Monthly Archives: August 2022

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The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy.This conversation with Dr. Mathieu Duchtel director of the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne in Paris and formerly the representative in Beijing of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is the 329th in The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.

Identify major differences between NATOs Strategic Concept 2022 and past versions.

The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace, and NATO cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies sovereignty and territorial integrity. From this bleak but obvious assessment, in stark contrast with the language of the previous Strategic Concept released in 2010 (an Euro-Atlantic area at peace and a low threat of attack against NATO territory), follows the great emphasis of the 2022 Concept on NATOs nuclear deterrence, with resolve as the key word to demonstrate credibility. No one should doubt our strength and resolve to defend every inch of Allied territory; The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.

Challenges from authoritarian actors to our interests, values and democratic way of life have outranked and downgraded the proliferation of ballistic missiles and terrorist risks to a secondary priority on NATOs threat assessment. Strategic competition with authoritarian actors impacts threat assessment across all security sectors but is particularly obvious in cyberspace. There is a world between 2010s Cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly to 2022s Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities.

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In sum, the intensity of current threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security suggests a strong sense of common purpose to an alliance that only a few years ago French President Macron was characterizing, or rather mischaracterizing, as brain dead.

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Analyze key shifts in NATOs approach to China as reflected in Strategic Concept 2022.

China poses systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security but is not considered an adversary or a threat. What best characterizes the inclusion of China on NATOs agenda Secretary-General Jens Stoltenbergs 2020 remark that this is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it is about taking into account that China is coming closer to us.

Two years later, the 2022 Strategic Concept prioritizes enhancing the resilience of NATO member states against Chinese actions that undermine the coherence and the strength of our societies, economies, and democratic institutions. In short, NATO remains focused on Euro-Atlantic security in a broad sense, not military competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Regarding China, NATO has a key role to play to achieve strategic unity and coherence among its member states. This role is particularly salient given that China systematically seeks to sow division in transatlantic relations and to exploit intra-EU differences to its advantage. A shared assessment of Chinese military policy can provide a strong basis for strategic unity. During the Cold War, NATO already provided a platform for intelligence exchange between member states on the state of PLA programs. There was no question at the time already that the focus of the alliance was overwhelmingly the Soviet threat.

Today in Europe, the EU lacks the capacity in Europe to produce shared awareness of development trends inside the PLA: decisions regarding equipment, force structure, overseas deployments, posture in East Asia, the change of format of Chinese nuclear forces A common understanding of Chinese military affairs is crucial as a basis to prevent transfers of dual-use technology that benefit PLA programs, and to guide European military cooperation to other partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The fact that military analysts focused on Russian deployments around Ukraine were much more successful in predicting the Russian attack than historians, diplomats, or political scientists is a tragic recent reminder of the peculiar reliability of military analysis to understand a countrys strategic orientation and predict its behavior.

Examine Beijings response to the Strategic Concept.

There is clearly irritation in Beijing. The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Zhao Lijian, has warned NATO that it is completely futile to play up and hype the so-called China threat and repeated known lines regarding Chinese normal defense spending, and NATOs quest of absolute military security.

But Chinas order of priorities is clear, and is encapsulated in the formula 2, 3, 4, 5: the U.S. bilateral alliances in East Asia, AUKUS, the Quad, and the Five Eyes. An Euro-Atlantic alliance focused on resilience in the Euro-Atlantic area poses no threat to China.

Could NATO play a role in the Indo-Pacific military balance? It is extremely unlikely in peace time. But there is an ambiguity regarding whether NATOs collective defense (Article 5, that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all) could be activated in case of a Chinese attack against U.S. bases in the Pacific, if China launched a Taiwan annexation war. In its detailed response to the Strategic Concept, the Chinese mission to the EU expressed skepticism regarding NATOs claim that its defense zone will not extend beyond the Northern Atlantic region. Chinese analysts tend to see a trend of NATO involvement in Indo-Pacific security in the making especially in the context of leaders from Australia, Japan, and South Korea attending the 2022 NATO summit.

How does the Strategic Concept raise the stakes in NATOs management of China-Russia relations vis--vis the China challenge and Russia as a significant and direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic area?

