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The Guardian reported:

The warrant covers the people who own and operate the site, but also seeks to get the IP addresses of 1.3 million people who visited it, as well as the date and time of their visit, and information about what browser or operating system they used.

There are a variety of concerning aspects to this set of events. First, and most obviously, are those related to the First Amendment (freedom of speech and assembly) and the Fourth Amendment (protection from unreasonable search and seizure). The Department of Justice wants the IP addresses of every visitor to the siteand from that information the physical location of each visitor can be ascertained. It makes identification not all that difficult. Besides freedom of speech, there are questions about the scope of the warrant. The Fourth Amendment makes it clear a warrant must specify locations to be searched and probable cause. Orin Kerr noted in the Washington Post:

Courts have allowed the government to get a suspects entire email account, which the government can then search through for evidence. But is the collective set of records concerning a website itself so extensive that it goes beyond what the Fourth Amendment allows? In the physical world, the government can search only one apartment in an apartment building with a single warrant; it cant search the entire apartment building.

Additionally, one has to be concerned that one branch of government would use their power to collect private information about citizens it feels threatened by. It looks like a personal score to settle. People who disagree with the executive branch are to be identifiedand to what end specifically? Over 200 people have already been charged with felony rioting at the inauguration. Why does the Department of Justice need to identify 1.3 million people who might disagree with the executive branch? It is frightening not only for civil liberties but for what it can mean on the slippery slope of settling political scores with citizens. Ask the Mothers of the Disappeared in Argentina: This is dangerous.

At the end of June, the executive branch asked the states to turn over voter registration information for the voter fraud commission. The information requested voter rolls, dates of birth and the last four digits of social security numbers. North Carolinas bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement announced it would turn over publicly available information to the commission, but not social security numbers and dates of birth. Some states have refused to comply. I have to admit: The possibility of finding oneself purged from the voter rolls is a scary idea.

About 10 years ago, I found myself dropped from the voter registration rolls. It was a bit of a surprise; I showed up on election day and was informed I was not registered to vote in New Hanover County. The poll worker asked if I had registered to vote?

Yes, I answered. I have voted at this precinct location for the past six years. I usually come in with one of my parents and we would take turns standing with the dog outside, because a family that votes together stays together.

After much hemming and hawing with the poll workers, I was given a provisional ballot. I sorted out my registration and, thankfully (fingers crossed), have not had a problem since.

I come from a family that makes voting a priority. I am comfortable advocating for that right with people in positions of authority.

Recently, my household went through the citizenship process and one of the recurring themes in the process was voting is one of the most important ways to participate in a democracy and preform a civic duty. At the Naturalization Ceremony, the League of Women Voters were standing by with voter registration forms for each of the newly sworn-in citizens.

It doesnt take a giant leap of imagination to see those two lists overlap: Who visited a website the executive branch dislikes and who voted against the candidate in the last election? Where there is a match, how hard would it be to drop a name from the rolls? As far-fetched as this would have sounded 18 months ago, it is just not hard to imagine right now. If they control who can vote, they can control who wins an election. The timing of demanding these two sets of data is startling and frightening.

Dreamhost is challenging in the warrant and a hearing is scheduled on August 18. What is possibly more frightening than the above scenario is the possibility this is just a litmus test. If successful, where does it stop? What speech and assembly freedoms could we lose?

In the wake of the events at Charlottesville and escalating concern regarding North Koreawhich strike a primal and emotional chordit is hard to focus on something as dry as a justice department warrant. But that is exactly why it is important. The events surrounding the warrant and what happens with the information gathered will directly impact the publics ability to talk back to power and speak freely.

Allowing one branch of the government to target citizens who disagree is dangerous The possibilities of the internet are a fascinating double-edged sword. Never before in history have we had the ability to share information, opinions and ideas with such immediacy. Social media and web tools can allow for assemblies with short notice on a scale not previously imaginedand the documentation of the assemblies can be shared and made available around the world as they unfold. But the footprint and trackability of online activity is the other side of the coin. Potentially targeting someones voting rights based upon political opinions is not what the constitution intends.

Its important: protecting citizens rights to vote, speak and participate in democracy. It is essential to our future.

CharlottesvilleDepartment of Justiceencore magazineFourth AmendmentGwenyfar RohlerLeague of Women VotersMothers of the Disappeared in ArgentinaNaturalization Ceremonynew hanover countyNorth KoreaOrin KerrState Board of Elections and Ethics EnforcementUnited States ConstitutionWashington PostWilmington NC

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LIVE LOCAL, LIVE SMALL: What freedoms and liberties do we stand to lose? - encore Online

Immigration Law

Posted August 21, 2017, 11:44 am CDT

By Debra Cassens Weiss

Several sheriffs told the New York Times about the legal maneuver in which sheriffs would become ICE contractors, and the jails would be paid a daily fee to hold immigrants believed to be in the country illegally until ICE takes custody.

ICE spokeswoman Sarah Rodriguez told the Times that the agency was exploring a number of options to address sheriffs concerns, and no final decision has been made.

The Times explains the Fourth Amendment issue. Sheriffs enforce criminal law, and they cant make immigration arrests because they are civil in nature. Because of that difference, judges have found that holding immigrants who have paid bail or served their sentence is an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Sheriff Bob Gualtieri of Pinellas County, Florida, told the newspaper that he came up with the reasoning supporting the idea and presented it to ICE. Its a seamless transition, said Gualtieri, who is also a lawyer.

Gualtieri said he was told that the plan would be rolled out through a pilot program in Florida before it is expanded nationwide.

Omar Jadwat, the director of the American Civil Liberties Unions immigrants rights project, didnt think the plan would satisfy judges. Its a kind of window dressing on the same practice, he told the Times. It doesnt really change the legal analysis.

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Plan would designate sheriffs as ICE contractors in bid to bypass Fourth Amendment court decisions - ABA Journal

The Home School Legal Defense Association, the nations premiere advocate for homeschooling, is representing a family in its suit against a police officers unauthorized entry into a private home, even though the case has nothing to do with homeschooling.

Its because the case brought by LuAnn, Joseph and Timothy Batt against police officer Joseph Buccilli, who forced his way into the familys home without either a warrant or an emergency reason, illustrates the battle for the front door.

The family is appealing to the the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing the Fourth Amendment protects them from unreasonable searches.

The amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The case is relevant to homeschoolers, HSDLA explains, because early homeschoolers sometimesfound an investigative social worker at their front door, often accompanied by uniformed police officers.

These authorities were typically investigating anonymous tips that didnt have much to do with homeschooling itself often something like this: The children are always home, they dont go to school, and the family seems really religious.'

Police State USA: How Orwells Nightmare Is Becoming Our Reality chronicles how America has arrived at the point of being a de facto police state and what led to an out-of-control government that increasingly ignores the Constitution. Order today!

HSLDA said homeschoolers soon learned that front-door encounters with an investigative social worker could be traumatic for both parents and children alike.

Protecting our member families from such unwarranted investigations was what drew HSLDA into what we call the battle for the front door defending Fourth Amendment rights, the organizationsaid.

In the New York case, Buccilli, a police officerin Orchard City, barged into the familys home without a warrant after being told he had no permission to enter.

He claimed social services had asked him to do a welfare check at the home.

According to an HSLDA brief to the 2nd Circuit, which asks that the lower courts decision to award Buccilli immunity in the case be overturned, the officeradmitted he knew nothing about any allegations of wrongdoingor any emergencyand didnt know who asked for the welfare check.

I dont know the basis of the allegations or what the welfare concerns are, he told the family. We do have a right to come in here when an allegation is made.

I dont need a search warrant. I dont need to ask permission, he continued.

And, multiple times, he threatened anyone who obstructed him with arrest.

He ended up talking to a senior citizen, LuAnn Batts father, Fred Puntoriero, who was well-dressed and well-groomed and was being cared for by a nurse, and left. Social services closed down its investigation almost immediately.

But the lawsuit against the officer argueshe did exactly what the Constitution, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, forbids.

Entries without a warrant are allowed for several reasons: when an officer is in hot pursuit of a suspect, when evidence is in imminent danger of being destroyed or someone is in need of emergency aid.

The brief points outnone of those circumstances existed for Buccilli.

