued that the organization focuses on defending Europe against Russia instead of combating terrorism.Member countries worry that Trump's criticism of NATO and praise of Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin, mean they can no longer rely on the United States as an ally in case of attack.

NATO's mission is to protect the freedom of its members. Its targets includeweapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber-attacks.

At its July 11, 2018, meeting, NATO approvednew steps to contain Russia. These include two new military commands and expanded efforts against cyber warfare and counterterrorism. It also contains a new plan to deter Russian aggression against Poland and the Baltic States. Trump agreed to these measures.

On July 8, 2016,NATO announced it would send up to 4,000 troops to the Baltic states and eastern Poland. It increased air and sea patrols to shore up its eastern front afterRussia attacked Ukraine.

On November 16, 2015, NATO responded to theterrorist attacks in Paris. It called for a unified approach with the European Union, France, and NATO members. France did notinvoke NATO'sArticle 5. That would be a formal declaration of war uponthe Islamic State group. France preferred to launch airstrikes on its own. Article 5 states, "an armed attack upon one... shall be considered an attack upon them all."

NATO responded to U.S. requests for help in theWar in Afghanistan. It took the leadfrom August 2003 to December 2014. At its peak, it deployed 130,000 troops. In 2015, it ended its combat role and began supporting Afghan troops.

NATO's protection does not extend to members' civil wars or internal coups. On July 15, 2016, the Turkish military announced it seized control of the government in a coup. But Turkish President Recep Erdogan announced early on July 16 that the coup had failed. As a NATO member, Turkey would receive its allies' support in the case of an attack. But in case of a coup, the country will not get allied help.

NATO's secondary purpose is to protect the stability of the region.

If the stability is threatened, NATO will defend non-members. On August 28,2014, NATO announcedit had photos proving that Russiainvaded Ukraine. Although Ukraine is not a member, it had worked with NATO over the years. Russia's invasion of Ukraine threatenednearby NATO members. They worried other former USSR satellite countries would be next.

As a result, NATO'sSeptember 2014 summitfocused on Russia's aggression. President Putin vowed to create a "NewRussia" out of Ukraine's eastern region.President Obamapledged to defend countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

NATO itself admits that "Peacekeeping has become at least as difficult as peacemaking." As a result, NATO is strengthening alliances throughout the world. In the age of globalization, transatlantic peace has become a worldwide effort. Itextends beyond military might alone.

NATO's 28 members are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Each member designates an ambassador to NATO. They supply officials to serve on NATO committees and send the appropriate officials to discuss NATO business. These designees could include a countrys president, prime minister, foreign affairs minister, or the department of defense head.

On December 1, 2015, NATO announced its first expansion since 2009. It offered membership to Montenegro. Russia responded by calling the move a strategic threat to its national security. Its worried by the number of Balkan countries along its border that have joined NATO.

NATO participates in three alliances that expand its influence beyond its 28 member countries. The first is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which helps partners become NATO members.Itincludes 23 non-NATO countries that support NATO's purpose. It beganin 1991.

The Mediterranean Dialogue seeks to stabilize the Middle East. Its non-NATO members include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It began in1994.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiativeworks forpeace throughout the larger Middle East region.It includes four members of theGulf Cooperation Council. They are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. It began in 2004.

NATO also cooperates with eight other countries in joint security issues. There are five Asian countries, which include Australia,Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and New Zealand. There are two cooperative countries in the Middle East: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

NATO'sprimary purpose was to defend member nations from threats by communist countries. The United States also wanted to maintain a presence in Europe. It soughtto prevent a resurgence of aggressive nationalism and foster political union. In this way, NATO made the formation of the European Union possible.U.S. military protection gave European nations the safety needed to rebuild after World War II's devastation.

During the Cold War, NATO's mission expanded to prevent nuclear war.

After West Germany joined NATO, thecommunistcountriesformed theWarsaw Pact alliance. That included the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and EastGermany. In response, NATO adopted the "Massive Retaliation" policy. It promised to usenuclear weaponsif the Pact attacked. NATO'sdeterrence policy allowed Europe to focus oneconomic development. It didn't have to build large conventional armies.

The Soviet Union continued to build its military presence. By the end of theCold War, it was spending three times what the United Stateswas with only one-third of the economic power. When theBerlin Wallfell in 1989, it was due to economic as well as ideological reasons.

After the USSR dissolved in the late 1980s, NATO's relationship with Russia thawed. In 1997, they signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act to build bilateral cooperation. In 2002, they formed the NATO-Russia Council to partner on shared security issues.

The collapse of the USSR led to unrest in its former satellite states. NATO got involved when Yugoslavia's civil war becamegenocide. NATO's initial support of aUnited Nationsnaval embargo led to the enforcement of ano-fly zone. Violations then led to a few airstrikes until September 1999. That's when NATO conducted a nine-day air campaign that ended the war. By December of that year, NATO deployed a peacekeeping force of 60,000 soldiers. That ended in 2004 when NATO transferred this function to theEuropean Union.

Protecting democratic freedom among its 28-member nations remains NATOS core purpose. As a political and military alliance, the coalitions value to global security continues to be paramount.

Its longevity, since its inception in 1949, is attributed to its members shared values championing democracy, freedom, and free-market economies.NATO has remained Americas most important Alliance.

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NATO: Definition, Purpose, History, Members

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance of countries from Europe and North America promising collective defense. Currently numbering 29 nations, NATO was formed initially to counter the communist East and has searched for a new identity in the post-Cold War world.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, with ideologically opposed Soviet armies occupying much of Eastern Europe and fears still high over German aggression, the nations of Western Europe searched for a new form of military alliance to protect themselves. In March 1948 the Brussels Pact was signed between France, Britain, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, creating a defence alliance called the Western European Union, but there was a feeling that any effective alliance would have to include the US and Canada.

In the US there was widespread concern about both the spread of Communism in Europe strong Communist parties had formed in France and Italy - and potential aggression from Soviet armies, leading the US to seek talks about an Atlantic alliance with the west of Europe. The perceived need for a new defensive unit to rival the Eastern bloc was exacerbated by the Berlin Blockade of 1949, leading to an agreement that same year with many nations from Europe. Some nations opposed membership and still do, e.g. Sweden, Ireland.

NATO was created by the North Atlantic Treaty, also called the Washington Treaty, which was signed on April 5th 1949. There were twelve signatories, including the United States, Canada and Britain (full list below). The head of NATO's military operations is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a position always held by an American so their troops dont come under foreign command, answering to the North Atlantic Council of ambassadors from member nations, which is led by the Secretary General of NATO, who is always European. The centrepiece of the NATO treaty is Article 5, promising collective security:

"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The NATO treaty also allowed for the alliances expansion among European nations, and one of the earliest debates among NATO members was the German question: should West Germany (the East was under rival Soviet control) be re-armed and allowed to join NATO. There was opposition, invoking the recent German aggression which caused World War Two, but in May 1955 Germany was allowed to join, a move which caused upset in Russia and led to the formation of the rival Warsaw Pact alliance of Eastern communist nations.

NATO had, in many ways, been formed to secure West Europe against the threat of Soviet Russia, and the Cold War of 1945 to 1991 saw an often tense military standoff between NATO on one side and the Warsaw Pact nations on the other. However, there was never a direct military engagement, thanks in part to the threat of nuclear war; as part of NATO agreements nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe. There were tensions within NATO itself, and in 1966 France withdrew from the military command established in 1949. Nevertheless, there was never a Russian incursion into the western democracies, in large part due to the NATO alliance. Europe was very familiar with an aggressor taking one country after another thanks for the late 1930s and did not let it happen again.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 led to three major developments: the expansion of NATO to include new nations from the former Eastern bloc (full list below), the re-imagining of NATO as a co-operative security alliance able to deal with European conflicts not involving member nations and the first use of NATO forces in combat. This first occurred during the Wars of the Former Yugoslavia, when NATO used air-strikes first against Bosnian-Serb positions in 1995, and again in 1999 against Serbia, plus the creation of a 60,000 peace keeping force in the region.

NATO also created the Partnership for Peace initiative in 1994, aimed at engaging and building trust with ex-Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and later the nations from the Former Yugoslavia. Other 30 countries have so far joined, and ten have become full members of NATO.

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia had not involved a NATO member state, and the famous clause 5 was first and unanimously - invoked in 2001 after terrorist attacks on the United States, leading to NATO forces running peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan. NATO has also created the Allied Rapid Reaction Force (ARRF) for faster responses. However, NATO has come under pressure in recent years from people arguing it should be scaled down, or left to Europe, despite the increase in Russian aggression in the same period. NATO might still be searching for a role, but it played a huge role in maintaining the status quo in the Cold War, and has potential in a world where Cold War aftershocks keep happening.

1949 Founder Members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France (withdrew from military structure 1966), Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States1952: Greece (withdrew from military command 1974 80), Turkey1955: West Germany (With East Germany as reunified Germany from 1990)1982: Spain1999: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia2009: Albania, Croatia2017: Montenegro

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About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

On 7 May 2020, U.S. Embassy Sarajevos Civil Military Support Element team and NATO provided critical supplies and disinfection equipment to the Armed Forces and Community Health Centers in eastern Mostar, western Mostar and Nevesinje. These Community Health Centers and their members are at the forefront of the Bosnia and Herzegovinas fight against COVID-19. The donation was made possible through support from the non-governmental organization Spirit of America and local BiH businesses.

