Values and Interests in World Politics Valdai Club – Valdai Discussion Club

There isnot only one-way traffic between values and interests. Not only values asabasic category define interests asamore applied category. Onthe contrary, interests also influence values; they shape and reform them. Sometimes they completely alter the values that were inherent insociety before. So, the question which isprimary values orinterests here does not have such anunambiguous answer, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.

The problem ofvalues inworld politics isone ofthe most acute. Virtually the entirety ofinternational relations inthe 21st century isclosely linked tothe discussion onvalues. Moreover, strategies topromote values have become key ones, aswell aspolicies based primarily, ifnot exclusively, onvalues, and only then oninterests. Inthe Lisbon Treaty, the European Union explicitly wrote that itpursues avalues-based policy. Thus, the previous interpretations ofinternational relations asastruggle for interests that form the basis ofthe classical theoretical school ofrealism, should beseem asathing ofthe past.

But isthis really the case? How unambiguously determined isthis process? Perhaps, ofall the values that somehow figure inpolitical discourse, there are only two that are definitely uncompromising and all-encompassing. These are religious values and national identity (ethnic, racial, caste, etc.). Itisclear that the willingness todefend these values and fight for them varies from religion toreligion and from ethnicity toethnicity. Itisclear that there are political strategies for the construction ofnational/religious identity and they are being implemented. Even ifweassume that acynical form ofsocial engineering played its role here, then wemust conclude that itfell onfertile soil. Issues ofethnicity and religiosity are just those topics that are primordial for anordinary person and mass society. Ifyou use Lev Gumilyovs term, then here the passionarity ismanifested especially quickly inaperson and society which isabsolutely necessary for the effective promotion ofavalue outside.

For all other values, honestly speaking, this isnot the case. Inaddition, the initiators ofthe discussion about values, about their universal character inaglobalised world and their promotion toall states and societies, hardly had inmind these two values (ethnic and religious). Itisunlikely that the European Union intends topursue apolicy that protects precisely ethnicity and religiosity. Moreover, lets behonest, asmany examples inhistory have shown, from national/religious identity tonational/religious exclusivity, there isoften only one small logical step left (especially inthe context ofthe struggle for the promotion ofvalues and the competition between them). This, Ithink, ishardly included inthe tasks ofthe programme tobuild ahomogeneous global society and asingle world policy based onuniversal values. Here ethnicity and religiosity should, ideally, become nothing more than anexotic highlight ofevery local society, something like cute stereotypes from tourist guides. Asamatter offact, the value oftolerance that isbeing actively promoted now isintended toachieve this (separate nuances ofthis value associated with positive discrimination and the priority ofminorities over the majority are aseparate issue, but for the purposes ofthis article itisnot soimportant). The only problem istowhat extent these globalist universal values are capable ofevoking inanordinary person and mass society aprimordial passionary response, atleast minimally comparable tothe values ofethnicity and religiosity? Ifthe answer isthat this extent isminimal (even for environmental values, which today, inour opinion, have the greatest potential for passionarity), then wouldnt itbecorrect tosay bluntly that these values are only apostmodern social construction, even ifthe entirety of21st century world politics are based onthem?

Animportant and practically controversial issue isthe relationship between values and interests. Onthe one hand, they are traditionally quite clearly separated from each other inconflictology and inother disciplines. The contraposition ofconflict ofvalues and conflict ofinterest isofgreat importance here. Attempts toresolve them should bebased onfundamentally different basic orientations and technological methods. Where the conflict isbased only onmismatched interests, then there isalmost always anopportunity tobring them closer together, tocome tosome kind ofatleast atemporary compromise, and therefore the potential tode-escalate these conflicts, oratleast tofreeze them, isquite high. Conflicts ofvalues, according tothe theory ofconflictology, are much more difficult toresolve, since there can benocompromise onvalues, they are all-encompassing and indivisible, and the struggle for them, ideally, should goonuntil complete victoryor, alas, until complete defeat and the undermining ofthe resource base.

Onthe other hand, world politics provides many examples where values and interests are intertwined. Inpart, this makes itpossible toactively use values inthe geopolitical struggle. For example, historical memory isundoubtedly avalue that can evoke aserious passionate response insociety. But the policy offorming (and modifying) historical memory, which isactively pursued bymany states, isasocial construct, implemented solely onthe basis ofinterests. And there are many examples ofthis kind. Thus, wecan conclude that there isnot only one-way traffic between values and interests. Not only values (asabasic category) define interests (asamore applied category). Onthe contrary, interests also influence values; they shape and reform them. Sometimes they completely alter the values that were inherent insociety before. So, the question which isprimary values orinterests here does not have such anunambiguous answer.

