Monthly Archives: May 2022

Photo courtesy of Anoma Wijewardene

The lion flag is waved for a historic first time on a mass scale in the Galle Face urban youth protest but the violent anti-protester attackers coming from Temple Trees also burnt those same lion flags. Meanwhile, there are instances in this anti-regime agitation when police checkpoints giving access to Fort from Galle Face refused to allow people to carry the national flag into the countrys centre of economy and power.

Is there an actual contest between power blocs over the use of the flag or is it a contest between forces within the Sinhala supremacist power bloc itself? Is this internal contest an explicit assertion of the social right of flag waving by the ethnically dominant citizenry?

Closer observation of the current flag waving indicates clearly that this anti-regime agitational usage is, principally and originally, the initiative of the protesting urban, ethnic Sinhala, cohort. They explicitly and proudly describe themselves as the vote bank of the Rajapaksas: the 6.9 million.

The modern Sri Lankan practice of public political protest and non-violent civic agitation is not known to extensively use the national flag either by design or spontaneously. The use of the lion flag by the urban youth protestors en masse in Galle Face is the very first time it seems to have happened, especially in post-colonial Sri Lanka. Until GotaGoGama (GGG), flag waving was largely the preserve of the state in various modes by state institutions at all levels at state functions, including military functions.

Two notable exceptions of civic social practice (as opposed to the state) are the hoisting of national flags in Sinhala-Buddhist weddings.

How often are national flags flown in any non-Sinhala-Buddhist formal social events? Probably never.

At the height of Mahinda Rajapaksas fame in politically leading the Thun Hela Lankan republics battle with the Thamil Eelam secessionists, Galle Face came to be dominated by a single giant lion flag flying at the top of a very tall flagpole jutting upward at the centre of the Greens sea front.

The supremacist narrative may be coming full circle: from the heady delusion of dominance to the carnage of economic collapse and political plunder. Those 6.9 million who wielded their ballot cards like lion flags in electing and sustaining the Rajapaksas in power had expected not just ethnic political supremacy but also a sustaining of their socio-economic prosperity (courtesy J.R. Jayewardenes costly economic liberalisation).

Rural society was the first to be hit by the colossal mismanagement and remains worst hit by far. The inability to budget for fertiliser imports was hidden under an elaborate pretence of upholding organic fertiliser, which may have temporarily appealed to the patriotic fantasies of the urban component of the 69 lakhs. But the non-supply of fertiliser has been economically and socially almost fatal to Lankan agriculture, both the export sector and the entire rural society, which comprises the bigger part of the 69 lakhs.

The lack of fertiliser has already severely reduced production and incomes in the agro-export as well as domestic food production sectors. The decline in exports also means loss of export markets. Reportedly Japan has drastically reduced future dependence on Lankan tea. This is just the tip of a deadly iceberg. The decline in food production means lower farmer income, high food costs all round and, creeping malnutrition if not famine. Ironically, the northern and southern insurgencies combined had not achieved so much economic upheaval.

Rural people, not just youth, have been frantically protesting at village level since the start of the fertiliser deprivation (ban on imports) almost a year ago. Although the news industry faithfully reported this rural protest on a daily basis for months, the urban component of the Pohottuwa vote bank, pre-occupied as they were with the heady fruits of ethnic hegemony and relative affluence, failed to either empathise with their rural counterparts or even foresee the impact of the financial crisis on their own lives.

The fuel, gas, electricity shortages and consequent transport, livelihood and communications disruption were what prompted urban society to react. Here too, numerically, the Sinhala-Buddhists dominate and their angry reactions convincingly present a seemingly consensual anti-regime configuration. But consensus is precisely what it is not.

GGG is both a media-facilitated impressionistic hyperbole (youth rebellion) as well as a hard political indicator of a considerable undermining of the Rajapaksa-led current political leadership of Sinhala supremacism.

This phenomenon of disenchantment of the Sinhala supremacist vote bank must, firstly, be noted for its lack of politically organised coordination between the rural cohort and its urban counterpart. There is no organised coordination because no new leadership has replaced the rejected Rajapaksas. The Sinhala farmers are spontaneously revolting in their impoverished desperation and lack political coordination even among themselves. The parallel Sinhala urban youth cohort has also spontaneously revolted but with some internal (inter urban, diaspora) coordination thanks to social media usage and also their greater affluence which enables sustained protest tactics like camps in city centres.

Secondly, both these rebelling Pohottuwa cohorts that now reject the Rajapaksas had combined previously in successive elections to summarily reject all other possible political leaderships on principally ideological grounds as not trustworthy of building and sustaining Sinhala supremacy.

Thirdly, these two parallel Rajapaksa constituency revolts are actually latecomers to an already ongoing substantive political resistance to the Rajapaksa-led imposition of a corrupt, authoritarian, ethno-supremacism. This political resistance, both in parliamentary opposition and outside, is articulated by the entirety of the rest of Lankan political formations: the more liberal Sinhala-led political forces (UNP, SLFP, SJB), Sinhala-led left political formations (JVP, FSP) and the bulk of the ethnic minority-led political forces.

The disenchantment with the Rajapaksas by the bulk of the Rajapaksa constituency should not be equated with a disenchantment with the fantasy of Sinhala supremacy. This is why, nearly a year after the Rajapaksa constituency revolt began, there is little indication of any major organised alliance between this Sinhala vote bank revolt and any of the rest of Lankan political formations.

