Category Archives: Federalism

IT seems inevitable that Scotland will remain in political paralysis until the independence referendum boil is finally lanced with a rerun. It is crucial for that issue and more generally the electorate's trust in politicians that we can at least make an informed choice.

It is the unquestionable duty of politicians to make their proposals backed up by detailed evidence of how the thorny issues will be dealt with. On the Yes side those are the EU, economics, the currency and more. On the No side, what changes are on offer to preserve the Union devo max? Federalism? What's the difference? What does it mean? How will the Celtic nations cope with a south-east of England-dominated, dominant England?

At least a fully informed referendum decision will give us the faint hope of subsequently being able to vote meaningfully for better governance than we are getting from either Holyrood or Westminster now. We, the electorate, are not stupid and last time I checked it was still our country

John Murdoch, Innellan.

* ALASDAIR Galloway (Letters, January 13) asks why those of us who do not support Scottish independence do not place the same burden of proof on our case as we demand from nationalists.

The answer is quite simple: the nationalist proposal is a hypothetical projection, while the status quo is an observable reality. We can see and record what happens and what has happened in the UK as it is (warts and all), but it is up to the nationalists to show that independence would be better, and how that could come about. There is currently no proposal for independence on the table, so it is quite legitimate to ask for one so that it can be scrutinised accordingly.

He also asks why any future proposal that may be produced should be subject to a higher level of electoral approval than in 2014 or 2016. Obviously he sees the Brexit vote as great success, but I think we should look to other countries like the United States, where two-thirds is the required vote for constitutional amendments, or to Switzerland, where they require a majority of all cantons (a double majority.) A simple 50 per cent +1 victory does not fulfil the purpose of a referendum (that is, to settle a matter for a generation or longer) but makes underlying divisions more permanent and more bitter.

Mr Galloway cites domestic precedents in his defence of a simple majority in these matters. However, unIike him, I do not believe that the British way is always the best way of doing things, especially in constitutional matters.

Peter A Russell, Glasgow.

NO MORE BRANCH MANAGERS

MARK Openshaw (Letters, January 13) details the many steps available in a free society to bring a recalcitrant politician to heel or justice, in this case the Prime Minister of the UK. This is true of all democracies which have evolved over hundreds of years. Democracy as we understand it today is underpinned by the rule of law and in Scotland the legal system can be traced back to the 12th century, perhaps slightly older than the English legal system. There are many countries able to trace their democratic roots back in time, although Mr Openshaw appears to allude to real democracy being the preserve of our islands.

If Scotland became independent, it is clear Mr Openshaw would not be supporting the SNP because of its omerta-like intolerance of internal dissent. I think the dictionary definition of omerta might be better applied to the governing party at Westminster with all its alleged dubious contracts to friends during the Covid crisis.

Mr Openshaw need not worry needlessly about who to vote for in an independent Scotland as he will be able to choose from a number of political parties. These are sure to include existing political parties now independent themselves. With the constitutional question having been settled, from a currently bare cupboard the Conservative and Labour parties might be able to come up with a policy or two which would benefit the new Scotland they might even get elected as the governing party.

No longer would the Tory leader in Scotland be regarded as a Tory lightweight by his betters in London or the Scottish Labour leader as a branch manager for a single MP sitting in London. Whats not to like?

Alan M Morris, Blanefield.

NATURAL REACTION TO EMPIRE BUILDERS

ALEXANDER R McKay's obsessive hatred of national independence (Letters, January 14) qualifies him to join the company of many celebrated figures from history.

The Romans viciously suppressed independence movements, the Habsburgs and the Romanovs were angered by them, Napoleon hated them and the British regarded them with indignation. The Ottomans failed to understand them and the Nazis ruthlessly attacked them in France, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Norway, Denmark and any of the other countries they invaded.

All these frenzied empire builders have been swept aside by history and independent nations have became the accepted normal.

As soon as people began to question the morality of empire building and international plundering, residual sympathisers went on the defensive and, by a spectacular inversion of the truth, condemned "nationalism" or "separatism" as the cause of all political problems. Any examination of history shows that, on the contrary, the pursuit of national independence is just a natural reaction to the arrogant greed of empire builders and conquerors. They all eventually discover its power but cause incalculable damage before they do.

Peter M Dryburgh, Edinburgh.

* REBECCA McQuillan ("Rees-Moggs disdain for Scots Tories shows they must break free", The Herald, January 14) displays the head-in-the-sand affliction widely demonstrated by journalists and commentators who do not seem to understand the difference between the terms nationalism and nationality.

She accepts the increasingly obvious fact that the UK Conservative Party is now an alien force in Scotland and that the Labour Party in Scotland is severely hampered by its stubborn unionist stance but continues to maintain that there is virtue in avoiding "separation" from England. Even if the bitter pill of Brexit were to be swallowed without complaint, federalism or devo max, both of which would continue to treat Scotland as a region rather than a nation, will never satisfy the aspirations of the emerging generation among which so many identify their nationality as Scottish rather than British; their voting choices are driven by nationality rather than nationalism.

I don't think I am better than any of my neighbours and don't want to be any more separated from them than at present but I don't want them to be in control of my home as well as their own.

Willie Maclean, Milngavie.

DOUBLE STANDARDS FROM GOVE

MICHAEL Gove expresses laudable sentiments in Fridays Herald such as "government is a team event" and he boasts of new arrangements that "put mutual respect and collaboration at the heart of a new, mature partnership ("By working as a team across the UK we can overcome common challenges", The Herald, January 14).

What does he mean then when he contrasts the locations of London and Elgin and those who live there? Does ones location confer superiority? How can we level up if the really important place to be is London? Could it be that this mindset is so thoroughly ingrained, ministers dont even recognise it in themselves?

Doesnt bode well for the future.

Jane Guz, Dundee.

POVERTY MUST BE THE NEXT FIGHT

I SUGGEST that post-pandemic we will have an opportunity to raise our aspirations beyond a pitiful return to normal, a normal which fails to present a particularly hopeful future for so many, at home and abroad.

Is it realistic to hope that significant numbers within our society will recognise and condemn at long last the structural injustices of ultra-free markets in which only the prosperous and relatively prosperous can thrive while so many others struggle even to survive?

I am confident that the Labour Party will give the poor more hope of a much better normal than would the Conservative Party. I base my confidence on the following statement by Sir Keir Starmer: I have always been motivated by a burning desire to tackle inequality and injustice, to stand up for the powerless against the powerful. If I see something wrong or spot an injustice, I want to put it right. Can any reader imagine any Conservatives, other than the handful of remaining One Nation Conservatives, saying that since the advent of Margaret Thatcher 47 years ago?

Even during the Thatcherite-tinged New Labour years foreign aid was doubled and more than a million pensioners and more than a million children were lifted out of absolute poverty.

I await to hear the SNPs approach in its prospectus for an independent Scotland. How far down the social justice path would it wish to lead us? Can it demonstrate that the finances will allow it? Or would a Labour UK government and an enhanced devolution settlement be the answer?

