Monthly Archives: March 2017

Americas hysteria over Russian President Vladimir Putin is mounting, and theres no reason to think the fever will break anytime soon. At this point its only tangentially related to the accusations that Putin has made President Donald Trump his puppet or that Trump or Attorney General Jeff Sessions, or any number of other administration officials is in cahoots with Russian oligarchs.

Perhaps youve heard about the sudden death of Russias U.N. ambassador, Vitaly Churkin? Its all nefarious Kremlin intrigues or so were told. In fact, a lot of Russian diplomats have died recently isnt that suspicious? And dont look now, but while you were fixated on Russias subversion of American society through psychological warfare, you may have missed that Russias expanding its influence in Syria. And provoking Japan. And meddling with Britain. And its sowing chaos in the Balkans. And the Baltics. And Ukraine. And may invade Belarus. And Finland. And if that werent enough, Putin has a master plan for overthrowing the entire European and world democratic order. We might as well give up: Russia runs the world now.

With such bombast dominating American political discourse, citizens and pundits rightly worry about the potential for geopolitical competition from Russia. But is Putins regime really as threatening and omnipresent as it is cracked up to be?

Western commentary on the Kremlins foreign-policy ambitions tends to fall into two opposing camps, each with different starting points: One begins with Russias foreign policy, the other with Russian domestic politics. Both are prone to hyperbole in their appraisals and conclusions, albeit in different directions. And neither is useful for understanding, or responding to, the reality of Russian ambitions.

I call the first camp Putler, a mashup of Putin and Adolf Hitler, the two leaders whom Western commentators seem most fond of pairing. Largely a result of Russias 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbass, this lens portrays Russia as the foremost threat to liberal democracy: a scary, aggressive, expansionist, revanchist reincarnation of the Soviet Union, equating Putin with the worst excesses of authoritarianism. Rooted in 20th-century historical analogies, specifically World War II, this camp implicitly prescribes military confrontation: Anything less, including economic sanctions, is weak-kneed, Chamberlainesque appeasement, to evoke the Hitlerite comparison.

Another favored historical analogy for Putler adherents is the Cold War. For many observers, it is a given that we are already grappling in a life-and-death Cold War 2.0 (just without, they neglect to mention, the ideology of communism, the nuclear arms race, realist power balancing, global competition for proxies, or any of the other elements that defined the original Cold War). House Speaker Paul Ryans recent reference to Russia as a global menace led by a man who is menacing falls squarely within this school of thinking, along with his rejoinder that President Barack Obamas sanctions followed too much of an appeasement policy.

Turning from geopolitical ambitions to Russian domestic policy, the Putler worldview tends to highlight Putins consolidation of autocratic control, fraudulent elections, his harassment and murder of opposition journalists, curtailing of civil liberties, and his use of disinformation through state-run media to disorient and control the public. It is a portrait of Putin as an unrestrained totalitarian, intent on weaponizing absurdity and unreality. Such appraisals often border on the hysterical, but one imagines they draw a lot of internet traffic.

At the other end of the spectrum from the Putler worldview is the Dying Bear camp. This approach is dismissive of Russia as a threat; its adherents instead presage stagnation, corruption, and decline. The term originated with demographers, discouraged by Russias dim health prospects, but could reasonably include its political, social, and economic limitations as well. To be sure, Russias health and demographic statistics lag far behind those of Western Europe and the United States, with relatively high mortality rates, relatively low fertility rates, and average life expectancy on par with impoverished African countries. In the medium and long term, that means demographic decline: Fewer Russians means fewer taxpayers, fewer conscripts, and fewer state resources; all exert downward pressure on Russias growth potential. There are a bevy of other limitations on Russias potential for future economic growth: an undiversified economy cursed with an overreliance on resource extraction; a lumbering, systematically corrupt, and growing state bureaucracy that impedes entrepreneurship; technological backwardness; and a kleptocratic political system that rewards cronyism and penalizes development. Without economic diversification and freedom, were told, Russias economy has hit rock bottom. Groaning under the weight of Western sanctions and low global oil prices, Russias own Economic Development Ministry is forecasting no real improvement in living standards until 2035.

For some in the Dying Bear camp, Russias foreign-policy aggression including its incursions into Ukraine and Syria is just Putins attempt to distract patriotic Russians from the misery of their own existence and have them rally around the flag of patriotism, since he cant deliver the performance legitimacy associated with the economic growth of the early 2000s, driven by sky-high global oil prices. While the Putler perspective calls for confrontation, Dying Bear prescribes management or marginalization, if not disengagement: Why bother taking Russia seriously if its doomed anyway?

President Obamas dismissive public statements about Russia being at best a regional power, or a weaker country that doesnt produce anything worth buying except oil and gas and arms, and that its international interventions are borne not out of strength but out of weakness are all reflective of the Dying Bear position.

The reality, of course, is somewhere between these extremes. Russia is not nearly the global menace that many fear, nor is it doomed to collapse. Russias geopolitical strength is indeed constrained by its demographic, economic, social, and political weaknesses, but those arent as catastrophic as theyre often made to be. Russians today are healthier and living longer than they ever have. Though having ever fewer women of childbearing age presages long-term demographic decline, with births outpacing deaths, Russias population has recently registered natural growth for the first time since the collapse of communism.

Economically, the ruble has stabilized following the collapse of late 2014, and the recession of 2014-2015 is statistically over. However, Russia isnt out of the woods, with low oil prices leading to dwindling state revenue, and little private investment for the foreseeable future, which will inevitably mean stagnation and low growth. Russias economic performance is so intimately tied to public spending that any curtailment of spending despite dwindling oil receipts would reverberate throughout the economy. And the economy ultimately constrains its political options. Although Putins geopolitical gambits in Ukraine and Syria can boost his approval ratings, they come at the expense of increasing poverty and unpaid wages, which are fueling a notable rise in labor protests nationwide. While presently manageable, the Kremlin will need to address these socio-economic issues in order to maintain domestic tranquility, limiting its resources for foreign adventurism in Syria, Ukraine, and beyond, to say nothing of investments in health care, education, science, and infrastructure. Russia cant have it all.

So, despite its high-level meddling in American affairs, for the foreseeable future, Russia is poised to continue to muddle through, with economic and demographic stagnation constraining its lofty geopolitical ambitions. Unsurprisingly, the Russia of 2020 will look more like the Russia of 2012 or 2016, rather than the expansionist Soviet Union of 1944 or the collapsing Soviet Union of 1991. Accordingly, American foreign policy toward Russia should not be given to the militarization and conflict of the Putler camp, nor to the marginalization of the Dying Bear view, but rather a respectful engagement, recognizing the interconnectedness of Russias varied strategic interests, which may conflict with Washingtons own.

The problem, though, is that stasis isnt a particularly sexy prognosis, which means it is not a frequently made one. There are two reasons for this. First is a lack of nuanced understanding of Russian governance. Most experts know what liberal democracy looks like and if we believe democratization scholarship (and there is good reason for skepticism, especially in the Trump era) that once consolidated, democracies are robust and durable. We also understand that autocracies can be reasonably stable, too: just look at the longevity of Fidel Castros reign in Cuba or the Kim dynasty in North Korea. But we have a harder time understanding a polity like present-day Russia, which is neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. For a long time, democratization theorists have struggled to understand this sort of neither/nor illiberal democracy or competitive authoritarian regimes like Russia that combine democratic and nondemocratic elements. If liberal democracy is understood to be the optimal endpoint, then it is understandable to assume that Russia is just stuck in transition, rather than having achieved something of a stable equilibrium in its own right.

Second, still haunted by Kremlinologists fabled inability to foresee one of the most significant geopolitical events of the 20th century the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union Russia watchers now appear to be hypersensitive to any economic or social clue that may portend trouble for the Putin regime. When the global financial crisis rocked Russia in 2008, we were told it was the end of the Putin era. When popular protests opposed his re-election in 2011-2012, experts called it the beginning of the end of Putin. The Euromaidan revolution in next-door Ukraine likewise allegedly portended the end of Vladimir Putin. As it turns out, competitive authoritarian regimes in general, and Putins Russia in particular, tend to be surprisingly durable.

With Russias new prominence in American political discourse, it is necessary to have a sober assessment of the countrys capabilities and limitations. Russia is neither the juggernaut nor basket case it is varyingly made out to be. A well-reasoned Russia policy begins by quelling ones hysteria long enough to recognize this and then engaging it accordingly.

Photo credit:HARRY ENGELS/Getty Images

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Vladimir Putin Isn't a Supervillain - Yahoo News

World Calls for civil resistance against the rise of right-wing populism have emerged. But political activism is more than taking to the streets.

US residents in Mexico protest against President Donald Trumps foreign policy towards Mexico. Credit: Jose Luis Gonzalez/Reuters

From Brexit to the Trump presidency and Marine Le Pens campaign-trail successes in France, right-wing populism is sweeping across the West.

Analysts and scholars have expressed concerns that this movement could threaten the fate of liberal democracyand its hard-fought triumph over other contesting political ideologies since the end of Cold War.

In other words, the End of History, as described by USpolitical philosopher Francis Fukuyama, may come to an end.

The rise of right-wing populism may also open a Pandoras box for demagogues to promote a xenophobic agenda, as evident in Donald Trumps controversial travel ban.

Calls for civil resistance

There is deep fear that populist leaders such as Trump advised by the right-wing ideologue Steve Bannon will eviscerate democratic checks and balances in the pursuit of consolidated power.

As a response, activists are calling for civil resistance against authoritarianism, and street protests are being staged to remind the enthroned populists of people power.

Safeguarding democracy through civil resistance is necessary. But it is important to acknowledge the fact that many of these leaders are democratically elected and supported by large segments of society.

We may choose to believe that voters for right-wing populist parties share chauvinistic and nationalistic opinions with their strongmen. However, the popular appeal of these leaders has much to do with the socio-economic decline that some constituents in the West have experienced, and this needs to be addressed if we want to efficiently counter authoritarian regimes.

Dignity deficit

The increasing oligarchisation of liberal democratic societies set a stage for a dignity deficit, especially among white, non-urban and working-class population.

In recent decades, the middle class in the West found their lives unprecedentedly precarious due to increasing unemployment and a lack of social security. The post-Cold War era ushered into force neoliberal dominance.

The speed of economic globalisation means that manufacturing jobs have been lost to countries offering cheap labour, while austerity policies resulting in cutback in social expenditure imply that most of the time, individuals are left on their own to finance their increasingly expensive healthcare and education, to name a few necessities.

Automation and immigrants looking for high- and low-skilled jobs in economically advanced countries have raised many questions about the future of employment for the American and European middle classes. These were left unanswered.

Against this backdrop, the well-off have reaped the benefit of globalisation. So have the cosmopolitan urbanites who have caught up with changing socio-economic landscape.

Meanwhile, political elites in Washington, Paris and London are perceived as having ignored this crisis of surging inequality, as they continue neoliberal policies that hurt the working class people who often consider themselves the backbone of their societies.

For instance, a series of free trade deals have been advocated by governments to be a brainchild of liberal democracy. However, rather than improving work conditions and life chances for common people, many of these deals have strengthened global corporations, contributing to greater inequality.

A good example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which potentially radicalises corporate deregulation, challenging states judicial sovereignty, and imposes fiercer standards of intellectual property.

Think tanks also point out that the signed and ratified TPP can result in job losses and declining wages.

Anti-establishment rhetoric

Right-wing populism is a symptom of society polarised by economic injustice and the collapse of liberal democracy, which has enhanced the distance between political elites and their constituents.

Populist figures such as Trump and Le Pen can mobilise popular support sufficiently to contest other liberal or centrist candidates because of their anti-establishment rhetoric.

