Monthly Archives: May 2024

On May 7, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released a report that lays out the findings of a comprehensive and deep reflection process on the southern neighbourhood carried out by a group of independent experts. This process derives from a tasking at the 2023 Vilnius summit pushed mainly by nations from NATOs southern flank. This report comes against the backdrop of Russias aggression toward Ukraine, which has refocused NATO on its core mandatecollective defense and deterrenceand on its eastern flank. This refocusing follows three decades of postCold War soul-searching, which led to a constant expansion of the alliances missions, with an increasing emphasis on crisis management and a multiplication of out-of-area operations, with arguably mixed results and legacies. As a result, there is considerable friction, both among NATO members and between NATO and countries in its South, about the desired level of engagement in and with the southern neighborhood. The report shows a genuine and serious effort to factor in the many parameters and stakes, informed by exchanges with allies; NATO staff; and representatives, institutions, and civil society based in its southern partner states. Its recommendations are meant to guide discussions on the issue ahead of and during the July 2024 Washington summit.

Q1: What is the track record and perception of NATO in African and Middle Eastern regions?

A1: Over the years, NATO has increased institutional engagement in and with countries from what it calls its South, a vast area spanning from West Africa to Central Asia. This engagement has taken the form of institutional partnerships via the Mediterranean Dialogue launched in 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which included four Gulf countries and was launched in 2004. NATO also established a southern hub within the Allied Joint Force Command Naples in 2017.

Nevertheless, NATOs history with its South and perception in the region remains largely marked by its military interventions in Afghanistan (20032021) and in Libya (2011). Both failed to bring stability, if not witnessing a deterioration of the local and regional security environment. The report is clear-eyed when it states that:

"The perception of NATO and Allies in the southern neighbourhoods is somewhat negative. For many in the region, NATO is perceived as adopting double standards in responding to crises and conflicts on the world stage and is perceived as using its military assets to project power and interests from the so-called Global North without fully taking into account the needs and concerns of the South."

This perception is unevenly shared in the region, with some specific countries having developed close partnerships with the alliance, such as Jordan (one of the four Enhanced Opportunities Partners), Mauritania, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. But it might conversely be an understatement in some areas, such as in the Sahelian states, where a dominant narrative is that the 2011 NATO-led campaign in Libya is the original cause of the regions current instability.The subsequent collapse of the Libyan state that resulted from what Africans see as NATOs aggressive action, despite the organization framing itself as a defensive alliance, led to a mass exodus of foreign fighters from Qaddafis army, with the fighters fanning out across the Sahel and carrying with them stockpiles of Libyan weapons.This dramatic event is seen locally as the starters pistol to more than a decade of violence, instability, and military coups that have plagued the region (which the United Nations today refers to as the global epicentre of terrorism) ever since. NATOs hasty retreat from Libya in the aftermath of state collapse is not unrelated to the countrys current predicament, and it has more widely created both an impression of unreliability and of an organization interested in its security even at the expense of others.

Complicating the African view of NATO even further is the organizations language that the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the past two years, at least four Sahelian states have invited Russian military trainers to replace trainers from NATO member states as those countries security partner of choice. At a moment when Sahelian states are aligning more closely with Russia under the guise of asserting sovereign rights over their own security, governance, and economic futures, this has in many ways meant a broad rejection of the seemingly neo-colonial policies of traditional partners, amplified by misinformation and disinformation.

In the Middle East, the alliances actual footprint has been limited. But Washingtons war on terror and the forever wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll, by association, on NATOs image in the region. At the same time, demonstrating its adaptability after an initial withdrawal in 2011, NATO redeployed to Iraq in 2018 amid the fight against the Islamic State, complementing the efforts of the coalition to defeat the Islamic State and providing strategic advice to the Iraqi ministries of defense and the interior. In addition, NATO has conducted several maritime security operations, such as Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden from 2009 to 2015 and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, which has been active since 2016. Simultaneously, for countries that have tied their security to U.S. security guarantees, such as Jordan and the Gulf countries, NATO remains a reference model, the yardstick against which to compare their own defense relationship with the United Stateswhich they have been striving to upgrade.

Q2: Why was a report on NATOs southern flank published?

