Monthly Archives: July 2021

The year is 2030 and Russias military and intelligence services have spent months waging a disinformation campaign directed at the citizens of a NATO ally. The campaign has created strife among its target population and has increased civil unrest. Russian government actors proceed to conduct daily cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, causing prolonged electrical blackouts and cutting off access to water and hospitals in major cities, including the capital. Large-scale and coordinated terrorist attacks at ports of entry across the country including at the largest seaport and the hub of economic activity have increased fear. These attacks undermine the credibility of the government, which has struggled to provide relief to its citizens or stop the attacks.

A well-equipped and highly trained proxy force, backed by the Russian government, initiates attacks against the NATO allys security forces and intense fighting breaks out. The allys military is losing ground and violence spills into urban areas near the frontlines. Civilians citizens of the NATO ally confront the horrible decision of whether to flee or stay behind. Civilians who take flight, as well as those remaining in place, are targeted by cells of proxy fighters. The impact on the population is purposeful and immense: Harming civilians and civilian infrastructure is integral to the adversarys strategy.

Should NATO prepare for this scenario? Absolutely. The contingency above is a simplified version of what many who study the future of war are thinking through. In this imagined crisis, the conflict forces civilians to seek protection, even to cross borders to other NATO allies and partners. In turn, allies and partners see that a strong and skilled NATO force is needed to push back the incursion and assist the allied government in protecting its civilians. That could lead the North Atlantic Council, NATOs governing body, to enact Article 5, launching plans for a collective defense mission.

For NATO to succeed in the type of hybrid warfare scenario described above, alliance leaders would need to specify protection of civilians as an explicit mission objective. The good news is that the alliance already has a strong basis for doing that successfully, thanks to its existing policy and supporting documents. However, work on policy implementation building the skills, knowledge, and capabilities to protect civilians has been insufficient. Thats the clear finding of the research that our team has been conducting since 2019. Weve convened workshops focused on this issue with more than 100 practitioners, academics, and representatives of militaries and governments, and we presented a series of findings in a March 2021 report authored by our colleague Kathleen Dock.

NATO should take urgent actions now to ensure that it emphasizes protection of civilians as a core capability for future alliance missions not only out-of-area ones, but also any conducted on NATO territory and it should embrace protection of civilians as a cross-cutting requirement in NATOs new strategic concept.

Protection of Civilians: NATOs Existing Efforts

NATOs efforts on this issue are a work in progress. At the alliances 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO leaders adopted a landmark protection of civilians policy. It captured decades of lessons and experience, from operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya, and was written broadly to apply to all current and future NATO missions. In particular, the policy broke new ground by calling for the physical protection of civilians against harm caused by belligerents. The policy was the first such document for NATO and laid out the alliances approach to protecting civilians, which is built on four key concepts: understanding the human environment; mitigating harm; facilitating access to basic needs; and contributing to a safe and secure environment. The North Atlantic Council committed political support to the policy and, subsequently, NATO proceeded with practical implementation by producing an associated action plan, military concept, and a handbook on the subject.

Yet, as NATO marks the fifth anniversary of the policys adoption, continued work to build protection of civilians as a core capability is lagging. The policy is not being used actively to prepare NATO for its future, including missions where civilian protection would be a key objective and for operations in which NATO members might find themselves protecting allied citizens.

For some alliance and member state officials, protection of civilians is seen as rooted in the past and in those previous out-of-area missions where the alliance focused on protecting non-NATO citizens. Others argue that protecting civilians is not a future operational requirement. But, in fact, civilian protection is a challenge that will impact all future missions especially those that may occur within the borders of NATO allies and partners.

NATO officials have not surveyed those allies and partners to see how they plan to train and implement protecting civilians as a future mission requirement, what they have drafted as national-level guidance, and what is needed to prepare for such missions. Information about these matters is spotty today, and nations do not have an easy mechanism to learn from one another before a coalition is assembled for a specific mission.

The June 2021 NATO summit was a missed opportunity to catalyze further progress on this set of issues. Although NATO leaders took many vital steps to bolster the alliance against future threats, they failed to take additional actions to enhance the alliances ability to protect NATO civilians at home.

Toward the Future: Three Critical Steps

NATO allies and partners should champion, and resource, better implementation of the policy on protecting civilians, both during the drafting of NATOs new strategic concept and in other future planning.

