Monthly Archives: April 2022

At first glance, Frances presidential election looks rather like a rerun of the 2017 contest. Most polls suggest that incumbent Emmanuel Macron will top Sundays first-round vote before facing, and defeating, Marine Le Pen in the April 24 runoff. In other words, 2022 will be the return leg of the previous electoral matchup between liberalism and nationalism. But beyond this superficial resemblance, the political landscape has profoundly changed since 2017.

Chief among these structural differences is that, as the mainstream has steadily shifted to the Right, the far right is stronger than ever. Before the first round, Le Pen is polling at similar levels to 2017, at around 20 percent. Yet, she fares much better in second-round polls. While she only took 33 percent in the 2017 runoff against Macron, her predicted score if she makes it this time is roughly 45 percent.

Furthermore, the major event that shook the 2022 campaign was the meteoric rise of another far-right candidate: ric Zemmour. While Le Pen has managed to maintain a lead over him, he initially threatened her chances, bringing her down from her hitherto comfortable place alongside Macron and far above all other candidates. Indeed, beyond its current divisions the latest iteration of an older divide between traditionalists and modernists, which I will explore in this and following articles the far right as a whole is showing remarkable electoral strength. Tellingly and somewhat chillingly regardless of their relative strength throughout the campaign, the combined voting intentions for Le Pen and Zemmour have remained steadily over 30 percent.

To better understand this situation, lets turn back to the political landscape in 2017, a tight election and unique moment in French political history. The traditional alternance, or exchange of power, between center-right and center-left, which had shaped France for the last three decades, seemed like a relic of the past, threatened by a rising tide of new political challengers.

On the Left, the discredit of the Socialist Party (PS) after Franois Hollandes presidency opened an unlikely path for Jean-Luc Mlenchon and the radical-left France Insoumise (LFI). On the Right, the conservative Les Rpublicains (LR) chose in Franois Fillon a hardliner who was weakened by a political-financial scandal involving his wife. Benefitting from the defeat and discredit of centrist candidates within these mainstream parties, former finance minister Macron filled the vacuum in the center by building a personalistic movement, En Marche, which promised renewal through a liberal politics beyond left and right.

Meanwhile, the Front National (FN) was progressively losing its pariah status. Since its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, infamous for his politically incorrect and overtly antisemitic quips, left his place as party leader to his daughter in 2011, its communication had changed drastically. Indeed, Marine Le Pen placed the strategy of ddiabolisation (de-demonization) at the heart of her leadership. To normalize the partys image, she sought to distance the FN from its association with racism and antisemitism.

In practice, this meant adapting its discourse to make it more acceptable without fundamentally changing its program, and also excluding problematic party members who did not follow that new line. Burdened by her fathers embarrassing legacy in her first 2012 campaign, three years later she evicted him from the party he created after yet another revisionist declaration on the Holocaust. While Le Pen pre and his most faithful supporters cried betrayal, this exclusion was framed by the new FN leader as the ultimate proof of her commitment to ddiabolisation.

Simultaneously, Le Pen emphasized the personalistic dimension of her leadership, distancing herself even from her fathers divisive surname. Instead, she played along to the sexist trope of female politicians being defined by their first name, encouraging references to herself as simply Marine. This was most visible in her 2012 bid to coalesce smaller far-right candidates around her Rassemblement Bleu Marine (Navy-Blue Rally) playing on the polysemy of her first name, which also stands for navy blue. While this was criticized internally as a sign that the FN was becoming a dynastic party, Le Pen emphasized her femininity and ordinariness, to humanize her and soften her image.

Inspired by Donald Trumps unexpected breakthrough in 2016 and influenced by her then right-hand man, Florian Philippot, Le Pen fully embraced the populist style in her 2017 campaign. To be clear, here populism is not understood as inherently reactionary or grounded in any specific ideological content, like the nationalism with which it is too often conflated. Rather, following the work of Ernesto Laclau and Benjamin Moffitt, I define populism as a political style a way of articulating of ones discourse.