John Milne, Uddingston.

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Letters: Let's lance the Indy boil with a fully informed vote - HeraldScotland

A day after Samajwadi Party (SP) leadership said West Bengal Chief Minister and Trinamool Congress chief Mamata Banerjee would campaign for the party in Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls, the BJP leadership in West Bengal said her campaigning would only help the BJP in the election.

West Bengal BJP leader and Leader of the Opposition Suvendu Adhikari said the BJP leadership in Uttar Pradesh would not call Ms. Banerjee bahirgata [outsider] and allow her helicopter to land in the State.

Mr. Adhikari, who is the most vocal critic of the Trinamool Congress chairperson, described her as anti- Hindu , blamed her for the post poll violence in the State. Sanatanis [Hindus] of Uttar Pradesh will not vote for her.

On Tuesday, SP leader Kiranmoy Nanda met Ms. Banerjee at her residence in Kolkata and said she would hold a joint virtual meeting and press conference with his party president, Akhilesh Yadav, on February 8 in Lucknow.

Mr. Adhikari said Mr. Nanda had become irrelevant in politics. He refuted the SP leaders claims that Ms. Banerjee had become a face against the BJP in the entire country.

On the issue of proposed amendment to the IAS (Cadre) Rules, 1954, Mr. Adhikari supported the Centres move. He cited the instance of former West Bengal Chief Secretary Alapan Bandyopadhyay, against whom the Centre had moved disciplinary proceedings.

Ms. Banerjee had written a letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, urging him to roll back the decision. She said the changes in the rules for Central deputation of IAS officers would affect the States administration. She expressed strong reservation to the proposed amendment. It was against the spirit of cooperative federalism, she alleged.

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Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls | Mamatas campaign for SP will help BJP: Adhikari - The Hindu

Chairman of the State Administration Council and Prime Minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has expressed his belief that more could be done to restore internal peace as the invitation has been extended to peace talks for the resumption of new paces of peace.

He made the comment in his message of greetings to a ceremony to mark the 70th Anniversary of Kayah State Day that fell on January 15, state-run newspapers reported.

At present, the State Administration Council taking the State responsibilities in accord with the Constitution (2008) is implementing the five-point road map and nine political, economic and social objectives. It is very important to ensure peace and stability of the country and restore perpetual peace across the nation in order to secure success in implementation. Hence, as the invitation has been extended to the peace talks for the resumption of new paces of peace, he said he firmly believes that more cooperation could be achieved for the restoration of the internal peace for all ethnic national people. The government focuses on the interests of the State and the ethnic people and will continue further cooperation with the ethnic national people in unison to emphasize more peace and stability of the country with prosperity and food sufficiency. As unity will bring prosperity to the nation, all need to build the nation through united strength, the Senior General said.

He added that only when all public service personnel, all civil society organizations and the entire people together with the Tatmadaw (military) participate in the tasks to build the Union based on democracy and federalism in accord with the desire of all ethnic national people, will the country successfully reach the goal in a short time. Primarily, all ethnic national people need to have unity whereas the country is peaceful, stable and tranquil.

At present, it can be seen that incitement of some foreign countries, instigation of some organizations with different opinions turning a blind eye to the interests of the State and the people, fabricated news pulling down the State into the abyss of danger, persuasion of NUG, CRPH and PDF terrorist groups and their terror acts cause wrong thoughts and disintegration of unity among the people from some areas without peace, he pointed out.

He then stressed the need to consider that in consequence, it cannot bring the benefit to the State but it can only bring danger to the State and the people.

The Senior General also said in looking back the history, the country unavoidably accepted the independence together with events of internal insurgency based on impacts of the divide-and-rule policy of the colonialists, racism and isms as well as armed conflicts based on doubts among the ethnic nationals for many years. All have witnessed such consequential impacts on the peace, stability and development of the State.

Currently, the government is making relentless efforts for building the Union based on democracy and federalism all the ethnic national people aspire. That is why ethnic nationals from the Kayah State are to participate in the work process through the genuine Union spirit taking the lessons from the past events, he commented.

Continued here:

More could be done to restore peace as invitation already extended for peace talks resumption: Snr Gen Min Aung Hlaing - Eleven Myanmar

In the course of his nominally centrist 2020 campaign, President Biden embraced a whole series of radical, bad ideas for higher education. Whether due to old-fashioned realpolitik, the stylings of woke policy wonks on a somnolent staff, or an attempt to court the partys over-caffeinated Twitter base, Biden embraced free college, loan forgiveness, Title IX extremism, and much else.

Specifically, Biden pledged to make two years of community college free for all students and to forgive all undergraduate "tuition-related" student debt for those earning up to $125,000 a year. The price tag was extraordinary. Bidens free college and student loan proposals alone were estimated to cost $2.9 trillion over a decade. He also vowed to restore Obama-era Title IX rules that denied due process to students accused of sexual misconduct, yielded campus-run kangaroo courts, and led to hundreds of lawsuits from accused students on grounds of due process and discrimination. The DeVos Department of Education had restored due process in 2020 after a formal, lengthy rule-making process.

Well, after a year of fumbling, Biden has failed to achieve any of these goals. This is good for the nation, for taxpayers, and for students. Even if Biden can persuade Sen. Joe Manchin to resurrect something from the wreckage of Build Back Better, his free college and debt forgiveness proposals seem safely interred for at least the next few years. But it isnt all good news: Unable to move legislation through a Democratic Congress, Biden has increasingly turned to piecemeal pandering by executive order while ignoring easy opportunities to sound useful notes and solve practical problems.

Lets start by digging deeper into Bidens failures to move his agenda.

Bidens free community college proposal did make it as far as the falls initial $3.5 trillion version of Build Back Better. The proposed federal-state partnership (a delicate description of Obamacare-style federalism) prompted a frenzy of enthusiasm in the higher ed world, full of cart-before-horse conversation about how to spend the windfall. But, when Sens. Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema insisted that theyd meant it when they termed the $3.5 trillion price tag too high, free college got tossed overboard.

Loan forgiveness didnt make it that far. On the campaign trail, Biden promised, Im going to eliminate your student debt if you come from a family [making less] than $125,000 and went to a public university and Im going to make sure everyone gets $10,000 knocked off of their student debt. Thus far, though, the White House hasnt moved any actual legislative proposal on this count. Furthermore, Biden has responded to the woke lefts demands to order the secretary of education to discharge student debt by kinda, sorta explaining that he lacks the requisite authority (alert readers may find this eerily reminiscent of his Hamlet act regarding the eviction moratorium or federal vaccine mandates).

Of course, its unclear just what problems the trillions proposed for higher education are intended to solve. Indeed, the College Board, which annually tracks college pricing and aid, reports that generous public subsidies mean that the net cost of community college (i.e., tuition and fees minus student aid) has been $0 (or less!) for more than a decade. The Texas Public Policy Foundations Andrew Gillen has drily noted, Weve haddefactofree community college in this country since 2009-10.