A2: This report stems from a shared concern by some southern NATO countries that the renewed focus on the eastern flank could result in less attention to the threats emanating from the southern flank, including terrorism, the weaponization of energy resources, and irregular immigration. Notably, Spain, the host country of the 2022 Madrid summit, was instrumental in ensuring that the significance of these challenges and threats was reflected in NATOs new strategic concept and was consistent with NATOs broader 360-degree approach.

Southern European countries have since maintained pressure on NATOs international staff to have clearer deliverables or actionable plans to ensure the alliances enduring interest in its southern neighbourhoods. This eventually led the North Atlantic Council to commission an independent group of experts to formulate a set of political guidelines, centered around NATO's objectives and potential roles in these neighborhoods, at the 2023 Vilnius summit. A group of 11 independent experts was appointed on October 6, 2023. The reports recommendations should be discussed ahead of the July 2024 Washington summit, during which some decisions should be made on the matter.

Q3: What are the key takeaways from the report?

A3: The experts paint a grim picture of the security environment in this broad area. They assess that the challenges of the southern flank are increasingly interconnected with those of the east, by way of Russia, and that the security of allies is closely intertwined with that of the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea region. A novel aspect of the report is its focus not only on threats and risks but also on opportunities (a term that appears 16 times).

The report suggests a change in semantics when referring to the region, and it coins the term southern neighborhoods, with a final s, to better reflect the diversity of the subregions, each with unique political landscapes requiring tailored approaches. A crucial emphasis is placed on the need to listen, engage, and better understand the southern neighborhoods. The report insists that this must be a two-way process involving political dialogue, credibility, trust, and coherence. The southern neighborhoods must also gain a deeper understanding of NATO, given the existing negative perceptions of the organization. According to the report, NATO needs to undertake internal efforts to simplify processes and enhance transparency, thereby improving its image among neighboring regions.

The report tackles the vast region through two angles. First, the report employs a geographic lens, offering recommendations for short-, medium-, and long-term actions in the three regions of strategic interest: North Africa, the Middle East, and the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it examines thematic areas of cooperation such as human security; women, peace, and security; counterterrorism; maritime security; climate change; public diplomacy and strategic communications; and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).

The key recommendations of the report can be broken down into three categories.

The first category includes some institutional measures, such as the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhood, the convening of a special summit meeting with all of NATOs southern partners, or the establishment of NATO political representation within the African Union. It is also noteworthy that, in the context of the war in Gaza, the paper proposes that NATO invites the Palestinian Authority to observe or participate in NATOs ongoing Mediterranean Dialogue activities, in accordance with existing practices.

Second, the report makes recommendations related to concrete cooperation, notably in terms of training and capacity building, building on the experience of NM-I, which could be replicated to the benefit of other partners. The report also emphasizes the potential for maritime security cooperation and cooperation on resilience, including via the establishment of resilience advisory support teams.

Finally, special attention is given to information and communication, mutual knowledge, and civil society engagement. The report suggests setting up a Counter-FIMI Centre of Excellence and a permanent Facts for Peace initiative, as well as promoting youth engagement.

Relatively absent from the report, however, is a thorough analysis of interallied relations and dynamics regarding engagements toward the southern neighborhoods. While the report hints at risks of dispersion and duplications, it glosses over the competition and sometimes tensions among alliance members who have conflicting interests in some theatres, such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, or West Africa.

Q4: How might NATO go about implementing the reports recommendations?

A4: NATO should be careful; the Wests overreliance on security approaches to advance its own counterterror interests has been, at best, insufficient, and at worst counterproductive. For NATO to rebuild those relations, it first should demonstrate that it is genuinely interested in long-term partnerships that will deliver net benefits to African and Middle Eastern stateswhat their leaders regularly call win-win arrangements.It would do well to take a holistic approach to advancing its objectives: focusing on helping to develop state capacity and civic institutions, in close coordination with the European Union and the United Nations, which remain the best equipped in these fields.

