Monthly Archives: June 2022

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the most successful and enduring mutual security pact in history is about to start its second act. In Act 1, the United States played the leading role in deterring Russian aggression and keeping the peace in Europe. In Act 2, Europeans will take center stage.

With longtime neutrals Sweden and Finland knocking on its door, NATO likely will grow to 32 members. For the transatlantic allies, however, the wise course isnt merely to expand NATO, but to reinvent it.

How to seize that opportunity which goes well beyond hackneyed calls for greater burden-sharing should be the focal point of NATOs Madrid summit later this month.

NATO should be fundamentally reconfigured to reflect three geopolitical realities. First, since its creation in 1949, the alliance has expanded dramatically as many of Europes ancient feuds and rivalries have been subsumed within pan-European values and institutions.

Second, NATOs 27 European members (excluding Turkey) vastly exceed Russia in economic clout, population and military spending. Third, America inexorably is turning its strategic gaze to China and the balance of power in Asia.

All three developments point toward the same conclusion: Its time for Europe to cast aside the crutch of dependence on U.S. military might and assume primary responsibility for defending itself.

Whats brought Europe to this moment is not so much Russian President Vladimir Putins second invasion of Ukraine, but the Ukrainian peoples valiant and effective resistance. Their fight for freedom has revived and unified the democratic West, while also puncturing the myth of Russian military prowess.

At the end of World War II, there was no way a devastated and destitute Europe could stand up to a victorious Soviet Union without U.S. power. But the Soviet imperium dissolved decades ago, while Europe has steadily become more prosperous, more economically and politically intertwined, and largely liberal and democratic in outlook.

As a result, what Russian strategists call the correlation of forces has shifted decisively in Europes favor.

With a population of around 145 million, Russia has the worlds 11th largest economy with an annual Gross Domestic Product of $1.48 trillion. NATO is a juggernaut in comparison. Its 30 members have a combined population of nearly 604 million and GDP of $18 trillion.

But even if you take the United States out of the equation, our European allies are more than a match for Moscow in both economic and military terms. Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy all have economies larger than Russias. Moscow devotes about $66 billion a year to its military forces; these four NATO countries alone spend more than three times as much.

The key questions are whether Europe can muster the will to translate these enormous advantages into a credible military deterrent of its own, and whether this should happen within or outside of NATO.

Overreliance on American protection has had catastrophic effects on E.U. security, contend Vincent-Immanuel Herr and Martin Speer of Germanys Charlemagne Prize Academy. They and others propose a European army organized under the auspices of the European Union.

This is in keeping with French President Emmanuel Macrons ambitious call for Europe to embrace strategic autonomy and become a global foreign policy actor.

Former President Trumps abrasive America First policy convinced many Europeans that they cant rely on U.S. power in perpetuity. Given its preponderant strengths and demonstrated habits of cooperation, theres no longer any reason for Europeans to contract out their security to anyone else.

True, but it makes little sense to organize Europes common defense forces under the EU, which has no security remit or mutual defense assurances. If Sweden and Finland join, NATO will encompass almost all of Europe except four small countries. It has a unified command structure, Article 5s one for all, all for one guarantee and, crucially, North American partners.

As Europeans develop forces capable of protecting themselves from a Russian attack, the United States must stay engaged in NATO both as a strategic reserve and an arsenal for our democratic allies.

Whats more, while Britain and France are members of the nuclear club, they cant supplant Americas indispensable role in nuclear deterrence. Russias stockpile of more than 4,000 nuclear weapons is really all that remains of its former superpower status. Thats why Putin and his cronies keep raising the specter of nuclear escalation as the NATO allies funnel arms into Ukraine and clamp stringent sanctions on the Russian economy.

So far, Europe hasnt blinked. On the contrary, Germany has announced a $100 billion increase in military spending, and with the conspicuous exception of Hungary European governments also are moving to reduce their heavy reliance on Russian gas and oil.

By taking charge of their own security, Europeans would remove a major irritant in their relations with the United States, while also enabling Washington to devote more strategic attention and resources to shoring up stability and security in the Asia Pacific.

Already, Washingtons contribution to NATOs budget has fallen from 22 percent to 16 percent, roughly the same as Germanys. Over time, the United States should be able to bring home many of the 100,000 U.S. troops now stationed in Europe, while leaving smaller forces to act as a tripwire.

