Monthly Archives: June 2022

The rise of right-wing populism has been a feature of European politics over the last fifteen years. Drawing on a new report, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas explain what we have learned about the appeal of right-wing populist parties, and what other parties can do to counter their success.

Following a varied and more subdued performance in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis spurred an increase in right-wing populist party support across Europe. Worryingly, these developments have taken place at the expense of the mainstream: while the average electoral score of right-wing populist parties has been steadily increasing over time, support for both the mainstream left and right has declined (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The rise of right-wing populist parties has come at the expense of both the mainstream left and right

This right-wing populist momentum sweeping Europe has three key features. First, there has been the successful electoral performance of parties pledging to restore national sovereignty and implement policies that consistently prioritise natives over immigrants. Many right-wing populist parties have improved their electoral performance over time, although there remain important cross-national variations (Figure 2).

The French Rassemblement National (RN), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FP), and the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) have all increasingly managed to mobilise voters beyond their support core groups, significantly increasing their support in their domestic electoral arenas. At the same time, countries previously identified as outliers because of the absence of an electorally successful right-wing populist party are no longer exceptional such as Portugal with the rise of Chega and Spain with the rise of Vox.

Figure 2: Cumulative share of right-wing populist party votes received in most recent election

Second, there has been an increasing entrenchment of these parties in their respective political systems through access to office. A substantial number of right-wing populist parties have either governed recently or served as formal cooperation partners in right-wing minority governments. Examples include the Lega in Italy, the FP in Austria, Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary, the Danish Peoples Party (DF), and the National Alliance (NA) in Latvia. The so-called cordon sanitaire the policy of marginalising extreme parties has broken down even in countries where it has been traditionally effective, such as Estonia and Sweden.

Third, right-wing populist parties have increasingly gained the ability to influence the policy agenda of other parties. Parties such as the Rassemblement National, the Sweden Democrats and UKIP have successfully competed in their domestic systems, permeating mainstream ground and influencing the agendas of other parties. As a result, mainstream parties on the right and, in some instances, on the left have often adopted accommodative strategies mainly regarding immigration.

Understanding the rise of right-wing populist parties

What explains this phenomenon? Researchers and pundits alike tend to emphasise the political climate of right-wing populist normalisation and systemic entrenchment, where issues owned by these parties are salient: immigration, nationalism and cultural grievances. The importance of cultural values in shaping voting behaviour has led to an emerging consensus that the increasing success of right-wing populist parties may be best understood as a cultural backlash.

Figure 3: The demand, supply and policy levels

A sole focus on culture, however, overlooks three key issues at the demand, supply and policy levels, as illustrated in Figure 3 above. First, the predictive power of economic concerns over immigration and the critical distinction between galvanising a core constituency on the one hand and mobilising more broadly beyond this core constituency on the other. Second, the strategies right-wing populist parties themselves are pursuing to capitalise on multiple insecurities, including both cultural and economic. And third, the role of social policies in mitigating those insecurities that drive right-wing populist party support.

People

To address these issues, in a new report we examine the interplay between what we call the three Ps: people, parties and policies. With respect to people, a key question is how cultural and economic grievances affect individuals probability of voting for a right-wing populist party. Similarly, how are these grievances distributed among the right-wing populist party electorate?

We argue that the assumption that immigration is by default a cultural issue is at best problematic. Both cultural and economic concerns over immigration increase the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist party (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Predicted right-wing populist party vote for different levels of cultural and economic concerns over immigration

However, while cultural concerns are often a stronger predictor of right-wing populist voting behaviour, this does not automatically mean that they matter more for the success of right-wing populist parties in substantive terms because people with economic concerns are often a numerically larger group. The main issue to pay attention to here is size: as shown in Figure 5, many right-wing populist party voters do not have exclusively cultural concerns over immigration.

Figure 5: Distribution of immigration concerns

This suggests we must distinguish between core and peripheral voter groups. Voters primarily concerned with the cultural impact of immigration are core right-wing populist party voters. Although they might be highly likely to vote for right-wing populist parties, they also tend to be a numerically small group. By contrast, voters that are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration are peripheral voters. They are also highly likely to vote for right-wing populist parties, but in addition they are a numerically larger group. Since the interests and preferences of these two groups can differ, successful right-wing populist parties tend to be those that are able to attract both groups.

