ATHENS Greece's foreign minister on Tuesday said 'illegal' behaviour of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean was threatening the cohesion of NATO and Ankara's relations with the European Union.

Greece has long-running tensions with Turkey over a host of issues ranging from air and sea boundaries to ethnically-split Cyprus. Attempts by both Cyprus, a close ally of Greece, and Turkey at natural gas exploration in overlapping areas in the east Mediterranean have brought those disputes into sharper focus.

"The illegal and provocative behaviour of Turkey has a serious backlash not only to peace and stabiity in the Eastern Mediterranean but to the cohesion of NATO and to its relations with the European Union," Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias said after a meeting with his German counterpart Heiko Maas in Athens.

(Reporting By Michele Kambas)

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Greece Says 'Illegal' Actions of Turkey Threaten NATO Cohesion - The New York Times

Russian and NATO forces have ramped up their activity in the Arctic, seeking to bolster their presence in a region set to grow as a venue for "great power competition" as receding ice and rising temperatures make it more accessible.

But increasing military activity by each side has worried the other. While the potential for conflict in the Arctic is considered low, the risk remains that a crisis elsewhere could spill over into conflict there, and both sides are making sure they can fight in harsh Arctic conditions.

Much of the recent activity has been in the European Arctic, where Russia and NATO members are in close proximity.

British navy frigate HMS Kent; US Navy guided-missile destroyers USS Roosevelt, USS Porter, USS Donald Cook; and supply ship USNS Supply in the Arctic Ocean, May 5, 2020. Royal Navy/LPhot Dan Rosenbaum

Exercise Trident Juncture in late 2018 saw a US aircraft carrier above the Arctic Circle for the first time since the 1990s, and US Navy ships have traveled into the high north several times since then most recently in May, when Navy surface ships sailed into the Barents Sea for the first time in over 30 years.

That exercise was "a show-and-tell game aimed at demonstrating credibility of access and operation in a potentially contested environment, as well as improving maritime domain awareness," Mathieu Boulegue, a research fellow at the UK's Chatham House think tank, said in late June.

Russia called the exercise "provocative" and held its own live-fire exercise days later, but overall its response was "tepid," Boulegue said, adding that Moscow may feel validated that "after years of remilitarizing the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the perceived threat of NATO and US deployments is 'finally' coming true."

US bombers have also ventured into the high north several times in late 2019 and continuedto do so during the first half of 2020, often exercising with NATO allies.

"The Arctic remains a key area for us to continue to best understand how we will operate up there, and key to me for that is how we operate with our partners," Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, commander of US Air Forces in Europe, told Insider during a Defense Writers Group event in June.

US airmen conduct a landing zone survey at Jan Mayen Airfield, Norway, November 19, 2019. US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Kyle Yeager

US airmen traveled to an island in the Norwegian Sea in late 2019 to see if military transport aircraft could land there, causing immediate alarm in Russia. Harrigian said it was "crystal clear" that US partners have the best understanding of the Arctic, "so our reliance on them, and the interaction, as demonstrated by our visit up there to learn from our partners, is really going to be key to our success."

Russia has deployed sophisticated defensive weaponry around the European Arctic, part of its defense of the "bastion" where it would want to deny access to opponents in a conflict. Russia's powerful Northern Fleet, based on the nearby Kola Peninsula, has also increased its operational tempo and range at sea and in the air.

Russia's Ocean Shield exercise in late 2019 saw 70 warships take part in drills across the Arctic and northern Europe, and Northern Fleet aircraft have also flown farther south than usual several times already this year, including a flight all the way to the Bay of Biscay, off the coast of France.

Those flights are a message, according to Tobias Ellwood, chair of the defense select committee in the British House of Commons.

Russian fighter aircraft during training in the Arctic. Russian Ministry of Defense

"My district is on the very south coast of the UK. We've seen these [Russian] aircraft do a full circle around Ireland and the UK ... and then fly all the way back," Ellwood said at another recent CSIS event. "So this is all a statement of intent, to say that, 'we are growing and growing, don't mess with us.'"

More recently, the Northern Fleet kicked off its largest exercise of the year. Vice Adm. Aleksandr Moiseev, the fleet's commander, said the drills "are defensive in nature and are not directed against anyone" but added that the "actions of our forces are planned taking into account the international situation."

The US-UK exercise in the Barents was "uncomparable" to the scale and nature of recent Russian exercises, Katrazyna Zysk, head of center for security policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, said at a recent CSIS event.

