Category Archives: NATO

After the disastrous abandonment of Afghanistan, after years of bickering over the 2 percent of gross domestic product target for defense spending, and after French President Emmanuel Macron deemed the Alliance brain dead, NATO is front and center on the geopolitical stage and reclaiming relevance in the current cacophony. On June 29 and 30, the Alliance will meet in Madrid with two major issues on the agenda: the upcoming expiration of the Secretary Generals mandate on October 1 this year and the articulation of a new Strategic Concept, an outline of action that allies typically establish every ten years, though the current one was released in 2010.

It is therefore time to go above the noise and take stock of NATOs purposecreated by the 1949 North Atlantic Treatyand the philosophy that conceived it. General Lord Hastings Ismay, NATOs first Secretary General, is credited with coining the often-repeated shorthand description of the projects raison dtre when he first took office in 1952: Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. In other words, in the face of Soviet expansionism, rebuild the continent by avoiding the resurgence of nationalist militarism in Europe. This endeavor convinced US President Harry S. Truman to, instead of bringing US troops back home as soon as hostilities ended, consolidate their presence in Europe.In keeping with the architecture for peace developed after World War II, the United States bet on Europeand Europe bet on the protection offered by Washington.

The will of the twelve North Atlantic Treaty signatories (ten European countries plus Canada and the United States) was to advance the architecture of the international liberal system. With express mention of the recently formed United Nations, the preamble could not be clearer: Its founding impulse is to bring together countries founded on democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law in order to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

Both a political and military partnership, NATO is focused on collective defense, as touted in Article 5 of its founding treaty, which clearly states, if such an armed attack occurs, each of [the members] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Afghanistan has been a topic of almost constant conversation in the past year, owing to the United States haphazard departure in August 2021 with some NATO allies saying they werent consulted. But in the hubbub of Augusts events, a crucial fact was forgotten: NATO allies had been in Afghanistan since the first (and only) time that Article 5 has been invokedfollowing the September 11 attacks. Beyond being an attack on the United States, 9/11 represented a challenge to the very core of the North Atlantic Treaty: democracy and the multilateral order. And it forced NATO allies to develop an awareness of the potential for new, unconventional threatsthat is, those outside traditional warfare.

Just as the beginning of the Afghanistan operation marked a symbolic milestone, so, too, did its end. While former President Donald Trump damaged the image of the US presidency in the eyes of the world, those who hated the United States still had a general respect for the White House. However, since the scenes from Kabuls airport, Washington has been perceived as an unreliable partner shedding its Atlantic ties to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific: Some fear it is evidence of its abdication of global leadership. But the United States ability to respond to global challenges and the integration of values in its foreign policy should not be underestimated. After all, Uncle Sam has bounced back from other difficult situations in recent historyVietnam comes to mind.

In that vein, the United States and NATOs coordinated responses to Russian President Vladimir Putins December 17 ultimatum offer Moscow a serious and in-depth dialogue on arms control and strategic stability, but proclaim transatlantic commitment and steadfastness; a resounding rejection of Russian demands; and reaffirmation of the centrality of the principles of sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. They direct the Kremlin to refrain from the threat and use of force. Finally, and critically, both reiterate countries right to choose or change their security arrangementsto decide their future without external interference. This right is laid out in NATOs well-known Open-Door Policy which prompted one of Putins classic responses of convolution: They saya policy of open doors. Where did it come from? NATO has an open-door policy. Where is it stated? Nowhere.

As for Europeans, the situation in Ukraine has made internal contradictions come to a head. From the outset, the European Union (EU) has been largely absent from the dialogue with Moscow, barring Macrons bravado-riven bilateral conversations and his insights into the contemporary traumas of this great people [Russians] and great nation. Europes energy has been focused on grandiloquent speeches (unsurprisingly, primarily in French) and pompous formulas: while strategic autonomy loses momentum in Brussels talks, the term Strategic Compass is gaining ground after the European Council promised to adoptwithin six weekswhat it has described as a road map to turning the Union into a more effective international security actor by 2030 and to strengthening its strategic sovereignty. Per a lesson from Aesops Fables, the mountain will give birth to another mouseunless there is a miracle here, this speech promising great things will amount to little.

Europeans do not perceive danger in the same way across the board for historical and geographic reasons. Furthermore, there is the concerning about-facingsuch as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbns recent visit to Moscow and his statements that Putins requests for security guarantees are normal despite the fact that they include proposals to block NATO weapons and forces from NATO members who joined after 1997, which includes Hungary. Allies also have to face the weakening of the democratic link within the organization, and particularly within the EU. Finally, Europeans have not accepted that defense must be paid for. All of the above serves as a backdrop for pessimistic outbursts such as Macrons.

The Kremlin has spent years toward Putins objective of undermining the West but, more specifically, Europe and its futurethe democratic system. And Putin makes no attempt to hide it with his litany of aggressive statements, weaponization of energy, Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and invasion of Crimea in 2014. But Ukraine seems to be the straw that broke the camels back. Procrastination in the face of gradualism is not a solution for NATO. It is time for an analysis of the range of Russias capabilities that the current situation has confirmed: misinformation, hybrid attacks, new technologies (including cyberattacks), little green men, and mercenaries. Those are gray areas that the Strategic Concept will have to clarify due to their impact on the interpretation of Article 5.

In addition to the risk posed by non-state actors and terrorism, the working hypothesis in the run-up to the NATO meeting in Madrid is that tension with Russia will not disappear soon (regardless of the outcome of the current crisis), underscoring the need for a solid defense and reach to the east, and a realistic approach in the Mediterranean and Africa. Likewise, Europeans must develop a common policy towards China: In a dialogue organized by the Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted both the need for North America and Europe to maintain unity in the face of new threats, as well as the challenge of addressing the security consequences of the rise of China.

Putin, in his efforts to destroy the liberal international order, has shaken the foundations of NATO. It would be ironicand welcomefor the crisis over Ukraine to reinvigorate the Alliance.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the authors and publishers permission.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Councils Board of Directors.

Thu, Jan 20, 2022

New AtlanticistByAna Palacio

There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty. This warning by Jean Monnet sums up the crisis Europe is currently experiencing nearly eighty years later.

