Just One Thing Is Keeping Russian Warplanes From Rampaging … – Forbes

A Ukrainian Buk battery.

Russias winter offensive is grinding to a bloody halt in the ruins of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraines Donbas region. Yes, the Russians have occupied most of the devastated city. But its cost them thousands of their best troops.

Having defeated the Russian offensive without committing its 20 or so newly-raised brigades, Ukraine is poised to launch a counteroffensiveperhaps as soon as the spring mud finally dries up.

If theres a big potential spoiler, its the Russian air force. For most of the first 14 months of Russias wider war on Ukraine, Soviet-vintage Ukrainian air-defenses have kept at bay Russias hundreds of modern fighter-bombers.

But Kyivs old air-defense batteries are running out of missiles. If the surface-to air missiles run out before Ukraines foreign allies can deliver substantial numbers of new air-defense systems, the steel barrier that has blocked Russian air-strikes finally could fall.

Russias Sukhoi fighter-bombers then could range across Ukraine at altitudessay, 10,000 feet or higherthat are favorable to their relatively crude sensors and munitions.

Russian attack aircraft fleets have proven in Syria that they can be brutally effective against fixed defensive positions, cities and infrastructure targets if they are able to operate freely at medium altitude, Justin Bronk explained in a new report for the Virginia-based think-tank CNA.

Therefore, if Ukraines SAM systems cannot be kept resupplied, augmented, and ultimately replaced by Western partner nations, then the [Russian air force] could credibly threaten to overpower the Ukrainian air forces remaining fighters and gain control of the air space over the frontlines in key areas.

This would pose a serious risk to the Ukrainian armys ability to sustainably hold fixed defensive positions, assemble reinforcements and reserve units in rear areas, and safely marshal ammunition and logistics supplies, Bronk added.

However, if Ukraine can maintain its current levels of tactical and strategic SAM coverage, then it is unlikely that the [Russian air force] will be able to significantly change its fortunes so far into the war.

The Ukraine air war in many ways has defied expectations. Observers accustomed to the American way of war may have expected the war to begin with a concerted effort by the Russian air force to roll back Ukrainian air-defenses, shoot down Ukraines small force of Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters then relentlessly bomb headquarters, army bases, arms plants, railways and highways in order to behead, gut, strangle and paralyze Ukrainian ground forces.

None of that happenedand for one main reason. The Russian air force is bad at suppressing and destroying enemy air-defenses, a mission the Americans call SEAD/DEAD. The main problem, for the Russians, is intelligence. More specifically, timely intelligence that can inform command and planning processes for finding and destroying air-defense systems that move constantly.

The most significant limiting factor in terms of the initial [Russian air force] strike campaign was that dynamic battle-damage assessment and retargeting processes were not granular enough or fast enough to account for Ukraines successful repositioning of most of its mobile air-defenses, Bronk wrote.

The unsuppressed Ukrainian missile batteries quickly inflicted a heavy toll. Russian flying regiments lost around 50 Su-25s, Su-30s, Su-34s and Su-35s in just the first six months of the wider war.

So the Russian air campaign over Ukraine shifted. Instead of targeting Ukrainian forces and infrastructure across the country, regiments focused on shallow attacks across narrow sections of the front: lobbing rockets, unguided bombs and, more recently, crude glide-bombs at targets no more than 20 miles from the line of contact.

The closer crews had to get to the front line to deploy their munitions, the lower they had to fly to avoid detection by Ukraines intact air-defense network. Low flying helped to staunch Russias aerial losses, but it also greatly increased time pressure and cockpit workload, Bronk explained. That has constrained pilots ability to find and strike mobile targets.

Now imagine if Russian pilots didnt have to fly a few hundred feet from the ground just to keep from getting shot down. Imagine hundreds of Sukhois streaking across Ukraine, dropping thousands of tons of bombs from comfortable altitudes.

Given the depleted state of Ukraines own fighter brigadesand the refusal by Kyivs bigger allies to provide modern warplanes such as F-16s as replacements for the 60 or so MiGs and Sukhois Ukraine has lostonly Ukraines ground-based air-defenses can forestall this aerial apocalypse.

But after firing scores of missiles from its best, Soviet-made S-300 and Buk air-defense batteries every day for more than a year, Ukraine is running outand replacement missiles all are made in Russia.

The classified documents that a braggadocious U.S. Air National Guard airman leaked online indicated the Buks and S-300s would run out of missiles in April and May, respectively.

Which helps to explain why deploying new Western-made air-defense systems might by Kyivs top priority right now. We have a Soviet [air-defense] system, and its missile reserves are depleting, Ukrainian defense minister Oleksii Reznikov said. If we dont produce them and only nations from which we cant get them have more, we need to replenish them with something else.

Good news for Ukraine: the first of three long-range Patriot SAM batteriespledged by the United States, Germany and othershas arrived. Ukraines allies also have pledged 10 batteries of the medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System. As many as eight already are in Ukraine.

The problem for Ukraine is that these three long-range and 10 medium-range batteries are replacing at least 25 old S-300 batteries and a dozen or more batteries with Buks. Yes, Ukraine also is getting an assortment of other air-defense systemsold HAWKs, Aspides and Crotales, among othersbut the Patriots and NASAMS are the best and most numerous of Ukraines new air-defenses.

Theyre how Ukraine will maintain its air-defense network and prevent a profound shift in the aerial balance of power toward Russia. A shift that could disrupt Ukraines long preparation for a ground counteroffensive.

All that is to say, Ukraine needs more Patriots and NASAMS. And it needs them now.

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Just One Thing Is Keeping Russian Warplanes From Rampaging ... - Forbes