CBS 2 Chicago Wins Peabody Award For [un]warranted: A Series That Exposed Chicago Police Pattern Of Raiding Homes Of Innocent Families – CBS Chicago

CHICAGO (CBS) CBS Chicago won the prestigious Peabody Award for [un]warranted, an investigative project and documentary exposing an alarming pattern of Chicago Police officers raiding the wrong homes, traumatizing innocent families, and, in the process, violating citizens Fourth Amendment rights.

CBS Chicago was the only local news winner of the award.

The reporting discovered that CPD officers routinely violated department policies during these raids, yet none of the officers involved were investigated or disciplined. In 2019 alone, the project included more than 25 investigative news reports and a 30-minute documentary examining the impact of these wrongful raids on families of color in Chicago. It resulted in a new state law to protect children, two city probes into how officers obtain and execute search warrants, and nearly a dozen federal civil rights lawsuits.

The police department also changed its search warrant policy to ensure more oversight and accountability and additional protections for children. Newly appointed Superintendent David Brown also committed to tracking wrong raids for the first time in the departments history.

As a result of this exhaustive, moving report, the Governor of Illinois signed the Peter Mendez Act into law. Named for a boy whose home was wrongly raided, the legislation instructs police departments to train officers on how to de-escalate force if children are present during a raid. For its tenacity, thoroughness, and impact, CBS Chicago wins a Peabody Award, wrote the Peabody Board of Jurors in its winning citation.

According to the Peabody website, Judging for the Peabody Awards is a rigorous, deliberative process based on the belief that face-to-face discussions among board members is the best possible way to adjudicate more than 1,200 entries that Peabody receives each year. The Peabody Awards judging process ensures that each and every entry receives full attention in its pursuit of excellence.

The Peabody Awards recognixed 30 programs as the most compelling and empowering stories released in broadcasting and digital media during 2019.The Peabody 30 are the best of nearly 1,300 entries submitted from television, radio/podcasts, and the web across the genres of entertainment, news, documentary, childrens and public service programming. All winners are chosen unanimously by a board of 19 jurors. The Peabody Awards are based at the Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Georgia.

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CBS 2 Chicago Wins Peabody Award For [un]warranted: A Series That Exposed Chicago Police Pattern Of Raiding Homes Of Innocent Families - CBS Chicago

Bipartisan resistance to reining in the surveillance state – OCRegister

Have you been on the Internet lately? Where did you go? What did you do there?

If you think the answers to these questions are nobodys business, be grateful that the House of Representatives didnt pass a new reauthorization of the governments power to conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans.

March 15 was the expiration date for three Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorities: the foreign surveillance authorities known as Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the lone wolf authority and the authority for a roving wiretap. During that same month, the House passed a reauthorization bill, and the Senate made a few changes and sent it back to the House.

While the reauthorization of surveillance authorities has often stirred debate, in the end, something was always worked out to keep the authorizations in force.

This time it was different. Privacy advocates, including the American Booksellers for Free Expression, formed a coalition to call for the adoption of a privacy amendment. It would have aligned the law with court rulings to make clear that internet browsing and search history was not to be collected under Section 215, which allows the government to peruse records without meeting a probable cause standard.

The amendment introduced by Senators Steve Daines, R-Montana, and Ron Wyden, D-Oregon, was replaced by a negotiated amendment that was weaker, and Sen. Wyden announced his opposition.

Opposition also came from President Trump, who threatened to veto the bill. Warrantless surveillance of Americans is wrong! he tweeted, later adding, Our country has just suffered through the greatest political crime in its history. The massive abuse of FISA was a big part of it!

Support from House Republicans who had voted for reauthorization in March fell away, and they were joined by some Democrats. Congressional Progressive Caucus co-chair Rep. Mark Pocan, D-Wisconsin, said, the people of this country are over-policed and over-surveilled.

On the opposite side, Rep. Liz Cheney, R-Wyoming, said the privacy amendment to restrict the collection of internet browser searches was too great a risk to national security. Acknowledging that FISA authorities had been abused, Cheney said the House should still not pass a bill which would fundamentally weaken our ability to keep the nation safe.

Speaker Nancy Pelosi couldnt pull the votes together, and she pulled the bill off the floor.

The House has now referred the FISA reauthorization bill to a conference committee, where House majority Democrats will negotiate with Senate majority Republicans on a compromise version of the legislation.

Warrantless, secret surveillance of the phone and Internet records of Americans has always been unsettling, more so now that we have had multiple reports from the Justice Department inspector general documenting that the FBI and DOJ presented the secret FISA court with seriously flawed applications in order to obtain warrants for spying. Following an investigation that found 17 inaccuracies, omissions and significant errors in four applications for surveillance of Trump campaign associate Carter Page, IG Michael Horowitz looked at warrant applications in 29 other cases and found an average of 20 errors in each.

Before Americans again trust the government with the power to override Fourth Amendment protections in the name of national security, the failings that allowed these abuses to happen must be corrected.

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Bipartisan resistance to reining in the surveillance state - OCRegister

Felony DUI charge dismissed due to illegal breath test – Idaho Mountain Express and Guide

In accordance with an Idaho Supreme Court decision handed down last year, a charge of felony DUI has been dismissed for a Hailey man due to a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures.

Jeremy Sean Matthews, 32, was charged with felony DUI on Dec. 29 after a Sun Valley police officer approached his parked vehicle in the Sun Valley Figure Skating Club parking lot. According to a probable-cause affidavit, the officer was responding to a report of an intoxicated driver on Sun Valley Road around 12:30 a.m.

According to the affidavit, Matthews was detained and transported to the Sun Valley Police Department to give a breathalyzer test. Prior to that, the affidavit says, the officer informed Matthews that he was under arrest for misdemeanor DUI.

Matthews public defender, Justin McCarthy, filed a motion on April 7 to suppress evidence of the breathalyzer test.

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled last year in the case Clark v. Idaho that officers cannot make misdemeanor arrests without a warrant or without witnessing the offense. According to court documents, the Sun Valley officer was not informed of Matthews prior DUI convictions, which raised the alleged offense to a felony, until after the breathalyzer test was conducted.

Because the vehicle was parked and off at the time of the detainment and because the officer did not witness Matthews driving, the misdemeanor arrest was illegal, according to McCarthys argument in his motion to suppress.

Court records indicate that the Blaine County Prosecutors Office filed a motion to dismiss the case on May 20.

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Felony DUI charge dismissed due to illegal breath test - Idaho Mountain Express and Guide

Privacy Org Presses 5th Circ. To Veto Border Phone Searches – Law360

Law360 (June 9, 2020, 8:07 PM EDT) -- The Fourth Amendment shields travelers from having their phones and laptops rifled through during routinesearches at the border, a civil rights group is telling the Fifth Circuit in defense of a Texas immigration attorney who is challenging the warrantless searches as unconstitutional.

Because of their ability to contain massive amounts of information, digital devices don't fall under the Fourth Amendment's exception for warrantless and suspicionless routine searches at the border, the Electronic Frontier Foundation said Monday in an amicus brief.

"All border searches whether manual or forensic of the data stored on electronic devices are 'non-routine' searches that fall...

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Privacy Org Presses 5th Circ. To Veto Border Phone Searches - Law360

Can they do that? – USA TODAY

Police used gas to clear protesters from Lafayette Park before President Donald Trump walked over and held a Bible up at St. John's Episcopal Church. USA TODAY

Can police clear peaceful protests by force?Can the U.S. block migrants in the name of COVID-19?So much news, so many questions.

It's Ashley. Let's dive in.

But first, a modest pension: The last person in the USA to receive a Civil War-era pension died at age 90. She received a monthly check for $73.13.

The Short List newsletter is a snappy USA TODAY news roundup.Subscribehere!

More than 1,200 former Justice Department stafferscallfor a review of Attorney General William Barr's role in forcefully removing peaceful protesters near the White House before President Donald Trumps photo op with a Bible outside St. John's Church. The former staffers said they were "disturbed" by Barr's involvement in the action, adding that the move violated the First and Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Though Barracknowledged deciding to expand the security perimeter around the area requiring the movement of protesters he has since said that he did not give the specific directive setting federal authorities in motion.

Police used tear gas to clear protesters from a park before President Trump walked over to St. John's Episcopal Church.(Photo: Getty)

The Justice Department showed a "gross abuse of prosecutorial power" in its push to drop the case against Michael Flynn, a court-appointed arbiter said Wednesday. Remember Flynn? Hes President Trump's former national security adviser who pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contacts with Russia during RobertMueller's investigationinto election interference. Retired federal judge John Gleeson said the Justice Department's bid to dismiss Flynn's case should be denied because its arguments "are not credible," suggesting the government violated safeguards designed to prevent "dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants."

The ACLU filed a lawsuitWednesday challenging the Trump administration's decision to block many migrants from entering the country including those requesting asylum in the name of public health during the coronavirus pandemic.The suit claims the administration violated federal law by ordering blanket denials and immediate deportations of some migrants. Though federal law allows for the government to screen, quarantine and expel would-be migrants for public health reasons, it does not, according to the lawsuit, allow for the elimination of the asylum system or other forms of humanitarian relief.

Red flags are being raisedby experts around the country about Arizonas COVID-19 situation. Coronavirus cases and hospitalizations have increased over the past two weeks,and experts say the disease's spread can'tbe attributed solely to increased testing. Instead, it looks like the state is trending upward in a way that is concerning and could need another stay-at-home order to curb. "I would go so far as to say alarming," said William Hanage, an epidemiology professor at Harvard University.Gov. Doug Ducey said last week that therise in cases was expectedas the state beganreopening. Regardless, this is as good a time as ever for me to remind everyone: Social distancing, wearing masks and washing hands are some of the easiest ways to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Across the country, health experts have taken notice of Arizona's COVID-19 trajectory.(Photo: Arizona Department of Health Services)

A dark twist has been added to the disappearance of two Idaho children missing since September a bewildering case tied to mysterious deaths andallegations of cult-like religious beliefs. The new husband of the mother of the two kids wasarrested Tuesday after authorities found what they suspect to be two sets of unidentified human remains at his home.We dont know who the remains belong to, as autopsy results are pending. Chad Daybell, arrested on suspicion of concealing or destroying evidence, is the husband ofLori Vallow,who was arrested in February after she failed to bring her missing children to authorities.

