Monthly Archives: May 2021

WASHINGTON Russia has withdrawn only a few thousand troops from the border with Ukraine, senior Biden administration officials said, despite signals from Moscow last month that it was dialing down tensions in the volatile region.

Senior Defense Department officials said that close to 80,000 Russian troops remained near various strips of the countrys border with Ukraine, still the biggest force Russia has amassed there since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014.

The Russian military did order some units back to their barracks by May 1 and they did move from the border the officials said. But many of the units left their trucks and armored vehicles behind, a signal that they could go back if President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia decided to deploy them again.

President Biden said on Tuesday that it was his hope and expectation that he would meet with Mr. Putin during a trip to Europe in June that includes attending a NATO summit in Brussels. The administration has paired the offer of a meeting, an important symbol of Moscows continuing influence on the world stage, with a toughening of sanctions on Russia for its cyberattacks, election meddling, threats against Ukraine and poisoning of Aleksei A. Navalny, the opposition leader.

Administration officials said they were taking the sustained troop presence at the Ukrainian border as a message from Mr. Putin that he could match and, in fact, dwarf the number of troops taking part in American and NATO exercises in Europe. The American-led exercise, called Defender Europe, officially began on Tuesday. It includes about 28,000 troops from the United States and European allies participating in maneuvers over the next two months across Albania and other parts of Eastern Europe on Mr. Putins doorstep. And over the next month, NATO will lead another exercise, called Steadfast Defender 21, in Romania and Portugal.

Military analysts have noted that Mr. Putins troop deployment was clearly intended to be visible, an effort at muscle-flexing and part of standard operating procedure for the Kremlin, especially at the beginning of a new American presidency. Mr. Putin could well be looking for ways to test Mr. Bidens resolve, officials said. But the danger is that any military buildup could spiral out of control, or prompt a deeper crisis.

For all of the deliberative strategy, there is a standing risk of things going wrong, signals being misinterpreted, said Ian Lesser, the vice president of the German Marshall Fund. An aircraft could be shot down. Something could happen.

American officials say they remain unsure what exactly Mr. Putins aims are in his troop surge or in his decision so far not to follow through completely on the withdrawal announcement. That ambiguity could be part of the Russian leaders calculations.

They have retained a rather lethal force in the region and have only pulled back some forces, said Maj. Gen. Michael S. Repass, a retired former commander of U.S. Special Operations forces in Europe who is now NATOs special operations adviser to Ukraine.

That tells me they may want to come back later when timing and circumstances are more advantageous to Russia, General Repass said. This will happen again.

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will be in Kyiv on Thursday to reaffirm unwavering U.S. support for Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russias ongoing aggression, the State Department spokesman, Ned Price, said in a statement. But Mr. Blinken will also be looking for ways to lower the temperature in the region, officials said. He will talk about Ukraines NATO ambitions Kyiv wants to join the alliance, a move that would provoke fury in Moscow.

The big NATO exercise almost certainly has influenced that Russian decision to maintain a significant troop presence on the Russian-Ukrainian border, said James G. Stavridis, a retired admiral and former NATO commander. The message Vladimir Putin seeks to send is simple: Ukraine should not even think about a NATO membership. Nor should NATO offer one. Any move in that direction will lead to a Russian intervention.

Some American officials say the troop deployment is essentially intended to call the bluff of the United States and Europe and to make clear to Kyiv the limits of Western support. Russia, these officials say, wants to prompt a reaction from the West, but a reaction that will fall short of the hopes of the Ukrainian government.

Russia may have already achieved that goal. The United States has said it is prepared to impose further sanctions on Moscow and voiced strong support for Ukraine. But Mr. Bidens administration has taken no steps to move forward with NATO membership or significantly increase military aid to Kyiv.

The supply of water for Crimea remains a key friction point. If Russia makes an incursion into more Ukrainian-controlled territory, it could be to loosen sharp controls over the Crimean water supply that Ukraine put in after the 2014 annexation.

Senior American officials believe an incursion to secure the water supply remains a real threat. Moscow has played with the boundaries of occupied territories elsewhere; Russian forces regularly shift the boundary of their control of the occupied parts of Georgia.

But the water issue has been brewing for seven years and Russia has never made any such moves to seize control of the supply. Moving out of Crimea and into other parts of Ukrainian territory would bring a strong reaction from the international community, and Russian officials would have to decide whether it was worth the cost, both financially and diplomatically.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a scholar at the Center for a New American Security and a former senior intelligence official specializing in Russia, said any operation by Moscow to take control of the water supply would be difficult. It requires Russian forces to take it, garrison it and maintain control over it, which would be costly over the long run, she said.

