Category Archives: Populism

An audience of about 200 attended a conversation Friday night (Oct. 29) between Jason Kander and Congressman Adam Schiff at the St. Louis County Library headquarters in Frontenac. Kander, former Missouri Secretary of State, and Schiff are both Jewish. It was one of the first return to live events in the librarys author series.

It coincided with the publishing of Schiffs first book, Midnight in Washington: How We Almost Lost Our Democracy. Schiff discussed his workaholic nature, with the consequences of not getting enough sleep, and why he persisted in politics after losing his first two attempts at elected office, as a candidate for the 43rd district seat in the California state assembly: As my 93-year-old father says, Whats the point of being a Schiff if you cant be stubborn?

Schiff discussed the increased threats of violence he deals with, and misinformation disseminated by some media sources, including social media. He specifically addressed the presence of about a dozen QAnon protestors outside the library before the event:

You saw the protestors. Ill sometimes get off a plane and somebody will recognize me and say, I want to shake your hand, you are my hero, Another person will see me and say, I dont want to shake your hand, you lie all the time. They cant both be right. We need to figure out how to be good consumers of information. This downward spiral, particularly online, is dangerous.

The final question Kander posed to Schiff was related to the congressmans grim assessment of the political divide in America. Kander asked if Schiff had any reason to be optimistic about the future, and Schiff said the answer is yes. He explained that while the countrys leaders tell him theyve never previously seen anything like the level of violence seen at the January attack on the U.S. Capitol, At the same time they recognize just how incredibly resilient this country is . . .

The countrys endless capacity to reinvent itself and the millions and millions of decent, wonderful people who live in every state. This wave of xenophobic populism didnt start here. It was already creating the Viktor Orbn, the right-wing populists in Poland, the right-wing parties in Austria and Germany. This is a global phenomenon, and it will not persist if we do our job as Americans.

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In visit to STL, Jewish congressman addresses QAnon, Jan. 6 and future of democracy - St. Louis Jewish Light

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Forget Machiavelli.

In the world of politics these days, its not better to be feared than loved. Nor is it better to be loved. The key to success in the Western worlds hyper-polarized political culture is to be neither.

Just look at Joe Biden. Or Frances Emmanuel Macron. Or Mario Draghi. Or even Germanys Olaf Scholz (who?).

What these men all of whom are gathering this weekend for the G20 meeting in Rome have in common is not just their whiteness, but that most voters in their home countries find them at best to be more or lessmeh.

Biden, though loved by his party faithful, has the dubious distinction of having the lowest approval rating of any president at this stage of his term with the exception of Donald Trump. At just 41 percent, Macrons ratingis even worse though not bad by recent French standards. By comparison, Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank, who won his office by appointment, not election, looks like a man of the people with 47 percent approval.

Blame populism. What the leading lights of Western democracy all have in common is that theyre under constant fire from the populist right. That means their base isnt comprised of just traditional supporters, but of voters who feel they have no other choice.

Just a few years ago, personality was the coin of the Western political realm. And it wasnt just Trump. Macron, a pro-EU former socialist who promised to reinvent France as we know it, the U.K.s Boris Johnson and Austrias Sebastian Kurz all rose to power as one-man shows.

But slick populism has turned out to have the allure of a one-night stand. Trump and Kurz are gone. Johnson is still around, but with an approval rating of just 32 percent, the U.K. leader is no longer the all-conquering take back control Brexit leader of years past.

To be taken seriously in 2021, it helps to be reviled by half your electorate. The fact that Macron is holding firm in France has as much to do with his political skills as it does with the fact that some of his main challengers would be best described as the far right and the ultra-far right.

Despite their popularity deficit, chances are that every Western leader at the G20 will remain in power for the foreseeable future. Thats largely because even for voters who arent dyed-in-the-wool supporters, the alternative is simply too scary to contemplate. It might be easy, exciting even, to go with the shiny new thing, when the alternative isnt going to result in the end of the world as we know it (think about the appeal of Ronald Reagan in 1980, Tony Blair in 1997 or Macron in 2017).

If Trumps presidency taught the Western worlds democracies anything, its the virtue of the establishment. Put it the current context, if the alternative to a predictable, boring safe pair of hands is to be governed by pandemic-denying whackjobs inCamp Auschwitz T-shirts,mehstarts to look pretty attractive.

Thats why, despite political analysts incessant hand-wringing over the future of democracy, were not on the cusp of Armageddon.

This weekends Rome gathering is a reminder of that. It was forgotten before it started. The issues on the G20 agenda (vaccinating the developing world and combatting climate change) are as weighty as ever. But weighty is what serious leaders do best, which is why most citizens of the Western world happily ignore such summits. And without the antics, the drama and thegratuitous tweets, they can safely do so.

Post-Trump, the goal of any straight-thinking Western leader is to be as modest and meek as possible. The model: Angela Merkel.

At first blush, the German leader, who will make way for her successor as soon as a new government is formed, would seem to be the exception to the rule. Shes boring, yet hugely popular.

But recent outpouring of Merkel-love came only once she announced she was departing. Her decision three years ago not to seek a further term triggered a wave of nostalgia to rival Elton Johns endless farewell tour. It was made all the more potent by the fact that the crop of her potential successors left something to be desired.

Despite the recent Merkel mania, any honest appraisal of Merkels 16-year record would have to conclude that her accomplishments were few and far between. Her real achievement has been to hide that reality by giving Germans a sense of stability.

Thats why todays leaders would still be wise to bone up on their Machiavelli.

Everyone sees what you appear to be, he wrote Few experience what you really are.

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Biden, Macron and the rise of the meh men - POLITICO Europe

At the 1992 US Republican convention, the paleoconservative pundit and presidential candidate Pat Buchanan introduced the world to the idea that politics had become a culture war between progressives and conservatives. Campaigns for environmentalism, abortion and LGBT rights werent just about policy, he claimed, but were in fact intended to destroy wider American traditions and identity. This war is for the soul of America, Buchanan said, and called on fellow citizens to take back our culture, and take back our country.