Pointedly, the brief states, In 2004, the Supreme Court said no reasonable officer could claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitutional.

It turns out, the brief explains, that Puntorieros daughter-in-law, who had been involved in disputes with the family over Freds care and property, had called authorities with the complaint that two weeks earlier her husband had expressed concern over his fathers welfare.

However, when Fred livedwith her and her husband, he was diagnosed with failure to thrive.

She told adult protective services that her husband had said two weeks earlier that Fred was lethargic when he visited.

APS admitted such reports from an underlying family dispute often are false, but the officer charged into the home anyway.

On April 17, 2012, Lt. Buccilli forcibly entered the Batts home, without consent or a warrant, to conduct a welfare check. On that day, federal law prohibited police from forcibly entering a home without consent or a warrant for any reason whatsoever, unless the circumstances fell within one of the established narrowly-drawn exigency exceptions, the brief explains.

The circumstances Lt. Buccilli confronted presented no exigency whatsoever.

HSLDAs Darren Jones, a litigation attorney, said theFourth Amendment doesnt have an exception based on a welfare check.'

Before police can come into a home, they must have either a warrant or some clearly defined exception, like an emergency or a hot pursuit of a suspect, he explained.

HSLDA Senior Counsel James R. Mason previously notedthe Batts were members of HSLDA since their son was a child.

He grew up reading about his Fourth Amendment rights in The Home School Court Report.

Mason pointed out Buccilli even threatened the family with informing adult protect services about [your] lack of cooperation.

The officerthen said, You should not pretend to know the law.

Mason argued the Fourth Amendment does not permit the police to enter anyones home without a warrant unless there is a real emergency even if its called a welfare check.'

The report said HSLDA has long believed that it is important to dispel the notion among police and other authorities that all Fourth Amendment bets are off when they demand to enter a home to conduct a welfare check.'

Police State USA: How Orwells Nightmare Is Becoming Our Reality chronicles how America has arrived at the point of being a de facto police state and what led to an out-of-control government that increasingly ignores the Constitution. Order today!

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Homeschoolers ramp up 4th Amendment battle - WND.com

Location data from your phone may fall under the protection of the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, and advocates from various circles, including the tech world, are making the argument that this should be the case. The conversation was started by a court case known as Carter v. the United States, wherein the court is seeking the right to obtain rough location data to track the defendant over the course of 127 days. Carter is being represented by the American Civil Liberties Union. The movement includes representatives from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Verizon, and a panel of experts from around the tech sphere. The base argument is that obtaining data constitutes seizure, while interpreting the data constitutes search, two activities that are restricted by the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable examples of those activities, and establishes the requirement for law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant before performing most types of search and seizure procedures.

The type of location data thats presently at the center of the conversation is the somewhat less precise location data that can be gleaned from any device connected to a cellular network, with or without the involvement of GPS. This data includes a triangulation of your current location from nearby cell towers, as well as the locations of nearby Bluetooth devices and Wi-Fi networks, if available. This data tends to be less precise than GPS data, with an average accuracy of a couple dozen to a couple hundred meters, depending on network conditions. Thanks to the deployment of a larger amount of towers and small cells and more sophisticated network equipment, as well as a larger amount of mobile, IoT, and other electronic devices around at any given time, this location data has been less prone to gross inaccuracy in recent years.

The location data in question has, in the past, been considered imprecise enough to not warrant it being categorized as personal or private data. Police have used such data on a fairly routine basis for more rough usages, such as obtaining evidence of an alibi or a lack of one, putting multiple defendants near the scene of a crime at the same time, and doing other investigative tasks. Having such data require a warrant going forward could make investigations costlier and slower, which in turn means that the privacy and security advocates trying to push for this change will have an uphill battle ahead of them.

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4th Amendment Protections Sought For Cell Site Location Data - Android Headlines

Several of the largest technology companies in the nation filed a brief urging the Supreme Court to enhance Fourth Amendment protections for consumers by changing the way the amendment is applied to meet the public's expectation of privacy.

Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Verizon, and several other tech companies filed a brief late Monday night in Carpenter v. United States, a case the high court will hear next term regarding the constitutionality of the warrantless search and seizure of cellphone records showing the location and movements of the phone's user.

The tech giants made no explicit statement regarding how they want the case to be decided, but they wrote in their brief that the Supreme Court "should refine the application of certain Fourth Amendment doctrines to ensure that the law realistically engages with Internet-based technologies and with people's expectations of privacy in their digital data."

"The number and variety of organizations and experts filing represent the widespread recognition that your cell phone's location history is your own business, and the government needs to have a good reason to get its hands on it," said Nathan Freed Wessler, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union, in a statement. "In particular, the tech firms are sending a very clear message that the law needs to catch up with the technology that is now an integral part of our everyday lives." The ACLU is one of the groups representing Timothy Carpenter, the petitioner.

No date has yet been set for Carpenter v. United States' oral arguments.

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Apple, Facebook, others urge Supreme Court to change Fourth Amendment privacy doctrines - Washington Examiner

Press Release | August 14, 2017

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and a coalition of 19 other media organizations support requiring the government to obtain warrants for access to cellphone location records

The government should not be able to obtain cellphone location records without first getting a warrant, said Bruce Brown, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. The current ruling makes it too easy for the government to track a persons every move through their cellphone, which is especially worrisome if the location records in question belong to a journalist. This endangers journalists ability to gather information and keep the public informed without the risk of being easily and routinely surveilled.

The coalition brief argues that cellphone location records paint an intimate and comprehensive picture of where individuals go, and thus the people and places they associate with.

According to the brief, a journalists cellphone location data can disclose particularly sensitive details about the journalistic process: It can reveal the stories a journalist is working on before they are published, where a journalist went to gather information for those stories, and the identity of a journalists sourcesExposure of sources and journalistic methods can put sources jobs and lives at risk, compromise the integrity of the newsgathering process, and have a chilling effect on reporting.

The brief also argues that if the government can easily and routinely access detailed information about a persons movements without a warrant, it threatens the ability to freely engage in activities protected by the First Amendment like newsgathering, which now often relies on use of a cellphone.

Cellphones have become a mobile newsroom and a necessary newsgathering tool for journalists. Unfortunately, theres no way to use a cellphone without sharing some location data with a service provider, said Brown. Allowing the government to easily access cellphone location records that paint a picture of where a journalist goes and possibly even who they meet with chills reporter-source relationships, threatens newsgathering, and ultimately harms the flow of information to the public.

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Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless seizure of cellphone location records, amicus brief argues - Reporters Committee for Freedom of the...

If youre following along closely, youll recognize a strong similarity between the brief we filed Friday with the U.S. Supreme Courtin a criminal case called Carpenter v. United States and our argument to a District Court in California two weeks ago that the IRS should not be able to access Bitcoin users data willy-nilly. The theme running through both is that people have property rights in data about themselves that is allocated by contract between them and their service providers. Thats true whether the service being provided is cryptocurrency trading or cellular telecommunications.

In an article I published with the National Constitution Center earlier this year, I laid out a fully consistent way to apply the Fourth Amendment in the digital era. The Supreme Court has struggled with constitutional protections for communications and data, but there doesnt need to be different doctrine for physical things and for digital things. Data can be seized under the Fourth Amendment just like people and cars. Data can be searched just like homes.

In a methodical Fourth Amendment analysis, the next question is who can object to those seizures and searches. Today, various third-party services have control of the data, and some think that closes the question, but it doesnt. The right to possession is only one of the property rights. Those contracts have allocated to consumers the right to exclude othersthat is, to keep strangers away from data about them. The data may sit with a telecom provider, a crypto exchange, a cloud service, or an ISP, but our privacy comes from denying them any right to share data other than with parties agreed to in advance under conditions agreed to in advance.

When possession of data is with a service provider but the right to exclude and other rights are held by the consumer, the consumer has a right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In all but the narrowest of cases involving exigency and similar circumstances, that means the government has to go get a warrant.

Getting courts to recognize property rights in data is a big effort, and itll take a lot of work over a lot of years. But it is essential work because it will determine the shape of our future world.