After 70 years of deference to Washington on security matters, European leaders will need to reacquaint themselves with the risks, responsibilities and moral ambiguities of wielding hard power. They (and especially Germans) also will need to question habits of passivity and pacifism and disabuse themselves of sanctimonious notions about the efficacy of their multilateral and soft-power approach to containing international conflicts.

Americans should welcome Europes return to the historical stage as a second liberal bulwark, alongside the United States, to defend the free world against the league of pugnacious autocracies led by Russia and China.

Will Marshallis president and founder of the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI).

Original post:
Putin sets the stage for NATOs second act - The Hill

Turkey appears to be leveraging its position as a deciding factor in the U.S.-led NATO military alliance's attempts to counter Russia's war in Ukraine by planning a new operation in northern Syria, where factions backed by Washington and Moscow both oppose Ankara's aims.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has declared his opposition to the bids of Finland and Sweden to join NATO, arguing that the two countries offer safe havens for supporters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a separatist group that has waged an insurgency for Kurdish autonomy for more than three decades. The Turkish leader's approval would be necessary for the Western bloc to greenlight its latest expansion.

As Erdogan held steadfast in his view, Turkish officials have begun talking openly of plans to launch a new incursion across the Syrian border against forces they associate with the PKK. Among these factions are the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, a Pentagon-backed group that serves as a vanguard in the U.S.-led coalition's ongoing fight against the Islamic State militant group (ISIS).

Former Turkish diplomat and current Carnegie Europe visiting scholar Sinan lgen told Newsweek that with the U.S. depending on Turkey to hold the NATO line against Russia in Ukraine, its opposition to the planned incursion is likely to be muted.

"The calculus perhaps on the side of Ankara is that the West needs Turkey on board with NATO enlargement," lgen said, "and, therefore, at a critical time like this, there will be less criticism of Turkey's cross-border operation."

Still, he argued that the situation "has put Turkey and the U.S. on a collision course."

Further tying the timing of Turkey's planned incursion into northern Syria to the war in Ukraine, lgen pointed to the presence of Russian troops also operating within a "cordon sanitaire," which was established as a security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border in 2019 after Ankara struck back-to-back deals with Washington and Moscow to dismantle positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces within a "safe zone."

Russia, however, supports the Syrian government, which views Turkey, like the U.S., as an illegitimate occupying force. But as Turkey continues a years-long balancing act in its relations with the U.S. and Russia, lgen argued that Erdogan also saw an opportunity to bypass Moscow's protests over Ankara's objectives in Syria.

"There is a calculation in Ankara that Russia will not anymore oppose such an intervention," lgen said, "and will not want to oppose such an intervention because Russia now is also more in need of retaining Turkey as a diplomatic partner on Ukraine."

As Erdogan makes the case for what would be Turkey's fourth major intervention in Syria, following Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, he and his government have held high-level consultations with both Washington and Moscow.

In a call with Turkish presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin, White House national security council advisor Jake Sullivan "reiterated the importance of refraining from escalation in Syria to preserve existing ceasefire lines and avoid any further destabilization," and "urged continued dialogue and diplomacy to resolve any disagreements in the eastern Mediterranean region," according to a White House readout.

Sullivan also "expressed support for Turkey's continued direct talks with Sweden and Finland to resolve concerns over their applications for NATO membership, which the U.S. strongly supports."

Kalin, however, "pointed out that the countries that seek to become a member of NATO should adopt the Alliance's values and principles on security and combatting terrorism," and "stressed in this sense that Sweden and Finland have to take concrete steps regarding the terrorist organizations that threaten Trkiye's national security," according to the Turkish presidency's readout.

"It was stressed that the PKK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization continued to pose a threat to Trkiye's national security and Syria's territorial integrity," the readout added. "It was underscored that Trkiye would determinedly maintain its fight against all the terrorist organizations."

The U.S. also considers the PKK a terrorist organization, and officially opposes its presence, even if members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and its affiliated People's Protection Units (YPG) and the leading Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) at times openly flaunt PKK imagery, including pictures of its leader, Abdullah calan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999.

Reached for comment by Newsweek, the State Department referred to spokesperson Ned Price's remarks Tuesday, in which he said President Joe Biden's administration would continue "to support the maintenance of current ceasefire lines" and "condemn any escalation that has the potential to jeopardize that."

"We believe it is crucial for all sides to maintain and respect ceasefire zones, principally to enhance stability in Syria and to work towards a political solution to the conflict," Price added. "We believe that any effort to do otherwise could be counterproductive to our goals to bring about an end to the broader conflict in Syria, but also the tremendous progress that we've made together, including with our Kurdish partners, in the effort against ISIS that has achieved such important steps in recent years."

