Monthly Archives: January 2022

CDT Editors Note: As we enter 2022, CDT has compiled a special series of features for our readers, offering a look back at the people, events, controversies, memes and sensitive words that defined the past year. Some of this content is drawn from the CDT Chinese teams year-end series, with additional content added by the CDT English team. We hope that CDT readers will enjoy this look back at the busy, complex and fascinating year that was 2021.

We started with the CDT editors picks for favorite CDT posts and writing on China in 2021, CDT English top ten most-read posts of 2021, the Chinese internets top ten memes of 2021, and a look back at some of the civil society groups, bloggers, and media outlets that said goodbye in 2021. The following is a translation and contextualization of CDT Chineses Top 10 Censored Words of 2021.

1. Sprinkle Pepper

Related censored terms: indiscriminately + sprinkling pepper

February 25 was Xi Jinpings big day to celebrate Chinas triumph over poverty. But as he read out his florid victory speech, he flubbed one of his lines. Describing the governments poverty alleviation work, he read that we stress fact-based guidance and strict rules, not flowery fists and fancy footwork, red tape and excessive formality, and performative going-through-the-motions, and we resolutely oppose indiscriminately sprinkling pepper.

His long pause and the contrived earthiness of the phrase, which Xi uses to describe ineffectual work, offered rich fodder for those who suspect that Xis two Tsinghua University degrees (awarded under dubious circumstances) simply paper over his lack of formal education. He has stumbled over complex, and not so complex, phrases a number of times in the past. In 2016, CDT published two leaked censorship directives on a case in which Xi misread lenient to farmers as loosen clothing.

Censors immediately aimed to mute discussion of the pepper-sprinkling verbal blunder. The word pepper was completely censored on Weibo for eight days after the speech, and searches for video of the speech returned no results. The word remains sensitive today: posting sprinkle pepper on Weibo can result in deletion of the offending account. Former U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle once incorrectly instructed an elementary school student to spell potato with an appended e, eliciting widespread mockery across the United States, but no censorship.

2. Nomadland

Related censored terms: Nomadland + release date/cancelled release, Nomadland / Chloe Zhao + humiliate China, Nomadland + block, cancel + Oscar , 93rd + Oscar Awards, Oscar + live stream + cancel, Chloe Zhao + Oscar, Nomadland + Oscar, Oscar for Best Director

When Chlo Zhao won Best Director at the 2021 Academy Awards for her film Nomadland, nobody in China, the country of her birth, was watchingat least not via officially sanctioned media. Coverage of her historic achievement was blacked out after nationalist commentators dug up a 2013 interview in which Zhao said China was a place where there are lies everywhere. Her namealong with the terms Nomadland, Oscar, and Best Directorwere all censored. Millions still found a way to watch and discuss through the adoption of code words like Settled Sky, an inversion of the films Chinese title.

Zhaos other films also seem to be banned in China. A Marvel film she directed, Eternals, never aired in China, although other possible factors in that decision include state-approved homophobiathe film shows a kiss between a male superhero and his husband. Other Hollywood personages with family ties to China have been subject to similar political scrutiny. An encore of the Zhao controversy engulfed Canadian actor Simu Liu after nationalists posted screenshots of an interview in which he recalled that his parents memories of growing up in China included stories of people dying from starvation.

3. Support Xinjiang People

Related censored terms: support + Xinjiang People, Support + Uyghurs, support + Uy people

In March, the Communist Youth League set Weibo afire when it accused Swedish fast-fashion brand H&M of lying about labor abuses in Xinjiangs cotton industry, and actively encouraged Chinese citizens to boycott H&M products. Amidst the sound and fury of nationalist support for Xinjiang cotton, some Chinese citizens spoke out in support of the people of Xinjiang: Dont just support Xinjiang cotton, support Xinjiang people! Support allowing them to stay in hotels, support them traveling abroad, support them finding work, support them walking down the street without having their phones & IDs checked. Those posts were quickly censored. But as the government fanned the flames of the boycotts, many netizens began to ask, What is really going on in Xinjiang?

The censored Weibo posts are an indication that international condemnation of Chinas human rights violations in Xinjiang may be capable of influencing Chinese public opinion, despite the Chinese governments assertions to the contrary. In the meantime, nationalistic boycotts over Xinjiang continue. The latest targets are Intel and Walmart.

