The war on COVID-19 has a lot in common with the war on drugs. Just as it is unrealistic to believe we can ever achieve a drug-free society, it is unrealistic to believe we can achieve a COVID-free society. While case numbers seem to be ebbing right now, and vaccinations are revving up, the risk remains that new, more virulent and contagious strains will emerge, resistant to the vaccines and to the immunity derived from having already been infected. Humans are social animals, and as people resume the in-person interactions they psychologically need and crave, new outbreaks are prone to occur.

This pandemic has a way to go before it runs its course. Even then, we can expect COVID-19 to remain a part of life for the foreseeable future.

It is time to embrace a strategy long advocated by reformers who deal with risky substance use and addiction: harm reduction. Harm reduction is nonjudgmental. It focuses on reducing the harm associated with the use of certain drugs and away from an abstinence-based approach that so often fails. Harm reduction is not a difficult concept for medical practitioners to grasp. When doctors prescribe medications to overweight, borderline diabetic, hypertensive patients who are unable or unwilling to make the necessary lifestyle adjustments to correct their health problems, they are practicing harm reduction.

In the case of substance use, harm reduction uses methods such as needle exchange or syringe services programs, safe consumptions sites, anonymous drug testing for contaminants and potency, and medication-assisted treatment for dependency or addiction with drugs such as methadone, buprenorphine, or even pharmaceutical-grade heroin to prevent withdrawal and stabilize life.

It is unrealistic to believe COVID-19 can be eradicated. Only one virus that infects humans has ever been eradicatedsmallpoxand that took 200 years. The likelihood is that COVID-19 will become endemic, making oscillating or seasonal appearances. Dealing with this reality via oscillating lockdowns is unsustainable.

We have already seen some of the harms resulting from the abstinence-based approach to the pandemic. These harms are not only economic, though poverty is a social determinant of health. Children are losing out on developing critical social and cognitive skills due to school closures, and poor children in inner cities have been hit the hardest. Children and adults are experiencing mental health deterioration. Suicides are increasing, as are drug overdoses. Many illnesses are going undiagnosed that will lead to increases in late-stage cancer and other medical problems in coming years. Income disparities are widening. Pockets of rebellion against pandemic policies are multiplying and respect for public health and governmental institutions is fading.

We need to move away from an abstinence-based approach and adopt measures that allow us to return to as much of a normal life as possible.

A key harm reduction tactic is vaccination. Even as new variants develop, the immunity derived from vaccination or from previous infection means that a recurrent COVID-19 infection is much less likely to be severe or require hospitalization. Vaccination also reduces spread by moving the population toward herd immunity. As vaccinations increase, it becomes reasonable for people to resume dinner parties, home gatherings, and other social activities providing all involved have been immunizedeither with a vaccine or by having survived infection.

Coexisting with the virus means mask-wearing will still make sense in dense crowds with unknown people who might be carrying the virus. And we should keep our distance from vulnerable friends or family members when outbreaks occur. It also means frequent hand-washing. This might be a good time to abandon the handshake for good.

A centrally planned, one-size-fits-all approach will be inequitable and ineffective. Government should provide updated and accurate information so that individuals and private organizations can devise their own best practices. Restaurants, theaters, shops, and other places of business should have leeway to develop their own evidence-based safety measures, free of micromanagement from governmental authorities. The consuming public will reward or punish these establishments based on results. The same goes for protecting the most vulnerable, such as those in nursing homes. Public health agencies should provide useful guidance but should minimize micromanagement.

As hospital wards and intensive care units begin to decompress and the number of newly confirmed cases heads down, this is a good time to think about how to live in a world in which COVID-19 is endemicone in which viral flare-ups are inevitable. If we look at the future through the lens of harm reduction then hopefully these flare-ups will mean just a temporary inconvenience from a flu-like or cold-like illness for the overwhelming majority of us.

See more here:

What the War on Drugs Can Teach Us About Fighting COVID-19 - Reason

A new coalition of progressive groups is calling on New Jersey officials to decriminalize drugs in a bid to redirect funds used on policing and incarceration back to communities.

Abolish The Drug War New Jersey the coalition founded by a bevy of progressive groups, including New Jersey Policy Perspective, the New Jersey Harm Reduction Coalition, the Latino Action Network, Fair in New Jersey and the state branch of the ACLU, among otherswants to strip criminal penalties from drug use and focus those funds toward local groups in communities of color.

Criminalization of drugs has only served to increase police violence, stigmatize drug use, and limit future opportunities through criminal penalties, which disproportionately impact Black and brown people. To achieve meaningful racial and social justice in New Jersey, we must take a public health and restorative justice approach in addressing drug possession and use, ACLU-NJ Executive Director Amol Sinha said.

State lawmakers in December approved a bill reducing penalties for possession of hallucinogenic mushrooms and are jockeying over bills to decriminalize and legalize recreational marijuana use. Gov. Phil Murphy has yet to sign the mushrooms bill.

The coalition hopes to enable programs to reduce harm in such communities and help release inmates held on drug crimes that have historically disproportionately targeted Black and Brown residents.

New Jersey lawmakers must understand that, for decades, oppressive drug laws have dehumanized and harmed the very communities they are sworn to serve, New Jersey Policy Perspective President Brandon McKoy said. The people of this state support decriminalization efforts as we saw most recently in Novembers election. Now its time for Trenton to step up to the plate and build a system that addresses drug use with humanity, compassion, and restoration.

View original post here:

New coalition looking to end the War on Drugs - New Jersey Globe | New Jersey Politics

A new documentary on Netflix

In this new Netflix documentary, a timeline of events unfold during the period of the crack epidemic which began in the early 1980s in US cities.

The documentary builds on archive footage and interviews with former drug dealers, users and journalists to paint a picture of what crack meant for black neighborhoods.

It also focuses on the politics of the war on drugs begun by president Ronald Reagan.

Anti-drug rhetoricthe infamous Just Say No campaign for instancepaid little genuine regard for the black people whose lives and neighbourhoods were torn apart by crack.

At the beginning cops largely ignored what was happening and in fact actively took part in drug dealing and other forms of corruption.

They later went on to target and arrest black people, ending in mass incarceration.

An important part of the film focuses on the experience of black women and the myth of crack babies.

This was a moral panic hyped up by the media claiming that pregnant women were causing addictions in their babies.

There was never scientific evidence to back up this claim.

The documentary also highlights the shady role of the CIA and the military in ignoring or actively facilitating drug smuggling

It formed part of their secret involvement in supporting right wing militias and using the proceeds from drug deals to fund a right wing coup in Nicaragua.

Ordinary people were secondary to the needs of the USs interests in controlling South America.

Crack is an indictment of the hypocrisy and racism at the heart of the US establishment.

Read more from the original source:

Crack: Cocaine, Corruption & Conspiracythe truth about the war on drugs - Socialist Worker

For more than 50 years, Americahas been fighting the war on drugs, an endeavor that began under the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, who had the avowed purpose of arresting and incarcerating as many Blacks andother minorities as possible,especially for simple possessionof marijuana.

The war on drugs has been a failure by any measure. Not only have we spent hundreds of billions of dollars on failed law enforcement efforts both in this country and around the globe, directly leading to the destabilization of many nations that has had profound effects both for those countries and ours, but it is fair to say that the drug war has destroyed the lives of more individuals, families, and communities than the drugs themselves.

Thanks to the war on drugs, the prison population in the United States exceeds every other nation on earth, both in terms of sheer numbers and based on population.

At long last, after 50 years of fruitless and costly failure, things are about to change.

Voters in the State of Oregon recentlyapproved a ballot question that decriminalizes the possession of illegal drugs. Instead of throwing people in jail, the state will view druguse as a health issue, offering addicts treatment instead of prison time.

