Daily Archives: March 31, 2021

In his Annual Report, the NATO Secretary General spoke in his foreword of the need to maintain our technological edge, to remain competitive in a more competitive world. Three publications show how NATO researchers are pursuing this task.

Despite the pandemic that marked 2020 and will continue to challenge us in 2021, the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) and its network of over national 6,000 scientists, engineers and analysts delivered a tremendous programme of work (PoW). This programme demonstrates, once again, that the STO stays at the forefront of science & technology and remains committed to sustaining the Alliances technological advantage.

In March 2021, the STO issued three reports to introduce the general public to a selection of the impressive results achieved over the last year and to offer an overview of its future projects.

As the NATO Chief Scientist, Dr Bryan Wells highlighted: Supporting National and NATO priorities on delivering innovation for the Alliance has been a particular focus of the work of the STO in 2020.

While the threats that existed before the pandemic have not diminished, the STO remains committed to supporting, advising and preparing Nations and NATO for the emerging technological environment and future challenges.

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Maintaining NATO's Technological Edge - A Snapshot of the work of NATO Researchers - NATO HQ

When NATO suspended its training and advisory mission in Iraq following the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, the alliance experienced its first reality check on its new enterprise in the country. Iraq was and remains a tragic playground for domestic, regional, and international competition. Now NATO member states have agreed to expand the alliances Iraqi mission. What has changed in the last year? And how will the alliance fare?

COVID-19 may have temporarily constrained the behavior of some regional actors, particularly Iran, but the situation remains as challenging as ever and the distance between the level of ambition in Brussels and the reality on the ground in Baghdad remains significant. Despite renewed support for the alliance, the new U.S. administration appears still eager to continue with progressive disengagement from Iraq. The mission will therefore test NATOs well-known burden-sharing problems. European allies will be called to a greater role in the mission as the United States draws down, a factor that will necessarily bring about significant operational challenges to overcome.

The expanded mission will present NATO with the opportunity to evaluate its limited role in the Middle East, as well as its ability to deliver effective results in security-sector reform in such a polarizing political and security environment. The mission will only succeed if it is properly resourced by the alliance nations and rooted in serious and meaningful engagement with the Iraqis. In its search for relevance beyond Europe, including by articulating its approach to China and to the wider southern flank, NATO needs to decide whether it wants to invest in building effective political influence in the Middle East or be confined to the role of providing technical capacity-building.

A Greater European Role

In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to enlarge the alliances mission in Iraq. The expanded mission will work with a broader range of ministries beyond just the Ministry of Defense, and will possibly operate outside the Baghdad area. There will be a significant rise in personnel too: Up to 4,000 civilian and military staff are set to join the mission, up from a maximum of 500. The expansion will be incremental, conditions-based, and negotiated step by step with the Iraqi authorities.

Established in 2018, NATO Mission Iraq has thus far focused on professionalizing the Iraqi security forces, advising national security institutions the Ministry of Defense and the Office of the National Security Advisor and training the trainers, including the Iraqi Army Bomb Disposal School, the School of Administration and Logistics, and the Military Medical School. These activities have complemented the work of the American-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, the United Nations, and the European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq, the last of which is small and confined to strategic-level advising at Iraqs Ministry of Interior. Over the last year, however, many of these activities have stalled due to a double whammy of factors the killing of Soleimani in January 2020 and the global COVID-19 pandemic that have together contributed to halting progress and led to a departure of NATO personnel from Iraq.

With the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL reducing its footprint and activities in Iraq, the upgraded NATO mission is set to expand its scope. For instance, it is expected that the mission will initially broaden its role within the Ministry of Defense to include advising on leadership development, good governance, and policy and planning. In the future, and subject to Iraqi requests, NATO may also undertake the advising of the federal police, which sits under the Ministry of Interior and has up until recently been trained and advised by the Italian Carabinieri.

Italy will take the command of NATO Mission Iraq from Denmark in 2022, reflecting the sustained willingness of European countries to play their role in NATOs burden-sharing. Spain, which is a leading European contributor to the anti-ISIL coalition and already plays a prominent role in NATO Mission Iraqs training activities, is also well-placed to undertake a future leadership role. In a departure from President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has been quick to praise and reinforce the role of NATO allies and the value of multilateral frameworks, including in Iraq. With the U.S. presence in Iraq drawing down, European nations willingness to step in to fill the likely operational gaps will therefore be crucial to the sustainability of NATOs mission in Iraq.