In the ensuing decades, the right closely adopted the strategy proposed by Buchanan. It claimed that, by dint of their alleged control of the media and academia, unpatriotic and elitist progressives were imposing radical changes like openness to immigration and the demolition of the traditional family against majority will. The plan worked: culture war tactics were instrumental in the right gaining support among disgruntled workers increasingly suspicious of a centre-left that had little to offer in terms of socio-economic policies.

Since the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis, the pandemic has become yet another stage for the culture war. But it may be one that the right will end up regretting. The emergency unleashed a flood of disparate conspiracy theories about the virus and vaccines that spread rapidly on social media, while anti-mask and anti-lockdown protest movements framed contagion prevention measures as a health dictatorship.

Populist right leaders were quick to take advantage of this, seeing in Covid scepticism yet another opportunity to show the gulf between the priorities of progressives and ordinary people. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro described Covid as little flu, and to this day continues to claim he has not been vaccinated, though nobody knows for sure. In the US, Donald Trump went into full conspiracy mode, suggesting that bleach may be a cure for Covid. In the UK, Johnson took a more pragmatic mainstream stance after briefly favouring herd immunity. But to his right, Nigel Farage and some Tory MPs continued to dally with Covid scepticism.

Yet, in many countries the populist right is now finding itself at odds with a movement it has fuelled, but cannot control any more. In August, Donald Trump was booed by supporters at a rally in Alabama, after recommending they get the jab. In Italy, Matteo Salvini of the League party has faced heavy criticism from Covid sceptics for supporting a government which is enforcing vaccination passports a programme called Green Pass. Meanwhile, his more extreme rightwing competitor, Giorgia Meloni of post-fascist Brothers of Italy, has managed to gain support among anti-vaxxers by opposing the Green Pass and defending freedom of choice.

In France, Marine Le Pen also risks being outflanked on her right by populist candidates who have taken more radical culture war stances. These include anti-immigration talk-show star ric Zemmour, who is sky-rocketing in the polls, as well as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, the leader of the nationalist Debout la France party, and Le Pens estranged ally Florian Philippot, who have both espoused Covid conspiracy theories.

In Germany, the far-right Alternative fr Deutschland party has had a stormy relationship with the Covid sceptic movement Querdenker (literally lateral thinkers). Querdenker activists were involved in internal party squabbles and have gone on to launch a new formation called Die Basis (The Base) contributing to the AfDs disappointing performance in the last elections.

Amid growing culture war polarisation, rightwing parties that have adopted a populist strategy are struggling to hold together their brittle electoral coalition. One in which true believers who embrace conspiracy theories whole-cloth sit alongside more moderate centre-right voters with little patience for popular superstitions.

While anti-vaxxers are very vocal, they are actually a relatively small proportion of the population. In the US, according to a recent Axios-Ipsos poll, only 20% of US citizens say they are not likely to get vaccinated. In the UK vaccination rates among adults are around 80%, while in France and Italy 75% of people have had at least one dose. Being wholly identified with this relatively small section of public opinion is electorally dangerous.

Furthermore, the Manichean frame of a quasi-religious battle between good and evil that characterises the culture war approach means that any act of moderation or compromise on the part of existing populist or simply opportunistically populist leaders can be easily presented as betrayal, opening the space to holier-than-thou challengers, thus splitting the vote.

Embracing the culture war was meant to divide society along the cultural cleavage between progressives and conservatives, rather than the economic division between haves and have-nots that the left has traditionally preferred, giving the right a strategic advantage. However, the animosity of the culture war now seems to be playing out in a sort of civil war in the rights own ranks, and may lead to serious difficulties for the likes of Salvini, Le Pen, Trump and Farage.

In coming months and years, the culture war approach isnt going anywhere. In fact it may become even more intense and vicious, as the climate crisis and green transition policies impose major changes in peoples everyday lives. Rightwing populists once thought they were in control, but riding the tiger of conspiracy theories may prove more costly than they had anticipated

Paolo Gerbaudo is a sociologist at Kings College London and the author of The Great Recoil: Politics After Populism and Pandemic

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The populist right is regretting its encouragement of Covid conspiracists - The Guardian

Hungary and Poland have both faced accusations of violating the EUs democratic values. Andrs Saj argues that while it has become common to portray these states as implementing distinct forms of illiberal democracy, they share more in common with western democracies than is commonly recognised. The actions of the Hungarian and Polish governments should be viewed as an abuse of constitutionalism and the rule of law, not as a different conception of these ideas.

The new member states of the EU are increasingly perceived as populist-authoritarian political regimes. They are accused of (further) undermining the values and decision-making efficiency of the EU. But while the departure of these states from the EU normal is obvious, we have witnessed a Manichean forcing of Hungary and Poland into political science terminological straitjackets (autocracy, competitive authoritarianism, right wing populism, even soft fascism) with all the paralysing consequences dictated by the label.

Pedantic straitjacketing of this kind may serve the disciplinary needs of academia, but it does little to aid our understanding of complex phenomena. In a new book, Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracies, I argue that these failing democracies are not simply the opposite of democracy: in reality, they unpack the totalitarian and authoritarian tendencies of democracy itself, maximising the illiberal potential of western constitutionalism.

Ruling by cheating

Constitutional democracies are inherently vulnerable as they have historically incorporated illiberalism, for example by granting privileges to certain churches and illiberal actors. From Poland to Bulgaria and from Peron to Chavez, illiberal democracies rely on shortcomings that are kept within boundaries in consolidated democracies. All these continuities and commonalities are important, although there remain fundamental differences between the cheaters and more honest democracies.

In a genuine though imperfect democracy it is unthinkable that political competitors would aim at the perpetuation of power or seek to increase their domination without inhibitions. The uninhibited extension and perpetuation of centralised state power in the hands of the ruler necessitates systematic and systemic lying (disinformation by state means like education and mass media) and cheating.