Theres a path into the future where the Internet revolution causes the individual to become a pawn of governments and corporationsworking together, as often as not, to determine many, many dimensions of how we live and earn. Down the other path is a future where property rights in data make us even more free and autonomous in the digital realm then we are in our homes, neighborhoods, and marketplaces. Heres to charting our course down that second path.

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Defending 4th Amendment Privacy Protections for Digital Property - Competitive Enterprise Institute (blog)

The ACLU of Iowa says a Des Moines suburb has violated the constitutional rights of two couples, who displayed signs critical of the city on their properties.The civil libertiesorganization is demanding the City of Windsor Heights allow the homeowners to display their signs.

One of the signs opposes recent decision by Windsor Heights to install sidewalks. The second protests the city's removal of the first sign.

ACLU legal director Rita Bettis says Windsor Heights has violated the First Amendment in two ways. First, the city cant treat signs differently based on content. Secondly, Windsor Heights told one of the couples to remove their sign only after an anonymous complaint was filed.

"That is something that the courts call a 'hecklers veto' that regulates the speech that people are able to express, and censures that speech based whether others object to that speech and find it offensive," she explains. "Thats something thats clearly impermissible under the First Amendment."

In addition to the First Amendment violations, one of the signs was removed while the homeowners were on vacation. Because Windsor Heights didnt have a warrant,Bettis says thats a Fourth Amendment violation.

Also by simply removing the sign while the owners where on vacation, Bettis says this deprived the couple of their 14th Amendment right of due process.

Emails and calls to the Windsor Heights mayor, city council and staff were not returned.

The ACLU says the city has until next Monday to respond.

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ACLU Says Des Moines Suburb Has Violated First, Fourth And 14th Amendments - Iowa Public Radio

Timothy Carpenter and Timothy Sanders were convicted in federal court on charges stemming from a string of armed robberies in and around the Detroit area. They appealed on the ground that the government had acquired detailed records of their movements through cell site location information (CSLI) from their wireless carriers in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit turned their appeal aside, finding that [t]he governments collection of business records containing these data is not a search.

The Fourth Amendment states that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. Presumably, when called on to determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, courts would analyze the elements of this language as follows: Was there a search? Was there a seizure? Was any such search or seizure of their persons, houses, papers, [or] effects? Was any such search or seizure reasonable?

In cases involving familiar physical objects, they usually do. In harder cases dealing with unfamiliar items such as communications and data, however, courts retreat to the Supreme Courts reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine that emerged from Katz v. United States (1967). The Court has decided to review the important criminal-procedure and digital-privacy issues here.

Cato and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, joined by Reason Foundation and the Committee for Justice, filed anamicus brief urging the Court to return to the text of the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable expectation of privacy test is outdated because it lacks a strong connection to the text and asks courts to conduct a sociological exercise rather than a judicial one. This is especially true in the context of new technology, where societal expectations have not been fully formed yet and will change based on the Courts judgment, leading to circular reasoning.

Courts have also used the reasonable expectation of privacy test to undermine the very things the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. For instance, dog sniffs looking for drugs have been said to not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy because they are only looking for contraband. But just because a search is designed to look for illegal activity doesnt mean that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable.

Likewise with the third-party doctrine, which holds that constitutional protections stop when protected information is shared.

The Carpenter case deals with information about a persons location for more than 100 days, and yet the government claims that no privacy is violated when it seizes and searches that data. The Court should return to the text of the Fourth Amendment and recognize that data and digital communication are property that are protected by the papers and effects part of the Fourth Amendment, as it did in Riley v. Californiathe 2014 case where the justices unanimously required a warrant for searching a phone seized during an arrest.

Here, the government ordered the information on Mr. Carpenters location turned over (a seizure) and then processed that data for the location of the defendants (a search). The defendants had a contract with the phone company prohibiting the distribution of the data and the Court should recognize the property interest that the defendants had based on that contract.

In sum, the Fourth Amendment presumes that a warrant is required but for exceptional circumstances. There was no exigency that threatens the destruction of the data here, threat to officer safety, or any other reason that law enforcement officers could not get a warrant if they had probable cause. Focusing on the actual text of the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the governments actions here violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court will hearCarpenter v. United States this fall.

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To Apply the Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, Go Back to Its Text - Cato Institute (blog)

WAYNESBORO A lawsuit was filed Tuesday against an Augusta County Sheriff's investigator accused of violating the constitutional rights of a man charged in Waynesboro with distribution of methamphetamine.

The suit against Sheriff's investigator Michael Roane was filedon Tuesdayby Nexus Caridades, a law firm sponsored by the Verona-based Nexus Services.

The suit says that dating back to 2011, Roane has harassed Loren Varner and more recently violated his Fourth Amendment rights. During a Jan. 11, 2017 search outside of a Waynesboro restaurant, the suit said Varner was forced to empty his pockets and have his body searched by Roane, and a drug dog was used to search Varner's truck. The suit said this occurred after Varner had gone to the restaurant to eat.

According to the suit, a handler of the drug dog slapped Varner's truck, causing the dog to falsely alert on the truck and serve as probable cause for a search of the truck.

The suit said the search of Varner's truck produced no drugs or material related to drugs. Roane asked Varner to submit to a breath analysis, and Varner refused. Varner was not arrested or charged in the Jan. 11 encounter.

The suit seeks damages and attorney fees against Roane for what it calls Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure violations stemming from the search of Varner's truck and the allegedly false drug alert'' of the dog on the man's truck.

The suit also mentions that Varner was charged in connection with a May 6, 2016 incident involving a sting by a drug task force that included Roane.

According to court records, Varner was charged in Waynesboro in 2016 with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The charge carries a 20-year minimum jail sentence upon conviction.

Waynesboro Police Capt. Mike Martin said he found the suspect with nearly two pounds of meth, and arrested him as a result of a joint investigation with Roane. The trial date for Varner is scheduled for Sept. 5.

Nexus CEO Mike Donovan said he hopes the case shines a light on the potential for Fourth Amendment violations by police.

The Fourth Amendment means absolutely nothing if officers believe they can fraudulently manufacture probable cause, Donovan said. This officer has a track record of these type of allegations, and the people of Augusta County deserve better."

Donovan was referring to a second case in which Roane is also a defendant. The federal lawsuit filed in June by Nexus Caridades on behalf of Desiree Watford of Fishersville charges Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations.

Roane, and a Sheriff's deputy identified as John Doe, are accused of an unlawful seizure and arrest of Watford.

Previously, Roane was a defendant along with Augusta County Sheriff Donald Smith in a $1.2 million federal lawsuit filed by Nexus. That suit, filed by Nexus Services in 2016, charged law enforcement officers with harassing and violating the constitutional rights of Nexus employees, including Donovan. Nexus, however, dropped that lawsuit in March.

Attempts to reach Augusta County Smith about the most recent lawsuiton Wednesdaywere not successful.

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Augusta Sheriff's investigator sued for alleged Fourth Amendment violations - The Daily Progress

The Fourth Amendment has protected our right to privacy since its ratification in 1791. Thetextof the amendment reads, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, but how well do these protections hold up in the digital age?

Today, most of us are typing emails on our laptops, not scribbling a letter with a quill and inkwell. Therefore, its important to ensure our sensitive, digital communications are well-protected. Clearly, the Fourth Amendment transcends time and technological change, but some sinister players are pretending otherwise.

Currently, under theElectronic Communications Privacy Act(ECPA), the United States federal government may seize any citizens private email communicationswithout a warrant, provided they are over 180 days old. By law, these older emails are not considered privy to a reasonable expectation of privacy under the ECPAsSection 2703(a).

Even worse, the ECPA was enacted in 1986, years before email usage was even widespread. However, the 180-day rule doesnt just apply to emailsevery Americans texts, GroupMe chats, and Facebook messages are fair game too.

Its time to modernize the Fourth Amendment to protect our online communications, and bipartisanThe Email Privacy Act, re-introduced by Reps. Kevin Yoder (R-KS) and Jared Polis (D-CO), does just that. Namely, the Email Privacy Act would require all government agencies to acquire a warrant before accessing any online communications over 180 days oldjust like any other private documents.

In the era of cloud technology, communications could be stored on enormous server, conceivably forever. More and more, our sensitive financial, relational, and personal details exist online, making their security absolutely essential.

