Jeff Sessions defends new ‘sanctuary city’ law in Texas – Washington Examiner

Attorney General Jeff Sessions on Friday defended a new Texas law that punishes sanctuary cities that is facing a lawsuit from pro-immigration officials groups.

The law, which is set to take effect in September, would let local law enforcement question the immigration status of people who are legally detained. It would also punish law enforcement officials who do not cooperate with federal immigration agents by cooperating with federal detainer requests.

The law is being challenged by officials in Maverick County and the city of El Cenizo, as well as the League of United Latin American Citizens. But in a court filing, Sessions argued that the law is not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment, which limits the reach of the federal government over the states, and also does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

"Texas has admirably followed his lead by mandating state-wide cooperation with federal immigration laws that require the removal of illegal aliens who have committed crimes," Sessions said in a statement Friday. "The Department of Justice fully supports Texas's effort and is participating in this lawsuit because of the strong federal interest in facilitating the state and local cooperation that is critical in enforcing our nation's immigration laws."

Sessions has been a vocal opponent of jurisdictions that implement so-called sanctuary policies, and has threatened to pull federal funding from ones that fail to show compliance with federal immigration law.

Opponents of sanctuary city legislation argue that being in the country illegally does not qualify as probable cause to keep someone detained in jail after a judge has cleared them for release after under the Fourth Amendment.

U.S. District Judge Orlando Garcia will hear a motion for a preliminary injunction that would block the implementation of the law on June 26.

See the original post here:

Jeff Sessions defends new 'sanctuary city' law in Texas - Washington Examiner

What is the future of privacy, surveillance and policing technologies under Trump? – CBS News

For weeks, President Trump cried foul, repeating unverified claims that the Obama administration wiretapped Trump Tower to spy on him, accusations that remain unsubstantiated.

But Mr. Trump, with the power of the presidency and executive branch as a whole at his fingertips, has said little of how he intends to approach the authority he now wields over the country's surveillance policies. As developing policing technologies continue to outpace laws restricting their use, and as Mr. Trump and top members of his administration like Attorney General Jeff Sessions take a hard line against illegal immigration, terrorism and crime, experts in constitutional law and civil liberties fear the lack of an accompanying conversation on privacy protections could contribute to the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."

"I think we will see a push from the Trump administration to expand surveillance powers, and that of course could directly implicate Fourth Amendment protections," said Christopher Slobogin, a professor at Vanderbilt University Law School who has studied and written on Fourth Amendment, privacy and surveillance issues for years.

"And they're going to push I think also for greater militarization of the police, which could affect Fourth Amendment issues," Slobogin added.

The American Civil Liberties Union is currently taking the Department of Justice to court to determine when the government notifies people they are under surveillance.

In May 2015, before announcing his bid for the presidency, Mr. Trump said he supported legislation allowing the National Security Agency (NSA) to hold bulk metadata, and later in the year reiterated he would tend to "err on the side of security." On the campaign trail, and after taking office, Mr. Trump has emphasized the importance of bulking up police forces and eradicating terrorism. Sessions fought against reforms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 2012, and against limits on the NSA's spying powers.

Play Video

FBI Director James Comey says there is no evidence to support President Donald Trump's tweet about a "wiretap" of Trump Tower during the 2016 ele...

"It's not as though this didn't exist before Trump, because it's all in this terrorism -- war on terrorism stuff," said Robert Bloom, a professor at Boston College Law School who focuses on criminal procedure and civil rights law. "We've loosened up on protections of individuals. But now you've really got an abusive executive. A president and attorney general who don't really give two whits about individual protection and about the Fourth Amendment."

The White House and Department of Justice did not respond to requests for comment for this story.

Guaranteeing Fourth Amendment rights has become increasingly complicated in the digital age. One longstanding legal theory dating to the 1970s, known as the Third Party Doctrine, asserts that once a person gives personal information to a third party, for instance, to a cell service provider, he or she loses the expectation of privacy, and the information can be given to other entities without the person's explicit permission -- without violating the Fourth Amendment.

The Obama administration placed some limitations on surveillance technology, but mostly through policy. The Obama administration required the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security to obtain warrants for the use of their 400 Stingrays or cell site simulators, devices that mimic cellphone towers, so all phones within a range connect to it instead of their cellphone provider's nearest tower, and the devices collect cellphone data. The IRS also acquired the technology in recent years.

"But that's the kind of thing that Jeff Sessions could do away with with the stroke of a pen," said Alvaro Bedoya, founding executive director for the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University Law Center.

Play Video

Law enforcement uses tracking devices called "stingrays" to locate cellphones. But the technology also picks up personal information from other c...

Law enforcement agencies say Stingray technology helps them catch suspected criminals -- and it does. But privacy advocates fear the technology's ability to collect nearby cellphone owners' data without their permission or knowledge -- and often, without a warrant -- compromises Fourth Amendment rights.

Federal authorities have said the devices they use are not configured to collect the content of communications, but the capabilities of the technology aren't clear. That's partly because federal authorities have shrouded cell site simulators in mystery, sometimes dropping cases against criminal suspects rather than reveal their policing methods and agreements with private cell site simulator companies that swear the government to product secrecy in contracts.

The ability to put the warrant requirement "through the shredder" at any moment is why policy is an insufficient safeguard, said Matthew Feeney, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank.

"We're relying heavily on government policy rather than law, and that I think is a problem," Feeney said.

Many states also use automatic license plate readers, technology that can scan hundreds of plates per minute. In the 2008 election cycle, Virginia State Police used automatic license plate readers on attendees' cars at political rallies for Barack Obama and Sarah Palin, the ACLU revealed. Alone, license plates may not amount to much information, but police have the ability to check those plates against other records, and -- over time -- can observe patterns about a driver's habits, the ACLU argued.

Meanwhile, the federal government is quietly ramping up its surveillance approach at airports, using technology that was, "in most cases developed for the battlefield," Bedoya said.

Play Video

Delta and JetBlue are rolling out new ways to use the sophisticated technology on passengers, but not everyone is on board. Stacey Butler of CBS ...

U.S. Customs and Border Protection began testing facial recognition software -- called Biometric Exit -- at Dulles International Airport outside Washington, D.C., in 2015, and pilot programs are expanding to other large airports. The software -- the concept of which was first required by Bill Clinton-era legislation in 1996 -- is intended to check visa holders entering or leaving the country through facial matching systems. That scan can be checked against a person's passport. As Mr. Trump looks to toughen immigration policies, it's a timely tool.

But Bedoya worries the technology's use won't stop there.

"There aren't many people talking about biometric exit, when it might fundamentally change the way we travel," Bedoya said.

It's unlikely the technology will only be used on foreign nationals, Bedoya said. Many airports mix international and domestic terminals, and it's more practical and realistic to use the technology at the main Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint, Bedoya said.

"That means you have a flow of both domestic and international travelers," Bedoya said.

Once it's in place, facial recognition software -- like other kinds of policing technology -- can be used to match other federal databases and tell a story.

"We shouldn't forget that all of these tools can be put together," Feeney said.

"Drones can be used to mount a license plate reader," Feeney said. "Body cam footage could be linked to drone footage."

Congress has made some efforts to strengthen privacy in recent months. In February, the House passed the Email Privacy Act, which would require a warrant for any access to stored digital communications. But the Senate has yet to take any action on it, and threats of terrorism may easily quash any momentum on similar legislation, Slobogin said.

"If we have an event like Manchester in the United States -- or Manchester itself -- that might push Congress in the other direction," Slobogin said.

Absent much guidance from Congress in the way of laws, the courts are deciding the future of surveillance as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment, Slobogin said.

"Some of the lower courts have looked at warrants and searches and things of that nature, but the Supreme Court really hasn't weighed in on those kinds of issues," Bloom said.

Slowly, that's changing, as cases work their way up to the highest court in the land.

This year, the Supreme Court will decide United States v. Carpenter, on whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing location and movements of a person over the course of months is constitutional.

"That is arguably going to be the most significant Fourth Amendment case in decades," Feeney said.

The Third Party Doctrine theory "needs to be grappled with significantly," and could be reviewed in that case, Bloom said.

The lack of legal protection against an expanding availability of policing technologies may not concern law-abiding citizens, but it should, Feeney said.

"At the moment, we seem to be mostly concerned about radical Islamic terrorism," Feeney said.

"Maybe in 15 years it's progressives, or libertarians, pro-life people or pro-choice people," he added.

This, Feeney said, is the fundamental question people should ask themselves: "Would I be happy with the state of the Fourth Amendment if my enemy is in charge?"

Read the original here:

What is the future of privacy, surveillance and policing technologies under Trump? - CBS News

Appeals Court Strikes Down California’s 30-Day Impound Law – FOX40

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) Law enforcement must provide a valid reason to hold peoples vehicles and cannot automatically impound them for a set period, a federal appeals court said Wednesday.

The unanimous ruling by a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a California law that requires police to hold impounded vehicles for 30 days.

Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for the panel, said the law violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures.

A seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that the governments justification holds force, he said. Thereafter, the government must cease the seizure or secure a new justification.

The decision revived a lawsuit against Los Angeles by a woman whose car was held by police for 30 days. The Los Angeles City Attorneys Office did not immediately have comment.

Lamya Brewster loaned her vehicle to Yonnie Percy, her brother-in-law, according to the 9th Circuit ruling. Los Angeles police stopped Percy and seized the vehicle when they learned Percy had a suspended drivers license.

The 9th Circuit said there was agreement that the initial seizure did not pose any problems under an exception to the Fourth Amendment that allows police to impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety.

But the court said police provided no new justification to continue holding the vehicle after Brewster showed up with proof of ownership and a valid drivers license three days later.

A lower court had thrown Percys lawsuit out, finding that the 30-day impoundment period was aimed at deterring unlicensed drivers or drivers with suspended licenses from driving and was a lawful penalty.

36.778261 -119.417932

View original post here:

Appeals Court Strikes Down California's 30-Day Impound Law - FOX40

SCOTUS reviews 4th Amendment vs. surveillance case – OneNewsNow

A legal organization that advocates for constitutional freedom is watching a 4th Amendment case currently being reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The case is Carpenter v. The United States, which reached the court from the 6th U.S. Court of Appeals.

The case involves a gang of armed robbers who were tracked by authorities after one of the robbers confessed to the crime and gave up his cell phone number and the numbers of his accomplices.Using cell phone data, authorities analyzed the usage history to trace their movements for 127 days, a Washington Post story explained.

Curt Levey of the Committee for Justice says long before cell phones came into being, court rulings would suggest the police can monitor phone movements. That doesn't apply now, he insists.

I think that would be a very bad interpretation when applied to today's technology, says Levey, because the government might as well put a GPS device on your car and the Supreme Court has said the government can't do that without a warrant.

In the Washington Post story, criminal law professor Orin Kerr summarized the two questions presented to the high court:

I gather, then, that the case will consider two distinct questions. First, is the collection of the records a Fourth Amendment search? And second, if it is a search, is it a search that requires a warrant?

The government argues cell phone owners opt in to third-party police access when they sign a contract with the company. Most of the data came from provider MetroPCS while some "roaming" data came from Sprint.

But Levey doesn't agree.