First, NATO leaders military and political should recognize that protecting civilians is relevant for their populations and smart policy for the alliance. The 2021 summit emphasized working toward common purposes and uniting all members in their political commitment to the alliance. Leaders know that commitment will be tested, especially in the context of an operation that may take place within the borders of a NATO ally. In a scenario like this, NATO citizens will effectively become civilians caught in conflict and the alliance will have a duty to protect them. Civilians living within the borders of an ally or partner will expect the alliance to keep them safe both by refraining from harming them through NATO operations and by protecting them against harm from adversaries. Protecting civilians is a whole of alliance endeavor. If it is to be done effectively, it should be a core political commitment and military task.

A robust commitment to protection of civilians also distinguishes NATO allies and partners from opponents who disregard international humanitarian law and human rights principles, or who disregard the rights of their own civilians. In contrast to their likely adversaries, NATO nations strive to uphold a rules-based international order. One key contributor to achieving that goal is signaling the importance of protecting civilians in future operations and supporting further development of military capabilities suited to that task. On the political side of NATO, officials and leaders should have expertise in protection of civilians to help ensure that future mandates set civilian protection as a central goal. Only if that happens will military planners be able to plan effectively.

Second, NATO should build its knowledge, skills, and abilities to protect civilians and treat such protection as an operational goal. Future war experts have researched and identified modes of conflict that will change the character of war, including proxy wars, cyber attacks on military and civilian infrastructure, conflict in densely populated urban areas, disinformation campaigns aimed at eroding social cohesion, and the use of artificial intelligence. Not all of these are new, of course. But trends point to the high likelihood that the United States and other NATO members will find themselves responding to future conflicts that, at the very least, are fought among civilian populations or in which civilians are deliberately targeted. NATO is still not fully prepared to deal with such situations.

To anticipate, plan for, and address civilian insecurity is more than a moral good. It is a requirement of operational success when a population is a strategic target. On the military side, understanding the operational aspects of civilian protection should be folded into doctrine and training and woven throughout various functions, from intelligence to planning, strategy, and leadership. NATO should also establish protection of civilians as an operational requirement and integrate it into work at the headquarters level, including at Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation, and in discussions with allies and partners. In a future crisis, political and military actors will need to work together, so establishing those lines of communication now is essential. Much of the protection of civilians agenda is currently managed by NATOs Human Security office in Brussels, which lacks the staffing capacity and bureaucratic heft to implement the policy in the future.

Third, protection of civilians should be included in NATOs next strategic concept as a core political and military capability. The new strategic concept is due to be completed by 2022. Building additional knowledge, skills, and capabilities to safeguard civilians needs to be directed. By crafting a new action plan, building off the one completed in late 2020, the North Atlantic Council could initiate the next phase of this policy agenda by early 2022. High-level policy attention and guidance do not, of course, automatically mean effective implementation in future conflicts. Implementation will take sustained political support and savvy political leaders who understand how their political and strategic decisions impact those on the ground and the military components meant to implement their mandates. It will also take knowledgeable and well-trained militaries. Just as nations dont assume that a new group of military trainees will innately know how to use advanced artillery effectively, neither can NATO assume that new personnel will know how to protect civilians. That intention should be captured in doctrine, and trained and exercised, just like other core military missions.

Its Time for Additional Policy Action

By including the protection of civilians in its strategic concept, and by recognizing the broad importance of protecting civilians to the alliance, NATO will meet multiple goals. It will prepare for future missions that its allies and partners may face. It will establish NATO as committed to the security of civilians in conflict, a value that will help unite the alliance and distinguish it from many of its adversaries. And it will build on the good work that it has started and that needs a push in order to move aspirational goals into operational capability.

Together, these proactive measures will ensure that NATO sees protecting civilians as a core task for future alliance missions, not only out-of-area ones but also any that occur in the territory of allies and partners. As the old proverb says, An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. NATO can take more strides now to enable it to protect civilians in future conflicts.

Victoria K. Holt is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to international security and multilateral tools, including peace operations and conflict prevention, the United Nations and U.N. Security Council, protection of civilians, crisis regions, and U.S. policymaking. Prior to joining Stimson, Holt was the deputy assistant secretary of state for international security in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, serving from 2009 to early 2017.