In Portugal, this approach has beenused for 20 years. The result has been stunning. Drug overdose deaths and HIV and other drug-related infections have decreased dramatically. In addition, the removal of criminal penaltiesdid NOT increase the rateof drug use.

The time has come for our society to acknowledge that the war on drugs, which was based on racism to begin with, must come to an end.

Oregon is leading the way and changeis coming none too soon.

Continued here:

Oregon Leads the Way on Drugs - Everett Independent

From: Sarah Ventura

Mass incarceration is a bipartisan issue and a human rights abuse. Solutions to mass incarceration draw on common values shared by both the political left and right.

The evidence that our country has a problem is clear. Since 1970, the number of people incarcerated in jails, prisons, and juvenile detention centers has increased by 700 percent so that the U.S. now incarcerates more people (both in absolute numbers and per capita) than any other country in the world.

Mass incarceration has shown a minimal impact on reducing crime rates and is costly at both a federal and local level. Mass incarceration disproportionately abuses people who are Black and brown and people who are poor.

If you doubt any of this, dont take my word for it. Dig into the research, see what you find.

The War on Drugs and the War on Crime hasnt worked unless the true purpose of each is social control via federal and state violence. Either mass incarceration is highly misguided, highly ineffective, and highly costly, or its straight-up evil perpetrated by big government.

Either way, it directly assaults the claimed values of both the left and the right.

Two well-researched books to read on this issue are The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness by Michelle Alexander and Drug Use for Grown-Ups: Chasing Liberty in the Land of Fear by Dr. Carl Hart. This is an issue we need to wrestle with together, as a local community, whether you want to defund the police, you back the blue, youre unsure, or youre somewhere in-between.

See the original post:

The war on us - Winona Post

An employee holds a jar of marijuana on sale after it became legal in the state to sell recreational marijuana to customers over 21 years old in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Illinois begins the legal sale of marijuana on Jan 1, 2020.

Matthew Hatcher | Reuters

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and two other Democratic senators said Monday that they will push to pass this year sweeping legislation that would end the federal prohibition on marijuana, which has been legalized to some degree by many states.

That reform also would provide so-called restorative justice for people who have been convicted of pot-related crimes, the senators said in a joint statement.

"The War on Drugs has been a war on people particularly people of color," said a statement issued by Schumer, of New York, and Sens. Cory Booker, of New Jersey, and Ron Wyden, of Oregon.

"Ending the federal marijuana prohibition is necessary to right the wrongs of this failed war and end decades of harm inflicted on communities of color across the country," they said.

"But that alone is not enough. As states continue to legalize marijuana, we must also enact measures that will lift up people who were unfairly targeted in the War on Drugs."

The senators said they will release "a unified discussion draft on comprehensive reform" early this year and that passing the legislation will be a priority for the Senate.

The trio also said that in addition to ending the federal pot ban and ensuring restorative justice, the legislation would "protect public health and implement responsible taxes and regulations."

Schumer co-sponsored marijuana decriminalization legislation several years ago.

The statement comes as public support for legal marijuana has grown. A Gallup poll in November showed that 68% of Americans, a record high, favored marijuana legalization.

Every initiative that involved the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana on the ballot in 2020 passed.

Voters in New Jersey and Arizona chose to legalize marijuana for adult recreational use. Mississippi voted to legalize medical marijuana use, and South Dakota legalized the drug for both recreational and medical use.

So far, 15 states and the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for adult recreational use, and 36 states permit medical use of the drug.

Oregon is the first to have decriminalized hard drugs.

Read more here:

Democratic senators will push to pass pot reform bill this year - CNBC

The last few weeks have been trying for the U.S.-Mexican relationship. They have called into question the principle of shared responsibility that underpins the joint effort to counter drug-fueled violence threatening citizens on both sides of the border, in the words of the 2008 Merida Initiative agreement, under which billions of dollars flowed to the Mexican military and judiciary. However, even if the Mexican government is now calling for nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty, regional challenges such as drugs, guns, and disease cross borders. And when the general formerly responsible for overseeing shared efforts to combat them is arrested on one side of the border on drug and money-laundering charges, then repatriated and exonerated, the repercussions are also shared.

Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda served as Mexicos national defense secretary during the Pea Nieto administration, from 2012 to 2018. On Oct. 15, 2020, Cienfuegos was arrested at the Los Angeles airport on drug trafficking and money laundering charges, making him the highest ranked official arrested in the United States on accusations of working with criminal groups, but not the only general in the Mexican army accused of helping drug traffickers. His arrest caused a media storm in Mexico and the United States because, among other reasons, apparently nobody within the Mexican government had been notified of the investigation or the impending arrest. It also put the small state of Nayarit and the criminal organization H-2 (the group alleged to have bribed Cienfuegos, whom they referred to as El Padrino, or the godfather, into helping move narcotics) on the map, both of which seldom feature in discussions of violence in Mexico.

For those who had followed the trial of Joaqun Guzmn Loera, also known as El Chapo, in New York, the impending legal proceedings against Cienfuegos promised an equal parade of colorful witnesses who would provide details on the relationship between organized crime and high-level Mexican officials. More importantly, while prosecution would not necessarily redress victims of the futile war on drugs, it would at least bring to justice a perpetrator who had abused his position within government for personal gain at the expense of Mexican lives.

It also had the potential of bringing to the fore significant vetting failures in the United States, and of helping improve vetting mechanisms for both countries. Cienfuegos was a close U.S. collaborator and even received in 2018 the William J. Perry Award for Excellence in Security and Defense Education given by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies based at the National Defense University. Recipients of the award are individuals or organizations that advanced a cooperative international security environment, and/or promoted sustainable institutional capacity in the Americas.

This was not to be. To the dismay of observers and victims of violence, charges against Cienfuegos were dismissed in the United States in November and he was exonerated in Mexico on Jan. 15. From the moment his repatriation was announced, observers believed Cienfuegos had little to fear. A serious investigation by Mexicos attorney generals office would likely unleash significant infighting within the government, and history suggests it would have been unlikely to lead to conviction and punishment. When Cienfuegos was repatriated to Mexico, the attorney generals office had not issued a warrant for his arrest. Even before being exonerated, Cienfuegos was, in nearly every sense, a free man. To date, Cienfuegos guilt or innocence remains to be demonstrated in the court of law.

According to some sources, his repatriation was the result of a negotiation heavily influenced by the Mexican army. It is important to note that unlike the United States, where the Department of Defense oversees the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in Mexico the army and the navy are separate secretariats with no authority like the Pentagon overseeing their activities. As a bargaining chip, the Mexican government apparently promised to prosecute Cienfuegos and continue to allow the operation of U.S. agents on Mexican soil in exchange for Cienfuegos return. Mexico failed on both accounts. On Dec. 15, the Mexican Congress approved changes to the 2005 National Security Law. The changes include the addition of paragraphs that regulate and control activities by intelligence agencies of foreign countries in Mexican territory. For some of us who follow and study the U.S.-Mexico relationship, these legal changes are, unfortunately, expected to severely hinder cooperation and hurt the relationship for years to come. This comes at a lethal time for the region, when COVID-19, homicides, and overdoses have killed Mexicans and Americans in record numbers.

Is Mexicos exoneration of Cienfuegos the end of the saga? Hardly.