The ECPA is problematic in other areas as well. In December of 2013, federal law enforcement sought asearch warrantfor Microsoft customers email account as a component of a criminal narcotics investigation. Microsoft complied up until a point, but there was one big problemthe actual emails were stored overseas.

Microsoft refused to turn the emails over, and was held in civil contempt by the district court. Three years later, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the federal government, expressing that companies cannot be compelled to release customer emails stored outside the United States.

We conclude that 2703 of the Stored Communications Act does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against USbased service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively on foreign servers, the courtruled.

TheInternational Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) is one potential solution to this issue, creating, a legal framework that clarifies the ability of law enforcement to obtain electronic communication of U.S. citizens, no matter where the person or the communications are located.

Additionally, the ICPA would allow law enforcement to obtain communications from foreign nationals, in consistency with international law. Sponsored by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chris Coons (D-DE), and Dean Heller (R-NV), the bipartisan legislation would remedy this complex problem.

The International Communications Privacy Act aids law enforcement while safeguarding consumer privacy, striking amuch-needed balance in todays data-driven economy, Senator Hatchstated. Clearly, Americans can no longer be complacent about their privacy protections. In a digital age of prying eyes, the consequences of privacy violations can be costly, and long-lasting.

On June 23rd, the Department of Justiceapplied to take the Microsoft case to the Supreme Court, but Congress shouldnt wait for the court to take action. Passing the ICPA and other meaningful reform is too important to wait, when innocent Americans are being caught in the crossfire.

One way or another, its time to give the Fourth Amendment a sorely needed update.

The rest is here:

The Fourth Amendment's Digital Update - The Daily Caller

The Fourth Amendment was established in a time when privacy expectations could be articulated through a simple maxim that every mans home is his castle. In the 21st century, however, our most private information is often guarded not by walls or with a key, but by the companies Microsoft, Verizon, and the like that provide us with access to the data cloud.

In a perfect world, the technologies of today would be met with the same principles that were laid out in the Fourth Amendment by our founders. Unfortunately, that is easier said than done. Technology has added lots of complications, and we are left trying to figure out what a reasonable search is in the age of the data cloud.

Much of the doctrine of the Fourth Amendment is based on definitions that are ill-equipped for dealing with challenges in the era of cloud computing. For instance, do emails, location information, and other data and documents stored in the cloud fall within the Fourth Amendments protection of The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects?

That is just one of several ways in which the third-party doctrine, which holds that people who voluntarily convey information to a third-party such as a bank or a telephone company have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information conveyed, results in a gaping hole in Fourth Amendment protections in this new age. When applied to the data cloud, this relatively narrow third-party exception granted to law enforcement becomes a broad license for the government to monitor virtually all the data we transmit in our day-to-day lives.

One would have to virtually opt out of our high-tech society to evade this license. That should not be a required trade-off for enjoying the protections of the Fourth Amendment, especially when the government has lawful alternatives for achieving its law enforcement needs.

Then again, if an entire class of technology needs to be exempt from a legal doctrine, there may be a problem with the doctrine itself. At the end of the day, it may be that the third-party doctrine has become irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment and needs to be discarded. However, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will go that far anytime soon.

The ECPA Modernization Act is a laudable effort to strengthen the warrant requirements for third-party data collection and guard the Constitutional right to due process when digital property is being searched. With the modernization act pending in the Senate andUnited States v. Carpenterpending in the Supreme Court, there is new hope that our institutions will succeed in applying the founders Fourth Amendment principles to the brave new high-tech world.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.

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Congress must act to protect data privacy before courts make surveillance even easier - The Hill (blog)

Mayor Rahm Emanuel's office said in a statement that the Trump administration's "latest unlawful misguided action undermines public safety and violates" the Constitution. He said the city is challenging the administration "to ensure that their misguided policies do not threaten the safety of our residents."

The legal action comes amid Trump administration threats to cut off funding for so-called sanctuary cities, including Chicago. The city, which emphasizes that Chicago and its Welcoming City ordinance are in compliance with the law, wants the court to render the federal stipulations unlawful.

"Chicago will not be blackmailed into changing our values, and we are and will remain a welcoming city," said Emanuel. "The federal government should be working with cities to provide necessary resources to improve public safety, not concocting new schemes to reduce our crime fighting resources."

The suit revolves around new conditions set for an important funding program: the FY2017 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant, or JAG, which provided federal funding to support local law enforcement efforts, according to the statement.

Applications for the grants in fiscal year 2017 are due on September 5. The program is named for Edward Byrne, a New York City police officer who was killed in 1988. He had been protecting a Guyanese immigrant who reported illegal activity to police.

Chicago argues the new conditions placed on the grant program "effectively federalize local detention facilities and violate the Fourth Amendment."

The conditions include:

-- "Compliance with a federal statute that bars restrictions on federal-local sharing of immigration status information";

-- "Unlimited access to local police stations and law enforcement facilities by US Department of Homeland Security personnel to interrogate arrestees"; and,

-- "The requirement that cities provide DHS with at least a 48 hour notice prior to an arrestee's release, which would require detaining residents longer than is permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution."

The Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures."

Chicago Corporation Counsel Ed Siskel said the attorney general's office doesn't have "the authority to add these requirements to a grant program created by Congress and cannot commandeer local law enforcement to carry out federal immigration law functions."

Chicago's Welcoming City ordinance "prioritizes effective local law enforcement and crime prevention over federal civil immigration issues."

"This ordinance promotes public safety by ensuring that no city resident, regardless of their status, is afraid to cooperate with law enforcement, report criminal activity to the police, serve as a witness in court, or seek help as a victim of crime," the news release said.

Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson said federal funding and agents have greatly helped Chicago fight crime.

"The federal government has been an effective partner in the crime fight, as funding and additional federal agents have greatly helped us to take guns off the streets and make our communities safer," said Johnson.

"Removing those resources, regardless of the reason, makes CPD's mission to protect all residents in Chicago that much more difficult."

The threats could result in the loss of billions of dollars in federal grants that pay for a range of programs for crime and domestic violence victims, drug treatment, missing and exploited children, forensic labs, services for disabled people, and boys' and girls' clubs.

In Chicago, $3.6 billion in federal funds are at stake, possibly jeopardizing money to pay for everything from feeding low-income pregnant women to repairing roads and bridges, according to a recent analysis by the Better Government Association, a nonpartisan state watchdog group.

In May, the city launched a campaign in response to President Donald Trump's threats to cut off funding for sanctuary cities. "One Chicago" was recently established in response to the growing needs of the city's refugee and immigrant populations.

The campaign slogan reads: "Three million residents, three million stories, one Chicago."

Originally posted here:

Chicago to sue over 'misguided' sanctuary city warning - CNN

Alan Butler is senior counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which filed amici briefs in support of petitioner David Riley in Riley v. California and in support of respondent Antoine Jones in United States v. Jones.

The Supreme Courts Fourth Amendment opinions, especially those involving new surveillance technologies, are well stocked with metaphors and similes. Lower courts are faced with the challenge of applying abstract contours of constitutional law to techniques unimaginable when previous cases were decided. Usually courts reach for similes first this new technique is like the old technique considered in that famous case several decades ago in hopes of maintaining consistency. But, more recently, the Supreme Court has relied on new metaphors to explain how to adapt old doctrine to new facts. These doctrinal course corrections are necessary where the routine application of old rules to new facts produces absurd results. We will likely see a similar correction in Carpenter v. United States.

Multiple appellate courts, including the lower court in this case, have held that cellphone location records are not protected under the Fourth Amendment because they are similar to the logs of dialed numbers that were at issue in Smith v. Maryland. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter, despite the lack of a circuit split, to address this important Fourth Amendment question. Now the court has an opportunity to set the record straight, and should avoid the conceptual pitfalls that have bedeviled lower courts over the last decade. The court should build upon its unanimous judgments in Jones and Riley to establish strong constitutional protection for location data.

The facts in Carpenter are similar to other recent location-data cases. Law-enforcement investigators obtained several months of the defendant Timothy Carpenters cellphone location records without a warrant. These records were obtained from Carpenters cellphone providers, and included a historical log showing which cellphone towers the target phones were connected to when they made or received calls during a six-month period. Unlike some other cellphone-tracking cases, this case does not involve real time location tracking or the use of GPS data.