The populist repertoire is built around three clusters: (1) framing politics as a conflict between the people and a specific elite although the exact content of what is meant by either depends on the ideological content that it shapes; (2) transgressing political norms to make oneself and ones message appear more authentic and closer to the people; (3) performing a crisis narrative which requires urgent change. Stripped to its core, the populist style articulates a society in crisis where an elite is failing in its duty to represent and act on behalf of its people, and where radical change is embodied through the salutary intervention of a transgressive leader.

But the ideological content of Le Pens campaign had already changed compared to her 2012 bid. Le Pen continued a trend that her father had begun in his 2007 campaign by adding social edge to her economic patriotism; she notably promised tax rebates to the smallest companies as well as various benefits aimed at the poorest. Although it remained grounded in an ethnocentric nationalism that de facto excluded immigrants, Le Pen defended a form of welfare chauvinism aimed at convincing blue-collar workers.

On social issues, she also toned down the most conservative side of her program. She adopted a form of ambiguity on issues like the death penalty, abortion, and same-sex marriage by not taking an overt stance on them, which contrasted with her explicitly reactionary position in 2012. The flagship measure of abandoning the euro, which occupied a whole chapter in her 2012 program, was kept but rephrased less radically as a return to monetary sovereignty.

However, what most notably distinguished Le Pens 2017 bid from her previous campaign was its populist framing, with her nationalist agenda entirely recast as a struggle by the people against an unresponsive elite. From her campaigns motto, In the name of the people, to the antiestablishment rhetoric in her campaign advertisement, Le Pens campaign heavily played on this antagonism to develop the image of a relatable outsider that would defend the people by changing the status quo.

This was also accompanied by a shift away from her party and its tricolor flame logo. Unlike in previous campaigns, Le Pen chose not to use any of the symbols and imagery associated with her party. Instead, Le Pen made the transgressive choice of embracing a blue rose, itself representing the claim to go beyond left and right: blue is traditionally associated with conservatives in France, whereas the rose has historically been the emblem of the Socialist Party.

Understood in this light, populism provided a way for her to cover her exclusionary nationalism with a new coat of paint. Fighting to close the French nation from foreign immigrants and influences sounds backward-looking, and implies an exclusionary vision of the nation. But framing this as a matter of defending the French people against a political and intellectual elite that benefits from immigration and enables terrorism made it seem much more legitimate to far more people.

This new line furthermore provided a way for the FN to reach beyond the traditional core of far-right supporters by appealing to the large pool of habitual nonvoters disappointed by the traditional parties. In a nutshell, the populist style which she was far from the only candidate to mobilize in that election allowed her to modernize her ideology and close off room for accusations of xenophobia or racism a natural fit with her de-demonization strategy.

So, what has changed for Le Pen and the far right more widely in 2022? The first part of this answer lies in a backlash against her personalistic and populist line from within her own political camp.

Although Le Pens 2017 results were a record performance for her party, the end of her campaign was tainted by her catastrophic performance in the debate with Macron during the runoff. Although Le Pen had developed a reputation as a combative debater, in this case she reached a new level of aggression. Furthermore, since Macron extended the first part of the debate on economic issues as long as he could, Le Pen ended up looking unprepared and out of her depth. She did partly recover in the latter half of the debate on security, but never regained the upper ground with commentators widely framing her abundant use of irony as flippant. In a rare candid admission of error, Le Pen later acknowledged that this was a failed rendez-vous with the French people,

Inside her own camp, Le Pens performance was seen as the embodiment of two things. Firstly, on a personal level, it was framed as a demonstration that Le Pen lacked the professionalism and stature to be a credible contender for the presidency a criticism especially damning as it was even leveled by her own father. Secondly, her crushing defeat by Macron highlighted the limits of a strategy reliant on populism and de-demonization. Some in the party insisted that Le Pen had diluted her message so much that her campaign lacked ideological spine and lost part of its radical appeal or even accused her of having become too leftist because of her choice to include social measures and incorporate criticism of laisser-faire into her anti-elite rhetoric. For them, courting voters disappointed by left-wing politicians was a fools errand which could never lead to victory.

