Monthly Archives: May 2022

The Ontario Progressive Conservative (PC) governments attempt at re-election brings to the forefront questions of Canadian conservatism and its viability, not just in the countrys most populous province.

Throughout its tenure, the PC government has undergone significant changes in policy, appearance and general tone. A 2018 populist movement has seemingly shifted to the moderate PC coalition of old.

To capture this change, is it necessary for Ford to turn back the clock to 2018? After all, he won both the party leadership and the election on a populist agenda.

Following the more centrist Patrick Browns removal as PC leader in January 2018, Ford entered the race brandishing his previous anti-establishment and brash Toronto City Council persona.

In narrowly beating Christine Elliot for the leadership, Ford quickly shifted the image and platform of the party to his own image.

The partys electoral platform, titled A Plan for the People, contrasted the people from the elites, who, through waste, mismanagement and scandal, had along with a set of special interests benefited from exploiting every day Ontarians.

The platform argued that Fords PC party, by being better connected to the taxpayer, would bring in a period of fiscal restraint, less wasteful government spending and a more common-sense driven policy process. Among the partys promises were to fire the CEO of Ontarios utility provider, Hydro One, launch a full audit of Liberal government spending and repeal the provinces cap-and-trade program.

These initiatives shaped the initial year of the Ford government as it brought in aggressive and controversial policies.

By the time the 2019 spring budget was tabled, the government had scrapped cap-and-trade, legislated an end to the strike at York University, cancelled several green-energy contracts, put in place the student choice initiative that was later struck down, fought teachers unions over increased class sizes, limited the salaries of public servants and budgeted significant cutbacks in public spending in addition to $26 billion in tax relief.

In particular, the decision to cut the size of Toronto City Council, coupled with the threat to use the Constitutions notwithstanding clause to enshrine its bill limiting third-party election advertising, seemed to show the willingness to lash back against conventional norms and institutions.

Read more: Doug Ford uses the notwithstanding clause for political benefit

To many, this was met with a certain dread: critics, particularly those on the left, saw Ford as the Donald Trump of the North whose emergence to power marked Canadas entry into a brash, authoritarian and xenophobic populism seen throughout the world.

Alternatively, many Conservatives positively regarded Fords government as a return of former premier Mike Harriss Common Sense Revolution of neo-liberal reform.

Neither of these predictions have turned out to be correct.

By 2022, Ford and the Progressive Conservatives have come to resemble an older, conservative powerhouse: the Big Blue Machine of onetime premiers Leslie Frost, John Robarts and Bill Davis.

This is because rather than making efforts to display its ideological or populist integrity, the Ford government has come to focus more pragmatically on the consequences of each of its policies. In particular, there remains next to no rhetoric on elites versus the people.

The party was in power for 42 consecutive years in Ontario, from 1943 to 1985, and its success has been attributed to its pragmatic, moderate and borderline bland style of governance, particularly in the way it ensured a consistent level of economic growth.

The change in tone for the Ford government seems to have started in late 2019 when, following a significant drop in popularity, it regrouped via a drastic cabinet shuffle and staffing changes in the premiers office.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 showed a new side to Ford and his government. The governments response, while far from perfect, suggested Ford was empathetic and, most importantly, concerned about the practical success of policies.

Rather than disparaging the media or other governments as part of the elite, the Ford government developed a solid working relationship with the governing federal Liberals.

This new, more moderate and pragmatic tone has taken over the partys 2022 policy platform, entitled Get It Done and there appears to be no intention to shift back to right-wing populism.

As Get it Done communicates, the party now bases its appeal in the claim that it can effectively get results and most competently manage the affairs of the province.

This includes providing more benefits for workers, expanding health care and investing $158.8 billion in several large transportation projects. The governments prior fiscal hawkishness seems to have disappeared given a balanced budget isnt projected until 2027.

This suggests that a contrarian populist appeal, while it could be useful in attaining office, is much more difficult to sustain as a coherent, effective and popular governing strategy over time.

As the Ford government learned, an aggressive and contrarian approach can quickly create too many enemies, especially given Ontarios large and powerful public sector.

This could be unique to Ontario. The provinces political culture has long favoured moderation and pragmatic governance.