4. Accelerationism

Related censored terms: China + accelerationism, Accelerator-in-Chief ()

From China Digital Space:

The concept that Xi Jinping is hastening the demise of the Chinese Communist Party by doubling down on his authoritarian rule, often referenced by the mock-title Accelerator-in-Chief. In its original sense, accelerationism holds that strengthening the growth of the techno-capitalist state, not resistance to it, will bring sweeping social change. While [the term] jiasuzhuyi is used satirically, in the West this fringe political theory has become closely tied to white supremacist groups, which hold that violence and discord will topple the current political order and pave the way for their vision of the future. [Source]

There was a brief moment on Baidu when searches for Accelerator-in-Chief returned results for Xi Jinping, but that is no longer the case. Bot accounts, the famed internet water army, have flooded Twitter with Chinese-language posts connecting accelerationism to America. These patently inorganic posts seem designed to drown out criticism of Xi in Chinese-language spaces on the global internet:

5. Guonan

Related censored terms: married ass, little dick, little dock

Guonan, a homophone for national male formed from characters that share a radical with maggot and cockroach, is a derogatory term for Chinese men. The term is used by some radical feminists to criticize what they see as pervasive chauvinism in Chinese society. A similar term exists for women in traditional heterosexual marriages: married asses. Censorship of guonan and related terms increased after Xinhuas May 31 announcement, The Three-Child Policy Is Here, which raised fears of another round of invasive government involvement in womens reproductive choices. The censorship of guonan seems mild in comparison to the mass shuttering of feminist groups and the arrest of #MeToo journalists. Even less overtly political expressions of feminism can be grounds for official censure. When the comic Yang Li posed the question, How can he look so average and still have so much confidence? she was accused of inciting gender oppositionwhich Weibo now uses as grounds for censorship.CDT was also accused of this by Global Times in December.

6. Liedownism

Related censored terms: involution, Luo Huazhong

Lying down is not acceptable, according to state media. In an effort to escape the perceived involution of Chinese society, Chinese youth are lying downmuch to the chagrin of the Chinese government. The Cyberspace Administration of China mandated that products branded with lie down, liedownism, involution and the like be removed from e-commerce sites. Yet the art of liedownism slouches on: an image of the actor Ge You reclining on a sofa has become a popular meme, even making the list of CDT Chineses Top Ten Memes of 2021.

7. Zhang Xianzhong

Related censored terms: Zhang Xianzhong, Xianzhongology, Xianzhong gist, Xianzhong, Xianzhong incident, Xianzhong behavior, everywhere Xianzhong, no different from Xianzhong

A 17th-century rebel famous for slaughter so indiscriminate that he left Sichuan depopulated centuries later is perhaps an unlikely candidate for a memenonetheless, Zhang Xianzhong has become one online. His name has become a stand-in for two unrelated topics: the mass deaths that followed Maos Great Leap Forward and other fanatical Communist policies; and those who take revenge against society by following Zhangs (likely apocryphal) injunction to Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. In a famous recent case, an impoverished man in rural Fujian murdered his wealthy neighbors, with whom he had a long-running property dispute, and then fled into the mountains. Despite his grisly crime, his plight garnered widespread sympathy, and a few even expressed admiration: If the dead and injured were from the village tyrants family, then Id admire this Ou guy for being a real man. The now-suspended WeChat account @ sought to explain the attitude underpinning the Chinese internets adoption of Zhang Xianzhong as an anti-hero: The bottom rung of society is like a stagnant pond that grows more suffocating by the day. People are on their last nerve, and theyre feeling desperate. Thats why they want someoneanyone, for whatever reasonto show up and destroy the social order, to smash everything, and to hell with the consequences, so that they can vent their outrage.

8. Zhao Wei

Related censored terms: evil-doing artist, Henry Huo, Kris Wu, Zheng Shuang, Fan Bingbing

A profound transformation is underway in Chinas entertainment industry. The government has cracked down on both celebrity behavior and fandoms. Zhao Wei was erased from the internet for reasons that remain unclearperhaps due to her connection with former Alibaba CEO Jack Ma. CDT Chinese created a chart of the most sensitive celebrities and the extent to which they are censored across Chinas largest video platforms: red=total censorship, yellow=targeted censorship, green=uncensored.