Moscow had been spooked by the Ukrainian governments perceived shift to a more anti-Russia policy stance, Ms. Kendall-Taylor said. The Russian moves are primarily to put pressure on Ukrainians, while also trying to expose the limits of what the U.S. and Europe will do for Ukraine, she said.

The Biden administration could increase military aid to Ukraine to counter Moscow. But that, again, demands a balancing act, senior administration officials said. The trick would be bolstering the Ukrainian military so that an invasion by Russia looks as if it could be a slog, but not strengthening the military to the point where Russia feels it is threatened and has to act.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

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As Russian Troops Stay at Ukraine Border, Biden Officials See ...

Speaking at the annual Riga Conference on Thursday (6 May 2021), NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoan stressed the importance of strategic communications to help build resilience among Allied societies faced with increased hybrid activities, including disinformation. Such hostile activities seek to undermine our democracies, our institutions, our shared values, on which our Alliance is founded, he said.

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided fertile ground for increased hybrid activities, but NATO has been able to adapt and continue to defend its one billion population.

Looking ahead, close cooperation with like-minded partners across the globe and a whole of society approach will be essential to continue to protect democratic societies against current security threats. NATOs 2030 initiative, Mr. Geoan stressed, also sets an ambitious agenda for enhanced transatlantic security and defence in such an uncertain world.

The event, held online on 6 and 7 May 2021, was organized by NATOs Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.

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NATO Deputy Secretary General: unity and adaptation are key in today's uncertain world - NATO HQ

May 1KABUL, Afghanistan U.S. and NATO forces officially began their final drawdown from Afghanistan on Saturday after nearly two decades of war and as violence continued to rage across the country.

Tensions remained high throughout the day after the Taliban suggested they would launch attacks on coalition troops who remained in the country past the May 1 exit date outlined in a U.S.-Taliban deal signed last year.

Militants fired at Kandahar Airfield in the afternoon, but the assault caused no injuries or damage to equipment, Col. Sonny Leggett, a spokesman for the U.S. military in Afghanistan said on Twitter.

U.S. forces conducted a precision strike later in the evening, destroying additional rockets aimed at the airfield, Leggett said.

It was the only reported attack that may have been directed at foreign forces during the day. On Friday night, a bombing at an Afghan military base next to Bagram Airfield, the largest American installation in the country, killed one Afghan soldier and injured over two dozen others, said Abdul Wasi Rahimi, head of security at the provincial police chief's office.

A separate bombing Friday at a guesthouse in eastern Logar province killed over 20 people and wounded dozens more, Afghanistan's Interior Ministry said, highlighting the precarious security situation the U.S. and its allies are leaving behind.

No group immediately claimed responsibility for any of the attacks.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid tweeted Saturday that the continued presence of foreign forces violated the U.S.-Taliban deal and said Taliban fighters were waiting for their leadership to decide what actions would be taken next.

The final months of America's longest war which began in late 2001 in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and has claimed the lives of more than 2,300 American service members have largely been shrouded in secrecy. Many details of the withdrawal, including when specific bases will close and when individual partner countries will leave, have been restricted due to security concerns, NATO and American military officials said.

"At this point, we will not go into operational details, including troop numbers or timelines for individual nations," NATO's press office said in an emailed statement.

On Saturday, Afghanistan's acting Defense Minister Yasin Zia said at a news conference in Kabul that the drawdown had begun and that some bases would probably be handed over to Afghan forces within a week.

"Maybe tomorrow, in Shorabak, a small team of foreign forces will leave the area and like this, they will step-by-step leave other areas," Zia said, referring to a base in southern Helmand province.

The final drawdown follows a series of troop reductions that began shortly after the Trump administration signed a deal with the Taliban in Qatar on Feb. 29, 2020, which called for all coalition forces to leave Afghanistan by May 1, if the Taliban met vague counterterrorism pledges.

Two weeks ago, President Joe Biden said the U.S. and its allies would continue with the withdrawal plans, regardless of the conditions on the ground. Biden said it could take until Sept. 11 to get all foreign forces out of the country.

"Our reasons for staying have become increasingly unclear," Biden said in a televised address to the nation on April 14. "It's time for American troops to come home."