Operational Challenges

The drawdown of the anti-ISIL coalition will have some significant implications for NATO in Iraq, but the upgraded NATO mission should not be simply considered as a transition of activities from the coalition to NATO. The two missions mandates are different unlike the coalition, the NATO operation remains a non-combat mission with NATO personnel not involved in the training or accompanying of military units at the tactical level. But NATO will build upon the coalitions gains and will be likely to put more emphasis on strategic-level advisory efforts once the main coalition-supported military operations end. While the coalition is in the last phase of its military campaign, we do not yet have an announced end-date for its operations.

In light of a greater European role within the NATO mission in Iraq, there are likely to be teething problems. Moving from the agile and flexible coalition framework to the highly standardized, bureaucratic, and consensus-based NATO mechanisms will bring operational challenges. NATOs force-generation process, the formal and often lengthy procedure through which alliance nations provide the necessary personnel and equipment for missions and operations, will take time to reach the required operational capability. Any significant expansion of the mission will therefore have to deal with a protracted process before it is properly equipped.

The NATO mission in Iraq is the first such mission with a strong civilian component, which mainly provides strategic-level advice to the Ministry of Defense. The expanded NATO mission will likely see an increase in these civilian elements. Success will therefore rest on NATO allies providing high-quality civilian personnel capable of navigating the complex bureaucracies of the Ministry of Defense and possibly the Ministry of Interior. The NATO mission aims to become more self-sufficient but currently relies on the anti-ISIL coalitions enablers mainly American-provided intelligence, infrastructure, basing, and logistics. Some countries may decide to reflag their military personnel under the NATO umbrella, but the mission will require its own enablers, as briefly alluded to by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during a recent press conference. If European allies are serious about burden-sharing, this is an area where they could do more.

It is not yet clear whether and how the NATO mission will go beyond the Baghdad area. It is not unimaginable that NATO could move to providing some level of strategic advising to the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north of Iraq in the future. Any such expansion, however, will have to be requested by the Iraqi government and approved by NATO countries, to include Turkey. Given the difficult triangle of relations between Iraqi Kurdish factions, Baghdad, and Ankara, this will be tricky to negotiate.

Expectations for NATO in Iraq and in the Middle East

The upgraded NATO Mission in Iraq will be demand-driven, and the relevant question is: What does the Iraqi government want or need? The Iraqi government has definitely requested support in the professionalization of their security institutions. However, NATO should not overlook the political, security, and socio-economic context in which the mission will operate in order to link strategic ambitions with realistic expectations.

Iraq is still experiencing a delicate transition process from a military campaign to recovery, reconstruction, and wider stability. There are myriad issues to consider an ambitious economic reform program, looming parliamentary elections, the unresolved future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, resurgent jihadist activity, and the uncertain prospect of American-Iranian relations. In opening up to the expansion of the NATO mission in Iraq, with a demand-driven approach and more of a European face than an American one, Iraqs Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has attempted to reach the dual objective of an assertion of Iraqi sovereignty coupled with a U.S. drawdown. He has also tried to seriously engage with neighboring countries, including Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to secure political and economic support and navigate the regions dangerous and delicate competitions.

In this context, the NATO mission will play a role in wider security-sector reforms an important domain, but one that cannot deliver quick wins and is highly polarizing in Iraq. And such reforms are not a panacea for wider structural problems.

NATO can provide technical capacity-building to Iraq in the form of training or advisory activities. However, this will be futile if not streamlined in a coherent strategy developed by the Iraqi government and supported by NATO, which is a highly politically sensitive process. NATO therefore should be more politically savvy with regards to what is happening in Iraq and its power relations, rather than just limiting itself to technical capacity-building. Iraq will continue to be at the crossroads of several regional and international issues relations between the United States and Iran and between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Turkeys regional ambitions. The expanded NATO mission cannot ignore this political context by staying in its comfort zone of capacity-building it needs to be more proactive if it wants to earn relevance. Bridging this political versus technical gap will contribute to NATO attaining a more significant and positive influence in achieving its stated objective of projecting stability in neighboring and partner countries in order to ensure the alliances own security. This will provide NATO with more robust political reach and relevance in the Middle East limited thus far and give much-needed coherence to the multitude of military partnerships established in the region.

Paolo Napolitano, Ph.D., is an independent international consultant with over 10 years of professional experience working in conflict analysis and crisis management for International Organizations and prominent research centers. He was the lead political and security analyst responsible for the Middle East at NATOs Strategic Military Headquarters until October 2020 and deployed to Iraq as a part of the NATO mission from July to October 2019. The opinions expressed here are his own.

Image: NATO

The rest is here:
What to Expect When You're Expecting NATO in Iraq - War on the Rocks

Since joining the alliance in 1952, Turkey has been a staunch NATO member that has decisively contributed to the materialization of the alliances interests. Both NATO and Turkey have been reaping benefits from this cooperation.