Marla B. Keenan is an adjunct senior fellow at the Stimson Center. Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to international security, including human rights in armed conflict, protection of civilians, civilian harm tracking and analysis, and civil-military relations in armed conflict. Marla is also an International Security Program senior fellow at New America, working to strengthen partnerships between non-governmental organizations and academic institutions on applied research in armed conflict, and a security fellow at the Truman National Security Project.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)

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An Urgent NATO Priority: Preparing to Protect Civilians - War on the Rocks

Donald Trump was considering pulling out of Nato and cutting the USs alliance with South Korea if he won the 2020 election, according to an account of his private meetings with top aides.

I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J Trumps Catastrophic Final Year is a behind-the-scenes account of Mr Trumps last year in the White House, authored by Pulitzer Prize-winning reporters Phil Rucker and Carol Leonnig.

In an excerpt published in the Washington Post, Mr Trump is said to have lost the confidence of Defense Secretary Mark Esper. According to the book, Mr Esper confided in colleagues that he was rooting for Joe Biden to win the election because he believed he cared about national security.

Esper couldnt say the same about Trump. In fact, Trump had privately indicated that he would seek to withdraw from Nato and to blow up the US alliance with South Korea, should he win reelection. When those alliances had come up in meetings with Esper and other top aides, some advisers warned Trump that shredding them before the election would be politically dangerous.

Yeah, the second term, Trump had said. Well do it in the second term.

According to the excerpt, episodes recounted in the book are based on interviews with senior Trump administration officials, friends and advisers to the president.

White House scenes from election night are described in detail, including Mr Trumps reaction to seeing Arizona called for Mr Biden on Fox News.

Trump, who had been watching Fox, was livid. He could not fathom that the conservative news network he had long considered an extension of his campaign was the first news organization to call Arizona for Biden. This was a betrayal. His top advisers, who had been in the Map Room at the time, rushed upstairs to see the president.

What the f--- is Fox doing? Trump screamed. Then he barked orders to Kushner: Call Rupert! Call James and Lachlan! And to Jason Miller: Get Sammon. Get Hemmer. Theyve got to reverse this. The president was referring to Fox owner Rupert Murdoch and his sons, James and Lachlan, as well as Bill Sammon, a top news executive at Fox.

Trumps tirade continued. What the f---? he bellowed.

I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J Trumps Catastrophic Final Year is published on 20 July by Penguin Press.

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Trump was planning to withdraw US from Nato and ditch South Korea alliance, according to new book - The Independent

The mobile phone video is short and slightly grainy, but you can hear the fear, even the panic in the voices of the people waiting. Theyre making their way up the gangway into the small plane. Nobody wants to be left behind. A single man finally makes it past the security people and rushes to the plane. The person filming explains, "That was a senator" a member of the upper house of parliament in Kabul. "These are members of parliament, representatives from the provincial council and commanders."

In recent days, the dramatic scenes in Faizabad, the capital of the mountainous province of Badakhshan, have been a Saigon moment for Afghanistans government. They are reminiscent of the iconic photograph shot half a century ago, when one of the last American helicopters took off from South Vietnam, leaving desperate allies behind.

The events in Faizabad have great symbolic importance and reinforce a suspicion that has been lingering for some time now: One day soon, the current elites in Kabul might also have to flee from the advancing Taliban.

There have long been fears in Washington that the Afghan leadership and its troops would have a hard time holding their own against the Taliban once the NATO troops left. The Washington Post recently reported on a United States intelligence assessment forecasting that Afghan leadership could only hold out for six months, perhaps a year, after the final withdrawal.

The clock started ticking on July 2, at 3 a.m. local time, when the last plane took off from the Bagram Airfield north of Kabul. The Americans didnt even tell the Afghans in advance that they were leaving, they just disappeared. When the Afghan army finally arrived hours later, they already had to drive the first looters away from the base. It only took a few hours for the panic-stricken crowd to descend on the Faizabad airport.

Despite its very clear risk analyses, the United States decided, after almost 20 years, to end the war it launched after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, initially to hunt down Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida terrorists he led. But also to stabilize and democratize the country in the long term with partners including Germany. The first part of the mission succeeded, but the second one largely failed. The Taliban has now secured control of large parts of the country.

Children stand in front of a bombed-out business in Kandahar: At night, the streets belong to the Taliban.