Special attention should be given to strategic communication. In 2021, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenbergs unconcerted announcement of a troop surge for NM-I, increasing its personnel from 500 up to 4,000, sparked outrage in Iraq. This announcement, which came one year after the adoption of a resolution by the Iraqi Parliament calling for the departure of all foreign troops, was widely exploited by pro-Iranian groups. Heeding the lessons learned, NM-I has embarked on a course correction, emphasizing in its communication a steadfast commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and a close partnership with the Iraqi government, which is currently led by parties aligned with Tehran. The faux pas highlights the importance of tailoring communication strategies to local contexts and political sensitivities, in Iraq and elsewhere.

Some elements of the report show a real effort to move toward a demand-driven, cooperative approach that factors in local contexts. It notably underlines the need for navigating non-exclusivity, hinting at many partners wariness of being drawn into a geopolitical struggle and their willingness to maintain cooperation with NATOs strategic competitors. The reports emphasis on inclusivity and broader engagement with parliaments, media, civil society and youth, as well as scholars and think tankers, is certainly moving in the right direction. Ultimately, its a strong and engaged civil society that is the best antidote to Russian and other competitors meddling, terrorist recruitment, and military rule.

Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Carlota Garca Encina is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at CSIS. Selin Uysal is a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

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NATO and Its South: Redefining the Terms - CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies

Cavoli's assessment comes from very close contact with our Ukrainian colleagues, and I'm confident that they that they will hold the line, he added.

Despite Russia pressing along the frontlines with Ukraine, and recently launching an attack near Ukraine's second city of Kharkiv, Cavoli said he was uncertain that this was Moscow's full-scale summer offensive.

What we don't see is large, large numbers of reserves being generated someplace," he said.

Cavoli added that it's difficult to know if Russia's effort has run out of gas. "Whether an offensive is stopped or not takes a little bit of time to figure out," he said.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the U.S. Congress agreeing on a $61 billion military aid package for Kyiv after months of delay, Ukrainians are right now being shipped vast amounts of ammunition, vast amounts of short range air defense systems and significant amounts of armored vehicles," he said.

Although Russia failed in its bid to overwhelm Ukraine, it should not be underestimated. In the more than two years of fighting, Russia has improved in areas such as logistics and industrial production where they are actually moving forward faster thanwe in Europe and in North America, Admiral Rob Bauer, chair of the NATO Military Committee, said at the same press conference.

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Top NATO commander: Russia's offensive won't succeed - POLITICO Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been considered the main political and military forum to discuss security issues across the Atlantic since its creation in 1949. However, as the United States and EU member states advance in their quest for economic security, a key question for transatlantic policymakers to consider is whether NATO provides a potential space to address geoeconomic issues. This commentary analyzes instances in which NATO has previously tackled economic security and evaluates how NATO allies view the prospect of the alliance widening its focus from traditional defense and deterrence to hybrid threats such as supply chain disruptions or economic coercion.

In April 2007, Estonia faced denial-of-service cyberattacks on public and private servers for 22 days. The operation affected Estonias digital economy by blocking online banking operations and financial transactions, as well as by disrupting government websites and public services. The attackers were from Russia, raising suspicions of Kremlin backing. This possibility could have led to NATO triggering Article 5, the clause of collective defense, where an attack against one represents an attack against all. However, that never materialized due to the lack of evidence against Russias direct involvement and because it was one of the first instances of a large cyberattack against a nation-state, making it difficult for NATO allies to consider it a full-scale attack that would trigger Article 5. Nevertheless, this instance encouraged the alliance to reflect on the nature of unconventional warfare, prompting NATO to establish the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn a year later. In 2014, for the first time, NATO acknowledged cyberattacks as part of Article 5 in the Wales Summit Declaration.

The securitization of supply chains during recent years has pushed NATO allies to reconsider what constitutes an existential risk. In December 2021, Lithuania was subjected to sanctions by China for allowing the opening of a Taiwan Representative Office in Vilnius. Not only Lithuania was impacted by this. Other European firms, like the German company Continental, faced uncleared customs in their Chinese operations. NATO then introduced the topic of economic coercion for the first time in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, stating that Beijing uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. Chinas use of economic coercion in the context of Lithuania was further condemned in the 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqu, which NATO member states released during the annual summit.