Even though in recent years tensions have increased between Turkey and some NATO allies, this should not be interpreted as a crisis between Turkey and NATO.

Changing security priorities and the geopolitical imaginations of members have caused serious spats within the alliance and Turkey is not the only ally that has done some soul-searching during this process.

NATO members now find it difficult, if not impossible, to be on the same page when it comes to certain key issues, such as the revival of Russian assertiveness in wider Europe, China's growing clout in international politics, enlargement of the alliance and American commitment to the liberal international order.

Since NATO adopted its latest security strategy in 2010, many things have changed in international politics. We are now fast moving to a post-liberal international order where not only the possibility of great power competition has increased, but also the rise of illiberal authoritarian powers in global politics have incrementally chipped away at the core principles of the rules-based order, of which NATO has acted as the chief custodian.

NATO now seems to be having a moment of reflection. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has already commissioned a group of wise men to prepare a blueprint for the alliance to chart its way through the next decade.

The goal is to come up with a new strategic concept that better reflects the current realities of global politics and helps the allies maintain cohesion in the years ahead.

We are now living in a new world and this requires a serious recalibration of the benefits of NATO membership. Whether NATO serves as a force multiplier for Turkey or seriously constrains its quest for strategic autonomy deserves closer attention.

With the process of readapting the alliance to the emerging realities of the new world order now fully underway, Turkey and its NATO allies would do well if they focused on the points of mutual commonalities rather than lashing out at each other on conjectural points of friction.

Even though some allies deem Turkeys recent international outlook as diverging from the West and accordingly treat Turkey as a potential geopolitical challenge to be managed, the big picture is that Turkeys membership in NATO is beneficial for both Ankara and the Western capitals.

Lets leave aside the points of friction for a while and focus on what Turkey and its allies could gain from closer cooperation within NATO.

Turkey benefits from its NATO membership. First, it is in Turkey's interest to be in NATO since the country's ability to deal with traditional threats to its territorial security certainly increases under NATO's nuclear umbrella and the "one for all, all for one" principle of NATO solidarity.

Second, NATO is the most important international organization in today's world tying Turkey to the West. Assuming that Turkey still defines itself as a western country, membership in NATO would offer the strongest confirmation in this regard.

The prospects of Turkey's membership in the EU are not so high and the westernization process Turkey has been pursuing for centuries indeed began as a security strategy. It was to ensure Turkey's territorial security by bringing Ankara closer to western capitals and securing western support against non-western security threats.

Third, Turkey's bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia, China and other non-western powers would certainly decrease should Turkey leave the alliance or experience acrimonious relations with its allies within NATO.

This point needs to be well understood by Turkey's rulers because neither Russia nor China is willing to admit Turkey into their geopolitical clubs. Both countries view Turkey from an instrumental perspective in that the more Turkey becomes part of intra-alliance crises and weakens NATO from within, the better for them.

Fourth, membership offers Turkey an immense opportunity to negotiate its priorities with allies within NATO's multilateral institutional setting. It is much better and cost-effective to talk to allies within NATO than to engage with them bilaterally.

No matter the issue, whether it be the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Libya, Syria, or the S-400s, NATO's mechanisms and platforms provide Turkey with credibility and the ability to make its voice heard more loudly.

The consensus-based decisionmaking process within the alliance enables Turkey to prevent some member states from pressuring it through NATO. Inside the alliance, Turkey could also play a role in shaping NATO's transformation agenda in its national interests.

From Turkey's perspective, the emerging world order should not be built on rigid ideological polarizations between rival blocks.

As a middle power, Turkey needs to maintain its ability to develop cordial economic and political relations with non-western global and regional powers.

Despite its shortcomings, Turkey is a liberal democratic country, yet it does not want a rigid ideological perspective to inform NATO's transformation agenda.

Fifth, Turkey's membership in NATO, alongside the EU accession process, does not only contribute to Turkey's hard power but also decisively shores up its soft power credentials. This is particularly valid in the wider Middle East and North Africa regions where many Muslim-majority states could potentially look to Turkey as a role model in their attempts to bring together religion and tradition with the requirements for sustainable modernization.

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general, and the United States in particular, also benefit from Turkey's membership.

First, since it entered into the alliance, Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south.

Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, the Black Sea, Central Asia and the wider Middle East.

During the Cold War, Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up a sizable amount of Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted.

Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO that has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations.

This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics.

For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence within the alliance has been of vital importance.

Third, if the Biden administration in the U.S. is sincere about reviving rules-based international order and is committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkeys cooperation within NATO would be key. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis.

Fourth, as Stoltenberg has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East.

Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would otherwise go on to European countries.

Fifth, having the second-largest army within the alliance and having participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities.

Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan, taking command numerous times, speaks volumes. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process.

Sixth, Turkey's NATO membership provides western countries with important opportunities to influence the orientation of Turkey's international and internal policies. Why lose this by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance?

All in all, both Turkey and NATO allies benefit from Turkeys membership. Unless NATO reveals itself to be an ideological weapon deployed by the liberal hawkish cabals in the West, Turkey will feel quite comfortable in the alliance.

*Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya Bilim University

More:
Turkeys NATO seat: Win-win situation for both sides | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

The NATO Secretary-General shakes hands with Japan's Prime Minister April 15, 2013. REUTERS/Toru Hanai

NATOs Asia-Pacific partner countriesAustralia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Koreaare easily among the Alliances most undervalued assets. All four are established democracies that share NATOs values and have contributed to NATO initiatives. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia are also US treaty partners and boast some of the worlds most sophisticated militariesoutmatching those of the vast majority of NATO alliesaccording to global military rankings. Although NATO and these partners have developed their relations over the past two decades, various constraints have limited the ambition and potential of these relationships. A recent report from a group of experts, charged by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with identifying ways to strengthen the Alliance for the future, could lead to a change in this status quo.

The report calls on NATO to devote increased attention and resources to the security challenges posed by Chinaa relatively new focus for the Alliancein part through deepened consultation and cooperation with its Asia-Pacific partner countries. Engagement between NATO and these partners on China is certainly important, but the increased attention paid in this context toward the Asia-Pacific partners also serves as an opportunity for both NATO and these countries to assessand where possible addressthe constraints that have thus far limited their relations. Doing so would enable NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners to maximize the potential of these partnerships going forwardboth in regard to China and more broadly.

The constraints from NATOs side include its partnership program, which poses particular challenges for the Asia-Pacific partners. These partners belong to a catch-all Global Partners designation created for countries falling outside of NATOs formalized, regionally based partnership categories: Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO has not made space for meaningfully engaging Global Partners in the partnership activities that it offers, which are geared toward the needs and interests of the countries in these formalized partnership categories. Most partnership activities are also held in Europe, limiting their accessibility to countries in the Asia-Pacific. Increasing resources for NATOs partnership program, as recommended in the expert-group report, could help with these problems, but first the problems must be recognized and solutions to address them prioritized.

NATO military exercises present a similar issue; although many are open to Global Partners, they are also largely held in Europe. Expanding formal NATO military exercises to other geographic areas more readily accessible to Asia-Pacific partnerslike the Indian Oceanwould require endorsement by the NATO Military Committee and approval by the North Atlantic Council. Such hurdles have thus far been too high for an organization whose decisions are made on the basis of consensus among thirty countries. A less formal option, such as a smaller, ally-led exercise under a NATO flag, would still require Military Committee approval but presents a somewhat lower bar to entry. More feasible still may be sending NATO observers to exercises held by Asia-Pacific partners. Such an option may provide a useful starting point from which to build momentum for addressing the accessibility aspect of military exercises more thoroughly.

The hurdle of consensus for military exercises highlights a deeper problem for relations between NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners. Despite NATOs outreach to and articulated support for these partners, and despite general acknowledgement of the significance of the broader region in which they are located, there has been no agreement among allies on the priority of the Asia-Pacific Global Partners for NATO. Thats the case even though these countries make up the largest regional group within the Global Partners category. NATO allies have been split on their level of ambition vis--vis the Global Partners writ large since the category emerged, with divisions breaking along intra-Alliance fault lines between more globally oriented allies, like the United States, and those favoring NATOs traditional transatlantic character, like France. Russias 2014 invasion of Ukraine, which underscored the continued importance of European territorial defense, added to the divisions among allies regarding Global Partners. If the emphasis on Asia-Pacific partner countries in the expert-group report is to find fertile ground rather than bumping up against these obstacles, it may be necessary to lay additional political groundwork within NATO.

The lack of consensus within NATO on the Asia-Pacific partners has also hampered the Alliances ability to craft a strategic approach to these partnerships, resulting in a largely tactical one instead. NATO has established the administrative and political frameworks necessary to formalize its bilateral relationship with each of the Asia-Pacific partners, including by finalizing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme agreements, approving national staff contributions to NATO headquarters and satellite installations, and facilitating exchanges of visits between high-level officials. The Alliance and its Asia-Pacific partners have also undertaken operational cooperation on issues like piracy and the war in Afghanistan. NATO has made uneven progress, however, in deepening and further developing the potential of its individual relationships with these countries, which have progressed largely on an ad-hoc basis. The Alliance has also lacked a strategy for harnessing the potential of the Asia-Pacific partners as a group, instead favoring a hub-and-spokes approach.