While the illiberal democracy systematically relies on cheating and lying, the democratic credentials of illiberal democracies still matter. The illiberal regimes cannot, and do not wish to, dispense of democratic processes, elections in particular. These are successful systems because they manage to mobilise genuine popular support (at least of a relative majority). The leader receives this popular support even if it is the result of mass media manipulation that relies on existing prejudice and resentment. The European illiberal leaders mobilise deeply rooted nationalism. National identity is a source of pride and a cultural expression of fear originating in historical losses. In most illiberal regimes, the leader can also rely on authoritarian predispositions among a good number of citizens (a predisposition that exists in many mature democracies too).

Most commentators fail to note that such regimes are popular enough to allow the illiberal leader to play at democracy and win elections (just like critics of China tend to forget that the restrictions imposed by the Party on individuals are welcomed by many Chinese). Illiberal democracies are successful, among other reasons, because they clean democracy of liberalism (constitutionalism).

These systems are built from the imperfections of consolidated democracies. The imperfections (shortcomings of constitutional design, cronyism, and the prevalence of ressentiment in politics that has become a personal competition in a world of spectacle democracy) are present in consolidated democracies and the demise of democracy (politely called a backlash) is not a tale about a faraway fairy land. The cocksure West would be better off to see its own traits in the mirror of Hungary (and Hungary should see its own traits in Russia).

Plebiscitarian leader democracies

Poland and Hungary (as well as Perons Argentina and Chavezs Venezuela, among others) are plebiscitarian leader democracies in the sense used by Max Weber. Weber defined these democracies as being democratic in their form but authoritarian in their substance, with a leaders legitimacy stemming from their charisma. For Weber, Britain served as a model for these democracies many years before the UK turned into an elective dictatorship. Weber realised the dangers of this form of democracy (centralisation of personal power) but assumed that there would be sufficient parliamentary and other controls to counter the inevitable tendency.

While parliamentary controls, checks and balances are formally in place in Hungary and Venezuela, none of these institutions work as envisaged in theory. Plebiscitarian leader democracies eventually turn into Caesarism (aka Bonapartism) with populist overtones. Not all plebiscitarian leader democracies are populist even if the elite/people dichotomy is always present and (most importantly) those who are not the supporters of the leader are deemed to be fake nationals. But in Hungary and Poland, nationalism is more important than populist arguments, though populism was important in obtaining power.

These regimes insist on defining the identity of the ruled and the ruler in a populist manner. In a plebiscitarian leader democracy, the leaders do care about their people.

As Jacob Talmon points out, there are dictatorship[s] resting on popular enthusiasm and thus completely different from absolute power wielded by a divine right king, or by a usurping tyrant. The leader will express their peoples desires and fears (nasty as these may be) and cater for the wellbeing of this part of the electorate, in the name of the common good.

The people here means a sufficiently large minority that is sizeable enough to win elections. This is unremarkable: it is normal in democracies to have distortive electoral systems, such as relative majorities receiving a bonus. This is not a peculiar shortcoming of the often-vilified US electoral college.

European plebiscitarian leader democracies not only cheat on democracy. Illiberal democracies abuse the rule of law systematically, relying on shortcomings such as formalism and inflexibility that are an inherent part of western rule of law. For example, public procurement follows the general frame required by EU law, but the specific criteria of the calls contain objective criteria that favour government cronies. If that does not help, the procurement will be classified as a matter of national security interest, or otherwise classified as not requiring a public call.

While the semblance of the rule of law is maintained and legal security is provided for ordinary life, law becomes a matter of cheating when it comes to power and domination. Legalism is observed: with a sufficient parliamentary majority, the laws can be written in a way that authorises formally neutral legal decisions even though the law systematically favours the interests of the government and its cronies and keeps the subjects of the law dependent of the state and its local satraps. These same rules (for example tailor-made electoral rules in the best tradition of US gerrymandering) help secure continued electoral victories.

The rule of law

The rule of law is both a shield and a sword. As Oscar R. Benavides, President of Peru, described it, for my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law. Giovanni Giolitti, the liberal Prime Minister of Italy, formulated it as laws are applied to enemies, but only interpreted as regards friends. The first version describes Putins Russia, the second one Hungary and Poland. The Caesarist regime pretends to observe law to protect otherwise illegal transactions and consolidate the gains of corruption. This is how the basis of power is built: the legally entrenched favours granted to cronies enable them to provide a network necessary for political, economic and cultural domination.

Law-making and its application are based on tricks and cheating. Benjamin Constant called such regimes usurpation which is characterised by counterfeit liberty. The Manichean presentation of these regimes fails to observe that contrary to standard authoritarian regimes, liberty does exist in usurpation: the plebiscitarian leader, because he or she responds to their peoples wishes, allows private liberties and tolerates political liberties as long as their exercise does not threaten the perpetuation of power.

How does cheating fit into the rule of law? It is a standard technique of interpretation used by judges all over the world not to see injustice. Procedural formalities enable malefactors to keep illicit gains and political accountability is of little relevance when immorality is normalised. One could refer to all the examples of cronyism without legal consequences or political consequences during the Covid-19 pandemic, from Greece to the United Kingdom.

Morphological research that concentrates on the techniques of emptying democracy and constitutional institutions is important for practical reasons too: it helps to unmask the normalisation of cheating, the deliberate impotence of judges and prosecutors, and the inhumanity of the everyday submission of citizens. Those concerned about a democratic backlash should be aware of continuities and commonalities between democracy and usurpation in order to understand the insufficient reactions of the European Union and its member states to the challenges to the foundational values and common interests of the European Union that illiberal democracy represents.

For more information, see the authors new book, Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracies (Cambridge University Press, 2021)

Note: This article gives the views of theauthor, not the position of EUROPP European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Council

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Is the West really that different? | EUROPP - EUROPP - European Politics and Policy

It will be some time until the Republican Party turns the page on Donald TrumpDonald TrumpTrump announces new social media network called 'TRUTH Social' Virginia State Police investigating death threat against McAuliffe Meadows hires former deputy AG to represent him in Jan. 6 probe: report MORE and returns to its more mainstream, conservative principles.

Eight months after the Jan. 6 insurrection, Trump still has the soul of the Republican Party. On Oct. 18, the former president filed a federal lawsuit against the Jan. 6 select committee seeking to block the panel from obtaining his administration's records from the National Archives.