Days later, German Defense Ministry spokesman David Helmbold was quoted by the dpa news agency as saying NATO was considering moving all troops out of Afghanistan by July 4.

Despite the imminent end to the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan, the Taliban who since last February have largely refrained from attacking foreign forces have criticized pushing back the original exit date and have warned there would be a "reaction."

Withdrawing from the country involves ground and air movements of troops, supplies and equipment, which U.S. defense officials said the Taliban might try to attack. The U.S. is keeping an aircraft carrier in the Middle East and has moved at least four B-52 bombers and portions of an Army Ranger task force to the region as a precaution, the officials said.

With regard to protecting Afghans, the Defense Department had yet not decided whether "to change or reduce air support" for security forces during the drawdown, the Pentagon said in a statement Tuesday, walking back earlier comments by Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby that suggested otherwise.

While the final drawdown of forces officially began on Saturday, the military in preceding weeks had been taking inventory and deciding what to ship back to the U.S. or hand over to Afghan forces. In recent days, some U.S. and NATO officials have said a small number of troops had withdrawn before the official start date.

There are currently between 2,500 and 3,500 American troops in Afghanistan in addition to 7,000 coalition troops and thousands of contractors, who are also being pulled out. At the height of the war there were over 100,000 American troops alone in the country.

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US and NATO Forces Begin Final Withdrawal From Afghanistan After Nearly Two Decades of War - AviationPros.com

Even as the Kremlin once again massed troops on Ukraines borders last month, Europe has still not addressed the glaring capability gaps exposed by Russias annexation of Crimea and its proxy war of aggression in Donbas. Having been rudely awakened from their dreams of the end of history by the return of geopolitics, Europeans are concerned but seem unable to devise a common, realistic response, instead resorting to debates over what to do, including calls for strategic autonomy. In a recently published study, we and our colleagues looked under the hood of the military forces in Europe north of the Alps and were unimpressed. Based on granular, country-by-country analysis, combined with a review of NATOs preparations for collective defense and a war game simulating a war in the Baltics, it is painfully clear that NATO and many European armies to this day remain ill-prepared to confront a peer adversary in a high intensity conflict. In fact, even with two weeks of preparations and support from U.S. troops stationed in Europe, NATO and its partners could currently probably not repel a swift Russian ground invasion into the Baltic states. Hence, while European efforts to assume a greater responsibility for their own security are absolutely necessary, largely symbolic initiatives or gestures should be avoided in favor of rebuilding the hard military capabilities that are still severely lacking, and of striking a balance between dealing with threats from the east and from the south. Europe can dramatically improve its own defense, but it will be costly and slow, and European efforts alone cannot replace the critical role of the U.S. military in deterring Russia for the foreseeable future.

The Twilight of Eternal Peace

Following the end of the Cold War, many Europeans embraced the idea that history had ended and that globalization would turn all countries into liberal democracies, thus bringing eternal peace. Accordingly, most European countries enjoyed the peace dividend and radically reduced their armed forces, configuring what remained primarily for stability operations overseas. But since 2014, Europe has been hit by a quadruple whammy: From the east it was rattled by a revisionist and revanchist Russia, from the south it was struck by mass migration and terrorism, from the west it was threatened with abandonment by America under President Donald Trump, and on the domestic scene the ruling elites were challenged by new forces of populism and nationalism. This has led to at least two lively debates, one on just how deficient NATOs defenses against Russia are, and the other on how to respond to the threat of American withdrawal. In the latter debate, which at times has been acrimonious, French President Emmanuel Macron and other voices from Europes south have called for a reduced dependence on the Unites States and for more European strategic autonomy, whereas Atlanticist voices (often from the east and north) instead have argued for revitalizing NATO and improving burden-sharing by rebuilding European military capabilities, while a third group of allies seems to hope that the whole thing will pass and things will go back to normal.