A New Aggravation in the U.S.-Mexican Relationship

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is an agency with long-term memory. Enrique Kiki Camarena, a DEA special agent who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in Mexico in the 80s, has become an integral part of the DEAs mythology, and to this day his murder is used as a rallying cry for the organization. Rafael Caro Quintero, one of the perpetrators of Camarenas murder, remains on the DEAs Most Wanted Fugitives list, and the organization offers $20 million for information leading to his arrest. As explained by the DEA on its 40th anniversary, the Camarena case was

a turning point internally and externally. [The] DEA went to war with the government of Mexico about the kidnapping of Kiki Camarena. We didnt have many persons behind us. DEA overseas depends upon the integrity of the police with whom they work. That trust, that honor failed completely in Mexico with the loss of Kiki Camarena. It took the loss of Camarena for the nation to realize that we had to get serious about corruption in Mexico. And so, it was a telling moment for the Drug Enforcement Administration. [B]ut more importantly, I think, [it] established that a murder or kidnapping of a DEA agent or any federal official overseas is a crime against the laws of the United States no matter where in the world it takes place.

Given that the indictment against Cienfuegos was built on evidence provided by the DEA, the dismissal of his charges and his return to Mexico are bound to infuriate more than one special agent. This will only be exacerbated now that Mexico has exonerated Cienfuegos and President Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador accused the DEA of fabricating the charges against him. But whatever Lpez Obradors feeling towards the DEA, the agencys intelligence is key for Mexican law enforcement. Last year, for example, intelligence the DEA shared with Mexicos Financial Intelligence Unit led to blocking approximately 2,000 bank accounts linked to the Crtel Jalisco Nueva Generacin criminal organization. Operation Agave Azul, as it was named, remains to date the most aggressive action by the Lpez Obrador administration against money laundering by criminal groups. Not long ago, the director of Mexicos Financial Intelligence Unit, Santiago Nieto, publicly thanked the DEA on his Twitter account for the intelligence that led to it.

To be sure, no government agency on either side of the border should be more important than the relationship. But without prosecution against Cienfuegos plus the law restricting U.S. agents, including those from the DEA, from operating in Mexico there is a new aggravation within the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship. Cienfuegos will become part of the call to arms used by the DEA to push for punitive and criminalizing drug policies (as opposed to a focus on public health) and a thorn in the relationship for years to come.

Biden Administration Puts Away the Carrots and Brings out the Big Stick

In the short term, it pushes the incoming Biden administration into a tougher stance. As my colleague Vanda Felbab-Brown has explained, this includes options like economic tariffs, arresting and prosecuting other Mexican officials, or cutting development aid to Mexico. The United States can do this not only because of the asymmetry that defines the bilateral relationship but also because there is hardly a consolidated bureaucratic corps on security matters in Mexico that can play hardball with the United States. This problem is not new, but the Lpez Obrador administration has implemented several substantial changes that have weakened Mexicos bargaining position at a time it wants to (regrettably) play the sovereignty card.

Some of the changes include the dissolution of the Federal Police and the creation of the National Guard, which has yet to meet its recruitment goals. The administration also brought back the Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection, which was eliminated under the Pea Nieto administration. Furthermore, Martha Brcena, a career diplomat and Mexicos ambassador to the United States, announced her resignation in early December. Her replacement will be Esteban Moctezuma, current secretary of education, who has never served Mexico on a foreign policy assignment.

To say this is unfortunate would be an understatement. The bilateral relationship has been strained for a few years, starting with a slowdown during the Pea Nieto years, and worsened when the 2016 presidential candidate for the Republican Party referred to immigrants from the countrys southern neighbor as rapists, drug traffickers, and criminals. January 2021 presented an opportunity to steer the relationship back onto a productive course, allowing Mexico to bring to the table crucial issues like arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. However, the hostility perceived by the United States as a result of Mexican actions in the Cienfuegos case is shutting a window of opportunity to deepen cooperation that ultimately benefits citizens in the region.

The Real Winners of the Godfather Scandal

The ultimate beneficiary of this breakdown in communications are criminal actors in the United States and Mexico who continue their profitable cross-border collaborations.

Advocates of U.S.-Mexican cooperation recognize there are many aspects in which security cooperation could be improved, starting with an approach to drug use and violence that focuses on public health rather than punitive policies. While I do not believe poppy growers in rural areas of Mexico are directly responsible for the loss of American lives, activities like transnational drug trafficking will continue to displace and kill both Mexican and U.S. citizens. In the current state of affairs, it should surprise nobody if we continue to hear devastating stories of mothers searching for their loved ones and count record numbers of homicides and overdoses on both sides of the border. Yet again.

With willful negligence and active hostility, through the exoneration of Cienfuegos and modification of a law that undermines U.S.-Mexican cooperation, the Lpez Obrador administration has pushed the United States into a defensive stand. After Mexico unilaterally unsealed the information the U.S. government shared for the Cienfuegos investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice accused the Lpez Obrador administration of violating an international treaty by releasing confidential U.S. documents. Furthermore, the United States has reserved its right to prosecute Cienfuegos in the future.

As a baseball fan, Lpez Obrador may do well to remember that in Americas favorite pastime, and unlike in most other sports, it is the defense that has the ball.

Cecilia Farfn-Mndez is head of Security Research Programs at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at U.C. San Diego and co-founder of the Mexico Violence Resource Project.

Image: Office of the Mexican President

Originally posted here:

After Cienfuegos, Criminal Cross-Border Collaboration Continues; Governmental Collaboration Suffers - War on the Rocks

Drugs and Power: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

By Gareth Rice

INTRODUCTION

Despite a significant counterinsurgency campaign since 2001, Afghanistan has transformed into a true narco-terror state. Providing the source of close to 90% of the worlds supply of heroin, Afghanistans narcotics trade has become interwoven in all aspects of Afghan society and has further compounded the countrys inability to achieve a peaceful end to hostilities. The Talibans relationship with this trade has slowly transformed from one of economic convenience to a dependency that sees it providing the largest source of their financing and significant political capital over large areas of the country. Moreover, that relationship has helped the group to control more territory than at any time since 2001.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) annual Opium Surveys have provided a stark depiction of the scale of this problem. In 2018, despite a drought in large areas of the country, Afghanistan cultivated the second largest area of opium on record, continuing the upward trend in cultivation since 2001. Indeed, in the last 30 years of the 20th Century, opium output increased in Afghanistan by 800%. As a global comparison, Columbian drugs at the height of their production never reached more than 5% of Columbias GDP, while Afghanistans drug trade accounted for 50% of its GDP by 2007. This figure declined to between 6-11% by 2018 (due mostly to the growth in the Afghan licit economy), although opium still surpassed the value of the countrys legal exports of goods and services.

There have been several barriers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in addressing this problem. Debate as to the extent of the Talibans relationship with this trade and the best methods to address the problem have contributed to some of the many reasons it has never featured as a key strategic issue. Similarly, the uncertainty of Taliban profit margins from the trade have resulted in a conflicting prioritisation of counter-narcotics efforts across the member nations of ISAF and provincial governors of GIROA. The drug trade in Afghanistan has simply proved to be insurmountable and its relationship to the insurgency too unclear to deserve greater attention.

This study seeks to understand the relationship between the drug trade and the insurgency to provide a better understanding of the interaction between counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency campaigns. Existing research on this topic has often focused on the socio-economic factors of the drug trade, criminal interactions or financing of terror groups; all of which fall short of providing constructive guidance to counterinsurgency campaigns. By exploring the economic, cultural and political dimensions that underpin this trade, this study will provide a greater understanding of not only how the insurgency continues to thrive but additionally, how this trade intersects with the Afghan society. In doing so, the study will demonstrate the economic motivations for entry into the insurgency and the drug trade, the cultural paradigm that ensures trust between actors and ultimately the political power that is derived from controlling an illicit drug trade. The importance of understanding these relationships has far reaching implications for counter-narcotics strategies and contemporary understanding of insurgent groups more broadly.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research paper provides a literature review with a counterinsurgency focus across the various intersecting fields of study relating to the Afghan drug trade. The counterinsurgency focus is unique because the trade in illicit narcotics are often seen as a policing or socio-economic issue. As such, there are few studies into illicit drug trades that are undertaken with the express purpose of aiding a counterinsurgency campaign. This in part explains the inconsistent approach to counter-narcotic programs that have been undertaken in Afghanistan. Further, when narcotics is discussed in relation to the insurgency, it is more often an analysis of insurgent financing which does not encompass the full impact of these trades on the conflict.