The top row lists artists (from left to right) and their reported offenses: Zhao Wei (offense unknown), Henry Hou (serial cheater), Kris Wu (rape), Zheng Shuang (surrogacy and tax evasion), Fan Bingbing (tax evasion). The left column list the various platforms (from top to bottom): iQIYI, Youku, Tencent Video, Mango TV, Migu Video, Bilibili, Douban

9. Fragile

Related censored terms: Wee Meng Chee, Kimberley Chen + Fragile, Fragile + humiliate China

It is not difficult to understand why Fragile, by Namewee (Wee Meng Chee) and Kimberly Chen, was banned in China. The lyrics mock Xi Jinping, little pinks and their love of saying your mom is dead (NMSL), the ban on Taiwanese pineapples, and all the rest. The song is so sensitive that even criticizing it brings on censorship:

Even this Weibo post calling Namewee a bastard is censored

Namewee, meanwhile, has reportedly struck it rich by selling non-fungible tokens (NFTs) tied to the song.

10. Peng Shuai

Related censored terms: Peng Shuai, ps, Eddie Peng + Shuai, Pu Shu, Vice Premier Peng, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Gaoli, Usury Zhang, Gaoli, zgl, Zhuge Liang, Kang Jie, State Council vice premier, melon, eat melon, big melon, jumbo melon, tennis, The Prime Minister and I, Diamond Cup, Yibin Guesthouse, Womens Tennis Association, WTA, tennis association + leave/stop/suspend, Womens Tableless Ping Pong Association, Steve Simon

On November 2, in a Weibo post on her personal account, Peng Shuai accused former Standing Politburo Committee member Zhang Gaoli of sexual assault. Before an hour had passed, her accusation was deleted. A scorched-earth campaign of censorship followed. Peng herself also disappeared from public view, sparking an international outcry that eventually led to her forced reappearance. The fallout inspired the Womens Tennis Association (or the Womens Tableless Ping Pong Association, as one censorship-dodging Weibo user dubbed the WTA) to suspend all future tournaments in China. The breadth and intensity of the censorship of Pengs accusation is unmatched by any other event this year.

Read more from the original source:
Sensitive Words: Top 10 Censored Terms of 2021 - China Digital Times

When Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in 2019 allowing the state to isolate the internet within Russia in the event of a security incident, international media outlets extensively covered the development, with many (incorrectly) likening it to Chinas Great Firewall. The spotlight quickly swiveled back to Beijings grip on online content and dataeven though a Kremlin campaign continues to ratchet up pressure on US technology giants, and could soon create a disruptive playbook for other states.

While Moscow made headlines after throttling Twitter and coercing Google and Apple into censoring opposition leader Alexei Navalnys election app last year, Western media coverage of internet repression and security threats still tends to focus on China. This penchant persists despite Russian developments that impinge on both the internet ecosystem and human rights in the countryand which constitute broader cyber threats and efforts to undermine the global internet.

In no small part, this pattern stems from the fact that Russian state control of the internet differs from that in China: It relies less on technical measures and more on traditional, offline mechanisms of coercion such as harassment, intimidation, and vague and inconsistently enforced speech laws. Notably, Russias domestic efforts to control the internet quite closely parallel its efforts overseas to shape information and to both weaponize the internet and undermine its global nature.

As the world watches Putins moves in and around Ukraine, these developmentswhile of course not comparable to the possibility of large-scale armed conflictare worthy of attention, given their impact on the Russian cyber and internet landscape more broadly.

The more the Kremlin cements its control over the internet, the more it can potentially suppress dissent and control information and data flows at home. And the more it slowly works on implementing the domestic internet law, the more it centralizes its control of the architecture of the internet in Russiawhich could also affect Russian cyber behavior abroad, such as by encouraging more assertive operations against global internet infrastructure. Though US policy debates often separate Russian internet governance and technology policy at home from Russian cyber behavior abroad, there is actually great interdependence and entanglement between the two.

As the Kremlin demonstrates and further develops a model of internet and information control that appeals to states without Chinas technical capacity, Moscows techniques may portend the future of internet repression elsewhere. Several recent, but largely overlooked, developments signal that the Kremlin may crack down on the internet more than ever in 2022while US tech companies and the US government increasingly have little room to push back.