They advanced rapidly in Faizabad, surrounding the city while simultaneously conquering almost the entire province. By July 14, they were in control of 26 of the 28 districts and had besieged two more. Other areas, especially in the north, are also falling into Taliban hands at ever-increasing speed. In the week up to July 5 alone, the Taliban captured another 38 of Afghanistans 407 districts, nearly one-tenth of the country. In all, they now control nearly 200 districts, with another 120 or so besieged. And almost nowhere have they triumphed as quickly and as radically as in Badakhshan.

On July 3, all commercial flights from Kabul to Faizabad were suspended until further notice. Then began the half-hearted evacuation attempts that were caught on video. Witnesses at the airport claim the government sent only one plane. GIZ, the German development aid organization, alone rented five aircraft from the United Nations fleet to bring its local staff to safety.

Fierce battles erupted around Faizabad, with dozens killed. But in most of the districts, there were no reports of fighting. The Taliban just marched through without resistance. The army, police, local militias some of them only recently established simply gave up, went home or fled. According to the Tajik army, over 1,037 Afghan security forces escaped across the border into the desperately poor neighboring country in a span of two days. And they werent the first to flee. "Staying would be suicide," said one soldier who had already fled to Tajikistan with an earlier wave. "Unfortunately, the majority of the districts were left to the Taliban without any fight," Mohib-ul Rahman, a provincial council member, told Radio Free Europe.

"Two helicopters picked up only the uniformed people, soldiers and police, a militia member who had deserted told DER SPIEGEL: "It was clear to everyone that it is over. Some fled, others just went home." All the reports from those holding out in Badakhshan and of those who have escaped Kabul confirm what the Talibans propaganda channels are communicating: The Taliban is advancing everywhere. In many cases, the government troops left their vehicles, weapons and ammunition. The only word from the Wakhan corridor, a remote mountainous area, is that the government has simply abandoned the district.

In Kabul, however, Defense Ministry spokesperson Fawad Aman tweeted: "Vast areas were cleared of Taliban terrorists in outskirts of Faiz-Abad, using an alternate spelling of Faizabad. In a second tweet, he posted four photos from the city as proof cars were still on the road. "People continue to live without fear of the Taliban terrorists." But there was no word about the abrupt loss of almost the entire province and the citys expected fall. There was only talk of victories even in the countrys other combat zone, where the Taliban are currently still advancing.

The spokesperson, indeed, the entire government, as well as President Ashraf Ghani and the political elite in Kabul all seem to be out of touch with reality. Ghanis national security adviser, Hamdullah Mohib, who just visited Moscow, earnestly declared that the Afghan forces had not expected a Taliban offensive. Nonetheless, he said they would "absolutely, definitely go on the counterattack.

In Kabul, politicians have been working for months to finalize the formation of a Supreme State Council that would have the authority to conduct peace negotiations with the Taliban at some point in the future. But the process has been repeatedly delayed, partly due to divisions among the Kabul elite: A "High Council for National Reconciliation" was announced in 2020, but a feud between President Ghani and his political nemesis, Abdullah Abdullah, over how many of his supporters could be included in the body has stalled that effort.

For 20 years, the changing governments in Kabul told themselves confidently that the Americans would stay forever. For former President Hamid Karzai, in particular, that self-deception became a mantra: The U.S. would never, ever pull out of Afghanistan. They believe the U.S. secret interests in Afghanistan its fabled mineral resources, geopolitical aspirations, or a host of other possible incentives were just too great. This made it easy for them to disparage their American occupiers while also sending them every bill. Afghanistan was occupied, they would say, and Kabul wasnt responsible for anything.

"We didnt realize the Americans were gone until it was light. No one told us anything."

This feigned incapacity, combined with grand patriotic gestures, was nurtured in Kabul. Even when then-President Donald Trump announced his withdrawal deal with the Taliban leadership in 2020, many still reacted with disbelief. And when, after his election, President Joe Biden gave specific withdrawal dates in April, some still didnt want to believe it. Even as Ashraf Ghani flew to Washington in late June, many in the Presidential Palace and the government ministries hoped that Biden, at the last second, would say: "OK, were going to stay."