Proponents of this line argued that the only path to success was to explode the republican dam between mainstream conservatives and the far right. In other words, rather than the populist promise to go beyond Left and Right, the FN should pursue the union of the right wings by reconciling the mainstream-conservative LR with the FN to create a united family of patriots. During the 2017 campaign, Le Pen described such an aspiration as a fantasy, but her disappointing second-round performance merely fueled her critics argument.

This conflict between a traditionalist wing calling for a return to the ideological fundamentals of the Right and a modernist wing seeking mainstream acceptance is nearly as old as the far right in France. In one of the major historic disputes within the FN, Bruno Mgret a key figure responsible for modernizing the partys ideological doctrine openly clashed with Jean-Marie Le Pen in the late 1990s, claiming that his transgressive posturing would never lead to victory. Le Pen pres refusal to change and his exclusion of Mgret led many high-ranking members to leave the FN with him, including Marine Le Pens eldest sister, Marie-Caroline Le Pen.

Indeed, the Tours congress in 2011, which determined who would succeed the founding leader, saw a re-emergence of this divide. Although Marine Le Pen garnered more than two-thirds of the votes with her promise to modernize the party, she confronted her fathers heir apparent, Bruno Gollnisch, who defended a much more conservative program.

After her defeat in 2017, Le Pen made some concessions to her critics from the conservative wing, pushing advisor Florian Philippot to leave the FN in September 2017. Having the man most closely associated with the FNs populist turn quit its ranks could be seen as an attempt at re-centering her party. Yet, this was also a perfect opportunity for Le Pen to get rid of a polarizing rival who had become increasingly central to the party and also made him the scapegoat for the campaigns various missteps.

Moreover, it further solidified her existing iron grip over the party, slowly isolating those who disagreed too openly and surrounding herself with faithful lieutenants like Jordan Bardella, a twenty-six-year-old whose meteoric rise in the party was entirely owed to Marine Le Pen herself. His youth, polished rhetoric, and ease in TV appearances, made him the ideal face of a de-demonized party. After a successful trial run as head of the 2019 European election campaign, Bardella was even made temporary party leader while Le Pen was campaigning for president a sign of trust demonstrating his solidified place within her innermost circle.

Indeed, Philippots departure would remain the only major change in Le Pens strategy as she set her focus on 2022. She persevered in her attempts at softening and normalizing both her partys and her own image. The most visible illustration of this was the name change in June 2018, as the party abandoned the divisive and combative connotations of Front to become Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN), a word which was associated with an idea of inclusive gathering while being the continuation of the aforementioned Rassemblement Bleu Marine.

For her 2022 campaign, Le Pen even abandoned the blue color, which was not only associated with her name but also semiotically attached to the Right. Instead, she chose a vivid green to serve as a natural backdrop for an optimistic pose that could have been lifted straight out of a green partys campaign. Le Pen added more focus on her personal life, as could be seen in her increasingly frequent mentions to her passion for cat breeding.

Ideologically speaking, she further accentuated her de-demonization strategy by developing two complementary tactics: mainstreaming her program and accentuating the populist framing of her politics as a struggle for the people beyond the Left/Right cleavage. To do so, she first removed several of the most controversial measures in her 2017 program, most notably the departure from the European Union, exiting the Schengen Area or returning to a national currency.

Instead, she continued the superficial hybridization of her nationalist and conservative agenda with exogenous elements from apparently left-wing ideologies, a phenomenon that was already apparent in her 2017 campaign with the introduction of social undertones to her rhetoric. Among the newest additions for 2022, the concept of localism,theorized by Herv Juvin, provided a local counterpart to the notion of national preference while introducing a green twist to her program.