The alignment ofvalues and interests has adirect impact onthe relationship between morality and law inworld politics. Traditionally, within the framework ofthe Westphalian model ofthe world, the interests ofstates were regulated byinternational law. Interstate treaties made itpossible tofix the achieved interests and put abarrier inthe way oftoo-ambitious interests which were unacceptable toothers. One ofthese interests, shared bymany countries, is, for example, the legal principle ofnon-interference ininternal affairs, enshrined inthe UNCharter. Atthe same time, the established international law often became anobstacle precisely inthe way ofthe realisation ofvalues, since the task ofpromoting values abroad presupposes, first ofall, the need for intervention inthe affairs ofother states and societies, directly orindirectly. Asaresult, adiscussion unfolded that the laws of1945 are out-dated with respect tothe value challenges ofthe 21st century, that the out-dated right contradicts morality and therefore must bereplaced and supplanted bymorality. The notion that there isamoral duty toprotect values has become anargument that legalises interference inthe affairs ofothers, even ifthe law does not allowit. Itseems that this trend will continue todevelop.

Aseparate issue isthe problem ofthe universality ofvalues. Isitpossible orisitjust anillusion? For Russians, there isalso asubjective aspect here. For aperson and asociety that emerged from the Soviet model, educated oncommunist ideals and values, who survived their collapse, itshould belogically characterised byacertain nihilism inrelation toany new ideals. The post-communist legacyor, ifyou like, the post-communist social trauma leaves little room for other dreams, except perhaps for some nostalgia. Therefore, this type ofsociety apriori isoften characterised bycynicism inrelation tothe issue ofvalues inpolitics ingeneral and inworld politics inparticular. They are completely supplanted bypragmatism and interests.

Inthis case, the dichotomy between true and false values does not work either. Ifour previous values turned out tobefalse (orwere declared assuch), then why should these others necessarily betrue? Here, experiential scepticism plays animportant role inthe perception ofvalues and their implementation inpolitics. Ingeneral, from the point ofview oflogic, the term true values ismore amatter offaith and religion, and bynomeans rationalism. Inaddition, given the aforementioned interweaving ofvalues and interests, there isalways atemptation tosay that any discourse about values isjust apretext topromote crystal-clear geopolitical interests. Hence, negativism arises when, inthe perception ofvalues, the key meaning isnot areflection onones own values, but the negation ofexternal ones. Therefore, itwill not besuch agreat exaggeration tosay that for many both inRussia and inthe non-Western world asawhole, the following postulate will betrue: our only value isthat weare against your values. For all its external paradox, itworks and even politically unites the most diverse countries and forces inthe non-Western world. Between them there isoften very little incommon from the point ofview ofpositive shared values, but there isanegative denial ofWestern domination, which was previously carried out through resources and interests, understood byeveryone (and provoking, just asimportantly, apassionate response inthe mass society ofthese countries). Domination through values isalso added toit. Inpostcolonial societies, this isoften combined with the implementation ofthe universal values promoted bythe West asanew culture colonialism, asanotorious, toborrow from Kipling, white mans burden 2.0, when heagain carries the light ofenlightenment through values tonon-Western communities who donot want toaccept them. Most often itcauses rejection inthe mass society ofthese countries and isperceived asneo-colonialism. All ofthese trends should not beunderestimated.

Asaresult, the discussion ofvalues inworld politics entails anumber offairly deep theoretical questions. First ofall, this isthe question ofthe primordiality ofvalues, whether they are inherent insociety from the very beginning orthey are constructed bymeans ofsocial engineering. Ifthe first answer iscorrect, then how easy (ifany) isittochange them? Ifthe latter istrue, then the cynical conclusion suggests itself that values are only asocial construct used toadvance interests inageopolitical struggle. However, even when admitting this, itmust beemphasised that there isnothing wrong with the postulated universal values inthemselves, that they are most likely capable ofmaking our world abetter place. And that isprecisely why (and bynomeans only because ofthe geopolitical struggle) they will determine the agenda ofworld politics inthe 21st century.

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Values and Interests in World Politics Valdai Club - Valdai Discussion Club