Can Republicans move past 2020?

Having fundamentally shifted away from its axis of reasonable conservative and libertarian archetypes, the Republican Party continues to relitigate Americas ugly past without any logical orientation or ideological reasoning to shape the party's future. There is no pablum platform or component figurehead, and the GOP doesnt have leaders but sycophants, afraid to challenge the distortion of the partys axis.

Very simply, it feels as if our federal republic is slowly eroding, and Jan. 6 was the breaking point.

The loss of Gen. Colin PowellColin PowellOvernight Defense & National Security Presented by Raytheon Technologies Navy probe reveals disastrous ship fire response Colin Powell: Soldier, scholar, statesman and gentleman CNN's John King says he has multiple sclerosis MORE is an unfortunate reminder that we are grieving our national political party system and an America that once was a collective bipartisanship. Nine months ago, in the wake of the Trump-inspired riot at the U.S. Capitol, Gen. Powell said that he could no longer call myself a fellow Republican. He castigated not just Trump but his enablers within the party. Ironically, a quarter-century before, the Republican Partys nomination had been Gen. Powells for the taking if he had wanted it.

Gen. Powell knew that the nations political landscape had become highly polarized, but he also knew that average citizens must engage to hold elected officials accountable; that the people dictate the terms of American politics. Moreover, citizen engagement is critical now more than ever, with Republican efforts systematically rolling back voting access in states following Democratic victories in the 2020 election.

Gen. Powell helped a generation of young people understand civic engagement. Furthermore, while he never denied the unfortunate role race played in his life and in our society more broadly, he repudiated the idea that race could end his dreams or the dreams of others, and through his balanced and moral leadership, helped pave the way for so many who would follow.

Our country is now teetering between the tyranny of elites and the tyranny of irrationality a societal bipolar condition that threatens to crash down on us. Moreover, representative democracy both domestic and abroad is being degraded by rampant populism being exploited by malicious forces to enshrine the dominance of political minorities over prevalent (not populist) will.

This anti-democracy craziness does have roots in a willingness of the Republican Party to leverage the structures of national governance to effect rule by the minority. But Republicans arent only at fault here; Democrats continue to be too soft during both campaigning and legislating and they fail to organize effectively. For a few decades now, it's been apparent that both parties are continuing to move to the extreme, turning to political gangsterism instead. This is worsened by the number of Democrats retiring and the few moderate Republicans like Rep.Anthony GonzalezAnthony GonzalezDemocratic retirements could make a tough midterm year even worse Ex-Trump aide sues Grisham over abuse allegations Juan Williams: GOP's assault on voting rights is the real fraud MORE (R-Ohio)leaving Congress altogether.

Gen. Powell served Republican administrations but was willing to endorse then-candidate Barack ObamaBarack Hussein ObamaEbay founder funding Facebook whistleblower: report Emanuel defends handling of Chicago police shooting amid opposition to nomination McAuliffe rolls out ad featuring Obama ahead of campaign stop MORE for president in 2008. And when conspiracy theories were trolling, and many Republicans were questioning Obamas faith, Gen. Powell replied in a resonant way, exemplifying his ethical clarity: The correct answer is, he is not a Muslim; he's a Christian. Hes always been a Christian. But the really right answer is, What if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer's no, that's not America. Thus, is there something wrong with some seven-year-old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she could be president?

Gen. Powell is the standard-bearer for what it means to be a great American regardless of political affiliation, race or creed. Could we as the American people emulate his example? Or could we as a country get back to what it truly means to be great the way in which Gen. Colin Powell made it great?

Quardricos Bernard Driskell is a former Republican operative and an adjunct professor of legislative politics at The George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management. Follow him on Twitter @q_driskell4

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Colin Powell's example to the GOP and to America | TheHill - The Hill

For years, he has been making this case, crafting a public persona as a pugilist for the American working class. But in recent months, the messaging has taken on elevated importance. His presidency rests on passing a massive social spending and climate bill through Congress in the next few weeks or months. And in order to do that, hes sold it as a generational chance to create economic equity.

Scranton was an obvious backdrop, tailor-made to provoke a sense of working class America. Biden had crafted his 2020 presidential campaign around these ideas too, a Robinhood-themed agenda, minus the actual thievery. It was Scranton vs. Park Avenuethe place of his birth held up as the very symbol of the plight of the average family against the extravagances of the wealthy.

But scripts like this arent always without complications. And what Biden has found out is that populism may sell electorally but it doesnt always translate into legislative language.

Back in Washington on Wednesday, reports emerged that Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) was balking at the presidents proposal to pay for his agenda by raising tax rates on the wealthy and corporations. Democrats insisted that they had other ideas for revenue. But, for the time being, chalk one up for Park Avenue.

Biden showed no signs of concern as he spoke. His party is still inching toward a deal on a multi-trillion Build Back Better domestic spending plan that could end up funding everything from parental leave to child and elderly care.

But the path to this point has taken an obvious toll. Sinemas opposition to corporate and income tax hikes on high earners, threatens one of the partys more attractive lines of messaging that the rich need to finally pay their fair share. And, in the Capitol, Democrats have begun to concede that all the messiness of negotiations has hurt their standing with the public. When reporters asked Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) about a recent poll showing few Americans knew what was contained in the Build Back Better plan, the majority whip blamed his own party.

I dont doubt that one bit, and I think [it's] our fault. We oversold it and underperformed for too long, Durbin told reporters Wednesday. Now we get a chance to close it the right way, hopefully.

Sen. Dick Durbin speaks to reporters at the Capitol on Oct. 7. | Drew Angerer/Getty Images

On Wednesday, Biden tried to get a little of that momentum back. He has largely operated in private in recent weeks, giving just five economic-themed speeches since Labor Day. But back in Scranton, he spun tales of his youth, how his relatives congregated around tables after meals, dispensing worldly advice to maintain his courage, loyalty and dignity all eventually built into his constitution. He retold stories of his dad losing his job and his health insurance, then of the death of his first wife and daughter, and how he worked as a single dad for years.

I believe that home is where your character is etched, he said.