The Supreme Court has made a point in its recent decisions in Jones and Riley to reject the wooden application of decades-old Fourth Amendment precedents to modern problems. In Riley, the court declined to apply the traditional search incident to arrest exception to permit the warrantless search of a cellphone in the defendants possession at the time of arrest. In a unanimous decision, the court dismissed the notion that a cellphone was materially indistinguishable from a cigarette pack or a wallet (That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.). Instead, the court found that the search of a cellphone is even more revealing than the search of a home.

In Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether the attachment and use of a GPS device to track the location of the defendants car was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court had previously held in a pair of cases in the 1980s that the use of radio beepers to track the movement of a car on public roads over a month-long period was not a search. Some lower courts had found that a GPS tracker was like a beeper and that use of the device therefore would not trigger the Fourth Amendment. But the court unanimously rejected that conclusion, albeit under two distinct rationales. Four justices joined Justice Antonin Scalias majority opinion finding that the attachment of a GPS device was a physical trespass, akin to a constables concealing himself in the targets coach. Three justices joined Justice Samuel Alitos concurring opinion, which found that the tracking violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. Alito was skeptical of the usefulness of Scalias metaphor, because it would have required either a gigantic coach, a tiny constable, or both, but nevertheless agreed that prolonged location tracking triggered the Fourth Amendment.

In both Jones and Riley, the Supreme Court re-evaluated long held assumptions in light of new technological developments. The result in both cases was the unanimous conclusion that digital tracking and surveillance techniques trigger close Fourth Amendment scrutiny because they are more intrusive than their physical analogs. The collection of cellphone location data at issue in Carpenter v. United States is another example of changing technology that has enabled a level of intrusiveness that was impossible in an analog world. If officers can warrantlessly track every phone, then they can essentially deputize millions of tiny constables, hiding in our pockets and constantly recording our movements. Under the courts rationale in Jones, such extensive tracking is unreasonable, but lower courts have continued to apply analog cases to this new digital problem.

Lower courts have struggled for more than a decade to determine what Fourth Amendment and statutory protections apply to cellphone location data. In particular, courts have grappled with intersecting provisions in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the Stored Communications Act and Pen Register Statute) and with technological developments that have continually increased the precision of location-tracking methods. Three general trends have emerged from these cases. First, some courts have drawn a distinction between historical and prospective location data, finding that warrants are only required for prospective (or real time) tracking. Second, courts have focused on the precision of the location-tracking method in order to measure the degree of intrusiveness or the privacy interest at stake. Finally, courts have relied on the holding in Smith and the content/non-content distinction to find that location data are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.

None of the concepts used by lower courts real time vs. historical, precise vs. imprecise, and content vs. non-content provides a principled basis for crafting a Fourth Amendment rule. The Supreme Court would be wise to avoid these distinctions because they all present major pitfalls.

First, while some courts have assumed that real-time location tracking is inherently more intrusive than collecting historical data, the opposite is actually true. Historical data is more frequently used in criminal cases because it is inherently more revealing historical tracking can reveal patterns, associations, behaviors and other personal details that cannot be so easily derived from records in real time. It is the duration and extent of the tracking, not its temporal relationship to an investigation, that matters. Alito reached a similar conclusion in his concurring opinion in Jones, noting that the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.

Second, attempts to distinguish cases based on the precision of the location-tracking methods at issue have been inconsistent and arbitrary. The government has argued that collection of cellphone-tower data should not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny because the data do not reveal the users precise location. Many courts have assumed that cell-tower data are necessarily less precise than GPS data (the type of data at issue in Jones). But that assumption is wrong in many cases (tower data can be more precise than GPS data in urban areas) and is inherently short-sighted. The precision of location-tracking methods has only increased over time and will continue to do so as the density of cellphone towers increases and data analysis methods evolve. Indeed, federal law requires all cellphone providers to develop the capability to locate 911 callers precisely in an emergency.

Third, the traditional distinction between content and non-content (or metadata) does not map well onto location data because it does not provide a useful analytical framework for evaluating the privacy interests at stake. The Supreme Court protected the contents of the phone call in Katz v. United States even though those contents had been disclosed to another person (the recipient of the call). The fact that cellphone location records are held by a third party does not mean they are not entitled to protection. Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart recognized in his dissenting opinion in Smith that even the mere numbers dialed can reveal private facts, and thus are not without content. But the data generated by modern communications bear no resemblance to the minimal billing data generated by the analog telephone system in 1979.

Lower courts refusal to protect cellphone location data is especially troubling when, as here, Congress has already established higher privacy standards for location data in some contexts. When Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994 at the behest of the FBI, it prohibited law enforcement from obtaining location data with a pen register (the same type of device at issue in Smith). But rather than view this statutory protection as an indication that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location information, courts have held that cellphone-tower data are similar to the call records at issue in Smith and thus are not protected.

A better way to resolve the issue in this case is to re-evaluate Smith in light of the changes in our communications systems since 1979. Justice Sonia Sotomayor alluded to the need to do so in her concurring opinion in Jones, positing that the rule adopted in Smith is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. Even Alitos concurring opinion in Jones implicitly recognized that long-term tracking was fundamentally different from the short-term, analog tracking methods in the 1980s beeper cases. If the Supreme Court rejects the conclusion that all personal data held by modern service providers are unprotected, and that the world has fundamentally changed since Smith was decided, then lower courts and Congress can finally begin to adopt appropriate digital-privacy rules.

Posted in Carpenter v. U.S., Summer symposium on Carpenter v. United States, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: Alan Butler, Symposium: Millions of tiny constables Time to set the record straight on the Fourth Amendment and location-data privacy, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 3, 2017, 10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-millions-tiny-constables-time-set-record-straight-fourth-amendment-location-data-privacy/

Originally posted here:

Symposium: Millions of tiny constables Time to set the record ... - SCOTUSblog (blog)

Benjamin Beytekin/picture alliance / Benjamin Beyt/NewscomA federal judge ruled Wednesday that a Michigan woman has no basis to sue the Detroit Police Department (DPD) for shooting her three dogs because they were not properly licensed.

U.S. District Court Judge George Caram Steeh dismissed a federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Detroit resident Nikita Smith last last year after a marijuana raid by Detroit police left her three dogs shot to death.

The ruling is the first time a federal court has considered the question of whether an unlicensed petin violation of city or state codeis protected property under the Fourth Amendment. Federal courts have established that pets are protected from unreasonable seizures (read: killing) by police, but the city of Detroit argued in a motion in March that Smith's dogs, because they were unlicensed, were "contraband" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, meaning she had no legitimate property interest in them and therefore no basis to sue the officers or department.

In his Wednesday opinion Steeh agreed.

"The Court is aware that this conclusion may not sit well with dog owners and animal lovers in general," the judge wrote. "The reason for any unease stems from the fact that while pet owners consider their pets to be family members, the law considers pets to be property."

"The requirements of the Michigan Dog Law and the Detroit City Code, including that all dogs be current with their rabies vaccines, exist to safeguard the public from dangerous animals," he continued. "When a person owns a dog that is unlicensed, in the eyes of the law it is no different than owning any other type of illegal property or contraband. Without any legitimate possessory interest in the dogs, there can be no violation of the Fourth Amendment."

And without any Fourth Amendment violation, Steeh continued, there is no basis for a civil rights claim against the city. Steeh also ruled that Smith's suit would have been dismissed even if she had a cognizable property interest in the dogs, finding that the animals presented an imminent threat to the officers.

Smith's lawsuit characterized the Detroit police officers who raided her house as a "dog death squad." She claimed officers shot one of her pets through a closed bathroom door. Graphic photos from the raid on Smith's house showed the dog lying dead in a blood-soaked bathroom.

Smith's case is only one of several lawsuits that have been filed against the DPD for dog shootings over the past two years. The city of Detroit settled one of those suits for $100,000 after dash cam video showed an officer shooting a man's dog while it was chained to a fence. It was also one of three lawsuits against DPD for shooting dogs during marijuana raids. The most recent was filed in June after DPD officers allegedly shot a couple's dogs while the animals were behind a backyard fence.