There was a lack of reliable, quantitative data to support an in-depth analysis of insurgent financing. Cultivation data produced by the UNODC was found to be the most reliable data on narcotics cultivation. However, corresponding data on other metrics of violence and insurgent behaviour were far less reliable. Utilising data on opium production and the deaths of western soldiers, Jo Lind, Karl Moene and Fredrik Willumsen provide one example of attempting to demonstrate a causal link between conflict and opium production. While the use of soldiers deaths is a questionable data metric, it was found by the authors to be the only reliable data available. As such, many of the findings of this paper are theoretical in nature and provide a framework from which to understand the insurgency.

There are a number of obstacles to conducting primary research into extremist groups. The ongoing violence in drug-cultivating areas is a significant disincentive for many researchers wishing to conduct field interviews. Similarly, the lack of modern financial infrastructure both within this region and utilised by the insurgency make it almost impossible to accurately track finances that are linked to this trade. As a result, it may well be impossible to accurately determine the level of insurgent finances derived from narcotic-related activities. It is not surprising then to see the significant debate on this topic as highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR):

the extent to which the Taliban participate in the trade of narcotics is debated. While the Taliban are believed to collect payments from those involved at each stage of the value chain in Afghanistan, the extent of their control over the processing, sale, and distribution of opiates is less clear.

Rather than contributing to the debate on insurgent finances, the focus of this research will expand on the intrinsic relationship between the insurgency and the drug trade. In doing so, it provides a framework for understanding how insurgent groups within this region operate and the often-convoluted relationship between criminal and extremist elements. More broadly, financing will always be a fundamental requirement for extremist groups to survive. Understanding how to dismantle these funding sources is therefore critical to defeating them. This research will demonstrate that narcotics is a particularly unique source of financing because of its ability to generate political capital for the group that ensures both its ongoing survival and the basis of its power.

Insurgent groups within Afghanistan operate under a number of different affiliations and with varying degrees of cooperation or competition. The most commonly understood insurgent affiliation is the Taliban, and to avoid confusion in this study all insurgent and terrorist groups connected to the drug trade will be referred to under this title. Further complicating this landscape, groups or cells within the Taliban do not always operate within a centralised, hierarchical structure. On the contrary, it is more common to see groups that are interconnected and responsible for their own finances and low-level operations. The same is true of the drug trade. Where some groups have almost no interaction with the drug trade, others have achieved significant control of the trade within their areas of operation. Consequently, the findings of this study may not apply to all insurgent actors in Afghanistan.

HISTORY OF NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN

Narcotics have played a role in Afghanistan since the days of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. Opium is believed to have been imported by Alexanders armies and it thrived in the Afghan climate, producing yields far higher than the global average and often in spite of scarce irrigation infrastructure. It is not surprising then to consider that opium has played a central role in Afghanistan for the past 40 years. Indeed, conflict and drugs have become a fundamental part of the Afghan state as both a crop of convenience for those seeking to survive a war-torn country and a commodity to be exploited for criminal gains.

Given its relationship with conflict, the drug trade has existed in its current form since the 1960s. The only variables that appear to have changed are the volume of drugs being produced and where the money from the trade is flowing. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, these variables would begin to change rapidly. Afghan farmers increasingly turned to opium as agricultural output declined, due in part to the deliberate destruction of irrigation infrastructure by the Soviets. When the Mujahideen required funding for their war against the Soviets, this crop also provided an easy source of revenue.

While the Mujahideen enjoyed significant foreign sponsorship during the Soviet-Afghan war, narcotics allowed them to gain financial independence and carry out more sophisticated attacks. With the help of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Mujahideen encouraged opium production and subsequently imposed a tax on its output. In what became a vicious debt cycle, farmers began to plant more poppy to pay for the tax and became victims to credit systems offered by an influx of drug merchants. The combination of (US led) foreign funding and an expanding opium harvest allowed the Mujahideen to sustain their insurgency until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

As Afghanistans opium production expanded from 100 tonnes per annum in the 1970s to 2,000 tonnes in 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), helping to coordinate the war, chose to ignore the drug trade in order to focus on defeating the Soviets. Indeed, at one point in the war, there were even plans to flood Soviet troops with heroin in an effort to undermine the militarys effectiveness highlighting the often conflicting approach to counter-narcotics. While the CIA appeared to quietly endorse the growth in narcotics, the ISI began to take a more direct role that helped contribute to a near twentyfold increase in output during the war. This period undoubtedly led to a transformation of many warlords into drug lords that would continue well after the war concluded.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan descended into a civil war that corresponded with another doubling in opium output. The opium trade would prove to be a popular market for an influx of returning refugees requiring employment and poor farmers seeking credit to sustain themselves between harvests. Opium would once again play a pivotal role in conflict as warlords sought to maximise their narcotics returns to fund their struggles for power. The political structures that many of these warlords created would eventually establish much of the framework for Afghanistans future. As the concept of a central political power became an increasingly distant reality, these warlords created their own cultural, economic and political structures of which opium would play a central role.

When the Taliban finally seized Kabul in 1996, they continued to encourage opium production and offered protection in exchange for taxes on production and refinement. Opium output increased by 25% in the year following the Talibans rise to power with 97% of this output coming from Helmand and Kandahar province where the Taliban held the most power. Despite earning significant profits, the Taliban had an inconsistent approach to the drug trade based on an ideological belief that it was un-Islamic, as well as a practical acknowledgement that foreign aid and political recognition would often be conditional on not supporting its continued cultivation.

Poppy Cultivation By Province (2018) and Historical Trafficking Routes

Figure 1

Notwithstanding their objections to the drug trade, the Taliban would (for the most part) chose their economic gains over any ideological or religious concerns. This relationship would continue until 2000 when the Taliban made the sudden decision to ban all opium cultivation in an apparent attempt to gain economic aid. Despite reducing opium output by 94%, it is speculated that the Taliban was able to offload significant stockpiles at now inflated prices while simultaneously receiving $US43 million in aid from the US. The Talibans ban on narcotics would, however, have serious ramifications for their political capital with the rural population and would contribute to their rapid removal from power following the US-led intervention. This is likely to be a lesson that the group remembered during the insurgency that would follow.

With the removal of the Taliban from power in 2001 and the exile of their senior leadership to Pakistan, motivations quickly turned to funding the new insurgency. The initial donors for this new movement were often drug smugglers. At the coalface, Taliban fighters quickly began adjusting battlefield tactics to focus primarily on protecting drug shipments of which they would receive a protection fee of as much as 20%. As the insurgency began to develop, the Taliban began to take on a more direct involvement in the drug trade at each stage of the value chain. From the outset of the insurgency it was clear that the drug trade was of vital importance to the Talibans ability to project power.

ECONOMIC POWER

The Afghan drug trade is most commonly understood in terms of the political economy that it generates to perpetuate the war. Loretta Napoleoni notes that war often creates alternative systems of power and profit that can be exploited by combatants and non-combatants alike. David Keen takes this notion further by extending Carl von Clausewitzs famous maxim of war as an extension of politics by other means, by observing that war is also an extension of economics by other means. In other words, it can be observed that war does not destroy an economy but rather transforms it to the benefit of certain groups. Those groups may not have caused the war but may well have strong motivations to keep it going. Therefore, we can see that war can be a rational economic pursuit for some, where ideological reasoning is not the primary motivation for hostilities.