That revolting Rajapaksa vote bank remains ideologically alienated from these other forces which have been saying some (not all) of the same things for nearly two decades. The other Sinhala-led forces, both liberal and left, cannot be trusted to sustain the current, constitutionally affirmed and, politically protected and enhanced Sinhala ethnic hegemony. That is the meaning of the wild rejection of all 225 parliamentarians.

However, in the current fluid political environment, it remains to be seen how this need for a supremacist political spearhead might be modulated by an absence of such a spearhead. The currently emerging alliance between the besieged, yet numerically secure, Pohottuwa parliamentary group and the barely liberal, electorally discredited, remnant of the UNP embodied by its sole MP, Ranil Wickremesinghe, could be a first test for the rebellious Pohottuwa vote bank. Repelled by this new alliance, will the ex-Pohottuwa vote bank opt for a less ultra-nationalist leadership which might come forward from any other Sinhala-led formation?

Theyll call me Freedom, just like a waving flag goes the song Wavin Flag by US Rapper Knaan that became a global hit in 2009. The song is about how the dominant forces in society get the masses to wave the flag but after enthusiastically waving the flag (and dying for it), those same masses find that their freedom is restricted to flag waving and dying. They remain socio-economically oppressed. The song graphically describes that continuing oppression: violent prone, poor people zone and, So we struggling, fighting to eat. Will this soon happen here?

As this writer learned after visits to the GGG campsite and conversations with these young formerly Pohottuwa protestors, this constituency is amazingly nave having being shielded from minority ethnic agitation by the counter insurgency victory, as well as not knowing a social past of deprivation and intensive economic class struggles. Thus, they have little idea of the degree of ethnic oppression and alienation of the ethnic minorities from the electoral mainstream. And their urban affluence kept them distant from rural economic struggles and previous semi urban protests.

This ethno-centric urban youth protest is characterised by their own political-cultural exclusivity, even isolation. Their affluent interactions with global culture and with the diaspora inspired them to use the lion flag as the expressive symbol of their patriotic anti-Rajapaksa revolt. So we have lion flag waving en masse initiated by the rebellious Pohottuwa urban youth. To these flag wavers, Lanka is a Sinhala world after all.

In fact, in this appropriation of the state ensign for their own spontaneous flaunting as opposed to exclusive, formal, state usage, these angry Pohottuwa protestors are deliberately exercising their Sinhala sovereignty over state and presidency as the true constituents of the republic. Lion flag-sellers are having a field day at Galle Face these days, in place of the kite-sellers. Small groups of ethnic minority citizens visiting Galle Face have wisely borne lion flags. Remember that the Green has been the sole evening promenade available to generations of central Colombo dwellers, the majority of whom are Muslim and Thamil.

The non-coordination between the Pohottuwa rebellion and the rest of the anti-Rajapaksa-SLPP political opposition betrays the divergence in motivation and long term political goals. The Pohottuwa rebels remain within that 69 lakhs Sinhala supremacist movement. They proudly proclaim their 69 lakhs identity the very identity explicitly and proudly described by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as exclusively Sinhala-Buddhist from his very first presidential address onwards. Even today, it is that same bloc vote that he uses as the excuse for remaining in office.

The ethnic minority political leaderships have no illusions whatsoever about the continuity of supremacist power. Neither do the parallel Sinhala-led political parties both liberal and left. Especially the Sinhala-led formations are busy mingling with the GGG and other urban protest centres elsewhere in order to milk whatever political leverage possible. In their GGG mingling they are extremely polite and avoid claiming any ideological or political convergence other than the economic crisis and plunder issues. Established parliamentary opposition politicians are studiously distant from the Green.

Those liberal citizens hoping for greater ethnic harmony are romanticising the so-called youth protest movement as being multicultural simply because they see some multi-ethnic mixing of protesters within their own social class circles. It is crucial that even small elements of such spontaneous cultural blending be encouraged as valuable reversals of the ethnic warfare incited these past decades. Certainly, in the greater urban ethnic mixture, there is some inter-ethnic solidarity over the common gas-fuel-electricity shortage.

A comment by a popular Sinhala TV channel news anchor made soon after the emergency was imposed for the second time is noteworthy. He echoed the popular expression that the emergency and curfews were intended to suppress the protests over the fuel-gas-electricity shortage. Once these essential supplies are brought to normalcy, then the government was free to impose emergency for any other purposes, he argued. The implied logic was that the emergency could be used to suppress other agitations by minorities? Unions? He did not say. Evidently, the issue for him was the current deprivations felt by the large protesting Pohottuwa constituency and not so much the spectrum of democratic rights. It was as if this TV personality had forgotten the decades of abuse of emergency powers to suppress the whole gamut of public agitation and dissent.

There is now a sizeable chunk of the Lankan electorate that is up for grabs, not by anyone, though. Much calculating is on by various Sinhala political leaderships ultra nationalist, liberal, left as to how at least portions of the 69 lakhs could be lured over. Some opposition personalities will calculate how much Sinhala supremacist discourse they must adopt to do the luring. The Pohottuwa political leadership itself, with its Viyath Maga business-intelligentsia support group, must also be exploring personality combinations that might pick up where the Rajapaksas left off.