However, NATO did not develop a tool similar to the European Unions anti-coercion instrument and did not trigger Article 5. The reason for this is very similar to that behind cyberattacks: NATO currently does not consider economic coercion as an attack on ones territory, showing that NATOs role is still limited to defense and deterrence, which could prove to be a shortcoming amid escalating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, in the same way the European Union has struggled to effectively substitute NATOs role as defense guarantor, the civilian and economic side of security has usually fallen into the formers field of action, leaving economic security outside of NATOs purview. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of economic coercion demonstrates potential for the alliance to address, albeit in a limited manner, how economic security interacts with NATOs values and interests.

China and the Indo-Pacific are no longer new topics for NATO. This echoes the fact that, in contrast to past understandings, the European Union agrees that Chinas economic dependencies constitute a security threat, resulting in a more proactive stance against Chinese economic statecraft practices. Since 2019, China has become a systemic rival for European countries, and Italy has recently pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative, for example.

In fall 2023, China retaliated against the U.S. controls on semiconductors by restricting exports of gallium, germanium, graphite, and rare earth processing technologies. These minerals are key for developing defense capabilities in the infrastructure, aerospace, automotive, industrial machinery, and electronics industries, all of which are critical for NATOs missionand China has strong leverage over them. Such dependency begs the question of whether NATO could lay the groundwork for a supply chain resiliency group on topics like critical minerals. Such a workforce could be led by the Defence Investment Division and cochaired with other relevant NATO bodies, similar to the White Houses Council on Supply Chain Resilience. This effort would identify critical supply chains for defense capabilities that would be disrupted if China deployed economic coercion, as well as establish an early-warning mechanism for this purpose.

It is increasingly difficult to separate NATO from geoeconomic risk calculations. However, discussing China still remains controversial within NATO. During the writing of the Vilnius Summit Communiqu, Germany and France were vocal against opening a NATO office in Japan, perceiving it as outside of the alliances mission. These countries are pushing for stronger European strategic autonomy and have been advocating for a close-knit and clear limitation of NATOs role that rests only at the Euro-Atlantic level.

NATO has previously supported efforts to foster investment between its allies in deep tech and critical dual-use technologies through joint procurement. To meet the growing demands of an increasingly advanced industrial defense ecosystem lacking sufficient investment, the alliance launched the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) in 2023. This can be seen as the promote pillar of the respective approaches of the United States and European Union. Barely a month after its accession, Sweden has already joined the NIF as a limited partner, showing the relevance of these initiatives in advancing NATOs mission.

Every NATO defense ministry has a close relationship with private contractors and companies due to the need for public-private collaboration in defense procurement. Initiatives like the NATO-Industry Forum have tried to standardize government-industry collaboration across the alliance and push forward projects like NATOs Defence Production Action Plan.

NATO can play an important role in fostering a stronger European industrial landscape in defense procurement. NATO can serve as the prime contractor in a market where European countries have mostly relied on respective national firmsFrance with Thales, Italy with Leonardo, and Spain with Indra, among others. NATO is well positioned to promote both cross-industrial and cross-country procurement, as well as to cooperate with respective initiatives from the European Union and other external partners, including the United States, Japan, and others.

Apart from the supply chain resiliency group and early-warning mechanisms, NATO allies could commit to a fund to stockpile key critical minerals. Such a fund would prevent supply chains for projects on military mobility like railways from being disrupted or boycotted. As the United States and the European Union continue to release their respective lists of emerging technologies and critical minerals, NATO could help in standardizing and narrowing down these lists between allies. Government-industry relations will remain fundamental to the alliances quest for economic security. For example, the organization of military-industry red gaming and simulation exercises on economic disruption and coercion could provide useful insights in securing defense-related supply chains.

The debate about creating an economic NATO has been raised by policymakers, including former British prime minister Liz Truss. However, in terms of existing governance architectures, the G7 is largely considered the closest to what an economic NATO would look like. Economic security was a primary topic of discussion during last years summit in Hiroshima, and many member states responded by strengthening their domestic strategies. As all G7 allies except Japan are also in NATO, their priorities are broadly interconnected. However, the G7 may have some blind spots in covering economic security with a specific transatlantic lens.