Afghanistan provides an unfortunate example of this economic transformation. Following the Talibans removal from power in 2001, farmers quickly returned to opium production to exploit the lack of governing authority and recover losses from the Talibans year-long opium ban. This lack of governance corresponded with an influx of criminal elements comprised mostly of drug merchants and traffickers to Afghanistans rural areas. Despite commentary often suggesting Taliban coercion of farmers to grow opium, the initial motivations appear to have been almost exclusively for profit. This is significant because it recognises that the Taliban likely had little to do with emergence of the drug trade post 2001, but rather exploited its existence once it was established.

In 2003, a UNODC Survey found one third of the surveyed populace reported poverty as their principle driver for growing poppy. Subsequent Opium Surveys have consistently highlighted the potential profit margin as a central motivating factor for farmers. The UNODC has, however, separately argued the desire to grow poppy is driven more by greed than need. These findings are supported by the work of Lind et al. in their comprehensive study examining the relationship between illicit trades and conflict conditions. In doing so, they conclude that the opportunity to exploit conflict conditions for profit provide the primary motivation for individual farmers. The population engaged in this trade is therefore likely to be drawn to an insurgency that supports their cultivation, as the prospect of government control over the country would threaten the basis of the drug economy and by extension, their livelihoods.

Poppy is simply a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment according to Adam Pain and David Mansfield. The ease with which it is planted, stored and sold make it a highly attractive crop for the rural population. Perhaps the only down sides to this crop are its significant labour requirements at harvest and, of course, its illicit nature. Mansfield has therefore challenged the notion that opium is often a more profitable crop for farmers. On the contrary, he argues that like any elastic commodity it is subject to the law of supply and demand. If farmers are unable to secure sufficient economic return from the crop to feed their household, it becomes more likely that they will switch to a food crop such as wheat. This economic correction can be seen in the 2009/10 crop cycle (see table 1) in which opium production declined due in part to an oversupply of opium and an undersupply of wheat.

Potential Opium Production 1994-2018 ($US/Mt)

Table 1

The elasticity of this commodity would typically provide promise of the growth in opium cultivation declining once economic returns reach equilibrium. Yet while there is little evidence of farmers being coerced into growing opium by force, there is significant evidence to suggest that opium related credit provides this persuasion. Due to the lack of available credit in rural areas, drug traffickers have typically filled this void. The resulting debt traps that many farmers find themselves in has only been further exacerbated by the impact of drought, government eradication and predatory debt lending. This potentially contradicts Mansfields findings as farmers may be unable to grow alternative crops if they have promised to provide an agreed quantity of opium at harvest.

The reluctance of agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to offer alternative seeds and credit has provided little competition to the drug trade. In 2012, Rajiv Chandrasekaran argued that USAID refused to provide support to farmers switching to cotton, in part due to a US law prohibiting aid being used to assist foreign agriculture that might compete with US markets. This was partially addressed by the establishment of the Agricultural Development Fund in 2010, however, SIGAR has criticised the programs effectiveness in reaching rural populations with an ambitious goal of default rates below 5% in one of the worlds most volatile environments. Indeed the bulk of foreign aid to Afghanistan has failed to provide any viable economic alternatives to the drug trade despite 70% of the nation living in rural areas and 61% of households generating income from agriculture.

A significant portion of the Afghan labour market is now dependent on the production of narcotics. In 2009, it was estimated that nearly two million people (or 8.7% of the population) had some involvement in narcotics. By 2017, the market was providing the equivalent of 354,000 full-time jobs. Despite a perception that drug labs are owned and operated by Taliban or criminal enterprises, there are a significant number of small family-run laboratories throughout the country. This adds to the challenge of attempting to distinguish between the civilian, criminal and insurgent sectors of the population. Moreover, any alternative to the drug trade will need to replace the existing labour market or risk further alienating the rural population and creating further poverty. Considering the opium crop requires nine times as many workers to cultivate than wheat, this will not be an easy transition for the local economy.

The economic incentives for the Taliban to become connected with the drug trade are significant. With an annual export value in recent years of between $US1.5 - $US3 billion a year, the potential for the Taliban to secure even a small percentage of this trade would provide an attractive source of financing for their insurgency. Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately determine the Talibans profits from the drug trade due to distinct differences in how various regional nodes operate. Similarly, the difference in the price of opium as it moves along the value-chain from farmer to market varies greatly with fiat currency not always being the preferred exchange for goods and services.

The Talibans initial profits from this trade appear to have manifested from the imposition of a land tax on farmers and protection fees to drug traffickers. The imposition of a land tax is perhaps the simplest method of securing a profit from the illicit trade. As a global comparison, Yasser Arafat was able to negotiate a 10% tax on the drug trade within the Bekaa Valey of Lebanon, which resulted in an estimated net return of $US150 million per year. This method is also similar to what occurred when the Taliban held power before the war under the guise of a zakat. The question of what is provided in exchange for this tax will be explored in the next section.

US Forces-Afghanistan have estimated that the Taliban receives 20% of the annual narcotics revenue. While it may be impossible to determine the accuracy of this figure, understanding where and how the Taliban establishes their profit along the value-chain is of fundamental importance when attempting to disrupt their finances. To demonstrate this, consider the prevalence of interdictions within counter-narcotics strategies as opposed to eradication schemes (see figure 2). The prevalence of interdictions presumably occurs because traffickers and drug labs are seen as being more affiliated with the insurgency than farmers. Briefly ignoring the accuracy of this perception, it is difficult to see how interdictions would successfully reduce the Talibans finances if their primary source of income is achieved through a tax at the beginning of the value-chain.

US Counter-narcotics funding allocation 2002-2017 ($US Millions)

Figure 2

As a fragmented insurgent group, it is also important to establish that the drug trade does not appear to be controlled by a central element but rather multiple independent groups who coexist in a mutually supportive arrangement. Such arrangements are also by-products of economic power which is inherently decentralised and dispersed. If the trade is in fact controlled by multiple independent elements, that may make the problem more challenging to confront. If there are no large cartels to dismantle and no central drug figures to arrest, it may prove ineffective to target traffickers and labs exclusively in an effort to bankrupt the insurgency. Following the money is also difficult in a country that has no traditional banking system and relies heavily on the hawala financial system which offers little in the way of records.

The ideological motivations of the Taliban appear to have shifted over time, with economic rewards now providing the principle driver, as is often the case when encountering illicit trades. While often appearing as ethnic conflicts on the surface, economic and political motivations have historically always shaped group and individual behaviour in Afghanistan. Gretchen Peters argues that the drug trade has fundamentally transformed the Taliban into a drug enterprise which is devoid of much of its ideological origins. This is a view that is also indirectly supported by the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler whose greed and grievance theory argues that the profits from illicit trades provide little incentive for insurgencies to seek an end to hostilities.

Regardless of the extent of Taliban involvement in this trade, the existence of an illicit trade of this magnitude significantly increases the potential for widespread corruption. While there have undoubtedly been Western perceptions of corruption as a cultural issue within Afghanistan, such perceptions fail to acknowledge the negative views of Afghan people towards corruption and its propensity to drive support for the Taliban. Indeed, the initial rise of the Taliban movement was due in large part to the corruption of many Mujahideen factions. The paradox here is that despite the Talibans connection to the drug trade, they have been able to escape similar allegations of corruption which have consistently undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government. Whether the Taliban deliberately facilitate aspects of this corruption (or at least allegations of it) to support their narrative remains to be seen.

