Category Archives: Fourth Amendment

Others say there must be a different standard because of the sheer amount of data on and available through cellphones. In February, for instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suppressed evidence found on the phone of a high school student who was arrested on charges of causing a disturbance on a school bus. "Searching a person's cellphone," the court said, "is like searching his home desk, computer, bank vault and medicine cabinet all at once."

The justices are not always savvy about technology. At last week's argument over whether an Internet streaming service is lawful, Justice Antonin Scalia seemed to think HBO is a broadcast rather than a cable channel.

Read More IRS to face the Supreme Court over summons power

But the justices can be sensitive to the implications of new technology for privacy rights, especially their own. Things did not go well for the Justice Department after one of its lawyers said at a 2011 argument that the F.B.I. was free to place GPS devices on the justices' cars. The government lost the case, against a drug dealer it had tracked for a month, by a 9-to-0 vote.

Similarly, in 2001, the court limited the use of thermal-imaging devices to peer into homes. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said, "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."

The problem in the thermal-imaging case, he wrote, was that the devices could detect not only heat lamps used to grow marijuana but also "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath."

Searches of phones may give rise to a similar protective reaction. "It's a technology that all the justices will understand," Professor Kerr said. "They all have cellphones."

But they may not know how much information such phones can contain, including call records, messages, Internet browsing records, calendars, books, diaries, photographs and videos, to say nothing of applications that connect to financial, medical and travel records.

Adam M. Gershowitz, a professor at William & Mary Law School, noted that his iPhone tracked and stored his movements. "I just looked," he said, "and my phone shows that I arrived at work yesterday at 8:56 a.m." It also showed where and when he had lunch.

The first case to be argued Tuesday, Riley v. California, No. 13-132, arose from the arrest of David L. Riley, who was pulled over in 2009 in San Diego for having an expired registration. The police found loaded guns in his car and, on inspecting Mr. Riley's smartphone, entries they associated with a street gang.

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Court may let cops search smartphones

The Fourth Amendment is destroyed by the Roberts led Supreme Court.
In May of 2011 the SCOTUS ruled on a lower state courts decision to throw out a case of drug possession because there was no valid search warrant for the sea...

By: Paul La Bonte

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The Fourth Amendment is destroyed by the Roberts led Supreme Court. - Video

The Fourth Amendment (Amendment IV) to the United States Constitution is the part of the Bill of Rights that prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires any warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause. It was adopted in response to the abuse of the writ of assistance, a type of general search warrant issued by the British government and a major source of tension in pre-Revolutionary America. The Fourth Amendment was introduced in Congress in 1789 by James Madison, along with the other amendments in the Bill of Rights, in response to Anti-Federalist objections to the new Constitution. Congress submitted the amendment to the states on September 28, 1789. By December 15, 1791, the necessary three-quarters of the states had ratified it. On March 1, 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson announced the adoption of the amendment.

Because the Bill of Rights did not initially apply to the states, and federal criminal investigations were less common in the first century of the nation's history, there is little significant case law for the Fourth Amendment before the 20th century. The amendment was held to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961).

Under the Fourth Amendment, search and seizure (including arrest) should be limited in scope according to specific information supplied to the issuing court, usually by a law enforcement officer who has sworn by it. Fourth Amendment case law deals with three central questions: what government activities constitute "search" and "seizure"; what constitutes probable cause for these actions; and how violations of Fourth Amendment rights should be addressed. Early court decisions limited the amendment's scope to a law enforcement officer's physical intrusion onto private property, but with Katz v. United States (1967), the Supreme Court held that its protections, such as the warrant requirement, extend to the privacy of individuals as well as physical locations. Law enforcement officers need a warrant for most search and seizure activities, but the Court has defined a series of exceptions for consent searches, motor vehicle searches, evidence in plain view, exigent circumstances, border searches, and other situations.

The exclusionary rule is one way the amendment is enforced. Established in Weeks v. United States (1914), this rule holds that evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation is generally inadmissible at criminal trials. Evidence discovered as a later result of an illegal search may also be inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree," unless it inevitably would have been discovered by legal means.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[1]

Like many other areas of American law, the Fourth Amendment finds its roots in English legal doctrine. Sir Edward Coke, in Semayne's case (1604), famously stated: "The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose."[2]Semayne's Case acknowledged that the King did not have unbridled authority to intrude on his subjects' dwellings but recognized that government agents were permitted to conduct searches and seizures under certain conditions when their purpose was lawful and a warrant had been obtained.

