The Qualities and Faults of Fourth-Generation Fighter Jets – The National Interest

The Navy and the Air Force appear to be making a pushto supplement the Defense Departmentsgrowing fifth-generation fleet of F-35 stealth fighter jets with advanced, enhanced fourth-generation aircraft. The Air ForcesBoeing F-15EXEagle II and the Navys Block III F/A-18 Super Hornet jets could be described as 4.5-generation aircraft. These jets are helpful on the modern-day battlefield but their existence raisesinteresting questions. Just how sensible is itto build and deliver advanced fourth-generation fighters that might be incapable of counteringfifth-generation jets flown by Americasadversaries,such asChinas ChengduJ-20 and Russias SukhoiSu-57.

The basic airframe structure and design of the Super Hornet, many of which have been preserved, upgraded and sustained through the Navys Service Life Extension Plan, is still viable. Butsome military strategistsmay question the rationale for continuing to build enhanced fourth-generation aircraft such as the Eagle IIand Super Hornet. These aircraftare not quite advanced,stealthy and effectiveenough to truly rival enemy fifth-generation jetsand successfully counternext-generation enemy air defenses. And yet, they may be far too advanced for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism missions wherein the United Statesalready has air superiority. Sojust what kinds of missions are these enhanced fourth-generation aircraftbest suited to perform?

It does not seem feasible that a Super Hornetor Eagle IIcould ever truly be stealthy but it might be able to make itself less detectable to some extent. Would it be less detectable against fifth-generation Chinese and Russian aircraft? Or advanced S-400 Russian air defenses? Or would upgraded Super Hornets primarily be useful against lower to mid-level threat environments? That seems to be a fundamental question to answer when trying to decide whether a Super Hornet or Eagle IImight truly be used as a deterrent or combat asset. Incounterinsurgencyenvironments or areaswhere the Air Force maintains air superiority, a wide range of less expensive or light-air-attack aircraft might be just as effective.

For example, the Super Hornetproved to beuseful in Iraq. It was able to conduct more than justattack or bomb-dropping missions.It conductedoverhead surveillance, targeting andinformation connectivity. Perhaps advanced sensors, AESA radars and longer-range sensors might indeed prove extremely useful in high-end combat? It seems logicalfor the Eagle II to supplement, support or offer additional capabilities to an advanced fleet of F-35 fighter jets.Yet, givenconcerns about cost and sustainment costs, decisionmakers wouldlikely question the cost-value equation ofenhancingand delivering a newly built generation of fourth-generation aircraft.

Nonetheless, these aircraft are far from useless. The Super Hornetand Eagle IIare engineered with an advanced suite of next-generationcombat capabilities.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the ArmyAcquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Air Force

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The Qualities and Faults of Fourth-Generation Fighter Jets - The National Interest