The weakest elements of the now disenchanted Pohottuwa constituency are the farmer society (not the agri-business corporates) and the poorest semi-urban working class, both sectors being the worst hit by the economic crisis. Unlike the urban middle and upper classes, their deprivation is not merely utilities and services shortages. Their very livelihoods are directly threatened.

Will this existential threat be enough for these most subaltern of Sinhala sectors to move beyond ethnic supremacy/security compulsions and toward political movements that offer new social and economic measures? Certainly, the JVP and smaller left groups are seeing lots of possibilities.

So are the anxiously watching foreign powers both in Delhi and in NATO-EU. From their point of view, Gotabaya Rajapaksa is better than any left options. These foreign powers are clearly unenthusiastic about the untested Sajith Premadasa and his fairly representative and balanced liberal coalition. From this foreign viewpoint Ranil Wickremesinghe, who served as premier in the far more repressive Ranasingha Premadasa regime, would be the safest bet. Is this why Wickremesinghe agreed to take the premiership under his political enemy?

Is this a marriage of secular right wing autocracy with racist supremacism? Fortunately, reassuringly, the most prominent characteristic of this new combination is their persistent record of incompetence and failure.

Civilised Lanka, both liberal and left, may have the last word after a breathing space to allow for re-grouping and expansion of mass mobilisation. The economy is not necessarily always priority number one as even the enlightened business leaderships will acknowledge.

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Waving the Lion Flag - Groundviews

Contents:

Paul SalemPresident

Election results show that voters dealt a serious blow to Hezbollahs political allies, favored their opponents, and brought a higher-than-expected number of new civil society candidates to parliament.

Despite a low voter turnout of 41%, significantly lower than the last elections in 2018, and despite great division among civil society ranks that failed to put together unified revolutionary movement or national lists, new candidates from these disparate lists made breakthroughs over established parties and politicians in 14 seats. Although this is still a modest fraction of the 128 seats in parliament, it shows that change is possible, that a significant number of voters will vote for change if given a viable alternative, and that the established parties and politicians are vulnerable.

In a more traditional calculus, the elections weakened the pro-Hezbollah alliance in favor of its opponents. Hezbollah and its allies ended up with a minority of only 60 seats, while their opponents of various stripes occupy a majority of 68 seats. In the Christian community, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law Gibran Bassil, which is allied with Hezbollah, saw their parliamentary bloc shrink to 17, and now take second place to the staunchly anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces party, which secured a bloc of 19. The pro-Hezbollah and pro-Assad leader in North Lebanon, Suleiman Frangieh, also saw his influence shrink, failing to secure a majority even in his own hometown of Zgharta. Both Bassil and Frangieh can no longer claim to represent a dominant political trend in the Christian community, nor do they have a strong case to be considered for the presidency.

In the Druze community, long-time pro-Hezbollah and pro-Assad politicians lost to reformist civil society candidates; several pro-Hezbollah Sunni and Christian candidates in the Hezbollah strongholds of south Lebanon also lost. In the Sunni community, the previously dominant leader Saad Hariri sat these elections out, and the Sunni vote was distributed among a wide array of anti-Hezbollah or reformist lists. Sunni allies of Hezbollah and Assad did very poorly.

Hezbollah and Amal maintained their sweep of the 27 Shiite seats in parliament. But Hezbollahs leader Hassan Nasrallah had made it clear in recent speeches that Hezbollahs goal in these elections was to make sure its allies in other communities did well. In this, it has failed. The decline of the FPM to minority status means that Hezbollah has lost a strong Christian cover especially after President Aouns term ends at the end of October. It has lost key allies in the Sunni and Druze communities, and has lost the majority it previously could count on in parliament. Of course it remains the dominant party of the Shiite community and an extremely powerful armed group that does not hesitate to use force inside, and outside, the country to pursue its or Irans goals.

It is fair to say that the results of these elections came as a surprise even to civil society and reform groups, which had begun to lose hope in the possibility of change. It shows how much elections still matter, and how much political mobilization and voting can bring about change, even in a dysfunctional and militia-dominated country like Lebanon.

In the weeks ahead the parliament has first to elect a speaker. Amal leader Nabih Berri has been speaker for the past 30 years, and might be so again, but the election results make his road to victory more challenging. Next, the president must engage in parliamentary consultations to designate someone to form the next government. The current Prime Minister Najib Mikati fared poorly in these elections, but its not yet clear who might emerge as an alternative. The naming of a prime minister and the process to form a government might not even come to fruition before the next big political milestone, which is the presidential election that should take place before the end of October. Hezbollahs original plan, to try to get one of its close allies, Bassil or Frangieh, into that position, is no longer viable. As electing a president requires a two-thirds quorum in parliament a ratio that no political coalition has the country might be bound for a presidential vacuum of extended duration.

Indeed, the country is in desperate need of a new government that can work with the new parliament to implement the urgently needed economic reforms to secure an IMF rescue package and begin reversing the socio-economic collapse. Although these elections have brought significant and positive political change, they leave the political road ahead still very contested and unlikely to produce sufficient political consensus to undertake the necessary major reforms. But the elections do give hope that change is indeed possible in the country, and that efforts to bring about more lasting and widespread change deserve to be redoubled.

An earlier version of this piece appeared in MEIs Monday Briefing on May 16.

Follow on Twitter: @paul_salem

Fadi Nicholas NassarContributor

In a world threatened by rising authoritarianism and growing worries over democracys retreat, a message of hope has emerged from Lebanon reminding those who need to hear it most that democracy still matters and is worth fighting for.