Despite its controversial stances and its ambiguous position on Russia, Turkey is one of NATOs key partners due to its military size as well as its strategic position on the Black Sea and the Bosphorus Strait. When Russia decided to weaponize the commerce of grain in exchange for concessions with Ukraine, Turkey negotiated the Black Sea Grain Initiative, allowing such trade to continue for a while. As critical NATO allies like Turkey are not in the G7, the G7 would struggle to understand the full picture of NATOs supply chains and its geostrategic chokeholds from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This is why NATO should, with or without the G7, try to develop its own transatlantic vision on economic security.

In terms of new forums that could operate as an economic NATO, past regional ministerial meetings like the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council or the U.S.-Japan-Korea Camp David trilateral summit could produce a more cohesive approach to economic security. Another potential option would be a new multilateral export control regime meant to replace the Wassenaar Arrangement that includes targeted efforts to scale up defense and dual-use technology. As the World Trade Organization (WTO) is increasingly politicized and institutionally broken, the outcomes seem more limited, as shown in its 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in Dubai. This demonstrates that the WTO cannot be redesigned to arbitrate matters that interact with national security. However, in a moment when economic security is fast becoming omnipresent, international partners must determine where to house discussions that intersect with trade, technology, and national security.

The same way that cyberattacks were not originally seen as part of NATOs Article 5, NATO allies do not yet seem to have a clear stance on economic coercion and Chinas economic dependencies. Whether NATO should take on a greater role in economic security remains to be seen, particularly since economic security issues do not fall squarely within the mandate of NATO. It is likely that serious disagreements among NATO allies would surface, particularly regarding decisions on when to invoke an economic security instrument. NATOs Article 5 has only been raised once, after 9/11, and it requires the consensus of all its membersexpanding its application to economic coercion may turn it into a more ineffective and diffused deterrent.

However, given the increasing prominence of economic security concerns in global affairs, supply chain security initiatives and broader economic security efforts are not something NATO can ignore. NATO should begin to consider economic security and supply chain security initiatives as critical for maintaining hard security capabilities. Even if NATO does not become a broader economic NATO, it can still play a vital role in pushing for common efforts to monitor supply chain vulnerability, enhance public-private cooperation, and reduce the bite of potential retaliatory measures from competitors.

Emily Benson is the director of the Project on Trade and Technology and a senior fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Pau Alvarez-Aragones is an intern with the Project on Trade and Technology at CSIS.

The authors would like to extend their sincere gratitude to Catharine Mouradian for her valuable insights during the research process.

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NATO and Economic Security: A Political Oxymoron or Inevitability? - CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies

Watch the full event

Right now, NATOs Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercise is taking place across Europe and at sea.

The effort, the largest the Alliance has undertaken since the Cold War, is not just a demonstration of the transatlantic bond; it is also NATOs opportunity to rigorously test its defense and deterrence strategy, said General Christopher Cavoli, supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander of US European Command.

Cavoli spoke at a May 7 Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was part of the Forward Defense programs Commanders Series (in partnership with Saab) and of the Transatlantic Security Initiatives programming organized in advance of the NATO Summit in Washington.

The general went on to say that NATOs 2020 defense and deterrence strategy is part of an effort to conduct a wholesale modernization of NATOs collective defense to respond to todays security challenges.

We had previously been optimized for a very different task, he said. Cavoli explained that after the Cold War, NATO pivoted toward conducting crisis-management missions well beyond its borders that allowed the Alliance to participate in missions on its own terms and on a predictable schedule.

But all that has changed, Cavoli said, pointing to Russias war in Ukraine. It is happening all the time, 24/7, [with] no respite for more than two years.

The war has shown that today, you either win up front, fast, and big, or youre in a long fight. So . . . win up front but be ready to win long, he said.

Below are more highlights from the event, where Cavoli touched upon NATOs plans to modernize its defenses and the intensifying threats to the Alliance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Image: General Christopher Cavoli speaks at the Atlantic Council on May 7, 2024.

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NATO must 'win up front but be ready to win long' in modern warfare, says General Christopher Cavoli - Atlantic Council

NATO allies are inching closer to sending military trainers into Ukraine. The move could draw the U.S. and Europe more directly into the war with Russia.

Ukrainian officials have asked their U.S. and NATO counterparts to help train 150,000 new recruits closer to the front line for faster deployment. So far the U.S. has been adamant that it will not put U.S. troops on the ground in Ukraine, and has urged NATO allies not to do so either.