The economic interests of both combatants and non-combatants remains a powerful barrier to any peaceful end to hostilities. Further, to accept Peters description of the Taliban as a cartel devoid of its ideological inceptions, it must also be accepted that narcotics plays a central role within the insurgency. Yet, while the value of this commodity to the Taliban explains much of how the group has managed to survive and potentially even recruit, it does not explain how the Taliban has continued to exert such significant resistance against both GIROA and ISAF. An economic analysis on its own simply does not explain how individuals and groups can interact with an illicit trade or, how a source of funding can generate political capital for an extremist group.

POLITICAL POWER

The Political Capital Model is derived from the work of Vanda Felbab-Brown who argues that the true strength of insurgent involvement in drug trades is derived from the political capital that it creates. While the financing of any extremist group is fundamental to its survival, there is no other source of financing which also provides this degree of political capital. Due to the labour-intensive nature of the drug trade and the ease of entry into the market, narcotics involves a larger portion of the population than many other illicit trades. By providing either land, credit or security (or a combination of these factors), the Taliban is able to facilitate the market that is sustaining the rural populations livelihoods and, in the process, ensures their dependence on the existence of the insurgency.

Whether political capital was the initial motivation for the Taliban is uncertain and perhaps irrelevant. It is this influence over the rural population that ultimately allows the Taliban to survive. Notwithstanding the fact that drug revenue allows the Taliban to pay its fighters and carry out attacks against GIROA and ISAF, it is the population from which any insurgency (and indeed any government) draws its strength. Of note, both Australian and US military counterinsurgency doctrine focuses on the ideology of the insurgent which presumably allows it to derive its legitimacy and win the support of the people. While there is undoubtedly an ideological element to the Taliban movement that forms the basis of their recruitment, there is little evidence to suggest that it is widely supported by the Afghan populace.

The Political Capital Model is significant because it contradicts the popular notion that a population will withdraw support for the insurgency once it loses its ties with the ideological basis of its group. A 2018 survey of the Afghan population by the Asia Foundation would certainly support the view that the population has lost support for the Taliban and yet, the group continues to flourish in large parts of the country. While it could be argued that the population supports the Taliban out of fear rather than any other motivation, this does not provide a conclusive explanation for the Talibans continued survival. It is perhaps more likely that the rural population has formed a relationship of convenience with the Taliban born out of the illegality of the drug trade and the protection that it requires from both criminal elements and the government itself.

Dipali Mukhopadyays study of Afghan warlords provides a strong foundation for understanding the relationship between the governed and the governing authority in Afghanistan. Since political power in Afghanistan has rarely been centralised, the power of warlords at the periphery has often been the norm. These warlords have typically derived the origin of their power through an ethnic, religious or tribal affiliation; however, their ongoing legitimacy is projected through the protection that they provide rather than any ideological foundation. The importance of political legitimacy (often featured in counterinsurgency doctrine) is therefore seemingly rejected by Mukhopadhyay. She goes on to state that Predation and protection often go hand in hand, which reflects both the Taliban and many warlords control of rural populations.

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Drugs and Power: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - smallwarsjournal

Ours is afederal republic. The federal government has only the powers granted to it in the Constitution. And the United States has atradition of individual liberty, vigorous civil society, and limited government. Identification of aproblem does not mean that the government should undertake to solve it, and the fact that aproblem occurs in more than one state does not mean that it is aproper subject for federal policy.

Perhaps no area more clearly demonstrates the bad consequences of not following such rules than does drug prohibition. The long federal experiment in prohibition of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs has given us crime and corruption combined with amanifest failure to stop the use of drugs or reduce their availability to children.

In the 1920s, Congress experimented with the prohibition of alcohol. On February 20, 1933, anew Congress acknowledged the failure of alcohol prohibition and sent the TwentyFirst Amendment to the states. Congress recognized that Prohibition had failed to stop drinking and had increased prison populations and violent crime. By the end of 1933, national Prohibition was history, though many states continued to outlaw or severely restrict the sale of liquor.

Today, Congress must confront asimilarly failed prohibition policy. Futile efforts to enforce prohibition have been pursued even more vigorously since the 1980s than they were in the 1920s. Total federal expenditures for the first 10years of Prohibition amounted to $88 million about $1 billion in 2015 dollars. Now, drug enforcement costs about $27 billion ayear in federal spending alone.

Those billions have had some effect. Total drug arrests are now more than 1.5 million ayear. Since 1989, more people have been incarcerated for drug offenses than for all violent crimes combined. There are about 300,000 drug offenders in jails and prisons, and 50 percent of the federal prison population consists of drug offenders.

Yet, as during Prohibition, all the arrests and incarcerations havent stopped the use and abuse of drugs, or the drug trade, or the crime associated with blackmarket transactions. Cocaine and heroin supplies are up; the more our Customs agents interdict, the more smugglers import.

As for discouraging young people from using drugs, the massive federal effort has largely been adud. Every year from 1975 to 2012, at least 82 percent of high school seniors said they found marijuana fairly easy or very easy to obtain. During that same period, according to federal statistics of dubious reliability, teenage marijuana use fell dramatically and then rose significantly, suggesting that cultural factors have more effect than the war on drugs.

The United States is afederal republic, and Congress should deal with drug prohibition the way it dealt with alcohol prohibition. The TwentyFirst Amendment did not actually legalize the sale of alcohol; it simply repealed the federal prohibition and returned to the states the authority to set alcohol policy. States took the opportunity to design diverse liquor policies that were in tune with the preferences of their citizens. After 1933, three states and hundreds of counties continued to practice prohibition. Other states chose various forms of alcohol legalization.

The single most important law that Congress must repeal is the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. That law is probably the most farreaching federal statute in American history: it asserts federal jurisdiction over every drug offense in the United States, no matter how small or local in scope. Once that law is removed from the books, Congress should move to abolish the Drug Enforcement Administration and repeal all the other federal drug laws.

There are anumber of reasons why Congress should end the federal governments war on drugs. First and foremost, the federal drug laws are constitutionally dubious. As noted, the federal government can exercise only the powers that have been delegated to it. The Tenth Amendment reserves all other powers to the states or to the people. However misguided the alcohol prohibitionists turned out to have been, they deserve credit for honoring our constitutional system by seeking aconstitutional amendment to explicitly authorize anational policy on the sale of alcohol. Congress never asked the American people for additional constitutional powers to declare awar on drug consumers. That usurpation of power is something that few politicians or their court intellectuals wish to discuss.

Second, drug prohibition creates higher levels of crime. Addicts commit crimes to pay for ahabit that would be easily affordable if it were legal. Police sources have estimated that as much as half of the property crime in some major cities is committed by drug users. More dramatically, because drugs are illegal, participants in the drug trade cannot go to court to settle disputes, whether between buyer and seller or between rival sellers. When blackmarket contracts are breached, the result is often some form of violent sanction, which usually leads to retaliation and then open warfare in the streets.

Make no mistake, the annual carnage from gang violence has little to do with the mindaltering effects of amarijuana cigarette or ameth pipe. It is instead one of the grim and bitter consequences of an ideological crusade whose proponents will not yet admit defeat.

Third, U.S. intelligence officials have repeatedly warned us of possible terrorist attacks. Given that danger, it is agross misallocation of law enforcement resources to have federal police agents looking for marijuana fields when they could be helping to discover terrorists on U.S. territory. The Drug Enforcement Administration has 10,000 agents, intelligence analysts, and support staff members. Their skills would be much better used if they were redeployed to fulltime counterterrorism investigations or recruited into local police departments to work unsolved murder and rape cases.