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The 2022 Strategic Concept does not represent China and Russia as the two faces of the same single threat. Despite the Concepts emphasis on authoritarian states, a clear distinction is made between the imminent Russia threat and the challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests posed by China. It could have been otherwise. Some countries would have accepted tougher language on the state of the Sino-Russian partnership. France reportedly played a key role in advocating a nuanced language merely noting that Chinese and Russian actions are mutually reinforcing. This suggests a growing awareness that Western policies towards China and Russia have largely contributed to cement their partnership.

From Abe Shinzos to Emmanuel Macrons, all attempts to drive a wedge between China and Russia proceeded on the assumption Russia will not accept a status of Chinas junior partner. All failed to capture the order of priorities in Moscow, and Putins drive to revise the international order. As Western sanctions against Russia are in the process of causing gigantic damage to its economy and access to technology, deepened Russian dependence on China is unavoidable. The risk of opportunistic Russian actions against NATO in a scenario of U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan may be higher than the risk of opportunistic Chinese military offensive in East Asia in the context of the Ukraine war, even though a prolonged war lasting years could provide China a window.

There is no silver bullet to prevent this worst-case scenario from happening NATO military superiority and the credibility of our deterrence posture remains the best security guarantee for NATO member states. At the same time, not designating China a security threat and focusing NATOs action on Euro-Atlantic resilience, security, deterrence of Russia, and simply military power is the safer road. This does not prevent European states like France and the United Kingdom from continuing to play a limited role in Indo-Pacific security, nor does this forego the possibility for the U.S. of mobilizing key NATO allies as part of a coalition if China starts a war in East Asia.

Assess NATOs plans to operationalize the Strategic Concept and implications for the geopolitical risk environment in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

The 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirms in unambiguous terms NATO as the cornerstone of Europe-Atlantic security. NATO provides credible deterrence against attacks against its member states. A Russian gamble that striking missile defense facilities in Poland or convoys of military equipment to Ukraine before they reach the border would uncover the void of Article 5 would be extremely self-destructive. The new Strategic Concept is all about strength, credibility, and resolve but the focus is NATO territory. Russias use of its nuclear umbrella to conduct a war of conquest and destruction in Ukraine shows the limits of NATOs capacity to defend the status quo and preserve peace in Europe.

In the coming years, facing a weakened and aggressive Russia, the priority to operationalize the Strategic Concept is to cultivate NATOs strategic superiority over Russian armed forces. The membership of Sweden and Finland and Germanys plans to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense will strengthen NATO. The EUs financial support for military innovation in Europe is also an important strategic asset. NATO needs to regain an aura of military power and resolve, which internal disputes regarding strategic orientations, Europe largely free-riding on U.S. military power, and the Afghanistan campaign had contributed to erode.

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China and NATO's Strategic Concept The Diplomat - The Diplomat

Brothers of Italy party leader Giorgia Meloni arrives for a meeting at the Quirinale Palace in Rome, Italy January 29, 2021. REUTERS/Guglielmo Mangiapane/File Photo

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ROME, Aug 2 (Reuters) - Italy's Chamber of Deputies approved a bill on Tuesday to ratify the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO in a vote welcomed by Giorgia Meloni, whose far-right Brothers of Italy party is seen as the front runner in the coming election.

The lower house voted by 398 votes to 20 in favour of the bill which now needs a second, final green light from the Senate.

"In the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine, strengthening the European front of the Alliance is an important step that can act as a deterrent to new Russian threats," Meloni said in a statement.

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The accession needs to be ratified by the parliaments of all 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization members before Finland and Sweden can be protected by the NATO defence clause that states that an attack on one member is an attack against all. read more

Meloni, whose party is the most popular in the conservative coalition ahead of the Sept. 25 election, had endorsed Prime Minister Mario Draghi's decision to ship weapons to Ukraine, even though it was in opposition to his government. read more

However, her two main allies, the League and Forza Italia, have been much more ambivalent, reflecting their historically close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

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Reporting by Angelo Amante; Editing by Mike Harrison

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Continued here:
Italy's lower house backs NATO membership for Finland and Sweden - Reuters

In the run-up to US President Joe Biden's visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia this month, Jordan's King Abdullah II said he "would be one of the first people that would endorse a Middle East Nato." The idea of a Middle East Nato a Nato-like military alliance among various configurations of states in the region was floated as recently as the Trump administration but has thus far failed to materialise.