Joshua Vallow, 7, and Tylee Ryan, 17, were last seen Sept. 23, 2019, in Rexburg, Idaho. Their mother, Lori Vallow, is the second wife of Chad Daybell.(Photo: National Center for Missing & Exploited Children via Associated Press)

George Floyd's younger brother Philonise addressed the House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday in a hearing on policing. "Thank you for the invitation to be here today to talk about my big brother, George. The world knows him as George, but I called him Perry," he said. "Im tired. Im tired of the pain Im feeling now, and Im tired of the pain I feel every time another black person is killed for no reason.Im here today to ask you to make it stop. Stop the pain. Stop us from being tired."Read his full statement here.

"Stop the pain," says Philonise Floyd, brother of George Floyd, during a House Judiciary Committee hearing on proposed changes to police practices and accountability June 10.(Photo: Michael Reynolds, AP)

Prince Philip, the oldest and longest-serving royal consort in British history, marked a big-timemilestone today: He turned 99! As usual, the husband of Queen Elizabeth IIopted for ano-fuss celebration.I'm not trying to make this weird, but here's a little fun fact:The royal couple, who have been married since 1947, are distant cousins, both descended from Queen Victoria. Cheers to royal bloodlines.

Prince Philip celebrates his 99th birthday June 10. He's spent more than 70 of them by the side of Queen Elizabeth II.(Photo: Steve Parsons, AP)

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Can they do that? - USA TODAY

Federal judge restricts use of tear gas, non-lethal projectiles by Denver police – JURIST

A federal judge for the district of Colorado issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Denver Police Department (DPD) on Friday.

The TRO was issued in response to a complaint filed by four Denver residents on Thursday. The four have participated in protests in Denver following the May 25 death of George Floyd in Minneapolis at the hands of police. The complaint alleges the DPD has violated their Fourth Amendment right against excessive force and their First Amendment right of free speech. They specifically cite the use of pepper spray, pepper balls, rubber bullets, flashbang grenades, and tear gas to punish plaintiffs for demonstrating against police brutality.

In addressing the protestors claims, Judge R. Brooke Jackson noted that the behaviors of some police officers in Denver and across the nation against peaceful protesters . . . have been disgusting. Examining the wealth of video and eyewitness evidence, Judge Jackson found a strong likelihood that the DPD did violate the plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, she found that irreparable harm would result if immediate relief were not issued to the plaintiffs, as the protests are ongoing and continued use of chemical agents and non-lethal projectiles will have the effect of chill[ing] and outright den[ying] . . . plaintiffs speech.

Jackson did note that limiting officers options could theoretically limit their ability to defend themselves, however she also pointed out the range of other non-lethal options officers have, including tazers. The unlikelihood of such harm to officers is outweighed by the very real harm that has already been caused to plaintiffs, she determined. She also acknowledged that there could be an increase in property damage, but found that the harm to protestors outweighed the threat of harm to property:

The TRO specifically limits the ability of DPD officers to use chemical agents and non-lethal projectiles unless an officer of the rank of Captain or higher is on the scene and orders their use in direct response to specific acts of violence or destruction of property that the command officer has personally witnessed. They are also enjoined from firing non-lethal projectiles into crowds, nor may they fire them at a persons head, pelvis, or back. All officers are additionally required to have body cameras recording at all times, chemical agents may only be used after an order to disperse has been issued, and such orders must be followed by adequate time for protestors to disperse. The TRO provides that officers must allow room for protestors to leave if an order to disperse has been given, otherwise enjoining the practice of kettling or forcing crowds into a contained area lacking any egress.

City and county officials filed a motion to modify two parts of the judges TRO, to allow officers of rank of lieutenant or higher to authorize the use of chemical agents and non-lethal projectiles, and to eliminate the body camera requirement.

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Federal judge restricts use of tear gas, non-lethal projectiles by Denver police - JURIST

Cops Who Allegedly Assaulted and Arrested a Man for Standing Outside His Own House Are Protected by Qualified Immunity – Reason

Two police officers who allegedly assaulted a man outside of his own house and arrested him on bogus charges after failing to identify themselves as law enforcement are protected by qualified immunity and cannot be sued, a federal court confirmed Monday.

Shase Howse, the appellant, alleges that on July 28, 2016, a group of men pulled up to his home in an unmarked vehicle without uniforms on and asked him if he lived at the residence. After Howse answered in the affirmative, Officer Brian Middaugh of the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) pressed Howse on if he was surehe lived there. "Yes, what the fuck?" Howse allegedly responded, still unaware Middaugh was a cop. Middaugh, commenting on Howse's bad attitude, then exited the unmarked vehicle and approached him on the porch, asking him once again if he lived there. Howse said he did.

Following that exchange, Howse alleges that Middaugh commanded him to put his hands behind his back because he was going to jail. Howse did not oblige, telling Middaugh that he lived at the residence and that he'd done nothing wrong. Middaugh then threw him to the ground, and with the help of CPD Officer Thomas Hodous, handcuffed him while Howse resisted. It was after he was tackled that Howse realized the men were police officers.

As he lay on the porch, Howse's mother, who heard the noise from inside, exited the residence, where she says she saw one man straddling her son while another punched his head with a closed fist, causing Howse's head to hit the porch. She, too, did not initially realize they were officers.

Howse was eventually jailed for several days before posting bond, and charged with two counts of assault and one count of obstructing official business. TheCuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office eventually dismissed those charges.

Howse then brought three claims against Middaugh and Hodous: one for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, another for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the last for assault and battery in violation of Ohio law. He also brought one claim against the City of Cleveland, arguing that the municipality shares liability for the officers' constitutional violations. He first filed his suit the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland, where a panel granted the officers qualified immunity and dismissed the case against the city. Howse then appealed.

In rejecting Howse's suit, Circuit Judge Amul Thapar of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrated what makes qualified immunity so confounding: public officials can violate your civil rights without consequence if those rights have not been "clearly established" by existing case law.

"'Clearly established' means that the law is so clear at the time of the incident that every reasonable officer would understand the unlawfulness of his conduct," Thapar writes in his majority opinion. "To avoid 'paralysis by analysis,' qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent officers or those who knowingly violate the law."

Reasonable officers should know basic right from wrong, Thapar implies, yet according to qualified immunity, they also need the judiciary to spell out those fundamentals with myopic detail.

What's more, the doctrine has indeed been used to protect "plainly incompetent officers" and "those who knowingly violate the law." Consider the two cops in Fresno, California, who allegedly stole $225,000 while executing a search warrant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that "the City Officers ought to have recognized that the alleged theft was morally wrong," but that they "did not have clear notice that it violated the Fourth Amendment." Both officers were granted qualified immunity.

Then there was the sheriff's deputy in Coffee County, Georgia, who shot a 10-year-old boy while aiming at the family's non-threatening dog while in pursuit of a suspect who had no connection to the little boy or his dog. Because there was no case law saying that shooting someone while aiming at something else infringes on someone's rights, the deputy received qualified immunity. Or the police officer in Los Angeles who shot a 15-year-old boy one morning because he saw the boy's friend holding a plastic airsoft gun replica. In that case, there was no legal precedent that said accidentally shooting a bystander infringes on the bystander's rights, though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit acknowledged that "a rational finder of fact" would conclude that the officer's conduct "shocked the conscience and was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment." The officer got qualified immunity anyway.

But Thapar's decision is in a league of its own, says Clark Neily, vice president for criminal justice at the Cato Institute. "It requires a certain amount of effort to write an exceptionally bad qualified immunity opinion, but this is, by any standard, an exceptionally bad one," Neily says. "Simply refusing to interact with police, and even being rude to them, does not provide probable cause for them to make an arrest, which is really what this case boils down to."

Thapar disagrees. "Howse argues that the officers violated his clearly established right to be free from 'unreasonable government intrusions,'" he writes, calling that basic constitutional standard "much too vague." The officers needed to be specifically told by the courts that assaulting someone who disobeys an order and using "additional force" when that person resists arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.

The primary problem with that framing, Neily notes, is that it assumes Howse should have been arrested in the first place. Yet when determining whether to grant qualified immunity, the courts are legally required to accept the plaintiff's version of events. After all, the decision to withhold qualified immunity only gives someone the right to sue a public official.

For their part, the officers allege Howse was "lingering suspiciously" (in front of his own house) and that the area is "known for violence, drugs, and gang activity." They admit that Howse confirmed he lived at the home, but their doubts about his honesty led them to "investigate more," culminating in the violent confrontation. In his decision, Thapar pays lip service to Howse's account but proceeds to rule under the assumption that his arrest was warranted.

It's for that reason the Sixth Circuit erred in denying the petition for a rehearing en banc, said Circuit Judge Julia Smith Gibbons in a dissent published Monday. "In qualified immunity cases, we have long held that a plaintiff's right must be defined with careful attention to the 'specific factual circumstances' of the case," she writes. "And yet, in framing Shase Howse's right in this case, the panel fails to account for his suspected criminality (none), location (home), or conduct (truthfully answering questions)."

Gibbons also takes issue with the majority's dismissal of the malicious prosecution claima decision she calls "a precedent-setting error of exceptional public importance." Thapar asserts that, in resisting arrest "by stiffening up his body and screaming at the top of his lungs," Howse provides probable cause for the charge of obstructing official business. "And because there was probable cause for that charge," Thapar writes, "Howse cannot move forward with any of his malicious-prosecution claims," notwithstanding the fact that Howse's original crime was sitting outside of his own house.

On the assault and battery claim, the officers invoked "an Ohio statutory provision which provides a general grant of immunity to government employees." Thapar, a former federal prosecutor, granted that as well.