Image: NATO flag flies in front of the Independence monument at the Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine. Photo by STR/NurPhoto.

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Why NATO will endure well beyond today's crises - Atlantic Council

Spy planes are conducting missions to track Russian movements, which might include listening to Russian soldiers' phone calls home, according to one expert.

The planes are equipped with devices that allow them to collect signals sent from Russian bases and to intercept communications.

Sky News analysis of flight tracking data from a typical day in recent weeks shows that a host of NATO and Swedish planes are monitoring key Russian positions.

Scroll through the maps below to see what aircraft movements on 25 January - represented by yellow dots - can tell us:

Two tracked the coastline of Crimea - one an RAF plane that departed from Lincolnshire and another from a US base in Sicily.

Three maritime patrol aircraft - "sub-hunters" - departed RAF Lossiemouth earlier in the day.

One of which flew for over 5 hours east with its transponder recording intermittently. It circled a position near the Baltic Sea where Russian naval vessels were believed to be close by.

A US Navy aircraft departed an airbase in Spain in the afternoon and flew along the Portuguese coast.

It turned off its transponder for an hour, but it was picked up again near the position of three Russian ships making their way into the Mediterranean.

Two more US flights departed an airbase in Lithuania in the afternoon and moved along the border of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

The RAF plane that was near Crimea earlier can also be seen coming close to the area, and taking an interest in the Belarusian border, on its return journey.

On 25 January there were at least 10 US, UK, and Swedish reconnaissance flights that took place.

Two tracked the coastline of Crimea - one an RAF plane that departed from Lincolnshire and another from a US base in Sicily.

Three maritime patrol aircraft - "sub-hunters" - departed RAF Lossiemouth earlier in the day.

One of which flew for over 5 hours east with its transponder recording intermittently. It circled a position near the Baltic Sea where Russian naval vessels were believed to be close by.

A US Navy aircraft departed an airbase in Spain in the afternoon and flew along the Portuguese coast.

It turned off its transponder for an hour, but it was picked up again near the position of three Russian ships making their way into the Mediterranean.

Two more US flights departed an airbase in Lithuania in the afternoon and moved along the border of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

The RAF plane that was near Crimea earlier can also be seen coming close to the area, and taking an interest in the Belarusian border, on its return journey.

What are the planes doing?

The aircraft are equipped with sensors that collect information on the electronic and radio signals being emitted in the areas they are monitoring.

Professor Mark Westwood, head of the centre of aeronautics at Cranfield University, said some of the aircraft typically "fly along a border and image off to the side, building up quite a detailed 3D picture of what's operating there".

Analysts stationed on the plane and back at base can then assess the information gathered and turn it into "intelligence" about Russian movements and capabilities.

The position of the planes also helps reveal where NATO countries are interested in and the position of Russian warships - a circling aircraft at sea suggests they are interested in something at the location.

Why all the activity?

The flurry of reconnaissance flights over recent weeks has coincided with a Russian troop build-up on the Ukrainian border.

It is likely that the spy planes are feeding in more specific information about this build-up, such as the type of equipment the Russians are using.

But it is not just about equipment.

Some of the planes are capable of intercepting voice and text communications.

According to Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow for military aerospace at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, this includes "listening to chatter and not just the official stuff. It could be troops phoning their boyfriend or girlfriend. It's why there are protocols in place to not phone home, but people don't always adhere to that. It's human nature to want to ring home".

Are we seeing everything?

These flights are only recorded on flight tracking databases because their transponders are turned on. The military could turn them off if they wanted, so there may be more that are not being picked up.

However, given the amount of reconnaissance aircraft countries like the UK are known to have, Mr Barrie thinks we are probably seeing most, but not all, of the flights taking place.

And there is a reason for making this activity public. It sends a clear message that Russia is being watched.

But the activity will not all be one way. Russia, and many other countries, have reconnaissance planes of their own.

As Mr Barrie said: "Everyone's listening to everyone else, on one level or another".

Digital Production: Ganesh RaoAdditional flight tracking: Amelia Smith

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Russia-Ukraine crisis: What are NATO spy planes doing to keep tabs on the Russians? - Sky News

Why has Russias President Vladimir Putin become so aggressive in his attitude to the US, NATO and Ukraine? In this article, I begin by examining the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and how it is still seen in the Kremlin as a great humiliation. Then I turn to the enlargement of NATO, and how Putin claims to see Ukraine and Russia as one people and why he is risking war. I conclude by sketching out how Putin sees opportunities in a friendship with China that has no limits and in which China opposes further enlargement of NATO and supports Russias proposals to create long-term, legally binding security guarantees in Europe.

I need to stress at the outset that by trying to understand Moscows hostile stance and the way it is currently threatening to use military force against Ukraine, I do not endorse Moscows belligerent attitude or the dictatorial role that Putin is playing in what is now a potentially very dangerous situation for peace in Europe and, indeed, globally.

If we are to attempt to understand why Russia is behaving in this potentially very dangerous manner, we need to begin by recalling what happened to the Soviet superpower as it collapsed in 1991 and how that calamity continues to affect current strategic thinking in Moscow. Putin recalls the Soviet collapse as a time when gross injustice was done to the Russian people: It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it had not been simply robbed, but plundered. The UK ambassador to Moscow from 1988 to 1992, Rodric Braithwaite, observes that the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991 was a moment of triumph for the West, but for the Russians it brought national humiliation, domestic chaos, great poverty, and even famine.

Former CIA director and US defence secretary Robert Gates recently stated that almost everything Putin does at home and abroad these days is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which for him marked the collapse of the four-century-old Russian Empire and Russias position as a great power. Gates remarks that Putins current actions however deplorable, are understandable. Since becoming president in 1999, Putin has been focused on returning Russia to its historical role as a major power and its historical policy of creating a buffer of subservient states on its peripherythe so-called near abroad.

Readers who wish to consult the definitive account of the USSRs collapse are strongly advised to read the just published authoritative book called Collapse: the fall of the Soviet Union by Vladislav Zubok, a professor of international history at the London School of Economics. Braithwaite describes it as a deeply informed account of how the Soviet Union fell apart and how we have once again come to the brink of a major armed stand-off between Russia and the West.