But its also important to recognize the implications this could have for the rest of Canada, because it provides Canadian Conservative governments with one of two choices in the coming years.

First, form legislatively influential but short-lived populist coalitions or, second, compromise to enjoy a longer, but likely much less impactful, control over the government.

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What Doug Ford's shift to the centre says about the longevity of populism - The Conversation

None of this is new. What stands out as a true departure is Mr. DeSantiss willingness to use government power in the culture war.

Sometimes this has involved areas, like public education, where the government has every right to set the rules. One such example is the Dont Say Gay bill, more properly known as the Parental Rights in Education bill, which prohibits classroom instruction on sexual orientation or gender identity in kindergarten through third grade. Another is the Individual Freedom bill, which, among other things, prohibits promotion of the concept that a person must feel guilt, anguish or other forms of psychological distress because of actions, in which the individual played no part, committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, sex or national origin.

Other times, Florida has pursued a laudable goal in a dubious manner. Its Big Tech bill seeks to keep social media companies from removing political candidates and other users from their platforms, but it has serious First Amendment conflicts and has been enjoined by a federal judge.

Then theres the fight with Disney. The revocation of its special tax status is a frankly retaliatory act that also presents free-speech issues and could prove a legal and policy morass. That said, Disney got a truly extraordinary deal from the state that allowed it, in effect, to run its own city. The company never would have been granted this arrangement 55 years ago if its executives had told the states leaders, And, by the way, eventually, the Walt Disney Company will adopt cutting edge left-wing causes as its own.

The broader point of making an example of Disney is to send a message to other corporations that there could be downsides to letting themselves be pushed by progressive employees into making their institutions weapons in the culture wars, so that they conclude its best to stick to flying planes, selling soda, and so on.

How can a limited-government Tea Party Republican like Mr. DeSantis have become comfortable with this use of government? For that matter, how is it that so many Tea Party types moved so easily toward Trumpist populism?

The key, I think, is that for many people on the right, a libertarian-oriented politics was largely a way to register opposition to the mandarins who have an outsized influence on our public life. And it turns out that populism is an even more pungent way to register this opposition. Progressive domination of elite culture has now grown to include formerly neutral institutions like corporations and sports leagues. More conservatives are beginning to believe that the only countervailing institutional force is democratic political power as reflected in governors mansions, state legislatures and likely beginning next year Congress.

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Opinion | Why Ron DeSantis Is the New Republican Party - The New York Times

At the height of their power, four brothers from Sri Lankas Rajapaksa dynasty held the presidency and theprime ministers officeas well as the finance, interior and defence portfolios, among others. But just when the Rajapaksa clan seemed invincible, an economic crisis of their own making led to their undoing. But does that spell the end of South Asias most powerful political family?

On August 12, 2020, an extraordinary display of family power was under way atthe Temple of the Sacred Tooth, one of the most sacred Buddhist sites in Sri Lanka, in the central city of Kandy, the political capital of ancient kings in the island nation.

Following a landslide victory in August elections, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa swore in a cabinet that included two of his brothers and two nephews, sharing multiple portfolios among the family.

The Rajapaksas have a tradition of temple swearing-in ceremonies, a symbolism-heavy acknowledgment of the Sinhala Buddhist populism that kept propelling them into power. Over the past few years, as the familys political fortunes enlarged, the investiture entourage of officials, diplomats and media teams dutifully trekked to sacred temples on historic sites, where yet another Rajapaksa was granted yet another portfolio.

The concentration of power and mismanagement though, have been unholy.

At the inauguration of the new cabinet, the president took on the defence portfolio, contravening a constitutional amendment barring the countrys head of state from holding a cabinet post.

His powerful brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa, became Sri Lankas new prime minister and was also named head of three ministries: finance, urban development and Buddhist affairs.

The president then swore in his eldest brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, as minister for irrigation, internal security, home affairs and disaster management. Chamals sonSashindra was made junior minister for high-tech agriculture. The prime ministers sonNamal became minister of youth and sports.

Barely a year later, Basil Rajapaksa was named finance minister, taking over the important portfolio from his brother, the prime minister.

At the height of their power, the Rajapaksas appeared invincible as they signed mega infrastructure contracts andamassed fortunes whilecracking down on minorities and journalists and successfully evaded accountability in a state where they held all the reins.