Russian aircraft have simulated attacks on Norway and Russia's neighbors have accused it of interfering with GPS. "There is not certainly about the intentions behind these kind of activities," Zysk said.

A US Air Force F-22s intercepts a Russian Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, March 9, 2020. NORAD

The Arctic north of the Pacific is generally less tense than the European Arctic and often sees US-Russian cooperation on issues like waterway management.

But Russia has pursued modernization there as well, upgrading runways and bases and opening new or refurbished facilities on nearby islands, according to Alexey Muraviev, a professor at Australia's Curtain University.

"They're effectively building up the radar shield but also intercept capability that would allow them to engage or deter any surprise aerial attacks," Muraviev said in late June. Wrangel Island, 300 miles from Alaska, has the easternmost radar in the "protective dome" of radars covering Russia's northern coastline.

While there don't appear to be plans to base sizable military units on the the Arctic perimeter, "what the Russians do is practice a lot of maneuver, so they've been staging naval deployments along the Northern Sea Route," and Russia's Pacific Fleet plans to stage a large-scale amphibious exercise in the Arctic later in the year, Muraviev said.

A strategic missile aircraft from the Russian Aerospace Forces takes off for a flight over the Chukotka, Bering and Okhotsk seas. Russian Ministry of Defense

US officials, with Russia in mind, have focused on Alaska as a prime vantage point and an important training area. Alaska is already home to ballistic-missile-defense systems, and the Air Force is ramping up the number of F-35s based there.

While the Far East is relatively calm, tensions elsewhere influence military activity there.

US and Canadian aircraft intercepted Russian aircraft entering the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone at least nine occasions in the first half of this year an increase from the average of six or seven intercepts a year since Moscow restarted long-range aviation patrols in 2007.

The uptick is a response to strained US-Russian relations, to Moscow's dismay over the collapse of major arms-control agreements, and, in part, to increased NATO military flights around the Baltic and Black seas, Muraviev said.

It's "an application of political-military pressure" by Moscow, Muraviev said. "What is happening in Russia's Western regions can get a mirror reflection [in] Russia's increased activity in the Far East."

"The Russians do flex their muscles in a variety of ways, and they certainly look at their strategic bomber force as a form of power projection, similar to naval capability," Muraviev added. "In fact, to some extent, they substitute a limited number of ocean-going vessels by increasing the operational tempo of their strategic bombers."

An underwater anti-sabotage detachment on combat duty at the Northern Fleet's main base in Severomorsk, on Russia's Kola Peninsula, February 1, 2019. Lev FedoseyevTASS via Getty Images

Russia announced in June that the Northern Fleet would become its own military district on January 1, 2021.

"The North Command (OSK Sever) was already half-autonomous in-between the Central and Western military districts," Boulegue said. "But now it's official: Russia will get its 5th military district, which means even more attention to anything Arctic."

There are a number of reasons Russia would want more military capability across the Arctic. It has the world's longest Arctic coastline and derives about one-quarter of its GDP from the region. Russian economic interests stretch across the region, especially the Northern Sea Route, which Moscow sees a valuable corridor for shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific.

Russia's military is also typically the best suited for operating in the harsh conditions in the Arctic, but its activity still worries the neighbors.

Russia's exercise tempo "has gone through the roof" without clarity about its goals, Heather Conley, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic at CSIS, said a recent event.

US soldiers sprint across a flight line toward their objective during an exercise in Deadhorse, Alaska, March 13, 2018 US Air Force/Airman 1st Class Isaac Johnson

"There is a lack of transparency. There's a lack of confidence-building measures. We don't ... completely understand Russia's interest and intentions," Conley added, arguing for a forum to discuss military issues in the region.

Russia, for its part, sees NATO military activity and other efforts to counter it as signs it's "being squeezed from the United States on the Alaska side [and by] NATO from the European side," Mike Sfraga, director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center think tank, said at an event in March.

Keeping track of what the US and NATO might be doing across the Arctic "is a significant concern" for the Russians, Sfraga added.

Adding military capabilities and infrastructure to secure economic interests is "quite rational," Sfraga said. "All good nations protect their assets and their interests."

"Our question is trying to get a handle on are there other motives, like any other nation, in terms of projecting force, influencing areas outside of their national boundaries, and that kind of thing," Sfraga said.