As for loans, generous financial aid policies mean that inflation-adjusted net annual tuition increased less than $600 between 1996 and 2016 for low- and middle-income students. In fact, a 2014 Brookings Institution Analysis reported that, since 1992, median borrowers have consistently spent about 4 percent of their monthly income repaying student loans. By income, the top 40 percent of households account for 75 percent of student loan payments; half of all student debt is held by households in which someone holds a graduate degree.

For the most part, loan forgiveness is a subsidy to the affluent and a solution to a non-problem, one that rewards heavy borrowers at the expense of those who didnt attend college, hustled to minimize borrowing, or whove paid off their loans. This makes it especially egregious that Biden has turned to executive orders to push piecemeal giveaways. Early in the pandemic, back before Washington had taken to mailing out trillions in federal aid, the Trump administration took the dramatic step of adopting a blanket pause on loan repaymentsfreezing the accrual of interest and suspending payment. Since that time, what was initially billed as a temporary stopgap has been continuously extended. In August, Biden announced one last, "final pause on student loan repayment that would end January 31. So much for that. Biden recently announced that the freeze will be extended into May, meaning its been two years since borrowerswhatever their financial circumstanceswere expected to make loan payments. As of last June, the cost (originally estimated to be $15 billion) already exceeded $68 billion. Its a safe bet that the total cost will eventually exceed $100 billion.

Biden has also provided loan relief via a series of executive actions. The administration has forgiven $5.8 billion to disabled borrowers, another $1.3 billion to borrowers who had failed to comply with monitoring rules, and aggressively used Borrower Defense to Repayment to forgive billions to borrowers who attended an institution with even isolated evidence of misleading promotional materials. Biden also unilaterally expanded the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, which eventually forgives loans to borrowers who take jobs in the public or nonprofit sector. The Department of Education estimates that the PSLF expansion could ultimately reduce loans for up to 550,000 borrowers. It projects the cost of all this thus far to be $11.5 billion, though the PSLF expansion means the final tally will likely be tens of billions more.

As for Title IX, Bidens promise to undo Trump-era reforms stumbled on the fact that the DeVos Department of Education (unlike her predecessors) actually went through the full federal rule-making process. Thus, itll take a while to restore the Obama-era star chambers, in which colleges were directed to use the lowest possible standard of evidence, deny defendants the chance to have a representative question their accuser, and even bar the accused from seeing the charges leveled against them. True to form, though, Bidens team hasnt allowed mere legal processes to stop them. On his first day in office, Biden issued an executive order extending the 2020 Supreme Court ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County (regarding employment protections for gay and transgender employees) to Title IX. In June, the Department of Education declared in a Notice of Interpretation that it henceforth reserved the right to take action against colleges that use biological sex to organize dormitories, locker rooms, or sports teams.

While Biden has been fiddling with his pen and phone, hes missed golden opportunities to speak for the nations broad middle on higher education in a way that would be exceedingly healthy (and that could do much to burnish his waning centrist cred).

For starters, given Bidens concerns about college affordability and student debt, its remarkable that he hasnt been willing to challenge colleges to tackle administrative bloat and rein in their costs. After all, this is a president who has enthusiastically blamed profiteering companies for runaway prices. Biden mightve coupled his big spending plans with a challenge to colleges to curb their costs, which have substantially exceeded the rate of inflation for decades. Indeed, given that many colleges have been remote for a chunk of the Biden presidency, Amtrak Joe mightve folksily asked why it costs so much to educate a kid in their parents basement. Sincere or not, this wouldve provided a veneer of fiscal responsibility and a common sense complement to his grand new spending plans.

Biden also mightve taken the lead in urging colleges to help guide the nation back to the normalcy he has championed. After all, colleges mostly serve a relatively young demographicat limited risk from COVID-19. Biden mightve argued that, aided by billions in emergency federal aid, CDC guidance, high rates of vaccination, and sensible mitigation policies, colleges should be offering in-person classes and doing everything they can to provide students with healthy social interactions. And yet, even as Michigan State, Yale, UCLA, Duke, and many other campuses are going virtual or embracing draconian lockdowns like it was spring 2020, Biden hasnt used his bully pulpit to push back or even explain that his own efforts have made such measures unnecessary and unwise.

As far as student loans, Biden could have tackled some of the low-hanging bipartisan fruit. For instance, forgiveness and loan freezes aside, existing income-based repayment (IBR) options make it possible for borrowers to pause payments when theyre out of work and limit repayment to a manageable portion of a borrowers income. Unfortunately, the existing programs are balky, confusing, and not customer-friendly. There are plenty of good ideas on how to fix that. Streamlining and overhauling the IBR framework would be greeted by most higher ed authorities, on the center-left, in the middle, and even on the right, as a terrific and timely step forward.

And then, of course, Biden has been presented with a grand Nixon-to-China opportunity to use his bully pulpit to push back on campus intolerance and censoriousness. After all, in 2017, at the University of Delaware, Biden thundered, We hurt ourselves badly when we dont allow the speech to take place . . . The First Amendment is one of the defining features of who we are in the Bill of Rights. And to shut it down in the name of what is appropriate is simply wrong. A Democratic president visiting a campus to repeat just that message would be an enormously important, healthy thing. Yet, since taking office, Biden has assiduously avoided addressing concerns about campus speecheven as surveys find that troubling numbers of students deem it okay to use violence to shut down speech.

All in all, Bidens higher education story in year one is mostly a blank page. Given the cost of his dubious solutions to non-problems, thats cause for relief. And yet, it means that Biden has left a tremendous amount of good undone, at a time when the nation could benefit mightily from a Democratic president urging the nations colleges to get their house in order.

Frederick M. Hess is the director of education policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

Read the rest here:

Biden's Higher Education Agenda, One Year In - The Dispatch

Good Congressional legislation that benefits the country and its citizens will have broad bi-partisan support. If a bill has strong support from one side, but little or no support from the other, it likely is good for the majority and/or bad for the minority.

Many bills, perhaps most, have only one party supporting them, the party in the majority, and are hotly contested.

A bill currently with this partisan split is the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, named for the late Georgia congressman and civil rights leader. The voting rights bill has strong support from Democrat majority, but strong opposition from the Republican minority.

As reported by Politifact, Supporters say the bill would renew the power of the federal government to oversee state voting laws and protect minority voters at a time when more GOP-led states have passed new restrictions. Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT., who introduced the bill, said it would ensure that the Voting Rights Act continues to have the effect long intended: to protect the right to vote.

The report continues, But Republicans say the John Lewis bill is federal overreach and would make it too easy for plaintiffs to challenge state election laws that Republicans say are designed to prevent fraud. Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader, has called it unnecessary and said that its against the law to discriminate in voting on the basis of race already.

Republicans view their election laws as mechanisms to reduce fraud, and Democrats view them as efforts to restrict voting to certain groups. Democrats see their election laws as making it easy for people to vote, while Republicans view them as mechanisms that make fraud and cheating easier.

The Democrat bill will transfer much of the control over elections that now resides with the states to the federal government. The system of federalism under which the United States was formed left much power to the states, deliberately not giving the federal government total control. The control of election procedures resides with state legislatures.