Shane Cawley, a fourth generation iron worker and union member who introduced Biden to the crowd, gave a boost to Bidens domestic spending plan, pointing to added assistance for child care and elder care as vital to his family in Pennsylvania.

We work hard for every dollar that we earn and some days it feels like the odds are stacked against us, Cawley said, before introducing Biden.

Bidens last trip to Scranton had been on Election Day, when he stopped at his childhood home and signed a wall there. "From this house to the White House with the grace of God, he wrote.

Biden did indeed make it to the presidency, as he was reminded of on the drive to Wednesdays speech. Just weeks earlier, new signage had gone up along Interstate 81 designating the Central Scranton Expressway as President Biden Expressway. Another roadway in town was renamed Biden Street just before his visit.

Scranton transformed Biden. The question now is how far beyond street signs he can transform Scranton.

President Joe Biden speaks during his visit to the Electric City Trolley Museum in Scranton, Pa. on Wednesday. | Susan Walsh/AP Photo

I think the Scranton visit brings back the conversation to where Biden and the average American sees it are we going to fix the things we need to fix in this county? said Greg Schultz, Bidens former campaign manager. So much of the recent debate has been about the legislative process and policy maneuvering these are important but at the end of the day people want their government to understand their problems and try to make them a little better. Biden returning home helps bring him and the issues back to a home base.

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Biden leans on Scranton. In D.C., Park Avenue may be winning. - POLITICO

The rise of populism a political argument that pits ordinary people against a corrupt, government elite is putting democracy at risk, said Stanford scholars in a new white paper released today.

When populist leaders discredit formal institutions and functions, democracy is being undermined and hollowed out, warns Stanford political scientist and paper co-author Anna Grzymala-Busse.

Stanford political scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse has co-authored a white paper that examines the threat global populism poses to democracy. (Image credit: Andrew Brodhead)

Here, Grzymala-Busse discusses what is at stake for democracies worldwide if populist rhetoric continues to take hold. As Grzymala-Busse points out, populists grievances about government failures are not entirely baseless. Thats why Grzymala-Busse and the papers co-authors who include director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, and political scientists Francis Fukuyama and Didi Kuo argue that populism is a political problem that requires political solutions.

Their paper, Global Populisms and Their Challenges, released Mar. 11 through the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), outlines what mainstream political parties must do to protect democracies from populists, including strategies such as reclaiming the rule of law and upholding democratic norms and values.

Why do some politicians find populist arguments so appealing?

Populism argues that elites are corrupt and the people need better representation, but makes very few policy commitments beyond this criticism. Theres been increasing distrust regarding political parties and politicians, especially given various funding and election scandals. And so people readily believe that these actors are corrupt and not to be trusted.

It is a message that is credible these days. It is also a message that doesnt tie politicians down to any other ideological or policy commitment.

Why is populism on the rise?

The immediate causes are the failures of mainstream political parties parties of the center-left and center-right to meet voter concerns and respond with distinct policies. In both Europe and in the United States, many voters who support populists want a change from politics as usual, which they view as unresponsive and unaccountable, and who fear losing cultural and economic status. They perceive that politicians have failed to respond to immigration, free trade, international cooperation, and technological advances and the threats they pose to many voters.

According to your research, what makes populist rhetoric detrimental to democratic governance?

Stanford political scientists Francis Fukuyama, Anna Grzymala-Busse and Neil Malhotra discuss why populist messages have emerged in contemporary politics and how they have evolved into larger, political movements.

Populist politicians and governments view the formal institutions of liberal democracy as corrupt creations spawned by crooked establishment elites and so they systematically hollow out and undermine these institutions, such as the courts, regulatory agencies, intelligence services, the press, and so on. They justify these attacks as replacing discredited and corrupt institutions with ones that serves the people or, in other words, populist parties and politicians. Moreover, precisely because populists claim to represent the people, they have to define the people first and that often means excluding vulnerable and marginalized populations, such as religious or ethnic minorities and immigrants.

For example, in Hungary, the governing populist party brought the courts under political control, abolished regulatory agencies, and funneled funding to allied newspapers and media. In Poland, the chair of the governing populist party refers to his opponents as a worse sort of Poles.

In the short term, what can be done to counter the effects of populism?

Vote! Vote for politicians and parties who make credible promises, who do not simply want to shut down criticism or who view their opponents as their enemies, and who are committed to the democratic rules of the game. At the same time, we need to understand, not just condemn, why so many voters find populist politicians appealing.

And in the long term?

Mainstream political parties need to credibly differentiate themselves, become far more responsive to their voters and consistently articulate and uphold the democratic rules of the game. Our research finds that where mainstream political parties are strong, populists stand far less of a chance of making inroads. Such parties would also be far more responsive to voter concerns about economic and cultural status, which also motivate populist support.

Some of the papers findings are from Global Populisms, a project sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation at FSIs Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CCDRL).

Grzymala-Busse is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences and a senior fellow at FSI. She is also co-leading The Changing Human Experience initiative, which is part of Stanfords Long-Range Vision.

Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), the Director of the Ford Dorsey Masters in International Policy, and the Mosbacher Director of CCDRL.

McFaul is also the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science in the School of Humanities and Sciences; and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow at FSI.

Kuo is a senior research scholar and the associate director for research at CCDRL.

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Populism jeopardizes democracies around the world ...

BY SIMON SHUSTER / LONDON

Donald Trump met with his first foreign ally just a few days after winning the U.S. presidency. But it wasnt one of the worlds leading statesmen who got the invitation to Trump Tower. It was Nigel Farage, a man once considered a footnote in British politicsbut who, in 2016, found himself on the snug inside of one of historys hairpin turns.

As the face of the United Kingdom Independence Party, a right-wing group on the fringe of British politics, Farage campaigned for 17 years for the U.K. to leave the European Union, styling himself as a middle-class boy from Kent who was not afraid to tell hard truths about the failures of the European project, from out-of-control immigration to the coddling of radical Islamism. On June 23, British balloters finally granted Farage his wish, voting to leave the E.U. in the stunning Brexit referendum. The result was one that Europes pundits, pollsters, bookies and politicians said would never happen. Farage then spent weeks in the U.S. stumping for Trump, who took to calling himself Mr. Brexit.