And while Price asserted that U.S. officials "recognize Turkey's legitimate security concerns on its border," he emphasized that the administration was "concerned that any new offensive would further undermine regional stability and would put at risk those hard-won gains in the campaign against ISIS."

A day before Sullivan and Kalin's call, Erdogan spoke directly via telephone with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin's readout made no mention of Syria, only that "the presidents also reviewed a number of regional issues," and instead focused on the situation in Europe.

"Discussing the developments in Ukraine, they emphasized the need to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and to remove the threat of mines in these waters," the Russian account stated. "Vladimir Putin noted Russia's willingness to facilitate unimpeded cargo shipping in coordination with its Turkish partners including grain shipments from Ukrainian ports."

On Ukraine, Erdogan presented himself as a mediator, stating "Trkiye's readiness, if agreed upon in principle by both parties, to meet with Russia, Ukraine and the United Nations in Istanbul, and to assume a role in a possible observation mechanism," according to the Turkish account.

Turkey has joined NATO and a number of partnered countries in condemning Russia's attack on Ukraine, and has provided Kyiv with advanced Bayraktar TB2 drones that have inflicted significant casualties among Russian troops. These unmanned aerial systems have been deployed in past operations with similar lethality against Russian allies in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as in Libya and Syria.

In addition to blocking Finland and Sweden's NATO aspirations, Turkey has also shown it can cause frustrations for the bloc in other ways. It holds the keys to the straits that lie between the Mediterranean and Black Seas as part of the 1936 Montreux Convention, and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told the Anadolu Agency that Ankara has, "in accordance with the convention, cancelled or postponed planned NATO drills."

Speaking to Putin on Monday, Erdogan also made clear his intentions in Syria.

"Drawing attention to the PKK/YPG terrorist organization's continued attacks in Syria against Trkiye and Syrian civilians," the readout said, "President Erdoan said that the terror-free zone with a depth of 30 kilometers from the Trkiye border, as had been stated in the memorandum of understanding of October 2019, was not established, and that it was imperative to make these areas secure."

Newsweek has reached out to the Turkish embassy in Washington for comment.

The Syrian Democratic Forces and their political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council, have raised protests toward the planned Turkish attack.

A statement published last week by the group alleged "a Turkish plot to establish a black belt of terrorist organizations" involving front-line deployments of the powerful Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former Al-Qaeda affiliate, and Hurras al-Din, currently aligned with Al-Qaeda, in the leadup to Ankara's operation.

These groups, along with Turkey-backed opposition factions active in the rebel-held province of Idlib and across the border security corridor, have been accused of human rights abuses, especially against Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities.

Syrian Democratic Council representative to the U.S. Sinam Mohamad told Newsweek that, "Turkish threats against our semi-autonomous region are nothing new."

"They are serious and we take them that way," Mohamad said. "However, it is not easy for Turkey to obtain the approval of countries directly engaged in Syria to carry out unprovoked military operations against us. I believe the United States has made it clear to Turkey that a new Turkish military campaign in northeast Syria will have repercussions. Attacks against the SDF will only serve ISIS' interest and run counter to the interests of the anti-ISIS coalition including the U.S."

And when it comes to the U.S. role, she said the Syrian Democratic Council is "in dialogue" with the Biden administration regarding the prospect of yet another Turkish assault. She said she believed that "we are in full agreement with it that a new Turkish campaign will only de-stabilize the region," serving not only ISIS' interests but also those of other "Islamic radical groups operating in Syria," while creating "a new humanitarian crisis including by displacing hundreds of thousands of Syrians as previous Turkish military operations did."

However, when asked if she was concerned that the U.S. focus was elsewhere, given the events in Europe, she said she still held hope that Washington would not abandon its partners in Syria.

"The war in Ukraine has impacted us all in some way," Mohamad said, "but I don't believe that the administration has taken its eye off of Syria, and it remains fully committed to ensuring our region's security and stability."

Also warning against a new Turkish incursion was Syria's central government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, who with help from Russia and Iran remains firmly in power more than 11 years after crackdowns on protests devolved into an uprising backed by the U.S. and its partners, including Turkey.