Le Pens strategic decision to double down on her normalizing strategy for the 2022 campaign unsurprisingly did little to satisfy party hardliners. Worse than that, her attempts at marginalizing the voices of her critics became increasingly obvious over the years leading to the next election. A major turning point happened in 2020 as Le Pen prevented many of the most prominent representatives of her internal opposition, including notably Gilbert Collard and Nicolas Bay, from being part of the commission nationale dinvestiture,the committee determining local candidates for future elections. The event, which some described as a purge, pushed Marion Marchal, Le Pens niece and the rising star of the conservative wing of the party, to take a stand in the media against her aunt.

Marchal, who used to go by Marchal-Le Pen until 2018, had made history as the youngest member of parliament in 2012. She then retired from electoral politics after the 2017 campaign to launch a private political science school with the purpose of training up cadres from the right, from all the strands of the right. As against the aim of electing Le Pen through what Bardella called a front populaire populiste opposed to liberal elites, Marchal became the most vehement advocate for a return to the strategy of the union of the right wings. This would mark a clear return to the left/right cleavage, with the RN contesting the leadership of the declining LR, the conservative party weakened by Macrons hostile takeover of the center-right. However, despite her protests against the marginalization of her allies within the RN, Marchal had chosen to bide her time and build her networks outside of party politics. Acknowledging the dominance of her aunts strategy within the RN, it seemed that Marchal was betting on Le Pens defeat in 2022, so that she could herself make a bid in 2027.

Indeed, although she asserted her control of her party in a less openly authoritarian manner than her father did, Marine Le Pen managed to quell most internal dissent without appearing overly rigid or controlling. In a remarkable parallel with her overall success in crafting a smoother image for her party without compromising on its nationalist radicalism, Le Pens strict leadership did not seem to affect the relatable persona she had constructed in the public eye. In both party and personal matters, Le Pen thus perfectly embodied an iron fist in a velvet glove.

However, the image of a party cohesively united behind the leader, which Le Pen had worked so hard to mold for the RNs presidential campaign, soon showed cracks with the causes of discord only temporarily silenced. Indeed, as internal challenges to Le Pen seemed doomed to fail, the perspective of a successful comeback from the traditionalist line unsurprisingly came from an outsider: ric Zemmour. A conservative pundit in the media eye, Zemmours voice in the far right mattered and he has always been a critic of Le Pen, both strategically and personally.

A few days after Le Pens defeat in the 2017 runoff, Zemmour targeted scathing criticisms toward her, describing her campaign as a complete debacle and comparing her to a reverse Midas that turned into lead all the gold she was touching. Today, the longtime journalist is challenging her hegemony over the far-right camp in France, as he mounts his own bid for the presidency. In a second article, I will discuss what the rise of Zemmour represents exploring its consequences for the future of the far right and of French politics more generally.

Read the rest here:

Marine Le Pen's Populist Image Is an Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove - Jacobin magazine

Weve been hearing for years about how the U.S. two major political parties have realigned on economic issues, and the new breed of MAGA Republicans arent like the old corporate Reaganite Republicans. Theyre populists. Ive even heard the claim that, however conservative they may be on social issues, their economic views approximate those of democratic socialists like Sen. Bernie Sanders.

Now, the House just passed a measure to cap the price of insulin at $35 a month. And yet the loudest MAGA-ites all voted against HR 6833the Affordable Insulin Now Act. Take a look at the roll call. Marjorie Taylor Greene voted nay. Madison Cawthorn and Lauren Boebert? Nay, nay. Paul Gosar, Louie Gohmert, and Matt Gaetz? Nay, nay, and nay.

You can argue that politicians of many different ideological hues are often corrupt (or simply insincere) and fail to live up to their crowd-pleasing rhetoric. And thats true. But these are supposed to be the hardest corethe GOPs equivalent of Bernie or the Squad. And they couldnt even vote to throw the tiniest bone to suffering people at the expense of corporate profits. (37.3 million Americans, or one in every 10 Americans, has diabetes, according to the CDC.)

The idea that the price of insulin is just being cappedrather than made free to those who need itsays depressing things about the level of resistance to more meaningful reform among our political elites. Medicare for All is supported by well over half of the American publicand a public option in healthcare is backed by an even bigger majority. The insulin issue is a perfect demonstration of why these proposals resonate with so many people.