The 1760s saw a growth in the intensity of litigation against state officers, who, using general warrants, conducted raids in search of materials relating to John Wilkes's publications attacking both government policies and the King himself. The most famous of these cases involved John Entick, whose home was forcibly entered by the King's Messenger Nathan Carrington, along with others, pursuant to a warrant issued by George Montagu-Dunk, 2nd Earl of Halifax authorizing them "to make strict and diligent search for... the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers intitled, 'The Monitor or British Freeholder, No 257, 357, 358, 360, 373, 376, 378, and 380,'" and seized printed charts, pamphlets and other materials. Entick filed suit in Entick v Carrington, argued before the Court of King's Bench in 1765. Charles Pratt, 1st Earl Camden ruled that both the search and the seizure was unlawful, as the warrant authorized the seizure of all of Entick's papersnot just the criminal onesand as the warrant lacked probable cause to even justify the search. By holding that "[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave",[4]Entick established the English precedent that the executive is limited in intruding on private property by common law.

Homes in Colonial America, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same sanctity as their British counterparts, because legislation had been explicitly written so as to enable enforcement of British revenue-gathering policies on customs; until 1750, in fact, the only type of warrant defined in the handbooks for justices of the peace was the general warrant. During what scholar William Cuddihy called the "colonial epidemic of general searches", the authorities possessed almost unlimited power to search for anything at any time, with very little oversight.

In 1756, the colony of Massachusetts enacted legislation that barred the use of general warrants. This represented the first law in American history curtailing the use of seizure power. Its creation largely stemmed from the great public outcry over the Excise Act of 1754, which gave tax collectors unlimited powers to interrogate colonists concerning their use of goods subject to customs. The act also permitted the use of a general warrant known as a writ of assistance, allowing tax collectors to search the homes of colonists and seize "prohibited and uncustomed" goods.

A crisis erupted over the writs of assistance on December 27, 1760 when the news of King George II's death on October 23 arrived in Boston. All writs automatically expired six months after the death of the King and would have had to be re-issued by George III, the new king, to remain valid.

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Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ...

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Ultimately, these words endeavor to protect two fundamental liberty interests - the right to privacy and freedom from arbitrary invasions.

A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society considers reasonable is infringed by a governmental employee or by an agent of the government. Private individuals who are not acting in either capacity are exempt from the Fourth Amendment prohibitions.

A seizure refers to the interference with an individual's possessory interest in property. To meet the definition of an unreasonable seizure, the property's owner must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items seized. A person is seized when law enforcement personnel use physical force to restrain the person if a reasonable person in the same or a similar situation would not feel free to leave the situation. The previous owner of abandoned property cannot allege an unreasonable seizure of that abandoned property. Abandoned property is property left behind by its owner in a manner in which the owner abandons the possessory interest in the property and no longer retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the search.

The prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures particularly affects the work of law enforcement personnel by restricting the actions that they may take in performing a criminal investigation; however, the ban also disallows unreasonable searches and seizures in the civil litigation context. Law enforcement may only conduct a search if individualized suspicion motivates the search. The Fourth Amendment prohibits generalized searches, unless extraordinary circumstances place the general public in danger.

To sue regarding an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must have standing. Standing with respect to Fourth Amendment violations requires that the plaintiff have had a legitimate expectation of privacy at the searched location. A legitimate expectation of privacy must meet both the subjective and objective tests of reasonableness. The subjective test requires that the plaintiff actually and genuinely expected privacy, and the objective test requires that given the circumstances, a reasonable person in the same or a similar situation would have expected privacy as well.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies the Fourth Amendment's provisions against the states as well as the federal government. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Courts ordinarily suppress evidence obtained during an unreasonable search or seizure and offered against the accused. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies equally to both the investigatory and accusatory stages of a criminal prosecution.

In order to avoid illegally searching or seizing the property of a suspect, law enforcement personnel typically obtain search warrants. To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must show probable cause, must support the showing by oath or affirmation, and must describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize. A judge can find probable cause only be examining the totality of the circumstances.

Different types of warrants exist. A knock-and-announce warrant requires law enforcement personnel to knock on the door of a residence and announce their identity before entering, giving the owner or occupier an opportunity to answer the door. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that law enforcement's failure to knock or announce when in possession of a knock-and-announce warrant does not necessitate use of the exclusionary rule. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).