NATO is not alone in these shortcomings; the Asia-Pacific partners all have various individual constraints on their relations with NATO. In a recent paper for the Japan Institute of International Affairs, I discuss examples from Japan-NATO relations. Although further research on the other partners is warranted, some of the basic issues facing Japanpersonnel shortages, competing priorities, and only a nascent strategic vision for relations with NATOare mirrored in other Asia-Pacific partner countries. The Asia-Pacific partners have also failed to take adequate advantage of coordination with one another as a tool for advocacy with NATO. Such coordination could amplify a regional voice in NATO and be a more effective method of championing issues and activities relevant to the region than the efforts of any single country. The partners, however, would first need to determine jointly any shared goals and interests regarding NATO, as well as potential areas of contention.

If NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners do undertake dialogue and consultation on China, as recommended in the expert-group report, they should pair this move with the broader strategic thinking about their relations that has so far been missing. NATO should determine what it wants going forward from its relations with these partnersboth the individual countries and the regional groupincluding an order of priority and a timeline for action. Even if NATOs resulting approach is relatively modest, reflecting the differing preferences of key allies, it will still provide the greater clarity needed to focus NATO efforts and resources. The Asia-Pacific partners should individually make similar determinations regarding NATO and should also consult with each other as a group. Such actions by NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners will not only help them identify how they can best work together to address the security challenges associated with Chinas rise, but also improve the overall health of their relations.

There is, moreover, an important benefit to such actions in terms of the message they would send to China and others in the region. A more holistic and strategic approach to relations between NATO and the Asia-Pacific partners would substantiate the view that NATOs increased engagement on China is part of a natural evolution of its relationships in the Asia-Pacific, rather than just a thumb in Chinas eye. China may still bristle at NATOs moves, but it will have a harder time seizing the narrative.

A concerted effort from both sides will be necessary if NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners are to address the constraints between them and maximize the potential of their relations. Fortunately, there is still time to undertake such an effort. Along with the expert-group report, Stoltenberg is continuing to gather other input on planning for NATOs future that he will distill at a summit later this year. The recommendations made at this summit will likely be in broad strokes and the subsequent process of implementation, during which NATO will need to work out the details, will provide a longer timeframe for planning and action. The Asia-Pacific partners and advocates of NATOs engagement with these countries should take full advantage of this period.

Mirna Galic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Asia Security Initiative and the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Councils Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Wed, Mar 24, 2021

Policymakers in Brussels should recognize that the EU has significant security interests in the Taiwan Strait, push for dialogue over the issues at stake there, andif this failswork with the United States to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

New AtlanticistbyPhilip Anstrn

Continued here:
Opportunity knocks for NATO and its partners in the Asia-Pacific - Atlantic Council

During the March 23-24 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council, Anthony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State, encouraged NATO members to join the U.S. in viewing China as an economic and security threat to the U.S. as well as to NATO countries, thereby expanding NATOs areas of focus to include the Pacific. This is a dangerous move that must be challenged.

To gain insight into what transpired at the March NATO meeting, we can look to a roadmap for NATOs future, which was released last fall. The report, entitled NATO 2030: United for a New Era, is intended to be a guide for the military alliance in meeting the challenges it will face in the next decade. In the report, released in November, the independent group of five advisers from 10 NATO countries identified 13 challenges and threats to NATO in the next decade.

This new proposed roadmap for NATO reflects an alarming expansion: It is as much about China and the Asia/Pacific region as it is about NATOs traditional area of operations and concern, Europe and Russia.

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Although the group identified the number one threat to NATO as Russia, China was named as threat number 2.

The document brings the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into the Pacific and attempts to provide a justification to expand and strengthen partnerships in the Asia/Pacific region. NATO already has four partners in the Pacific through bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. As NATO partners, Australia and New Zealand have deployed many troops under the NATO banner in Afghanistan, while Japan and South Korea have had reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the United States, NATOs mega-member, has military bases all over the Pacific, including in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, Guam, Singapore and Hawaii that are used by NATO partners during regional war drills.

U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, in his address on March 24 to NATO members, strongly rebuked China and urged NATO allies to join with the U.S. in this adversarial position.

Blinken said the U.S. wouldnt force its European allies into an us-or-them choice, but he then implied the opposite, emphasizing that Washington views China as an economic and security threat, particularly in technology, to NATO allies in Europe.

When one of us is coerced we should respond as allies and work together to reduce our vulnerability by insuring our economies are more integrated with each other, Blinken said.

Blinken cited Chinas militarization of the South China Sea, use of predatory economics, intellectual property theft and human rights abuses.