In addition to trying to federalize control over elections, Democrats also are now talking about eliminating the Senate filibuster, or eliminating certain of its uses. The filibuster, however, is a mechanism that both protects the Senate minority from being run over by the majority, and also helps to encourage the introduction of bills that will have bi-partisan support, which do not encourage a filibuster.

Some Democrats now favoring the changing or elimination of the filibuster have done an about face from just a few years ago.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., who in 2017 as Minority Leader spoke to the Senate, saying there should be a firewall around the legislative filibuster. Let us go no further down this road, he said. I hope the Republican Leader and I can, in the coming months, find a way to build a firewall around the legislative filibuster, which is the most important distinction between the Senate and the House.

He and other Democrats condemned efforts by Republicans to challenge the filibuster back then. Here are some of their comments:

From Schumer:

They want to make this country into a banana republic where if you dont get your way you change the rules.

Change the rules in midstream to wash away 200 years of history.

Ideologues in the Senate want to turn what the founding fathers called the cooling saucer of democracy into the rubber stamp of dictatorship.

Itll be a doomsday for democracy.

From President Joe Biden when he was in the Senate:

It raises problems that are more damaging than the problem that exists.

Youre going to throw the entire Congress into chaos and nothing will get done.

Nothing at all will get done.

It is ultimately an example of the arrogance of power.

Ending the filibuster is a very dangerous thing to do.

It is a fundamental power grab.

From Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill.:

That would be the end of the Senate.

You cant change the rules in the middle of the game.

Preserve checks and balances so that no one party can do whatever it wants.

From Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J.:

You cannot change the rules in the middle of the game because you do not like the outcome.

Partisan power grab that will stomp on the rights of the minority and leave fundamentally changed for the worse.

I will not stand by when a party drunk with power tries to overturn 200 years of precedent.

From Sen. Chis Coons, D-Del.:

Im committed to never voting to change the legislative filibuster.

The one most important rule that requires compromise requires working across the aisle.

From Sen. Cory Booker, D-N.J.:

The legislative filibuster should stay there and I will personally resist efforts to get rid of it.

From Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va.:

I dont think that we ought to be coming in willy-nilly and changing the rules.

From Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y.:

If you dont have 60 votes yet, it just means you havent done enough advocacy and you need to work a lot harder.

Isnt it interesting how politicians forego their support of important things when they get in the way?

James H. Smokey Shott, a resident of Bluefield, Va., is a Daily Telegraph columnist. Contact him at shottcommentary@gmail.com

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Originally posted here:

Federal control of elections, and getting the filibuster out of the way - Bluefield Daily Telegraph

Most of the 54 countries in Africa are unitary the power to govern them resides mostly in a centralised government.

Only Ethiopia and Nigeria are fully federal while others like South Africa, the Comoros, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia have some features of federalism.

Federalism involves the division of power between a central government and regional governments. Each level has specified political power over different areas and regional governments have power to determine local policies and raise their own revenue.

Ghana is not known as one of the federations in Africa. However, its life as an independent state in 1957 began as a loosely formed federation with fairly high levels of regional autonomy included in the constitution.

The rules set down for changing that arrangement were very strict because the proponents of federalism wanted guarantees against unilateral changes by the government.

Yet, more than six decades later regional government officials have no direct powers to determine their own policies. The regional ministers are appointed by the president, regional policy is controlled by a central government ministry, and regions are funded directly from central government administered funds.

How did this come about? In Africa, the conventional expectation is that drastic shifts like this only happen when a government is overthrown and the countrys constitution abandoned - through coup dtats.

But my research shows that gradual changes contributed to this outcome in Ghana.

I traced Ghanas journey over the past 60 years (1957 - 2018) as it moved from a federal to an entrenched unitary arrangement. I found that during this period, there has been a steady erosion of regional autonomy.

This happened through several changes to the constitution most notably those drawn up in 1960 when Ghana became a republic, and 1969 after the countrys first president Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown .

I conclude from my findings that constitutional guarantees should not be taken for granted. They are subject to change, but the way they change depends on the decisions that stakeholders make.

These findings and the realities of politics suggest that other federations in Africa might well be at similar risk.

The territory known as Ghana was formed in 1957 by a union of four regions: the British colony of the Gold Coast, Ashanti, Trans-Volta Togoland and the British Protectorate Northern Territories. This composition implied that federalism was the most practical way forward.

But the federal idea was a key bone of contention in the run-up to independence from British colonial rule.

On one side of the dispute was the the Convention Peoples Party led by Kwame Nkrumah, who wanted full unitarism. On the other side was the opposition alliance led by the Asantes and their political wing, the National Liberation Movement together with the United Party led by K.A Busia, who wanted full federalism.

This contest was settled by a compromise in the 1957 constitution, giving regions autonomy. Headed by the native chiefs, regions had their own regional assemblies. These were responsible for directing financial expenditure, by-laws, and other government services in their regions. Referendums were required to alter the boundaries of a region. Any changes to this constitutional arrangement needed to be approved by two-thirds of the regional assemblies themselves.

However, in the 1960 constitution, these regional assemblies and the referendum requirements were abolished and replaced with national parliamentary approval.

Moreover, chiefs were demoted as heads of regions and replaced with centrally appointed regional commissioners. The referendum requirement reappeared in less-stringent forms in the 1969 and 1979 constitutions but neither the regional assemblies nor chiefs as their heads were re-instated.

The current 1992 constitution maintains the referendum thresholds contained in the 1979 constitution but still does not reinstate the regional assemblies or chiefs to regional headship. Nor do regional administrations have the executive, legislative, and financial autonomies they had at independence.

In view of this lost regional autonomy, a constitutional review commission in 2011 recommended that the regional government should be designated as part of central government (page 504).

Based on my research, I conclude that Ghana lost its federalism as a result of a mistaken political choice and missed opportunity by supporters of federalism.

First, politicians who supported federalism failed to take steps to stop the introduction of a unitary state.

This started shortly after independence in 1958 when the main opposition boycotted national polls to elect members of the regional and national assemblies. As a result, the ruling party won a huge majority in the assemblies.

This meant that the ruling party had sufficient numbers to vote to abolish regional assemblies when a bill was introduced to this effect in the national assembly in 1959.

The constitution adopted in 1960 declared, for the first time, that Ghana was a unitary state. Other changes included the removal of chiefs as the head of the regions and their replacement by regional commissioners appointed by the president.

A critical opportunity presented itself to reverse this trajectory between 1966 and 1969.

Some of those behind the coup that ousted Nkrumah in 1966 were supporters of the pre-independence notion of autonomous regions. Hence, a new constitution-drafting process was led by those who had called for federalism. Yet, instead of reversing the trajectory, the new leaders maintained the status quo.

The new constitution proposed and adopted in 1969 still maintained that Ghana is a unitary republic and made no specific naming of regions. It failed to re-instate the original mandate of the regional assemblies or the chiefs as regional heads.