Echoing electoral results in Iraq, Lebanons parliamentary contest has proven to be a decisive blow to Irans allies, exposing the increasing vulnerability of its strategic position, the growing rejection of its regional project, and the expanding limits of its coercive abilities to dominate formal political processes.

More specific to Lebanon, however, has been the rejection of the 2008 Doha Agreement that positioned Hezbollah as the countrys dominant power broker following the turning of its arms toward local opponents. As I have written about in more detail elsewhere, the consensus that emerged in the aftermath of Doha Agreement was that Hezbollah was not a state within a state; rather, it eclipsed the state. All other actors and stakeholders were suspended in its orbit, competing over whatever fell outside its strategic interests. But the false stability of this illiberal status quo was never sustainable, and ultimately made the state fail.

It is this appeasement and acceptance of political violence, enabled by corrupt and broken elites and brokered with the tacit consent of international actors, that Lebanons opposition, and the electorate that voted them in, have now challenged. From the right-wing and center-leaning traditional parties to the emerging anti-establishment independent groups in the new parliament, those outside Hezbollahs axis have chosen confrontation, not compromise. This comes after more than a decade of living with the consequences of impunity and inaction in the face of Hezbollahs use of and monopoly on political violence, including the assassination of dissidents at home and participation in mass atrocities abroad in Syria.

In the battle between independent parties for who gets to represent the October 17 Revolution in parliament, groups that de-emphasized Hezbollah in their campaigns, framing the militia as merely facilitating pervasive corruption rather than being chiefly responsible for battering the state and leveraging its arms to maximize its position and suppress dissent, were soundly defeated. Independent actors that did not take a clear position on Hezbollah failed to win a single seat, whereas groups that refused to compromise on Hezbollah in their revolt against the establishment made breakthrough victories across the country, underscoring the impact that taking a confrontational position on Hezbollah had on voters trust. This current was also exploited by traditional parties campaigning on an anti-Hezbollah line, like the Lebanese Forces, to mask their own role in cementing the status quo, further highlighting that this election was in many ways a referendum on Hezbollah.

But what the uncompromising spirit of this new anti-establishment movement draws to light is that the struggles against corruption and political violence, though different, are connected and in Lebanons case, one cannot be resolved without addressing the other. That this movement will inevitably find itself in a hung parliament is not necessarily a weakness. If navigated carefully, this can even be used to pressure established parties to compromise on critical reforms that would make it easier to strengthen the integrity of core state institutions and work toward addressing systemic issues like elite capture, mismanagement, sectarianism, and clientelism. To be sure, the road ahead is perilous given the large representation of parties that were part of the former government. That same government deliberately failed to enact any critical reforms throughout the countrys debilitating economic crisis that would have placed significant losses on influential elites and institutions rather than the general public.

Yet none of this can happen without security for reformers from political violence.

It is here where international support is most needed, in reining in the capacity of local and regional actors to operationalize such violence without consequence and reducing their margin for maneuver.

Following Russias invasion of Ukraine, a global consensus is emerging that authoritarianism and the moral compromises that sustain it is an existential threat. Confronting it requires doing away with instrumentalizing the vague language of compromise to mask impunity for infringements on core freedoms in exchange for unchecked corruption.

While the Biden administration appears to have prioritized established democracies in its flagship Summit for Democracy, it is in small states like Lebanon, where the battle between democracy and authoritarianism is neither won nor lost, that solidarity is most needed.

Fadi Nicholas Nassar is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University. His research focuses on international humanitarian and relief interventions in fragile and conflict settings, popular uprisings and social movements, US foreign policy, and Middle Eastern politics.

Follow on Twitter: @dr_nickfn

Carmen GehaContributor

I was wrong. That is the first thing that comes to mind when I think about the election results that came out of Lebanon. For over a decade, I had tried to change, influence, and break the system, but to no avail. Its not just me either; there are countless others who have tried and we kept hitting a wall. Things just kept getting worse, and even after Beiruts port exploded in August 2020, the warlords seemed to be able to revive the system again. These elections were no different, or so I thought. After all, we were playing by the rules of the corrupt warlords who have ruled, impoverished, and destroyed Lebanon for 30 years. So I left, I immigrated for the first time, maintaining my commitment to Lebanon but choosing to relocate to Barcelona to work on diaspora activism. I was right to do this for personal reasons Lebanon is unlivable right now at all levels but even though my personal choice is right, I was wrong about the collective. An unprecedented awakening and political confrontation has started, and we must all rally to support it for three reasons.

First, over 80% of people in Lebanon are reeling under poverty. With the national government in utter failure and the international communitys historical complicity, it is up to us as people to stand up and advocate for those who are under-privileged and discriminated against. The political order is an exclusionary one: It excludes non-loyalists, non-nationals, women, youth, the elderly basically anyone that is not loyal to or benefiting from the establishment of violent mafia rule. This needs to change and now that we have a large group of revolutionary reformist parliamentarians, we have the opportunity to support this change.

Second, Lebanons traditional political leadership is evil. As a political scientist I wrote about the sectarian system for so long, arguing that it is the root of all of Lebanons problems. I was wrong again. I dont think that Lebanons power-sharing system is necessarily to blame. I think it is the handful of politicians who led the war and governed through impunity. They are the problem. Their arrogance, corruption, violence, and disdain for their own people is truly perverted. A group of men who cannot even manage garbage collection and who leave explosives at the port cannot be trusted with reform.