The Sixth Circuit's dismissal joins a mounting pile of decisions that protect public officials at the expense of the very people they've sworn to serve. But qualified immunity has come under new scrutiny amid protests surrounding George Floyd, the unarmed black man killed by former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin. Rep. Justin Amash (LMich.) recently introduced a bill to kill the doctrine.

"We have an astonishing double standard in this country where members of law enforcement hold we the citizens to a very high standard of accountability," says Neily. "It is not a defense that you didn't know that your conduct was illegal. But when the shoe is on the other foot, and the question is what standard of accountability members of law enforcement should be held to, they insist that it be so low that it is practically zero."

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Cops Who Allegedly Assaulted and Arrested a Man for Standing Outside His Own House Are Protected by Qualified Immunity - Reason

The Glaring Hole in the Democrats’ Police Reform Bill – The New Republic

Cops, along with other state and local officials who violate a persons constitutional rights, can already be sued in federal court under Section 1983, a major provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Over the past half-century, however, the Supreme Court has crafted a doctrine known as qualified immunity, which shields officials from liability unless they violated clearly established law. The Justice in Policing Act would abolish this controversial rule by explicitly stating in federal law that it cant be invoked as a defense. A related provision would make it easier for federal prosecutors to bring civil rights charges under Section 242, the criminal equivalent of Section 1983.

Naturally, there are practical and constitutional limits to the power of Congress to reform local police departments. Many of the bills provisions, including bans on chokeholds, racial profiling, and no-knock warrants in drug cases, would apply directly to federal law enforcement officials. But those and others, including body-camera reforms and racial-bias training, cant be imposed by Congress on state and local police through federal law. Instead, Congress would try to compel departments to make those reforms by withholding Justice Department grants if they dont comply. The law would also make lynching a federal crime for the first time, after 120 years of failed legislative efforts.

But while federal law enforcement officials would be covered on some of the proposed laws most sweeping changes, the bill avoids taking steps that would address several problems that are unique to the federal sphere. For instance, though the bill would strengthen Section 1983 by scrapping qualified immunity, that provision only allows civil rights lawsuits in federal court against state and local officials. There is no general statutory equivalent for civil rights violations committed by federal officials. The nearest comparable option is whats known as a Bivens lawsuit, which draws its name from the 1971 Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.

In Bivens, the court sided with a plaintiff who accused federal narcotics agents of conducting an unconstitutional search. The justices held that the lawsuit was allowed under the Fourth Amendment even if no federal law specifically permitted it. Here, too, the justices have steadily pared back what could be a formidable tool against civil rights abuses by federal officials. In the 2017 case Ziglar v. Abbasi, for example, the court rejected a Bivens lawsuit brought by a group of men of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent who were arrested and detained for months without sufficient cause in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The justices further held that they would not expand Bivens any further beyond the few circumstances where it had already been applied. Congress has not acted to fill that void.

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The Glaring Hole in the Democrats' Police Reform Bill - The New Republic

From bail money to filming the police, here’s how to protect yourself as a citizen journalist at protests – The Retriever

Ways to protect yourself as a citizen journalist covering the protests include having a lawyer's number and carrying bail money. Graphic by Madeline Arbutus

Citizens recordings of the police beating and killing black men, women and children have been crucial in exposing the racist violence ingrained in police departments across the United States. People post these videos on social media, calling for action and fueling protest movements like those ignited by the killing of George Floyd by Minnesota police officers.

On-the-ground recordings and depiction of the protests become further evidence of police brutality as people upload videos of police shooting tear gas at distant protestors, police instigating violence and police SUVs driving into crowds of protestors. As major news media like CNN and FOX fail to contextualize and accurately depict the violence protesters face at the hands of police, peoples videos and live accounts become important in accurately documenting the protests. These are often picked up by local news media and help correct the narrative around protesters.

If you are one of these people tweeting, recording and distributing live information about the protests, you are participating in citizen journalism. Citizen journalism is reporting on news events by people who are not professional journalists, usually shared via social media.

This definition encompasses a lot of people posting right now, so it is important to know how to protect yourself and your rights.

Pack your bag with the protest essentials: food, water, identification, portable chargers, and, if you can, enough cash to post bail. Bail varies person to person and crime to crime, but the National Press Photographers Association says people should carry between 75 and 200 dollars.

Travel in a group of friends, acquaintances or coworkers. If going to a protest alone, tell a friend or family member that, if you do not contact them by a certain time, they should assume you were arrested.

Whether traveling in a group or not, write down the name of a lawyer or a family member who can get in contact with a lawyer on your arm in permanent marker. This ensures that you have someone to call if you are arrested and the police confiscate your belongings. If you do not have a lawyer, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press offers legal aid to any reporter arrested while covering an event.

If getting arrested, Rima Kikani, a lawyer with Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie L.L.C and professor at the University of Maryland, College Park, emphasized that anything you say during the arrest can and will be used against you. She specifically advised to not say anything once your arrest begins.

Do not talk to anyone except your lawyer, Kikani said. You dont know how those statements will be used against you or twisted.

Videos of your arrest or the arrests of others are crucial in accurately depicting the police violence occurring at the protests. You, as both a citizen and a citizen journalist, have the right to film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties as stated in Glik v. Cunniffe.

However, Kikani says if you continue to record after an officer tells you to stop, you can have the additional charge of disobeying an officer brought against you even if the charge would not hold up in court. Dr. Eric Easton, a professor of law emeritus at the University of Baltimore School of Law, also counsels citizen journalists to follow any orders given by the police.

A journalist receiving an order to cease and desist and move on, it may be prudent to comply with that order, whether it turns out to be a proper order or lawful order in the long run, Easton said.

While Easton advises citizen journalists to obey officers, he does say that you can later question the police officers order and infringement on your First Amendment rights in court. This is particularly important as many members of the press have followed orders only to be pepper sprayed or detained.

If you do have video, photos or writing on your phone, camera or another device that you believe are important to your case or that could be used against the police, hand that device off to a trusted individual during the arrest. While it is illegal for police to seize, unlock and delete videos, photos and other content off a persons device without a warrant, as stated by the Fourth Amendment, giving your device to someone prevents it from ever being held by police. Easton explains that newer technologies like the use of facial recognition to unlock phones have yet to be ruled as unlawful for police to use, so it is in your best interest to ensure your devices are not in the hands of police.

While these are all ways to protect yourself, it is important to note that there are no special legal protections for citizen journalists.

When youre actually out there on the streets protesting, youre following the same laws as everyone else, Kikani said.

In general, Easton advises citizen journalists to be careful and try to identify yourself as a member of the press, even if you do not have official credentials, as that might prevent your arrest.

You dont do any good as journalists when youre taken out of the picture, Easton said.

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From bail money to filming the police, here's how to protect yourself as a citizen journalist at protests - The Retriever

The US Constitution and Limits on Detention and Use of Force in Handling Civil Unrest – Just Security

When I joined the military, some 50 years ago, I swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution. Never did I dream that troops taking that same oath would be ordered under any circumstance to violate the Constitutional rights of their fellow citizensmuch less to provide a bizarre photo op for the elected commander-in-chief, with military leadership standing alongside.

Under what circumstances may the government use lethal and non- or lesser-lethal force in the face of unlawful protests, riots, and looting? The answer is context dependent. But the use of such forcewhether exercised by state or federal armed forcesis always constrained by a fundamental constitutional principle of reasonableness, so long as no armed conflict exists. Although I agree with everything Mark Nevitt wrote in his Just Security article on the powers and limitations of the Presidents response to the recent protests, it is important to ground the discussion in constitutional norms rather than just Department of Defense understandings or policy which would apply to use of the US military as well as federal and state law enforcement authorities.

It is critical to understand the scope of the state and federal governments authority to use physical force against individuals. Although federal and state authorities generally have authority to control domestic violence and discretion to determine the means necessary to do so, they must exercise that authority and discretion reasonably under the U.S. Constitution. In fact, the use of force continuum to which law enforcement agencies generally adhere as policy should be understood to be a constitutional requirement.

The Use of Force and the Constitution

All uses of lethal and non- or lesser-lethal physical force by government agents must be reasonable under the circumstances. This is not only wise policy, it is a constitutional demand. Reasonableness is required either by the Fourth Amendment or by the general constitutional demand that all government action be reasonable and non-arbitrary. In this context, the latter reasonableness requirementthat all government action be reasonable and non-arbitrarycan also be based in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which protect against government infringements of personal liberty, including the infliction of physical injury.

Although not all measures to control crowds, riots, or looting necessarily implicate the Fourth Amendment, some certainly would. The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures. Searches and seizures always entail the use of some measure of actual or constructive forcebroadly construedagainst persons and property.

The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Courts interpret this requirement contextually. Reasonableness has substantive and procedural components. Substantively, there must be a legitimate constitutional basis for a search or seizure. Procedurally, both must always be conducted or executed reasonably. Measures adopted to control riots, looting, and crowds typically restrict or deprive individual movement, and therefore implicate arrests and other seizures.

Arrests involve substantial restraints on ones freedom of movement, typically taking someone from a public or private place where they have a right to be and placing them in government custody. Substantively, arrests require probable cause that the individual committed a crime. Procedurally, police may make arrests without a warrant for any crime committed in the officers presence or for a felony committed outside of an officers presence. Additionally, police may use only reasonable force to effect an arrest.

Seizures occur when someones movement is temporarily restricted in some meaningful way by an intentional show or use of government authority, including force short of an arrest. Substantively, in a law enforcement context, seizures are constitutional if they are based upon a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot or if there is some other specific, legitimate law enforcement purpose. Criminal behavior could include looting, assault, trespassing or a curfew violation. Other legitimate purposes for a temporary stop might include checking identification for a limited access area (such as by verifying press credentials, employment or residency) or seeking information related to a recent crime in the area. Procedurally, seizures are constitutional if the measures taken to effect a seizure, and during it, are reasonable under the circumstances. For example, stopping a suspicious person and conducting a non-intrusive frisk for weapons is appropriate if there is a reasonable suspicion both that the person may be involved in criminal activity and that they are armed and potentially dangerous.