A Reason investigation last year found the DPD's Major Violators Unit, which conducts drug raids in the city, has a track record of leaving dead dogs in its wake. One officer had shot 39 dogs over the course of his career before the raid on Smith's house, according to public records.

That officer is now up to 73 kills, according to the most recent records obtained by Reason.

Two other officers involved in the Smith raid testified during the trial that they had shot "fewer than 20" and "at least 19" dogs over the course of their careers.

The court's opinion notes that the "police officers conducting the search had not received any specific training on how to handle animal encounters during raids."

The ruling also noted that Detroit police supervisors found that the shooting of Smith's dogs by officers were all justified. "However, as in many other cases, the ratifying officers did so without speaking to the officers about what had transpired," the court wrote.

Reason's review of "destruction of animal" reports filed by Detroit police officers did not find a single instance where a supervisor found that a dog shooting was unjustified.

Detroit police obtained a search warrant for Smith's residence after receiving a tip that marijuana was being sold out of it. Police confiscated 25 grams of marijuana as a result of the raid, and Smith was charged with a misdemeanor.

However, the case against her was later dismissed when officers failed to appear at her court hearing.

Neither an attorney for Smith nor the Detroit Police Department were immediately available for comment.

Originally posted here:

Federal Judge Rules Unlicensed Dogs Aren't Protected By Fourth ... - Reason (blog)

Posted Wed, August 2nd, 2017 12:21 pm by Jennifer Lynch

Jennifer Lynch is a senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which filed an amicus brief in support of Timothy Carpenters petition for certiorari in Carpenter v. United States.

This summer, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, a case that offers the court another chance to address just how far the Fourth Amendments protections against warrantless searches and seizures extend to cover information generated by the modern technologies we rely on every day.

In Carpenter, the FBI accessed location data linked to Timothy Carpenters and his co-defendants cell phones in its attempt to place the suspects at the sites of several robberies. But the data the FBI asked for and received werent limited to the days and times of the known robberies they also included months of records that could reveal everywhere the defendants were every time they made or received a phone call. And the FBI got all of this information without a warrant.

The specific data at issue in the case are called cell-site-location information, or CSLI. These data, maintained by wireless carriers, are records of the cell towers our phones connect to every time they try to send and receive calls, texts, emails and any other information. The records generated hundreds and sometimes thousands of times per day include the precise GPS coordinates of each tower as well as the day and time the phone tried to connect to it. While this all may sound complicated, the important point is that, in cases like this one, the government argues that CSLI is really just a proxy for where the phone and, by extension, the phones owner is or has been.

Police ask for these records a lot in 2016, Verizon and AT&T alone received about 125,000 requests for CSLI and each request may involve months of information on multiple people. No federal statutes place any specific restrictions on how much data the police can ask for at any one time, and the standard required to obtain access whether there are specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe the data are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation is much lower than probable cause. As a result, cases like this one, in which the government obtained 88 days and 127 days worth of location information for each defendant, appear to be the norm. (In another cert petition filed this past term, Graham v. United States, the police accessed 221 days of CSLI for each defendant.)

In Carpenter, the Supreme Court will address whether access to this information is a search under the Fourth Amendment and whether that search requires a warrant. The issues raised in this case are important because location information like CSLI shows where we are and where we have been. And where we travel can reveal very sensitive details about our lives. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, location information can provide the government with a precise, comprehensive record of a persons public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. Or, as the lower court in Jones put it, [a] person who knows all of anothers travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groupsand not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.

Despite the sensitive nature of location data and the volume of information collected in Carpenter and other cases, five federal appellate courts, in deeply divided opinions, have held that historical CSLI isnt protected by the Fourth Amendment in large part because the information is collected and stored by third-party service providers. The courts have relied on a legal principle called the third-party doctrine, which was developed in two 1970s Supreme Court cases, Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller. This principle holds that information you voluntarily share with someone else whether that someone else is your bank (such as deposit and withdrawal information) or the phone company (the numbers you dial on your phone) isnt protected by the Fourth Amendment because you cant expect that third party to keep the information secret. By sharing that information with a third party, you have assumed the risk that it will be shared with others.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation and many others have argued that its time for the Supreme Court to revisit this outdated doctrine. As Sotomayor noted in Jones, the third-party doctrine is ill suited to the digital age. This is because, as she also noted, we live in an era in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. We use cellphones to stay in touch with friends and family on the go, store data in the cloud to be able to access it anywhere later, rely on GPS mapping technologies to find our way about town, and wear activity trackers to try to improve our health. Its impossible to use any of these technologies without sharing data with third parties.

This dilemma highlights a key weakness in this line of the Supreme Courts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: Assuming that it is unreasonable to expect privacy when we share something with others makes secrecy a prerequisite for privacy. But Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized in his dissent in Smith years ago that [p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. That an individual discloses information to a third party for one purpose does not mean he believes he has relinquished all privacy interests in that information. Nor is it clear that such a belief would be good for society. To maintain secrecy as a prerequisite for Fourth Amendment safeguards would mean that information once protected in the non-digital world would lose that protection today.

Some third-party cases at the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have recognized that sharing information with others doesnt always equal blanket disclosure to all. The court has held that patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in diagnostic test results, even when the hospital maintains the records (Ferguson v. City of Charleston); passengers retain an expectation of privacy in luggage placed in an overhead bin despite the possibility of external inspection by others (Bond v. United States); and hotel guests are entitled to constitutional protections even though they provide implied or express permission for third parties to access their rooms (Stoner v. California). And at least one lower court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in United States v. Warshak, has ruled that people have an expectation of privacy in email content, even if they use a third party service provider to transmit that email.

Thus, the main challenge for the Supreme Court in Carpenter will be to figure out how to reset the parameters of the third-party doctrine for the digital age or do away with it altogether.

One thing is clear: These thorny issues are not going away. How the Supreme Court decides this case will have important ramifications for the future especially for the internet of things, where sensors and devices in our homes, on our cars, and throughout our world will constantly collect, generate, and share data about us with little to no volition on our part. Choosing to participate in society in the 21st century will require use of these technologies; it shouldnt require us to relinquish our constitutional rights.

Posted in Carpenter v. U.S., Summer symposium on Carpenter v. United States, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: Jennifer Lynch, Symposium: Will the Fourth Amendment protect 21st-century data? The court confronts the third-party doctrine, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-will-fourth-amendment-protect-21st-century-data-court-confronts-third-party-doctrine/

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Symposium: Will the Fourth Amendment protect 21st-century data? The court confronts the third-party doctrine - SCOTUSblog (blog)

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Traffic Stop and Request to Search Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment WisBar Aug. 2, 2017 A sheriff's deputy ran a man's license plates in high crime area in Kenosha and learned the vehicle's registration was suspended for emissions violations. Recently, the state supreme court ruled the subsequent stop and search, which ...

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Traffic Stop and Request to Search Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment - WisBar

John Castellano is Deputy Executive Assistant District Attorney and Chief Appellate Attorney in the office of Richard A. Brown, District Attorney of Queens County, New York.

The Supreme Courts grant of certiorari in United States v. Carpenter highlights the clash between established Fourth Amendment doctrines and what many argue are the heightened privacy concerns of a digital era. The court will consider the scope of the Fourth Amendments protection of information contained in a cellular carriers records that reflects the location of cell towers used to complete customers phone calls and convey their texts. At stake will be at least two traditional notions underlying the courts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The first is the general understanding that information voluntarily exposed to others is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the second is the more specific third-party doctrine, which holds that government access to information collected by a private business in order to provide a service to a customer does not constitute a search.

In this case, the government obtained court orders under Section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act for a total of 127 days of historical cell-site information regarding phones used by defendant Timothy Carpenter, who had been named by an accomplice as the mastermind of a string of nine commercial burglaries committed in and around Detroit. As the governments expert testified, the records provided the location of cell towers that handled the defendants calls and texts, and indicated that the defendants phone was within one-half to two miles of the specified tower and within a one-third or one-sixth radial wedge, or sector, of the tower. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit applied the third-party doctrine to hold that the Fourth Amendment did not protect this information, because the records obtained were those of the cellphone provider and reflected information collected by the provider in order to provide a service to the defendant. The court of appeals also noted that cellphone customers generally understand that when they use their cellphones for calls or texts, they are employing nearby cell towers and thus providing information to the carrier, including their general whereabouts.