Todays delivery follows a request for assistance from Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATOs Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The EADRCC is NATOs principal disaster response mechanism. The Centre operates on a 24/7 basis, coordinating requests from NATO Allies and partners, as well as offers of assistance to cope with the consequences of major crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.As another demonstration of Euro-Atlantic solidarity in the COVID 19 crisis, NATO Partner Austria also delivered much needed medical assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier this week. A first shipment of 1.500 blankets, 1.000 bedding sets, 250.000 pieces of examination gloves left Vienna on 30 April and arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 4 May 2020. A second shipment from Vienna is in preparation and will reach Bosnia and Herzegovina in the coming days.In addition, in April, Bosnia and Herzegovina together with other NATO Allies and partners in the Balkans region received medical supplies provided by the United States, Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey. These included masks, overalls, and test kits.

The rest is here:

Coronavirus response: NATO Allies, Partners, NGOs and local business work together to deliver medical assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO HQ

Greek General Konstantinos Floros held two teleconferences with NATO officials in which he made it clear that Turkeys provocations in the Aegean and at Evros on the Greek-Turkish land border, will lead with mathematical precision to an accident with unforeseen consequences.

Turkeys daily aggression against Greece are obviously well known in NATO, which systematically covers it up and protects them from international scrutiny.

The danger of an accident caused by the Turkish violations in the Aegean and more broadly by Ankaras attitude towards Greece, was pointed out by Floros when he said the risk of an accident and the serious consequences that such a thing will bring is real.

More specifically, Floros held two teleconferences on Thursday.

One was at the request of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Sir Stuart Peach, as part of the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Military Committee to be held on May 14, 2020.

The other was with the Deputy Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, General Tim Radford, at his request and in the context of his recent assumption of office.

A number of issues were raised, such as the coronavirus and military issues.

Floros referred to the recent escalation caused by the immigration crisis in Evros and in the Aegean, that was orchestrated by Turkey.

He also discussed with the two NATO heads about Turkeys delinquent behaviour in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as seen by the daily air traffic violations of Greeces national airspace, including overflights at Evros and on the islands, as well as the illegal marine surveys and drilling in Greeces maritime space, and the violation of the UN-imposed arms embargo on Libya, in addition to other provocative actions.

Floros also referred to the harassment of a Greek helicopter by Turkey, which was transporting him and Minister of Defence, Nikos Panagiotopoulos, as reported by Greek City Times.

See the article here:

Greek General to NATO: "There will be an accident if Turkey continues its actions" - Greek City Times

Much has been said of the need to tackle the threat from Russia and China in recent weeks. In particular, when they spread lies, misinformation, and bullying around Europe in relation to the Coronavirus. Even trying baselessly to cast the blame on our American and British allies.

The European Union has so far failed to stand up and tackle the issue of misinformation in an appropriate way, showing constantly this weakness which her foes look for. I had to write to High Representative Borrell to demand answers in relation to allegations that they had allowed the Chinese Communists to alter phrasing in a report on the matter. His answers in the Foreign Affairs Committee were weak and instead accused the press of using racial stereotypes rather than directly addressing the issue. Days later, the EU Delegation in Beijing bowed again to pressure from the authorities of the Chinese Communist Party to amend an open letter that removed references to Chinas responsibility for the pandemic.

Thankfully, NATO has been doing better. Showing a firm stance and resolution in the defence of our actual Allies in the world. Whilst the European External Actions Service has more or less passively and timidly reported on the spread of Russian and Chinese propaganda. NATO, by contrast, has been using its resources to counter the threat from misinformation. They have been working hard to create reliable fact sheets for the press to point out disinformation as they find it. At the same time, their public diplomacy division has been working in overdrive to produce content directly aimed at demonstrating the cohesion between member states.

They have been fast to demonstrate that their airlift capacity is being used to bring vital supplies of medical equipment across borders. My own country of Spain has received such deliveries from friends and allies in Eastern Europe in a diligent manner in stark contrast with the disastrous record in crisis management of the leftist government in Madrid. Foreign, local and private help could not save Spain of being catastrophically hit both by coronavirus and the Socialist-Communist government which will have to respond to Justice for the highest death rate per million inhabitants and the highest number of infected medical workers due to lack of equipment.

NATO has shown its true strength during this crisis as an international organisation that can deliver for its members and its allies. All the talk in past years about difficulties in coordination among countries and soul searching inside NATO disappeared. And there we had effectiveness when we needed as we needed. NATO demonstrated again that it stands not just for the protection of its members during conflicts but also in other times of struggle. It is because of NATOs strength that Russia and China have an interest in trying to undermine it.

And theyre messaging is targeted. Both Russia and China aim their propaganda claiming that NATO is divided at those on the left and on the collectivist-right. It is these people who share our enemies desire to undermine NATO making them useful idiots or remunerated fellows in the campaign to weaken the west. For what I call the social democratic mainstream it is a matter of not just undermining or destroying NATO but replacing it with the fanciful dream of a European Army controlled by the council. It looks more moderate but it is not. Because every European defence force not fully integrated into NATO would ultimately be a useless force in defending our nations in the same way first and foremost because we would no longer have the decisive and essential support of the Americans, British or Canadians.

Of course, there is much more that NATO could be doing. And the new constellation after Coronavirus and the foreseeable polarisation will put the Chinese threat and expansionism on the NATO agenda. On the eastern border and the southeast with its new members, Northern Macedonia and Montenegro, NATO is fulfilling its duty of blocking Russias ambitions, while at the same time expanding the freedom of countries like Georgia, Ukraine and others who continue to live under in the shadow of Moscow.

A NATO partnership in Latin America with regional actors such as Brazil and Colombia, maybe Bolivia and Ecuador now in transition to democracy, could create inroads for aid and humanitarian work to help Venezuelans who are fleeing a communist regime backed by Russia and China. A partnership with Brazil and other Latin American countries could spur a combined international effort to combat organised crime and drug cartels that have filled the power vacuum in a region that has failed because of collectivism.

And in this sense, we should insist on one subject that has to be dealt with because it is a moral imperative for the Western democracies freedom for Cuba and the end of generations-old Communist tyranny. The dictatorship in Havana is nowadays the command and control centre for international organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, laundering and political subversion in democracies. It is feasible and necessary to eliminate this 60 years old hyperactive epicentre of evil on the American continent.

Equally, they could take a more active role in stopping the traffic of illegal immigrants and cracking down on the bases of the trafficking gangs and militias in Libya and the whole North African coast on the Mediterranean. The EU has shown a complete lack of competence when it comes to managing the defence of the borders and returns of illegal immigrants and I have no doubt that a NATO mission there would be far more robust especially as it would not have to listen to every petty complaint from those out of touch voices on the left mainstream in the European Parliament.

NATO is in far better shape than many thought and even desired. With President Donald Trump in the White House, discussions have been more outspoken and sometimes harsh but far more effective. And many countries are complying like never before with their promises. NATO has proven for the last 71 years, in very difficult times from the start of the Cold War, the Berlin Crisis or the Double Decision on Deployment of Cruise and Pershing to the intervention on the Balkans.

NATO is the only true and credible military defender of our way of life and has proven itself a model for international cooperation among free nations in the face of adversity. We should continue to place our full trust and support behind it for years to come.

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NATO, not the EU, is the protector of Europe - New Europe

NATO is launching a practical scientific project to develop new tools for a rapid and accurate diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection.

This multi-year project is launched within the framework of NATOs Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, and is led by scientists on the frontline of COVID-19 research from Italys Istituto Superiore di Sanit (National Health Institute) and Tor Vergata University Hospital together with the University Hospital of Basel University in Switzerland. This 24-month initiative aims to enhance the speed and efficiency of COVID-19 diagnosis through a multidisciplinary approach, by bringing together experts in the field of immunology, virology and molecular biology.

This project supports NATOs efforts to enhance resilience and civil preparedness of Allied and partner nations, and highlights the Alliances commitment to further enhance research and development efforts to combat COVID-19. This SPS project is an excellent example of the research communitys global effort to fight against COVID-19. said Dr. Antonio Missiroli, NATOs Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. This project also stresses the dedication of Allies to support each other, as well as partners, in times of crisis; and while the expected results of this project are extremely relevant to the situation the world currently finds itself in, we look forward to the long-term impact it will have on the international response to naturally occurring and man-made viruses and pathogens, he added.

Italy has been actively engaged in the SPS Programme since the beginning; not only by laying its very foundations with the contribution of Gaetano Martino, one of the three wise men, but also by steadily contributing to streamlining its decision-making, and by promoting more sophisticated projects through the active involvement of Italys scientific and academic community, said Ambassador Francesco M. Tal, Italian Permanent Representative to NATO. The launch of this project is yet another brilliant example of the political nature of this Alliance, he highlighted.