All subsequent constitutions have consolidated Ghanas unitary status.

There are lessons for other countries that have federal structures, or any form of power-sharing arrangements.

The discussions around federalism in Nigeria or Ethiopia are enough to show that when (federal) rules are made, they do not stay the same. Stakeholders are always looking for opportunities to change, keep or improve them.

If the changes reflect the interests of opposing political actors, as seen in Ghanas case, then the change process is smoother with less violent outcomes. For instance, in Ghana today both the political parties that evolved from the opposing Nkrumaist (mainly the National Democratic Congress ) and Busiaist (mainly the New Patriotic Party) political traditions at independence have united around unitarism. Without such shared political interests, the campaign for change becomes a violent and protracted struggle, as seen in the reform-related conflicts in Ethiopia.

Another case in reference is Burundi where in 2014, news emerged that the power-sharing arrangements were under threat of being dismantled through well-calculated steps by the ruling government.

So, can such power-sharing arrangements stand the test of time?

My central argument is that changes are inevitable. However, the lesson from Ghana is that perhaps when proposed changes reflect the common political interests for key stakeholder groups in the arena of governance, the outcomes are less problematic.

Continue reading here:

How Ghana lost its federalism -- and lessons for others - The Conversation CA

History repeats itself. Instead of demonstrating prudent leadership by proactively crafting a strategic response to the COVID-19 pandemic, premiers Ford and Kenney, in particular, have been playing the politics of blame avoidance to distract from their crisis mismanagement. But no matter how hard they are trying to disappear from the radar or deflect responsibility, in Canadian federalism their leadership failure is on full display.

From the second wave in 2020 to Omicron, the pattern has been the same. Remember when premier Kenney was outraged because a Calgary Herald reporter asked if he would take responsibility for Albertas dire situation in December 2020: I reject the entire premise of your question. Or in January 2021, when premier Ford offered advice to the prime minister on the Pfizer vaccine shortage while a second, preventable humanitarian crisis unfolded in Ontarios long-term care homes: If I was in (Trudeaus) shoes ... Id be on that phone call every single day. Id be up that guys yin-yang so far with a firecracker he wouldnt know what hit him.

The problem is: In Canadian federalism, responsibilities are quite clear. In fact, our federal system provides leaders with the best possible foundation to cope with policy challenges that require swift action. This becomes most obvious in comparison with its antipode, German federalism.

While Canadian federalism concentrates power in single party governments at the federal and provincial level, German federalism enforces power-sharing among multi-party coalition governments. The federal and state governments must agree on all major steps in Germanys response to the pandemic.

This system of joint-decision making is an institutional straitjacket no one can escape from. In March 2021, an increasingly frustrated Angela Merkel announced she would seek a federal solution if certain state governments continue to resist tougher restrictions to combat the third wave. It was clear from the outset, however, that this was an empty threat. Even a federal solution would have required the states consent in the first place.

Intergovernmental relations in Canada are different. Ottawa and the provinces can variously combine unilateral action, mutual adjustment or voluntary cooperation. This is exactly, for example, how the Atlantic provinces created and suspended their bubble. Unlike in Germany, federalism is not an impediment for effective political leadership.

Equally important is the question of political accountability. As political scientist Fritz Scharpf put it so aptly decades ago, in Germanys interlocked federal system, no one really wants what is done, and no one will accept responsibility for it. But in Canadian federalism the decisions of individual governments matter. Hence, it should be much more difficult for the Fords and Kenneys to shift credibly the blame on others.

With the federal election out of the way, it is now time for Ottawa to step up.

The federal government has contributed by far the largest share of all COVID-19-related spending. According to a study from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, this amounted to more than 90 per cent in 2020 alone. Alberta and Ontario received the highest support.

The implications are clear: What we need is a federal government that exercises committed leadership, capitalizing on its spending power. The Trudeau government must shift gears now to forge a more robust, coordinated pan-Canadian framework, and demand accountability. Ottawa must stop asking the provinces what they need without following up if things get out of control. And it needs to attach and enforce, temporarily at least, more conditionality to transfer payments instead of throwing money at the provinces like a generous donor.

Jrg Broschek is associate professor and Canada Research Chair (Tier 2) in comparative federalism and multilevel governance at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo.

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Opinion | Why the politics of blame avoidance shouldn't be working in Canadian federalism - NiagaraFallsReview.ca

The transition to GST is still in progress and an extension will provide comfort to States to help roll out crucial changes

It has been claimed that the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India was a grand experiment in cooperative federalism in which both the Union and the States joined hands to rationalise cascading domestic trade taxes and evolve a value-added tax on goods and services. Although the rate structure was presumed to be revenue neutral, the States agreed to forgo their revenue autonomy in favour of tax harmonisation. This was in the hope that it would turn out to be a money machine in the medium term due to improved compliance arising from the self-policing nature of the tax.

To allay the fears of States of possible revenue loss by implementing GST in the short term, the Union government promised to pay compensation for any loss of revenue in the evolutionary phase of five years. The compensation was to be calculated as the shortfall in actual revenue collections in GST from the revenue the States would have got from the taxes merged in the GST. This was estimated by taking the revenue from the merged taxes in 2015-16 as the base and applying the growth rate of 14% every year. To finance the compensation requirements, a GST compensation cess was levied on certain items such as tobacco products, automobiles, coal and solid fuels manufactured from lignite, pan masala and aerated waters.

Unfortunately, the compensation saga was not without controversy. In the first two years of its implementation, the amount of compensation to be paid to the States was modest and the compensation cess was sufficient to meet the requirements. In fact, the cess collections exceeded the compensation requirements by 21,466 crore in 2017-18 and 25,806 crore in 2018-19.

In 2018-19, the shortfall in the payment requirement from the cess collections was 24,947 crore which could be met from the surpluses of the previous two years kept as balance in the compensation fund. However, in 2020-21, due to the most severe lockdown following the novel coronavirus pandemic, the loss of revenue to States was estimated at 3 lakh-crore of which 65,000 crore was expected to accrue from the compensation cess. Of the remaining 2.35 lakh-crore, the Union government decided to pay 1.1 lakh-crore by borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India under a special window and the interest and repayment were to be paid from the collections from compensation cess in the future. However, the entire compensation payment episode plunged the Union-State relationship to a new low, creating humongous mistrust.

The agreement to pay compensation for the loss of revenue was for a period of five years which will come to an end by June 2022; and considering the uncertainty in revenue collections faced by the States, they are keen that the compensation scheme should continue for another five years.

Although it was hoped that the tax structure would stabilise in the first five years, the reform is still in transition.

First, the technology platform could not be firmed up for a long time due to which the initially planned returns could not be filed. This led to large-scale misuse of input tax credit using fake invoices. The adverse impact on revenue collections due to this was compounded by the pandemic-induced lockdowns.