Riot- and crowd-control measures include arrests and seizures, but not all measures would necessarily involve one or the other. Often, in these situations, an individuals movement or behavior is restricted or limited in some way, but they are free to leavein Fourth Amendment termsto go somewhere or do something else. A seizure occurs only when an individual is temporarily and intentionally immobilized, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, by a government agent. Efforts to effect a seizure or arrest must always be reasonable under a totality of the circumstances.

Notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment, there is also a strong argument that all government action must be reasonable in order to be constitutional. Generally speaking, government action must be reasonably calculated to achieve (or rationally related to) a legitimate government purpose. The government action must also be a reasonable and permissible means of achieving that legitimate purpose. As Justice Marshall wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional.

This is a general principle of constitutional law. Government action must be appropriate and plainly adapted to its alleged purpose. Not only must it not be prohibited by the Constitutions text, it must be consistent with the Constitution. Every use of physical force not amounting to a search or seizure must also, therefore, be reasonably directed to a legitimate end and reasonably necessary under a totality of the circumstances.

The Insurrection Act Does Not Alter These Constitutional Requirements.

The Insurrection Act allows a president broad discretion to use as much of the federal armed forces and state national guard units as he or she deems necessary to quell insurrections against the authority of a state or to remove substantial interferences with the enforcement of federal laws. A president could invoke either of these justifications in response to widespread riots and looting.

These statutes allow a president to take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy. Despite this broad language, the president may not authorize the armed forces to do anything he would like. Although the exigencies of a situation may require some deference to on-the-spot judgement calls, Congress cannot empower a president to violate specifically applicable aspects of the Constitution. The requirement that the use of all physical force be reasonable under the circumstances is one such specifically applicable constitutional requirement.

Recent Examples

Unreasonable use of lethal force that violates the Fourth Amendment.

The President has infamously tweeted that when the looting starts, the shooting starts. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court held that the use of lethal force to stop a fleeing suspected felon is a Fourth Amendment seizure that must be reasonable. In this context, lethal force is reasonable only if the suspect presents a threat of serious harm to the officers or others. Shooting unarmed looters who are not engaging in any form of violence against a person would therefore clearly violate the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

Unreasonable use of non-lethal force that violates the Fourth Amendment.

A viral video on social media apparently shows Minneapolis law enforcement shooting several people with rubber bullets or paint balls to force them to go inside a house rather than stand on a private porch. The officers were allegedly enforcing a curfew order. That order, however, prohibited only travel on public streets or places (with certain exceptions not relevant here). Violating the order is a misdemeanor. The curfew is likely a constitutionally reasonable response to the disorder and turmoil that has been taking place in Minneapolis. The Citys website containing the order specifically clarified, however, that people may be outside a home as long as they were on private property.

Under these circumstances, the use of non-lethal force to compel someone on private property to go inside a home was not rationally related to enforcing the curfew order. It also appears to lack any other basis in law and was undertaken without warning. Police were apparently shouting that people go inside their homes. When these individuals did not do so and continued recording, an officer said only light em up before the police fired. No additional warning and no explanation for the over-enforcement of curfew order were given. It would therefore amount to an unreasonable use of non-lethal force. Because the purpose was to confine someone in their home, and doing so is likely a seizure, it also violated the Fourth Amendment. The officers undertaking this action are guilty of an assault. The city is also subject to a civil action under federal law.

Another viral video shows several Georgia police officers apparently arresting two college students inside a car, smashing the cars windows and using tasers on both individuals despite no visible resistance. Under these circumstances, the use of force would not reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest to enforce the curfew order. Indeed, two days later, the Georgia chief of police fired two of the officers pictured in the video, and the Atlanta mayor condemned the officers actions.

Unreasonable uses of force not implicating the Fourth Amendment.

On Saturday night, May 31, 2020, there were reports of Minneapolis police firing rubber bullets and using tear gas and flash-bang devices to disperse allegedly peaceful crowds or protesters, all without warning. Numerous videos indicate that reporters and their cameramen have been pushed and shoved without warning despite their obvious status. And police in Washington D.C. reportedly used rubber bullets and tear gas to break up peaceful protesters outside the White House this past Monday night on June 1, 2020. This included a now-viral video of police and/or national guard, without warning, striking an Australian reporter and her cameraman with a baton and riot shield, respectively, before also being shot with rubber bullets. And several videos from New York City and Los Angeles over the past week seem to show police driving cars into protesters.

Lets assume the police were correct that a lawful government directive or purpose required the people affected to disperse or leave the area at the time and place that these forcible measures were used. Using such non-, lesser-, or potentially-lethal force without prior warning would be unreasonable if less stringent measures were feasible. Invasions of liberty and personal integrity such as occurred in these incidents must have some specific justification, including the absence or failure of feasible, less-intrusive coercive measures.

These examples do not involve a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Not only were the individuals free to leavemeaning they were not seized under court precedentthey were forced to do so. But even assuming that end was appropriate, can we say the use of tear gas, flash-bang grenades and less- or non-lethal bullets was proper? Can we say that potentially grievously injuring a person by running into them with a car is a reasonable response? Was it consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution? Absent some reasonable justification for failing to use lesser coercive measures, the answer is almost certainly no.

Because reasonableness surrounding the use of physical force is a constitutional requirement, nothing in the Insurrection Act would change the above legal analysis. It does not matter if the government agents are members of the national guard or federal armed forces or of the city police or state troopers. Whether acting under state or federal authority, the U.S. Constitution imposes the same constraints.

* * *

The authority to quell riots and looting must be exercised responsibly, meaning reasonably, at every level. All law enforcement officers, members of the National Guard and members of the federal armed forces must be told and trained to use force only when necessary and only when it reasonably appears that lesser means of coercion are not feasible under the circumstances or have failed. Warnings should be given before using physical force when possible. The Department of Justice and many law enforcement agencies refer to this as the use of force continuum. The continuum is not merely policy, however. It must be understood as a constitutional demand. Reasonableness is determined by what a government agent reasonably perceived in good faith under a totality of the circumstances. Those who have sworn to protect this country and its population have been vested with great power and must therefore show great restraint in the use of physical force.

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The US Constitution and Limits on Detention and Use of Force in Handling Civil Unrest - Just Security

Abolish qualified immunity and quit protecting abusive police – Chicago Sun-Times

Attorney General William Barr worries that making it easier to sue cops for abusing their powers would result certainly in police pulling back. White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany calls the idea a non-starter.

Americans who have watched the horrifying video showing now-former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin kneeling on George Floyds neck for nearly nine minutes while ignoring the prone, handcuffed mans desperate pleas, past the point where he stopped moving and no longer had a detectable pulse, might reasonably conclude that some pulling back by police is exactly what we need.

And once Americans understand the legally reinforced culture of impunity that encourages such abuses, they might view the reform peremptorily rejected by McEnany as a good start rather than a non-starter.

In other contexts, Barr recognizes the importance of litigation in protecting constitutional rights. He has repeatedly warned that COVID-19 control measures can violate the First Amendment when they discriminate against religious activities and has supported churches challenging such regulations.

Those lawsuits rely on 42 USC 1983, which allows people to sue anyone who, under color of law, violates their constitutional or statutory rights. Beginning in 1967, the Supreme Court has read into that law exceptions for government officials who act in good faith or whose conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Such qualified immunity especially under the latter exception, which the Court invented in 1982 has in many cases prevented victims of police abuse from pursuing their claims. In practice, it often means their lawsuits will be dismissed unless they can cite precedents with nearly identical facts.

Plaintiffs have found it increasingly difficult to locate such rulings since 2009, when the justices said courts can dismiss their lawsuits without even deciding whether their rights were violated. As 5th Circuit Judge Don Willett observes, important constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because those questions are yet unanswered.

Did Idaho cops violate the Fourth Amendment when they wrecked a womans home by bombarding it with tear gas grenades after she agreed to let them inside to arrest her former boyfriend? What about the Georgia sheriffs deputy who shot a 10-year-old boy while trying to kill his dog after police chased a suspect into their yard?

We dont know the answers, because appeals courts dismissed those cases without resolving the constitutional questions they posed. Likewise with the Nebraska sheriffs deputy who, while responding to an erroneous domestic assault report, lifted the purported victim in a bear hug and threw her to the ground, knocking her unconscious and breaking her collarbone; the Tennessee officer who allegedly sicced a police dog on a burglary suspect who had already surrendered and was sitting on the ground with his hands up; and the California cops who allegedly stole cash and property worth more than $225,000 while executing a search warrant.

As UCLA law professor Joanna Schwartz notes, such decisions deny what is often the best available relief to plaintiffs who have been grievously wronged by government actors, suggest to government officials that they can violate the law with impunity, and send the troubling message to victims of misconduct that they are not deserving of constitutional protection.

Or as Willett puts it, qualified immunity smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public officials duck consequences for bad behavior no matter how palpably unreasonable as long as they were the first to behave badly.

Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg who dont agree on much else also have expressed concern about qualified immunity. Rather than rely on the Supreme Court to reconsider that doctrine, Rep. Justin Amash, L-Michigan, last week introduced a bill that would abolish it, as would a broader package of police reforms that House Democrats unveiled this week.

This should not be a partisan issue. As Amash points out, Members of Congress have a duty to ensure government officials can be held accountable for violating Americans rights, and ending qualified immunity is a crucial part of that.

Send letters to letters@suntimes.com

Jacob Sullum is a senior editor at Reason magazine. Follow him on Twitter: @JacobSullum

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Abolish qualified immunity and quit protecting abusive police - Chicago Sun-Times

Suit against sheriff transferred to federal court – The Herald

By The Associated Press

FORT WAYNE A lawsuit alleging that a northeastern Indiana sheriff violated a teenage boy's constitutional rights during an altercation last year at a festival has been transferred to federal court.