Figure 6: Hypothetical representation of difference between predictive power and substantive importance

What determines right-wing populist party success is therefore the ability to mobilise a coalition of interests between core and peripheral voters. As the hypothetical example in Figure 6 shows, it is possible that right-wing populist parties galvanise voters with cultural concerns over immigration, while at the same time their success is dependent on their ability to mobilise economically concerned voters more broadly.

Parties

What strategies do right-wing populist parties adopt to capitalise on their core and peripheral electorates? While we examine the success of parties that tend to be defined as right-wing populist, we are also sceptical about the analytical utility of the term populism to explain the rise of this phenomenon. Instead, we emphasise the importance of nationalism as a mobilisation tool that has facilitated right-wing populist party success. Right-wing populist parties have increasingly emphasised the national way of life (Figure 7).

Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe employ a civic nationalist normalisation strategy that allows them to offer nationalist solutions to all types of insecurities that drive voting behaviour. This strategy has two features: it presents culture as a value issue and justifies exclusion on ideological grounds; and focuses on social welfare and welfare chauvinism.

Figure 7: Value policy priorities of RWPPs in Western and Eastern Europe

Eastern European right-wing populist parties, on the other hand, remain largely ethnic nationalist, focusing on ascriptive criteria of national belonging and mobilising voters on socially conservative positions and a rejection of minority rights. Eastern European right-wing populist parties are also more likely to emphasise negative attitudes towards multiculturalism (Figure 7).

Policies

What type of policies can mitigate the economic risks driving different social groups to support right-wing populist parties? European democracies have operated in a context of falling economic growth rates over recent decades, with recurrent economic crises in the 1970s, early 1990s and from 2008 onwards.

Many advanced economies have in time recovered, but growth has often not returned to the level of previous decades and achieving low inflation has been a policy priority. Many governments have liberalised and activated their labour markets (Figure 8) often at the expense of a growing group of so-called labour market outsiders in precarious contracts.

Figure 8: Rising expenditures and liberalised labour markets in the context of falling growth and increased needs

In addition, accumulating debt is leading to a climate of permanent austerity while constraining the necessary physical and social investments that could underpin future growth. While economic developments obviously affect the life chances and insecurities of individuals, as well as the risks that they face, the degree of redistribution and the social insurance provided by developed welfare states shapes their prevalence and political consequences.

Welfare state policies moderate a range of economic risks individuals face. Our analysis illustrates that this reduces the likelihood of supporting right-wing populist parties among insecure individuals for example, the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers and employees on temporary contracts.

Our key point here is that political actors have agency and can shape political outcomes: to understand why some individuals vote for right-wing populist parties, we should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks. This is consistent with a larger political economy literature documenting the protective effects of welfare state policies on insecurity and inequality.

What to do about it?

While this is a broad phenomenon, there is no single success formula for right-wing populist parties. Our analysis identifies regional patterns and different voter bases and grievances driving right-wing populist party success across Europe. Progressive strategies addressing those necessarily face different obstacles depending on the context. For instance, the Western European centre-left has a better chance of focusing on welfare expansion as an issue they own than many counterparts in Eastern Europe who have lost the ownership of those issues to right-wing populist parties that promote distorted nationalist and chauvinist versions of similar ideas.

Centre-left parties should not be fooled into thinking they can simply copy the right-wing populist party playbook by going fully populist and embracing restrictive immigration policies and questions of national identity. Instead, they should appeal to the economic insecurities that many peripheral right-wing populist party voters are concerned about, focusing on an issue the centre-left owns such as equality. After all, centre-left voters tend to be pro-immigration and a nationalist turn will likely alienate them.

Figure 9: Distribution of immigration concerns as a percentage of centre-left electorates

Successful centre-left strategies must attempt to galvanise the centre-lefts core voter base, addressing the (economic) grievances that concern much larger parts of the whole electorate. Therefore more energy should be invested into thinking about new social investment strategies, growth regimes and/or a universal basic income, rather than focusing purely on the cultural concerns of a small part of the electorate.

For more information, see the authors accompanying report

Note: This article gives the views of theauthors, not the position of EUROPP European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Presidenza della Repubblica (Public Domain)

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Understanding right-wing populism and what to do about it - London School of Economics

Slovenias parliament has voted into office a new, center-left government, replacing a right-wing one that had pushed the moderate European Union nation toward populism

LJUBLJANA, Slovenia -- Slovenias parliament on Wednesday formally voted into office a new, center-left government, replacing a right-wing one that had pushed the moderate European Union nation toward populism.