Last year was a stifling one for Russian internet freedom. When citizens took to the streets to protest state corruption and the Kremlins jailing of Navalny, the government sent censorship orders to YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, VKontakte (Russias leading social network, also known as VK), and other domestic and foreign tech firms. Many caved and removed protest-related content. When Twitter refused to comply, the government leveraged newly deployed deep packet inspection capabilities to throttle it from within Russia. That was only partly successful, as many other websites were inadvertently affected by the traffic slowdown, but it still demonstrated to foreign technology firms that Moscow was expanding its censorship capabilitieswhich it also threatened to use again as desired.

The crackdowns hardly ended there. The government demanded that foreign tech companies set up local offices in Russia, and the Foreign Ministry called in the US ambassador to complain that US tech firms were not complying with the Kremlins censorship ordersdecrying the companies behavior as election interference and describing them as tools of the American state. The government blocked access to the website for TOR (short for the Onion Router), an anonymizing browser often used to bypass government restrictions when surfing the web. It also blocked access to six major virtual private network (VPN) websites, where citizens were accessing software to circumvent online censorship; set up a registry to track tech company compliance with censorship orders; blocked many other websites, including those for Navalnys campaign; and used its foreign agents designation to crack down on numerous online media.

As more and more Russians get their news from social media, and as internet mobilization and outreach become more important to protesters and opposition figures, the states crackdown on the web means citizens will have an even harder time accessing and sharing news that criticizes (or merely reflects poorly on) the Putin regime.

Several recent developmentsincluding official pressure on Google, the expansion of domestic software and a push for domestic internet, as well as local office requirements for tech firmsillustrate how both economic and security motivations drive Russias new campaign to control and shape the domestic internet environment. They also underscore just how wide-ranging this campaign is.

In September, when Apple and Google refused to delete Navalnys election app from their platforms, the Russian government threatened their employees in Russia and sent armed thugs to Googles Moscow office; both companies then removed the app. Since then, the State Duma (Russias lower house of parliament) met with Google to issue even more demands (for example, edit Google Maps in Russia to show illegally annexed Crimea as part of Russia), while a Moscow court fined it $40,400 for not removing content the Kremlin deemed illegalthen fined it a record $98.4 million for not complying with state censorship orders. Google was targeted again just last month, when another Moscow court upheld a ruling from last April that found Google-owned YouTube must restore the account for Tsargrad, the TV channel owned by sanctioned Putin ally and oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. Though unsurprising, the ruling nonetheless gives the state another reason to increase its pressure on Google.

Meanwhile, a recently published BBC analysis found that between 2011 and 2020, the Russian government had filed more than 123,000 individual requests to Google search or YouTube to delete contentmany times more than the number issued by Turkey (14,000), India (9,800), the United States (9,600), Brazil (8,000), Israel (2,000), or China (1,200). Moscow continued issuing those censorship orders in 2021, mostly focused on removing content related to Navalny. The Russian governments commitment to fining Google a percentage of its annual revenue in Russia for not removing content signals increased Kremlin frustration at Google not bending the knee and suggests the pressure will ramp up even further.

Google matters as a stand-alone issue here because YouTube is the most widely used social media platform in Russia. It also provides cloud and other services to Russian citizens, while opposition leaders have used Google services as wellsuch as when the Navalny campaign used Google Docs to share a list of opposition candidates. Moreover, how the Kremlin treats Google, and its mixed record of compliance with the Russian government, could foreshadow how the state will treat other foreign tech companies facing similar demands.

The Russian government has increasingly been pushing the development and use of domestic software. Driven by economic and security factors, Russia aims to replace Western software with its Russian versions where possible. (However, if forced to choose between those two considerations, security would likely win out: While the Russian government doesnt want to undermine the operations of Russian tech firms, the Putin regime has demonstrated increasing concern about Western espionage through Western technologies.)

Moscow has been making this push on multiple fronts. For one, it has been updating its domestic software registry, established in 2015, which lists government-approved software that state bodies and companies should use when replacing foreign software. It also implemented a law requiring that smartphones, laptops, smart TVs, and many other consumer devices sold in Russia have state-approved, Russian software preinstalled. This is primarily economically drivena way to theoretically give domestic firms a leg up against foreign software developers and big US tech companiesbut security factors (like Moscow wanting to secure backdoor access to Russian phones) may play a role as well.

