Monthly Archives: July 2021

Afghanistan is falling apart. With US and Nato troops leaving the country earlier than planned, experts are warning that the Taliban could take control of the country within six months. Currently the insurgents control the strategically important province of Helmand, and control or contest territory nearly every province in the war-torn country.

As many as 188 of Afghanistans 407 districts are directly under Taliban rule. With up to 85,000 full-time fighters), the insurgents have already forced thousands of troops belonging to the US-trained Afghan army to surrender or flee.

In response to the Talibans onslaught, local militias are fighting back. Most notable among them is a coalition of militias in northern Afghanistan called the Second Resistance, led by Ahmad Massoud (the son of Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated in September 2001).

The Second Resistance has several thousand fighters and militia commanders who have fought against the Taliban, mostly of Tajik origin. Massoud insists that the Taliban will not have the same success in fighting his coalition due to far greater resolve of his soldiers compared to the Afghan military. But henceforth he will have to operate without the help of Nato troops.

But its not just seasoned veterans that are forming militias. Ethnic Shia Hazaras, thousands of whom were massacred between 1996 and 2001 by the Sunni Taliban, have tended to lack militias of their own. But after a wave of attacks in May that killed 85 people (mostly female students), Hazaras are also now rushing to mobilise.

But while these tribal militias might be able to defend themselves, this was far from the objective of the US-led coalition. The goal was to help build a national Afghan army that could become the sole legitimate fighting force. In spite of these intentions, this clearly never happened.

Much of the problem was that the US never fully grasped how to best support the Afghan military. The Americans relied on a model of trying to arm the Afghan army, training them and providing them with aerial support. But this model was not sustainable or practical for the Afghan military.

Afghanistan does not have the revenues to rely on sophisticated weaponry and technology. This remains a problem even though the US provides Afghanistan with almost US$5 billion (3.6 billion) in aid per year with US president, Joe Biden, asking for an additional US$300 million to support Afghan forces.

US efforts to engage in state building after it invaded in December 2001 was a more challenging objective than the Bush administration understood. For centuries, history has shown that Afghanistan has been difficult to conquer and impossible to govern. The country always struggled to create a unified national military to ward off invaders and maintain internal stability. Instead it has relied on local tribal militias led by warlords that could be immediately called to action to defend their territory. Efforts in the past (such as under Amanullah Khan in 1923) to enforce conscription into the Afghan army resulted in revolt.

As I discovered while researching a book on failed states, in addition to having little experience with a national military, other state institutions in Afghanistan were also almost nonexistent. This was not just because the country had faced decades of invasion and civil war, but also because it is is a nation in name only.

The various Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Turkmen, Baluch and Uzbek groups in Afghanistan never accepted a central regime. This complicated any effort after Afghanistan gained independence in August 1919 to create unified security institutions to fend off various violent non-state actors that threatened stability in the country.

The Taliban, which overthrew the Afghan government in 1996, was the only group able to exercise control over the country after the 1992-1996 civil war. But, in October 2001, after the 9/11 attacks and the Talibans refusal to turn in Osama bin Laden, US and British forces launched airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan. By early December, the Taliban had abandoned their stronghold in Kandahar and ceded their last territory in Zabul and a new president, Hamid Karzai, was sworn in within two weeks as interim leader.

But the Taliban never accepted a western presence and launched an insurgency in 2002. Over two decades, the Taliban has become the most effective fighting group in the country, building a professional and resilient organisation that has learned to rely on a sophisticated communication apparatus. Its structure has been flexible enough to withstand the death of its leadership, after Mullah Omar died in 2013.

During that time and despite the presence of Nato troops in the country thousands of civilians have continued to die in terror attacks and raids. In 2019 and 2020 alone, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has documented more than 17,000 civilians killed or injured the majority of which are blamed on the Taliban. Although the Taliban is currently in peace talks with the Afghan government in Tehran, it has little or no credibility when it comes to compromise or adhering to agreements.

So, after spending US$2 trillion and involving over 130,000 Nato troops for over 20 years, the US and its western allies are almost back to square one. Meanwhile almost 50,000 Afghan civilians have died and most Afghan citizens still live in poverty. The one concrete achievement of the 20 years of occupation reversing the Talibans ban on female education could be in jeopardy as well.