Given Trumps tirades against Europe and NATO while in the White House, and given the very real risk that he would have taken America out of NATO had he been re-elected, it is eminently understandable that Europeans started looking for the lifeboats in case the captain decided to scuttle the ship. In many ways, the Trump presidency was a near-death experience for NATO and the transatlantic link, and to judge from a recent survey it seems to have resulted in a widespread distrust of America as a security partner among European publics. Thus, given that an isolationist may return to the White House in four or eight years, appealing to a need for greater national or European self-reliance may be necessary in order to build the political support needed for greater defense efforts. However, moving from a strategic sabbatical straight to strategic autonomy in one go would seem like a very long jump. In fact, the kind of European strategic autonomy advocated by Macron could not replace the transatlantic link, since autonomy would effectively be limited to political matters, industrial policy, and intervening in Africa and the Middle East. Hence, Europe would still need America to balance out Russia militarily and politically, and to act as a backstop against the return of inter-European rivalry. True European strategic autonomy i.e. the ability to hold its own against major powers, including Russia will remain out of reach as long as Europe consists of separate and independent countries rather than of a single superstate. Indeed, there is a palpable risk that efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will instead result in strategic cacophony, given the widely diverging threat perceptions on the continent.

That said, greater European defense capabilities are an absolute necessity to improve deterrence against Russia and shoulder a greater share of the burden for defense of the continent, and for necessary interventions elsewhere. But, while a measure of signaling of reduced dependence on the United States may be both healthy and politically necessary, too much rhetoric about autonomy could undermine NATO reforms and provide ammunition to U.S. isolationists. Hence, instead of talking loudly but carrying a small twig, Europeans should focus on rebuilding their own military capabilities, with a focus on the near term. Here there is much work to do.

Quick to React, Yet Slow to Act

While Russia came back as a threat in 2014, many European armies to this day remain ill-prepared to confront a peer adversary in a high intensity conflict. With serious gaps in the existing organizations, European defense capabilities are less than meets the eye, and increases in defense budgets have tended to plug holes rather than create new capabilities. Progress has been made, for example, in readiness, planning, logistics, and training, but NATO would probably still come up short in case the Russians attacked the eastern allies.

On paper, NATO, or even NATO Europe alone, clearly outspends and outguns Russia when seen over the entire European theatre. However, funding does not equal fighting power, and troops at home in their garrisons cannot win battles. For political reasons, NATO has refrained from building a robust forward presence on the eastern flank, instead relying on tripwire forces and sending reinforcements rapidly if needed. However, many of the units on NATOs roster have low availability and readiness and are based far away in Western Europe, making demanding movements of troops and equipment necessary. For example, the distance from the port of Bremerhaven in northern Germany to the Suwalki corridor in eastern Poland is almost as great as that between Omaha beach and Berlin. Thus, on the eastern flank Russia has a time-distance advantage and can easily achieve a favorable force ratio. Moreover, as the aggressor chooses a time and place of its liking for an attack while the defenders have to cover a broader area, the local balance of forces at the point of attack will be even worse for the defenders. Adding to that, as many European ground units are either light or have obsolete equipment, they are ill-suited for high-intensity maneuver warfare in open terrain. Light units may be great for deterrence, as they can rapidly be deployed, and can also be useful in defending close or urban terrain, but they are of limited utility once a war turns hot and if the enemy choses another axis of advance, making it necessary to regroup or to counterattack.

Alarmingly, we estimate that given a weeks notice, NATO and partner countries in Northern Europe could only stand up half the number of mechanized battalions in their peacetime garrisons compared with what Russia could west of the Urals. The availability of forces is surprisingly low even for such large and potentially powerful allies as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and such forces that can be mobilised often have deficiencies in critical combat support elements artillery, engineering, air defence, not to mention logistic support. Importantly, since many of these battalions are garrisoned in Western Europe, the only units that would face Russian forces in a short-notice attack on the eastern flank would be the units already there, or those that could be brought there quickly. Moreover, most of the units from the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Poland are unsuitable for mobile warfare or incapable of counteroffensives, which would be necessary once the locus of the main Russian attack had been determined.

Hence, in a short, sharp conflict in Northern Europe, the balance of forces clearly favors Russia with respect to ground units with offensive capabilities, and also attack helicopter units. The reverse is true for naval and air forces, but this would only really matter if Russia could be denied a quick win on the ground and if airpower could be quickly brought to bear, which requires planning and preparations in advance, as well as American air reinforcements to Europe ahead of the onset of hostilities.

Fighting for a Draw?

As part of the study, we also conducted a war game covering the initial stages of a Russian attack against all three Baltic states from Russia proper and through Belarus into Lithuania simulating the military balance as of 2020. Compared with 2014, the United States and the countries in the region (Poland, the Baltics and Finland) have started to improve their capabilities for defense against an invasion. For instance, Finland has significantly enhanced the readiness of its conscript army and has improved its long-range precision fire capabilities, the Baltics are mechanizing their armies and are taking deliveries of self-propelled artillery and anti-armor missiles, while Poland has embarked on an ambitious program of upgrading and modernizing its armed forces. All of these front-line states have defense budgets north of 2 percent of GDP.