Lawmakers voted 53-28 for the Cabinet of Robert Golob, head of the liberal-green Freedom Movement party and a former business executive who only recently entered politics.

Golob's Freedom Movement won April 24 elections in Slovenia, defeating the right-wing Prime Minister Janez Jansa and his Slovenian Democratic Party. Golob has formed an alliance with two left-leaning parties.

The new government is a combination of experienced politicians and experts, Golob told parliament earlier on Wednesday.

Im pleased we have such a good team and I look forward to the weeks, months, years and terms in office ahead, as I know this team will deliver good results," he said.

Golob has said the government would promote social equality, green energy transformation and reform. Slovenias citizens will be proud of their new government, he promised.

I think you can already feel it in the last few weeks that the mood is more relaxed, that tensions have eased, he added.

Golob was referring to political tensions under previous PM Jansa, who has faced accusations of fostering divisions and curbing democratic freedoms. A close ally of Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Jansa has denied the allegations.

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Center-left government takes over from populists in Slovenia - ABC News

Though the political battle over gun reform laws in the US, after the latest school shootings in my home state of Texas, may seem like a faraway problem, its not. Even if events are happening across the Atlantic, we should be concerned by the intransigence of Republicans, who will not yield on their sanctification of the right to keep and bear arms. We should also be worried about other policy positions developed closer to home, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbans 12-point plan for successful Christian Conservative politics in Western democracies or the French far rights desire to limit the rights of migrants.

We should be concerned because, despite geopolitical separation, political leaders on the far right are co-ordinating strategic objectives and policy programmes. The recent American Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held in Budapest highlighted the level of co-operation. As this coordination becomes more powerful, then small countries such as Ireland, whose social values are moving in a different direction, will be increasingly troubled. They will find themselves navigating the politics of allies who are moving not just further and further away from liberal democracy, but also toward highly unequal societies where information is biased, opposition is limited or repressed, those in power act with impunity, and prejudice and patriarchy are validated.

Whats missing, though, from the far-rights otherwise coherent agenda, is any notion of how economic policy is going to support this kind of society. The gap in thinking offers an opportunity for liberal democracies such as Ireland, who can link economic policy to an alternative trajectory of societal change, distinctive from the exclusionary, even violent vision of the far right.

Far right governments have often treated the economy as a political tool, providing handouts to political allies and supporters, and punishing businesses that express political views they dont like, for instance, about climate change. They also engage in wishful thinking about the effects of deregulation and lower taxes on economic growth and income distribution. During his presidency, Donald Trump embraced tax cuts for the wealthy and stripping worker rights. Correspondingly, income inequality grew, with the top 5 per cent benefiting the most, while poor management of the pandemic undid gains in employment and economic growth after he took office.

[Spiralling rents and mortgage costs pushing more into poverty, study finds]

The current cost of living crisis, as well as the war in Ukraine, offer the chance for a rethink on precisely how to reduce inequality, diversify the economy, and account for the impact of economic growth on the environment and society. In Ireland, the combination of long-term structural problems such as underinvestment in public services and rising costs is certainly placing unbearable pressure on lower income households, but its affecting middle income households as well. The OECD recently reported on falling real wages in Ireland, along with higher taxes on that income.

Certainly, the Government should help households in the short term. But they should be more ambitious in confronting the inequalities that undermine social cohesion and provoke political discontent. For instance, policymakers could ask how new initiatives such as the 90 million start-up fund as well as investment in infrastructure could help reduce regional inequalities and the decline of rural communities.

According to 2020 data, the gap between the average disposable income per capita at a national level and in the Northern and Western region, as well as the gap between Dublin and the Border region, have tripled since 2010. These inequalities are manifested in local resistance against national policy, for instance, the protests against the ban on turf cutting. Communities have called the ban unfair, citing its significance to their livelihoods and sustainability as a community. Some have called for developing community-owned assets, such as energy production, so that residents benefit economically and communities themselves can be rejuvenated. They reject investment from multinationals or large companies whose priority is profitmaking.

These protests echo those in other countries, where communities suffering from years of underinvestment and economic decline feel neglected by national governments. Leaders such as Orban have taken advantage of this dissatisfaction. Indeed, he argues in his 12-point plan that there is no conservative political success without well-functioning communities. The fewer the communities and the lonelier the people, the more voters turn to the Liberals. Whereas the more communities there are, the more votes we get. It is as simple as that. Yet can communities really function if people cannot find good jobs or earn enough money to pay the bills?