Second, this is the only major source of revenue for the States and considering their increased spending commitments to protect the lives and livelihoods of people, they would like to mitigate revenue uncertainty to the extent they can. They have no means to cushion this uncertainty for the Finance Commission which is supposed to take into account the States capacities and needs in its recommendations has already submitted its recommendations; the next Commissions recommendations will be available only in 2026-27. More importantly, the structure of GST needs significant changes and the cooperation of States is necessary to carry out the required reforms.

It is very well acknowledged that the structure of GST requires significant reforms. Notably, almost 50% of the consumption items included in the consumer price index are in the exemption list; broadening the base of the tax requires significant pruning of these items.

Second, sooner or later, it is necessary to bring petroleum products, real estate, alcohol for human consumption and electricity into the GST fold.

Third, the present structure is far too complicated with four main rates (5%, 12%, 18% and 28%). This is in addition to special rates on precious and semi-precious stones and metals and cess on demerit and luxury items at rates varying from 15% to 96% of the tax rate applicable which have complicated the tax enormously. Multiple rates complicate the tax system, cause administrative and compliance problems, create inverted duty structure and lead to classification disputes. Reforming the structure to unify the rates is imperative and this cannot be done without the cooperation of States. They would be unwilling to agree to rationalise rates unless the compensation payment for the revenue loss is continued.

Thus, extending the compensation payment for the loss of revenue for the next five years is necessary not only because the transition to GST is still underway but also to provide comfort to States to partake in the reform. GST is the most important source of revenue to States and any revenue uncertainty from that source will have a severe adverse effect on public service delivery.

Similarly, reforming the structure to complete the process of transition to a reasonably well-structured GST is important not only to enhance the buoyancy of the tax in the medium term but also to reduce administrative and compliance costs to improve ease of doing business and minimise distortions. It has been pointed out by many including the Fifteenth Finance Commission that the compensation scheme of applying 14% growth on the base year revenue provided for the first five years was far too generous. The issue can be revisited and the rate of growth of reference revenue for calculating compensation can be linked to the growth of GSDP in States to ensure the comfort of minimum certainty on the revenue. This will incentivise them to accomplish the reform in the true spirit of cooperative federalism.

M. Govinda Rao is former Director, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy and Member, Fourteenth Finance Commission. He is presently Chief Economic Adviser, Brickwork Ratings. The views expressed are personal

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Extending GST compensation as a reform catalyst - The Hindu

The term federalism, according to Encyclopedia Britannica, refers to an arrangement among various levels of government for the implementation of policies through negotiations and coordination while still maintaining central integrity. Individual liberty being the central axis, its primary focus is on negotiations and coordination to make the law and policymaking process more participatory and representative.

In heterogeneous societies where socio-cultural diversity exists, federalism provides an opportunity for local political expression and protects it by promoting localised decision-making. It is a system of government that clearly divides authority between the federal and provincial governments while focusing on integrating the federating units into a single entity.

Administrative federalism in practice translates the aspirations of a federal polity into policy outcomes. It can be termed as the defining characteristic of a federation which relates to the executive autonomy of a province and includes devolution of all kinds of administrative and policymaking authority to the provincial governments, where the latter is responsible for the enactment of laws and its implementation using its resources.

That being said, a major part of these resources is the human resource or the civil service of a province which is primarily responsible for executing these policies and decisions. In Pakistan, the 18th Amendment gave practical form to federalism and outlined the clear distribution of power between different levels of government. This momentous constitutional development realises the need for implementing practices of administrative federalism.

In the context of legislative and fiscal federalism, the then political forces may have ceded some space to the federation because the matters were complex enough to threaten the unity of the federation and were mostly related to the entire country. However, regarding administrative federalism, no constitutional accommodation was made as it neither threatened the existence of the federation nor related to the affairs of more than one province.

The federal government, on the premise of lack of capacity, still shows reluctance in devolving the actual executive authority, and members of the federal civil service continue to manage important assignments in the provinces such as the chief secretary, administrative secretaries, inspector general of police, etc, where, counterintuitively, they are not answerable to the provincial governments. It is significant because anyone who is acquainted with the affairs of a provincial government knows how important the role of a chief secretary (CS) is as its chief administrative official, supervising an entire developmental and financial landscape.

Likewise, the role of administrative secretaries is equally important in their respective departments. Hence, the appointment of the CS by the federal government gives it considerable leverage over the affairs of the provinces, and the only justification that remains for federal civil servants to serve in the provinces, after the 18th Amendment, is to support the provincial governments in its transition-leading-to-self-governance phase. Also, it might not have been possible initially to provincialise all federal civil services, and the federal government might not have been willing to disturb the tenuous balance to avoid any constitutional and/or administrative crisis while it supposedly built the capacity of the provinces.

The spirit of provincial autonomy is barely addressed in the context of administrative positions. However, the said grounds for keeping the above ad-hoc arrangement in place are eroding fast and even resorting to legal and quasi-legal instruments such as the CSP agreement between the federal and provincial governments of 1954 and the apportionment formula of 1993 may not avert the impending governance crisis.

The provincial governments should have strengthened and expanded its civil service to include not only the district management cadre (provincial management service) but also education, health, excise and taxation, planning and development, food, police, prisons, prosecution, revenue/secretariat, communication and works, irrigation, agriculture, public health, municipal, local government and rural development and other services as its occupational groups/cadres to have enhanced its ability to take over the responsibility from the federal government, thus avoiding the present structural vacuum between the two levels of government.

Subsequently, these steps could have been complemented with building the capacity of provincial institutions such as the provincial public service commissions, mid-career training institutions, etc, thereby creating a realistic administrative structure for accepting executive federalism at the provincial level and improving the standards of public service significantly.

Also, after the 18th Amendment, neither the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) nor the federal government has any constitutional rationale to hold recruitment to the services which are now provincial subjects or post and transfer any officer from/to the province. If the federal government requires the human resource for running the day-to-day business of the federal capital or other departments, it may carry out a small-scale recruitment process or even request the provinces to fill the vacant senior positions. However, constantly ignoring the tenets of administrative federalism is indicative of the lack of intent on part of the federal government to protect the executive integrity of the provinces.

Conversely, there exists an anomaly where federal civil servants are both recruited and promoted by the FPSC on seats belonging to the provincial governments as a result of which the career progression of the provincial civil servants is slow. The Sindh government recently called this phenomenon an egregious anomaly and the tussle between the two governments serves as an example of a province asserting its constitutional authority. Such incidents are only the tip of the iceberg and could become frequent if this ad-hoc regime continues to run the administration of the provincial governments.

It makes one wonder: how and when will the provincial governments be considered worthy enough by the federal government to be empowered to run its affairs? To what extent has the federal government supported the provinces in this prolonged transition phase since 2010 (if not 1973)? Why is this ad-hoc regime becoming a rule in itself and a hurdle in the way of implementing administrative federalism? Why is the executive integrity of the provinces up for grabs and encroached upon as and when deemed necessary? These are some important markers that will shape the future of inter-governmental relations in Pakistan.