In a letter dated Monday to the U.N. Security Council and shared with Newsweek, Syria's permanent mission to the U.N. stated that Damascus "rejects the military hostilities launched by the occupying Turkish forces for several days" across towns and villages in northeastern and northwestern Syria, which have "led to the death and injury of many civilians, caused massive damage to public and private properties and infrastructure in those areas, and displaced dozens of Syrian families from their homes and villages there."

"The Turkish regime attempts to establish the so-called 'safe zone' on Syrian territory is a shameful act of aggression and part of the policy of ethnic and demographic cleansing practiced by the government of Erdogan in the occupied Syrian territories," the letter said, "and they are war crimes and crimes against humanity that are rejected by the United Nations Charter, international law and international humanitarian law."

Though Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces' semi-autonomous administration in northern and eastern Syria are at odds about the country's future, they are both opposed to Turkey and the insurgent militias aligned with it. The two sides have even cooperated at times to this end, even if repeated attempts at a broader reconciliation remain stalled.

But while the Syrian Democratic Forces view the U.S. as a potential barrier to Turkey's designs in northern Syria, the Syrian government sees it as an enabler.

"Syria affirms that its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity will not be the subject of blackmail or bargaining by the Turkish extremist regime in collusion with its ally in Washington and with some Western countries," the letter said, "that seek cheap political gain at the expense of the Syrian people and their territorial integrity and in contradiction to the international unanimity on the need to preserve and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic."

It remains unclear whether the Biden administration would increase its opposition to Erdogan's plans in Syria from words to action.

Myles B. Caggins III, a Council on Foreign Relations military fellow who previously served as senior spokesperson for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition during Turkey's last incursion into Syria, told Newsweek that any U.S. military resistance to another such incursion is unlikely.

"It's beyond my imagination that the United States would physically defend our partners on the ground against aggression from a NATO ally," Caggins said. "I think that's why we've seen high level talks with the U.S. national security adviser and his counterpart, and I think it's also why President Biden has strongly supported the applications of Finland and Sweden into NATO, despite opposition from Turkey."

And while he said any U.S. use of force against a NATO ally would be virtually "unprecedented," he also pointed out that "Turkey has used physical aggression against Greece," a longstanding rival yet fellow NATO member with whom tensions remain high.

"So if anybody doesn't play by NATO rules, it seems to be them," Caggins said of Turkish leadership.

But Ankara has repeatedly voiced its displeasure with what it perceives as NATO indifference to its security concerns in northern Syria, as well as to the vast migration crisis created by the conflict there that has seen Turkey take in some 3.6 million Syrian refugees, more than all other nations combined. Frustrated by NATO inaction over that crisis, Erdogan five years ago openly discussed invoking the alliance's Article 5, NATO's collective defense clause, which has only been used once in history, in response to the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. two decades ago.

Frustrated over U.S. support of Kurdish forces in Syria, Ankara's relations with Washington soured even further in the final weeks of the Trump administration, which imposed sanctions on Turkey for acquiring Russia's S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Biden has not yet made any movement to lift these restrictions or move forward with an indefinitely suspended F-35 fighter jet deal, despite Erdogan's repeated requests.

The Biden administration has, however, reportedly called on Congress to back a proposal to provide Turkey with upgraded F-16s, older versions of which Turkish forces have flown in operations in Syria and Iraq, where Kurdish forces have also been under bombardment. These aircraft may offer Turkey an enhanced capability to target the Syrian Democratic Forces as they continue to clash with ISIS and hold up to 10,000 detainees of the jihadi group.

"The world said we need to stop ISIS, and the people who stopped ISIS in Kobani in 2015 were the Syrian Democratic Forces," Caggins said. "These are the same forces who were the champions against ISIS, and who our NATO ally is ready to attack."

But he noted that the situation was complicated by Ankara's ongoing coordination with Moscow, which he said, beyond seeking to retain its presence in a unified Syria, "has a longstanding goal of fracturing NATO and causing multiple dilemmas for the United States."

Caggins stated that the overarching goal of the U.S. remains clear.

"The priority of the United States is going to be to keep NATO intact," he said.

Read more here:
Turkey Is Playing Off NATO Against Russia with Eyes on Northern Syria - Newsweek

As a result of the war in Ukraine, policymakers in Europe and North America have scrambled to strengthen defense cooperation in Europe. The headlines inevitably focus on NATO and the European Union. Yet this ignores the reality of how European defense cooperation is actually established, fostered, and solidified. Indeed, the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateralcollaborations. Often, NATO and the European Union work merely as a framework into which European countries upload their existing bi- and minilateral efforts.