The Russian government also updated its tax incentives for domestic technology production, making Russian companies with at least seven employees and 90 percent or more of their revenue from information technology (IT) eligible for reductions in their social security and corporate profit taxes. Given broader issues in Russian tech production (such as the quality of domestic hardware and the brain drain of IT talent to foreign countries), the effectiveness of this initiative seems questionable.

Overall, there has been mixed success in Moscows push to develop domestic tech. While some Russian companies have made small gains as Western technology is expelled from government and business systems, in many cases Chinese firms take slightly more market share in Russia. Chinese telecom company Huawei Technologies, for instance, has played into Kremlin fears of Western espionage to accelerate expansion in Russia.

It remains to be seen whether Russias increased use of domestic software will better protect the state against espionage or end up undermining the cybersecurity of Russian citizens and the Russian internet ecosystem.

On January 1, a new law came into effect requiring any foreign internet company with five hundred thousand daily Russian users to open an office in Russia. This is a blatant tool of coercion which fits neatly into the Russian governments internet control model. Technical measures play a part, but traditional forms of physical, offline coercionsuch as stalking and intimidation by the security services, including the Federal Security Service (or FSB, the KGBs successor) in the digital sphereare a means of scaring citizens, keeping tech firms in check, expanding surveillance, and generally controlling the shape of internet conversation.

The Kremlin demonstrated the power of this tool when it sent armed, masked thugs to Googles Moscow office: When a company has employees on the ground, those are people who can be stalked, harassed, intimidated, threatened, jailed, or even killed. As of a few months ago, Google and Apple had complied with the local-office law; other major companies with users in Russia, such as Facebook and Twitter, have not.

Russian authorities have said they will not begin fining companies immediately for noncompliance if they demonstrate they are working on setting up an office. The list of companies which are required to open offices is notable: Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, TikTok, Zoom, Pinterest, and Spotify. It will be key to watch if they complyand whether doing so would create any new legal or jurisdictional challenges amid any Kremlin censorship or data-access requests.

In December 2021, a law came into effect mandating that only Russian entities can own cross-border communications lines. While many telephone and internet cable systems in Russia are already owned by Russian entities (and, often, by state-owned firms such as Rostelecom), its unclear what this means for the undersea cables that link the Russian internet to the global internet and are owned by multiple companies, some of them foreign.

The government also set up a registry of autonomous systems (routing internet traffic) that would be critical to the operation of the planned domestic internet, as well as mandated that internet providers work on countering Kremlin-defined threats on their networks.

In short, the Russian government continued building out components of the domestic internet law this year and has slowly started centralizing control over internet infrastructure in Russia.

While its a very different internet and political environment, Western tech companies are at least generally familiar with a similar story in China: Companies wanted to enter the market and remain in the country to provide services and make moneyyet they all reached a point at which the Chinese government was cracking down harder on the internet, and at which compliance with Beijings demands was simply too much. Many US tech companies exited the market, or at least closed their local offices. The Russian government has far less technology leverage than Chinas vis--vis market size and power, as well as its chokehold on the global tech supply chain; but it has also demonstrated a considerable willingness to use outright force against foreign companies.

The Kremlins escalating pressure on Google portends a growing intolerance of Western technology companies that dont comply with its demands. Importantly, the states will and ability to crack down will not apply equally or identically to all firms. Twitter, for instance, has been resisting the Russian governments local office requirementwhich meant the Kremlin had no Twitter employees in Russia to threaten when it wanted the company to censor protest content in March 2021. Still, companies are likely to face even more Kremlin pressure in 2022, and there is increasingly little that they can do to push back.

Filing appeals in the Russian courts is not a viable option, nor is looking for market leverage to negotiate with Russian officials. The US government is likewise in a tricky position, because any efforts to support Internet freedom in Russia will only exacerbate Moscows accusations, as conspiratorial and deluded as they are, that the internet and US tech firms are tools of the CIA and American subversion. If the Russian pressure campaign on tech companies ramps up further, as appears highly likely this year, it may prompt some (especially smaller) foreign tech companies to contemplate exiting the market altogether.