Given that the kings and autocrats of the region deeply mistrust each other, especially on matters of security and intelligence-sharing, it remains a far-fetched notion. Martin Indyk, a former US ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs and now a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said such an alliance might require an "Article 5-like commitment from the US" referring to the principle that all Nato members must treat an attack against one as an attack on all and that "Congress would never agree to such a treaty."

But while creating a Middle East Nato remains out of the question, Abdullah's statement reflected an optimism for Biden's trip. Perhaps it would at least yield a regional air defence integration plan among Gulf countries and Israel. Even that smaller goal, though which seemed achievable in light of recent US-backed defence cooperation in the region did not come to fruition. In large part, this is because Arab leaders are wary of joining hands publicly with Israel to create what would effectively be a military front against Iran.

Iran's expansion in the region through militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has rattled some Arab nations so greatly that they have begun to see Israel, a historic enemy with superior military capabilities, as a potential defence ally. The Biden administration's strategy has thus been to encourage defence cooperation among US allies including Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia while also attempting to revive the Iran nuclear deal.

Although similar ideas have been discussed in the past under several US presidents, the prospect of an air defence group has gained momentum in recent years as Saudi and Emirati cities and oil facilities, as well as US bases and troops in the region, have come under more frequent drone strikes by Iran's proxies. These drones are small and hard to intercept, so it is only natural that defence cooperation is increasingly being considered.

In fact, defence cooperation to combat the Iranian drone threat is already taking place, the New York Times reported this month. In March 2021, Israel foiled an Iranian drone attack with help from an Arab nation probably Jordan, the Times reported when Israeli jets were allowed to use Arab air space to shoot down the drones.

Wider defence cooperation is on the rise as well. A year after Israel normalised relations with the UAE and Bahrain with the Abraham Accords in 2020, all three countries and the United States held their first joint naval drill. This February, Israel participated in US-led naval drills with Saudi Arabia and Oman for the first time. Soon after, a senior Israel Defence Forces official was posted to Bahrain the first time an Israeli officer has been stationed in an Arab country. Then, in March, military officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel came together in Egypt in secret to discuss a potential air defence alliance, the Wall Street Journal reported.

Then just days before Biden's visit, Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz said Israel had joined other countries which he did not name in what he called the Middle East Air Defence alliance, a US-led regional air defence group. According to Gantz, member countries would be sharing intelligence about incoming Iranian missiles and drones in order to warn each other about attacks. Expectations were high that an announcement on defence cooperation was imminent during Biden's visit.

But all the talk amounted to little during the visit. The joint statement following Biden's summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in Riyadh said GCC members and Washington would enhance "joint deterrence capabilities" but made no mention of a regional air defence mechanism including Israel.

As Lazar Berman aptly noted in the Times of Israel, "The much-discussed regional security alliance against Iran looks to be far less advanced than Israel would have hoped. Mentions of the framework during the visit were exceedingly vague, a far cry from a Middle Eastern Nato."

Several analysts told Foreign Policy that the United States and Israel overestimated Arab nations' willingness to publicly enter a defense alliance with Israel before a resolution to the Palestinian conflict. "Gulf countries don't trust each other and that is why such defence alliances have not materialised in the past despite US attempts," said Yasmine Farouk, a nonresident scholar in the Middle East programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

But now, Farouk said, "matters have been complicated further because the US has added Israel to the mix. Most GCC countries are not comfortable with publicly being a part of an alliance with Israel. Several Saudi officials have told me that they are not okay with it."

Anchal Vohra is a Brussels-based columnist for Foreign Policy who writes about Europe, the Middle East and South Asia.

Disclaimer: This article first appeared on Foreign Policy, and is published by special syndication arrangement.

Originally posted here:
Could there ever be a Middle East Nato? - The Business Standard

Whats in the kit of a French CBRN defence specialist? Brigadier Herton from the 2nd Dragoon Regiment, French Army, shows us what he carries in the kit bag to detect chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination in the field.