Zubok concludes that the speed and ease with which the Soviet central structures collapsed baffled even the most experienced Western observers. He believes Mikhail Gorbachevs leadership, character and beliefs constituted a major factor in the Soviet Unions self-destruction. His fumbling policies of reform generated total chaos that legitimised runaway separatism in the Baltics and, ultimately, in the core Slavic territories of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

In the summer of 1991, the expectation of a new Marshall Plan among the Soviet elites became almost universal. But many in Washington wanted to break up the Soviet Union for security reasons. Treasury secretary Nicholas Brady advised President George H.W. Bush that Americas strategic priority was to see the Soviets become a third-rate power, which is what we want. During the 1990s, Zubok claims that 7080% of Russians lived in poverty with the old Soviet social safety net gone and with rampant crime and mafia-like rule in most towns and regions.

Regarding the prospect of the incorporation of a democratising Russia into a larger Europe and NATO, the view was that the post-Soviet geopolitical space was too huge and unpredictable for integration within the Western orbit. The enlargement of NATO took place quickly, because the newly independent Baltic countries and Poland wanted to be free of the Russian military menace. Boris Yeltsin wanted Russia to join NATO, but the new US administration under Bill Clinton chose to offer Russia only a partnership with the alliance because the general view in Washington was that Russia was simply too big to fully belong to NATO.

Yeltsin warned that NATOs enlargement could lead to a new division in Europe. The US secretary of state, James Baker, reassured Gorbachev that NATO would not shift one inch eastward from its present position once it had safely taken in a reunited Germany. Those words were never recorded in any mutually agreed formula.

Neither was the issue of Crimea raised when the leaders of what became the new countries called the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus, met in secret in the Viskuli hunting lodge near Minsk on 7 December 1991. It was there that they agreed to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to Zuboks book, before Yeltsins departure from Moscow his adviser, Galina Starovoitova, suggested he offer the Ukrainian leadership an option of negotiated changes to the borders of Ukraine after a moratorium of three to five years. She was concerned about Crimea.

This option would have helped to placate Russian public opinion and leave open the possibility of settling the territorial issue according to international law. Yeltsin, however, didnt raise this issue in the Viskuli negotiations. The subsequent attitude of his state secretary, Gennady Burbulis, was that all this could be resolved by skilful diplomacy. And the rest, as they say, is history.

Turning now to the NATO issue, Braithwaites view is that, under relentless US pressure, NATOs borders have advanced until they are within spitting distance of Russia and Ukraine. That is how its seen in Moscow, but it is ridiculous in my opinion to suggest that current NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland present any realistic military threat to such a powerful country as todays Russia.

Putin, of course, takes an entirely different point of view. He believes that the Americans conspired to break up his country and encourage the creation of a separate country called Ukraine. We are now in a situation where the animosity between Moscow and Washington over NATOs future and the existence of an independent Ukraine has become central to the future of peace in Europe. As Gates observes, Putins embrace of the strategy of securing Russias near abroad is seen in his actions in Belarus, Moldova, Transnistria, Georgia, the 2020 ArmeniaAzerbaijan conflict, Kazakhstan and nowmost dramaticallyUkraine.

Putin regards Ukraine as a critical security risk for Moscowa dagger pointed at the Slavic heart of Russia. Gates believes that Putin has overplayed his hand on Ukraine because he finds himself in a situation where Russian success is defined as either a change of government in Kyivwith the successor regime bending the knee to Moscowor Russian conquest of the country. Resolving this serious threat peacefully is going to be an immense challenge to the resolve and unity of the Western alliance. Already, Germany is looking like a key weak link because of its dependence on Russia for half of its natural gas supplies.

Putin is proclaiming that Ukraines membership of NATO is a redline issue for Moscow and that he wants written guarantees from the US that Ukraine NATO membership will never be allowed. In July 2021, he allegedly wrote a 7,000-word article titled On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. In it, he asserts that Russians and Ukrainians are one peoplea single whole. He argues that modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know and remember well that it was shapedfor a significant parton the lands of historical Russia. He goes on to claim that the US and EU countries systematically pushed Ukraine into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia.

Putin asserts that what he terms the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia is comparable in its consequence to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. He ominously concludes: And we will never allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used against Russia. And to those who will undertake such an attempt, I would like to say this way they will destroy their own country. So, in effect, there is Putins declaration of war if the US and NATO do not for ever ban Ukraine from NATO membership.

But there is a further potentially dangerous international complication. As I have argued in ASPI publications over the past two years or more, Russia and China are increasingly looking like a de facto alliance. Last week, Putin visited China and met with President Xi Jinping. In a joint statement, the two leaders agreed that friendship between their countries has no limits; there are no forbidden areas of cooperation.

The two sides specifically agreed to oppose further enlargement of NATO, and the Chinese side proclaimed that it supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe. This is Chinas most explicit support to date of Moscows confrontation with the West over NATO membership.

The joint statement of this meeting between the leaders of the worlds two major authoritarian powers includes serious concern about AUKUS and strongly condemns the decision to initiate cooperation in the field of nuclear-powered submarines. The statement marks an increasingly serious joint confrontation with the West. What we are witnessing now is Beijings encouragement of Moscows hostility against the US over NATO membership.

Xi will now be closely scrutinising how Washington reacts to Moscows military threats against Ukraine and the implications for Beijings military intimidation of Taiwan.

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Why Putin sees the US, NATO and Ukraine as a threat | The Strategist - The Strategist

Issued on: 04/02/2022 - 18:19Modified: 04/02/2022 - 18:22

With concern still high over a potential war between Russia and Ukraine, NATO's deputy secretary general spoke to FRANCE 24. Mircea Geoana told our Europe editor Catherine Nicholson: "NATO will not get involved militarily in Ukraine we support Ukraine in many other ways, individual allies support Ukraine.And in order to deter Russia from doing that ... is to really demonstrate to the leadership in the Kremlin that in a cost-benefit analysis, an additional military intervention in Ukraine is a net loss for Russia."