But yesterday, Gen. Charles Brown, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that a NATO deployment of trainers seemed inevitable. Well get there eventually, over time, he told reporters.

For now, the general said, such a move would put NATO trainers at risk and would most likely mean deciding whether to use precious air defenses to protect the trainers instead of critical Ukrainian infrastructure near the battlefield. Any attack on the trainers would force the U.S. to honor its NATO obligations, dragging it into the war.

At the front: Ukraines position has worsened as Russia has stepped up attacks, in particular in the northeast. Yesterday, President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to the Kharkiv region and acknowledged that the situation there remains extremely difficult. We are strengthening our units, he added.

Russia: As he intensifies his war effort, President Vladimir Putin called for stronger economic ties between Russia and China at a summit in Beijing with Xi Jinping, Chinas leader.

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Friday Briefing: NATO Considers Sending Trainers to Ukraine - The New York Times

This July, Washington, DC will host the NATO summit, marking the Alliances diamond jubilee. This summers summit comes at a critical juncture as for the first time since the end of World War II, a major power is committing aggression in Europe. Putins war on Ukraine not only seeks the subjugation of Ukraine but is also part of the Kremlins revisionist agenda, which threatens all of Ukraines neighbors and is designed to undermine the NATO Alliance and the values of democracy and transatlantic security that the Alliance protects.

Last summer in Vilnius, the NATO summit delivered a vague promise to invite Ukraine to join NATO when allies agree and conditions are met. The year since has been marked by enduring and increased violence by Russia in Ukraine and directed moves by the Kremlin to destabilize international financial and food systems and engage in influence campaigns to challenge the democratic world, all while the United States stalled on providing Ukraine with critical aid until just last month.

Russias aggressive policy, most evident in its savage war on Ukraine, is a grave threat to US and European security and prosperity. Ukraine is at the front lines of the defense of Europe.Long-term US and Allied security require a secure and stable Ukraine.Right now, that means NATO and its partners should provide Kyiv all the aid it needs to win this war; it also means the Ukraine must become a member of NATO.

The Atlantic Councils Eurasia Center convenes twopanels of former senior US national security officials, as well as top experts on Russia, Ukraine, the transatlantic relationship, and NATO to discuss the authoritarian challenge that Russia and its allies pose to the US, NATO, and the West, and what should happen at the summit this summer to address the specifics of Putins revisionist agenda.

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The Washington NATO Summit: Ukraine and transatlantic security in the age of marching authoritarians - Atlantic Council

In a major escalation of the US-NATO war with Russia in Ukraine, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Q. Brown told the New York Times Thursday that the NATO military alliance will eventually send significant numbers of active-duty NATO troops to Ukraine, which the newspaper said meant the deployment was inevitable.

In asserting that NATO sending troops is inevitable, the Times means the decision has already been made, and all that is being awaited is the determination on how best to announce the escalation to the public.

Browns statement that NATO will send troops to Ukraine, after US President Joe Biden categorically ruled out such a move because it would lead to World War III, continues the pattern: Every time the White House has said it would not do something in Ukraine, it has subsequently done it.

It is high time for President Joe Biden to go on national television and inform the American people that a decision has been made to send US and NATO troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, that this is a massive escalation of the war, that there is a high probability that this will lead to a nuclear war, and that hundreds of millions of people will be killed if that happens.

Biden should also explain how the US government, or whatever is left of it, would deal with the obliteration of a large portion of the country. He should also explain clearly why the admission of Ukraine into NATO justifies risking such an outcome.

The claim that the troops being sent would merely be training Ukrainian forces, rather than serving as frontline troops, is meaningless. Once inside Ukraine, they would come under fire from Russian forces, leading to direct retaliation against Russian aircraft and air-to-ground sites by NATO forces.

The Times makes this clear: As a part of NATO, the United States would be obligated under the alliances treaty to aid in the defense of any attack on the trainers, potentially dragging America into the war.

Browns claim that the decision will be made eventually and over time is purely to obfuscate the fact that the USs leading military official has publicly announced an action that Russian officials have said would lead to direct attacks on US troops.