The 2nd Dragoon Regiment is the French Army unit dedicated to combatting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

The unit was filmed in Norway while training with other NATO Allies in Exercise Cold Response 2022

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NATO: What's in the kit of a French CBRN defence specialist? - EU Today

Dr Noorma took up his post following a formal, change-of-command ceremony held at Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) headquarters in Tallinn, where outgoing director, Brig. Gen. Jaak Tarien, handed over.

Noorma's term is for three years, and Ministry of Defense Undersecretary for Defense Planning Tiina Uudeberg psaid of his appointment that: The past two years have been very challenging for the CCDCOE as well. Despite Covid restrictions and other challenges along the way, you have succeeded in organizing your flagship cyber exercises and conferences both online and in-person," noting that this year's annual CyCon conference was a sell-out and brought the highest-ranking generals and experts from all around the world, from a total of 50 countries, to Tallinn.

Uudeberg also praised Jaak Tarien's stint as director, which he commenced in September 2018.

Christian-Marc Liflnder, Head of Cyber and Hybrid Policy at NATO said: "Looking at what this Centre, and this team in particular, has achieved I can confidently say that you have set the standard for excellence on cyber."

Noorma's resume includes active engagement in innovation and novel technology development at NATO, EU and international level, while he has been a board member of the European External Action Service(EEAS) Space Advisory Board and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Autonomous Weapon Systems Expert Advisory Committee.

Monday's ceremony also saw the traditional planting of an oak tree (see cover image), jointly by incoming and outgoing directors.

The CCDCOE is a NATO-accredited knowledge hub offering a unique interdisciplinary approach to the most relevant issues in cyber defense, spearheaded by international experts from 35 countries and from the military, government, academia and industrial spheres. Around 80 people work at the headquarters.

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New NATO CCDCOE director takes office in Tallinn - ERR News

This week, MPs are set to study the bill aimed at improving peoples spending power after its contents were examined by Frances commission mixte paritaire (joint committee) following reviews from senators last week.

The government will bring forward the results of estimations on Frances projected growth and spending for debate by MPs as part of a report that seeks to establish economic stability.

Other debates include topics already discussed, such as the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO and the projet de loi de finances rectificative (PLFR) budget amendment bill.

The governments proposed measures on spending power received support from members of conservative Les Rpublicains (LR) and far-right Rassemblement National (RN), who said that they were moving in the right direction.

Tuesday, August 2

The report contains government projections on growth, public spending and debt The Connexion understands.

Estimates from the government are expected to take into consideration the spending power and the PLFR bill.

Wednesday, August 3

French military, police and firefighter forces will offer assistance to Qatari forces in handling, planning, monitoring and intervening on every security aspect of football games during the World Cup.

The commission is composed of seven MPs and seven senators from both chambers and is charged with finding a compromise on conflicts between senators and MPs.

Read more: MPs pass Frances purchasing power law: What does it include?

Senators from the Les Rpublicains (LR) group have previously expressed the desire to free up access to work, encouraging unemployed and underemployed people to find employment rather than offering them state support.

For example, LR senators already proposed an amendment to the spending power bill which would have kept increases to the revenu de solidarit active (RSA) benefit payment below the 4% rise that was eventually agreed. This amendment was rejected by the Senate.

The bill was passed to the Senate on Thursday after a heated Assemble nationale debate which continued into Tuesday night.

Thursday, August 4

The PLFR is designed to explore new measures aimed at containing inflation and protecting spending power, and proposes to spend 55billion after an unexpectedly strong 7% growth in 2021.

The bill will be discussed on Thursday and Friday.

Monday, August 1

Wednesday, August 3

The report comes after several fires have caused considerable damage in Brittany and southern France in a summer heatwave that saw record-breaking temperatures.

The heatwave also convinced the government to increase the countrys water bomber plane capacity to cope with future fires, which are predicted to grow more frequent as a result of climate change.

Read more: Arson suspected in two wildfires in southern FranceRead more: French wildfires: Airbus tests way to adapt plane into water bomber

Senate votes to keep ability to impose Covid pass at French bordersExplainer: What is Frances Assemble nationale and how does it work?

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World Cup, spending power, NATO: This week in French politics - The Connexion