In his March 24 press conference after the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and after U.S. Secretary of State Blinkens statement, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg focused on primarily on Russia but echoed Blinkens oppositional rhetoric regarding China. While saying We dont regard China as an adversary, Stoltenberg nevertheless continued to spell out specific reasons NATO agrees with the U.S.: The rise of China has direct consequences to our security. So, one of the challenges we face as we now have this forward looking process with NATO 2030 is how to strengthen and how to work more closely together as allies, responding to the rise of China.

NATOs concerns about Chinese military expansion include the construction of nine naval bases on atolls in the South China Sea and an increasing number of ships: China now has the largest navy in the world, with 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 ships. In comparison, the U.S. Navy has 293 ships as of early 2020, but U.S. naval ships have substantially more firepower than Chinese Navy ships.

While Chinas military budget has increased dramatically in the past decade, it still amounts to only one-third of the military budget of the U.S. and is very small compared to the combined military budgets of NATO members and partners.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes 2019 estimates show the U.S. military budget of $732 billion is 38 percent of global military expenditures, while Chinas $ 261 billion is 14 percent and Russias military budget of $61 billion is 3.4 percent. Six of the 15 highest military global spenders are members of NATO: the U.S., France, Germany, the U.K., Italy and Canada. Together, these six accounted for 48 percent ($929 billion) of global military expenditure. Total spending by all 29 NATO members was $1035 billion in 2019.

At the March meeting, NATO members spoke frequently about Chinas increasingly global military footprint, including the development of an overseas base in Djibouti, which now hosts military bases of the United States, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Japan and China. China also has several smaller bases around the world, including in the province of Neuqun, Patagonia, Argentina, on land loaned to the Chinese government during Cristina Fernndez de Kirchners presidency. China claims the land is for space exploration and intelligence services. The Chinese government also has a naval electronic intelligence facility on the Great Coco Island of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal and a small military post in south-eastern Tajikistan.

China has a total of 13 military bases worldwide, including the 9 on atolls in the South China Sea. For perspective, the United States has over 800 military bases around the world.

Meanwhile, NATO is also raising alarm about Chinas economic Belt and Road Initiative, which includes a belt of overland road and rail corridors and a maritime road of shipping lanes and ports.

The groundwork has already been laid for NATOs expansion into Asia: The dominant and continued presence of the United States in the Pacific has given NATO a permanent foothold in the region. The Obama administrations Pivot to Asia was a NATO stepping-stone for increased military actions in the region.

For many years, NATO countries have participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the worlds largest naval exercise held every two years in Hawaii. In 2020, the COVID-modified RIMPAC had ships from 25 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. China participated in the 2014 RIMPAC with four ships and in 2016, but was disinvited in 2018 due to its military activities in the South China Sea.

The United Kingdom and France have increased their presence in the Indo-Pacific. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, French and British defense ministers announced they would sail warships through the South China Sea to challenge Chinas military expansion. The Shangri-La Dialogue is a security forum attended by defense ministers and military chiefs of 28 Asia-Pacific states and is named for the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore where it has been held since 2002.

Subsequently, the United Kingdom deployed the HMS Albion to conduct freedom of navigation exercises near the Paracel Islands in August 2018 and conducted its first joint exercise with the United States in the South China Sea in 2019. NATO member France has exclusive economic zones in the Pacific around its overseas territories and in February 2021, France conducted a patrol through the South China Sea with a nuclear attack submarine and two other navy ships as a part of its freedom of navigation exercises.

Additionally, the U.S. military is already reorienting much of its military equipment and war maneuvers to the Pacific. The U.S. Armys longstanding massive land maneuvers Defender exercises in Europe will be in the Pacific in 2021. Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps is reorganizing its forces in the Pacific to be fast moving counterweights to Chinas growing navy fleet.

NATOs new strategy in the Pacific is for Marines, as well as small Army units, to operate in littoral operations or operations around shorelines from the islands around the Western Pacific in small units with ship-killing missiles. The Corps is testing missiles fired from these smaller vehicles, which according to the Marine Corps, will make it incredibly hard for the enemy to find us. We will have dozens and dozens and dozens of these platoons and vehicles placed strategically throughout the region.

In 2021, Hawaii will become the home of the Marine Corpss first Marine Littoral Regiment, with initial operating capability in 2023. The Hawaii-based 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment will be composed of 1,800- 2,000 Marines from the 3rd Marine Regiment at Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, which has about 3,400 Marines.

Currently, the Marines have two regiments on Okinawa and one in Hawaii. In the next two years, the new strategy calls for one littoral regiment each on Okinawa, Hawaii and Guam.