The speed and the scale of the COVID-19 virus is unprecedented and all types of disruptions it has caused are unparalleled. As daunting as it may seem, we will get back to some sort of normality only when effective means to prevent the spread of COVID-19 will be identified, said Ambassador Philippe Brandt, Ambassador of Switzerland to the Kingdom of Belgium and Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO. For Switzerland, being associated to NATO Partnership for Peace means sharing capacities to improve security in a multilateral framework. With several top-ranked universities and programmes, scientific academies and moreover a strong relationship between private sector and scientific research, Switzerland is well positioned to join the international community efforts to combat COVID-19. Academics and researchers working within Swiss institutions have been associated to various projects conducted by NATO through the Science for Peace and Security programme (SPS), he pointed out.

Professor Silvio Brusaferro, President of the National Health Institute and Professor of General and Applied Hygiene at the University of Udine (Italy) remarked on the role played by the National Health Institute. "The National Health Institute is fully committed to dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, he said. This project is very important, especially in the context of new indispensable tools that we will have to deal with the second phase of the health emergency, he added.

The results foreseen from this project are extremely relevant to the current pandemic, and they are expected to have a long-term impact on the international response to the spread of viruses on a large scale. The contributions to the improvement of risk management and public health measures will be significant. This project will also represent a model for quick measures to counteract epidemics.

The NATO SPS Programme supports security-relevant civil science and technology addressing a set of Allied-approved priorities. In addition to this innovative project, several other SPS activities are also supporting the development of new technologies and capabilities relevant to the fight against COVID-19. These are mainly in the fields of telemedicine, emergency response coordination, and the detection of biological threats.

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Coronavirus response: NATO supports practical scientific cooperation with Allies and partners to enhance COVID-19 diagnosis - NATO HQ

Pristina (29 April 2020) Today, Brigadier General Frank BEST (German Air Force) assumed his duties as new Director of the NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT) from Brigadier General Michael G. OBERNEYER (German Army), at a transfer of authority ceremony held at Camp Film City, headquarters of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

During the ceremony, Brigadier General Oberneyer remarked: We have continued to build on the excellent working relationship developed over the course of the years with our colleagues in the new civilian structure overseeing the Kosovo Security Force and the Kosovo Security Force, in an environment of mutual respect, trust and transparency. Within our respective mandates, we have worked together for a common goal: a professional Kosovo Security Force, with representation from all communities, working together for the benefit of all citizens in Kosovo. Brigadier General Oberneyer leaves the NALT in the capable hands of his colleague Brigadier General Best, who has built an impressive career in the German Air Force since joining in 1983. Most recently, he served as the Branch Head for Forces Policy in the German Ministry of Defence in Bonn.

The NATO Advisory and Liaison Team was set up in August 2016. Its mission is to support the further development of the security organisations in Kosovo which includes providing advice and support with a focus on capacity-building, education and training coordination.

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New Director of NATO Advisory and Liaison Team starts his tenure - NATO HQ

Two B-1B Lancers arrived in the Baltics to work with NATO allies this week, marking the heavy bombers first flights to Europe in about 18 months.

After crossing the Atlantic, the Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D.-based bombers flew with Danish F-16s over Bornholm Island, east of mainland Denmark, and worked with Estonian ground forces to provide close air support training, U.S. Air Forces in Europe Air Forces Africa said in a statement Wednesday.

The training also included overflights of Lithuania and Latvia.

Integrating bomber missions with our NATO allies and partners build enduring relationships that are capable of confronting a broad range of global challenges, said Gen. Jeff Harrigian, USAFE-AFAFRICA commander.

The strategic bombers participated in the Spring Storm military exercise, the Estonian Defense Ministry said in a statement.

It is important that our allies understand that security cannot be put on pause for the duration of the pandemic, Estonian Defense Minister Juri Luik said Tuesday, the Baltic Times newspaper reported.

The Lancers were last in Europe in November 2018 supporting NATOs Trident Juncture exercise.

Strategic bomber deployments to Europe have become more frequent in recent years, amid U.S. and European concerns about potential Russian aggression. In March, a flight of B-2 stealth bombers participated in a series of training operations on the Continent. And last August, the Air Force deployed a similar B-2 bomber task force to Europe.

The Air Force did not say how long the Lancers would remain in Europe.

The Europe mission for the variable-wing Rockwell jets came just after B-1B bombers from Texas flew to the Western Pacific region.

Four B-1Bs from Dyess Air Force Base arrived in Guam on Friday to conduct training and operations with allies and partners, the Air Force said.

svan.jennifer@stripes.comTwitter: @stripesktown

A B-1B Lancer from the 28th Bomb Wing out of Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., receives fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, May 5, 2020.KELLY O'CONNOR/U.S. AIR FORCE

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Air Force B-1B strategic bombers arrive in the Baltics for NATO training - Stars and Stripes

Karol Karski, a Polish member of the European Parliament has written an article for the British publication Reaction.life, in which he writes that in the European neighborhood, democracy and freedom remain a shining city on the hill", for Georgians and that the country is determined to pursue a pro-Western, pro-NATO path.

Sandwiched between Russia and Iran, its current government is nevertheless determined to pursue a pro-western, pro-NATO path. Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, from the ruling Georgian Dream party, has made clear public statements that the government desires to join both NATO and the EU. Over 80 per cent of the Georgian public supports this goal according to the latest polling, writes Karski.

Karski mentions that Georgia is already the largest per capita contributor to NATO missions in Afghanistan, and it has recently become only the second non-NATO country (after Finland) to join the NATO cybersecurity platform, known as MISP.

The Georgian Dream government has also implemented a pro-market economic revolution: taxes and regulations have been cut, corruption has been ruthlessly targeted, and investment has been unleashed. As a result, poverty rate has been cut in half in just over a decade; the World Bank now ranks Georgia the second-best country in the world to start a business; and the country lies in the 12th position in the Heritage Economic Freedom Index, above the USA and most of the EU member states, reads the article.

The member of European Parliament also mentions the global crisis caused by COVID-19, after which the world will be different. Most jarringly, we will all be poorer, he says.

The world will not magically become safer and happier when COVID-19 recedes. It is for the Western powers to make it so, and the newly-independent UK must commit to a central role in that effort.

Karski believes that the European Parliament should support Georgia, especially now, when economic challenges exist as a result of COVID-19 crisis.

Read the full article here.

Originally posted here:

Reaction.life: strengthen NATO, help Georgia, defend the West - Agenda.ge

The Pentagon has committed to competing with China and Russia but its not training that way. If the United States is to be truly prepared for great-power competition, its forces need to train as they expect to operate in theater. The U.S. Cold War experience offers valuable lessons, positive and negative, about how best to equip the joint force to handle near-peer adversaries. Relearning the mechanics of great-power competition will require changing exercises and experimentation, and the Pentagon should emphasize joint exercises to draw on the collective capabilities of its services.

Focusing on joint exercises conjures a back-to-the-future feeling. For decades during the Cold War, major overseas training exercises featured prominently in the U.S. militarys playbook, and with good reason. Big exercises training thousands of troops across services, domains, and sometimes nations enhance joint force readiness by improving interoperability and building command, control, and communications among services and coalition members; demonstrate the value of relationships with allies and partners; and send a range of messages to adversaries.

To update the joint force for the challenge of China and Russia, the United States should build on these Cold War lessons by ensuring that its large-scale joint exercises also test U.S. forces ability to operate in multiple domains against gray-zone threats.

Pretend Jointness

Regaining the muscle memory to compete against China and Russia after counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is no small task. The pivot from counter-insurgency to great-power competition is moving slowly for two reasons. First, there is widespread confusion as to what accurately constitutes a joint experiment or exercise. To be clear: a joint exercise entails significant personnel participation from each of the services that are integrated into a single joint force executing the will of the joint force commander. It is not a Navy corpsman going to the field with the Marine infantry unit; it is not an Air Force Joint Tactical Air Control Party supporting an Army rotation at the National Training Center; and it is not Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation deploying aboard aircraft carriers. No, these are joint operations with a little j activities that the services routinely conducted a half-century ago. Today, these little j events, overly focused on service sustainment training, do little to advance 21st-century concept experimentation and joint force integration in preparation for major conflict.

Jointness with a big J, on the other hand, is a deployable joint headquarters that is fully integrated with experts from across all the warfighting functions and services. The headquarters should be commanded by a flag officer and tasked by a combatant commander with cradle-to-grave execution of large-scale exercises that agnostically integrate kinetic and non-kinetic effects across the air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains, as well as the electronic spectrum. Although talk of jointness abounds across the Department of Defense, the force seldom walks the big J walk. To quote Winston Churchill, perhaps we have been guilty of some terminological inexactitude.

A second factor is that planners across the combatant commands are consumed with repeating the same named annual exercises even though most of them to be precise are demonstrations or service-centric sustainment training. These exercises drain scarce resources and compound legitimate challenges to expanding jointness to include tracking and coordinating service-specific concept development, sustaining a reasonable operations tempo, complying with headquarters-mandated reductions, and reducing overhead costs. Decreasing the number of annual combatant command events to accommodate a joint force commanders higher-quality experimentation plan and credible big J exercises is therefore an imperative that can no longer be ignored. Victory on tomorrows battlefield against peer adversaries requires that the United States transform how it prepares for war.