The lawsuit against Allen County Sheriff David Gladieux was filed by the parents of a 15-year-old boy in a county court, but it was moved to U.S. District Court in Fort Wayne after Gladieuxs attorneys filed a notice of removal.

The suit claims that Gladieux injured the teen and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment during a July 2019 altercation. Removal to federal court is common when constitutional questions are raised, The Journal Gazette reported.

Brad and Erin Bullermans son was a volunteer during Fort Waynes Three Rivers Festival in July 2019. The couple's suit alleges that Gladieux smelled of alcohol and pushed their son to the ground, injuring him when he fell onto a metal stake, after the teen asked to see Gladieuxs VIP pass to a restroom area.

Their suit is seeking $300,000 for medical costs, emotional distress and other damages, according to documents now filed in federal court.

Gladieux, who was charged with misdemeanor battery in September, has said he used a sweeping motion to move the boys hands from the sheriffs chest before the youth fell. Gladieux was placed in a pretrial diversion program and ordered to pay a $334 fine and complete accredited anger management and alcohol treatment courses.

If he complies with all the programs terms, the battery charge will be dismissed Oct. 18.

The sheriff has apologized for his actions but says he did not commit battery. In a statement after he was charged, Gladieux said he failed to conduct myself in a manner fitting my office.

Excerpt from:

Suit against sheriff transferred to federal court - The Herald

Judge tosses suit on officer’s actions before car strike – Arkansas Online

A federal judge has thrown out a lawsuit filed by a Little Rock man who was struck by a hit-and-run driver in late 2017 while being escorted in handcuffs across a city street by a police officer who was also struck.

Daryl M. Johnson, who was taken to a hospital alongside the arresting officer, Lt. Johnny Gilbert Jr., alleged that Gilbert lacked probable cause to arrest him on a disorderly conduct charge that was later dropped.

In an order issued Friday, Chief U.S. District Judge D. Price Marshall Jr. noted that he had earlier dismissed several of Johnson's claims in the lawsuit, leaving three federal claims and several state claims that Johnson alleged against Gilbert; other officers he accused of covering for Gilbert; and the city, which he accused of failing to train all the officers.

The arrest occurred early Nov. 5, 2017, on Daisy Gatson Bates Drive outside Philander Smith College, which was hosting a homecoming party.

In his order, Marshall recapped the facts as presented to the court: Johnson and two friends rode together to the party, arriving around 11 p.m. Nov. 4. They parked across the street and were admitted into the party by police and door monitors. When they and some others left some time later, the door monitors said they would be allowed back in. But while they were at their cars, police decided to stop letting people back in because the venue was full and the event was scheduled to end in about an hour.

When Johnson and his friends were denied reentry, "that's when things heated up," Marshall wrote.

He said Johnson and the others were "understandably frustrated," and they exchanged some words as the officers told them to disperse, then stopped on the sidewalk.

Marshall said Gilbert "made a pointed comment: the young people should be more worried, he said, about getting a degree than about getting into a party. This made several people mad, because almost all were college graduates. There was cussing from both sides. The officers continued to tell the group to disperse. The five or six young people hem-hawed around -- now walking across the street, but pausing to trade more heated words with the officers."

Marshall noted that at this point, "Officer Gilbert had enough" and approached them as they walked slowly across the street, saying he was going to "make an example" out of them or "teach y'all a lesson."

Gilbert then grabbed Johnson, the closest of the young men, and as he began to escort Johnson out of the street, both were hit by a passing car.

Earlier reports said other officers quickly responded, removing Johnson's handcuffs and rendering aid before both he and Gilbert were transported to a hospital, where Johnson stayed for three days. While he was hospitalized, another officer gave Johnson a disorderly conduct citation.

Marshall said Arkansas' disorderly conduct law "is in the margin" when it comes to deciding when an officer has probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, but that a "reasonable officer" could have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Johnson on the Class C misdemeanor, as he and others didn't comply with the officers' orders to disperse.

"Viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson," as judges are required to do when evaluating early motions for a ruling based on the law alone, "the prosecutor's decision to drop the charge indicates that Officer Gilbert made a mistake," Marshall said. "But qualified immunity protects him" because a reasonable officer in his shoes could have believed that Johnson and his friends violated the refusal-to-disperse part of the disorderly conduct law.

Marshall said that eliminated the only remaining federal claim, the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, which left only state-law claims that he declined to assert jurisdiction over.

Keith Hearnsberger, then an assistant principal at McClellan High School who lived in the area, surrendered the next day, admitting he was the hit-and-run driver. He pleaded guilty in February 2019 to two second-degree battery charges for which he was sentenced in May 2019 to a year in prison.

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Judge tosses suit on officer's actions before car strike - Arkansas Online

What if police were ordered to search homes in violation of the Fourth Amendment? – LawOfficer.com

Would you (peace officers) follow an order to search someones home unlawfully in violation of the Fourth Amendment? You have no search warrant, court order, exigency, parole or probation exemptions, fresh pursuit, plain sight, no probable cause to even secure the residence for a warrant, etc. The answer should unambiguously be, NO!

What if your mayor or governor made the same demand via executive order? Hopefully, the answer would remain, forcefully, NO!

Yet what if there was a really good reason, like a public pandemic? Would you go house to house at the demands of a politician who justified that his or her order was meant to facilitate the greater good? Although the illustration is easy to answer for most police officers since the lines of delineation between right and wrong are clear, this appears to be the roller coaster ride we are currently on.

Things have gotten pretty murky with executive orders being issued in violation of several constitutional rights. Weve clearly seen demands that have violated the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, citizens caught failing to comply with these commands have been warned, cited, and arrested. This is becoming a field day for constitutional attorneys defending these cases, many of which have been immediately dismissed.

The problem for police officers is that many of the orders are not exactly defined as illegal until a court says so. In the meantime, politicians are expecting cops to be mindless robots following directives under the threat of discipline; or worse yet, termination.

We are beginning to see it happen, and it should scare the luster off our badge. Its tyranny, and its currently being practiced across America at this very moment.

RELATED:

As the coronavirus takes on political manifestations demanding safety at all cost, the price being paid includes economic catastrophes, which lead to high rates of domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse as well as suicide. Therefore, in reality, the safety protocols are producing extremely tragic, unintended consequences. Some argue the results will ultimately outweigh coronavirus concerns.

That is why the salon owner in Dallas and other business owners like her have said enough, and are willing to be jailed or cited in defiance. Long-term repression of liberty and freedom ARE NOT the American way.

Police leaders should consult with legal counsel as the stakes are increasing, particularly those working in organizations demanding that police officers enforce orders that discard the Bill of Rights.

Peace officers should also consult with their labor attorneys before they are fired for insubordination, as Ive heard many cops talking about the price theyd pay if they failed to comply with enforcement demands resulting from executive orders issued by mayors and governors.

However, there will also be a price to pay for blind allegiance to violating constitutional rights, assuming our republic doesnt crumble.

The following excerpt is from an earlier Law Officer article, Taking enforcement action on rules that violate the Bill of Rights is bad practice.

Almost all orders related to COVID-19 violate the Bill of Rights in one way or another. Therefore, any government agency taking an aggressive enforcement approach, including the physical use of force, should reconsider its actions. We (peace officers) swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

Historically, the enemy has been far more recognizable. Yet now it is masked in the zeal of political leaders willing to discard the Constitution as they flex their power with the explicit desire to be powerful.This is more than the slippery slope we often use as an idiom, its a tidal wave crashing down on freedom and the blood that was shed to obtain and defend it.

Therefore, police officers need to reflect upon the substance of the oath they took when their badge was pinned in place.

So, am Im calling political leaders urging aggressive enforcement of rules as our enemy? If they continue to repress liberty, freedom, or the values that created American exceptionlism, they are not acting like a friend to our way of life. As a matter of fact, the more these individuals demand compliance with unreasonable demands, the more they sound like third-world dictators. Hence, an enemy!

So back to my original question: Would you intentionally search someones home unlawfully in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Of course not! Or would you?

Jim McNeff

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What if police were ordered to search homes in violation of the Fourth Amendment? - LawOfficer.com

These Are the Legal Issues Surrounding Unmasking, and Heres Whos Doing It the Most – Law & Crime

Everyones talking about unmasking, but very few people are being honest about what that term really means or where it came from.

The Donald Trump White House and its allies have projected the notion that the unmasking process is always nefarious and illegal, though the current administration has issued unmasking requests far in excess of the administration of immediate predecessor Barack Obama. National security state fixtures and Democrats insist the unmasking process is standard, routine, and necessary despite the fact that unmasking has only existed for a little over a decade and was specifically conceived as an ex post facto method to reward and protect what critics say is rampant criminality by the national security state.

Spying on American citizens without a warrant used to be illegal. The administration fronted by George W. Bush and largely administered by Dick Cheney did it anyway for several years. In 2005, The New York Times finally released a story that had been withheld prior to the 2004 presidential election which confirmed the existence of the program known as Stellar Wind which critics call unconstitutional.

The reactionary U.S. Congress, with both houses controlled by the Democratic Party, passed a bill to retroactively and arguably legalize these spying efforts by way of the Protect America Act of 2007. Subsequent amendments made in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act (FISA) of 2008 ensured that the Bush-Cheney warrantless spying program would stand the test of time.

Gone were the days of law enforcement having to seek out warrants for intercepting Americans communications. So long as the spy agency targets a foreign national reasonably believed to be outside the United States, the government has given free rein, for up to one year, to listen in and otherwise collect all forms of electronic data.

One of the few protections afforded to American citizens who are caught up in such dragnets is the masking requirement, which is mainly sourced from FISAs general minimization procedures. Each agencys rules are somewhat different, but when, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or National Security Agency (NSA) targets a foreign national and catches the name or communications of an American citizen, the spy agency is supposed to obscure the American citizens name by using U.S. Person 1 or a named U.S. Person in any resulting intelligence reports.

Those protections are, by design, not very strong.