The new strategy not only redesigns units but is also redesigning the sea transportation to move the forces around the Pacific. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Light Amphibious Warship, a proposed new class of Navy vessel, will be between 200 and 400 feet long and cost $100 million. The Navy wants to have 28 to 30 of these amphibious ships, which will have the capability to pull up onto beaches. How many ships would be based in Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa remains unclear, as is where they would practice beach landings in the islands, which will be watched closely by local environmental activists.

The U.S. Marines are also adding weaponized drones to their war-fighting equipment. Beginning in 2023, 18 Predator drones will come into the Pacific region, 6 in Hawaii and the others going to Guam and Okinawa.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military is building new bases in the Pacific. In 2020, the president of Palau, a small Pacific island nation of a population of only 17,000, offered his country as a new base of operations for the U.S. military in the Pacific. The U.S. has already constructed a runway and has increased the number of U.S. Navy ships using Palaus ports. The Trump administration quickly sent the secretary of defense and secretary of the navy to consolidate the agreement. Palau already receives extensive funding from the U.S. through an economic and defense agreement called the Compact of Free Association.

U.S. military operations from other Pacific islands have increased in recent years. U.S. nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and their accompanying escorts of 10 ships and B-2 nuclear-equipped bombers operate daily from the U.S. territory of Guam on freedom of navigation sea drills and overflights of Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and South Korea.

The Chinese military has responded with its own naval drills in the South China Sea and air armadas of 18 aircraft flying to the edge of Taiwans air defense zone during the Trump administrations increased diplomatic engagement and military sales to Taiwan, an island the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) considers as a renegade province of the PRC.

The level of air and sea confrontation in the Western Pacific between the U.S. and NATO forces and China has increased dangerously over the past two years, and its only a matter of time until an accident or purposeful incident presents a potential war incident that can lead to horrific consequences.

As NATO advisors name China as the number two threat to the organization after Russia, the U.S. top diplomat echoes their rallying call as the U.S. military ramps up its forces in the Pacific region. These worrisome developments suggest the U.S. will continue to play a leading role in pushing NATO to train its sights on China, which will heighten the dangerous confrontation in the Western Pacific.

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In Alarmist Turn, NATO Is Increasingly Positioning Itself in Opposition to... - Truthout

Sailors man the rails as the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey (CG 61) departs Constanta, Romania, March 23, 2021. Monterey is operating with the IKE Carrier Strike Group on a routine deployment in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations. US Navy photo.

A U.S Navy guided-missile destroyer and guided-missile cruiser left the Black Sea this week following drills with NATO allies.

The Navy announced cruiser USS Monterey (CG-61) and destroyer USSThomas Hudner (DDG-116) moved into the Mediterranean Sea following a multinational drill organized by Romania.

Sea Shield 2021 is an annual Romanian-led multinational naval exercise in the Black Sea focused on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and participating nations, emphasizing anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, and mine countermeasures mission sets, U.S. 6th Fleet said in a news release.

Montereyleft the Black Sea and sailed through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean Sea today, and Thomas Hudnermade the transit on Tuesday.

Our operations in the Black Sea demonstrate our commitment to NATO partners and supported the provision of stability in the maritime environment through reassuring presence of an active naval force to deter destabilizing activity, Capt. Joseph Baggett, Montereys commanding officer, said in the news release. Our operations in this strategic waterway were professional, timely and critical to enabling global operations that serve to counter malign influence.

Both ships arrived in the Black Sea last week to perform drills with NATO allies, USNI News recently reported.

Our trip to the Black Sea was very productive, Cmdr. Bo Mancuso, Thomas Hudners commanding officer, said in a separate news release. We are excited to have been part of a continual integration of air and maritime units operating across the U.S. European Command area of responsibility for establishing air and maritime superiority and to continue enabling freedom of navigation in all international waters and airspace.

Before leaving the Black Sea, Monterey pulled into port in Constanta, Romania, earlier this week to refuel, according to 6th Fleet.

Multiple countries were slated to join for the Sea Shield drill, including [m]aritime forces from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Standing NATO Maritime Group TWO, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, 6th Fleet said.

Chief Quartermaster Amy Birkholz, from Kalamazoo, Minnesota, left, looks through binoculars at a bearing indicated by Quartermaster Seaman Aaron Maluffgaray, from Asuncion, Paraguay, aboard the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey (CG 61) while operating in the Black Sea on March 21, 2021. Monterey is operating with the IKE Carrier Strike Group on a routine deployment in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations. US Navy photo.

Monterey and Thomas Hudner deployed last month with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. While it is the second deployment in a year for aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower(CVN-69), escorts Monterey and Thomas Hudner are new to the CSG.