The Past as Prologue (Kinda)

Large-scale Cold War exercises ensured that combat formations remained tactically proficient, and officers gave serious thought to the likely chaos and uncertainty that major conflict between nuclear powers would create. But these exercises also played a critical political-military role, signaling a strong U.S. commitment to allies and partners whose forces routinely operated with the United States in combined maneuvers designed, in part, to help improve coalition interoperability and bolster readiness.

Such exercises did not only serve as a signal to allies and partners, though. Their value as a showcase for U.S. resolve and global power-projection capabilities was significant. Large exercises like REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) and TEAM SPIRIT in South Korea were essential to maintaining credible conventional deterrence of both the Soviet Union and North Korea. As intended, the latter two belligerent states often perceived such exercises as war-plan rehearsals and as possible (but still ambiguous) forward posturing for potential operations.

Large, multiple-theater exercises diminished after the Cold War. The Pentagon focused on reducing operating costs, confronting terrorism, and fighting simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the rise of China and renewed focus on Russia means large-scale overseas exercises should again play a key role in sustaining readiness and demonstrating U.S. preparedness to deploy and conduct multi-domain operations.

But the complexity of todays security environment is not defined solely by conventional peer-versus-peer or even proxy conflicts. China and Russia rely on gray-zone operations below the traditional thresholds for conflict competing with the United States without provoking a conventional response. Future joint and combined exercises should go beyond the traditional air, land, and sea domains to include cyberwarfare, space, the electromagnetic spectrum all integrated into a holistic and coherent operational design that includes features of irregular warfare. Jointly considering and exercising responses to gray-zone threats will pay dividends across the force.

Soviet Exercises during the Cold War

The Soviet Union attracted U.S. attention by using large-scale exercises as operational rehearsals and as signaling tools. The Okean global naval exercise series in the 1970s demonstrated the transformation of the Soviets coastal defensive navy to a blue-water force under Adm. Sergey Gorshkov. In April 1970, multi-fleet maneuvers across many oceans under a unified command from Moscow shocked the U.S. Navy and its NATO allies, who identified them as a challenge to U.S. maritime supremacy.

In April 1975, Soviet news agency TASS reported an even larger naval exercise Okean 75, the largest to date in the Cold War involving over 220 Soviet ships of all types conducting maritime maneuvers by the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets. Land-based aircraft joined this massive power-projection display, with Tupolov-35s flying from Central Asian bases to the Arabian Sea, while surface units in the Indian Ocean indicated Soviet anti-convoy capabilities in a new theater. Meanwhile, maritime task forces conducting antiaircraft carrier operations near Sardinia highlighted a potential Soviet threat to western merchant shipping and NATO naval activities at Tyrrhenian Sea choke points. In a particularly pointed signal, submarines and surface ships set up a barrier between Iceland, the Norwegian Sea, and the North Atlantic to rehearse extending the Soviet maritime defensive perimeter away from the Barents Sea to keep U.S. aircraft carriers out of range of military and industrial targets. Significant command and control capabilities enabled simultaneous Soviet strike missions, highlighting the maturation of Gorshkovs long-discussed battle of the first salvo concept.

The massive scale of Okean 1975 was impressive for the times and elicited a sharp reaction from the United States. Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf II publicly admitted, [the exercise] clearly demonstrates the fact that the Soviet navy is capable of operating effectively in all the oceans of the world with a fleet that had twice the number of major combatants and submarines as the U.S. Navy. Okean was a wake-up call for the United States, which was preoccupied with evacuating Vietnam. Rattled Pentagon leaders commissioned a series of studies to better understand the new geopolitical landscape that was shaping the Cold War. The unambiguous message sent by the Okean exercises of the 1970s was that the Soviet Union had developed a robust navy to back its claim as a global military superpower.

Learning from the Bear

During the 1980s, Pentagon planners recognized that large exercises could play a useful role in demonstrating U.S. power-projection capabilities while offsetting the Soviet Union conventional military advantages. Accordingly, the United States implemented annual REFORGER exercises to practice rapidly deploying multiple divisions from the United States to reinforce NATO. As one 1988 observer noted, REFORGERs impressiveness stemmed not only from its size (125,000 personnel deployed across the Atlantic in 10 days) but also its critically important military and civilian mobilization and preparedness when U.S. forces reached Europe. REFORGER exercises were also complemented with annual air and sea deployments of U.S. Marines to Norway. Collectively, they broadcasted to friends and adversaries alike Americas ability to rapidly project credible combat power across the globe.

Other U.S. and NATO naval exercises in the 1980s were designed to prod Soviet decision-makers and expose Soviet wartime responses for U.S. planners. Virtually the entire U.S. attack submarine force was deployed at top speed from U.S. ports to the high North Atlantic on at least three separate occasions, sending the message to the Soviets (among others) that the United States could reach the Barents Sea before Soviet subs could sortie out of their bastions. In the Atlantic, Ocean Venture 1981 encompassed 120,000 personnel, 1,000 aircraft, and 250 ships from 15 allied nations. The apparently shocked Soviet navy dispatched unprecedented numbers of surveillance and strike aircraft, submarines, and surface ships to shadow the exercise, offering the United States and NATO valuable insights into Soviet formations and operational procedures.

Not all signals sent during Cold War exercises were received as intended. The 1983 NATO ABLE ARCHER exercise contributed to a Kremlin war scare and nearly initiated nuclear war. Nonetheless, NATO judged the exercises strategic insights as invaluable. Then-Supreme Allied Commander Gen. John R. Galvin observed, There was a failure to understand the absolute requirement for coordination and common purpose among the civilian, political, diplomatic, governmental, and military aspects of every endeavor.

On the other side of the globe, U.S. and South Korean forces conducted exercise TEAM SPIRIT each spring from 1978 to 1993 to broadcast credible defensive preparations of the peninsula to North Korea. TEAM SPIRIT peaked at 200,000 personnel in 1989, but its importance lay in its impact on North Korean perceptions. President Kim Il-sung reacted to the exercise by mobilizing his reservists and repositioning air, naval, and land forces annually at significant economic and political costs to the regime, making TEAM SPIRIT both a carrot and a stick for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations and North Koreas inspections compliance. By revealing certain strengths through REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT, U.S. planners enhanced deterrence and forced adversaries to divert resources into more expensive defense programs or alter key aspects of their overall strategies.

Operate and Train as You Plan to Fight

Treating peacetime exercises as real-world operations like the United States did with REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT provides the joint force with a number of advantages. Across the force, a heightened warfighting mentality will help improve overall readiness. Such an approach will imbue training events with a heightened sense of realism, compelling forces to replicate many actions they will have to execute in conflict.

Imagine a scenario where Army and Marine High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) units deploy with little notice to remote overseas islands and establish secure communications with a joint task force headquarters theater fires cell. The cell then receives targetable information from real-world sensors, provided by space or training drones. This allows the HIMARS unit to engage a hostile moving target (being simulated by a self-piloted garbage barge) once non-kinetic effects have neutralized onboard emitters replicating the ships countermeasure system. This cradle-to-grave kill chain scenario requires sophisticated multi-domain effects to be integrated across the joint force. If, for technical or political reasons, this type of realism is impractical, augmenting live exercises with high-quality virtual capabilities can help servicemembers master essential skills. This is especially important at the joint/combined level because those senior headquarters that are not forward deployed should be required to deploy to overseas exercise locations to flex their command and control responsibilities.

Second, dynamically planned operations can be used to temporarily increase U.S. force posture and presence overseas. Deploying additional brigades, air defense units, and fleet assets to key European and Pacific theater locations will not go unnoticed by Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. More importantly, these events can serve as pre-crisis, flexible deterrent options. Before the outbreak of COVID-19, the exercise DEFENDER-Europe 20 would have been the largest deployment of U.S.-based forces to Europe in more than 25 years. Carrying out similar future exercises will also allow the United States and its NATO allies to address long-standing interoperability, mobility, and command and control challenges.

Third, operations can be used to stress test existing practices against new concepts. In particular, the logistical concepts that underpin major war plans can be tested by requiring forward-deployed units to actually perform such real-world sustainment functions as drawing live ammunition out of storage bunkers, transporting different fuel types between theaters, and commencing operations with planned shortages of major classes of supplies. These critical sustainment events are too often ignored or simulated in traditional exercises, which allows the joint force to cheat at solitaire in other words, to take expedient shortcuts.

New exercises can also stress test familiar operations at unfamiliar scales. One such exercise might test special operations and conventional forces ability to enforce a blockade with the simultaneous boarding of multiple adversary-leased commercial vessels. Simultaneous ship seizures by special operations forces and conventional Navy-Marine units trained to conduct complex visit, board, search, and seizure missions would signal mastery of all-domain coordination. Moreover, it would afford at tightly integrated rehearsal with multiple coalition partners who could provide the leased ships safe anchorage until the mock naval blockade ends.

Fourth, new large-scale exercises will allow the joint/combined force to experiment with concepts that are widely discussed in many military journals, such as multi-domain or all-domain operations, but that are too infrequently practiced. As Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. has noted, properly designed and conducted field exercises are a great source of competitive advantage that can reduce uncertainty about emerging threats, determine the right mix of new and legacy systems, enable development and evaluation of broad capabilities and new, relevant forms of operation, and uncover practical problems in new operation and force structure development.