Try to imagine this happening in other scenarios.

Imagine that before the police investigated death threats from a stalker, you had to pay a fee at the Police Departments reception desk. Or that when you stood on your front lawn watching your house burn down, the local fire captain approached you with a portable card reader so you could swipe or tap your debit card before he let his men take out their hoses and get to work. Would you be concerned with making these services more affordableor would you regard the very idea that they would be treated as commodities as a moral abomination?

Its a ludicrously tiny infringement on the Divine Right of Corporations to make as much money as all possible, at the expense of suffering people. That was too much for the MAGA populists.

You cant be denied entrance to an emergency room because of your inability to pay. (Youll just be bankrupted by the bill if you live.) You can, however, be denied life-saving insulin.

As of last August, there were 3,600 campaigns on GoFundMe that mentioned diabetes or insulin. In one disturbing case that went viral a couple of years ago, Shane Patrick Boyle died after falling $50 short in his GoFundMe effort to raise $750 to buy a month of insulin. He succumbed to diabetic ketoacidosis while rationing his last vial of insulin, which made his blood acidic. Its a horrendously painful way to die.

As conservatives never tire of pointing out, someone has to pay for free services. Yet when it comes to services ranging from fire protection to K-12 public schools, the moral calculation is its better for everyone to pay for them through progressive taxation. That means no one has to think about money when they call 9-1-1 or enroll their child in school. This concept has become so baked into how we understand what it is to live in a civilized society, that the very thought of charging for these things at the point of service sounds like the stuff of dystopian science fiction.

If that calculation should be applied to anything, it should be medicine. Charging a diabetic for their insulin is like charging someone on a future colony on the moon for their months supply of breathable air.

Given all that, its pathetic that the best President Joe Biden can do is push for a limit on how much people are shaken down for the privilege of continuing to draw breath. And it was telling that in the same State of the Union speech where he introduced the idea, he announced that new anti-viral treatments for COVID were going to be offered for free. COVID is a unique crisis and, thus, centrists are willing to situationally support Medicare for All. The 100,000 people who die every year of diabetes, though? That just feels like business as usual.

It's also worth noting that the Affordable Insulin Now Act wouldnt have saved Shane Patrick Boyle, who lost his benefits because hed moved across state lines to care for his ailing mother. It also wouldnt help many of the thousands of people currently raising money to pay for their insulinwho dont have health insurance at all. The only thing the Act would do is stop insurers from passing on more $35 a month of the cost to diabetics.

And even that was too much for the allegedly populist and anti-corporate MAGA wing of the GOP. Its a ludicrously tiny infringement on the Divine Right of Corporations to make as much money as all possible, at the expense of suffering people. That was too much for the MAGA populists.

If you can see this shameful episode and still believe that economic populism exists in any meaningful way on the American Right, I have a whole series of bridges to sell you.

See the article here:

Republicans Just Proved 'Right Wing Populism' Is a Con Job - The Daily Beast

Indias top bureaucrats are worried about political parties resorting to competitive populism and announcing fiscally unsustainable schemes to win votes in state elections. Reports suggest that they voiced these concerns to the Prime Minister in a meeting on April 2.

We did not need secretaries of the government of India to highlight the growing tendency towards competitive populism in India. Political parties are increasingly promising all sorts of things to voters from restoration of the old pension scheme for government employees to cash and two-wheelers for students who enter or finish college and free pilgrimage to senior citizens.

Is this new wave of competitive populism going to lead to a fiscal disaster in the country? Who exactly is responsible for this kind of behaviour? And can a political consensus be built to prevent such spending by state governments?

How big a problem is competitive populism in India?

This is not an easy question to answer. A state can spend money on providing free food over and above what the Public Distribution System (PDS) entitlements provide for, or it can spend money giving scooters to students who have entered college. There are enough examples of political parties making such promises in India.