For several years, human rights defenders condemned the reprisals, massacres, crackdowns, corruption and cronyism of South Asias most powerful political dynasty. Their calls went unheeded by an electorate willing to overlook assaults on liberties and persuaded by the cult of strong leaders preferring action over compromise.

But that was before the island nation descended into its worst economic crisis since its independence from Britain in 1948. As an acute foreign currency crisis sparked fuel shortages, power cuts and spiraling inflation, the tide finally began to turn against the Rajapaksa clan as Sri Lankans struggled to cope with a disaster of their elected governments own making.

This week, as peaceful anti-government protests turned violent, symbols of the Rajapaksa family power came under attack in scenes unimaginable two years ago.

On Monday night, crowds stormed the prime ministers official Temple Trees residence in Colombo, forcing the army to conduct a predawn operation to rescue Mahinda Rajapaksa and his family. The prime minister by then had already submitted his resignation letter to his younger brother, the president, clearing the way for a new unity government.

Meanwhile in the southern province of Hambantota, mobs attacked the Rajapaksa Museum in the familys ancestral village of Medamulana. Two wax statues of the Rajapaksa parents were flattened and mobs trashed the building as well as the ancestral Rajapaksa home nearby.

It was a violent assault on a clan that has held feudal power since colonial times and has used patronage and privilege to rise from local to national power, placing family members in strategic positions along the way.

The Rajapaksas are a rural land-owning family from southern Sri Lanka whose ancestors have represented their native Hambantota on state and regional councils since pre-independence days.

Prominent families have always played an important role in Sri Lankan politics. But the Rajapaksas were not part of the urban political elites in the decades following independence. While families such as the Bandaranaikes which produced three Sri Lankan prime ministers and one president dominated the national scene, the Rajapaksas were part of the rural elites in the countrys Sinhalese Buddhist southern heartland.

The current presidents father, D. A. Rajapaksa, was a parliamentarian representing Hambantota district. But it was his second son, Mahinda, who catapulted the clan into national dominance when he rose from opposition leader in parliament to prime minister in 2004.

A year later, Mahinda won the 2005 presidential poll with a narrow margin, aided, according to his opponents, by a call for anelection boycott by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), a militant group better known as the Tamil Tigers.

It was Mahindas first win in the bloody fight against the Tamil Tigers based in Sri Lankas neglected north, home to the countrys Tamil minority.

As president, Mahinda initiated a pattern of leadership that would serve his familys political fortunes, earning him the moniker of clan leader of the rising Rajapaksas.

The transition from a rules-based order to one of family networks began shortly after the 2005 presidential inauguration when, according to family lore, Mahinda emerged from the investiture room and spotted his younger brother, Gotabaya.

A former army officer, Gotabaya had moved to the US only to return home ahead of the 2005 to work on his brothers election campaign.

According to biographers, the new president tapped Gotabayas shoulder and told his brother who had left the army as a lieutenant colonel that he was going to be Sri Lankas new defence secretary.

The Rajapaksas consolidation with the military had begun. It wasnt long before Mahinda was ready to unleash a war that would end the Tamil Tigers, as he promised his electorate.

By the time Mahinda was elected president, the Tamil Tigers had dropped their demands for an independent state in the north and were asking for greater autonomy under the terms of a Norway-sponsored ceasefire.

The agreement, it was hoped, would usher in a peace deal that would end a brutal civil war that had killed tens of thousands of people over two decades.

The Rajapaksa brothers instead oversaw a military operation that would defeat the Tamil Tigers, earning the support of Sri Lankans eager to end the civil war. But for the countrys Tamil minority, it unleashed a period of state violence against civilians that drew condemnations from the UN and international human rights groups over the abductions and disappearances of suspected Tamil Tiger supporters as well as journalists, activists, and others deemed to be political opponents by armed men operating in white vans, which became a symbol of political terror.

Gotabaya was particularly implicated in the infamous 2009 White Flag Incident when Tamil Tiger members and their families, after contacting the UN, Red Cross and other Western governments, agreed to surrender to Sri Lankan authorities only to be gunned down by the army.