You're really not consenting to anything when you use it, he says, and to say that by using a cell phone you have to give up all your Fourth Amendment rights, it would result in a government too powerful and too intrusive for my taste, and I think the taste of most Americans.

In taking up the case, he adds, the Supreme Court can update old rulings based on modern technology and determine whether police can have access to the information without a warrant or not.

Kerr described the SCOTUS review as a "momentous development" because the future of surveillance law hinges on the coming ruling.

We moderate all reader comments, usually within 24 hours of posting (longer on weekends). Please limit your comment to 300 words or less and ensure it addresses the article - NOT another reader's comments. Comments that contain a link (URL), an inordinate number of words in ALL CAPS, rude remarks directed at other readers, or profanity/vulgarity will not be approved.

Continue reading here:

SCOTUS reviews 4th Amendment vs. surveillance case - OneNewsNow

So now coordinated traffic stops are a Fourth Amendment violation? – Hot Air

Orin Kerr at the Volokh Conspiracy has another twisted and complicated Fourth Amendment case for us to consider this week. It deals with United States v. Gorman and its yet another traffic stop challenge, but with several twists. This particular incident involved an officer stopping Straughn Gorman while he was driving his brothers motor home cross country to California. The officer believed that Gorman was carrying drugs and/or drug money in the RV but didnt have a drug sniffing dog with him and had no further grounds to search the vehicle so he let him go. The officer then called ahead to law enforcement in the next county and alerted them to Gormans approach and of his suspicions. A second officer (with a dog) intercepted Gorman and pulled him over on another very minor traffic violation. The dog detected drug residue and a warrant was issued, leading to a search which turned up $167,070 in cash, stuffed in white envelopes and sealed in plastic bags.

There were no criminal charges brought against Gorman, but the authorities did seize the money. The courts eventually found that the search was unsupportable and Gorman got his money back. This brings Kerr to ask the following question.

If an officer pulls over a car for a traffic violation and suspects the car has drugs, but he cant get the drug-sniffing dog to come in time to sniff it, can the officer end the traffic stop and call ahead to another police officer to get a dog and watch for the car to pull it over for a second violation? Specifically, if the second officer gets a dog and spots a second traffic violation, can the second officer pull over the car and use the drug-sniffing dog to get probable cause to search the car?

The bottom line to this lengthy discussion is that there are two conflicting elements to the decision, at least for my interest in the subject. One of them is the forfeiture of all that money and the efforts by the cops to keep it. From the sound of the police reports theres pretty much zero doubt that this guy was hauling drug money, but thats not the point here. The cops have to be able to prove their case before they should even be allowed to consider confiscating someones property. Since Gorman guilty or not in reality was never even charged its preposterous that they should keep his cash. That aspect of the challenge is easy enough for me.

But the stickier subject is the fact that the courts are once again summoning up the misbegotten fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine here. If you read the entire account of both officers in the full decision, even Ill admit that these traffic stops were dodgy at best. I have no clue what tipped off the first officer that there was money (as opposed to drugs) in the vehicle. But the fact is that something tipped him off. And it was later discovered that there absolutely was a large quantity of cash with drug residue on it. So why should the second officer be forbidden to act on that tip and have a dog sniff the vehicle? What if they had received an anonymous tip from somebody telling them the driver was trafficking drugs? Wouldnt that be suitable justification?

This fruit of the poisonous tree nonsense is completely out of hand. Theres a line to be drawn somewhere between ensuring the rights of citizens against unreasonable search or seizure and simply tying the hands of law enforcement to the point where they cant do their jobs when theres obviously a crime taking place. And cases such as this one cross that line by a fair margin.

Follow this link:

So now coordinated traffic stops are a Fourth Amendment violation? - Hot Air

Phillips: Congressman Goodlatte, Save the Fourth Amendment – Roanoke Times

Phillips is the founder of Tea Party Nation. He is based in Nashville, Tenn.

Among lawyers, there is a saying, Bad cases make bad law. Now, a single case is about to make very bad law. It will eviscerate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution in the 21st Century.

And Congressman Bob Goodlatte can stop it.

While the background for this is a little technical, it is worth knowing. In 2013, the United States Department of Justice sought a search warrant on electronic communications for an individual, under Section 2703(a) of the Stored Communications Act.

The search warrant was served on Microsoft, for communications in the companys possession. Microsoft complied with the warrant as far as any digital communications that it had that were stored in America. The problem for law enforcement was some of those communications were stored in Ireland and Microsoft said it could not and would not produce those. Microsoft was held in civil contempt for refusing to turn over the emails and contents stored in Ireland.

Eventually the case went to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that Microsoft was not obligated to turn over emails and other digital records that were exclusively stored outside of the United States.

Not satisfied with that ruling, the Department of Justice chose a different route. They decided to ask Congress to give them what the Courts would not. The House Judiciary committee will hold a hearing on June 15th, entitled, Data stored abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Protecting Privacy.

Fortunately, the laws governing false advertising do not apply to Congress.

When the 4th Amendment was written, it was one of the most expansive statements of liberty and an incredible restriction on the power of government. The Fourth Amendment says, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

If you consider the world of the 1780s, that statement was amazing. Every form of property the founding fathers could think of was included. Today, we live in a world where the government wants all of the data about us it can get. Guilty or innocent, it does not matter.

The modern surveillance state is the exact reason our founding fathers incorporated the Fourth Amendment into the Bill of Rights.

In the last few years, the American people have been treated to one horror story after another that featured the abuse of citizens by our government. America is only scratching the surface of the unmasking scandal from the last year of the Obama administration. The story of the IRS abuse of citizens who dared to disagree with the government continues

Does any sane person trust giving the government more power?

Privacy, as we know it, is on the endangered species list. There are many government officials who believe that the only privacy rights Americans should have are those the government chooses to grant them.

There is an truism that says, Those who forsake liberty for security, deserve neither. As the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Goodlatte has the power to stop this bad idea and protect the Fourth Amendment.

He needs to hear from Virginians that the government is too powerful now. He needs to hear that the government needs to stay within its bounds and allow liberty to flourish. He needs to hear that this idea should be tossed on to the ash heap of bad ideas and forever forgotten.

Congressman Goodlatte, help save the Fourth Amendment.

The rest is here:

Phillips: Congressman Goodlatte, Save the Fourth Amendment - Roanoke Times

Third party rights and the Carpenter cell-site case – Washington Post

In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court will decide whether a warrant is required for the government to obtain historical cell-site records from a customers account. This post asks a question for those who think the answer should be yes: How do you deal with the Fourth Amendment rights of the cellphone providers? Im not sure what the answer should be, but I think its an important question to help understand the issues and stakes in Carpenter.

This is a complex issue, so Im going to break it down into three steps. Ill start with an overview of the third-party doctrine. Ill then turn to third-party rights under current law. Ill next consider different ways the third-party rights might work if the Supreme Court holds that a warrant is required.

I. Overview of the Third-Party Doctrine

Lower courts have held, consistently with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that historical cell-site records are not protected under the Fourth Amendment. They have mostly based this holding on the third-party doctrine, the rule that you dont maintain Fourth Amendment rights in information that you voluntarily disclose to a third party.

As I explained in this article, the third-party doctrine was originally intended to be the subjective expectation of privacy test in Justice Harlans Katz concurrence. The idea was that you can only have privacy in what you try to hide from others: You need to manifest your subjective expectation of privacy to have Fourth Amendment rights, shielding it from observation, so that you cant have such rights in what you knowingly disclose to others. As my article explains, this rule has been around for a very long time, but it accidentally moved over time from the subjective expectation test into the objective expectation of privacy test in the 1970s and 1980s.

The third-party doctrine has had very wide application. If a criminal confesses to his friend about his crimes, the government can get the information from the friend without implicating the criminals Fourth Amendment rights. If a person commits an offense in front of an eyewitness, the government can get the information from the eyewitness without implicating the criminals Fourth Amendment rights. If a person goes to the bank and deposits a check, the government can get the information from the bank without implicating his Fourth Amendment rights. And if a person dials a number to place a phone call, the government can get the numbers dialed from the phone company without implicating his Fourth Amendment rights.

II. What About the Constitutional Rights of the Third Party?

A key implication of the third-party doctrine is that the government only has to deal with the constitutional rights of the person or business that received and now possesses the information. Upon the informations receipt, the thinking goes, the sender of the information no longer has Fourth Amendment rights in it. Only the rights of the recipient/holder of the information matter.

That raises the question of to what extent the constitutional rights of the holder of the information can limit law enforcement. The answer is: some, although not much. First, the Supreme Court has held that there are no Fourth Amendment limits to the government compelling a person to testify about what they know and what they saw. That raises Fifth Amendment issues if the person who would testify may be thought to be involved in criminal activity, but the compelled testimony is not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).

Second, if the government compels a person or company to hand over stored records as opposed to live testimony, the Fourth Amendment applies to the records but the constitutional limit is only unreasonable burdensomeness. There is no warrant or probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.). To be sure, the Fourth Amendment still applies fully to direct entry. The government ordinarily needs a warrant to break into a business and seize records just like it needs a warrant to break into a home. But its a different situation when the government is compelling assistance rather than searching directly.

These same Fourth Amendment rules apply when the government is seeking information that a business happens to hold about its customers. Whether the target of the investigation is the business or its customers doesnt matter under the Fourth Amendment. This means that if the government is seeking a companys assistance to disclose records about the businesss customers, the information is protected under the Fourth Amendment in the abstract because the business has its own Fourth Amendment rights. At the same time, the third-party business generally can be required to keep and disclose the records under a fairly low burden. See, e.g., California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971). And because the information or records ordinarily could not incriminate the third party in criminal activity, the third party business cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against production. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).

The idea that a business has only modest Fourth Amendment rights to fight compelled disclosure of customer records isnt new. It has been around a long time. For example, in First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), the IRS wanted to see if a couple had underreported their income on their federal income tax forms. The IRS issued a summons to the couples bank requiring the bank to produce their books showing the couples banking account records. The idea was that the bank statements would reveal whether the couple had falsely reported their income. The bank refused to comply under the Fourth Amendment on the ground that producing the records was an unreasonable search or seizure and that the bank wanted to keep its customers account records private.

The district court rejected the banks claim. This is not a question of a search and seizure of a partys books and papers, the court wrote, but of whether a witness who has information as to a partys dealings may be required to testify to those facts, and produce book entries as to such entries in connection with and supporting such testimony. It would be monstrous, the court rather dramatically added, for the government not to be able to determine the proper taxes that a person owed simply because the bank desires to protect the dealings of its customers from unauthorized investigation. The Supreme Court then affirmed the district court in a one-sentence per curiam opinion upon the authority of the courts precedents about subpoenas for business records (including Hale v. Henkel, cited above).

III. Applying the Traditional Approach to Historical Cell-Site Records

Applying this traditional body of law to historical cell-site records is pretty straightforward, I think. The cellphone company generates and stores business records of what cell towers were used to connect a customers calls. Those records are like the banks records in First National Bank. The cellphone provider is ordered to be a witness who has information as to a partys dealings [and] may be required to testify to those facts, and produce book entries as to such entries in connection with and supporting such testimony.