And there is bipartisan support for this kind of politics. For example, both the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI (M) led government in Kerala and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in Uttar Pradesh banked heavily on the free ration scheme in the elections held in 2021 and 2022. The Congress accused the BJP of copying its demand of giving free scooters to women students in the recently held Uttar Pradesh elections.

While a fiscal hawk will scoff at both kinds of spending, especially if the state is hard-pressed for resources, the actual economic impact of such programmes is likely to be quite different. Additional food entitlements are likely to generate tailwinds for aggregate demand as the recipient households will be able to spend the money they would have had to spend on food on other items. Such a scheme is also targeted towards the most needy. The same cannot be said about gifting scooters to students. That money would have had a better use somewhere else. Similarly, farm loan waivers are a sub-optimal use of money towards throwing palliatives at what is a structural problem and often at the cost of long-term spending in agriculture.

This qualitative difference in the effect of various populist schemes also underlines the pitfalls of reading too much into headline numbers on categories such as social service spending by state governments. Building a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative database of what and where exactly state governments are spending on populist schemes, and how it is affecting the macroeconomy and society is a project which can keep even a large think tank busy for the next couple of years.

What drives this political behaviour?

The lack of clarity on the second question is the biggest reason why some of these schemes have attracted economists who use randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to understand policy decisions and their impact in India.

While the RCT method has been duly recognised with a Nobel Prize to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer in 2019, there is an illustrious list of economists who have spoken against the dangers of relying too much on RCTs to make large policy decisions. The short point is, economists, on their own, are unlikely to arrive at an agreement on the impact or efficacy of such policies.

This brings us to the question of why are politicians doing this? The clichd answer that they do not care about fiscal prudence will not suffice, because state governments have to adhere to a more stringent fiscal norm than the Centre in India. When read with the fact that states have been left with very little tax sovereignty after the roll-out of Goods and Services Tax (GST), this is an even more intriguing question.

At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that the best answer to this question was given by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a campaign speech during the recently held Uttar Pradesh elections. Speaking at a rally on February 20, Modi referred to a social media video, where an old woman was pledging loyalty to the BJP because she had tasted Modis salt (ration) and therefore wont ditch him. While this can sound like usual election rhetoric to some, political scientists have been arguing that the BJP has been making a concerted effort to centralise welfare delivery which also leads to greater attribution for giving these benefits to none other than the Prime Minister.

This extraordinary centralisation of power, not just institutionally but also within the BJP, implies that the voter is increasingly likely to attribute (that is, give credit for) the delivery of economic benefits to Modi rather than the state-level leader. This contrasts with much of the 2000s, where, after a spate of fiscal decentralisation, several state-level leaders built their reputations on the ability to deliver benefits Neelanjan Sircar, a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research argued in a March 2021 Economic and Political Weekly article.

While Sircar argues that this process has also weakened the welfare credentials of chief ministers from the BJP and its allies too, and they will most likely look to establish their credentials not in welfare delivery but in Hindu mobilisation, it is not surprising that the anti-BJP parties have been trying to outdo the BJP by promising more populist schemes. Promises such as restoration of old pensions scheme and cash transfers by anti-BJP parties need to be seen in this light.

As is obvious, competitive populism by regional political forces is a last-ditch attempt to push back against the BJP which is the new national political hegemon in India. To meet such challenges, the BJP also indulges in competitive populism at the level of states, not to speak to decisions such as implementing PM-Kisan, which gives 6,000 to every farmer in India, from the Centre a decision taken after the BJP lost crucial state elections just before the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

Realpolitik suggests that regional parties are unlikely to prioritise long-term economic health over political survival. And that perhaps answers the third question.

Every Friday, HTs data and political economy editor, Roshan Kishore, combines his commitment to data and passion for qualitative analysis in a column for HT Premium, Terms of Trade. With a focus on one big number and one big issue, he will go behind the headlines to ask a question and address political economy issues and social puzzles facing contemporary India.

The views expressed are personal

See the original post:

Terms of Trade | What drives competitive populism in India? - Hindustan Times