FISA simply provides that American citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy vis--vis such intercepted communications a legal standard derived from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

The statute also offers a general definitional guideline:

Minimization procedures, with respect to electronic surveillance, means

(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;

(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in subsection (e)(1), shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such persons consent, unless such persons identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance;

Spy agencies, in turn, craft their own determinations of how to keep American citizens privacy in place via internal rules.

Thus, those agencies mask. But national security officials and other high-level executive branch figures can also unmask with ease if they merely justify their unmasking requests with a plea to national security or some other allegedly legitimate rationale.

Unmasking procedures are also governed by internal agency rules andof a piece with the Kafkaesque contours of FISA generallytheres only oversight in name. That is, there is effectively no oversight whatsoever. Whether or not an unmasking is truly legitimate is necessarily impossible for the American public to know.

A brief unmasking scandal quickly passed through the collective consciousness during the spring and early summer of 2017 after allies of President Donald Trump alleged that highly-placed Obama administration officials mishandled and leaked surveillance information in a way that led to the improper identification of non-targets implicated in a foreign intelligence-gathering scheme.

Those charges, mainstreamed by Rep. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.) on behalf of the White House, effectively amounted to a dual-pronged blunt political instrument: (1) they suggested the then-controversial idea that Barack Obama authorized surveillance against the Trump campaign; and (2) they had characteristics of specific retribution directed against members of Trumps transition team.

The original story concerned Obamas onetime national security adviser, Susan Rice, who was apparently the foremost impetus behind the majority of those requests for the Trump aides in question to be unmasked after they appeared in surveillance reports of non-U.S. citizens during the final days of the Obama administration.

Again, the names of Americans are initially redacted in such intelligence reports. But the quirks of the national security state reward powerful individuals with end-runs around procedures and safeguards if their hearts desire such knowledge. When Rice requested those redactions be lifted, the intelligence community was more than happy to comply. It is a feature, not a bug, of how such facially sensitive information can quickly shape-shift according to political whims. Thats how the national security state works.

The inner logic is power itself. Democrats and national security-flavored pundits insisted the whole to-do was merely ho-hum; the Trump administration saw red, called foul and screamed like blood at several decibels for awhile. The scandal eventually died down and went away. Now it is back again.

Now, it appears, other key Obama administration officials were part of those unmasking efforts including presumptive Democratic Party presidential nominee and former vice president Joe Biden.

And this time, theres no guessing game as to who was outed for being mentioned by or conversing with a foreign surveillance target. This time around, the unmasked man is well known and already consuming a fair deal of digital ink and broadcast bandwidth. And he just so happens to be the subject of Trumpworlds latest passion play: retired lieutenant general Michael Flynn.

CBS News reporter Catherine Herridge posted images of documents that showcased Bidens involvementin the purported scandal mid afternoon on Wednesday. Other high profile Obama administration officials also signed off on the Flynn unmasking decision, like James Clapper, John Brennan and Samantha Power.

Notably, the Biden campaign did not respond favorably to Herridges reporting.

SCOOP, tweeted Bidens Rapid Response Director Andrew Bates in a since-deleted tweet. Catherine Herridge is a partisan, rightwing [sic] hack who is a regular conduit for conservative media manipulation ploys because she agrees to publicize things before contacting the target to ask for comment.

As it turns out, Bidens request to unmask Flynn was made on January 12, 2017 the same day that the Washington Posts David Ignatius initially reported on the conversations via Flynn and then-Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. The Intercepts Glenn Greenwald argued at the time that the senior U.S. government officials leak to Ignatius was illegal. It would not be a surprise if Trumps allies pushed for an investigation. Such a course of action would, of course, have severe implications for the 2020 presidential election.

This was the description of the list of individuals who submitted requests to unmask Flynn:

The landscape here is a partisan minefield constructed out of what the intelligence community insists is simply business as usual.

Former CIA official Michael Morell told the Washington Post that unmasking happens all the time: literally hundreds of times a year across multiple administrations, he said. In general, senior officials make the requests when necessary to understand the underlying intelligence. I myself did it several times a month and NSA adjudicates the request.

Former Director of National Intelligence and retired lieutenant general James Clapper said Thursday on SiriusXMs The Joe Madison Show that unmasking is not at all nefarious.

Well, I think creating that exact narrative as though this was something illegitimate or inappropriate when it is actually a very, very useful tool available to national security officials. And I know that officials in the current administration are using it to a fairly well actually much more than the previous administration, he said. So they too must recognize that this is a valuable tool that serves the national security interests of the United States. Its not at all nefarious. And the unmasking is occasioned by the interest, the objective of trying to minimize the identity of U.S. persons and restrict that access as much as possible. Thats why the program is designed the way it is. So its a legitimate, appropriate and important national security tool.

He also said that the alarm bells were going off about Flynn and that it was perfectly legitimate to take a closer look.

There were actually dozens of contacts with various representatives of Russia. And so at the time our dashboard warning light [started blinking] . . . given the responsibilities of these positions, it seems to me perfectly legitimate, in fact people would be derelict if they didnt have enough curiosity to inquire what was going on, he added.

Civil libertarians and Fourth Amendment advocates would likely counter that the status quo of routinely unmasking American citizens due to requests from political appointees is, actually, somewhat problematic and, as noted above, its certainly not a longstanding feature of American society; it was only constructed from the ashes of an expressly illegal and unconstitutional program in the first place.

So, has the Trump administration found religion when it comes to the protection of Americans civil liberties? Hardly.

In fact, after learning all about the Obama administrations efforts to unmask certain members of their transition team, it seems the Trump administration underwent a Damascene conversion in the exact opposite direction. The 45th presidents national security state has ordered a massive spike in unmasking requests when compared to numbers from prior years.

Former National Security Agency intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer John Schindler noted the uptick:

[Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images.]

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These Are the Legal Issues Surrounding Unmasking, and Heres Whos Doing It the Most - Law & Crime

Arlington gym owner reopens, trying to be as responsible as possible – MyNorthwest.com

(Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Mike Jellison, owner of PA Fitness in Arlington, Wash., has decided to reopen his gym despite Washingtons ongoing stay-at-home order.

Initially, Jellison did close his business. He took time off, went to Arizona where his family has a home to think about the future, and told the Jason Rantz Show that he even considered retiring.

I understand. I get it. Everybodys got their own job, but now Ive got my job and Ive got to reassess, understand what I need to do, Jellison said. And then I started digging into a proper procedure, a proper way of actually running our situation.

WA salon owner believes they could safely reopen now, if allowed

Jellison said he listened to the federal briefings with President Trump and understood that health and fitness is essential for a persons mental and physical well-being. Knowing that, it seemed reasonable to expect a gym or fitness center to be included in the early reopening phases.

I mean, thats what he had stated, and thats what I thought the situation would end up being, Jellison said. So coming back up here after that situation, with all my ducks in a row and all the plans and procedures and understandings to make us CDC qualified, and everything in order, come to find out it wasnt to be.

Then, Jellison said, he was infuriated.

I started looking into our constitutional rights and checking out my Fourth Amendment, for business purposes, understanding that we have certain rights, he said. Were all Americans. Everybody has a say in whats going to happen, and whats going to go on, and what were doing. Its called the Constitution. It was put in place for us.

The last straw for Jellison was that any county would have to go three weeks, at least during this phase, without a positive case or a death. Spokane County was denied the ability to move to Phase 2 because of this rule.

I listened to that, and I was outraged, he said. I was totally outraged because of the idea that this cant be true.

So then he opened, with proper rules and restrictions in place.

In my facility, what we did is we put everything at six feet apart, he said. We got rid of half of our stuff. Were doing cleanings through a cleaning company, through us, bleaching. Were doing everything we need to do once an hour. Were taking temperatures at the front door to make sure that nobody is compromised.

The person at the front door checking temperatures wears a mask and gloves. Once the temperature is approved, each person signs a waiver from the insurance company.

We hand them a disinfectant bottle, which is a hospital disinfectant and a towel. They have the personal stuff, and then they go on about their business and do their workout constructively, Jellison said. We have a couple of rovers that are on the floor, and what they do is they make sure that the customers are doing their job.

Jellison said his gym wants to set a good example for the community.

We want to make sure that the community understands that were trying to be as responsible as possible, he said. But physical and mental health is important, and its been pushed to the side for a long time. Its just not right.

Jellison said PA Fitness was contacted yesterday by the state. They had received one complaint, Jellison said. While Jellison said he respects others opinions and right to complain, he also has heard from many more people who recognize that he is trying to do the right thing and being responsible.

Why one customer defied the rules to get a haircut at Snohomish barbershop

He said hes not worried about his business license because he understands his rights as a business owner and has thought about the recourse to his action.

I understand what, legally, what can and cant happen to me. I get it, he said. Like I told my other partners, Ill be the shield, you be the sword.

His message to Gov. Inslee is to put the people as the first priority.

Dont use us as second, third, or fourth priority of what you have going on, he said. I mean, we cant be a sub line, the people, to your agenda. Put the people first because we deserve it.

PA Fitness in Arlington will remain open, Jellison said.

Read more:

Arlington gym owner reopens, trying to be as responsible as possible - MyNorthwest.com

Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment Reason.com – Reason

A key issue will be determining what policy responses to the coronavirus can be squared with the requirements of the Constitution. Many constitutional provisions are implicatedfor example, the Due Process Clause may restrict the government's ability to quarantine people suspected infection, the Commerce Clause (and its judicially crafted inverse, the Dormant Commerce Clause) bears on the question of division of power between the federal government and the states, and the open-ended nature of Article II raises questions about the president's inherent powers to act in the absence of congressional authorization. For now, I want to focus on the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that warrants be supported by probable cause, and which will determine the outer bounds of permissible surveillance at the federal and state levels.