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Russia and NATO are increasing their military activity in the Arctic - Business Insider - Business Insider

In June, NATO conducted a scaled down version of its annual BALTOPS naval drills in the Baltic Sea. But with a heavy emphasis on land-based deterrence since re-independence, the Baltic states and NATO alike have been largely plagued by what experts refer to as sea apathy or sea blindness. This has led to gaps in capabilities, strategy, and procurements, as well as vulnerabilities related to critical infrastructure under sea and onshore.

In the Baltic Sea Region, the maritime status quo favors Russia. Though its Baltic Fleet is not particularly impressive, Russia could use it to harass military and civilian activity at sea and take surprise offensive military action. In the case of the latter, there is very little that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could do to prevent Russia from projecting power into their port facilities, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, or other littoral areas. Likewise, in the event of grey zone activities (i.e., hostile activities which generally fall below the threshold of war) and/or surprise offensive military action, there is very little that the Baltic states or NATO could do to stop Russia. Combine that with Russias anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities based in Kaliningrad and the logistical chokepoint of the Suwaki Gap, and the strategic calculus for NATO in the Baltic theater becomes extraordinarily difficult.

The Baltic states face myriad hybrid and conventional threats from Russia in the maritime domain. NATO as a whole is unprepared for Russian aggression at sea. Given the economic and strategic importance of the Baltic Sea itself to the Baltic states and NATO, this situation must be remedied. By strategizing procurements, crisis response, and coastal defense, the long-standing condition of sea blindness can be reversed.

Map of the Baltic Sea highlighting narrow access, outlying islands and archipelagos, and jagged coastlines in some localities.

The Baltic Sea is a narrow, confined sea with many jagged shorelines, scattered islands, and other operational hazards. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, coasts are poorly marked and the waters along these coasts are unusually shallow. In relation to other seas, the Baltic is generally shallow, and low salinity results in further complicated conditions for sailors. Alongside the low salinity, salt pockets are common in the Baltic Sea. These pockets have a higher salinity than the surrounding water, creating spots where sound waves deflect. This causes problems for sensors and other navigational and surveillance equipment. Combined with cold winters, the low salt content in the Baltic Sea results in high levels of surface ice. Shipping is confined to channels through the Baltics bottlenecks and turns as a result of outlying islands and the unusual characteristics of the water itself.

Bottlenecks, such as the Danish Straits and the entrances to the Gulfs of Riga, Finland, and Bothnia, allow for easy and complete surveillance of the local maritime situation. Each of these routes is heavily traveled, and closely monitored and thoroughly surveyed. However, the geography of the many archipelagos and larger islands creates difficulties for permanent surveillance and provides opportunities to evade observation. As retired Swedish Navy Captain Bo Wallander noted, Its easy to hide if you are an aggressor here; there are short transit times and short reaction times, leaving defenders with little time to react. The islands, especially those belonging to Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Estonia thus hold critical strategic significance. They are ideal bases, supply hubs, staging areas, and jumping off points for special operations or surprise ambushes. Likewise, bottlenecks may also be blockaded and mined to establish local sea control or denial.

As of 2017, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet stationed in Kronstadt and Baltiysk features two tactical submarines, two destroyers, six frigates, 23 patrol and coastal combatant vessels, 12 mine warfare and mine-countermeasure vessels, four amphibious tank landing ships, and nine other smaller amphibious landing craft. This fleet has largely been neglected, but has seen modernization programs since 2007. Its Steregushchiy class corvettes are equipped with advanced stealth, radar and electronic warfare systems, and have missile systems that can strike targets on land with precision a capability new to the fleet. Likewise, the naval infantry brigade attached to the Baltic Sea Fleet has seen improvement and equipment modernization in recent years, and there are plans to increase Russias submarine presence in the region.

Though the Baltic Sea Fleet is the weakest of the Russian fleets, the geography of the Baltic Sea combined with Russian naval air force and missile capabilities in the region render the battlespace anything but easy for NATO. Further, the Baltic Sea Fleet is more than capable of surprise offensive action or hybrid warfare measures. As Russia has generally sought to economize the use of force and control the intensity of what it views to be an ongoing conflict with the West by hybrid means, it is critical to address the gaps Russia could exploit in the Baltic states and NATOs security posture in the Baltic Sea Region.