Originally posted here:
Afghanistan: two decades of Nato help leaves a failed and fractured state on the brink of civil war - The Conversation UK

The conflict in Afghanistan Americas longest war is at an end, or so President Joe Biden is expected to declare this week. At an end, too, is Britain and Natos military involvement, dating back to the invasion that followed the 2001 al-Qaida attacks on the US. Except the conflict is not over. In truth, it is intensifying. Whats changed is that the western allies are, in effect, washing their hands of it.

By setting an unconditional US withdrawal date of 11 September shortly after taking office, Biden triggered an unseemly military scramble for the exit that has been joined by all residual Nato forces, including most UK troops. It now appears the vast majority will have left by today, without ceremony or fanfare, almost by the back door. The fourth of July is American independence day. It may also come to be remembered as deserting Afghanistan day.

The official silence in Britain surrounding this shabby, half-hidden retreat is deafening partly for justifiable security reasons, but also out of sheer political embarrassment. Boris Johnsons government, so painfully dependent on Washingtons favour, dare not openly criticise Biden. But ministers and army chiefs surely know his unilateral decision to quit, despite the absence of a peace deal or even a general ceasefire, is dangerously irresponsible.

The withdrawal has set Afghanistan back on the path to terror, mayhem and disintegration. A catastrophe is in the making. These are not the predictions of mere armchair critics. Gen Austin Miller, commander of US forces, warned last week that chaos beckoned. Civil war is certainly a path that can be visualised if it continues on the trajectory its on. That should concern the world, he said.

The former Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, is similarly pessimistic. Look at the scene. We are in shambles. The country is in conflict. There is immense suffering... Those who came here 20 years ago in the name of fighting extremism and terrorism not only failed to end it but, under their watch, extremism has flourished. That is what I call failure, Karzai said.

Facts on the ground, as the Observers Emma Graham-Harrison reports, support these grim analyses. While cannily eschewing clashes with departing Nato troops, the Taliban has mounted multiple territorial offensives, overrunning district after district in recent weeks. At least half of rural Afghanistan is controlled or contested by insurgents. Regional capitals, even Kabul, may be next.

President Ashraf Ghanis government looks on helplessly as its Nato-trained and equipped soldiers are repeatedly forced into flight or surrender. Faced with such incapacity, local armed militias are reforming. Majority non-Pashtun groups in the north are also threatening to revive their 1990s anti-Taliban struggle.

Biden assured Ghani last month that the US would continue to provide financial assistance and support. Yet lacking bases in neighbouring countries, US aircraft and drones will be hard put to provide meaningful, timely back-up.

The Pentagon says in any case that its priority is containing Islamic State and al-Qaida, whose jihadists may soon freely roam ungoverned Afghan spaces.

The American decision to throw in the towel privately horrified Britains past and present military leadership, properly mindful of two decades of often thankless, bloody striving. Gen Sir Nick Carter, chief of the defence staff, tactfully said it was not a decision we hoped for. Having rallied to Americas side in 2001, Bidens failure to fully consult the UK and Nato was especially galling.

After the failure of US peace talks in Doha, Carter and UK diplomats in Kabul are quietly encouraging increased security and political cooperation between the Afghan government and Pakistan, a key Taliban supporter and influencer. How ironic that after all the Biden ballyhoo about America being back, they leave and the British are left to manage the mess.

For the Afghan people, the prospect of renewed anarchy is plainly terrifying. Limited recent gains democratic governance, free expression and improved healthcare, education and civil and womens rights are all imperilled. So, too, are the sacrifices of the tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers, Afghan and foreign, who died or saw their lives permanently scarred. Blighted is the hope of justice for those unlawfully killed or, for example, illegally tortured at the CIAs black site at Bagram airfield.

For western countries that imposed forcible regime change in Kabul, then promised to build a new nation of laws forged in their own image, this weekend marks a chastening moment. Who knows what historians will make of George W Bushs ill-conceived, too-costly Afghan adventurism? Yet as matters stand now, its unlikely, thankfully, that any western leader will again risk a similar gamble.

The death last week of Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary who oversaw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, is a reminder of just how immeasurable, lethal and lasting are the terrible harms done by him and other neoconservatives and reckless ideologues in the Bush-Cheney administration, none of whom has ever been satisfactorily called to account. Like Iraq, coldly abandoned to its fate 10 years ago, Afghanistans post-American future is deeply daunting.