Fourth, drug prohibition is aclassic example of throwing money at aproblem. The federal government spends some $27 billion to enforce the drug laws every year all to no avail. For years, drug war bureaucrats have been tailoring their budget requests to the latest news reports. When drug use goes up, taxpayers are told the government needs more money so that it can redouble its efforts against arising drug scourge. When drug use goes down, taxpayers are told that it would be abig mistake to curtail spending just when progress is being made. Good news or bad, spending levels must be maintained or increased.

Fifth, drug prohibition channels more than $40 billion ayear into acriminal underworld that is occupied by an assortment of criminals, corrupt politicians, and terrorists. Alcohol prohibition drove reputable companies into other industries or out of business altogether, which paved the way for mobsters to make millions in the black market. If drugs were legal, organized crime would stand to lose billions of dollars, and drugs would be sold by legitimate businesses in an open marketplace.

Sixth, drug prohibition has exacerbated racial tensions in America. The immense profits to be had from ablackmarket business make drug dealing the most lucrative endeavor for many young minority men. Drug dealers become the most visibly successful people in innercity communities, the ones with money and clothes and cars. Social order is turned upside down when the most successful people in acommunity are criminals. Even though most will end up in prison, the money tempts many young men away from seeking lowerpaying legal employment. Since the police are tasked with combating the drug trade, they constantly clash with the residents in minority neighborhoods.

Students of American history will someday ponder the question of how todays elected officials could readily admit to the mistaken policy of alcohol prohibition in the 1920s but recklessly pursue apolicy of drug prohibition. Indeed, the only historical lesson that recent presidents and Congresses seem to have drawn from Prohibition is that government should not try to outlaw the sale of booze. One of the broader lessons that they should have learned is this: prohibition laws should be judged according to their realworld effects, not their promised benefits. If the 115th Congress subjects the federal drug laws to that standard, it will recognize that the drug war is not the answer to problems associated with drug use.

The failures of drug prohibition are becoming obvious to more and more Americans. In 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington approved ballot initiatives that legalized marijuana for recreational purposes. In 2014, voters in Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia approved similar measures. Several more states California, Massachusetts, Maine, and Nevada followed suit in the fall of 2016.

A particularly tragic consequence of the war on drugs has been the refusal to allow sick people to use marijuana as medicine. Prohibitionists insist that marijuana is not good medicine, or at least that legal alternatives to marijuana are equally good. Those who believe that individuals should make their own decisions, not have their decisions made for them by Washington bureaucracies, simply say that thats adecision for patients and their doctors to make. But in fact there is good medical evidence of the therapeutic value of marijuana despite the difficulty of doing adequate research on an illegal drug. ANational Institutes of Health panel concluded that smoking marijuana may help treat anumber of conditions, including nausea and pain. It can be particularly effective in improving the appetite of AIDS and cancer patients. The drug could also help people who fail to respond to traditional remedies.

More than 70 percent of U.S. cancer specialists in one survey said they would prescribe marijuana if it were legal; nearly half said they had urged their patients to break the law to acquire the drug. In 2013, Dr. Sanjay Gupta, the chief medical correspondent for CNN, apologized to his viewers for previously voicing his opposition to medical marijuana without having done his own homework. He admitted that he had basically assumed that the Drug Enforcement Administration had sound scientific proof that marijuana could not benefit persons who are ill. After studying the subject more thoroughly, Gupta said, We have been terribly and systematically misled for nearly 70years in the United States, and Iapologize for my own role in that.

The most relevant point for federal policymakers is that 29 states have authorized physicians licensed in those states to recommend the use of medical marijuana to seriously ill and terminally ill patients residing in the states, without being subject to civil and criminal penalties.

If it is inappropriate for governors and mayors to entangle themselves in foreign policy and it is it is also inappropriate for federal officials to entangle themselves in state and local politics. In the 114th Congress, Reps. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Thomas Massie (R-KY), Jared Polis (D-CO), Justin Amash (R-MI), and others jointly proposed the Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2015, which would have prohibited federal interference with any person acting in compliance with state rules pertaining to the production, possession, or delivery of marijuana. The 115th Congress should enact asimilar bill without delay.

One of the benefits of afederal republic is that different policies may be tried in different states. One of the benefits of our Constitution is that it limits the power of the federal government to impose one policy on the several states.

The common law in England and America has always relied on judges and juries to decide cases and set punishments. Under our modern system, of course, many crimes are defined by the legislature, and appropriate penalties are defined by statute. However, mandatory minimum sentences and rigid sentencing guidelines shift too much power to legislators and regulators who are not involved in particular cases. They turn judges into clerks and prevent judges from weighing all the facts and circumstances in setting appropriate sentences. In addition, mandatory minimums for nonviolent firsttime drug offenders result in sentences grotesquely disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses. Rather than extend mandatory minimum sentences to further crimes, Congress should repeal mandatory minimums and let judges perform their traditional function of weighing the facts and setting appropriate sentences.

Drug abuse is aproblem for those involved in it and for their families and friends. But it is better dealt with as amoral and medical problem than as acriminal problem a problem for the surgeon general, not the attorney general, as former Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke put it.

Congress should repeal the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, shut down the Drug Enforcement Administration, and let the states set their own policies with regard to currently illegal drugs. They would do well to treat marijuana, cocaine, and heroin the way most states now treat alcohol: it should be legal for stores to sell such drugs to adults. Drug sales to children, like alcohol sales to children, should remain illegal. Driving under the influence of drugs should be illegal.

With such apolicy, Congress would acknowledge that our current drug policies have failed. It would restore authority to the states, as the Founders envisioned. It would save taxpayers money. And it would give states the power to experiment with drug policies and perhaps devise more successful rules.

Repeal of prohibition would take the astronomical profits out of the drug business and destroy the drug kingpins who terrorize parts of our cities. It would reduce crime even more dramatically than did the repeal of alcohol prohibition. Not only would there be less crime: reform would also free federal agents to concentrate on terrorism and espionage and would free local police agents to concentrate on robbery, burglary, and violent crime.

The war on drugs has lasted longer than Prohibition, longer than the Vietnam War. Prohibition has failed, again, and should be repealed, again.

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23. The War on Drugs - Cato Institute

Cannabis stocks rallied anew on Wednesday, spurred on by news of a $7 billion deal for the first company to win U.S. regulatory approval for a cannabis-based drug, a move thats expected to boost investor interest in the plant and its medical benefits.

GW Pharmaceuticals Ltd. GWPH, +44.53%, developer of Epidiolex, the drug that won U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval as a treatment for severe forms of childhood epilepsy in 2018, said earlier it is being acquired by Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC JAZZ, -3.87%, which specializes in sleep medications.

The news sent U.S.-listed shares of the U.K.-based GW Pharma up 46% in afternoon trading, and helped spark a broad-based rally among cannabis stocks. Jazz shares slipped 1.0%.

We dont think this is the last deal we will see in the sector, said Nawan Butt, portfolio manager of the Medical Cannabis and Wellness UCITS ETF CBDX, +9.77%.

The deal is a clear sign that the pharmaceutical industry is recognizing the value and future potential of cannabinoid based medicines, said Jason Wilson, cannabis and banking expert at ETF Managers Group, which manages the ETFMG Alternative Harvest ETF MJ, +9.80% with $1.5 billion in assets under management.

It is also another example that the cannabis industry is continuing to normalize and evolve beyond the traditional cultivation of flower, with potential well outside of our borders, said Wilson. For investors, the acquisition of GW Pharma is another reminder that investing in cannabis touches many verticals globally, requiring a diverse approach beyond traditional cannabis cultivation companies.

David Johnson, chief executive of Enveric Biosciences Inc. ENVB, +1.18%, a Nasdaq-listed biotech that works with cannabinoids to help patients suffering from the side effects of cancer treatment, agreed. The deal serves as further validation that thoroughly researched and developed medical cannabinoids have significant potential to address patients unmet medical needs, he said.