Granted, Congress requires an intermediate facts court order under the Stored Communications Act for the government to compel those records. A mere subpoena, which would be sufficient under the Fourth Amendment, isnt enough under the statute. But if the lesser process of a subpoena is sufficient to satisfy the rights of the company, presumably the greater process of an intermediate facts court order is as well (although that hasnt been challenged), And under the third-party doctrine, access to the account records wouldnt implicate any Fourth Amendment rights of the user.

If youll pardon a brief digression, its not even clear you need the third-party doctrine to say that the records dont implicate the users Fourth Amendment rights. The third-party doctrine is traditionally about the disclosure of private information that a suspect has revealed. The idea is that the suspect has private information, chose to reveal that information (often in confidence) to someone, and then the government sought that private information from that person. The cell-site business records in Carpenter are arguably one step removed from that. They are business records of how a private company decided to direct calls to and from the user. The records are about what a private company did for a user, not necessarily what a user chose to disclose in confidence to the company.

But at the very least, the third-party doctrine seems to fit the Carpenter case under traditional caselaw principles. So the old answer would be no Fourth Amendment rights for the customer, although statutory rights provided by Congress, and only modest Fourth Amendment rights for the cellphone provider.

IV. If the Third-Party Doctrine is Rejected, How Should Courts Deal With Third-Party Rights?

Thats the old law, at least. Now lets consider how the Fourth Amendment would work if the Supreme Court rejects that traditional approach. Lets assume the Supreme Court agrees with the defendant on both issues in Carpenter: First it holds that users have Fourth Amendment rights in cell-site records, and second it holds that the records are protected by a warrant protection.

Now we get to my question: Assuming the Supreme Court makes these two holdings, how would this work with respect to the providers rights? The government does not seek cell-site records by breaking into the providers business and rummaging around its offices and computers. That would ordinarily require a warrant even under the traditional law of the third-party doctrine. The records are already protected under the Fourth Amendment as held by the company, after all, and ordinarily the government would need a warrant to break into the company headquarters and seize them because of the companys Fourth Amendment rights.

The tricky problem, I think, is what to do with the providers rights once the user also has rights in the records. Assume, for now, that the company does not want to comply with the governments legal process. If the records were about the provider, a subpoena would be enough for the government to force the company to disclose them.

Heres what Im stuck on: How do you reconcile the conflict between that rule and a warrant requirement if the Fourth Amendment rights belong to the user? Is the idea that a company served with a subpoena for business records has to figure out if the subpoena implicates only its own Fourth Amendment rights (in which case the subpoena complies with the Fourth Amendment so long as it is not overbroad) or if it also implicates a users Fourth Amendment rights (in which case the subpoena is insufficient and a warrant is required?). If the government issues a subpoena for business records and it turns out that a customer also had rights in the data, would we say that compelled compliance with the subpoena violated the rights of the user but not the company?

Alternatively, if it doesnt make sense for every subpoena and sub-warrant court order to require a standing analysis before knowing if compliance is legal, which rule do you apply to both situations if a single rule has to be chosen? Do you say that both situations require a warrant, such that all subpoenas issued to businesses now require probable cause and warrant particularity (effectively eliminating the use of business record subpoenas for investigations)? Or do you say that neither situation requires a warrant, such that the user has Fourth Amendment rights in cell-site records but that a valid subpoena is enough to overcome the Fourth Amendment rights just as it it would for ordinary business records?

Next assume that the cellphone company wants to cooperate. If both the user and the company have Fourth Amendment rights in the records, then I imagine the common authority doctrine would apply. Under the common authority doctrine, if there is mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, they both can consent to a search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Cellphone customers may not have joint access and control over cell site records: They dont know what the records say and have no ordinary means of accessing them. But if they nonetheless have Fourth Amendment rights in the records, I would think that at least the company has common authority over the records allowing them to legally consent to law enforcement access to the records.

If thats right, though, how does it work if the phone company is willing to help the government? Imagine Carpenter holds that users have Fourth Amendment rights in cell-site records, and that a warrant is ordinarily required. Can a provider tell the government that as long as the government has a 2703(d) court order, as required by the statute, that it will voluntarily consent to hand over the records under the common authority doctrine? If so, whether there is really a warrant requirement would depend on what the company wants to do: Because both the user and the company have common authority over the companys business record, the company could consent and eliminate the right.

You could try to avoid this by saying that the cellphone providers lack common authority over their own business records. But that seems like a hard result to justify. The companies created and used the records and keep them. It seems hard to say that they lack access to or control over the records that they created and keep for their own use.

Granted, caselaw would suggest that companies lack common authority to consent to a government search of the contents of communications, such as emails. In physical space, the landlord of an apartment or the hotel employee at the hotel lacks common authority to consent. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel employee). By analogy, I would think that an email provider couldnt ordinarily consent to a search of the contents of a users emails, at least barring some unusual terms of service. But with cell-site records, I would think that the phone companies have at least common authority (if not exclusive authority) over the records of how their network connected calls.

V. Let Me Know Your Thoughts

For the seven readers that have made it this far, let me know your thoughts! There may be good answers to these questions. But it seems like largely uncharted territory, and Im not sure yet what those good answers are.

View original post here:

Third party rights and the Carpenter cell-site case - Washington Post

Coordinated traffic stops and the Fourth Amendment – Washington Post

A new decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, United States v. Gorman, touches on an interesting question: If an officer pulls over a car for a traffic violation and suspects the car has drugs, but he cant get the drug-sniffing dog to come in time to sniff it, can the officer end the traffic stop and call ahead to another police officer to get a dog and watch for the car to pull it over for a second violation? Specifically, if the second officer gets a dog and spots a second traffic violation, can the second officer pull over the car and use the drug-sniffing dog to get probable cause to search the car?

In Gorman, there was a twist: The first officer held the driver for too long. The officer pulled over Straughn Gormans motor home for a traffic offense and then he held Gorman for almost a half-hour. He called for a drug-sniffing dog but was told there werent any available. Twenty minutes into the stop, the officer gave Gorman his documents back and told him he was not issuing a ticket. The officer continued to question Gorman, however, based on suspicion that Gorman was carrying drug money in the motor home. The stop went on for too long under the time-limiting doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015).

The officer became convinced that there was drug money in the motor home, but he did not have sufficient probable cause to search the car. He let the driver go, and he then called ahead to a second officer in the next county to get a dog and watch the vehicle. The second officer did so, later pulling over the motor home for a second traffic violation. The dog alerted, and a warrant was obtained to search the motor home. The search revealed $167,070 in cash in various interior compartments. The government brought a civil forfeiture action seeking to keep the cash as the proceeds of illegal drug activity, and Gorman moved to suppress the fruits of the search so it could not be used in the civil forfeiture action.

Held, per Judge Reinhardt: The evidence found following the second stop was a fruit of the unconstitutionally prolonged first stop. As a result, the money was suppressed.

From the opinion:

Here, there is an indisputable causal connection between Gormans concededly unlawful detention and the dog sniff and its fruits. See id. at 245. The detention unquestionably served as the impetus for the chain of events leading to the discovery of the currency. See id. It is clear, moreover, that [the first officer]s suspicions from the first stop significantly directed [the second officers] actions in making the second stop and conducting the sniff and search. See id. The close connection between the constitutional violation (the first detention) and the seizure of the currency is apparent.

On the basis of suspicions that accrued during the course of Gormans unlawful detention, [the first officer] alerted a separate law enforcement agency, informed [the second officer] of the basis for his suspicions, and requested that he attempt to stop Gorman for a second time, this time with a drug-sniffing dog. [The second officer] promptly estimated Gormans location and made a special trip to the highway for the purpose of apprehending him and conducting the dog sniff the sniff which led to the discovery of the currency. To repeat, there was a direct connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and its fruits. Thus, any evidence obtained from the sniff and search is inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

The government does not contend that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is applicable only if the impetus for the second stop came from the unlawful portion of Gormans detention. Even if it did, however, our conclusion would be the same, because the facts here show clearly that part of the impetus for the second stop did come from the unlawful portion of Gormans detention. It was only after the stops mission had been completed that [the first officer developed suspicion that the car motorhome was being used to carry drug money. . . . ] Given that sequence, we need not determine whether it would be appropriate to divide an unlawful detention into lawful and unlawful parts for purposes of fruit of the poisonous tree analysis

Reinhardt adds:

The coordinated action at issue in Gormans case offers a prime illustration of the value of the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis. The analysis allows us to see the officers conduct in Gormans case as what it is: a single integrated effort by police to circumvent the Constitution by making two coordinated stops. When the result of one stop is communicated and, on that basis, another stop is planned and implemented, the coordinated stops become, in effect, one integrated stop that must as a whole satisfy the Constitutions requirements. An illegal police venture cannot be made legal simply by dividing it into two coordinated stops. . . . The Constitution guards against this kind of gamesmanship because the Fourth Amendments protections extend beyond the margins of one particular police stop and can extend to the integrated and purposeful conduct of the state.

Putting aside whether this fruit of the poisonous tree analysis is correct under Utah v. Strieff, Im more interested in whether the second stop would be allowed if the first stop had not been prolonged. That is, can officers coordinate stops, watching for new traffic violations to stop a car to make sure a drug-sniffing dog will be present?

Reinhardt drops the following footnote on this issue:

Because we conclude that the seized currency is inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree, we do not consider the argument that the second stop, taken independently, was itself unconstitutional. It could well be argued, for example, that performing the routine records checks during the second stop (which in Gormans case took significantly longer than usual because the central dispatch was delayed in responding to [the second officer]s inquiry) unreasonably prolonged Gormans roadside detention because [the second officer] knew in advance what the results of those redundant checks would be, as he correctly assumed [the first officer] already had done them and knew [the first officer] had found no probable cause to search the vehicle. [The second officers] checks therefore served no purpose other than to prolong the traffic stop.

Im not sure what I think of this, but it seemed like an interesting question worth flagging for the Fourth Amendment nerds among our readership.

Read the rest here:

Coordinated traffic stops and the Fourth Amendment - Washington Post

How should an originalist rule in the Fourth Amendment cell-site … – Washington Post

The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear Carpenter v. United States, a case on whether the Fourth Amendment protects historical cell-site records. In this post, I want to focus on a small but potentially important part of the Carpenter litigation: How should an originalist Justice vote in the case? There are many different flavors of originalism, of course, and originalist arguments often can be used to argue for different outcomes. But in this post I want to discuss one originalist argument that I think is significant. Ill then ask readers to weigh in on it.

Lets start with the obvious: The Framers could not have imagined a world of cell-site records. And the original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment is open to a wide range of interpretations at different levels of generality. With that said, the text of the Fourth Amendment does have an important clue about what the Fourth Amendment was originally understood to mean that might be important to the Carpenter case.

Heres the opening text of the Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]

As Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized in his concurrence in Minnesota v. Carter, the word their can be understood as important in historical context. It signals that to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, a persons own self, houses, papers or effects must be unreasonably searched or seized.

Heres what Scalia wrote in Carter, with emphasis in the original:

The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . U. S. Const., Amdt. 4 (emphasis added). It must be acknowledged that the phrase their . . . houses in this provision is, in isolation, ambiguous. It could mean their respective houses, so that the protection extends to each person only in his own house. But it could also mean their respective and each others houses, so that each person would be protected even when visiting the house of someone else. As todays opinion for the Court suggests, however, ante, at 88-90, it is not linguistically possible to give the provision the latter, expansive interpretation with respect to houses without giving it the same interpretation with respect to the nouns that are parallel to housespersons, . . . papers, and effectswhich would give me a constitutional right not to have your person unreasonably searched. This is so absurd that it has to my knowledge never been contemplated. The obvious meaning of the provision is that each person has the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person, house, papers, and effects.