The outsiders won again with Trumps victory on Nov. 9, and Farage has become a kind of roving ambassador for Trumpism ever since, giving speeches and campaigning for the dawn of a new world orderor at least the destruction of the old one. Its a movement, a revolt, that is rising throughout Europe, including core E.U. nations like France and Germany. Im in no doubt that the European project is finished, Farage told TIME over a pint of stout in London one chilly afternoon in late November. Its just a question of when.

But even Farage, the 52-year-old soothsayer with the arsonists grin, has no clear idea of what to put in place of that establishment. The contours he describes (and apparently longs for) cast Europe as a kind of patchwork, broken down to its constituent nation-states and unbound by what he calls the false identity of Europeanness and all its prim ideas of tolerance and multiculturalism. He also has a deep mistrust of institutional power. Real power in the modern day resides, Farage says, ever more massively in personalities, not formal titles. What keeps it alive is the charisma of those who possess it, their ability to rally the masses and make deals and connections as expediency dictates. It is a world of horse traders, not bureaucrats.

Given how fast the dominoes are falling in Farages direction, that world might soon be upon us, for better or worse. Italys populist parties helped swing a referendum result on Dec. 4 that forced Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to resign. The Netherlands and France have crucial elections scheduled next year, and front runners in those countries are tapping the same veins of anger at the establishment that fueled the rebellions of 2016. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front in France, has chosen a blue rose as the logo for her presidential campaign, a symbol, she says, of the freak events that now seem almost natural. I think the British, with the Brexit, then the Americans, with the election of Donald Trump, did that, she tells TIME. They made possible the impossible.

Not even Germany looks like such a stable pillar of the Western world these days. Angela Merkel, who has served as Chancellor since 2005, plans to run for a fourth term next fall. But her party, like her country, has felt the backlash against slow economic growth and mass migration across Europe. A November poll found that 42% of Germans want a referendum on E.U. membership. After Brexit, thats more than enough to make TIMEs 2015 Person of the Year and her allies nervous. What we are seeing is a re-emergence of state egotism and nationalism, says Norbert Roettgen, a senior lawmaker in Merkels center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union. This is our disease, and it goes right to the foundations of the European idea.

By voting to leave the E.U., the British people showed that the integration of the West is neither inevitable nor irreversible, a message that Trumps campaign drove home by calling for the U.S. to pull back from its commitments around the world and to focus on America first. It is a world where the international agreements of the past are up for renegotiation and the interests of the nation-state are not bound by an established global order. None of us conform to any of the rules by which politics is operating, Farage says. And people like that!

Making a New World OrderFor more than a generation, the Western elites settled into a consensus on most major issuesfrom the benefits of free trade and immigration to the need for marriage equality. Their uniformity on these basic questions consigned dissenters to the political fringefurther aggravating the sense of grievance that now threatens the mainstream.

That is what helped Farage, Le Pen and other European populists find an audience in 2016. They wanted Europe to be a mosaic of states instead of an integrated commonwealth with a shared currency and open borders. They wanted, in short, for Europe to look more like it did before the E.U.s grand experiment, never mind that this experiment was designed to prevent the nations of Europe from engaging in an endless cycle of wars.

What weve tried to do in Europe is go against all the trends globally, says Farage. Globally, the world is breaking down into smaller units. The desire to reverse that trend shows Europes complete lack of understanding of how human beings operate. In the world of Farage and his allies, people gravitate more toward tribal notions of identity than to lofty principles of integration.

The coming months and years will test that theory. While most European leaders were still scrambling on Nov. 12 to establish contact with Trump, Farage was sitting with the President-elect in his penthouse in midtown Manhattan.

They even posed for a photo together that day, grinning in front of the gilded doors of Trumps apartment; Farage sent a chill through European capitals when he posted the picture online. Christoph Heusgen, who has served as Merkels top foreign policy adviser since 2005, says the image was very confusing. Farage does not hold any formal power in Britain and never has. Yet there he was, leapfrogging the line of world leaders desperate to arrange a meeting with Americas President-elect.

Adding insult to injury, Trumps transition team broke with the tradition of arranging all calls with foreign leaders through the State Department. So the Australian government had to get Trumps cell-phone number from one of his golfing buddies. Heusgen tells TIME the Germans were forced to seek advice from Henry Kissinger, the German-born former U.S. Secretary of State, who suggested reaching Trump through his son-in-law Jared Kushner. That has been proven successful, Heusgen says.

But its not exactly comforting. Trump has already risked infuriating China by accepting a call from the leader of Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway province, and his breezy pledge to Pakistans Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to play any role you want me to play in future talks left Indian diplomats aghast. So either the incoming U.S. President has no idea how diplomacy works or he doesnt care for its niceties. Heusgen prefers to believe the former, which at least allows room for a learning curve, he says. Farage has a more simplistic answer: If [Trump] believes in you, if he trusts you, then youre the man he wants to deal with.

And sure enough, a week and a half after their meeting in New York City, the President-elect tweeted that many people would like to see Farage as Londons new ambassador to the U.S. He would do a great job! Trump wrote, as though it had somehow become his job to pick the envoys of foreign nations. The British government was then forced to issue an equally bizarre response, reminding the President-elect that its Washington embassy had no vacancy.

Farage found this all rather amusing. A bolt from the blue! he says. I had no idea it was going to happen. Trumps tweet came as he was sleeping in Strasbourg, the seat of the European Parliament, and Farage says his phone didnt stop ringing all night.

Its been an amazing year, he says after draining the rest of his pint. What comes next is far less certain. Putting Brexit into effect has been monstrously difficult, and while the British economy has proved more resilient than expected, growth is still predicted to be slower than if the Brits had opted to remain in the E.U. But as Trump takes power and France ponders whether to put an icon of the far right in the lyse Palace, the West seems to belong to the populists. Only the brave would bet against them after the year theyve had. With reporting by Vivienne Walt/Paris

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Populism: The Rise of This Political Trend in Europe

Theres been an interesting debate raging among conservative intellectuals on social media to determine the best way to navigate a post-Trump world and assess the threat that the nationalist and populist base of the GOP poses to the country. The factions are roughly divided by the writers and thinkers at three publications,National Review Online,The Dispatch,and The Bulwark.