The writer is a public policy practitioner hailing from erstwhile Fata. He tweets @syedabdullah100

Originally posted here:

Administrative federalism - The News International

Section 1135 emergency waivers were designed as tools for policy-makers to rapidly increase health system capacity during a disaster. Granting regulatory, administrative, or payment-model flexibilities during the covid-19 pandemic, states may be better equipped for an influx of hospitalizations. One month passed before every state adopted a covid-19 waiver and no research investigated why states adopted waivers sooner than others. This study utilizes a Parametric (Gamma) Time-to-Event design to construct a Contextual, Institutional, Political, External, and a combined Integrated model to identify determinants of speedy waiver request. States with Section 1135 precedent in previous disasters submitted requests to CMS more quickly than states without prior experience. In the Integrated Model, four indicators were significantly associated with a shorter time to request: history of a previous waiver (0.7248, p <0.01), state health expenditures (0.9994, p <0.001), a democratic governor (0.6794, p <0.05), and a new 1135 Waiver request in the region (0.8424, p <0.001). Within the U.S. federalist system, states with greater institutional experience and fiscal capacity appeared to act most quickly to expand health system flexibility during the peak of the pandemics uncertainty. Such state variation in ability to respond rapidly to an emergency may confound attempts for equity in this pandemic and beyond.

On January 31, 2020, HHS Secretary Azar declared covid-19 a national public health emergency, which was followed by President Trumps March 13th proclamation declaring the covid-19 outbreak a national emergency (Proclamation No. 9994). In tandem, these two executive actions permitted Secretary Azar to invoke the Section 1135 Waiver Authority, immediately granting medical providers across the country blanket regulatory flexibilities (42 U.S.C. 1320b5). That day, Florida became the first state to initiate additional regulatory flexibilities through an 1135 waiver request (CMS 2020). By April 16, all fifty-one states had submitted a request for specific flexibilities (Medicaid 2020).

While the HHS Secretary can permit blanket waivers over the affected regions, once the Section 1135 Waiver authority has been invoked, states in the designated emergency area can begin initiating state-specific flexibility and capacity requests (CMS 2017). In recent decades, especially with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) which further empowered state waiver institutions (2010), governors and agency directors have been largely responsible for requesting waivers (Thompson, 2013). Though state legislatures have codified statutes which either expedite or hinder a governors ability to act unilaterally, most state legislatures passively allow the executive branch sole authority to request 1135 waivers, leaving governors and agency directors to exercise authority (Hinton, 2019; NCSL 2017).

Emergencies pose an immediate threat to health so it can be safely assumed that, all else equal, a more rapidly requested waiver will be more effective. For the covid-19 emergency, thirty-four days separate the first and last waiver request (CMS 2020). But what caused some states to request a waiver sooner than others? Was this variation a function of covid-19 outcomes? Or, were other state-specific factors contributing to the timing of a request? Previous studies suggest that financial capacity and politics significantly influence the utilization of current waivers (Nattinger, 2016; Nattinger & Kaskie, 2017). Yet, no study has systematically investigated the determinents of emergency waiver adoption.

While likely uncorrelated with the states covid-19 situation, this analysis hypothesizes that Section 1135 waiver precedent from previous emergencies is a major determinant of the timing of a covid-19 waiver request. Along with previous 1135 Waiver experience, this analysis tests if the timing of covid-19 waiver requests are associated with contextual (supply and demand), institutional, political, or external factors. For example, were states with higher proportion of people susceptible to covid-19 hospitalizations more likely quickly demand an increase in hospital capacity? Or, were 1135 Waiver decisions driven by state supply of hospitals? Additionally, after controlling for contextual factors how do state agency, legislative, and executive capacity influence 1135 Waiver time to adoption? And what role, if any, does state ideology play in the realm of emergency waiver negotiations?

Covid-19 has reminded policy-makers that national disasters do not impact states uniformly. Given that 1135 Waivers were designed to provide states flexibility to meet their contextually specific needs, ideally emergency waiver activity during covid-19 will be determined by each states need during the first month of the pandemic. If, however, factors unrelated to need are driving 1135 Waiver timing, then without further action existing disparities could be intensified as a result of underlying differences between the states.

This study utilizes a Time-to-Event analytical design to identify significant determinants influencing the adoption of a states 1135 Waiver request. These study designs have traditionally been used by public health researchers to model survival (Lee & Go, 1997). More generally, any event which is a function of the length of time from onset can be incorporated into a Time-to-Event analysis (Schober & Vetter, 2018). In primary model, the event of interest is a state requesting a Section 1135 Waiver, while the time between disaster proclamation and state request date is the dependent random variable. The primary independent (binary) variable is whether a state has previously requested Section 1135 Medicaid flexibilities during previous emergencies.

Time-to-event policy analyses can be modelled with a multitude of approaches, each allowing for different levels of interpretability and complexity. To enhance the robustness of this study, three different approaches are used: Kaplan-Meier, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Parametric (Gamma).

The Kaplan-Meier analysis, considered the most general, is a non-parametric model which evaluates the time to survival between two distinct groups (Dudley 2016). As a non-parametric model, the Kaplan-Meier estimate will not be sensitive to the underlying distribution of a states time to request. This Kaplan-Meier model compares the timing to a covid-19 waiver request between states with and without 1135 waiver precedent from previous emergencies. However, this Kaplan Meier estimate cannot control for any other covariates influencing a states timing to request (Rich 2010).

To include additional variables which could potentially identify factors influencing a states timing to request, two other approaches are used: A Cox Proportional Hazard Function and Parametric Model. A Cox Proportional Hazards analysis estimates the associated risk of requesting a waiver at any given time (conditional on not having already requested a waiver). Conversely, the parametric model estimates the effect of each variable on the length of time to waiver request. Along with interpretability, this parametric model holds other benefits over the Kaplan-Meier and Cox methods. Typically, parametric models may not be favored as they require additional assumptions related to the selected distribution (Abadi 2012; Siannis 2005). However, a Generalized Gamma incorporates multiple distributions and provides greatest flexibility under minimal assumptions (Cox 2007; Cox & Matheson, 2014; Matheson 2017). Another benefit to the parametric model is the inclusion of robust standard errors, which can account for potential heteroskedasticity in the model (Yau, 2001; Gutierrez, 2002). Following a framework developed by previous time-to-event studies, the Gamma analysis fit a Contextual, Institutional, Political, External, and a combined Integrated model (Berry, 1990; Nelson, 2007; Eaton, 2013). As a sensitivity analysis, Cox model estimates will be reported, along with a test of the assumption that risks do not differentially vary over time for each model.

The data for each states Section 1135 Waiver request date were obtained from CMS correspondence with state Medicaid Directors. Previous 1135 Waiver activity were obtained by a systematic process 1) identifying previous public health emergencies for all states (DHHS, 2020), 2) identifying which public health emergencies led to an invocation of Section 1135 Waiver authority (DHHS 2020), 3) reviewing archival correspondence (CMS 2020; PHE 2019; ASTHO 2010) and federal government reports (81 FR 63859).