The founding-era materials that I have examined confirm that this was the understood meaning. . . . Like most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was derived from provisions already existing in state constitutions. Of the four of those provisions that contained language similar to that of the Fourth Amendment, two used the same ambiguous their terminology. See Pa. Const., Art. X (1776) (That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure . . .); Vt. Const., ch. I, XI (1777) (That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search or seizure. . .). The other two, however, avoided the ambiguity by using the singular instead of the plural. See Mass. Const., pt. I, Art. XIV (1780) (Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions); N. H. Const., XIX (1784) (Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions).

The New York Convention that ratified the Constitution proposed an amendment that would have given every freeman a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person his papers or his property, 4 B. Schwartz, The Roots of the Bill of Rights 913 (1980) (reproducing New York proposed amendments, 1778) (emphases added), and the Declaration of Rights that the North Carolina Convention demanded prior to its ratification contained a similar provision protecting a freemans right against unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers and property, id., at 968 (reproducing North Carolina proposed Declaration of Rights, 1778) (emphases added). There is no indication anyone believed that the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina texts, by using the word his rather than their, narrowed the protections contained in the Pennsylvania and Vermont Constitutions.

That their . . . houses was understood to mean their respective houses would have been clear to anyone who knew the English and early American law of arrest and trespass that underlay the Fourth Amendment. The peoples protection against unreasonable search and seizure in their houses was drawn from the English common-law maxim, A mans home is his castle. As far back as Semaynes Case of 1604, the leading English case for that proposition (and a case cited by Coke in his discussion of the proposition that Magna Carta outlawed general warrants based on mere surmise, 4 E. Coke, Institutes 176-177 (1797)), the Kings Bench proclaimed that the house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his house. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 93a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K. B.).

Thus Cooley, in discussing Blackstones statement that a bailiff could not break into a house to conduct an arrest because every mans house is looked upon by the law to be his castle, 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 288 (1768), added the explanation: [I]t is the defendants own dwelling which by law is said to be his castle; for if he be in the house of another, the bailiff or sheriff may break and enter it to effect his purpose. . . . 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 287, n. 5 (T. Cooley 2d rev. ed. 1872). See also Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246, 248, 128 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1030 (C. P. 1815) ([I]n many cases the door of a third person may be broken where that of the Defendant himself cannot; for though every mans house is his own castle, it is not the castle of another man).

Of course this is not to say that the Fourth Amendment protects only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in fee simple. People call a house their home when legal title is in the bank, when they rent it, and even when they merely occupy it rent freeso long as they actually live there. That this is the criterion of the peoples protection against government intrusion into their houses is established by the leading American case of Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816), which held it a trespass for the sheriff to break into a dwelling to capture a boarder who lived there. The court reasoned that the inviolability of dwelling-houses described by Foster, Hale, and Coke extends to the occupier or any of his family . . . who have their domicile or ordinary residence there, including a boarder or a servant who have made the house their home. Id., at 523 (emphasis added). But, it added, the house shall not be made a sanctuary for one such as a stranger, or perhaps a visitor, who upon a pursuit, take[s] refuge in the house of another, for the house is not his castle; and the officer may break open the doors or windows in order to execute his process. Ibid. (emphasis in original).

Thus, in deciding the question presented today we write upon a slate that is far from clean. The text of the Fourth Amendment, the common-law background against which it was adopted, and the understandings consistently displayed after its adoption make the answer clear. We were right to hold in Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (1961), that the Fourth Amendment protects an apartment tenant against an unreasonable search of his dwelling, even though he is only a leaseholder. And we were right to hold in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 (1968), that an unreasonable search of a grandmothers house violated her resident grandsons Fourth Amendment rights because the area searched was his home, id., at 548, n. 11 (emphasis added). We went to the absolute limit of what text and tradition permit in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91 (1990), when we protected a mere overnight guest against an unreasonable search of his hosts apartment.

I think we can all agree that the cellphone companys records of which of its cell towers were associated with its customers phone at some point in the past are, in the abstract, papers or effects. I would think that an originalist would then want to ask the Carter question: Whose papers or effects are they? Presumably they are the papers or effects of the phone company. But are they also the papers or effects of the customer?

The idea of papers and effects presumably was understood to include situations such asEntick v. Carrington (1765), the case that helped inspire the Fourth Amendments enactment, in which the kings officials broke into Enticks home. Inside the home, the officials removed all the private papers, books, etc. of the plaintiff there found, . . . and took and carried away 100 printed charts, 100 printed pamphlets, etc. etc. of the plaintiff there found, and other 100 charts etc etc took and carried away. In that setting, papers and effects likely meant something like a persons private property. Indeed, the first draft of the Fourth Amendment used property instead of effects.

The question is, can cell-site records be the users own papers or effects? It seems like an uphill battle. Cell-site records are a phone companys internally generated records ofhow its network connected a communicationbetween a customer and someone else. Cellphone customers dont know what cell towers their phones are connecting to, or where the towers are located. They dont know what the phone companys records say. Thats information that the phone company generates describing how its own network service operated that the phone company keeps in the ordinary course of its business. Whether those records are retained, and for how long, is up to the phone company. Its the phone companys business and its network, and users wouldnt see or access the records that the phone company creates and stores.

Given that, to say that cell-site records belong to the user that they are the users papers or effects you would need some kind of theory by which a person has some kind of property or property-like rights in another persons records of what they did on your behalf.

There are ways to get there, but Im not aware of any of those theories being recognized in the past much less the late 18th century. For example, one option would be to look to contract law or agency law. Perhaps signing the agreement makes the phone company the agent of the user, such that the phone company is working for the user and its company records belong, at least in some sense, to the user. This is creative, but at least at this point I dont see support for this theory in the historical caselaw or other materials.

Id be happy to be corrected, but Im not aware of an early court or even just a litigant suggesting that the contractual or agency relationship made the providers records in some sense the customers own, triggering the Fourth Amendment, its state equivalents, or common law search and seizure principles. There presumably were situations in the 18th or 19th century in which two parties would enter into a contractual agreement and the government would want records or testimony from the provider of those goods or services concerning what the recipient of the goods or service had done. A possibly interesting example is hotel guest lists, which are at least somewhat analogous to cell-site records records by a business of who was using a particular service and when. My understanding is that hotel guest lists were traditionally left open to inspection by anyone. See Jefferson Williamson, The American Hotel: An Anecdotal History 181 (1930). The records apparently werent considered the guests own papers, even though they were created in the course of providing a service to the guest.

It would be a different case, I think, with the contents of communications. In the case of contents, the network provider is merely holding the private communications of the user on the users behalf. The communications are still the users communications. The user wrote them, or, on receipt, received them. If I decide to store my emails on Gmails servers, for example, they are still my emails, just as my letters are still my letters when I send them through the postal mail. See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 US 727, 733 (1877) (Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.).

If Im right, an originalist might plausibly conclude that the contents of communications are protected by the Fourth Amendment as the users papers or effects but that the business records of the company as to how those papers or effects were delivered would be the companys records, not the users.

Anyway, thats my tentative thinking. Im very interested to know whether readers who are interested in originalism find this thinking persuasive. And my apologies in advance if I have offered a wrong or naive view of originalism. It sometimes seems that one must be a sophisticated theorist of originalism to truly understand what originalism means, and I admit I am only a simple country Fourth Amendment lawyer.

Here is the original post:

How should an originalist rule in the Fourth Amendment cell-site ... - Washington Post

With Cell Phone Record Case on SCOTUS Horizon, Originalist Analysis on IV Amendment Is Helpful – CNSNews.com

With Cell Phone Record Case on SCOTUS Horizon, Originalist Analysis on IV Amendment Is Helpful
CNSNews.com
On June 5, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving Fourth Amendment protections for cell phone records, Carpenter v. U.S. This case features a much-criticized judicial creation called the third-party doctrine and how it applies to an ...

See the article here:

With Cell Phone Record Case on SCOTUS Horizon, Originalist Analysis on IV Amendment Is Helpful - CNSNews.com

Constitution and Fourth Amendment – Gettysburg Times

The Fourth Amendment states, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Pretty straightforward, right? It was, until something labeled the "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act" (FISA). Today, every electronic communication of every kind -- e-mail, telephone conversation, radio or TV communication, in any medium -- is routinely overheard, recorded, stored and available for use against any American citizen by the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the IRS, the Social Security Administration and every information and intelligence gathering agency government-wide. Your cell phone isn't just a telephone any more: it's a GPS for government trackers; it stores your phone records and conversations; and the "your" telephone company routinely provides that Government whatever it asks about what we say, to whom, and when. So do our computers. The result? There is no longer any reasonable expectation of privacy, anywhere, anytime, for anyone.

One might ask, "How did this come to be?" In 1978, under President Jimmy Carter, Congress enacted something called the "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act" (FISA), whose nominal purpose was to enable the federal government to eavesdrop, wiretap, or otherwise capture the contents of communications and/or conversations involving people from other nations around the world whom our government believed might be plotting or conspiring to do America harm. Of course, some of those nefarious plotters might also be doing so in conjunction with Americans; therefore, it was necessary to "listen in" on everyone, lest our defenders in the intelligence community not be able to detect all they could. Which in turn meant that a mechanism needed to exist to honor the 4th Amendment - if only in form. Thus came about what is now known as the "FISA Court," whose two-fold purpose was to approve the "listening" while maintaining a cover for violating the 4th Amendment, and appearing to provide protection for American citizens against the very Government behavior things that Court was approving. (No, it doesn't make sense, but it's the way it is.) All this, of course, was long before cell phones, personal computers, laptops and even the internet.