The issue may not be so clear cut for some members of the Supreme Court, however. In a 2011 concurrence in United States v. Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, although the third-party doctrine was not at issue in that case, it might in the future be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. And Justice Samuel Alito, writing for himself and three other members of the court, noted in Jones that long-term monitoring of specific GPS-location data could impinge on expectations of privacy, but suggested that legislative solutions might be best suited to balance these concerns with public safety in an era of dramatic technological change.

The way in which the Supreme Court resolves these issues in Carpenter will undoubtedly revolve around how the justices view the scope of the issue presented. If the question is, as some suggest, whether the Fourth Amendment does anything to regulate government access to the nearly limitless information stored by telecommunications companies and internet service providers, many of the justices are likely to be reluctant to sign on to an expansive application of traditional doctrines. But if the issue is confined to the particular type of information involved in this case, the specific privacy interests at stake, the judicial mechanism Congress provided to restrict access to the information and the legitimacy of the governments interest in the information, the outcome may well be different.

The privacy concerns raised by the specific information at stake in this case may be far less significant than those attached to other types of information a digital consumer provides to carriers or internet providers. The information obtained in Carpenters case involved only the location of towers used to convey calls and messages, and not, notably, the content of any communication. As the 6th Circuit noted, in the telecommunications context, the Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between content-related information and information about the mechanisms used to convey the message. And, whatever the precise contours of the line between content and non-content, in this case there seems little doubt that the information was not content-related.

Moreover, unlike the specific GPS coordinates in Jones, accurate to within 100 feet, the information in Carpenter was non-specific, placing the phone as far away as two miles from the towers, and only within a one-third or one-sixth sector of the tower. Nor is the tower identified in records like those at issue in this case necessarily the closest one to the caller, because two people making calls from the same car at the same time may be employing two different towers, depending on, among other things, whether one tower has reached its capacity.

This difference in specificity between GPS data and cell-site information would appear to be significant. Rather than allowing the government to observe what businesses or residences a phone subscriber visits, and thus, as Sotomayor feared, compile a comprehensive record of a persons public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations, the records in this case identified at best a general neighborhood or group of neighborhoods, which, in an urban context, potentially covers hundreds or thousands of businesses and residences.

Nor is the privacy interest in location information, something traditionally exposed to the public and observable by the government, greater than the privacy interest in other types of documents clearly covered by the third-party doctrine. Numbers dialed from a phone, for example, which are far more specific and in many ways more revealing than the location of cell towers, fall squarely within the third-party doctrine and may be accessed without resort to any court order, as the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland. According to United States v. Miller, the same is true of bank records and other financial information, which many consider to be highly personal and private.

And although some litigants and commentators have challenged the voluntariness of a cellphone customers disclosure of location information, cellphone users, as the 6th Circuit noted, generally understand that the phone company completes calls by the use of cell towers and knows what towers are being used to complete a customers calls. Moreover, all carriers provide notice of their privacy policies, which routinely include warnings that information is collected in connection with the provision of a carriers services and that this information may be provided to law enforcement.

The notion that prosecutors routinely abuse their access to this type of information, effectively tracking the whereabouts of citizens for weeks or months and for little or no reason, lacks a legitimate foundation. For one thing, the government conducts no tracking when it gains access to this type of information: The phone company collects cell-site location information for its own purposes and the government, retrospectively, views it based on a court order. For another, prosecutors do not routinely access such information. In fact, in 2016, prosecutors in Queens, New York, the 10th most populous county in the nation with 2.3 million inhabitants, obtained historical cell-cite information only 92 times, each through a court order, out of the more than 54,000 prosecutions in the county that year. And most of those orders covered periods far less extensive than those in this case. Indeed, more than half of the Queens County orders covered 10 days or less, and an additional 22 percent covered 30 days or less. Only seven orders for the entire year exceeded 90 days, and most of those were issued in pattern robbery or burglary investigations like the one in Carpenter, in which a review of records over a longer time period was warranted.

Furthermore, prosecutors access to cell-site location information is limited by judicial intervention. The Stored Communications Act requires a court order based on specific and articulable facts establishing that the information requested is relevant and material to an investigation. Both the citizens affected and the time period covered by the records can be limited in this manner. This is precisely the type of statutory mechanism that Alito suggested in his concurrence in Jones would operate to protect any perceived privacy interest at stake. Indeed, subpoenas for potentially far more personal information, like bank information, credit card statements and call detail information, can be issued in most states without any such check.

Moreover, the legitimate interest of law enforcement in historical cell-site location information in certain cases is very compelling, because it provides an important investigative tool when it may be difficult or impossible to show probable cause. Orders may be used, for example, to obtain the location history of homicide victims to determine their whereabouts immediately prior to their deaths, thereby aiding in the investigation of relevant events and possible causes. Similarly, when multiple legitimate suspects could have motives for committing a crime, location information may exclude some or all of these suspects. Historical cell-site information can also be used to check the reliability of information provided by informants or contained in the statements of accomplices. And, when pattern crimes are alleged, review of cell-site location data can provide critical evidence of, for example, an individuals commission of serial killings or a persons participation in pattern robberies or burglaries like the one in this case, because presence at multiple crime scenes or other relevant locations over a period of many days or weeks is not likely to be mere coincidence. In this way, a Section 2703 order provides an essential investigative tool, often used in conjunction with subpoena requests and other investigative techniques, that imposes minimal intrusions on any legitimate expectations of privacy.

The Supreme Courts decision in Carpenter will thus likely turn on how broadly the justices view the question presented in the case. Whatever the outcome, the Supreme Courts decision is likely to be merely the opening salvo in the legal debate rather than a definitive resolution of the issues raised by law-enforcement access to cell-site location information.

Posted in Carpenter v. U.S., Summer symposium on Carpenter v. United States, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: John Castellano, Symposium: Justices poised to consider, or reconsider, Fourth Amendment doctrines as they assess the scope of privacy in a digital age, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 1, 2017, 2:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-justices-poised-consider-reconsider-fourth-amendment-doctrines-assess-scope-privacy-digital-age/

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Symposium: Justices poised to consider, or reconsider, Fourth ... - SCOTUSblog (blog)

The bipartisan ECPA Modernization Act of 2017 introduced by Sens. Patrick LeahyPatrick LeahyDigital privacy bill still abandons probable cause for our papers Overnight Tech: Driverless car bill advances in House | Bezos now world's richest person | Tech groups hail new email privacy bill Senate panel advances measure to protect medical marijuana states MORE (D-Vt.) and Mike LeeMike LeeDigital privacy bill still abandons probable cause for our papers McConnell faces questions, but no test to his leadership Overnight Cybersecurity: Senate sends Russia sanctions bill to Trump | Senators unveil email privacy bill | Russia tried to spy on Macron with Facebook MORE (R-Utah) is a welcome correction to a legislative flaw in the Fourth Amendment protections of emails stored in the cloud. Because of a law created before the cloud came to be, emails stored longer than 18 months could be accessed by government agencies without a warrant signed by a neutral judicial officer after presentation of probable cause of unlawful activity.

Citing the most basic Fourth Amendment protocols against warrantless access to emails, the bill was introduced under the premise of fixing that flaw for these older emails in the cloud. The bill, though, still leaves open probable cause-free access to emails and other papers through use of judgeless administrative subpoenas.

A rule of construction in the ECPA Modernization Act that is entirely inconsistent with the sacrosanct warrant and probable cause provisions of the Fourth Amendment is that it shall [not] limit an otherwise lawful authority of a governmental entity to use an administrative subpoena authorized by Federal or State statute.

Administrative subpoenas, also called civil investigative demands, are search writs issued by government agencies and state attorneys general or prosecutors to disgorge private papers. They may be issued without probable cause, and require no before-the-fact review by neutral judicial officers. They may be enforced in court under threat of contempt and other penalties, and courts give Chevron deference to these writs, meaning the issuers of them may in large degree determine the scope of the laws they claim to be enforcing.