Ireland has a chance now to strengthen the connection between investing in local economies and community development, a connection that goes beyond building rural work hubs. Adoption of models such as community wealth building entails altering local public institutional spending in areas of high deprivation, for example, using procurement contracts to generate growth in local businesses, especially those that pay a fair wage.

The Government should go further by expanding use of public funds to bring together researchers, entrepreneurs and community stakeholders to cultivate centres of innovation that benefit local businesses and residents in regions suffering long-term downward economic trends. The reality is that communities will only become more functional if instead of uncertainty and decline, their members can now visualise a more vibrant future, where they can trust economic policy to increase local opportunities and improve community life.

Shana Cohen is the director of Tasc, the think tank for action of social change

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Don't let the cost-of-living crisis feed far-right populism - The Irish Times

Amazon Primes fabulously gory superhero satire The Boys returns for its third season on Friday 3 June, facing the unenviable task of surpassing the ultra-violent excesses of its first two instalments, which brought us exploding invisible men, a laser-eyed baby and the brutal impaling of a 50-foot blue whale by speedboat in a shower of blood.

The show is based on a long-running series of comics from legendary Preacher creator Garth Ennis and takes place in an alternate reality in which a team of superheroes, known as The Seven, police society under the auspices of Vought International, a shadowy corporation that keeps a tight rein on their image with at least one eye on lucrative commercial partnerships.

While The Seven are adored by an unquestioning public, not everyone is convinced they are as squeaky-clean as they appear. Enter the maverick Billy Butcher (Karl Urban), who steers a ragtag crew of grudge-bearing vigilantes on a mission to expose the supes for who they really are.

The Seven are led by the omnipotent Homelander (Antony Starr), who initially appears as a straightforward riff on Superman or Captain America, a chiselled ubermensch with a square jaw and Colgate smile who wears the Stars-and-Stripes billowing from his shoulders beneath golden eagle epaulettes.

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But behind that clean-cut veneer, Homelander is really a deeply disturbed narcissist not to mention a homicidal, xenophobic rapist who sees no contradiction between his grinning, glad-handing persona (You guys, youre the real heroes) and the blank amorality of his conduct.

Antony Starr as Homelander in The Boys and former president Donald TrumpAmazon/ Getty Images

As Dr Johnson warned us: Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.

Utterly untroubled by conscience or the hundred-weight of his own hypocrisy, Homelander ended season two unhappily and was last seen stood on top of a skyscraper and seething I can do whatever the f*** I want! while masturbating petulantly in the moonlight.

If that deluded pronouncement from an American tyrant with lavish blonde hair and too much power reminds you of someone, it might well be former president Donald J Trump, who notoriously declared on the campaign trail in January 2016: I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldnt lose any voters.

After shocking a complacent world by beating Hillary Clinton to the White House later that year, Trump proceeded to behave in office as though the presidency conferred on him the divine right of kings and frequently said as much, telling a Turning Point summit in July 2019, to take just one example: The Constitution says I can do whatever I want as president but I dont even talk about that.

Trumps disastrous tenure began with a bitterly opposed Muslim travel ban and an emboldened far-right rallying in Charlottesville, almost brought nuclear war with North Korea and Iran and ended with an unfinished border wall, unprecedented twin impeachments and a deadly attempted insurrection at the US Capitol inspired by a lie, the 45th president leaving Washington, DC, without so much as access to his own Twitter account to show for four years of division, mendacity and mass protest that left Americas credibility in tatters.

A Homelander presidency could hardly have been worse and the comparison between the two men does not end there.

In an infamous episode of season one of The Boys, the caped hero intervenes in an airline hijacking by Islamist terrorists, vapourising the attackers only to leave the passengers to plummet to their deaths once he realises that the pilot has already been executed and calculates that the hostages lives are not worth his time to save.

Rather than grieving their loss or confessing his cowardice, Homelander instead sees an opportunity, telling the news media the tragedy could have been averted if superheroes were accepted into the US military hierarchy and given prominence within its chain of command.

Trump has shown precisely the same callous disregard, insensitivity and naked self-interest on multiple occasions, most recently suggesting Vladimir Putin would never have invaded Ukraine if he still occupied the Oval Office.

Season two of The Boys meanwhile introduces the character of Stormfront (Aya Cash), an initially charming, livestream-literate addition to The Seven who threatens to steal Homelanders thunder before gradually revealing herself to be an immortal superbeing spawned in Nazi Germany.