Furthermore, what would have been a nightmarish contingency in 2014 a swift Russian attack against any or all of the Baltic states is now such a well-known scenario as to almost have become clich. Plans and preparations are being adjusted accordingly, with large-scale, international exercises having increased considerably since 2014, and battalion-sized enhanced forward presence battlegroups are in place in the Baltic states and Poland as multinational tripwires to enhance deterrence.

The downside is that currently, given Russias continuously improved military capabilities, NATO could still probably not repel a swift Russian ground invasion into the Baltic states even with support from American troops stationed in Europe and with two weeks of preparations. In a previous study, we have sought to dispel some of the exaggerations surrounding Russian anti-access/area denial capabilities in the region, particularly its ground-based air defenses. While suppressing Russias air defenses in the region will probably not be as difficult, costly, or time-consuming as previously thought, it would still have to be done before Western airpower could be effectively employed against the attacking Russian tank columns. Crucially, this means that NATOs ground forces would need to delay the Russian advance sufficiently for NATO airpower to come into play, and that NATO must be able to generate a substantial number of suppression of enemy air defenses sorties and ground attack sorties from day one. Thus, the initial duel between NATO airpower and Russian ground-based air defenses could very well prove decisive. With substantial air support early on in a confrontation, NATO ground forces in the Baltics might inflict very substantial damage to any attacking force and possibly even stop it. However, if NATOs air forces are late coming out of the starting blocks, or if Russian ground-based air defenses and other assets deter, delay or, sufficiently degrade NATO airpower, NATOs ground troops would in all likelihood be overrun. In such an air operation, the American contribution would be key in providing planning, striking power, and scarce high-end capabilities such as suppression of enemy air defences, offensive electronic warfare, stealth capabilities, remote sensing, and advanced munitions.

However, we contend that given the Russian aversion to a drawn-out conventional war of attrition which it would probably lose unless it escalated to nuclear weapons NATO and its partners would not have to win in a conflict over the Baltic states; they simply must not lose. This should be within the realm of the possible, if not immediately achievable. For instance, in our assessment, an addition of a handful of mechanized brigades suitable for offensive operations in the Suwalki corridor area, improved combat support especially artillery, air defense, and engineering and particularly improved capabilities for suppressing Russian air defenses, would shift the likely outcome of this scenario considerably. None of this is easily or cheaply achievable, but neither should it be insurmountable.

Building Capability and Cohesion, but Not Pursuing Full Autonomy

In a nutshell, Europes dependence on American military support to balance out Russia remains for the foreseeable future, regardless of debates over strategic autonomy. And even with support from the Unites States, it currently seems difficult for Europe to defend the eastern allies against a short-notice offensive by Russia, especially if this remains limited in geographical scope and ends quickly. Moreover, as Russia seems prone to play the nuclear card in conflicts, having America on board becomes a sine qua non in a confrontation. Nevertheless, a reduced European dependence on America should be within reach, as Russia is not the Soviet Union and has finite resources, while Europe has untapped economic and manpower reserves. A key measure would be to improve the readiness of existing European units and to ensure that they are given the necessary combat support units rather than creating new units or acquiring exotic new technologies. Given the balance of forces and the geography of the eastern flank, improving suppression of enemy air defenses capabilities could be a key force multiplier.

Furthermore, improving operational planning and properly organizing the chain of command for defense is extremely important, relatively cheap and would have good optics; i.e. this would be noticed as a signal of seriousness and determination in Moscow without necessarily causing major political protests in the West.

Improving European defense capabilities is already a work in progress, but this is mainly true for countries bordering Russia or Belarus, while the big three Germany, France, and the United Kingdom still do not seem fully committed and could and should do more. While improvements are underway, they are not happening at a speed that add up to a credible NATO Europe deterrence anytime soon, and France seems to be the only of the majors determined to rebuild a capability for waging high-intensity war. Military capabilities can quickly be abolished but often take a decade or more to reconstruct. That said, as seven years have already passed since the annexation of Crimea, and as the time of maximum danger may lie only a few years ahead as illustrated by Russian sabre-rattling on Ukraines borders it is crucial to identify and exploit any opportunities to plug existing capability gaps as quickly as possible. Instead of pursuing largely symbolic autonomy without credible military substance, Europe should focus on the nuts and bolts of rebuilding its military capability and nurture its strategic cohesion, the key source of its strength.

