Darwinism – an overview | ScienceDirect Topics

The evolution of moral norms.

In the Descent of Man, Darwin speculated on the origins of what he called our moral sense. He argued that other intelligent organisms, were there any, would acquire a moral sense other than our own. Darwin cites the case of the hive-bees who might well support fratricide (Descent, chapter 4). According to Darwin, and I daresay, contemporary sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, the kind of organisms we are determines, in a broad sense, what kinds of norms we are likely to develop and endorse. This has both a positive and negative aspect.

On the positive side, given our social natures and the need for communal support in the raising of children, human beings have evolved altruistic motivations that temper inclinations toward self interest. We can well imagine, in the spirit of Darwin, that other creatures that are intelligent but self reliant would not be moved by considerations of sympathy and empathy with their fellow kind.

On the negative side, just as the Naturalistic Fallacy suggests that is does not imply ought, it is often pointed out in ethical circles that ought implies can. The idea is that no norms that require what is impossible can be binding on us. So, for instance, it is folly to establish or endorse norms that are beyond our capacity to obey. The norm Thou shalt not kill seems perfectly proper while the norm Thou shalt not eat seems ludicrous. There are limitations to the expectations we can have for ourselves and for others. These limitations are a result of our limited physical, emotional and intellectual capacities. But these limits are the fruits of our evolutionary progress. So, it seems reasonable that the evolved limitations of our physical and mental capabilities ar relevant to determining or setting the boundaries of our normative demands.

Some moral theorists might take exception to the above conclusion. A God-centered ethics might argue that the limitations of human beings are the reflection of original sin or something of the sort and that this just shows that human beings need to resign themselves to the will of their Maker. A secularized version of such an ethic can be found in Kant who postulates an ideal Kingdom of Ends as the (ultimately) unachievable model for human moral behavior. These concerns can not be easily dismissed although I do not propose to pursue them here. Instead I commend to your attention James Rachels Created from Animals which explores the implications of Darwinism for formulating a moral theory and effectively calls into question both theologically based and Kantian ethical positions.

Rachels book is one long argument to the effect that Darwinism undermines the concept of human dignity that he claims forms the basis for traditional moralities. This, in turn, has implications for the moral status of animals. Rachels takes what he calls the traditional concept of human dignity to be the presumption that the primary purpose of morality is the protection of human beings and their rights and interests [Rachels, 1990]. This presumption is supported by certain factual (or quasi-factual) assumptions about human nature. Two basic claims emerge from this factual base and support the sanctity of human dignity. One is the presumption that human beings were created (as special) in the image of God. Rachels calls this the image of God thesis. The second is the presumption that human beings alone among the animals are rational beings. It does not follow logically from these presumptions that human dignity is or ought to be the lynch pin of morality. But, Rachels argues, the primacy of human dignity does rest on and is supported by these presumptions. They serve, as it were, as the rationale for putting human concerns ahead of all others in matters of morals.

Darwinism indirectly undermines the primacy of human dignity by undermining the presumptions that support the doctrine. The Darwinian perspective marginalizes God as the creator of human beings as special. Although Darwinism does not entail that God did not create human beings as special, it renders the story superfluous or suspect.1 From the Darwinian perspective, humans are just one among the animals. The Darwinian theory of common descent suggests that all organisms are interrelated. Darwinian gradualism suggests that differences between species are often matters of degree and not matters of kind. These implications undermine the status of human beings as special and in so doing undermine the traditional moralities which are based on that explicit or implicit assumption.

To replace the discarded image with something of value, Rachels proposes a view he calls moral individualism. Moral individualism treats all individuals, human or not, as individuals and not as members of a certain species. Considerations of moral relevance are to be determined by circumstances and not by fiat. Rather than pursue that development here I want to note that Rachels argument is not intended merely to replace one set of moral norms by others but that it calls into question some of the fundamental assumptions that lie behind any norms. This takes us into the realm of the meta-ethical.

What, if anything, are the implications of Darwinism for meta-ethics? The verdict is still out but one can find adherents of a wide diversity of views. Michael Ruse, for one, has argued that a Darwinian approach to ethics rules out any form of moral realism in favour of an error theory of the form first promoted by David Hume [Ruse, 1986]. This has led to a vigorous debate in the literature with no clear resolution in sight.

One might argue that Darwinism lends itself to moral realism by adapting an argument formulated by Donald Campbell with respect to human cognitive faculties. Campbell argues that just as the physical environment shapes the evolution of organismic features, so the physical environment is held to shape the evolution of what we know [Campbell, 1974]. Our cognitive faculties and our scientific theories fit our physical environments in much the same way the organisms in successful lineages are co-adapted to their environments. If our cognitive abilities and guesses about the world we live in were not on the mark more often than not we would be on the road to extinction. There is a congenial reciprocity between what we think and how we think and what we think about. Campbell calls this view critical realism and thinks that a Darwinian viewpoint is committed to it. I have some reservations about this argument in its guise as an account of the evolution of our cognitive capacities but, were one persuaded by it, it might be invoked as a defense of the contention that Darwinism is committed to or, at least, is compatible with some form of moral realism.

If we understand a minimal version of moral realism to be committed to the view that there are moral facts in the world then we can well imagine that the moral environment might shape the evolution of our moral capacities and moral norms in much the same manner as the physical environment is held to shape our cognitive capacities and cognitive norms. I'm not sure how far this argument can be pushed but it seems that the cognitive realm and the moral realm are, prima facie, on a par and if an evolutionary argument for critical physical realism can be made then perhaps an evolutionary argument for critical moral realism could be made as well.

This ignores, of course, all the arguments that have been made to the effect that moral claims have an absolutely different status from physical claims and I am far from suggesting that an appeal to evolutionary theory is likely to resolve this debate. In fact, since I do not think that Campbell's argument should persuade us of the truth of critical physical realism as he understands it, I do not think a parallel argument would persuade anyone of the truth of critical moral realism either. With respect to the ultimate status of moral claims evolutionary theory is, to this point, silent.

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Darwinism - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics