Category Archives: Russia

The 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense operates a dozen central storage facilities for nuclear weapons. Known as Object S sites and scattered across the Russian Federation, they contain thousands of nuclear warheads and hydrogen bombs with a wide variety of explosive yields. For the past three months, President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have been ominously threatening to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine. According to Pavel Podvig, the director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project and a former research fellow at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, now based in Geneva, the long-range ballistic missiles deployed on land and on submarines are Russias only nuclear weapons available for immediate use. If Putin decides to attack Ukraine with shorter-range, tactical nuclear weapons, they will have to be removed from an Object S sitesuch as Belgorod-22, just 25 miles from the Ukrainian borderand transported to military bases. It will take hours for the weapons to be made combat-ready, for warheads to be mated with cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, for hydrogen bombs to be loaded on planes. The United States will most likely observe the movement of these weapons in real time: by means of satellite surveillance, cameras hidden beside the road, local agents with binoculars. And that will raise a question of existential importance: What should the United States do?

President Joe Biden has made clear that any use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be completely unacceptable and entail severe consequences. But his administration has remained publicly ambiguous about what those consequences would be. That ambiguity is the correct policy. Nevertheless, there must also be open discussion and debate outside the administration about what is really at stake. During the past month, Ive spoken with many national-security experts and former government officials about the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the probable targets, and the proper American response. Although they disagreed on some issues, I heard the same point again and again: The risk of nuclear war is greater today than at any other time since the Cuban missile crisis. And the decisions that would have to be made after a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine are unprecedented. In 1945, when the United States destroyed two Japanese cities with atomic bombs, it was the worlds sole nuclear power. Nine countries now possess nuclear weapons, others may soon obtain them, and the potential for things going terribly wrong has vastly increased.

Several scenarios for how Russia might soon use a nuclear weapon seem possible: (1) a detonation over the Black Sea, causing no casualties but demonstrating a resolve to cross the nuclear threshold and signaling that worse may come, (2) a decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership, attempting to kill President Volodymyr Zelensky and his advisers in their underground bunkers, (3) a nuclear assault on a Ukrainian military target, perhaps an air base or a supply depot, that is not intended to harm civilians, and (4) the destruction of a Ukrainian city, causing mass civilian casualties and creating terror to precipitate a swift surrenderthe same aims that motivated the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

From the July/August 2022 issue: We have no nuclear strategy

Any response by the Biden administration would be based not only on how Russia uses a nuclear weapon against Ukraine but also, more important, on how Russias future behavior might be affected by the American response. Would it encourage Putin to back downor to double down? Cold War debates about nuclear strategy focused on ways to anticipate and manage the escalation of a conflict. During the early 1960s, Herman Kahn, a prominent strategist at the Rand Corporation and the Hudson Institute, came up with a visual metaphor for the problem: the escalation ladder. Kahn was one of the primary inspirations for the character Dr. Strangelove in Stanley Kubricks classic 1964 film, and yet the escalation ladder remains a central concept in thinking about how to fight a nuclear war. Kahns version of the ladder had 44 steps. At the bottom was an absence of hostilities; at the top was nuclear annihilation. A president might choose to escalate from step No. 26, Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior, to step No. 39, Slow-Motion Countercity War. The goal of each new step upward might vary. It might simply be to send a message. Or it could be to coerce, control, or devastate an adversary. You climbed the ladder to reach the bottom again someday.

The escalation vortex is a more recent and more complex visualization of a potential conflict between nuclear states. It was developed by Christopher Yeaw, who served as chief scientist at the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command from 2010 to 2015. In addition to the vertical aspects of the escalation ladder, the vortex incorporates horizontal movement among various domains of modern warfarespace, cyber, conventional, nuclear. An escalation vortex looks like a tornado. An illustration of one, featured in a Global Strike Command slideshow, places the worst outcome at the widest part of the funnel: the absolute highest levels of permanent societal destruction.

In October 1962, Sam Nunn was a 24-year-old recent graduate from Emory University School of Law whod just gotten a security clearance and a job as a staff member for the House Armed Services Committee. When a colleague backed out of an overseas tour of NATO bases, Nunn took his place, left the United States for the first timeand wound up at Ramstein Air Base, in Germany, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Nunn remembers seeing NATO fighters parked near runways, each loaded with a single hydrogen bomb, ready to fly toward the Soviet Union. Pilots sat in chairs beside their planes, day and night, trying to get some sleep while awaiting the order to take off. They had only enough fuel for a one-way mission and planned to bail out somewhere, somehow, after dropping their bombs. The commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe told Nunn that if a war began, his pilots would have to get their planes off the ground within a few minutes; Ramstein Air Base would be one of the first NATO targets destroyed by a Soviet nuclear attack. The commander kept a walkie-talkie with him at all times to give the takeoff order.

The Cuban missile crisis left a strong impression on Nunn. During his 24 years as a United States senator, he worked tirelessly to reduce the risk of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. As the head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he championed close cooperation with Moscow on nuclear matters. To continue those efforts, he later co-founded a nonprofit, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, with which I have collaborated on a number of projects. All of that work is now at risk of being undone by Russias invasion of Ukraine and the strident nuclear rhetoric accompanying it.

Before the attack on Ukraine, the five nations allowed to have nuclear weapons by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Francehad reached agreement that the use of such weapons could be justified only as a purely defensive measure in response to a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack. In January 2022, those five countries issued a joint statement affirming Ronald Reagans dictum that a nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won. A month later, Russia violated norms that had prevailed under the NPT for more than half a century. It invaded a country that had given up nuclear weapons; threatened nuclear attacks against anyone who tried to help that country; and committed acts of nuclear terrorism by shelling the reactor complexes at Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya.

Nunn supports the Biden administrations strategy of deliberate ambiguity about how it would respond to Russias use of a nuclear weapon. But he hopes that some form of back-channel diplomacy is secretly being conducted, with a widely respected figure like former CIA Director Robert Gates telling the Russians, bluntly, how harshly the United States might retaliate if they cross the nuclear threshold. During the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy and First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev both wanted to avoid an all-out nuclear warand still almost got one, because of misunderstandings, miscommunications, and mistakes. Back-channel diplomacy played a crucial role in ending that crisis safely.

From the October 2007 issue: A near miss

Nunn describes Russias violations of long-standing norms as Putins nuclear folly and stresses that three fundamental things are essential for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe: rational leaders, accurate information, and no major blunders. And all three are now in some degree of doubt, he says.

Nunn argues that if Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the United States should not respond with a nuclear attack. He favors some sort of horizontal escalation instead, doing everything possible to avoid a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. For example, if Russia hits Ukraine with a nuclear cruise missile launched from a ship, Nunn would advocate immediately sinking that ship. The number of Ukrainian casualties should determine the severity of the American responseand any escalation should be conducted solely with conventional weapons. Russias Black Sea fleet might be sunk in retaliation, and a no-fly zone could be imposed over Ukraine, even if it meant destroying anti-aircraft units on Russian soil.

Since the beginning of the invasion, Russias nuclear threats have been aimed at discouraging the United States and its NATO allies from providing military supplies to Ukraine. And the threats are backed by Russias capabilities. Last year, during a training exercise involving about 200,000 troops, the Russian army practiced launching a nuclear assault on NATO forces in Poland. The pressure on Russia to attack the supply lines from NATO countries to Ukraine will increase, the longer this war continues, Nunn says. It will also increase the risk of serious blunders and mistakes. An intentional or inadvertent Russian attack on a NATO country could be the beginning of World War III.

During the summer of 2016, members of President Barack Obamas national-security team secretly staged a war game in which Russia invades a NATO country in the Baltics and then uses a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon against NATO forces to end the conflict on favorable terms. As described by Fred Kaplan in The Bomb (2020), two groups of Obama officials reached widely divergent conclusions about what the United States should do. The National Security Councils so-called Principals Committeeincluding Cabinet officers and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staffdecided that the United States had no choice but to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Any other type of response, the committee argued, would show a lack of resolve, damage American credibility, and weaken the NATO alliance. Choosing a suitable nuclear target proved difficult, however. Hitting Russias invading force would kill innocent civilians in a NATO country. Striking targets inside Russia might escalate the conflict to an all-out nuclear war. In the end, the NSC Principals Committee recommended a nuclear attack on Belarusa nation that had played no role whatsoever in the invasion of the NATO ally but had the misfortune of being a Russian ally.

Deputy staff members at the NSC played the same war game and came up with a different response. Colin Kahl, who at the time was an adviser to Vice President Biden, argued that retaliating with a nuclear weapon would be a huge mistake, sacrificing the moral high ground. Kahl thought it would be far more effective to respond with a conventional attack and turn world opinion against Russia for violating the nuclear taboo. The others agreed, and Avril Haines, a deputy national security adviser, suggested making T-shirts with the slogan Deputies should run the world. Haines is now President Bidens Director of National Intelligence, and Kohl is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In 2019, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ran extensive war games on how the United States should respond if Russia invades Ukraine and then uses a nuclear weapon there. DTRA is the only Pentagon agency tasked exclusively with countering and deterring weapons of mass destruction. Although the results of those DTRA war games are classified, one of the participants told me, There were no happy outcomes. The scenarios for nuclear use were uncannily similar to the ones being considered today. When it comes to nuclear warfare, the participant said, the central message of the 1983 film WarGames still applies: The only winning move is not to play.

None of the national-security experts I interviewed thought the United States should use a nuclear weapon in response to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. Rose Gottemoellerwho served as the chief American negotiator of the New START arms-control treaty with Russia and later as the deputy secretary general of NATObelieves that any nuclear attack on Ukraine would inspire global condemnation, especially from countries in Africa and South America, continents that are nuclear-weapon-free zones. She thinks that China, despite its tacit support for the invasion of Ukraine, would strongly oppose Putins use of a nuclear weapon and would back sanctions against Russia at the United Nations Security Council. China has long supported negative nuclear assurances and promised in 2016 unconditionally not [to] use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

If the United States detects tactical weapons being removed from Russian storage sites, Gottemoeller thinks the Biden administration should send a tough warning to Moscow through back channelsand then publicize the movement of those weapons, using the same tactic of openly sharing intelligence that seemed to thwart Russian false-flag operations involving chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine. Over the years, shes gotten to know many of the top commanders who oversee Russias nuclear arsenal and developed great respect for their professionalism. Gottemoeller says they might resist an order to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. And if they obey that order, her preferred option would be a muscular diplomatic response to the nuclear strike, not a nuclear or conventional military response, combined with some form of hybrid warfare. The United States could launch a crippling cyberattack on the Russian command-and-control systems tied to the nuclear assault and leave open the possibility of subsequent military attacks.

Uri Friedman: Putins nuclear threats are a wake-up call for the world

Scott Sagan, a co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, at Stanford University, believes that the risk of Russia using a nuclear weapon has declined in the past month, as the fighting has shifted to southern Ukraine. Putin is unlikely to contaminate territory hes hoping to seize with radioactive fallout. And a warning shot, such as the detonation of a nuclear weapon harmlessly over the Black Sea, would serve little purpose, Sagan says. It would signal irresolution, not resolvea conclusion that the United States reached half a century ago about the potential utility of a NATO demonstration strike to deter the Red Army. Sagan concedes that if Russia were to lose major battles in the Donbas, or if a Ukrainian counteroffensive seemed on the verge of a great victory, Putin might well order the use of a nuclear weapon to obtain a surrender or a cease-fire. In response, depending on the amount of damage caused by the nuclear explosion, Sagan would advocate American conventional attacks on Russian forces in Ukraine, Russian ships in the Black Sea, or even military targets inside Russia, such as the base from which the nuclear strike was launched.

Sagan takes issue with how the back-and-forth of military conflict is commonly depicted. As an image, an escalation ladder seems too static. It suggests the freedom to decide whether you should go up or down. Sagan thinks nuclear escalation would be more like an escalator: Once it starts moving, it has a momentum of its own, and its really hard to get off. He would be deeply concerned by any sign that Putin is taking even the initial steps toward nuclear use. We should not underestimate the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation if tactical weapons are removed from their storage igloos and dispersed widely among Russian military forces, Sagan warns.

I recently had lunch with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at his home in Palo Alto, California. Perry is 94 years old, one of the last prominent military strategists active today who witnessed firsthand the devastation of the Second World War. He served in the U.S. Army of Occupation of Japan, and nothing that he had read about the firebombing of Tokyo prepared him for what he saw therea great city burned to the ground, the survivors living amid fused rubble, dependent on military rations. In Naha, the capital of Okinawa, the destruction seemed even worse. In his memoir, Perry writes that not a building was left standing, and includes a famous description: The lush tropical landscape was turned into a vast field of mud, lead, decay, and maggots. What Perry saw in Japan left him profoundly unsettled by the nuclear threat. Naha and Tokyo had been devastated by tens of thousands of bombs dropped in hundreds of air raids; Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by a single atomic bomb each.

Perry later earned advanced degrees in mathematics and became an early Silicon Valley pioneer, specializing in satellite surveillance and the use of digital technology for electronic warfare. During the Cuban missile crisis, he traveled to Washington, D.C., at the request of the CIA, and scrutinized satellite photographs of Cuba for evidence of Soviet nuclear weapons. He helped prepare the morning intelligence reports for President Kennedy and wondered every night whether the next day would be his last. As an undersecretary of defense during the Carter administration, Perry played a crucial role in developing stealth technology, and as secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, he led the effort to lock up nuclear weapons and fissile material at locations throughout the former Soviet Union. After leaving the Pentagon, he earned a dovish reputation, joining Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz in 2008 in a plea for the abolition of nuclear weapons; opposing American plans for new ground-based, long-range ballistic missiles; and calling upon the United States to make a formal declaration that it would never be the first to launch a nuclear attack. But Perrys views on the Russian invasion of Ukraine are anything but warm and fuzzy.

We ate sandwiches that Perry had prepared, with bread hed baked, sitting on a large terrace where the planters overflowed with flowers and hummingbirds hovered at feeders, beneath a brilliant blue sky. The setting could not have been more bucolic, the idea of nuclear war more remote. A few days earlier, Perry had given a speech at Stanford, outlining what was at stake in Ukraine. The peace that had reigned in Europe for almost eight decades had been shattered on February 24, he said, and if Russias invasion is successful, we should expect to see other invasions. Putin was now engaging in blackmail, threatening to use nuclear weapons for offensive, not defensive, purposes, trying to deter the United States from providing the conventional weapons that Ukraine badly needs. I fear that if we give in to this outrageous threat, Perry said, we will face it again.

Perrys manner is thoughtful, calm, and gentle, not the least bit alarmist or overemotional. Ive known him for more than a decade, and though his voice has grown softer, his mind is remarkably undimmed, and beneath his warmth and kindness lies steel. Perry has met Putin on a number of occasions, dating back to when he was the deputy mayor of St. Petersburgand thinks Putin will use tactical weapons in Ukraine if it seems advantageous to do so. Although the Russian Federations declared policy is to use nuclear weapons only when confronted with an existential threat to the state, public declarations from Moscow should always be taken with a grain of salt. The Soviet Union adamantly denied having any missile bases in Cuba as it was building them. It publicly vowed for years never to be the first to use a nuclear weapon, while secretly adopting war plans that began with large-scale nuclear attacks on NATO bases and European cities. The Kremlin denied having any intention to invade Ukraine, right up until it invaded Ukraine. Perry always found Putin to be competent and disciplined, but cold. He believes that Putin is rational at the moment, not deranged, and would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve victory and thereby ensure the survival of his regime.

During the Cold War, the United States based thousands of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in NATO countries and planned to use them on the battlefield in the event of a Soviet invasion. In September 1991, President George H. W. Bush unilaterally ordered all of Americas ground-based tactical weapons to be removed from service and destroyed. Bushs order sent a message that the Cold War was overand that the United States no longer considered tactical weapons to be useful on the battlefield. The collateral damage they would cause, the unpredictable patterns of lethal radioactive fallout, seemed counterproductive and unnecessary. The United States was developing precision conventional weapons that could destroy any important target without breaking the nuclear taboo. But Russia never got rid of its tactical nuclear weapons. And as the strength of its conventional military forces waned, it developed very low-yield and ultra low-yield nuclear weapons that produce relatively little fallout. In the words of a leading Russian nuclear-weapons designer, they are environmentally conscious. The more than 100 peaceful nuclear explosions conducted by the Soviet Unionostensibly to obtain knowledge about using nuclear devices for mundane tasks, like the excavation of reservoirsfacilitated the design of very low-yield tactical weapons.

Two nuclear detonations have already occurred in Ukraine, as part of the Soviet Unions Program No. 7Peaceful Explosions for the National Economy. In 1972, a nuclear device was detonated supposedly to seal a runaway gas well at a mine in Krasnograd, about 60 miles southwest of Kharkiv. The device had an explosive force about one-quarter as large as that of the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. In 1979, a nuclear device was detonated for the alleged purpose of eliminating methane gas at a coal mine near the town of Yunokommunarsk, in the Donbas. It had an explosive force about one-45th as large as that of the Hiroshima bomb. Neither the workers at the mine nor the 8,000 residents of Yunokommunarsk were informed about the nuclear blast. The coal miners were given the day off for a civil-defense drill, then sent back to work in the mine.

Tom Nichols: We need to relearn what wed hoped to forget

The weakness of Russias conventional forces compared with those of the United States, Perry suggests, and Russias relative advantage in tactical weapons are factors that might lead Putin to launch a nuclear attack in Ukraine. It would greatly benefit Russia to establish the legitimacy of using tactical nuclear weapons. To do so, Putin must choose the right target. Perry believes that a demonstration strike above the Black Sea would gain Putin little; the destruction of a Ukrainian city, with large civilian casualties, would be a tremendous mistake. But if Russia can destroy a military target without much radioactive fallout, without civilian casualties, and without prompting a strong response from the United States, Perry says, I dont think theres a big downside. Russia has more nuclear weapons than any other nation in the world. Its national pride is strongly linked to its nuclear weapons. Its propagandists celebrate the possible use of nuclear weaponsagainst Ukraine, as well as against the United States and its NATO allieson an almost daily basis, in an attempt to normalize their use. Its military has already destroyed Ukrainian cities, deliberately targeted hospitals, killed thousands of civilians, countenanced looting and rape. The use of an ultra low-yield nuclear weapon against a purely military target might not seem too controversial. I think there would be an international uproar, but I dont think it would last long, Perry says. It might blow over in a week or two.

If the United States gets intelligence that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon, Perry believes that the information should be publicized immediately. And if Russia uses one, the United States should call for international condemnation, create as big a ruckus as possiblestressing the word nuclearand take military action, with or without NATO allies. The reprisal should be strong and focused and conventional, not nuclear. It should be confined to Ukraine, ideally with targets linked to the nuclear attack. You want to go as little up the escalation ladder as you can get away with doing and still have a profound and relevant effect, Perry says. But if Putin responds by using another nuclear weapon, you take off the gloves the second time around and perhaps destroy Russias military forces in Ukraine, which the United States could readily do with conventional weapons. Perry realizes that these escalations would be approaching the kind of Dr. Strangelove scenarios that Herman Kahn wrote about. But if we end up fighting a war with Russia, that would be Putins choice, not ours.

Perry has been warning for many years that the nuclear danger is growing. The invasion of Ukraine has unfortunately confirmed his prediction. He believes that the odds of a full-scale nuclear war were much higher during the Cuban missile crisis, but that the odds of a nuclear weapon being used are higher now. Perry doesnt expect that Russia will destroy a Ukrainian air base with a tactical weapon. But he wouldnt be surprised. And he hopes the United States will not be self-deterred by nuclear blackmail. That would encourage other countries to get nuclear weapons and threaten their neighbors.

As I listened to the recording of my conversation with Bill Perry, it was filled with the incongruous sounds of wind chimes and birds singing. Vladimir Putin can determine if, when, and where a nuclear attack occurs in Ukraine. But he cannot control what happens after that. The consequences of that choice, the series of events that would soon unfold, are unknowable. According to The New York Times, the Biden administration has formed a Tiger Team of national-security officials to run war games on what to do if Russia uses a nuclear weapon. One thing is clear, after all my discussions with experts in the field: We must be ready for hard decisions, with uncertain outcomes, that nobody should ever have to make.

Link:

What If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine? - The Atlantic

Vladimir Putins appearanceon the third day of the St Petersburg economic forum, the Kremlin promised, would be an extremely important intervention. And it was. The Russian leaders lengthy address, a rarity since the invasion of Ukraine, was a flame-throwing show of defiance and blame-shifting, a remarkable snapshot of a state of mind that leaves little hope for compromise. It was also a staggering display of weakness that even presidential bluster could not mask.

First, the context. Putin has avoided high-profile public speechesover the past four months, keeping his Victory Day speech brief and pushing back other mainstays of his calendar, like his televised direct linequestion and answer session,a multi-hour marathon that is a crucial part of Kremlin political theater and efforts to burnish the presidents image as benevolent patriarch. So itmattersthat he went ahead with the flagship addressat an investment gathering Russia has long toutedas its answer to Davos, the elite Alpine get-together, thumbing his nose at the West.

See the original post here:

The Weakness of Putin's Economic Show of Force Is Russia's Reality - Bloomberg

Islam is not just another soldier.

"If the Russians take me, I won't be exchanged", said the Chechen fighting with the Ukrainian army near the front line.

"They'll torture me then show me on television."

The 33-year-old dissident, a refugee who has been in Poland for nearly two decades, joined the Sheikh Mansur battalion in April. Founded in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the unit is mostly made up of veterans of the Chechen wars.

It takes its name from the 18th-century Chechen military commander who fought against Russian expansion in the Caucasus a reminder that the Chechen campaign for independence is not new.

"Several hundred" men with shaven heads and long beards like Islam have volunteered to help Ukraine fend off Russia's invasion.

Islam did not reveal exactly how many troops there are in the battalion, or where they are stationed.

He wants to keep their identities secret for fear of reprisals against relatives in Chechnya.

Because just across the front line, there are Chechens loyal to the Kremlin serving with the "Kadyrovites" Chechen militias with a sinister reputation, deployed alongside Russian troops.

They are said to be 8,000 fighters a figure that has not been verified.

"We want to show that not all Chechens are like them many of us see the Russians as aggressors and occupiers," said Islam as bomb sirens blared.

For him, the war here has an air of deja vu.

"It's like a journey into the past, a continuation of what started in the Caucasus," he said calmly, getting out of a van with a broken windscreen and a hurried spray paint job.

Echoes of war

Chechnya's capital, Grozny, destroyed by Russian bombs more than two decades ago, suffered a fate similar to that of Mariupol.

The small Muslim-majority republic was ravaged by two brutal wars. The last, begun by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 1999, led to the installation of Chechnya's strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, who has been accused of ruthlessly suppressing opposition.

As a result, a Chechen diaspora of an estimated 250,000 people has formed in Europe, Turkey, and the UAE.

"I decided to join the battalion (for) the honor of the Chechens Moscow is trying to pass off as terrorists," said Islam, who has received threats for documenting alleged Russian war crimes online.

He takes orders from Deputy Commander Mansour, a battle-scarred 40-year-old soldier.

"Two of us have been killed and others injured. But it's important we're here," Mansur said. "We have things to teach the local soldiers about war."

The Chechen fighters are not officially part of the Ukrainian army. The equipment they use has been recovered from the Russians, and they are fed by locals, mostly Orthodox Christians, who seem to have taken kindly to them.

"We're not here to impose Islamic beliefs we're here to fight a common enemy and defend freedom," said Mansour.

Read the original:

The Chechens Fighting Russia on the Front Line - The Moscow Times

Reflecting a shockingly barbaric and old-fashioned wartime strategy, Russian forces have pummeled Ukrainian cities and towns with a barrage of rockets and other munitions, most of which can be considered relatively crude relics of the Cold War, and many of which have been banned widely under international treaties, according to a New York Times analysis.

The attacks have made repeated and widespread use of weapons that kill, maim and destroy indiscriminately a potential violation of international humanitarian law. These strikes have left civilians including children dead and injured, and they have left critical infrastructure, like schools and homes, a shambles.

The Times examined more than 1,000 pictures taken by its own photojournalists and wire-service photographers working on the ground in Ukraine, as well as visual evidence presented by Ukrainian government and military agencies. Times journalists identified and categorized more than 450 instances in which weapons or groups of weapons were found in Ukraine. All told, there were more than 2,000 identifiable munitions, a vast majority of which were unguided.

The magnitude of the evidence collected and cataloged by The Times shows that the use of these kinds of weapons by Russia has not been limited or anomalous. In fact, it has formed the backbone of the countrys strategy for war since the beginning of the invasion.

Of the weapons identified by The Times, more than 210 were types that have been widely banned under international treaties. All but a handful were cluster munitions, including their submunitions, which can pose a grave risk to civilians for decades after war has ended. More than 330 other weapons appeared to have been used on or near civilian structures.

Because of the difficulties in getting comprehensive information in wartime, these tallies are undercounts. Some of the weapons identified may have been fired by Ukrainian forces in an effort to defend themselves against the invasion, but evidence points to far greater use by Russian forces.

Customary international humanitarian laws and treaties including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their protocols demand that the driving principle in war be military necessity, which mandates all combatants direct their actions toward legitimate military targets. The law requires a balance between a military mission and humanity. Combatants must not carry out attacks that are disproportionate, where the expected civilian harm is clearly excessive, according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to the direct and concrete military advantage that would be anticipated. Combatants must consider distinction, that attacks are directed only toward lawful targets and people and are not applied indiscriminately. And they must not use weapons calculated to inflict unnecessary suffering.

The Russians have violated every single one of those principles almost daily, said Mike Newton, a Vanderbilt University law professor who frequently supports efforts to prosecute war crimes all over the world.

The law of war is far more demanding than the rule of simple expediency and convenience, Professor Newton said. Just because I have a weapon doesnt mean I can use it.

What follows is an analysis of the visual evidence The Times examined in its investigation.

A vast majority of the weapons identified by The Times were unguided munitions, which lack accuracy and, as a result, may be used in greater numbers to destroy a single target. Both of these factors increase the likelihood of shells and rockets falling in areas populated by civilians.

Russia has relied heavily in Ukraine on long-range attacks with unguided weapons, like howitzers and artillery rockets. By comparison, Western military forces have almost entirely converted their arsenals to use guided rockets, missiles and bombs, and they have even developed kits that can turn regular artillery shells into precision weapons. Russia may be limited by sanctions and export controls affecting its ability to restock modern weapons, and much of its precision-guided arsenal may now have been exhausted.

Illustration of a D-30 Howitzer

Illustration of a multibarrel rocket system

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

These Cold War-era, unguided Russian weapons have the capacity to shoot well beyond the range of the human eye many miles past the point where a soldier could see the eventual target. To use these weapons lawfully at long range, Russia would have to use drones or soldiers known as forward observers to watch where the weapons hit, and then radio back corrections. There was little evidence that they were doing so until recently.

I think what were seeing here with the Russians is kind of like what youd see back in World War II, where they just bomb the hell out of people, a senior American defense official said in an interview.

The most surprising thing is, I guess, their philosophy on trying to break the will or the spirit of the Ukrainian people by just leveling large sections or entire towns, said the official, who was not authorized to speak publicly about assessments of Russian behavior in Ukraine. He added: This is what war used to look like, and they just brought it back center stage. And people, I think, are horrified.

Artillery rockets like the 122-millimeter Grad were fielded long before precision-guided weapons were invented. They were designed for something called saturation fire in which a handful of mobile rocket launchers, each of which can fire as many as 40 rockets in about 20 seconds, can offer the same firepower as many dozens of larger towed howitzers. They can essentially flood an area with warheads exploding in rapid succession.

When fired in a barrage, the rockets make up for their comparative inaccuracy with sheer volume blanketing their targets with explosions.

The warheads on these weapons can be devastating. When they explode, they produce a blast wave that can grow in intensity as it bounces off buildings, shattering concrete on neighboring structures and damaging internal organs of anyone nearby. The munitions casing breaks into razor-sharp fragments that can penetrate bodies. Both the blast wave and the fragments can be lethal at various ranges. Here are three common types of weapons Russia has been using in Ukraine whose fragments can be dangerous to unprotected people at great distances.

9N210 submunitions

316 ft

9N210 submunitions

316 ft

Sources: Collective Awareness to Unexploded Ordnance (munitions explosive quantities); U.S. military publications (hazard ranges)

Munitions and remnants of weapons have been found throughout Ukraine, and about one-fifth of those identified were located outside of the areas of Russian troop presence, according to a Times analysis. Though some of the munitions were almost certainly used in airstrikes, many were most likely launched at maximum range, meaning that estimates of troop presence during the span of the war may have underrepresented the extent of the threat to civilians and civilian structures.

Rockets, missiles and other weapons identified in photos

Approximate extent of Russian troop presence

Sources: Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institutes Critical Threats Project (Russian troop presence) | Notes: Only munitions with known city or town locations are included. Extent of Russian troop presence shows combined assessments from March to June.

In the early weeks of the invasion, Russia shifted many of its attacks to highly populated areas with civilian infrastructure, hitting churches, kindergartens, hospitals and sports facilities, often with imprecise long-range unguided munitions that could be heaved blindly from afar, causing wreckage well beyond the boundaries of occupied territory.

The top prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague has opened a formal inquiry into accusations of atrocities in Ukraine. Under international humanitarian law, combatants and commanders are supposed to take all feasible precautionary measures to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, like apartments, houses and other buildings and structures that are not being used for military purposes.

Targeting civilian structures or indiscriminately bombing densely populated areas, depending on the circumstances of an attack, could violate the laws of war, or even possibly be a war crime. And the burden of proof to show that an area was a justified military target and that the attack was proportionate, experts have said, generally falls on the aggressor.

A photo of a warhead spiking the center of a playground, though it may be upsetting, does not necessarily prove that a war crime has been committed. Details of each instance, including the intent behind an attack and the surrounding circumstances, must be thoroughly investigated. (For example, if a school was being used as a military command center, it could potentially be considered a justified target under international law, though that would need to be weighed against other factors, like determining whether an attack would be proportionate.)

Still, experts said documenting evidence of potential violations could be an important first step in that investigative process and could help tell the story of civilians struggling on the ground. And a pattern of widespread attacks involving civilians and protected structures, they said, particularly with imprecise weapons, should not be ignored.

This is a window into the mindset of how Russia views Ukraine, said Pierre-Richard Prosper, who served as U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues under President George W. Bush and who has also been a war crimes prosecutor. And its a window into how Russia views the likelihood that it will be held accountable for its actions.

Its emblematic, he said, of how the Russian government has been operating with impunity on so many fronts.

Over and over, The Times found visual evidence that Russian forces fired on areas that were near easily recognizable civilian buildings. Hundreds of munitions were identified in or near houses and apartment buildings, and dozens were identified in or near schools. Weapons were also identified close to churches, cemeteries, farms, medical facilities and several playgrounds.

The Times found the distinctive remains of cluster munition warheads scattered across Ukraine they were photographed sometimes where they landed, and sometimes where they were gathered in piles. The munitions are a class of weapon comprising rockets, bombs, missiles, mortar and artillery shells that split open midair and dispense smaller submunitions over a wide area.

Although some of the Russian submunitions used in Ukraine have been mines designed to kill people or destroy tanks, they usually take the form of small anti-personnel weapons called bomblets that are cheaply made, mass-produced and contain less than a pound of high explosives each.

About 20 percent of these submunitions fail to detonate on impact and can explode if later handled. Many of the solid-fuel motors tallied by The Times that were left over from rocket attacks might have carried cluster munition warheads, but it was unclear meaning that the cluster weapon tally is likely an undercount.

A number of nongovernmental organizations have reported injuries and deaths in Ukraine resulting from cluster munitions. In February, Human Rights Watch said a Russian ballistic missile carrying submunitions struck near a hospital in Vuhledar, killing four civilians and injuring 10, including health care workers, as well as damaging the hospital, an ambulance and other vehicles.

The same month, according to the human rights organization, Russian forces fired cluster munitions into residential areas in Kharkiv, killing at least three civilians. Amnesty International reported that a cargo rocket dropped bomblets on a nursery and kindergarten in Okhtyrka, in an attack that was said to have killed three people, including a child, and to have wounded another child.

In April, Ukraines Office of the Prosecutor General, which has been investigating potential war crimes, said a man in the village of Mala Kostromka picked up an unexploded submunition, which then detonated, killing him. In May, the office said Russian forces had used cluster munitions in a village in the Dnipropetrovsk region, possibly killing one person. Neither Ukraine nor Russia (nor the United States) have joined the international treaty banning the use of cluster munitions.

Uragan 9M27 rockets have an average range of about 21 miles.

1 Once fired, an Uragan burns through its solid rocket fuel and follows an unguided ballistic course.

2As it nears the target, the warhead separates from the rocket motor, which falls to the ground.

3As the warhead spins, it releases its cargo of bomblets that fall over a wide area.

4About 20 percent of the bomblets will fail to detonate. They become hazardous duds that remain dangerous for many decades.

Uragan 9M27 rockets have an average range of about 21 miles.

2As the warhead spins, it releases its cargo of bomblets that fall over a wide area.

1 Once fired, an Uragan burns through its solid rocket fuel and follows an unguided ballistic course.

3About 20 percent of the bomblets will fail to detonate. They become hazardous duds that remain dangerous for many decades.

Uragan 9M27 rockets have an average range of about 21 miles.

1 Once fired, an Uragan burns through its solid rocket fuel and follows an unguided ballistic course.

3As the warhead spins, it releases its cargo of bomblets that fall over a wide area.

2As it nears the target, the warhead separates from the rocket motor, which falls to the ground.

4About 20 percent of the bomblets will fail to detonate. They become hazardous duds that remain dangerous for many decades.

Sources: Fenix Insight Ltd.; Collective Awareness to Unexploded Ordnance; Armament Research Services (ARES) and Characterisation of Explosive Weapons Project Note: Illustration is not to scale.

The military forces of both Russia and Ukraine are known to have used cluster munitions in Donbas during fighting in 2014 and to have used weapons in civilian spaces. But since the Feb. 24 invasion, with the exception of a single known use attributed to Ukrainian troops, evidence has pointed to nearly exclusive use by Russian forces.

The Times identified these weapons through photos of the skeletal remnants of empty rocket warheads as well as images of unexploded bomblets they left behind some of which were designed to demolish armored vehicles and others to kill people.

The Times defined civilian areas narrowly, as locations in or near identifiable nonmilitary or government buildings or places, like houses, apartment buildings, shops, warehouses, parks, playgrounds, schools, churches, cemeteries and memorials, hospitals, health facilities, agricultural structures and farms. Because some of the visual evidence in both city centers and small villages did not include clear examples of civilian buildings or landmarks, this tally is an undercount as well. The Times did not include infrastructure like roads or bridges.

In the photos below, The Times identified other weapons that are widely scorned by the international humanitarian community: a hand grenade used as a booby trap, an antipersonnel land mine, remnants of incendiary weapons and a group of flechettes.

Novoiakovlivka, Zaporizka

The hand grenade in the first photo, disguised in a crumpled coffee cup, was found by Ukrainians near their home in Zalissya Village, near Brovary. The weapon potentially violates the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which restricts the use of booby traps in the form of seemingly harmless portable objects that can explode if disturbed or approached.

The POM-3 land mine in the second photo is also banned under international humanitarian laws; it can kill and maim civilians long after wars have ended. Ukrainian military officials reported that they found such land mines in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. They are a new type of weapon, equipped with sensors that can detect when people walk nearby unlike older types of land mines, which typically explode when people step on them or disturb attached trip wires. Ukraine is one of 164 nations that have signed a 1997 treaty banning the use of antipersonnel land mines and have pledged to purge their stockpiles, while Russia has refused to join it (as has the United States).

The POM-3 generally is launched by a rocket and then parachutes back to the ground. There, it waits until it senses a person nearby and then launches a small explosive warhead that can detonate midair. The fragments can be lethal to someone as far as 50 feet away. In April, the HALO Trust, a British American nonprofit that removes explosive remnants of weapons after armed conflicts, told The Times that these create a threat that we dont have a response for.

The third photo shows small, hexagonal cylinders of thermite an incendiary compound used in some Russian rockets and bombs that have been seen bursting open mid-air, streaming burning sticks of thermite onto the ground below. International law specifically prohibits their use near civilian areas.

The fourth photo shows a handful of flechettes, essentially tiny steel arrows released from certain types of shells. Using them does not necessarily violate international humanitarian law, but the weapons could potentially run afoul of the laws of war if deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or if used in civilian areas because of their indiscriminate, lethal nature.

Even guided munitions, which are not generally banned on their face, can potentially run afoul of international humanitarian laws if they are used to harm civilians or structures without a justified military target. The Times found evidence of more than a dozen guided weapons in civilian locations.

Russias weapons strategy will reverberate far into Ukraines future. The Times found visual evidence of more than 120 rockets, bombs, shells and other munitions in Ukraine that failed to detonate or were abandoned. That count is surely just the tip of the iceberg, according to experts, who have said that proper cleanup of these weapons will take years.

Leftover munitions not only pose a danger to civilians if they unexpectedly explode, but also can wreak havoc on the environment, contaminating drinking water, soil and air, sometimes sickening or killing people. They can hinder rebuilding after fighting has ended, experts said, because people sometimes cannot return to their homes or cannot reach essential services.

Cherkaska Lozova, Kharkiv

In April, HALO, which stands for Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization, told The Times that future efforts to remove explosives in Ukraine would require roughly the same number of workers as its current operation in Afghanistan, which has suffered decades of conflict.

Unexploded ordnance poses a serious and ongoing threat, even decades after wars are fought. In Syria, land mines, explosive remnants and unexploded weapons were a leading cause of child casualties last year, making up about a third of recorded injuries and deaths and leaving many children permanently disabled.

In Laos, where the United States used cluster munitions extensively during the Vietnam War, nine million to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict, causing more than 10,000 civilian casualties, according to the Congressional Research Service. More than a full century after World War I, unexploded shells still litter parts of Europe where battles were fought. Some zones are still uninhabited because they are considered unsafe.

In addition to launching weapons that have failed to explode in Ukraine, Russia has also attacked local arms depots, causing fires and explosions that typically can fling hundreds of damaged and unstable munitions into surrounding areas.

Leila Sadat, a professor of international law at Washington University in St. Louis and a special adviser to the International Criminal Court prosecutor since 2012, said there was a huge degree of weapon contamination that then Ukrainians have to address, assuming they can come back to these areas.

Ukraine, Prof. Sadat said, could become a wasteland.

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What Hundreds of Photos of Weapons Reveal About Russia's Brutal War Strategy - The New York Times

She says:

"The best, better than anyone else, with all this music."

You have got Russian music, special Russian music?

"Yes, yes," she says, "every single day and night."

She is referring to the daily rhythm of small-arms fire and explosions which echo through Lysychansk and its twin city across the valley.

Over here is the city of Severodonetsk, which is now half-occupied by the Russians. You can see where the battle is raging and smoke filling the entire valley here. And you just got to wonder how long that they can hold on, the Ukrainians, there before finally the Russians come up to the river.

Today, Russian state TV released footage it claims is inside Severodonetsk, showing its soldiers recovering what appears to be a Western-supplied anti-tank weapon. These images will be difficult to stomach for the authorities in Kyiv, who are watching Russians slowly gaining ground and removing all trace of the Ukrainian state.

The Russian advance is forcing some families to leave neighboring Lysychansk, a few bags and a cherished companion. Ukraine's modern-day evacuees are dispatched with a prayer for safe delivery.

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Russia slowly advances in the Donbas region - PBS NewsHour

Valentin Yumashev, the son-in-law of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, has left his position as a Kremlin adviser, according to a Monday report by Reuters.

The media outlet cited two people close to the situation as saying Yumashev, described as a key element to Russian President Vladimir Putin's rise to power, quit his role in April. He is the latest of several prominent Russian officials to resign since Putin launched his war on Ukraine that will hit the 100-day mark Friday.

Reuters noted Yumashev worked in an unpaid capacity and had only "limited influence on Putin's decision-making," but his name recognition, past influence and connection to Yeltsin make his resignation a high-profile loss to the Kremlin.

Lyudmila Telen, who works as first deputy executive director of the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Centerwhere Yumashev serves as a member of the board of trusteesreportedly said he left his position last month. She also indicated it was Yumashev's own decision to leave.

Another person said to be knowledgeable of the situation spoke with Reuters on the condition of anonymity. That source also said Yumashev stepped down from his role as a presidential adviser in April.

No explanation has been given for Yumashev's departure, but his daughter posted an anti-war message with a Ukrainian flag on Instagram on February 24the day Putin's forces began attacks in Ukraine.

Yumashev is married to Yeltsin's younger daughter, Tatyana, and was once an aide to his since-deceased father-in-law. The BBC reported that Yumashev, while serving as Yeltsin's chief of staff, gave Putin his first job in the Kremlin in 1997. He was said to have later recommended to Yelstin that Putin become his successor.

Since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, other top Russian officials have stepped down from their posts. One of the most powerful was Anatoly Chubais, a longtime government official who acted as Putin's envoy to international organizations concerned about sustainable development, according to the Associated Press. Like Yumashev, Chubais was once a top aide to Yeltsin.

On May 23, Boris Bondarev, Russia's diplomat to the United Nations, announced his resignation over the nation's invasion of Ukraine. In a letter sent to other diplomats, Bondarev wrote that he has "never been so ashamed of my country as on February 24 of this year."

Arkady Dvorkovich, a former Russian deputy prime minister, quit his role as chairman of the Skolkovo Foundationa top state-sponsored science organizationafter the war began, the AP reported.

Additionally, Zhanna Agalakova and Lila Gildeyeva both gave up their jobs as anchors on Russian state-run TV channels over the invasion. And Elena Kovalskaya, who worked as the director of a state-run theater located in Moscow, also resigned out of protest, according to Business Insider.

Newsweek reached out to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov for comment.

The rest is here:

Putin Loses Another Close Ally as Russia Closes in on 100 Days in Ukraine - Newsweek

Sat, May 28 20224:55 PM EDT

This photograph shows a railway wagon and sleepers burning after a shelling near the Lyman station in Lyman, eastern Ukraine, on April 28, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Yasuyoshi Chiba | AFP | Getty Images

Russian forces stepped up their assault on the Ukrainian city of Sievierodonetsk on Saturday after claiming to have captured the nearby rail hub of Lyman, as Kyiv intensified its calls for longer-range weaponry from the West to help it fight back in the Donbas region.

Slow, solid Russian gains in recent days point to a subtle momentum shift in the war, now in its fourth month. The invading forces appear close to seizing all of the Luhansk region of Donbas, one of the more modest war goals the Kremlin set after abandoning its assault on Kyiv in the face of Ukrainian resistance.

Russia's defense ministry said on Saturday its troops and allied separatist forces were now in full control of Lyman, the site of a railway junction west of the Siverskyi Donets River in the Donetsk region that neighbors Luhansk.

However, Ukraine's deputy defense minister, Hanna Malyar, said the battle for Lyman continued, the ZN.ua website reported.

Sievierodonetsk, some 60 km (40 miles) from Lyman on the eastern side of the river and the largest Donbas city still held by Ukraine, was under heavy assault from the Russians.

"Sievierodonetsk is under constant enemy fire," Ukrainian police posted on social media on Saturday.

Russian artillery was also shelling the Lysychansk-Bakhmut road, which Russia must take to close a pincer movement and encircle Ukrainian forces.

"There was significant destruction in Lysychansk," the police said.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 20221:08 PM EDT

A senior pro-Russian official in the occupied Ukrainian region of Kherson told Reuters on Saturday that nearby fighting could affect the timing of its formal bid to join Russia and a decision was likely "towards next year."

Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian-backed Kherson Military-Civilian Administration, also said in a video call that the process might involve a referendum, backtracking on previous comments that none would be needed.

Asked about the timetable for joining Russia, he replied: "It won't happen by autumn. We're preparing an administrative system and then towards next year we will see what the situation is like."

Stremousov told Russian state media on May 11 that Kherson, just north of Crimea and the only regional capital that Russia has captured in more than three months of fighting in Ukraine, would ask President Vladimir Putin to incorporate it into Russia by the end of 2022. He said at the time: "There will be no referendums."

In his interview with Reuters, however, he said there could be a vote.

"We'll announce later when some kind of vote or plebiscite is planned, but it won't be today and it won't be tomorrow because our first task is to restore order in the Kherson region," he said.

Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies have since March predicted that Moscow would hold a referendum on incorporating Kherson into Russia, as it did after seizing Crimea in 2014.

Russia has said that the fate of the Kherson region is for local residents to decide. Ukraine has pledged to expel Russian forces from all the land they have seized.

A small-time local politician and anti-vaccine video blogger before the arrival of Russian troops, Stremousov, 45, has teamed up with pro-Russian former Kherson mayor Volodymyr Saldo, serving as his deputy in the region's Russian-appointed government.

Both Stremousov and Saldo are wanted for treason by Ukraine.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 202210:28 AM EDT

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends the plenary session of the First Eurasian Economic Forum in Bishkek, via video link from Moscow, Russia May 26, 2022.

Mikhail Metzel | Sputnik | Reuters

Russian President Vladimir Putin told the leaders of France and Germany in a phone call on Saturday that Russia was willing to discuss ways to make it possible for Ukraine to resume shipments of grain from Black Sea ports, the Kremlin said.

Russia and Ukraine account for nearly a third of global wheat supplies, while Russia is also a key global fertilizer exporter and Ukraine is a major exporter of corn and sunflower oil.

"For its part, Russia is ready to help find options for the unhindered export of grain, including the export of Ukrainian grain from Black Sea ports," the Kremlin said.

It said he also informed French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Russia was ready to increase its export of fertilizers and agricultural products if sanctions against it were lifted - a demand he has raised in conversations with the Italian and Austrian leaders in recent days.

Ukraine and Western countries have accused Russia of weaponizing the food crisis created by its invasion of Ukraine, which has sent the prices of grains, cooking oils, fuel and fertilizer soaring.

Russia has blamed the situation on Western sanctions against it, and on the mining of Ukrainian ports.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 20229:34 AM EDT

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron attend a news conference ahead of a Weimar Triangle meeting to discuss the ongoing Ukraine crisis, in Berlin, Germany, February 8, 2022.

Hannibal Hanschke | Reuters

Russian President Vladimir Putin held a call with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The group discussed stalled negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, with the Kremlin saying Kyiv was to blame for the current impasse. Putin "confirmed the openness of the Russian side to the resumption of dialogue," Russia said in a read-out following the 80-minute call.

Scholz and Macron called on Putin "to engage in serious direct negotiations with the President of Ukraine and to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict," according to a read-out from the German Federal Government.

Putin also said the West delivering weapons to Ukraine could risk "further destabilization of the situation and the aggravation of the humanitarian crisis."

Jessica Bursztynsky

Sat, May 28 20229:27 AM EDT

Russia successfully test-fired a hypersonic Zircon cruise missile over a distance of about 1,000 km (625 miles), the defense ministry said on Saturday.

The missile was fired from the Barents Sea and hit a target in the White Sea, it said. Video released by the ministry showed the missile being fired from a ship and blazing into the sky on a steep trajectory.

President Vladimir Putin has described the Zircon as part of a new generation of unrivaled arms systems. Hypersonic weapons can travel at nine times the speed of sound, and Russia has conducted previous test-launches of the Zircon from warships and submarines in the past year.

Russia's military has suffered heavy losses of men and equipment during its three-month invasion of Ukraine, which it calls a "special operation", but it has continued to stage high-profile weapons tests to remind the world of its prowess in missile technology.

Last month it test-launched a new nuclear-capable intercontinental missile, the Sarmat, capable of carrying 10 or more warheads and striking the United States.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 20225:58 AM EDT

Russia's defence ministry said on Saturday that the eastern Ukrainian town of Lyman had fallen under the full control of Russian and Russian-backed forces in the region.

Pro-Russian separatists from the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic had said on Friday that they had fully captured the town, a railway hub west of Sievierodonetsk.

Ukraine said on Friday that Russia had captured most of Lyman but that its forces were blocking an advance to Sloviansk, a city 20 kilometres (12 miles) southwest.

Ukrainian and Russian forces have been fighting for Lyman for several days.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 20223:42 AM EDT

Russian forces have likely captured most of the Ukrainian town of Lyman in the north of the Donetsk Oblast, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry. It is seen as likely to be a preliminary operation for the next stage of Russia's Donbas offensive.

"Lyman is strategically important because it is the site of a major railway junction, and also gives access to important rail and road bridges over the Siverskyy Donets River," the U.K. ministry said via Twitter.

"In the coming days, Russian units in the area are likely to prioritise forcing a crossing of the river. For now, Russia's main effort likely remains 40 km to the east, around the Sieverodonetsk pocket but a bridgehead near Lyman would give Russia an advantage in the potential next phase of the Donbas offensive, when it will likely seek to advance on key Ukrainian-held cities deeper in Donetsk Oblast, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk."

Sam Meredith

Sat, May 28 20223:35 AM EDT

Russia has pressed its offensive to capture key points in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, with more bombing of residential areas.

Aris Messinis | Afp | Getty Images

Russian forces have begun direct assaults on built-up areas in Severodonetsk despite not yet having fully encircled the Ukrainian city, according to The Institute for the Study of War, a U.S.-based think tank.

In its latest daily assessment, the ISW said Russian forces were likely to struggle to take ground in Severodonetsk itself, citing a poor track record in operations in built-up areas in urban terrain throughout the war to date.

"Russian forces will likely continue to make incremental advances and may succeed in encircling Severodonetsk in the coming days, but Russian operations around Izyum remain stalled and Russian forces will likely be unable to increase the pace of their advances," the ISW said.

Sam Meredith

Sat, May 28 20223:24 AM EDT

Russian forces have began direct assaults on built-up areas of Severodonetsk, a city in the Luhansk Oblast and one of Russia's immediate tactical priorities.

Sopa Images | Lightrocket | Getty Images

Ukrainian forces may have to retreat from their last pocket in the Luhansk region to avoid being captured, a Ukrainian official said, as Russian troops press an advance in the east that has shifted the momentum of the three-month-old war.

A withdrawal could bring Russian President Vladimir Putin closer to his goal of capturing eastern Ukraine's Luhansk and Donetsk regions in full. His troops have gained ground in the two areas collectively known as the Donbas while blasting some towns to wastelands.

Luhansk's governor, Serhiy Gaidai, said Russian troops had entered Sievierodonetsk, the largest Donbas city still held by Ukraine, after trying to trap Ukrainian forces there for days, though adding that Russian forces would not be able to capture the Luhansk region "as analysts have predicted".

"We will have enough strength and resources to defend ourselves. However, it is possible that in order not to be surrounded we will have to retreat," Gaidai said on Telegram.

Gaidai said 90% of buildings in Sievierodonetsk were damaged with 14 high-rises destroyed in the latest shelling.

Reuters

Sat, May 28 20223:23 AM EDT

Tanks of pro-Russian troops drive along a street during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the town of Popasna in the Luhansk Region, Ukraine May 26, 2022.

Alexander Ermochenko | Reuters

Luhansk regional governor Serhiy Gaidai has said there are approximately 10,000 Russian troops in Ukraine's eastern region.

"These are the [units] that are permanently in Luhansk region that are trying to assault and are attempting to make gains in any direction they can," Gaidai said on Ukrainian television.

CNBC was not able to independently verify this report.

Sam Meredith

Fri, May 27 20226:29 PM EDT

The 106m-long and 18m-high super luxury motor yacht Amadea, one of the largest yacht in the world is seen after anchored at pier in Pasatarlasi for bunkering with 9 fuel trucks, on February 18, 2020 in Bodrum district of Mugla province in Turkey.

Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

The United States won the latest round of a legal battle to seize a $325-million Russian-owned superyacht in Fiji, with the case now appearing headed for the Pacific nation's top court.

The case has highlighted thethorny legal groundthe U.S. finds itself on as it tries to seize assets of Russian oligarchs around the world. Those intentions are welcomed by many governments and citizens who oppose the war in Ukraine, but some actions are raising questions about how far U.S. jurisdiction extends.

Fiji's Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Feizal Haniff, who represents the company that legally owns the superyacht Amadea. Haniff had argued the U.S. had no jurisdiction under Fiji's mutual assistance laws to seize the vessel, at least until a court sorted out who really owned the Amadea.

Haniff said he now plans to take the case to Fiji's Supreme Court and will apply for a court order to stop U.S. agents sailing the Amadea from Fiji before the appeal is heard.

As part of its ruling, the appeals court ordered that its judgment not take effect for seven days, presumably to give time for any appeals to be filed.

The U.S. argues that its investigation has found that behind various fronts, the Cayman Islands-flagged luxury yacht is really owned by the sanctioned Russian oligarch Suleiman Kerimov, an economist and former Russian politician.

Associated Press

Sat, May 28 20223:22 AM EDT

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Pro-Moscow Kherson official sees decision 'toward next year' on joining Russia; Kremlin forces advance in the east of Ukraine - CNBC

The sharp polarisation between mainly western liberal democracies and the rest of the world in perceptions of Russia has been laid bare in an annual global poll of attitudes towards democracy.

Within Europe, 55% of those surveyed for the Alliance of Democracies said they were in favour of cutting economic ties with Russia due to Vladimir Putins invasion of Ukraine, whereas in Asia there was a majority against, and in Latin America opinion was evenly split.

Negative views of Russia are largely confined to Europe and other liberal democracies. Positive views of Russia have been retained in China, Indonesia, Egypt, Vietnam, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The annual Democracy Perception Index, carried out after the invasion of Ukraine, covers 52 highly populated countries in Asia, Latin America, the US and Europe.

Majorities in a total of 20 countries thought economic ties with Russia should not be cut due to the war in Ukraine. They included Greece, Kenya, Turkey, China, Israel, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, Algeria, the Philippines, Hungary, Mexico, Thailand, Morocco, Malaysia, Peru, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia. Colombians were evenly split.

By contrast, among the 31 countries that favoured cutting ties, 20 were in Europe.

Although Russian diplomats will point to the findings as evidence that global public opinion does not share western interpretations of events in Ukraine, the level of distrust of Russia in some countries was high.

The countries with a widely held most negative view of Russia included Poland (net negative 87%), Ukraine (80%), Portugal (79%), Italy (65%), UK (65%), Sweden (77%), US (62%) and Germany (62%). Even in Hungary whose leader Viktor Orbn is an ally of Putin a net 32% have a negative view of Russia. In Venezuela, often seen as propped up by Russia, the local population has a net negative view of Russia of 36%.

Countries with a net positive view of Russia included India (36%) Indonesia (14%), Saudi Arabia (11 %), Algeria (29%), Morocco (4%), and Egypt (7%).

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Despite the mixed views about Russia, strong sympathy was shown for Ukraine. Most people surveyed in Asia, Latin America and Europe thought Nato, the US and the EU could do more to help Ukraine. In Latin America, 62% of respondents thought Nato has done too little and only 6% too much. In Europe 43% said Europe has done too little and 11% too much. In China, 34% said the US has done too much to help. Nearly half (46%) globally said that the European Union, United States and Nato were doing too little to assist Ukraine, while 11% said they are doing too much.

Negative perceptions of China are not as widespread as for Russia. British respondents were the most likely to want to cut economic ties with China if it invaded Taiwan.

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Negative views of Russia mainly limited to western liberal democracies, poll shows - The Guardian

This week, events in Ukraine continued to demonstrate the fluid nature of war. After their successes in the Battle of Kyiv, and the Battle of Kharkiv, the Ukrainians ceded territory in the east. It is indicative of the Russian military's determination to continue its Ukrainian campaign.

The Russians have made steady, if slow, progress in the conduct of their eastern offensive in the Donbas. These tactical advances are probably part of a wider Russian operational design to envelop the territory that forms the last parts of Luhansk under Ukrainian control.

But the Russian successes in the east are also indicators of another more important trend in this war: the Russians are starting to learn from their earlier failures.

Before exploring this in detail, a short detour is necessary to define a method for exploring where the Russians have learned.

Military organisationsincluding in Russia, the US and Australia use principles of war to instruct their soldiers, develop common tactics, and to organise combat and support formations. These principles are, in effect, maxims that represent essential truths about the practice of successful wars, military campaigns and operations.

In the context of this exploration of Russian learning, three principles of war in particular stand out. These are: selection and maintenance of the aim, concentration of force, and cooperation.

In war, and in any military action, the aim must be simple, widely understood and within the means of the forces available. The initial Russian war aims were broad ranging, and did not count on massive Western military aid to Ukraine.

It quickly became clear that these aims were beyond Russian military capacity. The Russians had allocated an invading military that was smaller than that of the state it was attacking, and failed.

More recently, the Russians as highlighted in briefings by senior Russian officershave consolidated their aims to narrower objectives in the east. And they have shifted their forces to give themselves a better chance at achieving these tighter strategic goals. This leads to the second principle of war where Russia has clearly learned.

Success in war often depends on achieving a concentration of military force at the most effective time and place. This should then be supported by efforts such as information operations and diplomacy to magnify the impact of the concentrated military forces.

Early on, the Russians sought to prosecute their war against Ukraine on four ground fronts in the north, northeast, east and south of the country. Another front was the clearly disconnected air and missile attacks against Ukraine.

As shown by the failures around Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Russians have had to reassess this approach. First, they realigned the deployment of their forces so they had fewer "fronts" to support. Second, the Russians have focused their offensive operations in one part of the country the east while largely defending other parts such as in the south and the northeast.

The preponderance of their combat power is in the east, especially Luhansk. They are using this concentration of combat forces to bludgeon their way through Ukrainian defences, destroy military units and population centres, and capture additional territory.

But in stripping forces from other regions, it has made them vulnerable elsewhere. The Ukrainians have thus launched a counter offensive around Kherson.

A final principle of war is cooperation. This is a principle that aims to ensure resources are employed to best effect through the well-planned and cunning orchestration of operations at every level.

Early in the war, it was clear the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force were poorly aligned. At the same time, the Russian inability to effectively use combined arms operations on the groundto synchronise infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers and logistics was another indication of their lack of adherence to the principle of cooperation.

The operations in the east demonstrate a degree of learning in this regard. The Russian air force sortie rate has improved, and it is concentrating much of its efforts to support ground operations in the east. At the same time, there is coordination of Russian ground forces. They have moved slowly and cautiously, used their advantage in artillery well, and have been careful not to expose their logistics to attack.

And at the higher level, the Russians have appointed a senior Russian general as the overall commander of the Ukrainian campaign. It has been a brutal and destructive approach in the east, but the Russians are likely to see it as successful.

This begs a larger question: What might be the impact of this Russian tactical learning be on the overall conduct of the war? The Russians have generated tactical momentum in the east, but how far they can carry their current advances will depend on their logistics, Ukraine's defensive strategy, and the conduct of Ukrainian offensives elsewhere that might draw away Russian forces.

And despite recent Russian gains, the overall strategic balance still appears to favour Ukraine. They have significant reserves of personnel available. The Ukrainians have also demonstrated better tactical leadership, morale and strategic planning than the Russians.

And finally, the massive inflow of Western arms, including longer range rocket artillery and precision weapons, gives the Ukrainians a significant edge over a Russian Army whose access to such systems is being constrained by Western sanctions.

All wars are ultimately a learning competition; they are in effect an adaptation battle.

Russia has demonstrated some capacity to learn from its mistakes at the tactical level. But its ability as a nation to learn and adapt to the economic, diplomatic, informational and other impacts of its flawed strategy to invade Ukraine remains to be seen.

Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.

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The Russians may be learning from the mistakes of the Ukraine war. But are they adapting fast enough? - ABC News

National flag flies over the Russian Central Bank headquarters in Moscow, Russia May 27, 2022. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov/File Photo

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May 30 (Reuters) - SPB Exchange, Russia's second-largest bourse, said on Monday it will transfer up to 14% of U.S.-listed shares that its clients possess to a non-trading account after the central bank said it will restrict trading in some foreign shares.

Financial links between Russia and external markets have been damaged by sweeping sanctions that the West imposed after Moscow sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24.

Citing the need to protect investors' rights and interests, the central bank said it decided from May 30 to restrict trading in foreign shares that have been blocked by international clearing houses, except for shares of foreign companies that carry out "production and economic activity mostly in Russia."

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SPB said the decision was caused by restrictions imposed by Euroclear and will impact shares with primary listing in the United States.

"Freely traded foreign securities will be completely separated from securities that cannot be traded until the change in Euroclear's policy towards Russian depositories," SBP said in a statement.

This implies investors that used to trade U.S. stocks via SPB Exchange, which specialises on foreign shares, will retain their ownership rights but will lose access to some of their holdings of U.S. stocks, including blue chips, such as Apple (AAPL.O) or Tesla .

Tinkoff, one of Russia's leading brokerages, said it had engaged lawyers to protects interest and rights of its clients.

SPB saw a surge in trading volumes during the COVID-19 pandemic and, before Feb. 24, was hoping for a listing on the Nasdaq Global Select Market in the first half of 2022 after its domestic initial public offering. read more

In money terms, the separation will affect less than 14% of all shares in clients' portfolio and will have no impact on the number of shares the bourse offers, which currently exceeds 1,650, SBP said.

The central bank's decision will not affect shares of companies with Russian roots, such as HeadHunter Group (HHR.O) Yandex N.V. (YNDX.O), Ozon Holdings PLC (OZON.O) and Cian PLC (CIAN.N).

"The Bank of Russia, SPB Exchange and trading participants are constantly working to develop a system solution, interacting with international counterparties," SPB said.

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Reporting by Reuters; editing by David Evans

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Russia freezes trading in up to 14% of U.S.-listed shares on SPB Exchange - Reuters