Excerpt from:
The Observer view on US and Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan - The Guardian

The existence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its entry into force on 22 January 2021 rang as an earthquake among states possessing or supporting a nuclear deterrence policy, write Jean-Marie Collin, Susi Snyder, and Tuva Widskjold.

The authors are non-proliferation activists Jean-Marie Collin (ICAN France), Susi Snyder (PAX Netherlands), and Tuva Widskjold (ICAN Norway).

This positive evolution of International Law is strongly rejected by NATO, which claims its nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression yet issues thinly veiled threats to those who would join this new UN Treaty.

The Alliance is creating conditions for proliferation and setting a dangerous precedent.

Lets recap. Nuclear disarmaments inertia is a reality. Its carried out by States that possess or support a policy of nuclear deterrence. Compounding the problem, their constant modernization and renewal of their nuclear arsenal undermine the non-proliferation regime.

And if nuclear-armed states are accountable for nuclear weapons reduction, states that accept, support, and benefit from this defence system also have a responsibility.

No one claims that nuclear disarmament is an easy task. But one thing is certain: not doing anything or going against legal progress is a dangerous game.

By rejecting the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Atlantic Alliance and its 30 democratic regimes have sent a clear signal to non-democratic States on the right not to comply with International Law.

The TPNW, adopted on July 7th 2017, is in force since January 22nd 2021. The Treaty, which has 86 signatures and 54 Member States, will welcome new Member States in the coming months.

It benefits from broad global support, as testifies the commitment of cities (Amsterdam, Berlin, Bruges, Paris, Manchester, Oslo, Toronto) and parliamentarians from NATO Member States, to support it.

This Treaty reinforces non-proliferation and allows the implementation of NPTs article 6 (nuclear disarmament). The latter, considered as the backbone of the non-proliferation regime, is in danger. Even the Alliance implicitly recognizes this danger in its Statement, the enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted.

However, this reasonable thinking is confronted with contrary and irresponsible actions by three nuclear States of this Alliance: the United Kingdom announced its will to increase its nuclear arsenal, backing away from its 2010 NPT disarmament commitment.

France wants, in a parallel effort to support NATO, while completely renewing its arsenal, to promote the Europeanization of its nuclear deterrence, through strategic dialogue and the opening of French deterrence exercises to the other European States.

Finally, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the United States will spend a whopping $634 billion in the next ten years on new nuclear arms systems.

The facts are crystal clear. These states do not respect the good faith principle, as required by the NPT and the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion (July 7th 1996).

The Alliance Statement also undermines the democratic values of the UN and its institution. It is important to be aware that the TPNW was subject to open negotiations (2017), during which all States could be present to expose their own point of view, and thus, influence the content of the text.

Except for the Netherlands, all NATO Member States stayed away from these negotiations. By challenging the TPNWs existence, they are equally challenging the functioning of the UN and of its Secretary-General, who is the depositary of the Ban Treaty.

In our report A Non-Nuclear Alliance: Why NATO Members Should Join the UN Ban on Nuclear Weapons (116 pages), we have reviewed the Alliances arguments, point by point, demonstrating that they are based on myths, misconceptions, and deliberate lies. NATOs hostility to the TPNW is in direct contradiction to its own security interests.

By working constructively against the threat posed by nuclear weapons, the Alliance Member States would protect their populations. Yet, today they keep relying on a deterrence policy to tackle this threat which is only adding fuel to the fire.

Some NATO partners, in Europe (Austria, Ireland and Malta) or in Asia-Pacific (New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand), are already States Parties to the TPNW; and more are to come.

Others have announced their participation as Observatory States (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland) to the First Meeting of State Parties, which will be held at the UN in Vienna (12th to 14th of January 2022). And the list is expected to grow.

Yet, the Alliance is attempting to sabotage the sovereign will of countries and prevent them from engaging by calling on its partners and all other countries of the international community, to think twice before joining the TPNW.

This barely veiled threat reveals how scared the three nuclear-armed members are of losing the moral support they need to justify military capabilities, capable of causing catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences

NATO cannot hinder International Laws development. The TPNW has no other objective than to create more security, by becoming universal.

When declaring that its member states support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, NATO must see the TPNW as an opportunity to put an end to a threat too many generations have known.

Read more:
NATO and its nuclear policy: In contradiction to its own security objectives - EURACTIV