Fifth, large training exercises can be effective vehicles for sending signals to potential adversaries about U.S. intentions and capabilities. For example, they might reveal the capability of U.S. forces to launch surprise drone swarm attacks simultaneously against multiple naval targets. U.S. vessels could be designated a naval opposing force being pursued by blue surface and subsurface naval assets. Opposing force ships could then come under swarm drone attack from shore-based land forces (American or allied) that release waves of inexpensive, sea-skimming, short-range drones. Obviously, the risks and opportunities associated with revealing certain capabilities and sending specific messages should be calculated in advance. The United States should carefully consider any ambiguities that U.S. adversaries could misunderstand, thus resulting in spiraling tensions and unwanted escalation. Tracking and recording both adversary and ally responses to exercises should be required, and post-exercise analyses should gauge the overall impact of messaging.

Looking Ahead

The joint staff and geographic combatant commanders need to revise their annual experimentation and exercise programs to be more relevant to todays great-power competition. They cannot merely fall back on large-scale exercises like REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT, designed for another era, in the hope that they continue to be successful models for todays deterrence and force posture. Exercises of yesteryear should be refined and repurposed as real-world operations. They should thoughtfully reveal credible kinetic and carefully selected non-kinetic warfighting capabilities to U.S. adversaries. Additionally, a sophisticated global strategic communications campaign that pushes back on adversary propaganda and disinformation in real time delegitimizing such activities in frontline states under a bright international spotlight should be central to all operations.

To truly disincentivize Russian and Chinese gray-zone operations, the United States should effectively use recurring and realistic big J operations to display credible American military force. A critical by-product of this approach is that joint force commanders will be able to integrate and shape the disparate service warfighting approaches.

Tom Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), is a research staff member in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He was an infantryman with subsequent assignments in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff.

Owen Daniels is a research associate in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this paper should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Institute for Defense Analyses or the Department of Defense.

Image: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet (Photo courtesy of LPhot Dan Rosenbaum, HMS Kent, Royal Navy)

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The Pentagon Should Train for and Not Just Talk About Great-Power Competition - War on the Rocks

COLOGNE, Germany As NATO members respond to the coronavirus, individually and collectively, officials in Brussels have begun cataloging lessons learned for the next pandemic.

The goal is to find ways of turning the current crisis into something of a teachable moment, fusing COVID-19 improvisation with Cold War-era plans that have largely laid dormant for decades.

For now, there are still more questions than answers after NATO defense ministers commissioned the review in mid-April, as announced by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Since then, the key term kicked around in alliance circles is resilience a reference to the ability to absorb major shocks while upholding the promise of collective security.

The military has been tasked with quite a lot in the past weeks, Camille Grand, NATOs assistant secretary general for defense investment, told Defense News in an interview. What does that tell us in terms of defense planning, in terms of capabilities? Is it useful to put more focus on capabilities that can be useful in a pandemic? Do we need some sort of planning associated with that, collectively as an alliance?

NATO was built on the premise of being able to outlast the Soviet Union in the aftermath of a catastrophic war, with detailed plans for the military to prop civil societies recovering from the brink of destruction. The novel coronavirus has, in some ways, reinvigorated the alliances interest in such scenarios.

Resilience is an important part of what NATO is doing, Stoltenberg said on the eve of the April 15 defense ministers' online meeting. It's actually enshrined in Article 3 of our treaty, that national resilience is a NATO responsibility. We have baseline requirements, guidelines for national resilience, including health and dealing with mass casualties.

On the table are questions ranging from the ability of decision-makers to work under the types of social distancing restrictions in place now, to incentivizing members nations to stockpile vital equipment, said Grand.

We're in a health crisis, not in a military one. But it gives NATO a chance to check how well it can operate under degraded conditions, for example in Iraq, the Baltic region, Afghanistan or the Middle East, he said.

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While the alliances past may hold ideas for improved contingency planning, the direction of military funding seems to be the greater unknown.

Member states are expected to take economic hits as a lot of business activity has remained frozen for months. The effect of such a downturn on defense spending has been the topic of several studies by European national security-minded think tanks in recent weeks.

While some have speculated that states with gross domestic product in free fall would more easily be able to hit the alliances spending target of 2 percent, for better or for worse, the actual effect may be less severe.

Torben Schtz, an analyst with the Berlin-based German Council on Foreign Relations, argues the projected decrease in economic activity, coupled with the lag time for military spending to adjust, wont be significant enough to make much of a difference in relative spending anytime soon.

Even economically grave decreases in GDPs have only limited impact on defense spending as a share of GDP, he wrote on Twitter, predicting that only a handful of additional member states would reach the 2 percent target in 2020.

At NATO, some might see the much-criticized relative spending objective vindicated in times like this.

The 2 percent target remains, and I dont see any reason for challenging that, Grand told Defense News. We are of course fully aware that nations will face tough fiscal choices. But at the end of the day, moving 0.5 percent of GDP in favor or against defense spending is not going to dramatically change the fiscal situation.

With defense spending cuts expected to vary considerably among nations, NATO officials have argued that threats to the alliance have remained the same, prompted primarily by Russias annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

That is a major factor expected to work against the reflex to cut the military, as compared with the 2008 financial crisis that saw defense spending decimated because it was considered more expendable, said Grand.

I dont want to sound too optimistic, but I neither foresee nor take for granted that we will see a dramatic shift in the priorities against defense spending, he added.

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NATO checks its Cold War playbook in bid to fight pandemic - DefenseNews.com

In a strategic conversation today (27 April 2020) with Friends of Europe senior fellow Jamie Shea, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Mircea Geoan, argued that now is not the time to cut investments in defence. This pandemic has not made the security risks to our nearly 1 billion citizens disappear, said Geoan.

He added that we live in a world that is even more unpredictable. He underscored the important role of the military both in helping save lives and in keeping our citizens safe, and stressed the importance that we continue to invest in our armed forces.

The Deputy Secretary General also mentioned that in these very difficult months and weeks of this pandemic, Allies have shown solidarity. NATO has flown more than 100 missions and strategic airlifts providing essential medical and healthcare assistance to Allies and partners. NATO has also helped construct field hospitals and deployed thousands of military medical personnel in support of civilian efforts. The Deputy Secretary General indicated that we are an Alliance which is based on the culture of solidarity, and this is is one of those times when solidarity has been proven and to this day, our solidarity remains intact.

Mircea Geoan spoke about the deliberate and continuous efforts by some actors to use this difficult moment to seed discord and mistrust, to undermine our resilience and to weaken our political democratic system. We are pushing back because this is not OK, said Geoan. Together with the European Union and others, NATO will continue to push back energetically and professionally against those abusing the situation.

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NATO Deputy Secretary General conversation with Friends of Europe on NATO's response to COVID-19 - NATO HQ

Some are born wise, some achieve wisdom, and some, I fear, have wisdom thrust upon them; we three seem to be in the last and most dangerous category, observed Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, commenting on the committee of three foreign ministers Pearson, Norways Halvard Lange and Italys Gaetano Martino formed in 1956 to advise the North Atlantic Council on how to develop greater cooperation and unity among the allies.

Three weeks ago, 10 wise women and men set out to resuscitate NATO from what French President Emmanuel Macron called its political and strategic brain death. This is not going to be an easy task, as the 70-year-old alliance has been recently suffering from a double crisis of democracy and leadership not to mention its old burden-sharing problem, the foundation of everything NATO does, which has seriously challenged NATOs cohesion to an unprecedented level. The current narrative that frames burden-sharing as a budgetary issue will eventually become unsustainable, because the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will certainly not spare NATO burden-sharing. Shrunk national budgets and the new post-crisis social, economic, and political realities will undermine the idea that burden-sharing is about financial sharing. NATO allies need to abandon the obsession with defense accounting the idea that all members should spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense and instead boost the cooperative development of interoperable capabilities and force readiness.

As both the European and North American continents have been hard-hit by COVID-19, the governments will be busy restoring their national economies and improving public health systems, which will negatively affect their ability to increase national defense spending to 2 percent in the next four years as NATO members agreed to do in 2014. This inability to meet the 2014 Wales defense investment pledge may further endanger already shaky trans-Atlantic solidarity. Rethinking NATO burden-sharing along the lines of Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty can emphasize the mutual-aid and sharing dimension of burden-sharing, moving it away from quantitative defense accounting.

Burden-Sharing Is More than Budget Sharing

On March 31, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg appointed the group of 10 experts the new wise men and women to reflect on NATOs political dimension. This group is expected to come up with recommendations to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between allies, and strengthen NATOs political role, as agreed at the NATO leaders meeting in London last December. Chaired by an American and a German, the expert group is gender balanced, though from a geographical perspective only Poland represents the former Eastern bloc that joined the alliance after 1989. The secretary-general will present the groups recommendations during the next NATO summit in 2021.