kAmwF>2? ?2EFC6 36:?8 H92E :E :D[ H92E6G6C q:8 v@G6C?>6?E 42? 86E 2H2J H:E9[ D>2== 8@G6C?>6?E H:== 7@==@H] $@ ?@H H6 92G6 2== <:?5D @7 6=64EC@?:4 DFCG6:==2?46[ ac^f[ @? 6G6CJ@?6 E9C@F89@FE E96 =2?5[ 7C@> E96 (9:E6 w@FD6 2== E96 H2J E@ r:EJ w2==] u@C E9@D6 C6256CD 72>:=:2C H:E9 v6@C86 ~CH6==[ Q`hgcQ 😀 2=:G6 2?5 H6==j 2?5[ J6D[ q:8 qC@E96C 😀 H2E49:?8] p?5 =:DE6?:?8] p?5 C64@C5:?8] p?5 H2:E:?8 \ E@ FD6 H92E6G6C 96 92D 282:?DE 2?J@?6] xEVD ?@ =@?86C D4:6?467:4E:@?j :EVD 724E 2?5 56D4C:36D E92E A2CE @7 E96 x?E6==:86?46 4@>>F?:EJ E92E 92D 4@>6 E@ 36 =236=65 E96 Qs66A $E2E6]Qk^Am

kAmp82:?[ 9F>2? ?2EFC6 36:?8 H92E :E :D[ 2?5 9F>2?D 36:?8 E96 :?96C6?E=J 4FC:@FD A@=:E:42= 2?:>2=D E92E H6 2C6[ D@>6 😕 E96 :?E6==:86?46 4@>>F?:EJ 92G6 EFC?65 E96:C 2FE9@C:K2E:@?D 7C@> 8F2C5:?8 282:?DE @FC 6IE6C?2= E9C62ED[ E@ 2EE24<:?8 2?5 56DEC@J:?8 E9@D6 E96J A6C46:G6 2D A2CE:D2? A@=:E:42= 6?6>:6D 7FCE96C G:@=2E:?8 E96 cE9 p>6?5>6?E[ 3@E9 😕 DA:C:E 2?5 😕 724E]k^Am

kAmp== @7 E9:D 😀 ?@E @?=J 😕 5:C64E G:@=2E:@? @7 E96 cE9 p>6?5>6?E[ :EVD E@E2==J 56DECF4E:G6 E@ 2 7C66 2?5 @A6?[ D6=78@G6C?:?8 D@4:6EJ[ :]6][ @FC 7@F?5:?8 AC:?4:A=6D] x7 E96 u@F?56CD 2?5 uC2>6CD 5:5?VE H2?E E96 rC@H? DAJ:?8 @? FD[ H9J 5@ H6 2==@H @FC 8@G6C?>6?E 2E 6G6CJ =6G6= E@n u@C 36EE6C D64FC:EJn q6? uC2?<=:? D2:5 :E H6==i Q%9@D6 H9@ EC256 7C665@> 7@C D64FC:EJ 56D6CG6 ?6:E96C]Qk^Am

kAm(92E 42? (6[ E96 !6@A=6[ 5@ E@ EFC? E9:D 2C@F?5n ~3G:@FD=J[ ECFDE:?8 E96 v@G6C?>6?E E@ 4@CC64E :ED6=7 >2<6D ?@ D6?D6 2E 2== 8@G6C?>6?ED[ 3J E96:C G6CJ ?2EFC6[ 24BF:C6 A@H6Cj E96J ?6:E96C D92C6 ?@C J:6=5] qFE[ H6 DE:== 92G6 😕 A=246 2 WD@>6H92EX C6AC6D6?E2E:G6 8@G6C?>6?E2= DECF4EFC6j H9J ?@E >2<6 :E ECF=J C6AC6D6?E2E:G6n *6D[ :E >62?D A2J:?8 4=@D6C 2EE6?E:@? E@ H92E E92E 8@G6C?>6?E 😀 24EF2==J 5@:?8] p?5 :E >62?D A2J:?8 6G6? 4=@D6C 2EE6?E:@? E@ 9@H H92E :E 5@6D 27764ED FD[ 3@E9 4FCC6?E=J 2?5 5@H? E96 C@25] p?5 :E >62?D A2J:?8 6G6? >@C6 2EE6?E:@? E@ E@ H2?E E@ C6AC6D6?E FD H:== 24EF2==J 5@ E92E[ @C 72== :?E@ >@C6 @7 E96 :?E6C?64:?6 A2CE:D2?D9:A E92E H:?D A@=:E:42= G:4E@C:6D 3FE 56DEC@JD E96 723C:4 @7 @FC #6AF3=:4] xE >62?D[ 2D !=2E@ H2C?65 a[d__ J62CD 28@[ E92E (6[ E96 !6@A=6[ >FDE 86E :?G@=G65 2?5 A2CE:4:A2E6 😕 E9:D D6=78@G6C?2?46 AC@;64Ej @E96CH:D6 H6V== D:>A=J 4@?E:?F6 EC2?D:E:@?:?8 E@ :ED @AA@D:E6[ :]6][ EJC2??J] p?5 H6 D66 EJC2??J 3=@DD@>:?8 6G6CJH96C6[ 7C@> D49@@=D E@ 8@G6C?>6?ED 2?5 6G6CJH96C6 😕 36EH66?[ =2C86=J 3642FD6 (6[ E96 !6@A=6[ 92G6 2DDF>65 E96 36DE 2?5 6?23=65 E96 H@CDE]k^Am

kAm#6>6>36C[ E96 r@?DE:EFE:@? ?6:E96C 8F2C2?E66D ?@C 6?7@C46D @FC C:89ED 2?5 AC@E64E:@?Dj :E D:>A=J 277:C>D E96>[ 2?5 7F?4E:@?D 2D 2 >6492?:D> 7@C FD E@ 6I6C4:D6 2?5 AC@E64E E96> @FCD6=G6D] v@G6C?>6?E[ 3J :ED G6CJ ?2EFC6[ ?6:E96C D92C6D ?@C J:6=5D A@H6Cj :E E2<6D :E] %92EVD H9J %9@>2D y6776CD@?VD Qx? BF6DE:@?D @7 A@H6C E96?[ =6E ?@ >@C6 36 962C5 @7 4@?7:56?46 😕 >2? 3FE 3:?5 9:> 5@H? 7C@> >:D49:67 3J E96 492:?D @7 E96 r@?DE:EFE:@?[Q 😀 D@ :>A@CE2?E] qF5 }2D@? =:G6D 😕 {:EE=6DE@H?[ 😀 2 r@?D6CG2E:G6 %9:?<6C 2?5 2? p52>D r@F?EJ '@E6C] t>2:= 9:> 2E k2 9C67lQ>2:=E@i3F5?2D@?o2@=]4@>Qm3F5?2D@?o2@=]4@>k^2m]k^Am

Originally posted here:

Constitution and Fourth Amendment - Gettysburg Times

Highland case a Fourth Amendment victory: Guest commentary – San Bernardino County Sun

The doorbell to the home you are renting rings. You open it to find a city code enforcement officer asking to do an interior inspection. The officer unveils a list of 80 items to check. There will be snooping through cupboards and drawers, bathrooms, bedrooms and closets.

You feel extremely uncomfortable with the idea of a stranger rummaging through your home, and you wonder why the city feels its needed. After all, if theres a problem with the property, all you need to do is call the owner. It you dont get satisfaction, you could contact code enforcement at that point.

So, you politely tell the officer, I do not want you to inspect the inside of my home.

The officer responds that the inspection is required by city law, and the owner will get in trouble if you dont let me in.

You reply, Im sorry, but without a warrant you cannot come in.

This is a true story, showing how the tenants in a Highland rental home that I own became caught up in the citys systematic assault on privacy rights.

Highland developed a plan to inspect all 4,800 residenti al rentals, whether or not there were any issues with the properties. Officials also decided to cut corners and not seek judicial approval to enter dwellings. Instead, they would pressure owners and renters to allow inspectors in.

My tenants certainly had no complaints about their rental home; it is well-maintained, as with all my properties. They had no reason to want officials intruding on their privacy, so they refused to agree to the inspection, as did I.

The city responded by issuing me a fine, and withholding my rental license in order to force me to comply.

Some property owners might have given in at that point, unwilling to fight city hall. But I have a strong reverence for the Constitution and Americas heritage of liberty, and I was determined not to let the citys coercion go unchallenged. Along with my tenants, I filed a lawsuit in federal court, represented free of charge by Pacific Legal Foundation, a watchdog organization for property rights and individual liberty.

Our case rested on the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches. This is a core liberty, part of the Bill of Rights. It reads as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

You dont need to be a legal scholar to interpret these words. In order for a government agent to enter a private home without permission, a warrant must be obtained.

Advertisement

The good news is that, in the wake of our lawsuit, the city has now repealed its invasive inspection scheme, replacing it with an owners self-inspection program. Highland can now focus enforcement resources on the small number of real problem cases, instead of unnecessarily disturbing the privacy of rental-home residents.

Tenants are customers. Like any business, if you dont take care of your customers they will give their business to someone else. Rental owners want happy, long-term tenants. That is why the vast majority of owners do a good job taking care of their customers.

Whether you own or rent, the Fourth Amendment protects you from warrantless searches of your personal effects, in your private home. It is a precious liberty that we should all cherish.

Unfortunately, Highland is far from alone in imposing oppressive, unjustified search and inspection schemes for rental homes. But the victory that my tenants and I have achieved in Highland should send a message to cities throughout California: They need to bring their code enforcement into conformity with the Constitution.

Karl J. Trautwein, a resident of San Juan Capistrano, owns rental homes in Highland and other Southern California communities.

Read this article:

Highland case a Fourth Amendment victory: Guest commentary - San Bernardino County Sun

Brushing up on landmark Fourth Amendment cases | Tandem … – Land Line Magazine

June 8, 2017

The law dictates when enforcement officers need a warrant for searches and when they dont. Where do the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply and where do they not.

Technologys rapidly changing capabilities present a constant need for constitutional protections to be guided by updated rule of law.

In June 2014, the Supreme Court expanded the law to address privacy concerns in the digital age. In Riley v. California, the justices decided a warrant is needed to search cellphones seized from someone who has been arrested. They knew when they ruled that they werent just talking about a flip phone with a few photos and a contact list. It was a landmark ruling.

In that 2014 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote: The term cell phone is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps or newspapers.

Roberts likened it to ransacking a persons home. Indeed, a cellphone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form.

An example he gave: past location information, now a standard feature.

The court will decide whether law enforcement authorities need a warrant to gather cellphone data from cellphone companies.

The case, Carpenter v. U.S., involves a convicted robber named Timothy Carpenter, who was found guilty partly on the basis of months of cellphone location records turned over without a warrant.

The justices know that technology now gives government the ability to rummage through more than cars, closets, bedroom drawers and smartphone photos. Technology gives enforcement the ability to look at a persons entire life, personal and otherwise, under an amazingly invasive digital microscope. Where and when do you need a warrant for that?

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court conferences on 159 petitions for review and OOIDAs ELD mandate case is one of them. How does OOIDAs ELD case relate? Youve probably already put the dots together. The issues differ fromthose in OOIDAs ELD case. But the courts interest in the gathering of data from electronic devices is significant.

View original post here:

Brushing up on landmark Fourth Amendment cases | Tandem ... - Land Line Magazine

Colorado housing officials invite cops to perform warrantless searches on poor people – Washington Post

Yesterday we looked at a warrantless, mass search of Georgia high school students that was almost certainly unconstitutional, and that some students say included touching and probing of their genitals. Today,another disturbing story about what would seem to be clearly unconstitutional searches at a Colorado low-income apartment complex:

The Longmont Housing Authority says it was using the homes of low-income residents to train police drug dogs. There werent warrants, but simply a notice that the landlord was coming, and a police officer and drug dog would be there, too.

The letter to residents of The Suites low-income housing community starts with standard stuff, notifying them of an inspection. Thats what landlords across Colorado do.

Then it mentions that the police officer and drug dog. Nowhere in the letter are residents told that while they must let the landlord in, they do not have to allow the police officer and drug dog inside without a warrant. And then, if the officer does come inside, anything they find is fair game.

The head of the complex isKrystal Winship Erazo, and she appears to have no concept whatsoever of the Fourth Amendment.

Two months ago, there were some rumors and some concerns about drug activity on the property and one way we found to address it was to invite a partnership with the Longmont Police Department to invite the canines over on their training day, Erazo said in an interview with 9NEWS. Usually it helps the residents feel really secure in that were following up, were holding residents accountable, its an opportunity for the dogs to train.