No knock warrants allow law enforcement personnel to enter a building or home without announcing their presence and without knocking on the door first. Courts reserve these warrants for situations in which a building's owner or occupier could destroy the sought-after evidence by the time law enforcement waits for the owner or occupier to open the door.

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Fourth amendment | Wex Legal Dictionary / Encyclopedia ...

Next week, the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to hear arguments over whether police can search a person's cellphone without a warrant upon arrest. That will give the justices a rare opportunity to draw a bright line about what police can do in the digital age.

The court should conclude that searching smartphones should require a warrant. That is what law enforcement needs in most cases to search a home.

More than 50 percent of Americans now carry smartphones, and those phones' search histories, photos, emails, chats and contacts offer not only a window on the owner's mind, but also can document their every step and communication.

Courts have given mixed rulings how the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable search and seizure, applies to cellphones. The right to privacy in these cases conflicts with the important public interest in police solving and preventing crimes.

The high court will have to balance these two interests in a decision that makes sense not just for smartphones, but also for tablets, laptops and the new gadgets down the road.

"Some members of the court will certainly try to consider the place mobile devices play in modern life," said Jennifer Granick, director of civil liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society.

The justices' ruling will involve two cases. In 2007, Massachusetts police searching a man's rudimentary flip phone noticed a phone number that led to the suspect's home where they found drugs, cash and guns. The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The government is appealing the decision.

In 2009, San Diego police stopped David Riley for expired registration tags. A search of his smartphone revealed images tying him to a gang shooting and other evidence. Convicted of attempted murder and serving a 15-year sentence, Riley has challenged the evidence police found on his cellphone. In a 5-2 decision, the California Supreme Court upheld the cellphone search in the case.

In taking on the Riley case, the high court said it would decide the narrow question of whether evidence admitted at Riley's trial as part of the smartphone search violated the Fourth Amendment.

Legislative attempts to clarify the rules in California have not succeeded. In 2011, state Sen. Mark Leno, D-San Francisco, proposed a bill that would have required a warrant to search cellphones. Gov. Jerry Brown vetoed it.

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Quinn: Supreme Court should clarify Fourth Amendment rights in the digital age

By Marianne Goodland

Journal-Advocate legislative reporter

A resolution to add "electronic data" to the Colorado constitution's equivalent of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution got unanimous support this week from a Senate committee.

The Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday gave a 5-0 vote to Senate Concurrent Resolution 14-002, sponsored by Sen. Greg Brophy (R-Wray) and Senate President Morgan Carroll (D-Aurora). The resolution, which asks for voter approval in November, would add "electronic data" to the list of items protected from unreasonable search and seizure in Article 2, Section 7 of the Colorado constitution.

The resolution now goes to the full Senate. Two-thirds of the Senate, or 24 votes, are needed for the resolution to go on to the House.

While the committee was unanimous in its support of SCR 2, the legal community was not. Opposition came from the Colorado Attorney General, police chiefs, and the Colorado District Attorneys' Council. The Colorado County Sheriffs' Association, the Libertarian Party and the Colorado chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) all spoke in favor of SCR 2.

The courts are weighing this question now, said Brophy in introducing the resolution. "It's appropriate that the Legislature also weigh in." He noted that electronic data should be private, the same as if it were stored in a file cabinet in the home. But government agencies aren't treating it that way and are looking at this data without a warrant, he explained.

Papers and other effects are already protected in the state constitution, but electronic data is the modern equivalent, Carroll said. Law enforcement should interpret it that way, but they don't always do that. "There should be a reasonable expectation of privacy" for electronic data.

Carroll also noted that any data that is encrypted or password protected should be protected under the law, even when it is stored in cyberspace, or the Cloud. "I don't forego a reasonable expectation of privacy when I enter a physical public domain" such as Civic Center Park in Denver, she said. The same should apply to electronic data stored in the Cloud.

Deputy Attorney General Matthew Durkin said the resolution was unnecessary, since the state and federal constitutions already protect electronic data, even if it is not listed. Electronic data is not defined in the resolution, he said, and it could be interpreted in many different ways. Instead, citizens should rely on the judicial branch to make to make that determination, which they have done for more than 200 years.

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Protections for e-data clear Senate committee