Third, there is power in the collective. We learned this in the revolution that began in October 2019 and even experienced it in mobilizing for justice after the port explosion. We cannot leave the new members of parliament to do the work alone. We must rally around them and the more of us who volunteer to help, advocate, serve, and uplift, the more these new parliamentarians can have the security and support to continue confronting an evil political class that has survived on blood and impunity for way too long.

I think both realities are true: Many of us need to leave for our survival but at the same time many of us can and should help. Politics, like life, can be a complexity of emotions. Today in Lebanon, both statements are true: The country has never seen such hopelessness and hopefulness co-exist. What we do next is up to us as these election results have proven.

Dr. Carmen Geha is an activist, scholar, and consultant with more than 15 years experience working for international organizations across the MENA region with expertise in governance and institutional reform.She is currently a senior member at the Inter-disciplinary Research Group on Migration at Pompeu Fabra University in Spain, and has been awarded the prestigious Maria Zambrano fellowship by the Catalan government.

Follow on Twitter: @CarmenGeha

Bachar El-HalabiContributor

While on paper Hezbollah lost its parliamentary majority in the elections that took place last week in Lebanon, precedents and realpolitik prove that a parliamentary majority is not the criterion for ruling under the countrys sectarian power-sharing formula. The lesson to be drawn from the election rests elsewhere, a point missed by the majority of reporters from international media outlets in Beirut, who rushed their editors to run pieces headlining: Hezbollah lost its parliamentary majority.

Over the past 15 years, three main events contributed to Hezbollahs ruling recipe, cementing the paramilitary groups status as Lebanons powerbroker. The first was the 2008 Doha conference, which came against the backdrop of the groups military incursion into Beirut and Mount Lebanon, officially giving Hezbollah veto power within government. The second was the ouster of Saad Hariri from the premiership in 2011 while he was meeting with then U.S. President Barak Obama, knocking out the working framework of the so-called national unity government. In practice, the group has retained the upper hand in governments ever since. The third event was the presidential deal that installed Michel Aoun in Baabda Palace in 2016 as part of an expansion of Iranian influence following the nuclear deal with the U.S. and the conclusion of wars in Syria and Iraq. Hezbollah proceeded to win a clear majority of seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections and reinforced its grip on power.

The emerging parliament today, with its diversity and uncertainty regarding a clear-cut majority, undercuts Hezbollahs ruling recipe and offers heightened polarization that could result in protracted deadlock, at a time when the country is dealing with one of the worst economic meltdowns in documented history. This polarization was the result of Hezbollahs unwise decision to frame the election as a referendum over its weapons. The group knows that no majority in parliament can carve out a policy that targets its security concerns, and it plans to capitalize on the lack of unanimity among so-called independent and opposition MPs to weather the election results in a similar fashion to what the pro-Iran Coordination Framework is attempting in Baghdad. However, one unmistakable conclusion from the elections is the huge reduction in support among all other sects for parties or personalities close to Hezbollah, an indication of the increased isolation of its policies and narrative within Lebanon. A clear majority of Syrian President Bashar al-Assads allies lost as well, dealing a blow to his aspirations for a renewed role in Lebanese politics.

Meanwhile, there is enough reason for the Iranian regime to be concerned over its regional influence and expansionist plans. The outcome of the Iraqi and Lebanese parliamentary elections, coupled with Assads growing need for Iranian support as Russia takes heavy losses in its badly calculated invasion of Ukraine, presents Tehran with growing challenges. Moreover, the lack of news from Vienna and the bottleneck facing the nuclear talks do not instill confidence in Irans allies and proxies in the region.

On the flipside, Saudi Arabias role and influence in Lebanon have been reinvigorated with the Lebanese Forces (LF) winning a majority of seats within the Christian constituency. Riyadh, under the new leadership, has replaced its longtime ally Saad Hariri with the head of the LF, Samir Geagea. From a Saudi perspective, Geagea is a bulwark against Irans growing influence in Lebanon and remains an endorser of the Taif Agreement, until further notice. As such, Lebanon today can become an item on the agenda of the Baghdad dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran. With balance seemingly restored, at least in parliament, Riyadh and Tehran can either find a cohabitation arrangement that helps lift Beirut out of its misery, or push the country toward its breaking point.

Bachar El-Halabi, LLM, is a Lebanese activist and an energy market reporter and analyst. His published work focuses on Lebanese politics and regional geopolitical-related developments.

Follow on Twitter: @Bacharelhalabi

Bilal Y. SaabSenior Fellow and Founding Director of the Defense and Security Program

The electoral outcome in Lebanon has given both optimists and pessimists enough reason to deepen their convictions. The optimists will point to the unprecedented victories of new faces, many from civil society, who long forsystemicchange in the country, and concurrently, to the defeat of traditional politicians and sectarian chiefs who support the rotten political status quo and are allied with Hezbollah and loyal to the Syrian regime.

Despite a global pandemic, dreadful economic circumstances, intimidation and possible fraud in some districts, and an electoral law that to a large extent favors the old guard, there were significant electoral breakthroughs. And in a country awash with weapons, small and heavy, not one person was killed in this monumental national event. Thats worth noting.Kudos to the Lebanese army for providing security.