Ill go ahead and write this, because it apparently needs to be written: Low-incomepeople havethe same rights as everyone else. Low-income people are not the equivalent of tackling dummies, or lab rats or volunteers on some police training course.You cantuse poor people to train your police dogs.

Erazo then spoutsthe hackneyedline of every Fourth Amendment authoritarian everywhere.

If there is concern, it kind of sparks some curiosity for me, Erazo said. You know, what are they concerned about if (the officers) only job is to ensure there arent drugs in the unit?

It sparks some curiosity is a euphemistic way of saying poor people who dont want cops going through their stuff can only beup to no good.

The complex has since halted the searches. But it makes you wonder where else this sort of thing is happening. I recall in researching my first book that in the 1980s and 1990s there were policeraids on entire housing complexes. Every unit inside was hit. The raids were obviously illegal, but the people on the receiving end of them were usually powerless to do much about it.

Good on Denvers 9 News for covering this story, and for making this point in particular:

Its worth noting that the only reason this practice went public and stopped is because someone at the public housing complex knew her rights, and knew that she didnt have to submit to a warrantless police search, no matter what the housing authority said.

See the original post:

Colorado housing officials invite cops to perform warrantless searches on poor people - Washington Post

Sixth Circuit Appeals Court Latest To Say Real-Time Cellphone Location Tracking Not A Fourth Amendment Issue – Techdirt

The Sixth Circuit Appeals Court is the latest to weigh in on cell site location info. It joins every other circuit that has handled the issue in deciding the gathering of cellphone GPS data by law enforcement is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.

This decision [PDF] isn't too surprising considering the court reached the same conclusion last year in a similar case. The difference between the two is the latest case deals with real-time collection of GPS data, rather than historical GPS records. But that's the only difference. The Appeals Court believes the same holds true for real-time location info, although it cites something other than 1979's Smith v. Maryland in its analysis.

[T]he district court heldand we affirm, holding that the governments detection of Montai Rileys whereabouts in this case, which included tracking Rileys real-time GPS location data for approximately seven hours preceding his arrest, did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search under our precedent in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012). The government used Rileys GPS location data to learn that Riley was hiding out at the Airport Inn in Memphis, Tennesseebut only after inquiring of the front-desk clerk did the government ascertain Rileys specific room number in order to arrest him. The GPS tracking thus provided no greater insight into Rileys whereabouts than what Riley exposed to public view as he traveled along public thoroughfares, id. at 774, to the hotel lobby. Therefore, under Skinner, Riley has no reasonable expectation of privacy against such tracking, and the district court properly denied Rileys motion to suppress evidence found upon Rileys arrest.

While tracking a robbery suspect, law enforcement obtained an order demanding AT&T hand over location data as soon as it was collected.

The court order compelled disclosure of call metadata such as inbound and outbound phone numbers and cell-site location (CSL) data, as well as real-time tracking or pinging of the latitude and longitude coordinates of Rileys phone. Specifically, the order required AT&T to disclose the following, potentially for two months, until August 26, 2015:

16. Precision location of mobile device (GPS Location) such that service provider shall initiate a signal to determine the location of the subjects mobile device on the service providers network or with such other reference points as may be reasonable [sic] available and a [sic] such intervals and times as directed by State Task Force Investigators and Deputy Marshals of the United States Marshal Service.

The court goes on to note that the location records submitted as evidence do not show whether this collection of info was triggered by AT&T or by the cellphone's owner.

No evidence of record indicates whether Rileys phone automatically transmitted its GPS coordinates to AT&T (and if so, whether on a continuous basis or otherwise) or whether AT&T affirmatively sent a signal to Rileys phone to cause it to send AT&T its GPS coordinates.

This should have been a warning flag. It's one thing to collect this info as it comes in. If AT&T is pinging the phone to generate GPS coordinates, AT&T is essentially performing a search on behalf of the government. That should make a difference in this case, as it shifts it from being about a collection of third-party records to an affirmative gathering of records by the government, using AT&T as a third-party stand-in to work around warrant requirements. (Not that case law is settled for GPS tracking, but still)

But it doesn't. The court goes on to say it doesn't matter because the records were gathered by a third party and they all dealt with the movement of an individual in a public area (the motel where he was arrested). That's why the court cites the Skinner decision, rather than relying exclusively on Smith v. Maryland.

In Skinner, we held that location data emitted by a voluntarily procured cell phone could not be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the cell-phone user had no reason to expect that the government would compel the service provider to disclose those data. Id. at 779. There, because the defendants movements could have been observed by any member of the public, ibid., we held that it could not possibly be a Fourth Amendment violation for law-enforcement officers to monitor those movements by using cell-phone location data just because such electronic monitoring was more efficient than relying on visual surveillance alone.

But it then goes on to reach a conclusion which seems to contradict the evidence provided.

Using seven hours of GPS location data to determine an individuals location (or a cell phones location), so long as the tracking does not reveal movements within the home (or hotel room), does not cross the sacred threshold of the home, and thus cannot amount to a Fourth Amendment search. After all, the tracking in Knotts revealed the location of the cabin to which the criminal suspects had traveledbut the tracking in Knotts was not a search because it revealed no information about the interior of the cabin itself. Likewise here, the tracking revealed only that Riley had traveled to the Airport Inn, not which room (if any) the phone was in at the time of the tracking.

The lack of location info particularity should have worked against the government's argument. The court even admits in a footnote the government had no idea where exactly the suspect was located -- only a general idea that he was likely in a publicly-accessible building.

When viewed on a map, the majority of these coordinates are scattered within the perimeter of the Airport Inn, but with insufficient precisioneven if the Airport Inn were only one story tallto reveal which room, if any, the phone was in at the time of each ping.

So, it could be argued the government did track the suspect's "movements within a hotel room," which would put this back in Fourth Amendment territory. But the court never attempts to reconcile these contradictory statements and instead continues to use both the motel's accessibility and the coarse location info as an argument against potential Fourth Amendment violations.

That Riley was arrested in a motel is of no moment, for the government learned no more about Rileys whereabouts from tracking his cell-phone GPS data than what Riley exposed to public view by traveling to the motel lobby along public thoroughfares, Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774even if Riley meant to keep his location a secret, one cannot expect privacy in ones public movements.

Certainly the arrest was "no moment," but the tracking that occurred once he was inside the building should have been given more consideration. The fact that law enforcement can obtain real-time location tracking information definitely needs to be examined more closely, especially when there's ample evidence law enforcement has effectively backdated orders like these to cover up use of more intrusive technology like Stingray devices.

More here:

Sixth Circuit Appeals Court Latest To Say Real-Time Cellphone Location Tracking Not A Fourth Amendment Issue - Techdirt

Supreme Court agrees to hear ‘Carpenter v. United States,’ the Fourth Amendment historical cell-site case – Washington Post

Therewas enormously important Fourth Amendment news from the Supreme Court on Monday: The justices agreed to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuits decision in Carpenter v. United States, one of the long-pending cases on whether the Fourth Amendment protects government access to historical cell-site records.

This is a momentous development, I think. Its not an exaggeration to say that the future of surveillance law hinges on how the Supreme Court rules in the case. Let me say a bit about the case, the issues it will decide and why it matters.

I. The Facts of the Case

Carpenter involves a string of armed robberies that occurred over a two-year period. A group of men (at least five of them) would go into cellphone stores armed with guns, order the customers and employees to the back, and steal the phones. Carpenter was the lead organizer of the conspiracy, and he often supplied the guns, acted as a lookout and would signal when each robbery was to begin.

One of Carpenters conspirators confessed to the crime and gave the government his cellphone number and the numbers of the other conspirators (16 numbers total). The government applied for three different court orders for the cell-site records associated with those numbers, which included Carpenters number. Specifically, the orders sought cell site information for Carpenters phone at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls. The government obtained the orders under the Stored Communications Act. They complied with the statute, but the statute requires only reasonable suspicion and not probable cause.

The order that covered Carpenter was directed at his cellphone provider MetroPCS. MetroPCS produced 127 days of historical cell-site records. (Sprint produced another seven days of historical cell-site records for Carpenters phone from a time window when he was roaming and Sprint picked up his service instead of MetroPCS.) Together with the orders obtained, the records showed that that the phones of the alleged conspirators were within distances ranging from a half-mile up to two miles of the robberies at the time they occurred. Specifically, Carpenters phone was shown to be in communication with cell towers near four robberies over a five-month window.

II. The Legal Issues

Here is how counsel for the petitioner framed the question presented:

Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

And heres how the United States redrafted the question presented in its brief in opposition:

Whether the governments acquisition, pursuant to a court order issued under 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), of historical cell-site records created and maintained by a cellular-service provider violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual customer to whom the records pertain.

I gather, then, that the case will consider two distinct questions. First, is the collection of the records a Fourth Amendment search? And second, if it is a search, is it a search that requires a warrant?

Notably, neither side sought review of whether the good-faith exception applies if the answer to both of these questions is yes. The parties are asking only for a ruling on the merits, with any remedies decision bifurcated for review on remand if the Supreme Court reverses.

III. Why The Case Matters

The Carpenter case is tremendously important, I think. The structure of modern surveillance law is built on the idea that the contents of communications receive Fourth Amendment protection but that non-content metadata records about communications, and other third-party business records do not. That has been the rule since the 19th century for postal letters, and it has been the rule since 1979 for phone calls. Carpenter will help determine if that basic rule framework will remain, or if the Supreme Court will amend it somewhat or even dramatically change it.

Part of the importance of the case is that its not just about cell-site records. Although the case is formally about cell-site records, its really about where to draw lines in terms of what network surveillance triggers the Fourth Amendment and how the Fourth Amendment applies. The justices cant answer how the Fourth Amendment applies to cell-site records without providing a framework for how the Fourth Amendment applies to many other forms of surveillance, such as visual surveillance, obtaining traditional phone records, obtaining e-mail transactional records, obtaining credit card records and the like.

For example, readers will recall the debate over the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. Among the issues likely to be pressed in Carpenter is whether the justices should adopt or reject the mosaic theory. Note that the question presented focuses on the fact that the records covered 172 days. Should the length covered by the records matter? Is evidence collection for a short time window no search that becomes a search because the records spanned a long time window?

Plus, remember that the justices will have two questions: what a search is, and when searches are reasonable. Most will focus on the first question, but note that the two issues go together. As I explained here, the broader the court interprets search, the more pressure there is to water down reasonableness. The narrower the definition of search, the stronger the reasonableness standard tends to be. This creates some interesting dynamics. For example, you might get a ruling that there is no search but that retains the traditional default warrant rule for searches. On the other hand, you might get a ruling that a search occurred but that authorizes a new category of warrantless surveillance. This is just speculation, of course, but I suspect the briefing will urge major doctrinal innovations on both questions.

IV. Why Did the Justices Take the Case?

Some will speculate that the Supreme Court would have taken the case only if it were going to reverse. I have no idea how the court will rule, but I tend to doubt that. If I had to guess, I would guess that the court took these cases because theyre really important. The lower court rulings are based on the third-party doctrine, and none of the current justices were on the court the last time the justices decided a case on the third-party doctrine. Its pretty sensible to have the current Supreme Court weigh in.