Air power, especially anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, are where Russia shines in the Baltic Sea Region. In the Western Military District, Russia maintains 27 combat air squadrons, six attack helicopter squadrons, and a division of airborne infantry. In terms of overall quantity and quality, NATO maintains superior air forces, but Russia maintains a local advantage, which is reinforced by its A2/AD systems. These include its surface-to-surface Iskander Ballistic Missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles, SA-21 Growler surface-to-air-missiles, and long-range integrated air defense S-400 systems. Likewise, Russia maintains the K-300 Bastion-P coastal defense system in Kaliningrad. According to the Center for International Maritime Security, this system is capable of searching, detection, tracking and classification of sea-surface targets by active radar; over-the-horizon detection, classification, and determination of the coordinates of radiating radars, using the means of passive radar detection and ranging.

Map: Effective ranges of Russian A2/AD missile systems. Illustration by Matthew Thomas, map by Cartographer of the United Nations, Creative Commons.

Additionally, Su-27 fighter aircraft and Su-24 attack aircraft may be called into action and scrambled to contest Baltic Sea access at a moments notice. Sea mines may also be used as a component of the broader A2/AD system, as Russia could take advantage of the bottlenecks and chokepoints in the Baltic Sea, and could do so relatively cheaply and with plausible deniability given the number of mines still buried from the world wars.

The Russian A2/AD systems can reach far flung destinations from Kaliningrad. All of Lithuania and nearly all of Poland and Latvia are in-range, as are parts of Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Estonia. However, as Michael Kofman of CNA and the Kennan Institute points out, Russian strategy generally prefers an offensive posture with a damage control defense, rather than developing purely defensive capabilities. This means that A2/AD will largely be used in an offensive capacity. This is generally well understood, but, as Russian strategic thinking generally views purely defensive capabilities as cost prohibitive, there are likely vulnerabilities in the systems which make up A2/AD. Thus, as Kofman argues, A2/AD may be defeatable. However, it is still a critical component of Russias posture in the Baltic Sea Region, and a major challenge to military logistics in the event of war in the Baltic theater. If Russia could quickly seal off access by land over the Suwaki Gap and complement this achievement by rendering the Baltic Sea closed to surface and air traffic, it could effectively isolate the Baltic states from the rest of NATO.

As a broader institution, NATO does not maintain a forward presence at sea the way that it does on land. The Baltic states themselves operate very small navies with a primary focus on mine-hunting and clearing. While Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have built an extraordinary expertise in this area, they have done so without much attention to other capabilities beyond constabulary measures such as counter-smuggling. None of the Baltic states could deny Russia access, even if all their individual naval assets and sea-borne weaponry were combined. Poland has a moderately sized navy, but the serviceability of its combat ships is questionable. Germany has a substantial naval force in terms of quantity, but it operates well beyond the Baltic Sea. It, too, has been largely neglected and, like Poland, its combat ships may not be ready for action.

The Danish navy is perhaps the most prepared of the NATO member states along the Baltic Sea, but it is modestly sized and, like Germany, operates beyond the Baltic Sea as well. While Finland and Sweden are not NATO members, they are key partners in the region and would undoubtedly play a role in the battlespace should conventional conflict emerge. They have modest naval capabilities tailored to their environment, but Finlands forces are small and structural problems complicate cooperation between the Swedish navy and coast guard.

On the air side, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are deficient, but the NATO air-policing mission largely fills that gap for peacetime operations. Given the local air force presence within Russias Western Military District, however, even this would likely be inadequate in case of attack. The other Baltic littoral states, including Finland and Sweden, offer a decent range of tactical airpower, including a number of F-16s and F-18s, and Denmarks F-16 contingent has recent high-end operational experience in Iraq and Libya. Further, the US has demonstrated in the recent Spring Storm exercises an ability to quickly respond to a crisis scenario in the Baltics with airpower from the continental United States. Likewise, European NATO allies will also be able to respond quickly with airpower. Thus, the primary gaps for NATO and its partners Sweden and Finland are in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and the surface and subsurface domains in the Baltic Sea Region.

Individual states ISR capabilities vary, but the Baltic states, NATO, and their partner states Sweden and Finland do not have shared, integrated, and continuous awareness at sea. NATO first achieved a complete picture of the air, surface, and subsurface domains in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 2017, a basic condition which should be a continual reality. There are decent cooperative organizations for the objective of improving situational awareness, interoperability, and information sharing among members at the regional and EU level, but these have had varying levels of efficacy. Many are not well attuned to facing hybrid threats, and thus it is possible that Russia could exploit this weakness by using commercial or research vessels for mine laying or grey zone activities. Likewise, geographic factors hamper ISR. For example, Swedens radar capabilities are hindered by weather and in some regions, such as Stockholm, a complex archipelagic coast. In the case of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, there is both a lack of situational awareness and a lack of any coordinated means of processing and responding to threats. Reports also point to varying levels of success with information sharing. Given their security environment, these issues are critical. Throughout the region, there is a need for a unified picture of the air, surface, and subsurface domains, but currently this does not exist. The maritime domain contains major critical infrastructure components and this lack of awareness opens the door for Russian hybrid activity in the particularly vulnerable Baltic states.