The pessimists will argue that preciselybecausethese elections were being held under historically bad economic conditions, political collapse, and massive societal depression, many more people should have voted for change (most from the Sunni community even boycotted!), civil society should have found a way to unite, and a much larger number of reform candidates should have won.

You can pick either narrative and you wouldnt be entirely wrong. More than two years ago, Iwrotethat getting even a small number of change candidates represented in the next chamber would constitute a decent start to the long and arduous journey of political rehabilitation. This goal has been accomplished, no doubt, which is a big deal. This constituency now exists, no matter how small and fragile it is.

The challenge now for the honest voices who won is to get sufficiently organized inside the next parliament toimplementwhat they have been calling for. This obviously will be very difficult given the still considerable power of Hezbollah and its allies and the next presidential race in October will show the immediate impact of these parliamentary elections.

Its not too late for the change candidates to unite to amplify their numbers and influence inside the next chamber, but it wont be easy given the significant differences they have on priorities and the sequencing of reforms. The Lebanese Forces, which won big and will form the largest Christian bloc, have not only an opportunity but also a responsibility moving forward: to refuse any bargaining with the status quo powers, which they didnt do when they signed off on Michel Aouns terrible presidency, and form a bond with as many independents and reformists as possible to introduce some much-needed change into the system.

This piece originally appeared in MEIs Monday Briefing on May 16.

Georges El KhouryContributor

On May 6 and May 8, Lebanese citizens around the world exercised their right to participate in Lebanons parliamentary elections. In most nations, expat voting is commonplace. But for the Lebanese diaspora, the road to the ballot box has been hard-fought and far from straightforward.

The primary reason for this struggle comes down to Lebanons 2017 electoral law, which gave Lebanese diaspora voters the right to elect a mere six members of parliament (one MP per continent) rather than the full 128 members. With a diaspora estimated to be twice as large as the actual population within Lebanon and often displaced by necessity rather than choice its easy to see why this law was controversial. The diaspora wanted a voice in the country they were forced to leave, and they were willing to fight for full electoral rights. Months of international and domestic pressure and campaigning led to parliament eventually caving and amending the 2017 electoral law gone were the paltry six seats previously allocated.

After this initial success, the fight then centered around ensuring that elections were actually held on time. In the run-up to May 2022, the Lebanese government had expressed concerns about the financial costs and operational complexity of organizing diaspora elections in a country already gripped by multiple crises. While this rhetoric might sound plausible given the circumstances, it was not lost on most diaspora voters that such excuses were merely tactics to avoid shaking up the domestic political status quo. The political establishment was undoubtedly aware of the threat that significant diaspora mobilization would pose to their rule and was keen on retaining their tight grip over parliament. Despite incessant rumors of cancelled elections that continued up until a few days before the vote, Lebanese expats finally went to the polls in unprecedented numbers.

Participation in the 2018 diaspora elections, the first time voting was allowed outside Lebanon, was limited, but in 2022, the Lebanese came out in droves to register for their right to vote from abroad.

From an estimated 1 million Lebanese citizens eligible to vote from abroad, fewer than 10% registered to vote in 2018 (82,965 voters). In contrast, around 24% registered in 2022 (244,000 voters). In 2018, 46,800 voters actually followed through with their vote, whereas more than three times that number 142,041 expats showed up to vote this time around. Significant participation, averaging more than 70% turnout, was recorded in countries like France, the UAE, the U.K., and Canada.

This considerable surge in voter registration and turnout abroad can be attributed to the increase in political awareness among Lebanese expats, their disillusionment with the current establishment, and their ability to distance themselves from the day-to-day struggles of Lebanese life. Devastating incidents such as the 2020 Beirut port explosion as well as all-encompassing financial and social crises have fueled a desire for change, particularly among expats who have spent the past two years watching their home country sink deeper and deeper into the abyss.

In the build-up to elections, opinion polls had estimated that registrants from abroad could provide enough votes to secure 8-10 new seats in parliament for alternative candidates not affiliated with establishment parties. In this weeks elections, diaspora voters did not disappoint, making a considerable difference in a number of electoral districts.

For example, in the electoral district of South 3, which encompasses the Lebanese regions of Bint Jbeil, Nabatieh, and Marjeyoun-Hasbaya, the diaspora vote helped break through decades of entrenched voting patterns by securing two out of 11 seats for alternative candidates. This may sound small but is in fact a huge breakthrough in a district historically under the thumb of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. Similarly, Yassine Yassine was the first alternative candidate to secure a seat in Bekaa 2.In the electoral district of Beirut 1, two alternative seats were also secured and, in the case of Cynthia Zarazir, only after diaspora votes were added to the final tally.The same is true for Waddah El Sadek, a candidate in Beirut 2, who was also able to secure a third alternative seat for the district once diaspora votes were counted. The diaspora votes also favored the alternatives in North 2, where Ramy Finge, a candidate from Tripoli on the list Intafid, was able to snatch the seat from the grip of the current establishment.

It is critical to keep in mind that such breakthroughs were not a product of luck. Diaspora voters actively and unequivocally played a role in tilting the balance in favor of alternative parties and creating surprise victories across many of Lebanons 15 electoral districts.In total, voters both in Lebanon and abroad secured around 13 seats for alternative parties in parliament this year, compared to only one in 2018.A feat once considered impossible has now happened, and expats, as well as their families and friends in Lebanon, have played an integral role in making 2022 an election year to remember.