But that didnt happen. Instead, unit by unit, the U.S. military, intelligence and service providers said goodbye and disappeared. The harsh awakening came early in the morning of July 2. Over two decades, the gigantic U.S. base at Bagram had grown into a kind of city with, at times, tens of thousands of residents, fast-food outlets, a hospital, a prison and a 3.6-kilometer (2.2-mile) runway big enough for a Boeing 747 aircraft to take off and land. Bagram was the heart of the American military machine in Afghanistan. But the place fell silent overnight. "We didnt realize the Americans were gone until it was light," said General Mir Asadullah Kohistani, the Afghan who is now in charge of the compound. "No one told us anything.

At an evening gathering in Kabul, officers were still upset about the callous departure days earlier. And it sounded less like determined anger than fearful indignation.

No one in Kabul seems to have a plan for stopping the Taliban. President Ghani doesnt make public appearances. Western diplomats in Kabul say he only consults with his closest confidants. A new defense minister with combat experience from the guerilla war has been appointed, but overall, the executive branch in Kabul seems shockingly paralyzed.

Afghan soldiers on the former U.S. base at Bagram: The Afghan elite had somehow convinced themselves the Americans would stay forever.

Even the elite units, which are robust in combat and yet manageable in size, are driven haphazardly and without cover into suicide missions, complains one of their commanders. On June 16, when a special forces group was sent into the Taliban stronghold of Faryab to retake a district, the men came under mortar fire from a much larger Taliban force. They had been expected.

If things had gone according to plan, there would, for example, have been air support for the elite force. But as one military man later summed it up "the army didnt come, the police didnt come and the secret service didnt come." He didnt even bother mentioning the air force. "Everyone left them hanging." At least 21 of the elite fighters were killed in less than an hour, including their well-known commander. There was a big funeral in Kabul, and the district was retaken. But only for three days. The Taliban has been in control ever since. A member of the provincial council, Abdul Ahad Elbek, criticized the deployment, saying that sending the troops there in the first place had been a death sentence.

Its a strange contrast: On the one hand, the government is acting mindlessly, while, on the other hand, as Bill Roggio, the matter-of-fact editor of The Long War Journal, argues, the Taliban is acting more strategically. By attacking the north, he says, the Taliban is about to threaten the power bases of the government and its allies. "If the Afghan government loses the north," he recently wrote, then Afghanistan is effectively lost. Then "the Taliban could take the population centers in the south, east, and west without a fight, and begin its siege of Kabul."

Badakhshan, the mountainous province that has now been conquered, played a central role as the last bastion against the Taliban in the 1990s. The legendary guerilla leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, the "Lion of the Panjshir Valley," successfully fought to ensure the Taliban never captured the region. He also became famous for controlling the hinterlands leading to the border with Tajikistan, through which he ran his supply route.

The Taliban grew out of the Pashtun ethnic group almost three decades ago. They never gained complete control over northern Afghanistan, which is primarily home to Tajiks, Uzbeks and Ismailis. Taloqan was the last provincial capital they managed to capture in 2000, a year before they were driven out altogether by the U.S. forces. The Taliban captured the rest of Takhar in June and now Taloqan is under siege.

Back in the autumn of 2019, a team of reporters with DER SPIEGEL witnessed how the governments power in the districts had shrunk to the central military posts. Even then, the Taliban controlled the villages and streets after sunset.

As in Takhar, many soldiers and police in Badakhshan are simply giving up. Before closing in, the Taliban dispatch village elders as emissaries to the military posts to make an offer: the freedom to retreat and around 50 euros in pocket money or a fight to their death. According to reports from the ground, the Islamists sometimes pay extra for equipment, vehicles and ammunition left behind. Afterward, the people who abandon the fight are left alone.

Politically, the Taliban are seeking to promote themselves as representatives of all Afghans and not as just the leaders of the Pashtuns. Their shadow governor for Takhar province is an Uzbek, and the military commander for the northern offensive is a Tajik. A high-ranking Taliban delegation recently traveled to Day Kundi province to assure the Shiite Hazara living there that nothing would happen to them. Just 20 years ago, they were persecuted and massacred by the Taliban as heretics.

But what is credible change and what is just deception? The fear runs deep in millions of Afghans, and the dearth of information from remote districts fuels that fear. Shaky mobile phone videos are circulating of women being flogged by the Taliban for "immoral behavior," of individual men being executed. Some of the people who have fled to Kabul describe acts of revenge. Decrees issued by local Taliban leaders forbid women from leaving the house without a male family member, girls schools have been closed.