The romantic relationship between the pair neatly mirrors the manner in which many of the more unsavoury elements of the American alt-right ecosystem latched onto Trumps coattails after he secured the Republican nomination in the hope of cementing proximity to power.

Discussing the changes made in adapting Stormfront for the MAGA era, showrunner Eric Kripke told Den of Geek in August 2020 that there is little ambiguity about the character in the comics pages.

THE BOYS Season 2 - STORMFRONT and HOMELANDERs Fascist Fight (Eric Kripke & Cast Interview)www.youtube.com

[But] thats not really how hatred works these days, he explained. A lot of people espouse some pretty hateful ideologies cloaked in pretty savvy, even sometimes attractive, social media packaging and they say they are coming off as disruptors or free-thinkers and are, a lot of the time, good-looking young men and women who attract a younger generation.

When you dig deeper into that, you realise they are peddling the same old bulls*** that people have been peddling for a thousand years.

On the amazing prescience of The Boys, Kripke said: This show happens to be and Im not sure I knew it was going to be when I started working on it the perfect metaphor for the exact moment were living in, where authoritarianism and celebrity combine, where fascism and entertainment combine.

Such subtleties were entirely lost on some of Trumps own fans, at least one of whom was confused enough about the shows politics to attend the Million MAGA March in DC in November 2020 in protest at his election defeat dressed as Homelander.

Kripke responded to a picture of this buffoon by asking: Um... are they actually watching the show?

Starr was even more withering, labelling the spectacle (in a nod to the title of Trumps ghost-written autobiography): The art of ignorant dumbf***erry.

Perhaps neither should have been so surprised that the MAGA mob were confused by something they had seen on TV.

These were, after all, the same people who believed the host of The Celebrity Apprentice might make a solid commander-in-chief.

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Why Homelander from The Boys is the perfect parody of Trumpian populism - indy100

The 2021 Donner Prize for best public-policy book by a Canadian will be awarded on May 31 in Toronto. Four of the five authors shortlisted for the $50,000 prize responded to The Globe and Mails questions on the rise of populism; they commented on the mistrust in government and institutions that divisive populist leaders tend to generate.

Courtesy of Oxford University Press

Chair of innovation studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, nominated for Innovation in Real Places: Strategies for Prosperity in an Unforgiving World

The current wave of populism is mainly fear mongering and burning down the house. But if you look at history, there have been other kinds of populism. Louisianas Huey Long, for example, was a left-wing populist member of the Democratic Party who attacked President Franklin D. Roosevelt for not being radical enough about building what we now call welfare institutions.

If not for Long, the New Deal would not be what we know of it today. It would have been mild, and it would not have been such a positive change for American society.

Because people are attracted to populism today, it behooves us to offer not just grand visions Canada will be a green leader, whatever that means but pragmatic visions on how our society will look better for everyone in 50 years and how we can build it.

Former governor of the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada, nominated for Value(s): Building a Better World for All

Trust is the glue of our citizenship. Fostering it must reach beyond partisanship. Our institutions and leaders must serve all Canadians and earn their trust every day. So how can they? Trust demands competence to be relentless in implementation and to deliver reliably on expectations. Trust is built on transparency and accountability.

At a time when some foster division, fear and distrust in others, our institutions must look like the Canadians they represent and engage with all Canadians to understand their perspectives. And trust requires humility.

Being humble doesnt mean being passive. Humility means planning for things that can go wrong like financial crises, pandemics and wars. Humility means setting ambitious goals, knowing that we need to work together to achieve them. And humility means never being satisfied with all that weve achieved, but knowing that, by staying true to our values, by trusting each other, we can build an even better Canada for all.

Professor of international relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, nominated for Stand on Guard: Reassessing Threats to Canadas National Security

One of the key underlying arguments of my book is that national security threats often benefit and thrive from fear, which is a product of and in turn contributes to mistrust in our government institutions. However, if the years since 9/11 have taught us anything, it is that national security cannot, and should not, be the frame through which we seek to solve problems of trust.

Instead, longer lasting solutions must be grounded in community empowerment and social capital, supported with government intervention. Research on disasters shows that empowered communities are more resilient, better placed to deal with trauma, have a better sense of community, more citizen participation, social embeddedness and attachment to place.

This means, perhaps counterintuitively, the responses of our national security institutions need to be grounded in empathy for the communities that are experiencing threats. Empathy being aware of, understanding and appreciating the ordeal of others as they experience the impact of threat-related activity highlights the need to robustly tackle these challenges, but to do so in a way that minimizes distrust.