TheNational Reviewfolks represented by writers Charles C. W. Cooke, Dan McLaughlin, and Michael Brendon Dougherty are really tribalists, though they would be loath to admit it. While they may not like Trump, they will downplay his excesses and make excuses for the populists and nationalists within the GOP ranks. They express outrage at overt expressions of racism or fascism, but defend the use of Critical Race Theory as a wedge issue. Many of the tribalists are driven by religious convictions, particularly as they apply to abortion. All are more concerned about the Democratic Party than they are about the GOP.

As Erick Erickson, who aligns mainly with the tribalists, says, they believe that the populism invading the Republican Party is mostly a fad and that it will eventually fade, leaving the establishment in control. Their fear is an ascendant left that will make abortion available on demand, provide single-payer health care and universal child care, over-regulate guns and industries, and generally force a worldview thats an anathema to people who live in a world where socialism is a bigger threat than racism. For them democracy is just a means to an end.

They are largely Republicans first and conservatives second. If the Trumpists actually do disrupt democracy in upcoming elections, they will be making the case that its somehow alright, probably emphasizing the threat from antifa or arguing that Republicans were just playing by the rules, even if the rules were altered to undermine democracy. They see themselves as ideologically consistent but are really ideological cynical, believing whatever is convenient to hold power. They could also be described as the Mitch McConnellists.

The more interesting debate, though, is between the never-Trumpers atThe DispatchandThe Bulwark.Until recently, the two outfits seemed largely on the same page, unified against Donald Trump and believing that the populism of the GOP is a threat to the well-being of the nation. Then, Jonah Goldberg wrote a column atThe Dispatchlaying out his disagreements with his friends atThe Bulwark.

Goldberg argues that the never-Trumpers need to form a new conservative party to combat Trumpism. He understands that it may cause some Republicans to lose, but he believes it could also pull the party away from populism and back toward conservatism. He largely sees it a coalition building model where the new party would support Republicans who rejected Trumpism, or at least adhered to traditional conservative positions at the expense of populism.

Goldberg chastised his erstwhile allies atThe Bulwarkfor jumping into bed with Democrats, particularly Joe Biden. Hes clearly a movement conservative from the Reagan era who does not believe the Republican Party is a lost cause yet and sees the progressive agenda of the Democrats as something he cannot support. He may agree with Ericksons contention that Trumpism is more of a fad than a movement and that pressure from inside the conservative world will yield better results than leaving the GOP behind.

Over atThe Bulwark, Bill Kristol and Charlie Sykes see Trump and Trumpism as an existential threat to the American experiment. They havent abandoned many of their center-right views, especially on foreign policy, but they believe Trump and his populists authoritarian impulses could end democracy as we know it. They also believe that, with enough support, they may be able to pull the Democratic Party to the right or at least strengthen the centrist wing of the party.

While Goldberg and his supporters would work to build a coalition with the populists in hopes of moderating them, Kristol and Sykes look to build a coalition of the center that could defeat them. They dont believe the GOP is salvageable under the current leadership and direction. They are supporting Joe Biden in general, while criticizing him where they disagree, as in his handling of Afghanistan. They have been supporters of Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema while most traditional Democrats oppose them.

Republican operatives and tribalists believe that the conservative Never-Trumpers at The Dispatch and The Bulwark are such a small segment of the party and the country that they lack the ability to influence politics much at all. I think they are wrong. A majority of the Republican Party does not want Trump to be the nominee in 2024. And while 66% of the GOP believes the election was stolen, about a third of the party believes Biden won. That third probably has problems with the disinformation being spread by conservative commentators and politicians and is uneasy with policies and tactics that would undermine our democracy. They may be looking for a place to go if either the Bulwark or Dispatch folks can make them comfortable.

Personally, I believe we need a big tent centrist party because illiberalism on the right is the greatest single threat to our country. Right now, Democrats offer the only possibility for a party with broad appeal. I think Erickson is wrong in his analysis about the GOP. The populists and nationalists in the party know exactly what they are doing and are putting in place the infrastructure to maintain power. They are a threat to our democracy. While I respect Goldbergs commitment to conservative ideals that I certainly dont share, hes nave to think that he can build a third party infrastructure that could threaten the GOP on national scale. As Erickson pointed out, structural obstacles to getting on the ballot in many states makes a viable third party difficult.

The Bulwark folks also have their work cut out for them. They may find they attract more support from centrists Democrats than they do from disgruntled Republicans. Still, rebuilding a centrist wing of the Democratic Party that is socially liberal and fiscally conservative with a muscular foreign policy might have more support than people on Twitter believe. Ultimately, what they are seeking to build is a coalition party based more on broad ideology than the smorgasbord of issue advocacy organizations that dominate Democratic politics today. Thats no easy lift, but its certainly interesting.

Thomas Mills is the founder and publisher of PoliticsNC.com. Before beginning PoliticsNC, Thomas spent twenty years as a political and public affairs consultant. Learn more >

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The fight on the right - PoliticsNC

HODMEZOVASARHELY, Hungary A devout Catholic, he abhors abortion as murder and once voted for Viktor Orban, Hungarys pugnacious populist leader, impressed by his promises to root out corruption and end the disarray left by years of leftist rule.

On Sunday, however, Peter Marki-Zay, the mayor of this town in Hungarys conservative rural heartland, became the most potent threat yet to the decade-long stranglehold on the country by Mr. Orban and his combative brand of far-right nationalism.

Mr. Marki-Zay, 49, victorious in a primary election that brought together six previously squabbling opposition parties, is now the standard-bearer for a rickety political alliance that will challenge and, according to opinion polls, perhaps defeat Mr. Orban and his political machine, Fidesz, in legislative elections next year.