On the latest mobilisation of Russian troops and weapons in Ukraine and Belarus, Geoana described the movements as "suspicious and very unusual"."We are seeing a further mobilisation of Russian military presence in and around Ukraine, in Belarus, in a suspicious and very unusual way. Of course you do not know the real intentions of President Putin and what he will decide or not. But we are seeing with growing concern, further mobilisation of Russian presence in and around Ukraine," he said.

On Russian President Vladimir Putin's demand that NATO rule out Ukraine ever joining the military alliance, the deputy secretary general toldFRANCE 24: "Nobody says that Ukraine will join NATO any time soon. Ukraine has lots of things to reform domestically. And also we need NATO to have consensus today we don't have consensus for eventual membership of Ukraine into NATO. But having said that, no third party has a veto right on a decision that is sovereign of the country, and the organisation they want to join. So it's up to us."

Finally, after Moscow accused the United States of trying to incite a war by moving NATO troops "to Russia's doorstep", Geoana contested that it's Russia's own actions that have pushed NATO to deploy troops and weapons in the region: "NATO didn't have any military presence in the Eastern flank before 2014, after the illegal annexation of Crimea. [Russia] want to have Ukraine in their sphere of influence. What's the result of the continuous war in the Donbass and the annexation of Crimea and the threat today against Ukraine? Ten years ago, only 20 percentof Ukrainian people wanted to join NATO and the EU, today we have 60-something percent. So in a way we hope that Russia will realise that they get the opposite of their intentions."

Submit your views and put forward your ideas on the role of the EU in the world to the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Produced by Isabelle Romero, Sophie Samaille, Georgina Robertson and Perrine Desplats

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Talking Europe - NATO will not get involved militarily in Ukraine, says alliances deputy chief - FRANCE 24

File photo of an F-15C Eagle assigned to the 493rd Fighter Squadron launching for a sortie at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, Dec. 18, 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Madeline Herzog)

According to a NATO Allied Air Command press release, US fighter jets are about to start their stay at the ask Air Base in central Poland to enhance the NATOs collective defence posture and support the NATO Air Policing mission.

In particular, the U.S. Air Force would deploy its 48th Fighter Wings F-15C and F-15D jets, normally stationed at RAF Lakenheath in the UK; the Eagles are scheduled to join the Polish and Danish assets working in the region deployed to Siauliai in Lithuania, within the framework of NATOs BAP (Baltic Air Policing) mission. The reinforcement is said to boost readiness, deterrence, and defensive capabilities of the alliance, amidst the Russian military buildup around Ukraine.

Along with the routine sorties flown to support the NATO Air Policing, the deployment is to involve thorough work with other allies stationed in the region.

The deployment of U.S. F-15s to Poland elevates the collective defense capabilities on NATOs Eastern flank and the enhanced Air Policing mission, said General Jeff Harrigian, Commander Allied Air Command and Commander U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa. The commitment of U.S. aircraft and Airmen demonstrates the solidarity of the Alliance, as we continue to work together in unity to execute our defensive mission.

As usual, in case of the eAP (enhanced Air Policing) initiative, the US jets would be coordinated by the CAOC UE (Combined Air Operations Center in Ueden, Germany). This body is responsible for directing, tasking, and coordinating the assets deployed to Northern Europe, in peacetime, crisis, and conflict, as the NATOs release specifies. In essence, the fact that the jets remain at different locations does not necessarily mean that they are separately commanded, as CAOC views the eAP as one, big operation. CAOCs staff is multinational and remains in touch with Control and Reporting Centres, National Air Policing Centres and dedicated Quick Reaction Alert bases routinely to execute NATOs Air Policing mission.

Enhanced Air Policing is one of the tools that has been implemented as a part of the Assurance Measures promoting the regional stability. Even though Baltic Air Policing has so far been associated mainly with the Siauliai AB in Lithuania, NATO currently has numerous assets stationed in multiple locations, boosting the deterrence and air potential in the area. Not only have the jets been stationed in Lithuania (Polish Air Force, Royal Danish Air Force), as currently they also remain on location in Iceland (currently Portuguese Air Force), Estonia (Belgian Air Component, USAF), Poland (USAF) and Romania (Italian and German Air Force).

Anyway, F-15s of the 48th FW have already deployed to Poland operating within theframework of an Agile Combat Employment exercise. For instance, in April 2021, 20x F-15s (both E and C models from RAF Lakenheath, UK) and 4x F-16s (assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany) deployed to ask (EPLK) and Krzesiny (EPKS) airbases for Aviation Detachment Rotation (AvRot) 21-2.

By the way, as we write this article, U.S. B-52s from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, are deploying to RAF Fairford, UK, as part of a Bomber Task Force rotation..

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U.S. F-15s Deploy to Poland To Boost Defensive Capabilities On NATO's Eastern Flank - The Aviationist

It is unusual for Finlands defense policy to attract much international attention. But this is turning out to be an unusual year. As Russia surrounds Ukraine with military forces, media outlets and pundits across the transatlantic space and elsewhere have been speculating about whether Finland is considering joining NATO. Even President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have aired the possibility of Finland joining the alliance. Is Finland on the verge of making such a strategic shift? Probably not.

As opposed to the vivid international speculation, Finnish leaders have emphasized the continuity of the countrys current policy. Rejecting Russias recent demands to stop the further enlargement of NATO, Finnish President Sauli Niinist pointedly said in a speech to mark the new year that Finland, if it so chooses, could apply for NATO membership. Some commentators took this to mean that Finland would seek to join NATO should Russia invade Ukraine, coming as it did on the heels of a similar statement by the president weeks before. But these voices ignore that in the same speech Niinist also said that Finlands foreign and security policy line remains stable.

Finland has already de facto aligned its defense policy with NATO, having taken on more strategic importance since Russias 2014 assault on Ukraine. In fact, despite its non-allied status, Finland is already an integral security player in Northern Europe, with capabilities that contribute to Western deterrence efforts in the region. Observers of European security would benefit from a deeper understanding of Finlands role in Northern European security, the underpinnings of Finnish defense policy, and the significance of NATO to Finland and vice versa.