A word of warning: Any analysis is going to be highly tentative, for two reasons. First, Fourth Amendment analysis is highly sensitive to factual details about both the surveillance at issue and the broader context (for example, the severity of the pandemic). In the absence of concrete proposals, any analysis is going to necessarily be at a fairly high level. Second, the relevant Fourth Amendment doctrinesthe third-party and special needs doctrinesare, even by the standards of constitutional law, in flux and without much coherence. Any predictions will thus be somewhat speculative.

I'll first give an overview of the relevant Fourth Amendment law and then apply it to three types of disease surveillance that are likely to be relevant in the near term: tracking the occurrence of coronavirus infection, contact tracing and quarantine enforcement.

Much of the legal difficulty, of course, indirectly stems from the text of the Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Not all searches and seizures are banned, but just the "unreasonable" ones; and the warrant/probable cause provision doesn't mandate warrants or probable cause, but only requires that a warrant be based on probable cause. That leaves a vast amount open to interpretation (as of course is true for many other constitutional provisions as well), but even more guided than usual by a necessarily vague principle of reasonableness, because "unreasonable" is right there in the text.

Excerpt from:

Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment Reason.com - Reason

Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment – Lawfare

Like governments around the world, the United States is struggling with the coronavirus trilemma: It wants to protect lives, ease social isolation, and protect privacy and civil liberties, but it can do only two of those at the same time. In particular, and as South Koreas successful management of the coronavirus shows, extensive surveillance may be the only way to control the outbreak while preserving some degree of normalcy for economic and social life. Ive argued that the longer the pandemic drags on, the more willing (and rightly so) people will be to trade in some of their privacy for the freedom to work and play. There is already significant support for location tracking among both policy experts and the general public, and we should expect this sentiment to increase.

A key issue will be determining what policy responses to the coronavirus can be squared with the requirements of the Constitution. Many constitutional provisions are implicatedfor example, the Due Process Clause may restrict the governments ability to quarantine people suspected infection, the Commerce Clause (and its judicially crafted inverse, the Dormant Commerce Clause) bears on the question of division of power between the federal government and the states, and the open-ended nature of Article II raises questions about the presidents inherent powers to act in the absence of congressional authorization. For now, I want to focus on the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that warrants be supported by probable cause, and which will determine the outer bounds of permissible surveillance at the federal and state levels.

A word of warning: Any analysis is going to be highly tentative, for two reasons. First, Fourth Amendment analysis is highly sensitive to factual details about both the surveillance at issue and the broader context (for example, the severity of the pandemic). In the absence of concrete proposals, any analysis is going to necessarily be at a fairly high level. Second, the relevant Fourth Amendment doctrinesthe third-party and special needs doctrinesare, even by the standards of constitutional law, in flux and without much coherence. Any predictions will thus be somewhat speculative.

Ill first give an overview of the relevant Fourth Amendment law and then apply it to three types of disease surveillance that are likely to be relevant in the near term: tracking the occurrence of coronavirus infection, contact tracing and quarantine enforcement. Since the Fourth Amendment imposes no restrictions on voluntary sharing of information with the governmenton the part of either surveillance targets or third parties who may have information about the targetsIm going to address only mandatory reporting. I will also address the implications of the Fourth Amendment on surveillance. The Fourth Amendment has other applications to disease control that I dont address herefor example, whether individuals can be subject to quarantines and forced medical testing, which raises the question of government seizures (of the body).

A threshold question in any Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the government activity is a search. An activity is a search and thus triggers the Fourth Amendment if it infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy (the Katz test) or it involves a government trespass (the Jones test). Different forms of disease surveillance could trigger the Fourth Amendment under one or both of these tests. For example, any government surveillance program that required individuals to download an app on their phones might constitute a Fourth Amendment search under the trespass test, since it would interfere in individuals property intereststhat is, to control what is on their devices. By contrast, if the government were to track peoples movement by directly surveilling cellphonesfor example, though IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) catchers, which mimic cell towersthat might violate a persons reasonable expectation of privacy.

Things become more complex if the government were to compel third partiescellphone companies, internet platforms, medical-device makers or health care providersto turn over data. A long-established carve out to the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is the third-party doctrine: People cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they have voluntarily handed over to a third party and that the government subsequently acquires. But the third-party doctrine is in flux, and its precise contours are unclear. For example, in the landmark Carpenter v. United States case from 2018, the Supreme Court held that the third-party doctrine did not apply to a weeks worth of cellphone location data that the government had acquired from a mobile provider. Unfortunately the court did not provide much guidance on how to apply Carpenters reasoning to different fact patternssmaller amounts of more-precise location data, larger amounts of less-precise location data, nonlocation data (for example, health data) that nevertheless reveals intimate information about an individual, and so on. All we can say is that, after Carpenter, courts are going to have to decide whether data that would normally be excluded from the Fourth Amendments scope under the third-party doctrine is nevertheless protected because it is particularly sensitive and revealing.

Assuming the Fourth Amendment does apply to the government surveillance, the Fourth Amendment requires that the activity be reasonable. In most cases reasonableness requires that the government have probable cause and get judicial authorizationa warrantbefore conducting the search. In some cases this may be feasible. For example, if the government gets a reliable tip that an infected individual has violated a quarantine order, that might be enough to establish probable cause that a crime has been committed (the quarantine violation) and thus justify a warrant for location data to confirm this fact.

But for many public health purposes, strict adherence to a warrants regime may not be required. Specifically, warrants are not required when exigent circumstances make getting them unfeasible. For example, police do not need a warrant to arrest a fleeing suspect or to prevent the destruction of evidence. Nor is a warrant required when police are engaged primarily in a community caretaking activityfor example, when they are trying to track down someone who is experiencing an imminent medical emergency. But courts tend to construe these exceptions narrowly and, most importantly, they still require police to have probable cause that the underlying activity is taking place. These exceptions to the warrant requirement thus are unlikely to be sufficient for disease surveillance, which requires gathering ongoing data on a wide population (rather than individual by individual), of which few if any may have clear symptoms.

For this reason, any disease surveillance program is likely to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendments special needs doctrine (also called the administrative search doctrine), by which courts sometimes permit warrantless surveillance with less than probable cause if getting a warrant would be impracticable; the search is aimed at something other than a traditional law enforcement purpose; and the search is, all things considered, reasonable.

The difficulty is that the special needs doctrine is by far the least coherent and unsettled part of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Every element in the test is contested, lacking coherent theoretical foundations and full of seemingly arbitrary distinctions that appear to reflect little more than the gut instincts of shifting majorities on the Supreme Court. For example, vehicle checkpoints are permissible when aimed at drunk driving but not at intercepting drugs. Discretionary stops of vehicles to check licenses are not permitted, but similar stops of ships are. Searches of students generally require some degree of individualized suspicion, but student athletes or anyone engaging in extracurricular activities can be subjected to blanket mandatory drug testing. It remains difficult to predict when the courts will authorize nontraditional surveillance under the special needs doctrine.

Nevertheless, the cases suggest some factors that courts routinely consider. First, courts consider the proportionality of the government action. This inquiry balances the intrusiveness of the search against the expected government benefits of that search and also asks whether the government could achieve its objective using less intrusive means. Second, courts are more comfortable when warrantless searches are conducted pursuant to legislative authorization and strict administrative guidelines. Legislative authorization is important for democratic and separation-of-powers reasons, and administrative guidelines help limit the discretion that the front-line enforcement officials have. Third, judicial supervisionin particular ex ante authorization or the ability of the target to challenge the search before it is executedimproves the chances that the search will be deemed constitutional, even if judges arent applying the probable cause standard. Fourth, searches that can be done on an individualized basis are preferred to dragnet searches. Finally, the less that law enforcement has access to or uses the data in criminal prosecutions, the more likely courts are to find that the program is not intended for ordinary law enforcement purposes and is thus permissible.

We can now begin to apply the Fourth Amendment to different kinds of disease surveillance. First, disease reporting. All states require health care providers to report information about infected diseases, and the federal government has extensive disease-reporting programs as well. Traditionally these did not raise any Fourth Amendment concerns, chiefly because the third-party doctrine excluded such data collection from the Fourth Amendments scope. Carpenter may change this, although, given the public health interests at stake and the long history of mandatory disease reporting, such programs would almost certainly pass muster under the special needs doctrine.

Second, contact tracing. Traditional contact tracing involves a manual process by which infected individuals are interviewed and asked with whom they came in contact, so that those individuals can be tested and monitored. But as a group of Oxford researchers wrote in Science, traditional manual contact tracing procedures are not fast enough for the coronavirus. They recommend the widespread use of a contact tracing app that would use location tracking to detect contact with an infected person. If the government requires people to download such an app on their phones, that might trigger the Fourth Amendment under the Jones trespass test. If instead the government were to collect large amounts of location data from companies (in order to do contact tracing), that would likely trigger the Fourth Amendment under the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, especially in light of Carpenter.

Thus the constitutionality of contact tracing would hinge on the special needs analysis. Here a lot would depend on how the factors listed above applied to the specific contact tracing program at issuethat is, how effective the contact tracing program was, what safeguards were built into the program, and so on. This is particularly important because contact tracing requires surveillance not just of infected individuals but of all the individuals the infected person might have come into contact with. This means that the government will need to collect information on individuals it has little individualized suspicion to think have contracted the virus. A robust contact tracing program would thus raise constitutional concerns similar to those regarding the National Security Agencys telephony metadata program under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.

Finally, location surveillance to enforce quarantine orders. As above, a threshold question is how the government collected the information at issue. If the government required infected individuals to download a location-broadcasting app on their phonesor, in an extreme case, to wear a physical device, like a GPS braceletthat would almost certainly trigger the Fourth Amendment under Jones. If the government instead tracked the quarantined persons phone directly (for example, through IMSI catchers) or indirectly (by compelling the disclosure of location data from the cellphone provider), whether the activity was a search would likely turn on how much information the government acquired. And whether the search was nevertheless reasonable in the absence of a warrant would turn on the intrusiveness of the search relative to its importance in enforcing quarantine. Broad, constant surveillance would likely not pass constitutional muster given that enforcing a quarantine does not require constant surveillance of people while theyre in the quarantine zone but, instead, only when they leave it.