In these regards, administrative subpoenas are worse than the general warrants banned by the Fourth Amendment after Americas colonial experience with the Writs of Assistance, which in fact helped foster the American Revolution. The Writs of Assistance targeted colonial merchants, but were at least issued by judges who could determine that legitimate laws were being enforced. These colonial Writs required returns before judicial officers, and government searchers were subject to legislative penalties and even private lawsuits for exceeding the scope of the judicially authorized searches. Some colonial judges even refused to issue these Writs when government officials refused to provide facts under oath.

The administrative subpoena regime abandons the requirement of probable cause both before issuance by the searchers themselves and in after-the-fact judicial hearings to enforce them. Unlike the general warrants under which judges determined the scope of the searches in advance, although leaving the persons, businesses, and places to be searched up to the discretion of the government searchers, administrative subpoenas may be issued based on flawed interpretations of the law and without independently verified facts indicating law may have been violated by the targets.

Administrative subpoenas therefore lack the separation of powers found even in the Writs of Assistance regime. The discretion of searchers under the administrative subpoena regime is therefore broader and in many ways more dangerous to the Fourth Amendment right of security than the Writs of Assistance.

The Boston Globe recently reported that the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts is calling out the explosion in the use of these sanctioned fishing expedition tool[s], and how some state prosecutors have refused to disclose how many they issue. This mirrors my own experience with one state attorney general who ducked a Freedom of Information Act request about the quantity she issues, claiming attorney-client privilege among other excuses not to comply.

Administrative subpoenas are in fact impossible to reconcile with the Fourth Amendment. The very premise of the ECPA Modernization Act is that government may not violate the security of private records unless a judge has issued a warrant after hearing probable cause under oath that facts indicate a law is being broken. Government officials will exploit this expressly sanctioned loophole in the bill and subpoena emails directly from their targets in this probable cause-free administrative subpoena regime. Neither digital nor hard records will be safe from unreasonable government searches and compelled disgorgement.

Mark J. Fitzgibbons is President of Corporate Affairs at American Target Advertising, Inc.

The views expressed by this author are their own and are not the views of The Hill.

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Digital privacy bill still abandons probable cause for our papers - The Hill (blog)

In 1976, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that the bank records of a man accused of running an illegal whiskey-distilling operation were not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though law-enforcement officials did not have a warrant, because the bank records contained only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland, the justices ruled that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred when, without a warrant and at the request of the police, the phone company installed a device to record all of the phone numbers that a robbery suspect called from his home, leading to his arrest.

These cases are often cited as examples of the third-party doctrine the idea that the Fourth Amendment does not protect records or information that someone voluntarily shares with someone or something else. But does the third-party doctrine apply the same way to cellphones, which only became commercially available a few years after the courts decisions in Miller and Smith? Justice Sonia Sotomayor, at least, has suggested that it should not: In 2012, she argued that the doctrine is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. That question is at the heart of Carpenter v. United States, in which the justices will hear oral argument this fall.

The petitioner in the case, Timothy Carpenter, was accused of being the mastermind behind a series of armed robberies in Ohio and Michigan. Law-enforcement officials asked cellphone providers for the phone records for 16 phone numbers, including Carpenters, that had been given to them by one of Carpenters partners in crime. They relied on the Stored Communications Act, a 1986 law that allows phone companies to disclose records when the government provides them with specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that records at issue are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation; the government does not need to show that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. Such requests have become a common tool for police officers investigating crimes according to Carpenter, they are made in thousands of cases each year.

Investigators received several months worth of historical cell-site records, which indicate which cell towers a cellphone connected with while it was in use. Based on those records, investigators were able to determine that, over a five-month span in 2010 and 2011, Carpenters cellphone connected with cell towers in the vicinity of the robberies. After his arrest, Carpenter argued that the records should be suppressed because the government had not obtained a warrant for them. But the district court disagreed, and Carpenter was convicted and sentenced to almost 116 years in prison.

A federal appeals court upheld his convictions. Applying the Supreme Courts decision in Smith (among others), it ruled that the government was not required to obtain a warrant because Carpenter could not have expected that cellphone records maintained by his service provider would be kept private. Carpenter then asked the justices to weigh in, which they agreed to do in June.

Carpenter contends that the disclosure of his cellphone records to the federal government was a search for which the government needed a warrant. At the heart of this argument is the idea that, as Sotomayor has suggested, times have changed, and cellphones are different from the more primitive phone technology and bank records at issue in Smith and Miller. Therefore, he tells the justices, they should not mechanically apply their earlier decisions, but should instead use a more nuanced approach that accounts for both the volume and precision of the data that is now available for cellphones. And, in particular, the fact that a third party, such as Carpenters cellphone provider, has access to his cellphone records does not automatically mean that he cannot expect those records to remain private.

But even under Smith and Miller, Carpenter continues, he would still prevail. To determine whether he can expect his records to be kept private, he contends, the justices should look at whether he voluntarily gave the records to his service provider. Here, he stresses, he did not do so in any meaningful way, because he did not affirmatively give information about his location to his service provider by either making or receiving a call. Moreover, he suggests, another factor that the justices should consider his privacy interest in the information revealed by the records weighs heavily in his favor. Most people have their phones with them all the time, he emphasizes, which means that cellphone records can show where someone was and what he was doing at any given time, even in places most notably, at home where he would expect privacy.

In a friend of the court brief, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and other privacy groups echo Carpenters arguments. In particular, the groups highlight how times have changed since the courts third-party-doctrine decisions in the 1970s. Here, they observe, the SCA gives law-enforcement officials access to much more information than just the few days worth of dialed phone numbers at issue in Smith. Moreover, the data that can be obtained under the SCA are generated simply by the act of carrying a phone that has been turned on: It is created whenever the phone tries to send and receive information, generally without forethought or conscious action by the owner.

For the federal government, this case is a straightforward one, regardless of any new technologies like cellphones that may be involved. First, the government contends, Carpenter does not have any ownership interest in the cellphone records turned over to police by his service providers. Those providers, the government reasons, simply collected the information for their own purposes, which included a desire to find weak spots in their network and to determine whether roaming charges should apply.

Second, the government adds, Carpenter does not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the cellphone records, which only tell the government where his cellphone connected with the towers, without giving it any information about what was said in his calls a core distinction, according to the government. What Carpenters argument really boils down to, the government argues, is that law-enforcement officers could infer from his service-providers records that he was near a particular cell tower at a particular time. But, the government counters, an inference is not a search.

The federal government also pushes back against Carpenters suggestion that broader privacy concerns weigh in favor of Fourth Amendment protection for his cellphone records. Cellphone users like Carpenter know (or at least should know) how their phones work: by giving off signals that are sent to the cellphone providers through the closest tower. Therefore, the government contends, Carpenter assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to police.

Carpenters argument that cellphone records are somehow more private than the financial information that was not protected in Miller has no real support, the government tells the justices. And the information at issue in Carpenters case is more limited than in United States v. Jones, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the installation of a GPS tracking device on a suspects car, without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. In Jones, the government points out, the police used the GPS device to follow the cars movements continuously for 28 days, allowing them to pinpoint the cars location to within 50 to 100 feet. Here, the government emphasizes, the only information that the government received was which tower connected with Carpenters phone when he was making the calls.

Carpenters case is not the Supreme Courts first foray into the intersection of cellphone technology and the Fourth Amendment. In 2014,the justices ruled that police must obtain a warrantto search information stored on the cellphone of someone who has been arrested. In his opinion for the court, Chief Justice John Roberts emphasized that todays phones are based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago and are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy. And the justices made clear that their decision did not render the information on a cellphone completely off limits to police; it just meant that police officers will normally have to get a warrant. The justices may ultimately conclude that, as the federal government argues, giving law-enforcement officials access to information about where a particular cellphone has been is not the same as allowing them to review the kind of detailed personal facts available on the phone itself. But no matter what they decide, their ruling could shed significant new light on what limits the Fourth Amendment will impose on efforts by police to benefit from the significant technological advances in the 21st century.

Posted in Carpenter v. U.S., Summer symposium on Carpenter v. United States, Plain English / Cases Made Simple, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: Amy Howe, The justices return to cellphones and the Fourth Amendment: In Plain English, SCOTUSblog (Jul. 31, 2017, 10:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/justices-return-cellphones-fourth-amendment-plain-english/

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The justices return to cellphones and the Fourth Amendment: In Plain English - SCOTUSblog (blog)