The Integral Role of Finland in Northern European Security

Finland, with its 830-mile border with Russia, straddles the Baltic Sea region and the High North right on Russias doorstep. Since Russias illegal seizure of Crimea and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Baltic Sea region is routinely spoken of as a NATO-Russia flashpoint. The strategic importance of the European Arctic has also grown significantly in recent years.

These developments in European security have bolstered Finlands significance. Its geographic position and the strength of its armed forces make it an essential player when considering a conflict with Russia. At a minimum, Finlands ability to defend its own territory would help NATO, and especially the United States, to carry out its collective defense mission in Northern Europe.

Unlike most European countries, when the Cold War ended Finland decided to maintain a sizeable army. The wartime strength of the Finnish Defense Forces is 280,000 personnel a striking contrast to its 23,000-personnel peacetime posture. Moreover, Finland has one of the largest and best-equipped artillery forces in Europe, with 1,500 artillery pieces and precision-strike capabilities. In December 2021, Finland decided to replace its F/A-18 fleet with 64 F-35s, which, when operational, will significantly enhance Finlands defense capability. The fact that the United States has been willing to sell the country sophisticated weaponry is seen as a signal that a capable Finland serves American security interests in Northern Europe.

While Finland is not a member of any alliance, its security policy is rooted in the understanding that it cannot isolate itself from a European conflict. Finlands main and minimal contribution to allied efforts would be the protection of southern Finland from a Russian incursion, thereby denying Moscow the use of Finnish territory or airspace to operate against its Baltic neighbors. But Finland could do more. In wartime, certain NATO allies would likely seek to use Finlands airspace to defend the Baltic countries a request that would be hard to deny given Finlands dependence on the West. Finland is reliant on the flow of trade and supplies from the West across the Baltic Sea, and would need its partners assistance in a conflict to keep these crucial lines of communication open and, if necessary, to find alternative routes through Sweden or Norway.

In the European Arctic, Finland offers NATO a buffer zone defending the northern coast of Norway a reality that Finnish defense planners readily admit. The control of northern Norway is critical to the alliance in order to guard the Norwegian Sea and passage to the northern Atlantic, which are in turn critical to Americas ability to reinforce the European theater. In a war, Russia could try to gain control of northern Norway and use it as a spring board to disrupt the flow of U.S. reinforcements to Europe. Thus, from NATOs point of view, Finlands determination to defend its territory is linked to the defense of the North Atlantic.

Understanding Finlands Alignment with NATO

Before 2014, Finnish cooperation with NATO was primarily concerned with crisis management. But Russias attack on Ukraine in 2014 changed things. Finland intensified military cooperation with Sweden and several NATO allies to encompass territorial defense and regional security. The above-mentioned security dynamics in Northern Europe rendered Finland an interesting partner from the perspective of several NATO allies, who, after years of soul searching, were returning to the alliances traditional core task: collective defense.

Finland now boasts deeper defense relationships with Sweden and Norway, as well as with the United States and the rest of NATO. Geography and shared threats make Sweden and Norway natural partners for Finland, and the United States is an indispensable partner in terms of potential wartime reinforcements. The Enhanced Opportunities Partnership with NATO also grants Finland access to the alliances demanding exercises, developing Finlands interoperability with allied forces.

Although the scope of these defense partnerships varies, Finlands defense cooperation policy has explicit aims, which were most recently outlined in the governments 2021 defense report. This document highlights that defense cooperation, inter alia, raises the threshold against aggression and creates prerequisites for providing and receiving political and military assistance. The report also clearly indicates that Finnish peacetime cooperation creates a basis for collaboration during emergency conditions.

Finnish policymakers have clarified the principles of this defense cooperation policy by highlighting the likely importance of ad hoc coalitions in a European conflict and the decisive role of shared interests in operational cooperation. In 2017, Niinist pointed out that in case conflict breaks out, coalitions can take shape without treaty applications. The following year, the then defense minister stated in a speech that Finland hopes that its strong defense forces make it an interesting partner who others want to cooperate with, and that Finlands readiness to defend itself benefits its partners. That said, Finnish decision-makers understand that NATO has no formal commitment to assist Finland in the event of a conflict. Given its extensive military cooperation and the willingness to prepare for operational collaboration in wartime, Finlands policy cannot be called neutrality or military non-alignment. But Finland is not allied either. How could its status be portrayed, then?

In one of the classics of international relations alliance literature, Glenn Snyder distinguishes an alignment from an alliance. An alignment, he argues, occur when a group of friendly states, based on mutual interest and threat perceptions, coalesce to prevent and, if necessary, to counter aggression from a shared adversary. Alliances, per Snyder, are merely formalizations of existing alignments. Finland is aligned but not allied with NATO. Finland and most NATO allies share a potential adversary Russia and the aim of their respective policies is to deter Russian aggression in Europe. Finnish policymakers increasingly see effective Western deterrence as the best way to ensure that Finland never ends up being a party to a military conflict. Moreover, and importantly, Finland and its partners are developing prerequisites for conducting joint operations in wartime. Due to decades-long efforts, Finlands interoperability with the United States, for example, is high, and the two countries currently aim to achieve genuine day-zero interoperability for operations in Northern Europe.

Deep cooperation notwithstanding, Finland has not formalized its alignment by joining NATO. This has ramifications for Finlands position. The deterrent effect of a formalized treaty is stronger than the impact of alignment. Moreover, Finland is not under the American nuclear umbrella, making it, at least in theory, more susceptible to nuclear coercion. Lastly, Finnish-NATO/American interoperability is not yet seamless, but different measures, such as more regular table-top exercises, have been envisioned to help close the gap.

NATO Is Still an Option

This all invites the question: If Finland has already aligned its defense policy with the transatlantic alliance, why is it not making things simpler and just applying for NATO membership? There are at least three reasons why Finlands unorthodox security arrangement is likely to endure.

First, Finnish public opinion remains against NATO membership. Things may be changing, though. Opposition to membership has steadily declined for several years, although the opponents still retain the upper hand in public surveys. Interestingly, a recent poll showed that although most Finns are hesitant to join NATO now, they could support joining the alliance in the future. However, only two out of 10 parties in the Finnish parliament one large, the other small currently support NATO membership, and there is no real pressure from the public to change Finlands course. Moreover, Finland is a consensus-seeking society, and strategic shifts such as joining a military alliance are not likely to take place without broad political support.