The expert group resembles a 21st-century version of the Three Wise Men, a committee of three biblical Magi from Canada, Italy, and Norway, which was convened in 1956 to improve cooperation among the allies and develop greater internal solidarity within the Atlantic community. Back in the mid-1950s, NATO was primarily a military alliance focused on building its integrated command structure and drafting ambitious defense plans, in reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War. The 1956 report resulted in the adoption of political consultation among the alliance members, which eventually transformed NATO into the political and military collective defense alliance we know today.

Political and Strategic Dissonance in NATO

Setting up a reflection process that seeks expert advice on NATOs future is a welcome development. NATO needs to improve its cohesion, which has been eroded by the dissonance among the allies over both the political and strategic priorities of NATO. The alliance should also resolve the clash between liberal internationalists (represented for instance by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Canada, Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany, or Macron in France) and illiberal nationalists (Prime Minister Viktor Orbns Hungary, President Recep Tayyip Erdogans Turkey, or Prime Minister Jarosaw Kaczyskis populist Law and Justice party in Poland), which poses a challenge to the alliances identity, as democracy is one of NATOs core values, along with individual liberty and the rule of law.

What directly prompted the creation of the expert group was a controversial interview in the Economist last November, in which Macron declared that NATO was brain-dead. Although he received backlash for this blunt comment which arrived after uncoordinated unilateral actions by the United States and Turkey in Syria NATO was already suffering from a strategic schism between Eastern and Southern member countries. This divide concerns the different perceptions of the security environment among the allies, which creates a dilemma over how to allocate resources to address the diverging threat priorities of the alliance: improving the traditional deterrence and defense posture on NATOs Eastern flank on the one hand, and addressing Southern challenges of instability and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa on the other. The 360-degree approach put in place to address these diverging concerns has not managed to fully mitigate this strategic split.

This lack of coherent geopolitical thinking has been compounded by a major dispute over fair burden-sharing at NATO. Burden-sharing, usually understood as the distribution of costs, risks, and responsibilities among the alliance members, has been NATOs recurrent problem. Yet since the adoption of the defense investment pledge at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 projecting an increase in national defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2024, including 20 percent of annual defense expenditure on equipment the debates have fallen out of balance, focusing almost exclusively on financial sharing.

The Politics of NATO Burden-Sharing

The new Secretary Generals Annual Report shows that in 2019 only nine countries (one-third of NATO members) have reached the 2 percent guideline so far and 16 have invested 20 percent into equipment, procurement, and modernization. While the sharpest percentage increases are observed in Central European countries, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom represent together more than half of the non-U.S. defense spending (which accounts for 30 percent of alliance-wide national defense expenditures).

However, despite the increase in defense spending, this pledge has turned out to be a public relations disaster for NATO. Burden-sharing has become not only a politicized but also a very polarizing issue. Even though the plotline of this old debate has been the same for 70 years European allies free ride on the United States it seriously escalated with the arrival of U.S. President Donald Trump in 2016. Although the president has stopped calling NATO obsolete, he has been regularly and loudly criticizing the low level of defense spending of NATO European allies, up to the point of questioning Washingtons commitment to Article V, the core principle upon which the alliance is founded: that an attack on one is an attack on all. Even though NATO has been through several crises in the past, like the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 or the Iraq War in 2003, the United States was always interested in keeping the alliance united. The current NATO burden-sharing crisis is quite different in this respect, as it is Washington causing internal divisions.

In order to appease the United States, which is by far the greatest military spender in the world, the allies have agreed to adjust their direct contributions to NATO common budgets to reach fairer burden-sharing. NATO common funding has its own contribution mechanism based on the individual countries gross national income. Under the new cost-share formula for 2021-2024, Americas contribution will be reduced from around 22 percent to 16 percent, thus increasing the cost shares of European allies and Canada. However, NATO common funding fell short of 2.5 billion euros ($2.7 billion) last year and thus represents only a minor portion of the expenditures of NATO members, which together spent around $1 trillion on defense.

What Is Wrong with the 2 Percent Target?

Much ink has been spilled about the irrationality and ineffectiveness of the 2 percent defense spending measure. Even though it is a politically salient issue and all the allies have committed to it, the 2 percent pledge made in Wales is but a first step toward an honest discussion about how burden-sharing arrangements should play out in practice.

Imposing a one-dimensional quantitative measure of national defense spending is a rather technical depiction of burden-sharing that does not reflect the background process of political deliberations, nor qualitative differences among countries. National leaders in NATO countries have to navigate between national security interests and needs and their wider commitments to trans-Atlantic security. Rather than applying a one-number-fits-all approach, looking at the question through the prism of a normative dilemma of distributive justice, purchasing power parity estimates, and a progressive proportional scheme would provide a fairer burden-sharing measure (at least in statistical terms). Importantly, although the level of defense spending is a powerful predictor of future military capabilities and capacity, the translation of more resources into better capabilities is not straightforward.

The disconnection between alliance needs and the excessive focus on formal sharing of defense costs has created a strategic vacuum that damages the cohesion and reputation of the alliance. NATO is now caught up in meaningless burden-sharing exercises that do not serve its security interests, and that are mathematically and functionally ridiculous. Burden-sharing processes need to address explicitly the urgent need for substantial collective force planning. And they need to follow the interoperability imperative (do forces, units, and systems speak the common NATO language?) in pursuing the integration and modernization of European military capabilities. Measuring the level of national defense spending is a lazy shortcut for domestic political gains.

The expert group the new wise men and women should therefore reexamine the alliances philosophy of burden-sharing. For instance, they should rethink burden-sharing conceptually along the lines of Article III of the Washington Treaty. This article stipulates that the allies will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. Yet it does not specify the ratio between self-help and mutual help: that is, how much a member country must spend on its own defense before allies pitch in.

Reintroducing the mutual-aid dimension into the debate can emphasise the cooperative and sharing aspects of burden-sharing. This could point to what member countries have in common and what they can do together, such as stepping up integrated air and missile defense or sharing military expertise, rather than what divides them, and reflect the increasing number of high-visibility multinational capability cooperation projects at NATO. This approach would go beyond quantitative output and defense accounting and instead pay attention to the quality and effectiveness of burden-sharing.

You Cant Buy Interoperability

In contrast to statistical engineering that aims to adjust numbers to fit the desired fair share, true burden-sharing would put emphasis on defense capabilities and operational readiness. Shifting the emphasis away from abstract macroeconomic numbers to practical cooperation based on strategic needs should inform the content (which capabilities to buy), not only the form (defense spending levels), of burden-sharing debates. This highlights the problem that allies cannot just buy interoperability, as it requires enhanced cooperation and coordination. Although interoperability is considered the alliances core business, it has not been systematically treated in the burden-sharing debate. In addition, burden-sharing that includes the mutual-aid dimension would further refine the cash, capabilities, contributions or three Cs framework regularly mentioned by the current NATO secretary-general.

The current defense spending narrative is thus a symptom of empty formalism in NATO that reflects a lack of clarity about the alliances purpose, and favors statistical deceptions over effectively implementing the mutual commitment to defend each other. A February 2020 poll by the Pew Research Center revealed a worrying trend: While NATO is generally seen in a positive light across publics within the alliance (a median of 53 percent view NATO positively, though with double-digit percentage point declines in Germany and France over the past 10 years), many in 16 surveyed NATO countries seem reluctant to fulfill Article V collective defense obligations. A median of 50 percent across 16 NATO member countries is against their country defending an ally, while only 38 percent express willingness to come to help a fellow ally.

Future Defense Spending in Peril

NATO needs to get its burden-sharing right, especially in the context of the short- and long-term consequences of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. While the scope of the economic impact is still unclear, it is likely to reshuffle financial priorities in NATO countries. Defense ministries will find it more difficult to reach the 2 percent spending level by 2024 or even to maintain the current defense expenditures programs. Moreover, with economies put to halt and eventual drops in national GDP, even if countries fulfill the 2 percent pledge, they could end up spending less in real terms. If NATO members continue to frame fairness in terms of the 2 percent defense spending target, it will further aggravate the burden-sharing problem, seriously test NATO solidarity, and ultimately endanger the alliances ability to adapt to the increasingly unpredictable security environment and the changing nature of security threats.

Improving NATOs cohesion and its political role will not happen overnight or through high-level political declarations. If there are any lessons to be learned from the Three Wise Mens effort back in 1956, it is that perseverance, personal relationships and reputation, pragmatism, and humility matter a great deal.

Dr. Dominika Kunertova is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for War Studies in Denmark. With a Ph.D. in Political Science from Universit de Montral, she researches trans-Atlantic security and defense cooperation, NATO-EU relations, and military technology. Her previous work experience includes strategic foresight analysis at NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, and capability development and armaments cooperation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. She has published her research in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, European Security, Military Review, and Ethics Forum.

Image: NATO

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Can the New 'Magi' Save NATO? - War on the Rocks

The NATO-led KFOR mission continues its daily activities, ensuring a safe and secure environment for all communities in Kosovo, according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, KFOR has been fully implementing all preventive measures recommended by the World Health Organization. It has also provided assistance to local institutions in Kosovo. In the past days, it has donated personal protection equipment worth 70,000 Euro to the hospitals of Pristina and Gracanica. This included gloves, masks, goggles, isolation clothing, as well as infrared contactless thermometers and antiseptic hand cleansing. The project was funded by NATO and implemented by the KFOR Civil-Military Cooperation team, and is part of the overall commitment of the Alliance in support of its operations and of its member countries and partners. The donation is an act of solidarity that reflects the close cooperation developed between KFOR and the Ministry of Public Health, Major General Michele Risi, the Commander of KFOR said.