The Rajapaksa brothers have repeatedly denied responsibility for the disappearances. They also maintain that they did not give the shoot-to-kill order during the White Flag surrender.

Gotabayas tough on security position boosted his popularity in the 2019 presidential polls justas it helped his politically more experienced brother, Mahinda, win parliamentary elections the next year.

But it was economics, not security, that proved to be the Rajapaksa clans undoing.

Horrified by the gross human rights violations in Sri Lanka, Western governments began dropping Sri Lanka fromaid disbursement lists. With aid and concessionary borrowing avenues drying up as Sri Lanka upgraded to lower-middle-income status, the government began relying heavily on commercial borrowings to finance the national budget.

The Rajapaksas were also increasing their reliance on Chinese investment. A massive port project in the familys native Hambantota soon emerged as a textbook example of the Chinese debt trap, with Sri Lanka borrowing from Chinese banks to pay for commercially unviable projects at onerous rates.

Chinese investments in a number of unfeasible mega projects, mostly in Hambantota, are the subject of numerous economic reports,with analysts apportioning blame to different parties. But in the real world, there was no doubtthat life was getting increasingly difficult for Sri Lankan citizens.

As the countrys sovereign debt ballooned, the Rajapaksas resisted national and international calls for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement and debt restructuring, insisting that Sri Lanka would service its debt.

Meanwhile, Basil Rajapaksa, who was made finance minister in 2020 despite the corruption cases against him, was dubbed Mr. Ten Percent as allegations circulated that the family was siphoning off state funds.

His nephew, Chamal Rajapaksas sonSashindra, was involved in a disastrous ban on chemical fertiliser imports, which hit the countrys critical agricultural sector.

As the pandemic shut down tourism, Sri Lankans began to despair of their countrys ruling clan.

On May 9, when Rajapaksa supporters attacked peaceful protesters assembled in Colombo, the floodgates of rage against the powerful political dynasty opened.

A day after the deadly violence, Mahindas sonNamal, who was sports minister before his resignation earlier this year, insisted the family was merely going through a "bad patch".

At 36, Namal is widely seen as the primary Rajapaksa successor, and he has a vested interest indownplaying the troubles the family is facing.

But analysts familiar with Sri Lankas culture of dynastic patronage are not yet willing to write off the Rajapaksas as a political force. "The Rajapaksa brand still has support amongst the Sinhalese population," Akhil Bery from the Asia Society Policy Institute told AFP.

"Though much of the blame can be placed on the Rajapaksas now, their successors will inherit the mess, leaving space for the Rajapaksas to remain politically relevant."

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The rise and fall of a political dynasty that brought Sri Lanka to its knees - FRANCE 24 English

When school choice policy began making headway in the late 1990s, it came with a "voucher program" descriptor, as if a child possessed a golden ticket to visit Willy Wonka's chocolate factory but would instead use it to attend a private or parochial school.

Critics (primarily Democrats and their political benefactors, teachers unions) would harshly criticize the programs, calling them an unconstitutional violation of the separation of church and state or claiming it was a vehicle for Christian schools to "indoctrinate" young children.

It was one example of how Democrats used the culture wars to fuel their victories. Democrats and their political operatives were masters at attacking Republican motives and always keeping them on the defensive. When Republicans won control of Congress in 1994 for the first time in 40 years, their first budget included a proposal to consolidate various federal school lunch programs to reduce bureaucracy and overlap. Democrats called it "mean-spirited" and said Republicans "wanted" school children to "go hungry." It was all baloney. Still, it was effective, and it's all that mattered. Democrats played the part of the victim very well and used the politics of resentment to their advantage.

Over the past two decades, the fault lines have shifted. Democrats were once seen as the party of blue-collar, non-college-educated voters, while Republicans were seen as the party of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie. While those with higher incomes still generally vote Republican, the educational shift is where the stark change took place.

In 1996, Sen. Bob Dole beat President Bill Clinton among college graduates 46% to 44%. Among those who didn't attend college? Clinton won 51% to Dole's 37%. In 2020, Joe Biden received 55% of the vote among college graduates as opposed to President Donald Trump's 43%. Trump won non-college graduates 50% to Biden's 48%. But among those who never attended college? Trump won 54% to Biden's 46%.

