Opinion: Two years after my son died in a military vehicle rollover, another just took place. Why? – The San Diego Union-Tribune

McDowell is the father of Marine 1st Lt. Hugh Conor McDowell, who was killed in a military vehicle rollover on Camp Pendleton in 2019, and a fellow of the International Security program of New America in Washington, D.C.

Nine Gold Star families felt a chilling sense of dread last week when two Marine Amphibious Combat Vehicles floundered badly in the ocean off Camp Pendleton and their crews fled to safety.

Two years ago, on July 30 at Camp Pendleton, eight Marines and a Navy Corpsman, some in their teens, died horrific drowning deaths in one of the worst disasters in Marine Corps history in an Amphibious Assault Vehicle, the predecessor to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle.

Luckily (and it was probably sheer luck), no crew members died in the latest training fiasco. The House and Senate Armed Services Committee leaders have reduced training deaths. In December, they passed historic new laws to protect our troops to train hard and be ready for battle. But training debacles continue.

A dramatic and frightening video on YouTube shows last weeks accidents in real time. One 35-ton Amphibious Combat Vehicle flips onto its side, isolated and stuck in the high surf. Its crew manages to scramble out in time to prevent death or serious injury. Another Amphibious Combat Vehicle drops to the shallow ocean bed and the crew members jump off and desperately swim for land. Later, that Amphibious Combat Vehicle is towed onto the beach.

There are so many questions.

Hourly weather forecasts had predicted dangerously heavy swells and surf at this location, so why did the unit command or its upper-echelon bosses not ground the vehicles until sea conditions were safer?

Given that the last Amphibious Assault Vehicle disaster was just two years ago, why was utmost caution not exercised? Arent we supposed to learn lessons from that previous painful experience?

Crucially, what training were the Amphibious Combat Vehicle crews provided? For example, did they train in simulators on how to pilot an Amphibious Combat Vehicle in rough seas and high surf, like we see in the video?

Had evacuation (egress) training been done, allowing crew members to immediately act on instinct and exit the Amphibious Combat Vehicles at speed?

This time there were Navy safety boats on hand to act quickly, unlike two years ago. But were portable underwater breathing sets on board these vehicles, unlike two years ago?

Now once again after the fact Amphibious Combat Vehicles, like the old Amphibious Assault Vehicles are being grounded. But for how long?

How confident can we really be that the Camp Pendleton commanding general and others of flag rank are honestly accepting responsibility and being held to account? Safety should be Job No. 1 for leaders, especially after a second serious mishap, as the Pentagon farcically calls accidents.

After the July 30, 2020, catastrophe, it took 18 months and focused pressure on congressional leaders for a major general to be forced into retirement because of the Amphibious Assault Vehicle disaster and his boss, a lieutenant general (now retired) to be given a letter of censure from the civilian Navy secretary, which happened only last month. Neither lost any benefits or reductions in rank. Blaming down the ranks has to stop. This is not leadership.

Enough is enough. The Pentagon needs to get its act together to train hard but safely. This is not combat. Lets have no more Weve got this cringe-worthy excuses by flag officers before congressional hearings following yet another calamity.

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Opinion: Two years after my son died in a military vehicle rollover, another just took place. Why? - The San Diego Union-Tribune