Recently, the Italian-led Multinational Specialized Unit deployed with KFOR has also delivered more than 50 donations of food and clothing worth 70,000 to 14 Kosovo municipalities, in coordination with local charities and the Red Cross of Kosovo. The Multinational Specialized Unit consists of police forces with military status from Allied and partner countries contributing personnel to KFOR. They are tasked to support security operations, including through criminal intelligence control, mass and riot control, and information collection and evaluation. The Unit can advise, train and support local police forces on a wide range of policing issues.

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Coronavirus response: KFOR carries on with its activities and continues to provide assistance to local communities in Kosovo - NATO HQ

On 27 April 2020, a plane from the Spanish Air Force took off from the Lithuanian Air Force Base near iauliai (Lithuania) to deliver critical medical supplies to Spain, as part of ongoing Allied efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.

The delivery consisted of Lithuanian-made facial protection shields, medical gloves and disinfectant fluid and was provided through a bilateral arrangements between Lithuania and Spain. To date, Spain has received support from several NATO Allies, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Turkey, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Poland; both though the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Response Centre (EADRCC) NATOs principal response mechanism - and bilaterally. It has also received assistance from the NATO Support & Procurement Agency, through key relief acquisition and transport.

Last week, Spain notified the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Centre that thanks to the support received from Allied countries, medical items that were required at the beginning of the pandemic have now been fulfilled and that for this reason it does not require any additional assistance at the moment from the EADRCC. Spain also stated that it will approach the Centre again, should it require further assistance.

Lithuania has also donated 10,000 masks and respiratory equipment to Italy, through a bilateral arrangement. The delivery was made by truck by the Lithuanian logistics company Girteka. Italy has until now received critical support from several NATO Allies, including Albania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Turkey and the United States, through various mechanisms, including bilateral forms of assistance and delivery through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Response Centre.

Originally posted here:

Coronavirus response: Lithuania assists Italy and Spain in response to global pandemic - NATO HQ

At the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) December 2019 Leaders Summit in London, leaders acknowledged that technology is rapidly changing the international security environment, stating: To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge. Leaders also identified outer space as a key area of focus. They declared that space [is] an operational domain for NATO, recognizing its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law. NATO defense ministers had previously approved an initial space policy in June 2019, but the details of that policy have not been publicly released.

Given the increasing role outer space is playing in NATO military operations, and the growing anti-satellite threat from states like Russia and China, NATOs decision to declare outer space an operational domain was the correct one. The key question now is: How can the alliance develop an effective implementation strategy to ensure it can maintain assured access to outer space and space-derived data?

Such a strategy will require several elements. First, NATO will need to improve its understanding of the anti-satellite threat. Second, outer space will need to be mainstreamed within NATO, especially with regard to the defense planning and operations process. Third, NATO will need to improve cooperation and coordination with the United States, the alliances leader on outer space issues. Fourth, NATO should identify areas where it might work with the European Union (EU) on outer space. And finally, the alliance will need to find a way incorporate diplomacy into any eventual strategy.

The threat to U.S. and allied space systems from anti-satellite weapons continues to grow. As former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats noted in testimony before Congress in January 2019: China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold U.S. and allied space systems at risk. Coats testimony is complemented by numerous reports and studies by government and non-governmental organizations like the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Secure World Foundation.

NATO has also been the victim of real-world anti-satellite activities. In March 2019, the Norwegian government accused Russia of harassing communications systems during NATO exercises. Recent press reporting notes that the Norwegian Intelligence Service has documented a number of incidents in which GPS signals and other secured communications between the Norwegian Armed forces, or NAF, units engaged in exercises were subjected to blocking measures from sites located in Russia. And just last week, U.S. Space Command released a statement claiming that on April 15th, Russia had conducted a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test. Faced with these real threats, how should NATO respond?

Collective action by NATO on outer space security issues will only happen when allies reach a consensus on the anti-satellite threat. As a first step, an appropriate organization at NATO (e.g., the Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence) should be directed to develop a comprehensive assessment of the anti-satellite threat to the alliance.

To be successful, this effort will require the full support of the U.S. intelligence community. Additionally, NATO officials should ensure relevant alliance political and military bodies (e.g., the North Atlantic Council, Military Committee, Senior Political Committee, and Defense Policy and Planning Committee) receive regular updates on the anti-satellite threat.

NATO should ensure that outer space is mainstreamed and fully integrated within alliance political and military institutions, and is not treated as merely a novelty item. For instance, overall responsibility for outer space should be placed in an organization like the Office of the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, or the Office of the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment, which are responsible for defense policy, planning, and capability investment at NATO. Furthermore, noting the interrelationship between outer space and other domains like nuclear and cyber, NATO will need to establish mechanisms that encourage effective coordination and cooperation across the entire organization, including the military commands.

At the operational level, the alliance should ensure that outer space is incorporated in its major military exercises and wargames. This is critical because if NATO ever comes into a major conflict with Russia, one of Russias first targets would be the alliances space assets and space-derived information. Therefore, it is important for NATO to conduct its exercises with this in mind. Allied Command Transformation, NATOs warfare development command, should be tasked to make this a reality.

If NATO ever comes into a major conflict with Russia, one of Russias first targets would be the alliances space assets.

At the end of the day, NATOs ultimate effectiveness in outer space will depend on its cooperation with the alliances most important space power: the United States. To date, U.S. leadership has been the key driver of NATO decisionmaking on outer space, and senior U.S. officials have actively engaged the alliance leadership. For example, in October 2019, General John Raymond, commander of U.S. Space Command and chief of space operations, briefed the NATO Military Committee on outer space security issues. These types of senior-level engagements between U.S. political and military leaders should continue and be expanded.

In addition to senior-level engagements, there are a number of other actions NATO and the United States could take to improve cooperation and coordination. Specifically, they should establish clear consultative mechanisms between NATO, U.S. Space Command, and the U.S. Space Force. One relatively easy step that could be taken quickly would be to establish a NATO liaison officer at U.S. Space Command and/or U.S. Space Force headquarters. Indeed, a number of allied officers are currently attached as liaisons at several U.S. combatant commands like U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

The United States should also seek to incorporate NATO representatives into its outer space-related wargames where possible, especially the Schriever Wargame, the premier U.S. space wargame. According to a U.S. Air Force press release, several allies including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, have participated in previous Schriever Wargames. The United States should invite NATO political and military officials to participate in the next Schriever Wargame.

NATO should also explore ways to cooperate with the EU on outer space, primarily because the EU has developed and deployed the Galileo globalnavigationsatellite system, which like the U.S. Global Position System (GPS), provides accurate positioning and timing information. In particular, Galileo includes a capability known as the Public Regulated Service (PRS), an encrypted navigation service for governmental authorized users and sensitive applications that require high continuity. In a crisis situation, PRS could provide NATO important redundancy against an adversarys attempt to jam or destroy GPS. While many members of NATO are also members of the EU and have access to PRS, non-EU NATO members, and NATO as an organization, currently does not. Therefore, NATO should begin consultations with the EU about the possibility of gaining access to PRS for the alliance.

Military solutions alone will not allow the United States and its allies to address the increasing anti-satellite threat. While I have generally supported many of the Trump administrations space security initiatives like the re-establishment of U.S. Space Command, a key element missing from the Trump administrations outer space security strategy has been the complete lack of a diplomatic component. Without a more comprehensive strategy that includes a strong diplomatic element, it will make it difficult for NATO to maintain enough political cohesion to pursue effective military policies. These tensions were highlighted in a recent article that noted: With the exception of France and the United Kingdom, many Europeans countries are deeply uncomfortable with, or down right opposed to, the development and use of weapons in space.

This is not a problem unique to outer space. Throughout its history, there has been constant tension within NATO over the appropriate balance between defense and diplomacy in its strategy. Since the late 1960s, with the approval of the Harmel Report, named after former Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel, NATO has sought to more effectively balance some of the inherent tensions between defense and diplomacy. One of the key findings from the Harmel Report was that military security and a policy of dtente are not contradictory but complementary. Arms control was considered an essential element of this strategy. The general Harmel Report approach has shaped the key strategic decisions that the alliance has taken over the past 50 years, most notably the Double-Track decision in 1979 to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe, while simultaneously engaging the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations.

As part of its overall strategy for outer space, NATO should develop options and recommendations on how it can advance diplomatic solutions to address the emerging threat to outer space systems. In particular, NATO should task the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee to examine what role the alliance could play in developing norms of behavior to encourage responsible use of outer space. And even though the Trump administration has generally been opposed to arms control, it has expressed openness to the development of norms for outer space. In an recent speech, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford stated: We clearly need to do more to develop non-legallybinding international normsof responsible behaviorthat are complementary to the existing legal regime.