To better enhance European defense, policymakers should appreciate the dynamics of these many collaborations. Taking advantage of the current circumstances to build more mini and bilateral ties, particularly where leadership and financial circumstances are most conducive, will strengthen Europe and make its multilateral institutions that much more formidable.

A History of Bilateralism and Minilateralism

In a few months, NATO countries have deployed thousands of troops and significant capabilities to enhance the defense of members on its eastern flank. In a stunning transition, two traditionally militarily non-aligned E.U. states, Sweden and Finland, re-evaluated their geostrategic position and submitted applications to join NATO. The debate about boosting the European Unions strategic autonomy has become even more intense, and once again, member states are discussing coordinating their defense spending via joint procurements.

These vital initiatives could not work without existing, critical lower-level collaborations. For example, Russian military actions over the last several years in Ukraine prompted NATOs eastern-flank allies to work swiftly together with their bi- and minilateral partners. The United Kingdom took on a leading role in Estonia, building on the close relations the two countries developed carrying out dangerous operations over a decade in Afghanistans Helmand province. Lithuania is a relevant defense market for Germany, and not surprisingly, the Bundeswehr leads NATO efforts there. Thanks to cultural similarity and extensive previous military cooperation, the Czech Republic has sent the most troops to Slovakia and oversees the international forces located there. For similar reasons, France deployed 500 troops to Romania. Such comparatively low-key actions were crucial in developing the necessary bottom-up relations, norms, and experiences upon which more recent grandiose announcements build.

Although Finland and Sweden intend to join NATO, they also found it essential to sign bilateral mutual security deals with the United Kingdom. This could happen quickly, mainly because Helsinki and Stockholm have built trust with London working together in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The dynamics in the European Union are the same as in NATO. For example, in 2017, the European Union established the Permanent Structured Cooperation to strengthen defense cooperation among its member states after the Russian occupation in Crimea. However, most of its projects were based on existing bi- and minilateral defense initiatives, and the participating states often just rebranded them according to the new E.U. vocabulary.

The fact that existing bi- and minilateral relationships are the foundation of defense cooperation in Europe is not a new phenomenon. A survey of 70 examples of European defense collaboration highlighted that most have five or fewer participating states, and many are purely bilateral. These collaborations range from creating multinational units to cooperating on armaments, training, logistics, surveillance, operations, and/or command and control. More often than not, these collaborations are not part of NATO or the European Union, but they can be rebranded as E.U. and NATO projects quickly if it is necessary.

States can also use these collaborations to shape NATO and E.U. policies. For instance, the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 was basically an Anglo-French war, as France and Britain pushed for the intervention and took the brunt of the fight. They used NATOs command structure to coordinate their war effort and the limited military support they gained from some NATO members helped fill their capability gaps. The background of this was a historical and overarching British-French bilateral defense agreement, the Lancaster House Treaties, which the leaders of the two European military powers signed a year earlier. The launch of the European Unions European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 also stemmed from a British-French bilateral agreement in St. Malo in 1998 as well.

Strengthening the Network

Improving NATO and E.U. defense cooperation requires looking under the hood to appreciate the role of these efforts. Scholars have already pointed out that Europeans must recognize the minilateral foundations of Europes security architecture. This corresponds with my experience as a former defense official. European ministries of defense do not always think in terms of institutions like the European Union and NATO. They have their own considerations, and they are using the framework that fits their goals the best, which can be NATO, the European Union, or smaller formats. Starting an initiative at this level is often more effective and can provide results more quickly.

As I argue in my newly published book, while these forms of cooperation are not new, their recent proliferation is unprecedented in Europes history. Furthermore, they provide the substance of practical military cooperation in Europe, which NATO and the European Union can build on. Thus, comprehending the dynamics behind them is crucial to foster effective defense cooperation moving forward. The research in my book indicates that when European nations start new defense collaborations, five structural and situational factors are important to achieve success.

First, NATO and the European Union continue to provide the crucial structural context in which bi- and minilateral cooperation can happen. The countries that are members of these two institutions are part of the European security community. Members of these alliances understand the concept of security similarly, their core interests are generally aligned, and most importantly, they no longer envision solving their misunderstandings with each other through military force. This deeply rooted trust among E.U. and NATO members is a crucial precondition which enables the proliferation of multinational defense collaboration. This means that if Sweden and Finland join NATO, it will undoubtedly influence cooperation, especially in Northern Europe and the Baltic region.