Georges El Khoury is a graduate student at London Business School and a founding member of Sawti, a global initiative aimed at informing, engaging, and mobilizing Lebanese citizens abroad with the intent of increasing civic participation and voter turnout in the Lebanese elections.

Brian KatulisVice President of Policy

Lebanons imperfect democratic elections were nevertheless significant: They weakened Hezbollah, strengthened the proponents of state sovereignty, and brought in a significant group of new political representatives from civil society. It is also noteworthy that the elections were held on time and produced results that did not go the way entrenched powers wished them to go.

These election results dont immediately change the bigger picture inside of Lebanons political system, as the new parliament will be split among many groups. Most analysts expect gridlock to set in once again. It will be difficult to form a government in the next few months, and the country may be looking at another long period without a president after Michel Aouns term runs out at the end of October.

Nonetheless, the extended period of political negotiations that likely lies ahead offers an opportunity for the Biden administration to shift the focus of U.S. policy more clearly toward the needs and concerns of the Lebanese people. This means looking for new avenues to provide direct support to the most vulnerable without enabling the corruption and political gridlock that have become far too common in Lebanon.

The first step in crafting a new approach that directly engages the Lebanese people is building a diplomatic coalition with countries such as France and key partners in the Arab world that are looking for ways to avoid the past mistakes of underwriting a political system that doesnt respond to the people. Some key figures in the Biden administration have set out more modest goals for Americas approach to the Middle East, saying it should go back to basics and avoid having more failed states in the region.

Lebanon teeters on the edge of becoming a failed state, and its a good place to dedicate more diplomatic attention. Food insecurity, already a problem over the past year, has become a bigger challenge with the recent spike in food prices due to Russias war in Ukraine. The broader economic problems linked to years of mismanagement and corruption wont be fixed overnight and thats why new avenues of providing direct support to the Lebanese people through the World Bank and other international organizations should be developed. The Biden administration should also take more steps to hold corrupt officials accountable.

The Biden administration has serious bandwidth challenges in its foreign policy. Russias war in Ukraine and the broader effort to compete with China in the world dominate the time of President Joe Biden and his most senior officials. Thats why the Biden administration should empower a team of U.S. diplomats to work more closely with partners in Europe and the Middle East and international organizations to find ways to directly engage the Lebanese people and create incentives for the countrys newly elected leaders to respond to the needs of those they represent.

But the elections also showed that change is possible, as a significant number of new civil society groups unseated long-established politicians. This new group in parliament should be encouraged. The U.S. should also continue to help civil society further strengthen and coordinate its efforts to provide a better alternative for the desperate Lebanese people.

The elections in Lebanon resonate with the broader threat that democracy is facing in Ukraine and around the world. Lebanese voters, despite the deepest economic depression in living memory, a port blast that devastated the capital, and a militia-dominated political system, came out to vote and spoke out in favor of democracy, sovereignty, and reform. That should count for something in the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

Follow on Twitter: @Katulis

Photographer: Francesca Volpi/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Originally posted here:

Special briefing: Lebanese elections reshape the political scene - Middle East Institute

Nigerias coastal areas are known to present environmental hazards and risks. Oil exploration and exploitation is one source of these hazards. Oil spillage, gas flaring, air and water pollution and agricultural land contamination are serious problems in the region, with implications for human and environmental health.

Flooding and erosion are additional sources of danger in the region. Damage from floods is extensive.

Poor sanitation is a third hazard. Poor sanitation practices, poor location of facilities like toilets and kitchens, and the contamination of water sources in oil producing communities expose residents to cholera, typhoid, malaria and dysentery.

Residents perceptions of the environmental hazards have not been well explored. Its important to understand perceptions because they drive behaviour. In looking for ways to avoid, prepare for and respond to hazards and disasters, it is useful to understand what motivates peoples actions.

Research has shown that people take action on threats based on their personal perception of the risk. Perception, in turn, depends on the level of information people have about the risk, personal experience of past events and socioeconomic attributes. Its also influenced by the quantity of losses people think they can avoid, absorb and tolerate. The type of hazard makes a difference. So does peoples trust in the capability of authorities.

Therefore, in our study we sought to understand what influences the perceptions of people in Delta State when it comes to environmental risks. Understanding what drives their actions could help in finding ways to avoid or cope with risks and disasters.

We found that residents were less concerned about oil induced hazards and risks, or floods and erosion, than they were about the lack of sanitation amenities like drains and toilets. They perceived oil and flood risks as normal parts of their lives, not as major risks. Some even contributed to those problems by, for example, stealing oil.

What they were most worried about was being vulnerable to things like snakebites, reptile invasion, storm water diversion into their homes, collapse of buildings, spread of diseases from open defecation, and personal safety related to bathrooms and kitchens being located away from homes.

Many of the residential areas in the region have evolved without planning regulations. Residents havent always followed safe practices when building amenities. The resulting danger is an unsanitary environment. We suggest that government agencies ensure house owners adhere to building codes.

Our research was carried out in the southern part of Nigeria over 18 months. We focused on three towns: Sapele, Oghara and Koko. The towns are involved in crude oil activities and are close to the ocean. They also face dangers from toxic waste dumping.

In these towns, infrastructure such as roads, drainage and public toilets is inadequate and in very poor condition.