Secondly, the Finnish leadership sees the countrys current status as a useful tool for maintaining the delicate regional status quo and preventing escalation in Northern Europe. Since 2014, NATO allies and Finland have found a functional, non-escalatory way to intensify cooperation. Preserving regional stability has been a lodestar of Finlands foreign policy for decades, and Finnish politicians are hesitant to rock the boat. Moscows approach to NATO is currently outright hostile, and a decision to seek NATO membership could lead to Russian coercive countermeasures against Finland, potentially destabilizing the whole Baltic Sea region.

Moscows precise response to a Finnish NATO bid is hard to predict. It would likely use many means simultaneously, ranging from coercive diplomacy to economic pressure, such as harassing or restricting Finnish companies operating in Russia or banning certain Finnish goods. Retaliatory economic measures could be painful to the Finnish economy, as Russia is the fifth biggest destination for Finnish exports. Other measures could include the weaponization of migrant flows which Finland has already experienced. Cyber operations targeting Finlands critical infrastructure are also possible. The use of military force against Finland would nevertheless be highly unlikely. Rather, Russia would probably enhance its force posture in Finlands vicinity. Broader regional consequences could include military saber-rattling in and around the Baltic Sea something that the area witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the initial outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict.

Thirdly, there is a strong consensus in Finland on maintaining a functional relationship with Russia despite grave disagreements concerning European security. Finlands peculiar small-state realism has traditionally put a strong emphasis on reassuring Russia about Finlands friendly intentions. Moreover, regular interaction between Niinist and Russian President Vladimir Putin has given Finland a decent grasp of the Kremlins thinking, making it a useful interlocutor in the eyes of major players like the United States, Germany, and France. Furthermore, Russias force posture close to Finlands borders is limited, and Russia has not been as antagonistic with Finland as it has with Sweden and Norway. A Finnish bid for NATO membership would shake the foundations of its Russia policy, which is a genuine but not necessarily insurmountable concern for its policymakers.

Be that as it may, Finlands current policy is not set in stone. There are conceivable paths to NATO membership in the coming decade. A first avenue would be a Swedish decision to seek membership in the alliance. Swedens membership could jeopardize the future of deep bilateral defense cooperation, making Finlands position as the only non-allied Nordic-Baltic country politically untenable. Decision-makers in Helsinki and Stockholm know this, and seeking membership together would be the sensible course of action.

Secondly, persuasion from NATO, and particularly from the United States, for Finland to join the alliance could alter Helsinkis calculations. Hitherto, NATO allies have been agreeable to developing cooperation without treaty obligations. If this approach changed, or if there were a real risk of NATO closing its door for good, Finnish leaders could be ready to hand in the application. The instrumentalization of the option to join NATO is a crucial part of the Finnish security policy doctrine, and it is used as a soft deterrent against Russia like Niinist did in his new years speech. If NATO closed its door, Finland would see its options diminish.

Another possible path to getting Finland into NATO would be a change in Russias policy vis--vis Finland. Should Moscow take on a more aggressive posture, Helsinki might come to see joining the alliance as its best option. Russian leaders probably understand this, and it is likely the chief reason for their pragmatic policy towards Finland.

Ultimately, Finlands potential NATO membership boils down to a cool-headed cost-benefit analysis: Would the benefits of joining NATO outweigh the risks related to the danger of regional escalation and Russian countermeasures? From a purely defense policy point of view, NATO membership would be more credible than the status quo. It would not, however, be a silver bullet. Finns are asking legitimate questions about whether a diverse alliance can reach unanimity in a crisis or whether any NATO allies besides the United States have the capacity to reinforce Finland in a conflict. Furthermore, before making any choices Finland would have to be certain that its membership bid would enjoy unanimous backing among NATO members. The timing of the potential decision would also be of the essence in mitigating escalation risks. Presently, Western-Russian ties are extremely tense, and several allies could see NATOs enlargement closer to Russias borders as an unnecessary escalation. Indeed, the tenser the security situation gets, the more wary NATO members may be to accept new allies. This is something that stability-seeking Finnish leaders should be mindful of.

From the perspective of enhancing NATO deterrence in Europe, having Finland in the alliance would make strategic sense. Finlands membership would not bring substantial new burdens for the alliance. Its self-sufficient approach to defending its territory would likely continue, and Helsinki would take its alliance obligations, including that of assisting the Baltic States, seriously. But this would not be a big difference from what Finland is already doing. Even if it were to join NATO, the other members of the alliance would not necessarily expect Finland to provide significant reinforcements in a regional conflict. Rather, Finlands chief priority would continue to be the defense of its territory, to the benefit of its neighbors. On the other hand, if Finland and Sweden were to join NATO, this would allow the alliance to prepare operational plans for the whole Northern European strategic region. This fact should be kept in mind if the discussion on halting NATO enlargement gathers more steam in the United States and in the alliance more broadly.

Matti Pesu,Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include Finnish foreign, security, and defense policy, Northern European security, and Euro-Atlantic security.

Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Airman 1st Class Viviam Chiu)

See original here:
As Finland Watches: From Alignment to Alliance? - War on the Rocks

An armed guard patrols near the temporary barbed-wire fencing set up at the Latvia-Belarus border. The European Union says Belarus is flying in thousands of people from the Middle East and pushing them to cross into EU and NATO members Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.Gints Ivuskans/The Globe and Mail

NATOs eastern flank at the Latvian-Belarus border is lined with new barbed-wire fencing that runs as far as the eye can see a stark symbol of the state of emergency Riga has declared for the 172-kilometre frontier.

Russias menacing of Ukraine has set off alarms in Eastern European countries that border Russia and close ally Belarus, a second territory where Moscow has been massing troops as fears of military action against Kyiv remain high.

Latvias border patrols and national guard say theyre ready for the worst-case scenario where a threat to the Baltics emerges from the chaos of war in Ukraine. It doesnt matter if it comes from Russia or Belarus or Kaliningrad. We are prepared for total defence, Colonel Gunars Vizulis with the Latvian National Guard said at a training camp for new recruits at Meza Mackevici, about 35 kilometres from the frontier with Belarus.