In fact, if there is anything the NATO war effort lacks, it is time. The Times article admits this, declaring, Ukraines manpower shortage has reached a critical point, and its position on the battlefield in recent weeks has seriously worsened as Russia has accelerated its advances.

In other words, the USs strategy of fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian has played itself out, and there are no longer enough Ukrainian troops left to hold the front. Any effort to rescue the Ukrainian position will require the rapid deployment not just of NATO trainers but of active-duty combat forces to fight on the front line.

The Times itself admits that planning for the NATO deployments inside Ukraine is already far advanced. It reports that NATO last month asked Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, the supreme allied commander for Europe, to come up with a way for the alliance to do more to help Ukraine.

The declaration by the US Joint Chiefs chairman marks a new stage in a concerted and orchestrated campaign to legitimize the concept of sending NATO troops to Ukraine, which all US and other NATO politicians had vocally declared was beyond the pale.

In February, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that NATO should consider sending ground troops to Ukraine, which both he and Biden categorically promised not to do. Within weeks, Macron was joined by officials from France, Canada, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland. Last week, officials from Estonia echoed these statements.

Now, a US official has gone even further than Macron, not only declaring that sending NATO troops should be considered, but that it is inevitable.

The carefully stage-managed presentation of the US decision to send troops to Ukraine follows the exact same script that was used to introduce the sending of armored vehicles, tanks, fighter jets and long-range missiles.

In each case, the first stage is a categorical denial. In March 2022, Biden declared, The idea that were going to send in offensive equipment and have planes and tanks and trains going in with American pilots and American crewsjust understand, dont kid yourself, no matter what yall say, thats called World War III.

In June 2022, Macron echoed these sentiments, declaring, we are not entering the war. Thus, it has been agreed not to supply certain weaponsincluding attack aircraft or tanks.

By January 2023, Macron had declared France will provide light combat tanks and continue its support in air defense, followed by the announcement by Biden that the United States will be sending 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.

The script was then repeated in the decision to send long-range weapons to Ukraine and to allow them to be used against Crimea and other parts of Russia.

In May 2022, Biden declared, We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. In September 2022, Biden declared Were not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that strike into Russia.

But last month, the Biden administration announced that it had secretly sent long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, which had already been used to strike Crimea, which Russia claims as its own territory. Earlier this month, UK Foreign Minister David Cameron declared that Ukraine has the right to use weapons provided by NATO to strike any part of Russian territory.

Beyond the Times declaration that the US has decided to send troops to Ukraine, the article makes another staggering admission: The United States has already sent defense contractors to Ukraine to service advanced weapons sent by NATO countries.

The article declares, a small number of US defense contractors have already been allowed in [to Ukraine], under State Department authorities, to work on specific weapons systems like Patriot air defenses.

The article quotes Alexander S. Vindman, a leading architect of the US war with Russia in Ukraine, who declared, There is an element of ally malpractice in the fact that were providing masses of Western equipment to Ukraine, but not giving them the resources to sustain it.

When, last year, the US announced that it was sending M1 Abrams battle tanks to Ukraine, the World Socialist Web Site warned, The significance of Bidens announcement lies less in the battlefield impact of the tanks than in the consequences of deploying them. We warned that these weapons will require a massive logistical network inside Ukraine, involving large numbers of specialist American contractors. Attacks on these supply networks and American personnel servicing the tanks will then be used to press for implementation of a no-fly zone and the deployment of US and NATO troops to Ukraine.

Under conditions in which the Ukrainian battle front is nearing collapse, these plans have been significantly accelerated, raising the threat of a rapid escalation of a direct war between NATO and Russia.

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US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says NATO will deploy troops to Ukraine - WSWS

From May 21 to 24, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Minister of Defense Zukan Helez is visiting the NATO headquarters in Brussels, as well as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Kingdom of Belgium.

The delegation of the Minister of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Brussels will be joined by Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO Vanja Filipovi and the head of the military part of the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO and at the same time the military advisor for the EU Brigadier Edin Fako, it was announced from the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During his visit to Brussels, the minister will meet with the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for Europe, and hold other meetings with relevant NATO and EU departments related to current cooperation projects with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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The Minister of Defense Zukan Helez is visiting the NATO headquarters - Sarajevo Times