They acknowledge the injustice and humiliation inflicted on their constituents through the loss of jobs and neglect of the political class.

Often popular anger is being diverted toward immigrants, who are portrayed as a threat to economic and cultural security, resulting in the proliferation of xenophobic attacks. Scapegoating immigrants becomes the expression of fear and vulnerability.

The increasingly precarious livelihood of this section of the population has led to a general perception that their idea of a great nation is in danger.

Populist slogans such as Make America Great Again or Take back our Country respond to this perception and collective emotion attached to it.

Lacking other political alternatives, people find hope in right-wing populist discourse, even when the candidates push forward radical agendas.

In this sense, the social divide runs parallel to the crisis of liberal democracy. Tackling right-wing populism requires not only resistance against leaders with authoritarian traits but also comprehension of why a vast number of people view populism as a hopeful alternative to the existing system.

Addressing social bifurcation

Resistance in the form of street demonstrations and boycotts remains an important tool for defending democracy. Nevertheless, it does little to address ongoing social bifurcation.

It is difficult to imagine that supporters of right wing-populism, who despise the so-called political correctness and see the liberal agenda as irrelevant to their livelihood, would participate in progressive demonstrations such as the Womens March.

Does this mean that protests end up constituting an echo chamber where the progressive agenda circulates among those already convinced by the progressive ideas? Does it imply that while liberals resist Trump with various methods of nonviolent action, they have so far failed to understand the underpinning causes of populist trajectory, and have thereby missed the chance to communicate with those electing populist leaders?

Is it possible that protests can contribute to dividing society even more as protesters at times claim to hold higher moral ground than their populist opponents?

Rethinking resistance

It is high time to rethink how nonviolent resistance can help counter right-wing populism.

Nonviolent resistance is more than taking to the street. It is political activism in the sense that it offers analytic tools to understand pillars of support of the ruling government, which normally include electoral constituents, bureaucratic bodies and the media.

Well crafted messages should convey to the general public the elites legitimacy deficit, and at the same time show the availability to political alternatives.

The messages amplified through persistent campaigns should be conducive to the eventual realignment of allies. Shifting alliances especially the defection of electoral supporters of the government will allow activists to increase political momentum in the pursuit of social and political change.

The implication is that those committing to nonviolent resistance not only resist the powers that be they also analyse how the ruling powers discourses resonate with popular resentment, which in effect helps galvanise support to sustain its ruling legitimacy.

This understanding allows activists to design campaigns that show empathy to groups across political affiliations.

In the wake of right-wing populism, these campaigns need to address the structural underpinnings of a collapsing political establishment and offer a genuine platform for debating alternatives based on economic redistribution, reconfiguration of power relations between the political class and the people and political reconciliation of groups with different aspirations.

Communicating with those you disagree with instead of reinforcing an echo chamber is the key to achieving all this.

Communicating across the aisle

The ideas laid out above are not completely novel.

Examples of communicating across the aisle appeared during US Civil Rights campaigns where African-American leaders tried to appeal to white consciousness, extending their political messages to convince white priests and white constituents to endorse the course of the black struggle.

In ousting the Slobodan Miloevi, the Butcher of the Balkans, Serbias pro-democracy movements launched campaigns in Miloevis rural footholds, areas that had initially endorsed his ethno-nationalism.

Their success lived in the campaigns association of healthy patriotism with the downfall of Miloevi, and the creation of peaceful and democratic Serbia. The campaign message sought to unite Serbians whose political opinions were once split along the fault line of pro or anti-Miloevi.

Beyond overthrowing a dictator, a well-run campaign can bridge the perception gaps that divide a nation, reminding us of the importance of constructing the future together based on the idea of dignity, justice and inclusiveness.

This article is adapted from a blog originally published on Cafe Dissensus.

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Categories: World

Tagged as: Donald Trump, EU, European Union, Marine Le Pen, no-donate-link, Steve Bannon, TPP, Trump, United States, US, US President Donald Trump

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Rethinking Nonviolent Resistance in the Face of Right-Wing Populism - The Wire