Previous challengers hoping to unseat Mr. Orban, who has been prime minister since 2010, mostly channeled the frustrations and anger of a liberal elite in Budapest. This time, the mayor is fighting Fidesz on its own terms and home turf small towns and villages where many voters, Mr. Marki-Zay included, once found comfort in Mr. Orbans conservative message but grew disenchanted with what they see as his corruption, hypocrisy and authoritarian tendencies.

Orbans only real ideology now is corruption, Mr. Marki-Zay, the mayor of Hodmezovasarhely, (pronounced HOD-may-zur-vash-ar-hay), in southern Hungary, said in an interview in Budapest.

Many voters, particularly in Budapest, he added, do not share his own conservative views, but they know I dont steal and can beat Orban. Im not corrupt.

Janos Csanyi, a 78-year-old former porcelain factory worker who used to vote for Mr. Orbans Fidesz party, scoffed at Mr. Orbans oft-repeated claim that, by demonizing migrants, many of whom are Muslim, and confronting the European Union over media freedom, L.G.B.T.Q. rights and other issues, Hungary is defending Europes traditional, Christian values.

I dont understand what he is talking about, Mr. Csanyi said, resting in the sun on a park bench in Hodmezovasarhelys main square, adding that he had other priorities. There are Ten Commandments and a very important one of these is: Dont Steal.

An anti-corruption stance resonates loudly in Hodmezovasarhely. A former Fidesz mayor and a close associate of Mr. Orban, Janos Lazar, is part owner of a vast hunting lodge on a landed estate outside town, and a contract for an E.U.-funded street lighting project when it was controlled by Fidesz went to a company controlled by Mr. Orbans son-in-law, upsetting many.

The European Unions anti-graft agency investigated the lighting project and in 2018 reported serious irregularities and conflicts of interest in the awarding of contracts. Fidesz-appointed prosecutors declined to take up the case.

The lights dont even work. When the sun goes down you cant see anything, said Norbert Forrai, a local resident who, despairing at Hungarys direction under Mr. Orban, moved to England but recently returned home to be part of the change that I hope is finally coming.

Fidesz still has many ways to block that change. It has a firm grip on most media outlets, and controls an extensive patronage network rooted in jobs in the state sector and in companies controlled by Mr. Orbans associates.

This gives the governing party far more levers to influence voters than the regions other populist strongmen, one of whom, Andrej Babis, the Czech Republics billionaire prime minister, this month suffered an electoral defeat at the hands of a center-right coalition.

Trained to savage Mr. Orbans opponents as traitorous liberals serving the Hungarian-born financier George Soros, pro-Fidesz media outlets have struggled to find a new line of attack against an unexpected conservative opponent. A news portal close to Fidesz gave up trying over the weekend and claimed that Mr. Marki-Zay was also an agent of Mr. Soros.

Fidesz has been so wrong-footed by the primaries that, at its local headquarters in Hodmezovasarhely last week, it was still collecting signatures for a petition denouncing a candidate who had already lost the liberal mayor of Budapest.

The Budapest mayor, Gergely Karacsony, withdrew from the primaries after the first round last month and urged his liberal base to rally behind Mr. Marki-Zay, a former marketing manager with seven children, who lived for five years in Canada and the United States.

We have to accept political reality. It is not liberals or greens who can beat right-wing populists, Mr. Karacsony said in an interview. A future government led by a churchgoing provincial mayor, he added, will obviously have different strategies than those I would pursue, but the important thing is to pick a candidate who can win against Orban.

And, he said, Nationalist populism is most successful in small towns and rural areas where people are afraid. He added, Marki-Zay is a mayor in one of these places and understands the fears and problems of these people.

The populist wave that swept across Eastern and Central Europe and other parts of the world over the past decade was, he said, in the process of passing following the defeat of President Donald J. Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and Mr. Babis in the Czech Republic.

Now it is up to Hungary and Poland, Mr. Karacsony said, referring to his own countrys election next year and elections in 2023 that will decide whether Polands nationalist governing party, Law and Justice, hangs on to power.

While describing himself as first and foremost a Catholic, Mr. Marki-Zay insists he respects the separation of church and state in Hungary and that his personal views on things like abortion will not shape his policies should he become prime minister. Mr. Orban, he added, was never really a conservative, just an opportunist.

He openly betrays Europe, the United States, NATO and Christian values, he said, referring to Mr. Orbans warm relations with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Chinas Communist Party leadership. He is a crook.

He expressed dismay that right-wing pundits and politicians in the United States like Tucker Carlson, who visited Hungary in August and lavished praise on Mr. Orban, view the country as a bastion of conservative values and a lodestar for those who value liberty. Tucker Carlson forgot to mention where Orban stands on China and Putin, Mr. Marki-Zay said.

Mr. Marki-Zay shocked Fidesz in 2018 when he easily won a by-election in his hometown after the death of the incumbent, a supporter of Mr. Orban. A year later, he won a regular mayoral election with an even bigger margin.

The end of Fideszs previous near-monopoly over local affairs rattled the party faithful.

It came as a big surprise for us all, said Tomas Cseri, a Fidesz member of the municipal council.

If this could happen in a place like this it can happen anywhere, Mr. Cseri added. The longer you are in power the more and more people think it is time for a change.

He acknowledged that Mr. Marki-Zay is a more threatening opponent to the party than the losing left-wing candidate in the final round of the opposition primary, but, echoing a line promoted by Fideszs propaganda apparatus, dismissed him as a Trojan horse for leftists in the six-party coalition and denounced corruption allegations against Fidesz as a lie.

If we had stolen so much I would not be still riding that, he said, pointing to an old bicycle parked against a lamppost.

Still, anger against what many local residents, including former fans of Mr. Orban, see as theft and bullying by Fidesz is widespread.

Imre Kendi, an architect who runs a construction business, used to vote for the governing party and once served as an adviser to Mr. Lazar when Fidesz still controlled the town. But he fell out with the former mayor, and soon found himself not being paid for money he was owed for a government contract, which he said forced him to declare bankruptcy.

Fear is what keeps the whole system together, he said.

But, he predicted, change started here in this small town and now it is going to continue around the nation.

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In Hungarys Heartland, Orban Faces a Unified Challenge to His Rule - The New York Times