In doing so, America and the northern European allies and partners would be wise to accept and adapt to the fact that many allies situated farther from Russia consider the threat from the south and the Levant as more urgent and serious. Russias power and reach is, after all, much reduced as compared with the Soviet Unions, and it aims primarily to divide and dominate, not conquer, the European continent. This means that it should be much less demanding to deter Russia militarily than it was to contain the Soviet Union. Russia constantly tests and probes the boundaries constraining its return to great power status, looking for weaknesses while carefully watching Western reactions. In responding to this, Europe needs credible capabilities, not grand slogans or lofty long-term plans.

A continued tug-of-war between NATOs southern and eastern perspectives or over strategic autonomy could be as needlessly divisive as it is barren, and it would be better for both camps to mutually accept and support each others underlying concerns. If NATO is to have a new lease on life, and if the southern members are to feel motivated to really engage and contribute, the alliance needs to address both these perspectives and to add substance to the slogan NATO 360. For Europe north of the Alps and the eastern Balkans, this would mean taking a major role in deterring Russia, with especially Germany needing to play a more assertive role. At the same time, the European allies need to adapt to the long-term shift in Americas attention from Europe to Asia and shoulder more of the burdens, while America needs to realize that transatlantic trust has been dented, accept and encourage a greater role for Europe, and not be so instinctively suspicious of all European initiatives.

Robert Dalsj, Ph.D., is a research director in the Department for Strategy and Policy at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), specializing in politico-military matters in the Euro-Atlantic region. Robert has also served at the Ministry of Defense and on the Swedish NATO delegation and he is an active reserve officer in the Armed Forces.

Michael Jonsson, Ph.D., is a deputy research director in the Department for Strategy and Policy and the head of the Defence Policy Studies program at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Michael holds a doctoral degree from Uppsala University, has previously served at the Swedish Defence Headquarters and is the co-editor of Conflict, Crime, and the State in Postcommunist Eurasia (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

The opinions expressed in this article reflects the assessments of its authors alone, and do not represent any formal position of FOI as a government agency.

Image: Defense Department (Photo by Sgt. Maj. Marco Dorow, German Army)

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Autonomy, Cacophony, or Coherence? The Future of European Defense - War on the Rocks

The special F-16 of the Portuguese Air Force. (All images: David Parody)

NATO Tiger Meet (NTM) is one of Europes most famous and loved among the aviation enthusiasts community, multinational exercise attended by squadrons sporting Tiger (or feline) emblems. As often explained, although it usually includes Spotters/Media Day and, sometimes, an Open Day for general public, NTM is not an air show: all types of air-to-air and air-to-ground and a wide variety of support missions are part of each Tiger Meeting, whose goals are the creation of a high-level tactical exercise, where participants can train realistically; practice day and night operations in a multi-domain environment, against air, land and sea threats; maximize integration and interoperability with NATO members & Partnership for Peace Members, and share learning points; creation of an environment promoting the well-known Tiger Spirit, which respects the NATO Tiger Association Traditions and Customs.

However, the main difference between NTM and many other traditional exercises is that many aircraft taking part in the maneuvers, at least one (but usually more than one) per participating unit, sport Tiger markings, Special Tails or flamboyant tiger-themed paint schemes.

This years edition, NTM 21, organized by the Portuguese Air Force, is underway from May 2 to May 14, 2021, at Air Base No. 11 (BA11), in Beja. The Portuguese airbase was planned to host the NTM in 2020, but the exercise last year was cancelled because of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

NTM21 host unit is the Squadron 301 Jaguares of the Portuguese Air Force. At NTM 2019, which took place in Mont-de-Marsan, France, the Portuguese unit, flying the F-16 was awarded both the Silver trophy Tiger and the Tiger Spirit award.

Nine Tiger squadrons from 8 allied nations for a total of more than 50 aircraft and around 1,000 military personnel are scheduled to take part in this years Tiger Meet that, as usual, will also be supported by several external units, including Esquadra 751, performing troop insertion with its EH-101 Merlin helicopters; and the civilian Cobham Aviation with its Special Mission Falcon 20 jet.