By contrast, if the government program only disclosed when individuals left the quarantine zone, that would substantially strengthen its argument for constitutionality. Indeed, such a program (absent a physical intrusion into the quarantined persons phone) might not even count as a Fourth Amendment search at all. Under binary search doctrine, government action that only discloses whether or not some contraband or other illicit substance is present is not a search, on the theory that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in breaking the law. The binary search doctrine has been most commonly applied in the context of drug-sniffing dogs or drug field tests, but the same logic might apply here. Especially if leaving a quarantine zone would violate the law, a system that notified the government only when someone left the zone might avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny altogether.

In the background to all this doctrinal analysis is the question of the role of the Fourth Amendmentand the Constitutionin times of emergency. On the one hand, courts tend to give the government a lot more leeway in emergencies. We might expect the same in a pandemic situation, especially at the beginning, when there is less information and courts have little basis to question government representations about necessity or effectiveness.

On the other hand, emergency powers are not limitless. There are a number of safeguards that can be built into emergency powersand that courts might take into accountwhich can limit the possibility for abuse without harming efficacy. For example, courts may give the government more leeway when the action is taken pursuant to a formal invocation of emergency, especially if it is also ratified by the legislature. Sunset clauses (as in the United Kingdoms recently enacted Coronavirus Act), can provide an assurance that emergency powers will not be permanent. Transparency as to how the program is operating can increase accountability to the general public and civil society watchdog groups. And, above all, the emergency response must be limited to what is necessary to deal with the emergency; courts will (or at least should) examine the government program for surveillance creep.

To reiterate, this analysis is deeply provisional. We are confronted with a truly unprecedented situation (in both the legal and nonlegal senses of the term), and much will depend on the specific details of future disease surveillance programs. Part of my reason for writing this post is to encourage other Fourth Amendment scholars to weigh in and do their own analysis of how they believe the law applies to the coronavirus crisis. This legal spadework is important, if only to give policymakers and legislators as much guidance as possible as to what options are constitutionally permitted to fight the coronavirus and future pandemics.

View post:

Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment - Lawfare

Law Review: Police fail to inform drunk driver of loss of license for refusing blood test – Sierra Sun

If you are unfortunate enough to be pulled over for suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, are you required to submit to a breath or blood test? What if you refuse? Read People v. Peter Balov.

SUSPECTED DRUNK DRIVING

After Peter Balov was arrested for suspected drunk driving, the arresting officer advised him that per California law he is required to submit to a chemical test, either a breath or a blood test.

Understanding he had to take a test, Balov chose a blood test, which showed a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

Balov argued the results of the blood test should be suppressed in court, arguing his consent was invalid because the officer had not explained the consequences of refusing breath or blood testing as required by Vehicle Code section 23612. That section requires a driver to be told that his or her failure to submit to a test will result in a fine and loss of their drivers license.

CALIFORNIAS IMPLIED CONSENT

A blood draw is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment requiring a search warrant or the drivers voluntary consent to be searched.

To address that dilemma and prevent every driver from refusing to be tested, section 23612 provides that A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood That is the so-called implied consent law. By driving on Californias roads, you consent to be tested if you are lawfully arrested for drunk driving.

LOSS OF LICENSE

NOT EXPLAINED

Most importantly for Balov, section 23612, as noted, also requires that the driver be told that his or her failure to submit to a test will result in a fine, loss of drivers license (one year for first conviction) and mandatory imprisonment if convicted of driving under the influence. The gist of this case is that Balov was not informed of those consequences, he was merely told that he must take a test, either blood or breath.

Is Balov entitled to have the results of his blood test thrown out because he was not told of the consequences of refusing to be tested?

For example, if he had known of the consequences of refusing a test, Balov might have refused to take a test figuring his odds of convincing a jury that he was not driving under the influence would improve if the blood test was not entered into evidence.

COURT RULING

The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial courts finding that the officer correctly told Balov he was required to submit to a breath or blood test, and while the statement was incomplete because Balov was not informed of the consequences of his refusal, the officer did not intend to deceive Balov. To be honest, I find whether the officer intended to deceive Balov irrelevant. He did not tell him of the consequences of refusing to take one of the tests which the law required.

Balovs conviction of driving under the influence is upheld as he did not object to taking a test, even though the officer did not inform him of the consequences of refusing a test required.

Jim Porter is an attorney with Porter Simon licensed in California and Nevada, with offices in Truckee and Tahoe City, California, and Reno, Nevada. Jims practice areas include: real estate, development, construction, business, HOAs, contracts, personal injury, accidents, mediation and other transactional matters. He may be reached at porter@portersimon.com or http://www.portersimon.com.

Originally posted here:

Law Review: Police fail to inform drunk driver of loss of license for refusing blood test - Sierra Sun

Petitions of the week – SCOTUSblog

Posted Wed, April 8th, 2020 9:50 am by Andrew Hamm

This week we highlight petitions pending before the Supreme Court that address, among other things, whether a local ordinance that discriminates against interstate commerce, and was enacted for a discriminatory purpose, must discriminate exclusively against nonresidents to be subject to heightened scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause; whether a claim for violation of a prisoner-patients 14th Amendment right to informed consent requires a showing of deliberate indifference and proof of refusal; and whether the defenses of qualified immunity or good faith allow a defendant who takes another persons money or property in violation of the Constitutionbut in reliance on a statute or court ruling that is later declared unconstitutionalto keep that money or property when the owner sues for its return.

Thepetitions of the weekare below the jump:

Center for Biological Diversity v. Wolf19-975Issue: Whether Section 102(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996which grants the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security unfettered discretion to waive all federal, and related state, local, and tribal laws, regulations and legal requirements, and sets forth no standards or criteria to apply in determining whether such waiver is necessary for expeditious border-wall constructionviolates the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine and the presentment clause of the Constitution.

Jessop v. City of Fresno, California19-1021Issue: Whether it is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from stealing property listed in a search warrant.

Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, California19-1081Issues: (1) Whether a local ordinance that discriminates against interstate commerce, and was enacted for a discriminatory purpose, must additionally discriminate exclusively against nonresidents to be subject to heightened scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause; and (2) whether a local ordinance that purports to ban advertisements for interstate services made over the internet, and is enforced in that extraterritorial manner, can be saved from dormant commerce clause scrutiny based on an irrebuttable presumption that the legislature did not intend for the ordinance to apply in the extraterritorial manner in which the ordinance is being enforced.

Deasey v. Slater19-1085Issue: Whether, for purposes of qualified immunity, a merely sufficiently analogous case is enough to show that the law is clearly established, or whether something more is required, i.e., a closely analogous case finding the alleged violation unlawful.

Sharp v. Harris19-1105Issues: (1) Whether, in holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals made an unreasonable determination of the facts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit contravened the Supreme Courts repeated admonition that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, as inCullen v. PinholsterandWoodford v. Visciotti; and (2) whether the OCCA was objectively unreasonable in crediting the testimony of three experts who opined that the respondent, Jimmy Dean Harris, was not intellectually disabled and in not crediting the testimony of the one dissenting doctor, who has been censured, used an outdated test, made no assessment of adaptive functioning and disregarded the influence of factors he acknowledged could influence IQ test scores.

Sharp v. Smith19-1106Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in concluding thatMoore v. Texas IandMoore v. Texas IIwere mere applications ofAtkins v. Virginiathat could be applied retroactively on collateral review, contrary toShoop v. Hilland the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit; (2) whether, in sua sponte holding that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not rule on the adaptive-functioning prong because its analysis was too cursory, the 10th Circuit violated the Supreme Courts precedent that forbids the imposition of opinion-writing standards,Johnson v. Williams; and (3) whether, reviewed de novo or with deference, the 10th Circuit erred in granting habeas relief on the respondent Roderick Smiths claim of adaptive-functioning deficits when Smiths only expert to opine on this prong improperly administered the adaptive-functioning assessment directly to Smith, contemporaneously administered other tests to Smith that showed malingering and relied on information that was disputed by other witnesses.

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemens Association19-1114Issues: (1) Whether a party was wrongfully enjoined underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)when the district court confirmed via the grant of a permanent injunction that its entry of a temporary restraining order was correct under then-applicable law; and (2) whether a district court retains its full equitable discretion to deny recovery on a Rule 65(c) injunction bond.

Mooney v. Illinois Education Association19-1126Issues: (1) Whether42 U.S.C. 1983provides a good-faith defense to private entities who violate anothers constitutional rights before the courts have clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or good faith allow a defendant who takes another persons money or property in violation of the Constitutionbut in reliance on a statute or court ruling that purported to authorize its conduct and is only later declared unconstitutionalto keep that money or property when the owner sues for its return.

Danielson v. Inslee19-1130Issues: (1) Whether42 U.S.C. 1983provides a good-faith defense to private entities who violate anothers constitutional rights before the courts have clearly established the illegality of their conduct; and (2) whether the defenses of qualified immunity or good faith allow a defendant who takes another persons money or property in violation of the Constitutionbut in reliance on a statute or court ruling that purported to authorize its conduct and is only later declared unconstitutionalto keep that money or property when the owner sues for its return.

Knight v. Grossman19-1138Issue: Whether a claim for violation of a prisoner-patients 14th Amendment right to informed consent requires a showing of deliberate indifference and proof of refusal or whether the approach adopted by a majority of circuits, which applies a balancing test weighing, on one hand, the states interests in providing for the basic needs of prisoners and, on the other hand, the prisoners right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed treatment as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments available, should control.

Posted in Center for Biological Diversity v. Wolf, Jessop v. City of Fresno, California, Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, California, Deasey v. Slater, Sharp v. Harris, Sharp v. Smith, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemens Association, Mooney v. Illinois Education Association, Danielson v. Inslee, Knight v. Grossman, Cases in the Pipeline

Recommended Citation: Andrew Hamm, Petitions of the week, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/petitions-of-the-week-90/

See more here:

Petitions of the week - SCOTUSblog