As it happens, I think the third-party doctrine is essential to technological surveillance in a digital age. As I see it, the doctrine is needed to maintain the essential balance on which Fourth Amendment law has been built and on which it evolves in response to new technology. Prominent alternatives, like the mosaic theory, strike me as a dead end. But it makes a lot of sense for the justices to review these cases and decide whether they agree and if not, identify what new framework should replace it.

V. Lots of Blogging Ahead

Finally, Ill probably be doing a lot of carpentry (that is, blogging about the issues raised in Carpenter) over the next few months. A lot of my academic work in the past decade has been about issues that touch on the case, so it will be really fun to see what the justices do.

Excerpt from:

Supreme Court agrees to hear 'Carpenter v. United States,' the Fourth Amendment historical cell-site case - Washington Post

Opinion analysis: Finding Fourth Amendment unanimity while … – SCOTUSblog (blog)

In an opinion that seems carefully crafted to achieve unanimity rather than break new ground, the court yesterdayunsurprisingly and unanimously rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuits Fourth Amendment provocation rule while leaving the specific facts open for further analysis on remand. Justice Samuel Alito authored a crisp 11-page opinion, without dissent, for an eight-justice court (Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate) that is rightfully weary of 4-4 tie possibilities. Alitos opinion hewed closely to the excessive force precedent of Graham v. Connor and avoided points that had provoked strong disagreement at oral argument and in the briefs. As a result, the opinion masks more issues than it resolves. All we know, after reading this opinion, is this: When law enforcement uses force that is judged reasonable based on circumstances relevant to that determination, then a different Fourth Amendment violation cannot transform [that] reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure.

Sympathetic facts and three distinct Fourth Amendment claims

As detailed in my prior summary, two deputy sheriffs, searching for a felon, entered a shack where they had been told a homeless couple lived, without a search warrant and without knocking or announcing their presence or identity. Angel Mendez and his then-girlfriend were resting inside. When he heard someone entering, Mendez picked up a BB gun to move it in order to stand up. The deputies saw what they reasonably viewed as a weapon pointed in their direction, and immediately opened fire, severely injuring the woman and Mendez (whose lower leg was amputated as a result).

The Mendezes (now married) pursued three distinct Fourth Amendment claims in their federal lawsuit against the deputies and Los Angeles County: the failure to get a search warrant, the failure to knock and announce, and excessive force. No one has disputed that, at the moment of the shooting, the deputies acted reasonably in shooting to protect themselves. But as Alito notes, the district court did not end its excessive force analysis at this point. Instead, the court awarded damages based on why the shooting took place, noting that were it not for the failure to get a warrant and to knock and announce both constitutional violations Mendez would not have been startled or picked up his gun.

In so ruling, the district court applied the 9th Circuits provocation rule, which as described by Alito permits an excessive force claim where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed this application of its doctrine. The appeals court held that entering the residence without a warrant violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. But the court ruled that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity for the knock-and-announce violation, because it was not clearly established in this context: Other officers had in fact knocked and announced at the front door of the main house. Still, because the deputies unconstitutional warrantless entry had recklessly provoked the otherwise reasonable shooting, the court of appeals affirmed the damages award.

As an alternative rationale, the appeals court said that basic notions of proximate cause also supported the damages award, regardless of the provocation rule, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the officers would meet an armed homeowner when they barged into the shack unannounced. But, as the Supreme Court noted in remanding on this alternative theory, by relying on the unannounced nature of the entry, the court of appeals appeared to focus on the same knock-and-announce violation for which it had already ruled that the officers should receive immunity.

The court rejects the provocation rule as an unwarranted and illogical expansion of Graham

When law enforcement officers use force to effect a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness. A law-enforcement entry, an arrest, and even a shooting (a seizure) are Fourth Amendment events governed by this timeless yet amorphous constitutional standard. Claims of unreasonable force by law enforcement in such circumstances are characterized as excessive force, and can lead to constitutional tort damage awards for violating the Fourth Amendment, unless qualified immunity intervenes to protect the law-enforcement officers from liability.

As the court pointedly noted yesterday, The framework for analyzing excessive force claims is set out in Graham v. Connor. In Graham, Alito emphasized, the court held that the operative question in excessive force cases is whether the totality of circumstances justifies a particular search or seizure, paying careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

No one can argue with this account of settled law because, of course, it is so general that it answers no specific questions. The trick how such general legal principles are applied to the specific facts of each case.

It is in this application that the 9th Circuit erred, said the court as it overturned the provocation rule. [T]he objective reasonableness analysis, the court explained, must be conducted separately for each search or seizure. In the courts view, the fundamental flaw of the provocation rule is that it uses a separate and independent constitutional violation to manufacture an excessive force claim where one would not otherwise exist. When viewed from the deputies perspectives at the time they confronted a weapon pointed at them, the shooting in this case was not unreasonable. By asking a court to look back in time to see if there was a different Fourth Amendment violation that is somehow tied to the eventual use of force, the Supreme Court reasoned, the 9th Circuits novel and unsupported rule conflates distinct Fourth Amendment claims.

A key footnote necessary to avoid a 4-4 tie?

If you followed the courts opinion to this point, you might think that the it would conclude by holding that Mendez cannot recover damages in this case. But that is not what the opinion says at all. Instead, a single footnote appears in the opinion, marked with an * rather than a number. One can speculate that this footnote was first suggested by someone other than the opinions author a justice who threatened otherwise to dissent. Even more likely, four justices may have asked for this footnote as a condition for joining, thereby threatening a 4-4 affirmance of the judgment below and continuation of the provocation rule. That was surely an outcome Alito and other justices wanted to avoid. Thus footnote * is the key to this opinion. Here is what it says:

Graham commands that an officers use of force be assessed for reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. On respondents view, that means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior to the use of force that foreseeably created the need to use it. We did not grant certiorari on that question . All we hold today is that once a use of force is deemed reasonable under Graham, it may not be found unreasonable by reference to some separate constitutional violation.

Thus and this seems surprising given the tone of the opinion up to this point the court did not rule that the Mendezes cannot recover on the facts of their case. All the court held was that the theory of the provocation rule that one constitutional violation can somehow render a different, separate and distinct, reasonable seizure unconstitutional is rejected. This holding does not mean or at least it does not appear to mean that persons injured by law enforcements use of force cannot recover for injuries proximately caused by a Fourth Amendment violation committed before the moment of a shooting. Indeed, a key phrase from Graham at the moment on which the petitioners had relied, was pointedly not mentioned anywhere in this opinion.

In light of footnote *, yesterdays opinion seems uneventful. As with all good proximate cause tort hypotheticals, the outcome will depend on the facts. This is nothing new, given that the Framers made the word unreasonable the fulcrum of the Fourth Amendment in 1790.

Conclusion

In a concluding paragraph that I imagine was also worked on by more than one justice, the court appeared to endorse the objective Alito also called it a notion that it is important to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable consequences of all their constitutional torts. This seems like a healthy recognition in light of contemporary concerns regarding police shootings. Indeed, said the court, both parties and, it appears, the unanimous court accept the principle that plaintiffs can subject to qualified immunity generally recover damages that are proximately caused by any Fourth Amendment violation. This phrasing may satisfy the justices offended by this particular shooting and favoring recovery by persons like the Mendezes severely injured by law enforcement although they had nothing to do with the event, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor said at oral argument. In deference to those justices, the court remanded the case for the lower courts to revisit the proximate cause question. (In a somewhat unusual move, the court pointed to specific pages of the briefing as a useful starting point for the remand.) Meanwhile, the 9th Circuits general provocation rule is dead, as Alito had suggested it should be two years ago in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan and, indeed, years earlier as a judge on the U.S Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.

Thus the court preserved the logic of its precedents, while not endorsing the law-enforcement shooting of two innocent people. It would be encouraging if this opinion set a new standard for the newly reconstituted court: finding ways to rule unanimously while reaching fair results.

Click for vote alignment by ideology.

Posted in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, Analysis, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: Rory Little, Opinion analysis: Finding Fourth Amendment unanimity while allowing Fourth Amendment justice, SCOTUSblog (May. 31, 2017, 11:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysis-finding-fourth-amendment-unanimity-allowing-fourth-amendment-justice/

The rest is here:

Opinion analysis: Finding Fourth Amendment unanimity while ... - SCOTUSblog (blog)

Exigent Circumstances Under the Fourth Amendment May Extend to the Need to Interview an Arrestee in Place – Lexology (registration)

In a split decision in United States v. Delva, No. 15-cr-683 (Kearse, Winter, Jacobs), the Second Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment allowed law enforcement officers to seize cell phones and a number of letters that were in plain view in the room of a suspects home where he was interviewed immediately after an arrest. The majority opinion, written by Judge Kearse, relied on the exigent circumstances doctrine to hold that it was reasonable under the circumstances to hold an interview in the suspects home, which allowed the officers to seize incriminating evidence that was in plain view without obtaining a search warrant. Although the majority opinion is careful to recognize that the exigent circumstances exception requires a case-by-case analysis, the decision extends the infrequently applied exigent circumstances doctrine to a new set of facts. The decision drew a dissent from Judge Jacobs, who objected to the majoritys reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine when the government had not raised it in the trial or appellate court, thus denying the defendant any chance to respond to this somewhat novel analysis offered by the Court.

The case arose out of a brutal drug-related double kidnapping, robbery, and assault committed in 2012 in the Bronx. The panel opinion begins with a recitation of the gory facts, which involved a violent home invasion robbery followed by a second kidnapping, all in a search for drug money. The resulting investigation led law enforcement officers to a small, three-room apartment with an arrest warrant for Gregory Accilienbut no search warrant. When the police arrived, Accilien was in the apartment along with defendant David Delva, who was not yet a suspect in the kidnapping/robbery, as well as two other men, a woman, and several children. After entering the apartment, the police moved the woman and children to the living room, handcuffed three of the men in the kitchen, and handcuffed Delva on the floor of the bedroom. While securing Delva and checking the bedroom for additional people, the officers spotted a bag of cocaine and a loaded gun through an open closet door. They seized the gun and the drugs and moved Delva to the kitchen. It took the officers less than two minutes to secure the apartment.

While Accilien was put under arrest for the kidnapping, the officers testified that they did not know who was responsible for the guns and the drugs found in the bedroom, which contained both a bed and an air mattress. The officers took Accilien into the bedroomthe only empty room other than the bathroomto question him. Accilien said that the gun and the drugs were Delvas, and Delva was arrested and charged under state law. However, while they were in the bedroom questioning Accilien, one of the officers observed two cell phones, one on the TV and one on the bed, and several letters addressed to Accilien from an individual who was already under arrest for the kidnapping. The letters implicated Delva in the kidnapping, and he was rearrested on federal charges several months later.

The primary question on appeal was whether the district court (Forrest, J.) erred in denying the motion to suppress the phones and the letters. There was little dispute that the items were in plain view, so, under well-established case law, the officers could seize the phones and letters so long as the officers were lawfully in the bedroom when they spotted them. The Second Circuit began by rejecting the reasoning of the district court, holding that the phone and the letters were not seized as part of a protective sweep of the apartment. The Second Circuit found that the district court erred by treating the phone and letters, which the officers saw in plain view during the interview of Accilien, just like the gun and the drugs, which they saw in plain view while securing Delva and the bedroom. While the officers behaved reasonably to ensure their safety by conducting a protective sweep, handcuffing Delva, and checking that the bedroom was otherwise empty, they did not see the phone or the letters on this first trip to the bedroom during this protective sweep. It was only when the officers re-entered the bedroom, after the apartment had been secured, that the additional evidence was found. At that point, additional searches could not be justified by the officers concern for their safety.