We sampled residential buildings from each town and gave questionnaires to 218 residents of these buildings. The questionnaire aimed to capture the socio-economic attributes of the people and their awareness of environmental hazards such as oil and sanitation. It also asked about the severity attached to risk emanating from hazards and responses to them.

Previous research has found that peoples perceptions of environmental hazards and risks are influenced by socioeconomic characteristics and by environmental awareness. The presence of amenities such as well-lit and tarred roads, location of emergency management agencies, electricity transformers and fire stations has also been found to be related to perceptions. We examined the impact of these factors on the way our respondents viewed environmental hazards and risks.

We found that a direct relationship exists between residents perception of environmental threats and infrastructure availability. Such infrastructure includes roads, drainage, public toilets, health centres, schools and electricity transformers.

The availability and location of toilets and drains scored highest among residents concerns. Location of kitchens was another issue. In most cases, toilets, bathrooms and kitchens are constructed detached from the main buildings, making residents more vulnerable to health risks. Such kitchens are vulnerable to infestation by flies, ants, cockroaches and other disease vectors.

We also discovered that peoples views have no relationship with efforts by the government, international oil companies and nongovernmental organisations to address threats. Such threats include oil pollution, gas flaring, hazardous waste, odour and erosion. This implies that people do not trust the capacities of these stakeholders to manage environmental hazards. They therefore engage in environmentally destructive and defiant behaviours such as crude oil theft, illegal oil refining and pipeline vandalism.

Read more: Three things that can go wrong at an illegal oil refinery in Nigeria

The socioeconomic attributes of residents correlated with their views on environmental threats. These are attributes such as gender, age, educational status, household size, income, occupation and length of stay in the area.

Higher income, higher level of education, and longer length of stay increased concerns about environmental threats. This shows that the more peoples income and education level are enhanced, the more concerned they are about managing environmental hazards in their area.

We recommend ways to enhance peoples perception of environmental hazards and thus enhance safety practices.

Governments at all levels should improve the provision and maintenance of environmental amenities.

Government should also work with representatives of the people to effectively monitor and manage threats emanating from oil production activities. The key involvement of the representatives will instil trust and create a sense of belonging in the efforts to manage the threats.

Government and NGOs should provide environmental education for residents of the coastal towns. Residents need to know about the inherent harmful impacts of unsanitary environments and poor amenities. Education could be done through the media and the school curriculum.

Read more from the original source:

Oil hazards aren't the main worry of Nigeria's coastal residents: toilets are - The Conversation

Holyrood Notebook by Maree Todd

A huge congratulations to all new and re-elected councillors across Caithness! Its a privilege to be elected to represent your community and I know that each one of our councillors will work tirelessly and in the best interests of their communities over the next five years.

Of course, Im delighted to see my brilliant SNP colleagues, Karl Rosie and Raymond Bremner, re-elected, contributing to the SNP returning the highest number of councillors in the Highland Council area.

I know both Karl and Raymond are laser-focused on tackling the cost-of-living crisis in Caithness and I look forward to working collaboratively with them on this.

At the time of writing, negotiations on which parties will form the Highland Council administration are still ongoing. In the event of an agreement with the SNP, our councillors will work together to do whats best for communities across the Highland Council area.

Im keen to see the ambitious proposals set out in the Highland SNP Group manifesto implemented, which include a commitment to delivering rural bus and transport solutions, attracting inward investment to produce green energy and building more houses to reduce housing waiting lists, to name a few.

In acknowledging the extraordinary context we find ourselves in following Covid-19 and Brexit, the manifesto sets out how we exit these unprecedented times with a clear road map for public services and plans for economic growth to rebuild and sustain our communities. Im confident that in administration, the SNP group can deliver a positive and inclusive future for our Highland communities.

Turning to the national landscape, this election sees the 11th victory in a row for the SNP, with the most seats won and most gains out of any party, making the SNP the biggest party in 21 councils across Scotland.

For a party that has been in government for 15 years, this is a remarkable achievement and whilst it shows yet another resounding endorsement of the SNP and for pro-independence parties it has confirmed once again that Scotland utterly rejects the corruption, sleaze and law-breaking of the Tories. The negligent inaction of the Tories' self-made cost-of-living crisis, which is hammering households across the country, was another clear contributor to the collapse of the Tory vote.

To finish, Im pleased that the Minister for Just Transition, Richard Lochhead, has accepted my invitation to visit Caithness this summer to consult with the local community and stakeholders ahead of the Scottish Governments Energy Strategy and Just Transition Plan (ESJTP). The plan, which is set to be published in the autumn, will reflect Scotlands ambitious climate change targets and the pathways which will enable us to reach them.

Its vital that industry, business and communities are consulted ahead of the creation of the strategy, particularly in areas like Caithness and north Sutherland where nuclear research and decommissioning have been of huge value to the local economy and community over the decades.

During the ministers visit, he aims to listen to those most impacted by the energy transition, with a focus on communities, workers and businesses interlinked with Dounreay, to gather lived experiences and opinions on Scotlands future energy system. The plans set out in the ESJTP will be crucial to the socio-economic future of Caithness and north Sutherland and Im pleased that a thorough engagement process will be behind the strategy.

I look forward to welcoming the minister to Caithness in the summer.

Read more from the original source:

MAREE TODD: Sharp focus on cost-of-living crisis in Caithness - JohnOGroat Journal