The NTMs program is basically always the same: two waves are flown, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. The first ones are usually the most complex COMAO (Composite Air Operations) and the second ones are the so-called Shadow/Panther missions (the first are performed during the day the second are night missions), smaller scale events which usually involve junior pilots. There are also some night operations, this year planned on May 4, 5 and 6, 2021.

COMAO missions cover the entire spectrum of air operations with broad force involvement as part of the same package: from the air defense of a specific area to the offensive operations against all types of targets (both maritime and land), all the missions require the participants to cooperate and face threats to ingress and egress a simulated contested airspace.

Shadow and Panther missions are smaller scale missions, where specific operations will be trained. Some examples are: CAS (Close Air Support), in coordination with ground troops; Vehicle Interdiction or Hostage Rescue, where a helicopter will command the operation with the support of fighters; Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM) and DACT (Dissimilar Air Combat Training).

Tiger Meetings also offer some nice exchange opportunity for aircrew to fly orientation missions aboard allied aircraft.

On May 3, 2021, our contributor David Parody had the opportunity to attend the Media Day at Beja and shoot the photographs you can find in this article.

Among the most interesting, eye-catching liveries of NTM 21, we cant but mention the one of the Italian Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon with the 12 Gruppo (Squadron) with the Siberian/White Tiger as well as the host nations F-16 MLU jets: the full Tiger special color of the Esq 301 along with the other F-16 Viper sporting the 50th anniversary tail.

David Cenciotti is a freelance journalist based in Rome, Italy. He is the Founder and Editor of The Aviationist, one of the worlds most famous and read military aviation blogs. Since 1996, he has written for major worldwide magazines, including Air Forces Monthly, Combat Aircraft, and many others, covering aviation, defense, war, industry, intelligence, crime and cyberwar. He has reported from the U.S., Europe, Australia and Syria, and flown several combat planes with different air forces. He is a former 2nd Lt. of the Italian Air Force, a private pilot and a graduate in Computer Engineering. He has written four books.

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We Have Been To NATO Tiger Meet 2021 And Here Are The Most Interesting Aircraft We Found There. - The Aviationist

Two NATO warships have been spotted off the coast of North Wales ahead of a major two-week exercise.

One of the ships has stopped close to the Gwynt y Mr wind farm, while the second is close to the Conwy Platform, according to data from website marinetraffic.com.

Officials were unable to confirm the reason for the ships' appearance off the coast, but it is understood it is linked to a major exercise getting underway this month.

Exercise Strike Warrior, which takes place off Scotland, will involve more than 20 warships, three submarines and 150 aircraft from 11 nations.

It will be the UK Carrier Strike Group's "largest and most demanding exercise" so far before it heads out on operational deployment to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific, according to the Royal Navy.

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This exercise will also take place in conjunction with Exercise Joint Warrior, a NATO exercise which happens twice a year.

Aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth has already left Portsmouth as it prepares for the exercise, and will be joined by warships HMS Defender, HMS Diamond, HMS Kent and HMS Richmond.

The Royal Navy said: "The exercise, which will run for two weeks, will see the task group pitted against warships from NATOs Standing Maritime Group 1 in waters off north-west Scotland to prove it is capable of undertaking high intensity operations against the most demanding adversaries.

"The culmination of Strike Warrior will see the Carrier Strike Group certified ready for deployment, at which point operational command will pass from the Royal Navys Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Jerry Kyd, to the Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral Sir Ben Key."

Commodore Steve Moorhouse, commander of the UK Carrier Strike Group, said: The advent of the UK Carrier Strike Group represents a substantial new injection of fifth generation combat power into the defence of the Euro-Atlantic region.

It is therefore fitting that our final and most demanding test prior to deployment involves so many of Britains allies.

As the ships and aircraft of the Carrier Strike Group assemble over the coming days, Exercise Strike Warrior is an opportunity prove to ourselves, and to the world, that we have what it takes to act as cohesive and potent fighting force at sea, under the water, in the air and over the land.

Strike Warrior is the third and last in a series of pre-deployment exercises undertaken by the Carrier Strike Group over the past year.

It takes place concurrently with NATOs largest biannual maritime exercise, Joint Warrior, predominantly in the north west of Scotland, which sees the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and British Army joined by forces from NATO and Australia for a series of realistic operational scenarios spanning sea, air, land and cyber and space.

The participating NATO nations will be the UK, USA, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland.

Australia is the non-NATO participant.

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Huge NATO warships spotted off the coast of North Wales - North Wales Live