Not everything can be corroborated, but the Talibans foot soldiers appear to have changed far less than its leadership in exile, who like to think of themselves as modernized and having arrived in the 21st century.

"But what choice do we have? asks the militiaman from Badakhshan who had watched as the solider and police officers were taken away by helicopter. "The government is abandoning us, the foreign troops are gone, almost all the borders are closed. What are we supposed to do?

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Staying Would Be Suicide: With Departure of NATO Troops, the Taliban Gains Ground in Afghanistan - DER SPIEGEL International Edition

RIGA - On Monday, at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edgars Rinkevics, had a meeting with the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to discuss the outcomes of the NATO Brussels Summit, the upcoming meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Riga, and the international security situation in the region and across the globe, LETA was informed by the Foreign Ministry.

During the meeting, Rinkevics welcomed the successful NATO Brussels Summit this past June, which reaffirmed transatlantic unity and determination to continue strengthening the Alliance in the coming decade. The Minister thanked the Secretary General for his personal contribution in leading the NATO 2030 process. The Latvian Foreign Minister expressed support for increasing the overall NATO funding and the readiness of NATO forces, which is vital under current geopolitical conditions.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary General discussed the meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs planned for this coming December. The officials also shared opinions on the review of the NATO Strategic Concept. The Minister noted that the concept should be comprehensive in view of the various threats and challenges. At the same time, the existing security environment calls for a focus on collective defense as NATOs primary function. NATOs central role of defense and deterrence should be retained, while being complemented with crisis management and partnership.

In a discussion on security challenges, Rinkevics expressed the opinion that Russias aggressive military activities at the borders of the Baltic States and against Ukraine as well as its increasing military influence in Belarus are proof of security challenges impacting the region again and again. Russias upcoming strategic level military exercise this September, Zapad-2021, should also be closely followed and it raises further concerns in light of the complicated situation today in Belarus.

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NATO's central role of defense and deterrence should be retained, while being complemented with crisis management and partnership - Rinkevics - Baltic...

KARACHI: The FIA has started a probe to determine if Rs 80 billion tax has been evaded in fuel supply to NATO.

Adnan Afridi lodged a complaint with the FIA Karachi Zonal Office, which was put into the verification process on September 7, 2020. The investigation was entrusted to Inspector Fazal Muhammad of the Corporate Crime Circle. Later, the investigation was handed over to Inspector Attaullah Memon. After two months, he submitted a report, saying: The complainant seems to be anonymous and his email is fake. So the investigation should be stopped.

The advice to stop the investigation in just two months is strange as verifications and inquiries remain pending with the FIA for years. Later, on December 29, 2020, the zonal office was directed that the investigation should be transferred to the Federal Board of Revenue.

In the application submitted to the FIA, it was mentioned that the Pakistan State Oil first supplied fuel (jet fuel and diesel) to NATO forces in Afghanistan and deposited 17 per cent Customs Duty in the national exchequer. Then after using influence, this contract was given to Senator Taj Haiders two companies Alhaj Enterprises Pvt Ltd and Al-Noor Petroleum Pvt Ltd. Then ships carrying fuel from foreign countries started arriving in Pakistan and the cost of the fuel carried by a ship was shown as $3 million. According to an estimate, the above-mentioned companies brought 250 ships. If $3 million are multiplied into 250, it amounts to Rs 80 billion.

The complaint says that the Alhaj group owns offshore companies including Alhaj Energy, Alhaj Energy and Trade DMCC and Alhaj General Trading Company LLC. The complaint says the money received from the NATO under the fuel head was allegedly laundered to Dubai and the US. An Indian company has shares in the Alhaj groups fuel storage terminal and both partners own two petrol pumps on the Shahrah-e-Faisal.

When the daily Jang contacted Taj Afridi, he said there were no FIA investigations against his group. He said the FIA had received a complaint from an unknown person and the law does not permit investigation on a complaint lodged by any unknown person. He said he got no notice from the FIA.

Director Sindh Zone FIA Amir Farooqi confirmed that first there were investigations in the Corporate Crime Circle, but after he took charge, he entrusted these investigations to the Anti-corruption Circle. And now the investigations are under way in the ACC Circle under Inquiry No 42/2021.

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FIA probing tax evasion of Rs80 bn in fuel supply to Nato - The News International