Second, cooperation is driven by the fact that European armed forces believe they do not have the financial resources to meet their goals by themselves. Thus, they turn to each other in the hope of mitigating their shortfalls. (Not that this always works. If budgets are cut, the cooperation can still fail.) The third structural factor is existing defense collaborations. New cooperative initiatives are usually based on previous ones. If countries pursue ongoing military projects together, there is a higher chance that they will launch new ones with each other rather than with a totally new partner. This is why those NATO members who had a relevant bilateral relationship with certain allies on the eastern flank led the international efforts there.

Structural factors create the conditions for cooperation, but situational factors trigger collaboration. The first situational factor is personal relationships. Cooperation usually starts when at least two leaders politicians, civil servants, or military officers invest extra effort to make things work. Such leaders tend to have good chemistry, a necessary ingredient when creating something new that needs a huge amount of extra commitment. For instance, David Cameron, the former British prime minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president at that time, had good chemistry and could agree on the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010. Even though all other factors may be aligned, something similar is unimaginable with Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron because of their different characters and strained relationship.

Finally, situationally speaking, a supportive political environment is also needed. This can come either from the public or domestic actors or from international developments. Without it, the leaders who are the engines of the collaboration would work in a vacuum and would not be able to realize their ambitions. At the moment, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has clearly created a political climate in Europe that is quite conducive to defense collaborations.

Conclusion

If policymakers want to strengthen European defense through more bi- and minilateral collaborations, they should build off these five factors. This starts with appreciating how the potential NATO memberships of Finland and Sweden would create new opportunities for small scale collaboration. Policymakers should also look to their current minilateral efforts with an awareness that these provide the best source of potential partners for new efforts, while also choosing new partners with an eye toward the potential for future cooperation they bring. Furthermore, they should assess the economic viability of new commitments and defense collaborations not only from their vantage point but also from their partners side.

Policymakers should also be aware of the situational factors in launching new collaborative efforts. For instance, if the personalities in crucial positions do not match, collaboration should not be forced, and policymakers should wait for more favorable circumstances. However, if there is strong chemistry between leaders, they should exploit this opportunity quickly. Finally, the war in Ukraine has created an extremely supportive political environment. This situation is extraordinarily rare and can serve as the starting point for minilateral and bilateral initiatives that will pay dividends over decades.

Dr. Bence Nemeth is a lecturer (assistant professor) at the Defence Studies Department of Kings College London, where he primarily teaches military officers at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Prior to moving to Kings, he worked in various defense policy and planning positions at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence for eight years. His book, How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe? The Subregional Approach, was published by Bristol University Press in 2022.

Image: Estonian Defense Ministry

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Bilateralism and Minilateralism Are Europe's Secret Strengths - War on the Rocks

Russian state TV's Olga Skabeyeva claimed that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would have been accomplished a long time ago had it not been for NATO. Ms Skabeyeva said that unless Russia responds to NATO more aggressively and stops Western forces sending long-range weapons to Ukraine, our task will be more difficult. It comes as the US pledged to send more offensive military aid to Ukraine yesterday.

The Russian state media host said: Were not exaggerating the usefulness of that Western, American, British or whatever weaponry.

Simply, we were previously demilitarising Ukraine and that mission would have been accomplished a long time ago.

Now, well have to demilitarise all of NATO. Ive already said this several times and then people gasp in shock.

But in any case this is already called World War 3. New weaponry is arriving.

Yesterday [Anthony] Blinken said that as the situation on the front changes we will somehow adjust our military aid. Well deliver long-range weaponry.

That will in any case make our task more difficult and prolong the Americans pleasure.

The US announced yesterday that they would be sending long-range missiles to Ukraine after weeks of shying away from the move.

US President Joe Biden had expressed concern that Ukraine could use longer range weapons to bomb Russian territory beyond the scope of the conflict.

READ MORE:Russian senator warns missile aid to spark war with US[REVEAL]

And so for high-value targets that allow them to keep some of the pressure off of Ukrainian forces on the front, we think these systems will be very useful.

A host of Russian voices have spoken out against the new military aid, including Russian TV commentators and official aides.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the US was "intentionally adding fuel to the fire" by sending the missiles.

He added: Such supplies do not contribute to the Ukrainian leadership's willingness to resume peace negotiations.

And Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov suggested Mr Biden's announcement increased the risk of a third country being dragged into the conflict.

Read this article:
This is already WW3' Putin's mouthpiece makes eerie call for 'demilitarisation of NATO' - Express