It explains the hold populism currently has over the Republican Party. Whether it's economics, culture, or foreign policy, the Overton window within the GOP and a significant base of its voters shifted. What bothers Democrats and their allies in the press is not so much that Republicans are doing it but that they've become successful at it. It's similar to gerrymandering. It was never a "threat to democracy" until Republicans started doing it effectively.

People have recoiled at Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis for going after Disney for getting involved in the fight over the Parental Rights in Education bill after succumbing to pressure from some employees and LGBT advocates. But again, singling out corporations or specific industries is a tried and true Democratic tactic. "Windfall profit taxes," threatening to penalize companies financially that don't pay employees at least $15 an hour, threats of Federal Trade Commission investigations, and using environmental, social, and governance scores to force corporations into adhering to preferred Democratic climate policies are examples.

I mentioned it on Twitter and had several people offering up the "That's different!" excuse based on why Democrats did it vs. DeSantis. You see, Democratic motives for doing so are valid, while Republican motives are not. It's typical of the mindset that tries to reason, "It is awesome when our side does it."

Personally, I am not a fan of such tactics. As one who still adheres to conservatism's embrace of the three-legged stool (a robust national defense, free-market economics, and social values) variety, I am not happy with the GOP's populist shift. I think it values short-term success to the detriment of success in the long term. Still, I certainly understand why it's happening.

With a more polarized electorate, it becomes that much more critical for politicians to turn out base voters, particularly those who want to see their political leaders "fight" for whatever they think is worth the fight. Ironically, the liberal Left and nationalist Right have aligned on various economic issues as both bases have played to their more populist elements.

Republicans have found a way to reach what was always a core Democratic constituency. By aligning themselves with working-class voters, the GOP turned Ohio into a bright-red state, making Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Minnesota more competitive than they've been in decades. To the Democrats complaining about Republican tactics: The reality is, just like in that old Partnership For a Drug-Free America public service announcement from the 1980s, they learned it from watching you.

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Republicans learned some of their political tactics from watching Democrats - Washington Examiner

ByJavad Heiran-Nia

Irans Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sets the overall direction of the country, so understanding the psychological milieu of the leader and the political establishment is important in interpreting and anticipating Irans foreign policy.

Khamenei was considered a pragmatist before he became leader in 1989, according to a CIA report published in 1986. However, in office, he took the views of radical Iranian leftists, adopting extremist slogans against the west and the United States. Khamenei, who was from the right-wing, abandoned pragmatism in foreign policy to weaken left-wing rivals and get the support of Irans security establishmentparticularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)after being appointed leader of Iran in June 1989. In going along with the hardcore faction of power, he consolidated his position.

His view of the international order is based on three axes of global power. The firstthe liberal order based on institutions and laws created after World War IIis weakening in his view because American hegemony is declining. A second axis, formed by Russia and China, is seen as rising. The third axis joins Iran with this rising new world order with Moscow and Beijing, adopting a policy of look to the East, and abandoning the old slogan of Neither East, nor West that was dominant after the 1979 revolution.

On April 26, in a meeting with students, Khamenei said: Today, the world is on the threshold of a new international order, which, after the era of bipolar world order and the theory of unipolar world order, is taking shape. In [the] current period, of course, the US has become weaker day by day.

Referring to American theorists such as Stephen Walt, who also see the decline of US primacy, Khamenei said in 2019: Some American experts and thinkers have used the term termite-like decline in describing the political, social, and economic situation of this country.

The US economy now accounts for less than a quarter of world GDP, down from a 40 percent share in 1960. US military spending is still huge, accounting for almost 40 percent of the worlds total military spending in 2020, but the US is no longer seen as the sole global hegemon.

American thinkers such as Joseph Nye see a decline of the liberal order as countries such as China exploit their membership in the World Trade Organization. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, this order was challenged by the rise of China and populism in Western democracies. Once champions of globalization, the US and Europe are now seeking to counter this trend.

Although the US has long commanded the technological cutting edge, China is mounting a credible challenge in key areas, according to Nye. But, ultimately, the balance of power will be decided not by technological development but by diplomacy and strategic choices, both at home and abroad.