The littoral areas of the Baltic Sea Region are home to a host of critical energy infrastructure. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, key gas interconnectors and facilities such as the Klaipda LNG terminal are located at sea or onshore and are poorly guarded, if at all. Likewise, the sea itself contains critical communications cables which are unburied and unhidden. If Russia could disrupt energy supply and communications, it could wreak havoc on societal resilience. By wearing down societys ability and willingness to resist aggression, Russia stands to have much to gain. Likewise, Russia has been known to harass civilian and military activity at sea and conduct military operations within other countries exclusive economic zones. Port and supply chains are also vulnerable to Crimea-esque little green men operations and, perhaps more likely, cyberattack. These vulnerabilities could be exploited to complement overt aggression or to simply cow political leaders into making policy decisions in line with the Kremlins objectives. As hybrid activities tend to fall below the threshold of war, they also challenge NATOs solidarity and commitment to Article V, which states that an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all.

For the Baltic states and NATO, the maritime domain is a critical component of the broader battlespace in the event of conflict with Russia. In terms of logistics, it is critical to maintain supply and communication lanes through the Baltic Sea. By attacking from both land and sea, Russia could attempt to put the Baltics in a chokehold, isolated from the rest of NATO. Likewise, it is a probable theater for hybrid activity full of vulnerabilities, which, if exploited, could complement overt offensive action or serve as a tool of political subversion and coercion. But, with a renewed focus on the maritime domain, problems addressed can be remedied or at least mitigated and managed. To improve security in the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea Region:

The current state of affairs in the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea Region is not ideal for NATO. Russia maintains a local advantage in both hybrid and conventional capabilities. In the event of conventional conflict, Russia could attack from both sides and use its A2/AD capabilities to cut off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO in a rapid, modern Anaconda Plan. Hybrid vulnerabilities can be put to the test at peacetime for subversion and coercion. (However, Russia does not view the current state of affairs to be peacetime, but rather a continuously fluctuating conflict, as seen through its perceptions of NATO and its activities in the grey-zone.) These could also be exploited to complement overt, conventional aggression to break down societal and governmental structures. But, by addressing critical gaps in procurements, capabilities, and strategy, this condition can be improved. If NATO seeks either to avoid war or come in as defenders rather than liberators, it is essential that the maritime domain finally receive the attention it deserves.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

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Maritime Security Issues in the Baltic Sea Region - Foreign Policy Research Institute

Five NATO ships entered the port of Odesa as part of the Sea Breeze exercise. They will stay there until July 28, according to the local newspaper.

Commander of the Naval Forces of the Armed forces of Ukraine Alexey Neizhpapa on Monday said that the international exercise Sea Breeze-2020 has begun in the Black sea. In total, it was planned to involve about 2,000 people from nine countries, more than 20 ships, as well as planes and helicopters. In addition to Ukraine and the United States, the military of Bulgaria, Georgia, Norway, France, Romania, Spain, and Turkey participate in Sea Breeze 2020.

Early this morning, five NATO ships headed by the flagship of the SNMG2 group entered the port of Odesa. First, about 7 oclock (coincides with Moscow time), moored in the naval base South, which is in the Practical Harbor, corvettes-the Romanian Kontradmiral Sebastian (Board 264) and the Bulgarian Bodry (Board 14). By 9 oclock, the main sea Breeze strike force began to arrive at the port. Frigates Spanish (SNMG2 flagship) F101 Alvaro de Bazan, Turkish F243 Yildirim and Romanian F222 Regina Maria were moored at berths 18, 19 and 20, the newspaper writes.

It is noted that four ships, in addition to the Spanish one, have already visited Odessa.

Alvaro de Bazan is equipped with an analog of the American combat information and control system aegis. The ships primary strike weapon is the Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Also, it has 48 MK 41 vertical launch shafts for various missiles, torpedo launchers, and artillery weapons. Bazan carries one SH-60 Seahawk anti-submarine helicopter. The ships will stay in Odessa until July 28, the message reads.

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Five NATO ships entered the port of Odessa - FREE NEWS