Andr Picard

Christinne Muschi/The Globe and Mail

Health reporter and columnist for The Globe and Mail, nominated for Neglected No More: The Urgent Need to Improve the Lives of Canadas Elders in the Wake of a Pandemic

In health care, mistrust has real, harmful (and sometimes fatal) consequences, both individually and collectively. We saw this on a grand scale during the pandemic. Why did the U.S. have 2.5 times more COVID-19 deaths per capita than Canada (40,000 vs. one million)? Largely because many Americans doubted the value of vaccines, rejected public-health advice and embraced partisanship. They lost faith in government, and that spilled over to science, the media, corporations and more; anyone with expertise really.

Canadians were a little less cynical and a little more trusting, but their frustrations are spilling over too. People feel public institutions routinely fail them. In Canada, millions of people dont even have a family doctor, the most basic form of health care, and when they turn to the emergency room, they wait for countless hours. And during COVID-19, long-term care homes, which are supposed to protect societys most vulnerable, became slaughterhouses of neglect. If we want to restore trust, we need institutions (and their leaders) to be worthy of our trust.

The fifth shortlisted book for the 2021 Donner Prize is Indigenomics: Taking a Seat at the Economic Table by Carol Anne Hilton.

The interviews have been edited and condensed.

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Donner Prize finalists on the rise of populism, mistrust in institutions - The Globe and Mail

Analysis

14:19

by Eric Kaufmann

Credit: Getty

The British government has launched a high potential individual route to attract the brightest and best graduates from around the world to Britain. Those with a degree will have a good chance at a 2-year work visa and can bring their families in, a bridge to a longer-term work visa. Boris Johnson and many elite Brexiteers believe that Brexit was about sovereignty and control, not immigration numbers. This narrative served to deflect the charge of racism during the Leave campaign, but also highlighted that Vote Leave elites really are motivated by a high-immigration, libertarian Singapore-on-Thames vision.

The problem for Johnson is that the dream of a free-trading global Britain is not why most people voted for Brexit. Instead, immigration was by far the most important motivation for Leave voters. The 2019 British Election Study shows that 8 in 10 people who voted Conservative or Brexit Party wanted less immigration, and on a scale from 0 (reduce a lot) to 5 (stay the same) to 10 (increase a lot), the average 2019 Tory voter scores little more than 2 out of 10.

As Clare Foges points out in an important piece in the Times today, 60% of those polled in 2016 thought Brexit would deliver lower levels of immigration and, at the time, Johnson argued that there was no public consent for the scale of immigration we are seeing. Yet, six years later, new Home Office figures show that nearly a million people were offered visas last year: work visas are up 50% from 2019-20, study visas up 58%, visas granted for family reasons up 63%.

In a set of survey experiments in 2018, I found that the balance of UK respondents preferred lower numbers even if this meant a less skilled immigration intake. This was especially true when immigration was tied to more rapid ethnic change in Britain (i.e. a drop to 58% White British by 2060 instead of 65% with lower immigration). When these ethnocultural effects were pointed out in each option, support for skilled immigration dropped 25 percentage points. This gets at the source of immigration anxiety, which is primarily cultural, not economic, and is concentrated among those with a psychological makeup which views difference as disorder and change as loss.

The Johnson government is pursuing an Australia strategy predicated on the idea that if you have control, numbers dont matter. This has worked temporarily in Australia and Canada, but these societies are characterised by a weaker popular attachment to history and, certainly in Canada, growing polarisation on cultural lines. Populism around high levels of legal immigration has flared in New Zealand, focused on a narrative of high house prices and urban sprawl. Attempting such a strategy in Britain is a risky bet for a government which relies on culturally-conservative Red Wall voters for its survival.

It is true, as British Future and others point out, that immigration has fallen down voters priority list. But we have been living in highly unusual times. Managing a successful Brexit, followed by a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic, followed by the first interstate war in Europe since 1945. These events, and their economic knock-on effects, will not dominate the headlines forever. When the 2007-8 economic crisis subsided, the economy fell down EU citizens priority lists while immigration rose. This was the lay of the land prior to Brexit and the wider European populist moment, and when we return there, a government which has presided over high immigration levels may well be exposed, like David Camerons, to a populist insurgency.

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Boris Johnson is opening the door to a populist insurgency - UnHerd