Whats the latest in Russia and NATOs standoff over Ukraine? The story so far

Russia accuses West of ramping up pressure by supplying Ukraine arms

But officials say the biggest challenge for Latvia right now and the reason for this new barbed-wire fence is the continuing migration crisis orchestrated by neighbouring Belarus.

Juris Kusins, Lieutenant colonel of State Border Guard of Latvia Border Latvia-Belarus at the Silene border point.Gints Ivuskans/The Globe and Mail

More than 1,500 people from countries such as Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East were intercepted by Latvian patrols in January trying to enter the country illegally from Belarus. Thats up from 1,400 attempts in December and 500 to 600 a month when this began last summer, said Lieutenant-Colonel Juris Kusins with Latvias State Border Guard.

Those caught tell Latvian authorities that the Belarusian army directed them to the border.

Col. Vizulis blames the illegal migration on Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, accusing him of political mischief. The European Union says Belarus is flying in thousands of people from the Middle East and pushing them to cross into EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization members Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

He speculated that the Belarusians are trying to exhaust the Baltic countrys resources by engineering these migrant crossings. Its tiring. We are strong and will do our best if needed but nevertheless we are a small country.

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything

from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power are

now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO

multinational

battlegroups:

5,000 troops

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational

brigade 5,000

troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

graphic news, Sources: Janes; NATO, Reuters;

The New York Times; Rochan Consulting

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything

from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power are

now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO

multinational

battlegroups:

5,000 troops

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational

brigade 5,000

troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

graphic news, Sources: Janes; NATO, Reuters;

The New York Times; Rochan Consulting

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything from tanks and artillery to ammunition and

air power are now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO multinational

battlegroups: 5,000 troops

Other military

or air instal-

lations

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Transnistria:

Russian-backed

breakaway region

of Moldova

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational brigade

5,000 troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

See original here:
On NATO's eastern flank, Latvia contends with a migration crisis orchestrated by neighbouring Belarus - The Globe and Mail

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was formed in 1949 with the aim, first and foremost, of acting as a deterrent to the threat of Soviet expansion in Europe after World War II. Beyond that, the United States saw it as a tool to prevent the resurgence of nationalist tendencies in Europe and to foster political integration on the continent.

Its origins, however, actually go back to 1947, when the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirkas an alliance to counter the eventuality of a German attack in the aftermath of the war.

The original 12 founding members of the political and military alliance are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

At its core, the organization acts as a collective security alliance with the aim of providing mutual defense through military and political means if a member state isthreatened by an external country.

This cornerstone is laid outin article 5 of the charter, the collective defense clause:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Article 5 has been invoked once, by the United States, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

The Soviet Union responded to NATO by creating its own military alliance with seven otherEastern European communist states in 1955, dubbed the Warsaw Pact.

But the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, paved the way for a new post-Cold War security order in Europe.

Freed from their Soviet shackles, a number of former Warsaw Pact countries became NATO members. Visegrad Group members Hungary, Polandand the Czech Republic joined in 1999. Five years later, in 2004, NATO admitted the so-called Vilnius Group, made up of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.Albania andCroatia joined in 2009.

The most recent additions were Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020, bringing the total number of member states to 30. Three countries are currently categorized as "aspiring members": Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of thestandoff between Russia and Ukraine at their common border, the latter's ambition to join the alliance has again gathered pace. At NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008, the alliance formally welcomed both Ukraine and Georgia's membership aspirations, but stopped short of granting membership action plans. For Russia, the notion of its former Soviet satellite Ukraine joining NATO is a red line.

NATO's so-called open door policy, as outlined in article 10 of the treaty, allows any European country that can enhance and contribute "to the security of the North Atlantic area" to join.

"Countries aspiring for NATO membership are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military goals in order to ensure that they will become contributors to Alliance security as well as beneficiaries of it," it says on NATO's site.

Edited by: Martin Kuebler

Continued here:
What is NATO and why was it created? - DW (English)

NATOis uncharacteristically divided on how to deal with Russia in the escalating crisis over Ukraine. "The US and the UK favor deterrence and a hard line; Germany, France and Italy are emphasizing dialogue, and a third group, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, wants to stay out of the conflict and any troop deployment," says Stefan Meister, an expert on Russia and eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

He told DW that, while Germany is usually the moderate link between these groups, that link is currently missing because of weak leadership.

He warns that, in addition, NATO is already weakened by populism, Trump, and Brexit. "Russia's President Vladimir Putin is trying to exploit this to negotiate a new security order in Europe without the United States," he explains. And in this situation, the NATO countries of southeastern Europe have an unusually important role to play.

However, there are some strident, and conflicting, voices making themselves heard in the region. At the end of January, the president of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, caused confusion both at home and abroad when he declared that, in the event of a conflict in Ukraine, his country would retreat. Speaking in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, Milanovic said: "If it comes to an escalation, we will withdraw, down to the last Croatian soldier." He did not, however, specify exactly what he meant. There are no Croatian soldiers stationed in Ukraine.

The feud between Croatian President Zoran Milanovic (left) and Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic (right) has led to conflicting statements about Ukraine

The government of Croatia a member of both the EU and NATO immediately issued a contradictory statement. "The president does not speak for Croatia, but for himself," said the Croatian foreign minister, Gordan Grlic Radman. "We are and remain a loyal member of NATO."

What is most peculiar about the Croatian president's threat is that no one not NATO, not the US, not Ukraine had requested the Croatian military's involvement. "Milanovic's statements serve domestic political purposes. They have to be seen against the background of his ongoing feud with Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic," explained Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna, in an interview with DW. "Lately, the president seems to be playing the nationalist card. He has called Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, a 'partner,' and he wants to pander to Croatian nationalists, who dream of redrawing the borders in Bosnia, with Russian support."

In an appearance on Bulgarian television BTV on February 1, 2022, Russian ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova made it very clear what Russia is demanding of NATO: that it withdraw behind the borders of states that were members of the organization in 1997. This would require NATO to withdraw all its troops from countries like Romania and Bulgaria and close its bases there. Mitrofanova said that these countries could formally remain NATO members but only formally.