Foad Izadi, a well-known Iranian theorist and professor at Tehran University, shares the view that the US is declining due to structural weaknesses in its economic foundations. As Americas pillars and foundations become weaker, so does the strength of these pillars.

Izadi also said recently: We are witnessing the decline of the United States in various areas, including social and economic. This situation is not reversible and unstoppable. Many of the worlds problems will be solved with the decline of the United States.

Despite Russias poor military performance in Ukraine and the at least temporary reinvigoration of NATO, Iranian officials still assert that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a sign of the US losing strength. This was echoed by Khamenei recently on April 26, when he said, The issues of the recent war in Ukraine should be seen more deeply and in the context of the formation of a new world order.

The Iranian establishment also believes that there has been a decline in the liberal order amid a rise of populism and far-right currents in Western democracies.

The establishment uses these views to justify closer relations with Russia and China to a skeptical population, especially after intensifying criticism of the twenty-five-year agreement with China and twenty-year agreement with Russia (which hasnt been finalized).

Critics note that while Chinas rise has been substantial, its power in the future shouldnt be exaggerated. The US will remain strong for the foreseeable future, with the worlds second-largest and most dynamic and networked economy, even if Chinas GDP becomes larger.

It should be noted that the continuation of high economic growth and taking steps in the field of political development without basic fiscal, financial, and other market reforms isnt possible. As Rhodium Groups Daniel H. Rosen notes in Foreign Affairs, China is relatively poor. Per capita income in China is about one-fifth of that in the United States, at around $12,000 a year. Nine hundred million Chinese citizens are not yet living comfortable urban lives and are waiting for their turn. The problems of 2022, which will be an economically bad year for China, are expected to cast a shadow over the countrys economy for many years to come.

Regarding the second axisnamely, a future world system based on Russia and China as new polesthis approach reflects the Islamic idealist and leftist nature of the 1979 Iran revolution.

At the beginning of the revolution, the new regime sought to disrupt the international system. But following the devastating IranIraq War of the 1980s, Iran faced limitations that jeopardized the survival of the regime and forced them to adjust to new structural constraints.

In the 1990s, the Islamic Republic sought to integrate into the international system. However, the failed efforts to de-escalate tensions with the West in the Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjaniwho pushed for a China-like modeland Mohammad Khatami administrations, as well as the Western blocs unprecedented economic pressure on Iran, led Tehran to pursue strategic cooperation with US rivals.

The recent Iran-China cooperation document and Iran-Russia agreement can be seen in this light.

Irans Look to the East policy seeks to use Russia and China to bolster Iran, especially on the nuclear issue, and to withstand Western sanctions and threats. But, in practice, Russia and China dont always support Iran in the United Nations and even showed some relative compliance with US unilateral sanctions during the Donald Trump administration.

The look to the East policy also has domestic implications, reinforcing a uniform political and social structure and leading to the erosion of the middle class.

Reformists who back a look to the West view have been largely eliminated from the Iranian political structure and it is practically impossible for them to return to power, as former Iranian President Khatami recently acknowledged.

In promoting the third axis of Iran, Russia, and China, Khamenei stresses that cooperation isnt limited to trade and economic relations and includes military ties. The recent visit of Chinas defense minister, which was depicted as an extension of the Tehran-Beijing twenty-five-year document, is significant in this regard.

Irans establishment sees the US adoption of offshore balancing and gradual withdrawal from the Middle East as the harbinger of a new order in the region that entails more and more cooperation with China.

In conclusion, there is a gap between the psychological milieu of Iranian political elites and the real-world balance of power. This may cause Iranian foreign policy to be less successful, but will strengthen conservatives in the political system and their supporters at the community level. Thus, the psychology of Irans foreign political decision-makers should be assessed from the perspective of domestic politics and the protection of the interests of the ruling elite.

Javad Heiran-Nia is director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.

Wed, Nov 24, 2021

IranSourceByJavad Heiran-Nia

Iranian experts in Tehran see the Joe Biden administration's approach toward Iran and the JCPOA in the context of his government's overall foreign policy and its desire to extricate itself from military conflicts in the Persian Gulf.

Image: Iranian women hold a picture of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Iranian flag, during the celebration of the 43rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran, Iran February 11, 2022. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

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How Iran's interpretation of the world order affects its foreign policy - Atlantic Council