Following guidance from previous policy determinants research (Imhof & Kaskie, 2008; Nattinger, 2016; Nattinger & Kaskie, 2017), this studys conceptual framework motivates the inclusion of state indicators related to the supply and demand of covid-19 care (contextual factors); administrative, executive, and legislative capacity to respond to a pandemic (institutional factors); and state ideology (political factors). Additionally, this study includes state and regional indicators to conceptualize external factors which may have influenced when and how a state requested a Section 1135 Waiver. State demand for covid-19 response was operationalized as the percentage of the population over age 65, percentage of the population with multiple co-morbidities, and the percentage of the population covered by Medicaid insurance (Jordan 2020). Given the intensity of treatment necessary to care for covid-19 patients, state supply factors include hospitals per capita and Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds per capita (Hancock, 2020; Waldman 2020). State Medicaid agency capacity was operationalized using recent state expenditure data (Medicaid, hospitals, and total healthcare spending) and if the state had a current Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver (Jordan 2020; (Hinton 2019). Legislative and Executive Capacity were operationalized with salary and staff expenditure data, while the Executive model also included Line Item Veto and additional public health emergency authority (Jordan 2020; Perkins 2019). State ideology included the current Governors political affiliation, the percentage of Democrats in the current state senate, and the estimated percentage of citizens with liberal views (Jordan 2020; NCSL 2019; NGA 2020). Finally, along with the covid-19 cases and deaths at the time of the requested waiver, the external model also included a binary variable indicating if a new 1135 Waivers was requested in the region. Regions were determined by state networks (Olsen 2019).

States with Section 1135 precedent in previous disasters submitted requests to CMS more quickly than states without prior experience, however these differences were only marginally significant (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that states with at least one previous 1135 Waiver experience requested a covid-19 waiver more quickly (p = 0.1023). Additionally, states with two or more prior 1135 experiences requested a covid-19 waiver more quickly than states with one or fewer previous 1135 waiver experiences (Figure 2, p = 0.0500). In this unadjusted model (Table 1), the Cox Proportional Hazard for states with 1135 precedent indicated a higher likelihood of requesting a covid-19 waiver at any given time (Hazard Ratio 1.5605), however this effect was not significantly different than states without precedent. For the parametric model, however, the time-to-waiver request was (marginally) significantly less for states with previous 1135 Waiver experience (Time Ratio = 0.7522).

As expected, the Full Integrated Model had the best fit (p < 0.0001). Within this integrated model, four indicators were significantly associated with a shorter time to request: history of a previous waiver (0.7248, p <0.01), state health expenditures (0.9994, p <0.001), a democratic governor (0.6794, p <0.05), and a new 1135 Waiver request in the region (0.8424, p <0.001). The only variable with a statistically significant association with longer time-to-request were covid-19 cases (1.0230, p<-.001). Table 2 reports the full estimates from each models effect on time-to-waiver request, as well as the Cox Proportional Hazards results as a sensitivity analysis.

The critical nature of this ongoing disaster warrants persistent attention from policy-makers at all levels of government. While only a segment of the total covid-19 response, Section 1135 Waivers provide a unique opportunity for states to redirect healthcare resources and expand health system capacity. Yet, this research shows that states have taken different approaches even within the Section 1135 Waiver authority. In summary, institutional (1135 Waiver experience and state agency capacity) and external (a new 1135 Waiver in the region) factors are associated with the timing of a state response. These pre-existing differences between states potentially determining the timing of 1135 policy becomes problematic. However, this new evidence should promote continual innovation by state and local policy-makers. As states continue requesting second and third 1135 Waivers for covid-19 (CMS 2020), the public should expect more timely requests.

The covid-19 pandemic has motivated examinations on American Federalism during a public health emergency. These findings continue that discussion.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution, while never explicitly using the term emergency, understood the risks and benefits of instituting centralized authority during times of national emergencies (Hamilton, 1787). Fearing the risk of unchecked presidential authority as a precursor to tyranny, emergency powers were not allocated to the executive branch (Hamilton and Madison 1788). Rather, Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, call upon an army in times of war, and maintain an army during times of peace (critical to any legal analysis of modern emergencies was the foresight to extend these powers to situations seemingly unpredictable in 1788, including disasters during times of peace (Madison 1788)). Yet, despite the risks of concentrated emergency power within the Executive branch, the framers of the Constitution understood the value of such power when responding to an emergency in a timely, effective manner; resulting in largely undefined and broadly interpreted executive authority during emergencies (Fisch, 1990). As presidents began to exert their influence through emergency proclamations and executive orders, the federal Judiciary responded with oversight powers to mitigate presidential overreach (i.e.: Ex parte Merryman 1861; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952).

During the twentieth century, the constitutionally prescribed distribution of emergency powers shifted. Nearing the end of World War II, congress passed the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. ch. 6A 201); of which section 319 grants the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary authority to declare a national public health emergency (42 U.S.C. 247d). Two subsequent statutes continued the shift of emergency power from Congress to the President: The National Emergency Act of 1976 (50 U.S.C. 1601-51) and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. 5121-5207). Both acts explicitly delegate authority to declare a national emergency to the President. Finally, when both a public health and national emergency are declared, the HHS Secretary can invoke Section 1135 Waiver Authority and grant regulatory flexibilities to providers and hospitals in the designated emergency areas (42 U.S.C. 1320b5). However, while precedent is limited, just as in the wartime cases against executive overreach, the Judiciary maintains authority to ensure both the President and Secretary act within their delegated emergency powers (PHN v. U.S. 2015).

Contemporary analysis suggests two general approaches to understanding federalism. The first explores the changing power within each branch and level of government; the second explores the propensity for cooperation (Rigby & Haselswerdt, 2013; Weil, 2013) or competition (Shannon & Kee, 1989; Volden, 2005; Weil, 2009) between jurisdictions. The results of this study provide insight for both approaches. Unlike other Medicaid Waivers, which are largely driven by state executives and agency directors (Weissert & Scheller, 2008; Weissert & Weissert, 2017), Section 1135 Waivers place more authority within the federal executive branch. Even after 1135 invocation, which requires two federal actions, the HHS Secretary immediately provides a set of blanket flexibilities for all states, minimizing any subsequent request. State power is also reduced from the bottom-up, as local or municipal governments and health systems have the ability to bypass state authority to request their own waiver. This reduced authority, however, doesnt apply generally to the covid-19 pandemic which has shown massive expansion of state executives role (Cook 2020). Most interesting, however, is the apparent diffusion between states. By adopting concurrent waivers with other states in each region, the 1135 Waiver diffusion fits other cooperative activity necessary for states to pool resources, signaling that Section 1135 Waiver experience and expertise may be a valuable resource to neighboring states.

This is the first study to identify significant determinants of Section 1135 Waivers. If quality is defined by quicker requests, then the quality of emergency waivers during the covid-19 pandemic are largely determined by institutional and external factors. Meanwhile, supply and demand to do not appear to be driving the timing of emergency waiver decisions. These findings should motivate further research investigating the impact of late adoption effects on covid-19 outcomes, but more importantly, inform immediate policy decisions as state policy-makers continue to navigate the ongoing pandemic

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