Rather than reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case, the majority instead identified a different doctrine that supported the constitutionality of the search: the exigent circumstances exception. The Court held that this doctrine justified the officers presence in the bedroom when they saw the cell phones and letters. This rationale had not been raised by the government at the trial court or circuit court level. The classic exigent circumstances case involves a situation in which the police must enter a private area to prevent the destruction of evidence or a suspects flight. But the majority extended the doctrines reach to these facts, noting that reasonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court cited to its prior decisions considering whether warrantless conduct was permitted. E.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc). The majority found that it was reasonable for the officers to take Accilien into the bedroom to interview him because (1) they did not know who to arrest for possession of the drugs and the cellphone, (2) Accilien might have been intimidated from speaking freely in the presence of the others, and (3) besides the bathroom, the bedroom was the only empty room in the apartment with a door. The case cited by the panel involving the most analogous facts to those in Delva was an unpublished decision from the Sixth Circuit. See United States v. Ocean, 564 F. Appx 765, 771 (6th Cir. 2014).

Judge Jacobs dissented from the Fourth Amendment analysis, and would have remanded the case to the district judge to consider the exigent circumstances exception, the application of which is a fact-dependent question. He observed that because the government had never raised that exception, either before the trial court or on appeal, Delva had no opportunity to respond, either on the facts or the law. Moreover, Judge Jacobs said that [i]t is not as though there would have been nothing for Delvas counsel to say, noting that no published opinion from any circuit court has ever applied the exigent circumstances doctrine to similar facts.

In a brief final section of the opinion, the majority rejected Delvas remaining arguments. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing one of the victims to testify about her rape, even though Delva was not charged with rape, because it formed a part of the story line that explained how the crime progressed. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the removal of a juror who had failed to disclose arrests and convictions at voir dire and during later questioning. Finally, the Court rejected Delvas challenge to his sentence which, at 360 months, was below the Guidelines range of life plus five years.

The Court of Appeals was evidently troubled by the district courts ruling on the protective sweep doctrine, believing that the district court expanded the doctrine beyond the very specific type of situation it was meant to address: a warrantless seizure of evidence that is seen in plain view while the police officers are conducting a necessary safety procedure during an arrest. Where the officers have secured the premises and are taking second-order investigative steps, the protective sweep doctrine no longer applies. By deciding the appeal on alternate grounds, the Court of Appeals was able to avoid remanding this case, involving very serious allegations, for a new trial. However, this result came at the cost of a broadened interpretation of the exigent circumstances doctrine. Given the fact-specific nature of the Courts decision and the Courts emphasis on reasonableness as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, it leaves open the possibility of limiting the reach of Delva in future cases. Finally, although the majority seems to have believed that no additional fact-finding or briefing was necessary, litigants are rightly disturbed to lose on an issue that they never had the opportunity to brief or argue. In light of this, litigants will probably hope that this procedure continues to be the exception and not the rule.

Continue reading here:

Exigent Circumstances Under the Fourth Amendment May Extend to the Need to Interview an Arrestee in Place - Lexology (registration)

Obama vandalized Fourth Amendment – Washington Times – Washington Times

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

The Fourth Amendments barriers to unreasonable searches and seizures dont get the attention the First Amendment does, but theyre at least as important as a guarantee of liberty. And during his White House years Barack Obama vandalized the Fourth Amendment. His glittering words blinded the media to his unprecedented assault on the right to be let alonethe most cherished right among civilized people.

The American Revolution was ignited by British invasions of the right to privacy. James Otis protested British Writs of Assistance that empowered every petty official to rummage through colonial businesses and homes on a hope and a prayer that smuggled goods or other incriminating evidence of wrongdoing might be discovered:

Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial servants may enter, may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire. Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.

William Pitt the Elder, speaking to the British Parliament, captured the heart and soul of what came to be ratified as the Fourth Amendment:

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter, the rain may enter,but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.

The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy from government surveillance, and in Olmstead v. United States (1928), Justice Brandeis (dissenting) said that, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The government cannot invade a persons privacy without documenting a particularized and urgent criminal justice or foreign intelligence need to a neutral and impartial magistrate. The prohibition does not bend even in cases of homicide or international terrorism where its shield might enable serious wrongful conduct to escape detection. Our Constitution is anchored to the high principle that it is better to risk being the victim of injustice than to risk being complicit in it.

That is, until now. President Obamas dragnet collection of internet and phone metadata on every American citizen obliterated the Fourth Amendments privacy fortress. Without getting a court warrant, Mr. Obamas National Security Agencys Stellar Wind program indiscriminately collected internet metadata, i.e., the accounts to which Americans sent and from which they received emails. The metadata detailed the internet protocol (IP) addresses used by people inside the United States when sending emails. Julian Sanchez of the CATO Institute explained the magnitude of the invasion of privacy:

The calls you make can reveal a lot, but now that so much of our lives are mediated by the internet, your IP logs are really a real-time map of your brain: what are you reading about, what are you curious about, what personal ad are you responding to (with a dedicated email linked to that specific ad), what online discussions are you participating in, and how often?Seeing your IP logs and especially feeding them through sophisticated analytic tools is a way of getting inside your head thats in many ways on par with reading your diary.

President Obama also collected metadata on every phone call made by Americans, under a tortured interpretation of section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. Among other things, the telephony metadata included the time, duration, number called, and routing information of every phone communication in the United States. The database would enable the government to create a personal profile of citizen. U.S. District Judge Richard Leon found a high probability that the dragnet collection of telephony metadata violated the Fourth Amendment in Klayman v. Obama.

I cannot imagine a more indiscriminate and arbitrary invasion [of privacy] than this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen for the purpose of querying and analyzing it without prior judicial approval. Surely, such a program infringes on that degree of privacy that the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, I have little doubt that the author of our Constitution, James Madison, who cautioned us to beware the abridgment of freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power, would be aghast.

President Obamas own Privacy and Civil Liberties Board similarly found Steller Wind unauthorized by section 215 the USA Patriot Act. It amplified that it could not find a single instance in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a terrorism investigation[and added]we are aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also concluded that Stellar Wind was illegal in ACLU v. Clapper.

President Obamas presidency was unprecedented in its scorched earth tactics against the Fourth Amendment. And were only now beginning to find out how he weaponized this information against political enemies.

View post:

Obama vandalized Fourth Amendment - Washington Times - Washington Times

The Bill of Rights at the Border: Fourth Amendment Limits on Searching Your Data and Devices – EFF

More than 325,000 people enter the United States via airports every day, with hundreds of thousands more crossing by land at the borders. Not only is that a lot of people, its also a lot of computers, smartphones, and tablets riding along in our pockets, bags, and trunks. Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment protections we enjoy inside the U.S. for our devices arent always as strong when were crossing bordersand the Department of Homeland Security takes advantage of it. On the other hand, the border is not a Constitution-free zone. What are the limits to how and how much customs and immigrations officials can access our data?

To help answer those questions, were offering the second in our series of posts on the Constitution at the border, focusing this time on the Fourth Amendment. For Part 1 on the First Amendment, click here.

The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. In most circumstances, the Fourth Amendment requires that government agents obtain a warrant from a judge by presenting preliminary evidence establishing probable cause to believe that the thing to be searched or seized likely contains evidence of illegal activity before the officer is authorized to search.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a border search exception to the probable cause warrant requirement on the theory that the government has an interest in protecting the integrity of the border by enforcing the immigration and customs laws. As a result, routine searches at the border do not require a warrant or any individualized suspicion that the thing to be searched contains evidence of illegal activity.

But the border search exception is not without limits. As noted, this exception only applies to routine searches, such as those of luggage or bags presented at the border. Non-routine searches such as searches that are highly intrusive and impact the dignity and privacy interests of individuals, or are carried out in a particularly offensive manner must meet a higher standard: individualized reasonable suspicion. In a nutshell, that means border agents must have specific and articulable facts suggesting that a particular person may be involved in criminal activity.

For example, the Supreme Court held that disassembling a gas tank is routine and so a warrantless and suspicionless search is permitted. However, border agents cannot detain a traveler until they have defecated to see if they are smuggling drugs in their digestive tract unless the agents have a reasonable suspicion that the traveler is a drug mule.

How does this general framework apply to digital devices and data at the border? Border agents argue that the border search exception applies to digital searches. We think they are wrong. Given that digital devices like smartphones and laptops contain highly personal information and provide access to even more private information stored in the cloud, the border search exception should not apply.

As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in a 2014 case, Riley v. California:

Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life.

Snooping into such privacies is extraordinarily intrusive, not routine. Thus, when the government asserted the so-called incident to arrest exception to justify searching a cell phone without a warrant during or immediately after an arrest, the Supreme Court called foul.

Why is the Riley decision important at the border? For one thing, the incident to arrest exception that the government tried to invoke is directly comparable to the border search exception, because both are considered categorical exemptions. Given that the intrusion is identical in both instances, the same privacy protections should apply.

Moreover, with the ubiquity of cloud computing, a digital device serves as a portal to highly sensitive data, where the privacy interests are even more significant. Following Riley, we believe that any border search of a digital device or data in the cloud is unlawful unless border agents first obtain a warrant by showing, to a judge, in advance, that they have probable cause to believe the device (or cloud account) likely contains evidence of illegal activity.

However, lower courts havent quite caught up with Riley. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that border agents only need reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before they could conduct a non-routine forensic search of a travelers laptop, aided by sophisticated software. Even worse, the Ninth Circuit also held that a manual search of a digital device is routine and so a warrantless and suspicionless search is still reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Some courts have been even less protective. Last year a court in the Eastern District of Michigan upheld a computer-aided border search of a travelers electronic devices that lasted several hours without reasonable suspicion.

EFF is working hard to persuade courts (and border agents) to adopt the limits set forth in the Riley decision for border searches of cellphones and other digital devices. In the meantime, what should you do to protect your digital privacy?

Much turns on your individual circumstances and personal risk assessment. The consequences for non-compliance with a command from a CBP agent to unlock a device will be different, for example, for a U.S. citizen versus a non-citizen. If you are a U.S. citizen, agents must let you enter the country eventually; they cannot detain you indefinitely. If you are a lawful permanent resident, agents might raise complicated questions about your continued status as a resident. If you are a foreign visitor, agents may deny you entry entirely.

We recommend that everyone conduct their own threat model to determine what course of action to take at the border. Our in depth Border Search Whitepaper offers you a spectrum of tools and practices that you may choose to use to protect your personal data from government intrusion. For a more general outline of potential practices, see our pocket guides to Knowing Your Rights and Protecting Your Data at the Border.

Were also collecting stories of border search abuses at: borders@eff.org

And join EFF in calling for stronger Constitutional protection for your digital information by contacting Congress on this issue today.

Follow this link:

The Bill of Rights at the Border: Fourth Amendment Limits on Searching Your Data and Devices - EFF