Bulgaria's defense minister, Stefan Yanev, is apparently comfortable with the idea. In December 2021 he was publicly reprimanded by the prime minister, Kiril Petkov, after he spoke out on Facebook against the redeployment of NATO troops to Bulgaria. In a parliamentary hearing the following month, Yanev then declared: "We should stop reading the foreign press and speculating. We should be bulgarophiles, and think in terms of Bulgarian national interests." If any NATO troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria, he said, they should be exclusively Bulgarian.

There is a domestic political background to the emphasis on "national interests" in Bulgaria, too. In December 2021, the nationalist Rebirth party entered parliament, and since then it has been putting pressure on the government. The ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova is well aware of Bulgarian nationalists' traditionally pro-Russian sympathies. "Russia has an influence in Bulgaria: our common history," she says. "That is the most important lobbyist, the most important influencer in our relations."

The situation in Romania is quite different. Along with Germany and Poland, it is one of the countries to which additional USand NATO troops are already being deployed. According to a survey by the INSCOP Research polling institute, of all the countries in the region, Romania is the one where NATO enjoys the highest level of trust among the population. "Additional NATO troops are not just welcome, they're also a political asset for the government," Sorin Ionita, a political scientist at the Expert Group think tank in Bucharest, told DW. "Not even the nationalists dare to speak out against it."

The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban (left), maintains a 'special relationship' with Russian president Vladimir Putin

Hungary is also a focus for NATO troop deployments, since, like Romania, it shares a border with Ukraine. Prime Minister Viktor Orban has maintained a "special relationship" with Russia for years. His public admiration for President Putin, and rejection of sanctions against his regime, have earned him the nickname "Putin's pinscher."

A few days ago, at the start of February 2022, Orban traveled to Moscow on what he called a "peace mission." However, the main issues under discussion were actually supplies of Russian gas, which Hungary buys at well below market value, and Russian involvement in the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. Consequently, Budapest is avoiding any discussion of Hungary getting more involved in NATO activities.

Turkey is a strategically important NATO member that also has a particularly complex relationship with Russia. Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are cooperating in the Syrian civil war, but in Libya they support different groups. Erdogan first snubbed his NATO partners by buying Russian S-400 air defense missiles then Ankara supplied Ukraine with military drones. Like Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Turkey is also dependent on Russian gas and oil.

On his recent visit to Kyiv, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) offered to mediate between Ukraine and Russia

"It's a delicate balancing act for Ankara," says Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations. "Erdogan has a special connection with Ukraine, and will support both it and NATO. On the other hand, he mustn't anger Putin so much that he turns off the gas, or seeks revenge in Syria."

"Putin knows exactly what he wants in eastern Europe unlike the West," the British eastern Europe expert Timothy Garton Ash comments in the Guardian newspaper. "He wants to restore as much as possible of the empire, great power status and sphere of influence that Russia lost so dramatically 30 years ago, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union." In southeastern Europe, the Kremlin aims to achieve this by means of cheap gas and nationalism.

Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation adds: "Russia is also offering the nationalist elites in the western Balkans something the West is not offering, and should not offer: the promise of redrawing the borders in the region."

However, in the view of Stefan Meister of the DGAP, cheap gas, nationalism, and disagreement will not be enough to divide NATO in the event of a conflict. "Right now, as the leading power, the US is able to assert itself.NATO is relatively united on deterrence, and when it comes down to it, even if smaller states pull out, they won't call their loyalty to the alliance into question. Weapons are being supplied, troops are being reinforced and time is being bought where Russia is concerned."

This story was originally published in German.

Read more:
NATO and Russia: Conflicting views in southeastern Europe - DW (English)

The Russian army may be poised to annex Ukraine, but Americas most activist ice cream manufacturer thinks US troops should stay at home instead of heading to Eastern Europe to fight.

In a tweet, the official Ben & Jerrys account called on US president Joe Biden to de-escalate tensions and work for peace rather than prepare for war. You cannot, the account insisted, simultaneously prevent and prepare for war.

Biden, for his part, met with German chancellor Olaf Scholz at the White House on Feb. 7, reportedly telling him the US and Germany are in lockstep over Ukraine. And Anthony Blinken, US secretary of state, said there would be real and profound consequences should Russia choose to continue aggression.

It was not the message Ben & Jerrys was hoping for.

The tweet was completely in character for the company. Though Ben & Jerryhas been owned for more than 20 years by Unilever, it was started by two Vermont ice cream makers who were unafraid to be activists. In fact, the Ben & Jerrys brand has a steady record of advocating that the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reduce their presence in Europe.

In 1998, when NATO was expanding into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Ben & Jerrys thought it was crazy. In an interview with the New York Times, Ben Cohenone of the brands titular founderstried to find an ice cream industry analogy for NATO pushing toward Russias borders:

Our biggest competitor is Haagen-Dazs. So it would be as if one day Haagen-Dazs announced that after all these years of competing with us, it had decided to go out of the ice cream business and instead would sell only hot dogs. And then one day Haagen-Dazs Hot Dogs comes to Ben & Jerrys and says, We would like to be partners with you and sell your ice cream in our hot dog shops. But we said to them: No, we wont let you sell our ice cream. We still want to drive Haagen-Dazs out of business, even though youre not in the ice cream business anymore, because we remember you were once in the ice cream business. And furthermore, were going to spend $2 billion to kill your hot dog business to make sure youll never sell ice cream again.'

A nonprofit called Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, founded by Cohen, took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times that same year, accusing US defense contractors of lobbying hard for a NATO expansion that was really a $60 billion boondoggle. Other ads revealed the ice cream companys (unintentionally ironic) worry that alienating Russia would start a new Cold War.

Ben & Jerrys stance against military aggression of any kind first became visible in 1988, when Cohen founded 1% For Peace, a campaign that aimed to divert 1% of the US defense budget into peace-promoting activities and projects.

The company built a reputation for other kinds of activism as well, including championing same-sex marriage, pulling out of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and calling for the resignation and impeachment of Donald Trump after the Capitol riot in January 2021.

Read this article:
Ben & Jerry's thinks NATO should chill a little over Ukraine - Quartz