In January, two U.S. destroyers and a fleet oiler operated in the Black Sea. The destroyers USSDonald Cook (DDG-75) and USSPorter (DDG-78) and USNSLaramie (T-AO-203) were drilling with NATO, USNI News reported at the time.

The Montreux Convention limits the presence of non-Black Sea countries navies in the sea, but U.S. Navy leaders have said they prioritize the Black Sea region and aim to be present there for about a third of the year. Other NATO forces also aim to be present in the Black Sea for another third of the year, collectively with the U.S. promoting security in the region and pushing back against any aggression from Russian military forces.

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Navy Destroyer and Cruiser Leave Black Sea After Exercising with NATO Allies - USNI News - USNI News

LAST SUNDAY WAS Census Day in Northern Ireland. It is expected to show the current feeling of national identity in the NI population and could well confirm the reported demographic shift away from a unionist majority.

In the last Census (2011), 40% declared themselves to be British, 25% Irish and 21% Northern Irish. In the meantime, we have had Brexit and the rise of the pro-independence movement in Scotland. This 2021 Census could well be the last Census ever in NI as part of the UK.

If the UK union is really weakening, it is now more than probable that Border referendums on the reunification of the island of Ireland will take place within the next five to ten years.

Sinn Finhas called for referendums to be held much sooner. In the past, referendums have been lost in Ireland because the electorate was not informed nor fully convinced of the proposals being put to them.

The lesson learned is that a full and honest debate should take place before a referendum, not, as in the case of the UKs Brexit Referendum, afterwards.

We should remember the Nice Referendum in 2001 and the Lisbon Referendum in 2008, which were both lost on the neutrality issue.

Defence Policy for a United Ireland needed

In any future referendums on Irish reunification the issue of what defence policy a united Ireland should adopt, needs to be considered. In fact, it should be addressed, in advance, so that voters, North and South, know the full picture before making such a momentous decision on reunification.

Two key questions need to be answered. First, would the people in the South support joining NATO as part of the price of reunification? Conversely, would the people of Northern Ireland accept leaving NATO and supporting military neutrality as part of reunification?

At present, the Northern Ireland taxpayer is paying seven times more on defence (2% of GDP) than his/her Southern counterpart (0.27% of GDP). The EU average is 1.2% while the NATO average is 1.3% of GDP.

There is a third option, to be raised and set aside, which is that both current jurisdictions retain their present defence policies after reunification. However, if unification means that the all-Ireland State will be sovereign and independent, it is hard to see how two different and contradictory defence policies could be in place on one island.

Foreign and defence policies go hand in hand. It might, in theory, work, if Ireland were to become a two-state confederation of separate and independent states, pursuing two separate foreign and defence policies.

Of course, a confederal solution should be an option to be examined, along with a unitary state and a federal state. Nevertheless, even in a confederal situation, it would be doubtful that two separate defence forces, would be what the Irish people might have in mind by reunification.

Back in Dec 1993, the UK agreed, in the Downing Street Declaration, that it had no selfish strategic or economic interest in remaining in NI.

This does not mean that the UK will accept a weakening in its national defence arising from Irish reunification. Such a weakening of its national defence, on its North Atlantic flank, could occur if NI became part of an undefended neutral Ireland and if Scotland were also to become independent.

Ireland, the weak link

Up to recently, the North Atlantic had faded in strategic importance since the end of the Cold War. However, Swedish defence analysts have concluded that Russian military exercises in the Baltic area, along the Arctic Circle and down the North-Eastern Atlantic coastline, including in Irish territorial waters, is about cutting the link between the US and Europe.

The outgoing Officer Commanding Naval Operations Command, Captain (NS) Brian Fitzgerald, has pointed out that a large number of transatlantic cables, linking the two continents, are at their most vulnerable in the shallow waters off the Irish Continental Shelf. Maybe some might think we can manage very well without the Internet. Others would disagree.

The problem for the UK and NATO is not Irish Neutrality, but the long-standing underfunding of our Defence Forces for its primary role of national defence.

Until recently, as a defence analyst, I had hoped that Irish-British mutual defence issues could be addressed ultimately within the context of EU Common Defence. With Brexit, this is no longer possible.

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Alternatively, I had thought that an Irish Government would start to move towards bringing defence spending in line with other nations, which would mean that we would no longer be the weak link in Europes North Atlantic Defence. It seems I am wrong on both counts.

Until we sort out the defence issue, it is probably best to forget about Irish reunification.

Colonel Dorcha Lee (retd) is a former Defence Forces Provost Marshal and Director of Military Police. He is a former Irish Military Advisor in Brussels and a former military representative to the WEU and the EU.

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Retired Colonel Dorcha Lee: Is joining NATO the price for Irish reunification? - TheJournal.ie