Kyle Detwiler, chief executive of Clever Leaves, a company with operations in Canada, Colombia, Germany, Portugal and the U.S., said the news will help signal that global private equity and institutional investors are increasing their focus on the cannabis space.

This is a sign pharmaceutical cannabis is here to stay, he said.

The deal comes at a time of growing optimism in the cannabis sector, coming just days after Democratic Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and two other Democratic Senators pledged to make reform legislation a key priority in the current Congress, bolstering hopes for an end to federal prohibition.

Schumer, along with Sens. Ron Wyden of Oregon and Cory Booker of New Jersey,said in a joint statement Monday that they would introduce legislation in the coming weeks that would include expunging records relating to past activity deemed criminal during the so-called War on Drugs.

The sector had already enjoyed a boost since the election of President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, who were expected to pursue an agenda of reforming the U.S.s strict cannabis laws,which continue to classify the substance as a Schedule I drug, alongside heroin.

That classification has hampered the development of the sector, which is confined to those states that have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use and kept companieslocked out of the federally insured banking system.

Other positive developments include Mexico recently publishing federal medical cannabis regulations and the United Nations vote to remove medical cannabis from its list of dangerous narcotics, said Wilson.

These recent catalysts occurred on the backdrop of strong global cannabis sales growth in 2020 (2020 global sales are expected to reach approximately $20 billion an increase of approximately 35% versus 2019 sales of $15 billion) and suggest that the industry will continue to see strong growth and continued expansion domestically and globally for the foreseeable future, he said.

See also:New York is finally expected to legalize cannabis in 2021 as Gov. Cuomo goes all in

The Cannabis ETF THCX, +9.40% jumped 10% Wednesday, with 25 of its 30 components trading higher. Among individual stocks, Organigram Holdings Inc. OGI, +21.03% climbed 20%, Aphria Inc. APHA, +12.62% APHA, +12.46% was up 14% and Tilray Inc. TLRY, +12.01%, with which it is merging, was up 14%.

Cronos Group Inc. CRON, +7.93% CRON, +8.06% was up 9%, Aurora Cannabis Inc. ACB, +8.27% ACB, +7.48% was up 8.7% and Canopy Growth Corp. CGC, +7.73% WEED, +8.10% was up 7%.

Among U.S. companies, Charlottes Web Holdings Inc. CWBHF, +7.14% CWEB, +6.98%, a maker of CBD-based products, rose 7%, while vape maker Greenlane Holdings Inc. GNLN, +5.10% was up 5.6% and cbdMD Inc. YCBD, +7.00% was up 4%. Curaleaf Holdings Inc. CURLF, +4.46% CURA, +3.00% was up 5% and Cresco Labs Inc. CL, +2.37% was up 3.8%. Green Thumb Industries Inc. GTII, -0.05% was up 4.3%. KushCo Holdings Inc. KSHB, +16.54%, which containers, packaging and other products for the cannabis industry, was up nearly 10%.

The S&P 500 SPX, +0.10% was up 0.3%.

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Cannabis stocks rally anew as $7 billion GW Pharma deal spurs interest in weed and its medical benefits - MarketWatch

The chief in charge of the Garda Drugs and Organised Crime Bureau has warned anyone tempted to take on a role in a drugs gang that they should be prepared to be locked up.

etective Chief Superintendent Angela Willis, who has overseen the Bureaus response to organised crime and, in particular, the dismantling of the Kinahan mafia, says nobody is outside its reach.

Whatever your role. If you are one of our targets you better be ready to go to prison. It doesnt matter what your role is, a group cant operate without all its components, she said.

There is nobody beyond reach. Once the right collaboration is there and dedication to targeting them is there, then I dont think there is anybody who is untouchable.

Last year, the Gardas tough crime-fighting unit seized 8 million in cash, 23 firearms and 36 million worth of drugs, and while it is still difficult to ascertain how Covid-19 has affected organised crime, it has presented opportunities for the force.

In a wide-ranging interview which will be broadcast on the Crime World podcast this week, Detective Chief Superintendent Willis reveals how her own career has spanned the emerging drug market.

She details how she started out as a rookie cop in Store Streets drug unit, working the north inner city, but now liaises with police departments across the world tackling Irish criminals.

She was part of the team that took on Tony Felloni, Roly Cronin and who policed others like Thomas the Boxer Mullen and Derek Maradona Dunne, who flooded the area with heroin.

Just last week, a report found that one in four people living in the area have experienced drug-related intimidation, but just one in five said they would report it to the authorities.

The report from the Drug-Related Intimidation Initiative found that fear, open drug dealing and intimidation have now become normal for many in the area.

Back in the 1990s, we could identify all our targets as there werent so many of them. It was mothers who were coming to us, mothers whose children were dying from heroin, and our targets were the suppliers that were causing the most misery.

The community came on board with us and have continued to support what we do. Without the support from communities we simply couldnt do our job.

We would have carried out about 500 searches a year but it was different because we were never overly concerned about firearms.

We were always mindful they could be there, but the amount of times we found them was minimal compared to today, when that is now the first consideration when we are doing any operation.

I was just straight out of Templemore when I was assigned to the north central divisional unit. I suppose I was just thrown into the middle of it, but we had a great unit and it was very effective. It was a small number of key targets that interested us.

The people came to us and told us who was most affecting their community and we went after them.

"Tony Felloni lived up in Dominic Street flats at the time with his children and extended family and we looked at him and his lifestyle and put surveillance around him and we got help from the community who could see the comings and goings, and through that we worked out the right time to search the place and find the heroin inside.

That was the strategy, hitting them at the right time. You have to catch them and have enough evidence to support a prosecution so they end up in prison and cant cause any further harm to the community. That is where you have a significant impact.

Times have changed since Felloni and his counterparts pushed their poison. Back then, a seizure of 100,000 worth of drugs would make a difference and could even cause a drought on the streets. Its not the same today as drug use and supply has grown to unprecedented levels.

When the Garda National Drugs and Organised Crime Bureau (DOCB) was set up in March 2015 it had a new strategy, and targeting entire gangs rather than individuals was top of the list.

While seizures are still important, the focus is more on dismantling the structures that facilitate large-scale dealing.

Since then, more than 200 million worth of drugs have been confiscated, 133 guns and more than 5,500 rounds of ammunition. In January alone, almost 3 million in cash, 1.2 million worth of drugs and a pistol has added to the stash.

Less than a year after its establishment, the focus of the DOCB was fixed firmly on events surrounding the Regency Hotel attack and the bloody feud that it kicked off.

In her interview, Detective Chief Superintendent Willis describes how a plan was formulated around dismantling the Kinahan organised crime gang and others.

I suppose nobody expected in broad daylight there would be a murder of such significance.

We had been formed before that and we were a well resourced part of the policing reform, so we were in a good position to put those resources into tackling that group and others, she said.

The jailing of nine members of one murder squad, who were stopped as they attempted to kill Patsy Hutch, was exactly the type of new policing used by the Bureau where everyone involved from top to bottom of the murder team were targeted.

They were all convicted for their individual roles in that attempt.

We were as focused that morning on the ones with the firearms, the lookout and the person who bought the sim cards for the mobile phones as they approached their target. We achieved the desired outcome.

A lot of our work is obviously in preventing murders, and I think that when you look at the numbers you can see that our strategy is working.

We have intervened and prevented murders 75 times since the Bureaus establishment. Some of those cases involved the same person multiple times.

In the last year, those figures were reduced to two.

It shows that many of the people who are willing to engage in that type of thing are serving time in prison.

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Meet the female Garda chief superintendent spearheading Ireland's five-year war on drugs and organised crime - Sunday World