With the increasing role that outer space is playing in military operations, and the rise of the anti-satellite threat, NATO was correct in its decision to declare space as an operational domain in December 2019. The question now is whether the alliance will be able to translate this broad political guidance into an effective strategy.

An effective NATO strategy for outer space will depend on the ability of the alliance to build consensus on the threat; mainstream outer space into NATOs political and military institutions; find ways to cooperate with the EU; and incorporate diplomacy into that strategy. But at the end of the day, all of this will require clear, sustained, and consistent U.S. leadership.

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NATO and outer space: Now what? - Brookings Institution

NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Photograph courtesy of NATO.

By Frank A. Rose

At the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) December 2019 Leaders Summit in London, leaders acknowledged that technology is rapidly changing the international security environment, stating: To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge. Leaders also identified outer space as a key area of focus. They declared that space [is] an operational domain for NATO, recognizing its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law. NATO defense ministers had previously approved an initial space policy in June 2019, but the details of that policy have not been publicly released.

Given the increasing role outer space is playing in NATO military operations, and the growing anti-satellite threat from states like Russia and China, NATOs decision to declare outer space an operational domain was the correct one. The key question now is: How can the alliance develop an effective implementation strategy to ensure it can maintain assured access to outer space and space-derived data?

Such a strategy will require several elements. First, NATO will need to improve its understanding of the anti-satellite threat. Second, outer space will need to be mainstreamed within NATO, especially with regard to the defense planning and operations process. Third, NATO will need to improve cooperation and coordination with the United States, the alliances leader on outer space issues. Fourth, NATO should identify areas where it might work with the European Union (EU) on outer space. And finally, the alliance will need to find a way incorporate diplomacy into any eventual strategy.

The Emerging Anti-Satellite Threat

The threat to U.S. and allied space systems from anti-satellite weapons continues to grow. As former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats noted in testimony before Congress in January 2019: China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold U.S. and allied space systems at risk. Coats testimony is complemented by numerous reports and studies by government and non-governmental organizations like the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Secure World Foundation.

NATO has also been the victim of real-world anti-satellite activities. In March 2019, the Norwegian government accused Russia of harassing communications systems during NATO exercises. Recent press reportingnotes that the Norwegian Intelligence Service has documented a number of incidents in which GPS signals and other secured communications between the Norwegian Armed forces, or NAF, units engaged in exercises were subjected to blocking measures from sites located in Russia. And just last week, U.S. Space Command released a statement claiming that on April 15th, Russia had conducted a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test. Faced with these real threats, how should NATO respond?

Improve Intelligence-Sharing

Collective action by NATO on outer space security issues will only happen when allies reach a consensus on the anti-satellite threat. As a first step, an appropriate organization at NATO (e.g., the Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence) should be directed to develop a comprehensive assessment of the anti-satellite threat to the alliance.

To be successful, this effort will require the full support of the U.S. intelligence community. Additionally, NATO officials should ensure relevant alliance political and military bodies (e.g., the North Atlantic Council, Military Committee, Senior Political Committee, and Defense Policy and Planning Committee) receive regular updates on the anti-satellite threat.

Mainstream Outer Space at NATO

NATO should ensure that outer space is mainstreamed and fully integrated within alliance political and military institutions, and is not treated as merely a novelty item. For instance, overall responsibility for outer space should be placed in an organization like the Office of the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, or the Office of the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment, which are responsible for defense policy, planning, and capability investment at NATO. Furthermore, noting the interrelationship between outer space and other domains like nuclear and cyber, NATO will need to establish mechanisms that encourage effective coordination and cooperation across the entire organization, including the military commands.

At the operational level, the alliance should ensure that outer space is incorporated in its major military exercises and wargames. This is critical because if NATO ever comes into a major conflict with Russia, one of Russias first targets would be the alliances space assets and space-derived information. Therefore, it is important for NATO to conduct its exercises with this in mind. Allied Command Transformation, NATOs warfare development command, should be tasked to make this a reality.

Ensure Cooperation and Coordination With the United States

At the end of the day, NATOs ultimate effectiveness in outer space will depend on its cooperation with the alliances most important space power: the United States. To date, U.S. leadership has been the key driver of NATO decisionmaking on outer space, and senior U.S. officials have actively engaged the alliance leadership. For example, in October 2019, General John Raymond, commander of U.S. Space Command and chief of space operations, briefed the NATO Military Committee on outer space security issues. These types of senior-level engagements between U.S. political and military leaders should continue and be expanded.

In addition to senior-level engagements, there are a number of other actions NATO and the United States could take to improve cooperation and coordination. Specifically, they should establish clear consultative mechanisms between NATO, U.S. Space Command, and the U.S. Space Force. One relatively easy step that could be taken quickly would be to establish a NATO liaison officer at U.S. Space Command and/or U.S. Space Force headquarters. Indeed, a number of allied officers are currently attached as liaisons at several U.S. combatant commands like U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

The United States should also seek to incorporate NATO representatives into its outer space-related wargames where possible, especially the Schriever Wargame, the premier U.S. space wargame. According to a U.S. Air Force press release, several allies including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, have participated in previous Schriever Wargames. The United States should invite NATO political and military officials to participate in the next Schriever Wargame.

Cooperate With the EU

NATO should also explore ways to cooperate with the EU on outer space, primarily because the EU has developed and deployed the Galileo globalnavigationsatellite system, which like the U.S. Global Position System (GPS), provides accurate positioning and timing information. In particular, Galileo includes a capability known as the Public Regulated Service (PRS), an encrypted navigation service for governmental authorized users and sensitive applications that require high continuity. In a crisis situation, PRS could provide NATO important redundancy against an adversarys attempt to jam or destroy GPS. While many members of NATO are also members of the EU and have access to PRS, non-EU NATO members, and NATO as an organization, currently does not. Therefore, NATO should begin consultations with the EU about the possibility of gaining access to PRS for the alliance.

Dont Forget Diplomacy

Military solutions alone will not allow the United States and its allies to address the increasing anti-satellite threat. While I have generally supported many of the Trump administrations space security initiatives like the re-establishment of U.S. Space Command, a key element missing from the Trump administrations outer space security strategy has been the complete lack of a diplomatic component. Without a more comprehensive strategy that includes a strong diplomatic element, it will make it difficult for NATO to maintain enough political cohesion to pursue effective military policies. These tensions were highlighted in a recent article that noted: With the exception of France and the United Kingdom, many Europeans countries are deeply uncomfortable with, or down right opposed to, the development and use of weapons in space.

This is not a problem unique to outer space. Throughout its history, there has been constant tension within NATO over the appropriate balance between defense and diplomacy in its strategy. Since the late 1960s, with the approval of the Harmel Report, named after former Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel, NATO has sought to more effectively balance some of the inherent tensions between defense and diplomacy. One of the key findings from the Harmel Report was that military security and a policy of dtente are not contradictory but complementary. Arms control was considered an essential element of this strategy. The general Harmel Report approach has shaped the key strategic decisions that the alliance has taken over the past 50 years, most notably the Double-Track decision in 1979 to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe, while simultaneously engaging the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations.

As part of its overall strategy for outer space, NATO should develop options and recommendations on how it can advance diplomatic solutions to address the emerging threat to outer space systems. In particular, NATO should task the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee to examine what role the alliance could play in developing norms of behavior to encourage responsible use of outer space. And even though the Trump administration has generally been opposed to arms control, it has expressed openness to the development of norms for outer space. In an recent speech, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford stated: We clearly need to do more to develop non-legallybinding international normsof responsible behaviorthat are complementary to the existing legal regime.

U.S. Leadership Will Be Key

With the increasing role that outer space is playing in military operations, and the rise of the anti-satellite threat, NATO was correct in its decision to declare space as an operational domain in December 2019. The question now is whether the alliance will be able to translate this broad political guidance into an effective strategy.

An effective NATO strategy for outer space will depend on the ability of the alliance to build consensus on the threat; mainstream outer space into NATOs political and military institutions; find ways to cooperate with the EU; and incorporate diplomacy into that strategy. But at the end of the day, all of this will require clear, sustained, and consistent U.S. leadership.

Frank A. Rose is a senior fellow for security and strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He focuses on nuclear strategy and deterrence, arms control, strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging security challenges. From 2017-18, he served as principal director and chief of government relations at the Aerospace Corporation, a federally-funded research and development center focused on national security space. Before that, Rose served as assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance from 2014-17.Prior to joining the State Department in June 2009, Rose held various national security staff positions in the U.S. House of Representatives, including service as a professional staff member on both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rose has also held numerous positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including as special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction, and policy advisor in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Before that, he worked as a national security analyst with Science Applications International Corporation and on the staff of U.S. Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA). Rose received his bachelors degree in history from American University in 1994 and a masters degree in war studies from Kings College, University of London in 1999. Outside of Brookings, Rose is providing outside informal counsel exclusively to the Biden campaign for President.

This essay was originally published on the Brookings Institutions Order from Chaos blog on 22 April 2020 and can be found here, and is republished by SpaceWatch.Global with their kind permission.

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#SpaceWatchGL Opinion: NATO And Outer Space: What Now? - SpaceWatch.Global