Many factors will influence whether and how the Kremlin will act, including traditional political considerations. Tech-company actions or inactions that intersect with high-priority issue areas for the Russian government, such as election opposition and mass demonstrations, are likely to continue receiving Kremlin attention (and therefore more coercive force). Conversely, it remains to be seen if historically lower-priority areas, such as enforcing Russias 2015 data-localization law, will get any more buy-in amid the domestic internet push.

Website or platform popularity and the reach of particular content may also be factors in the Kremlins response. YouTube, for instance, is the most widely used social media platform in Russia (with 85.4 percent penetration versus VKs 78 percent penetration), whereas Twitter is much less popular among Russians. Even if Russian tech companies can functionally operate without YouTube in the Russian market, a severe crackdown on it would still be a serious decision given the platforms immense popularity with Russians.

Notably, this campaign marks a departure from years past, when laws were enacted (such as on encryption, source code inspections, or data localization), but not necessarily enforced with high-level political buy-in. So while the pressure now seems like a means for the Kremlin to achieve compliance with its wishes, there is no guarantee it will stop there. Companies may find themselves facing a regime willing to use these tools for outright punishment as well.

Justin Sherman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative. Follow him on Twitter: @jshermcyber

Wed, Jan 12, 2022

UkraineAlertByHarley Balzer

While Russia has attempted to reduce its dependence on the SWIFT payment system, it remains vulnerable to a sanctions cut-off in the event of a new Kremlin offensive in Putin's eight-year undeclared war against Ukraine.

Image: Russians attend a rally to protest against tightening state control over internet in Moscow, Russia, on March 10, 2019. Photo by Shamil Zhumatov/REUTERS

More here:
This year, Russia's internet crackdown will be even worse - Atlantic Council

The BBC has responded to criticism over editing some scenes of the legendary comedy show Chewin'' the Fat so that they do not offend modern audiences.

The hit BBC Scotland comedy series has been re-edited for repeat showing which are occasionally broadcast on the BBC Scotland channel.

The public broadcaster confirmed they edit every episode before they put it on the air, and this involves them removing some of the more risque sketches.

Chewin The Fat launched the careers of Ford Kiernan and Greg Hemphill who went on to write the sitcom Still Game.

Co-star Karen Dunbar discovered that the show had fallen foul of the censors while filming a new documentary on comedy in todays woke world.

She was shown how decisions were made on what to cut from the show before a repeat was broadcast last year.

Chewin The Fat started out as a radio show on BBC Radio Scotland and later ran for four series on television between 1999 and 2002, initially on BBC One Scotland. Favourites from the sketch show included the Big Man, Ronald Villiers and the woman who can smell "s***e," or a lie, from miles away.

It also featured characters such as Dunbars randy Auld Betty, the chain-smoking family who use voice boxes. It also features an infamous scene involving an female ice-cream van worker lifting her skirt up to two young boys.

Some of the material deemed unacceptable will be revealed in the documentary Karen Dunbar: The Comedy of Offence which is set to be broadcast later this year.

In the wake of the controversy, the BBC responded: The BBC regularly reviews older content to ensure it meets current audience expectations. This is part of our process when repeating archive content including comedy.

Scots comedian Leo Kearse, who appeared in the documentary, criticised the cuts and called on the BBC to stop censoring art.

"He said: "Now they're editing Chewin' The Fat - a fun, apolitical, good hearted comedy - in case it offends modern sensibilities. Would we put a mullet on the Mona Lisa or a Banksy over the Sistine Chapel?"

Ms Dunbar told the Cultural Coven podcast: The week we went down [to London for the documentary] Chewin' The Fat was going to be repeated at the weekend so they brought up sketches and they were asking me if I thought it was going to be kept or cancelled.

The BBC review every repeat that goes out and will take out the bits that arent acceptable today. The result of that was Chewin The Fat went out on the Saturday but it went out with bits taken out of it that would have been in the original 20 years before it.

Series three and four of Chewin' the Fat plus highlights from the first two series have been broadcast across the UK. The show has been regularly repeated on the BBC Scotland channel since it launched in 2019.

Last year, Mr Kiernan said that he did not think Chewin' The Fat would be made today because it would be deemed too offensive. He said: The likes of Karen pulling her skirt up I dont think you could do. We did get letters at the time and somebody wrote in and said As funny as the nation thought that sketch was, would that sketch work if it was two wee lassies at the van and it was a man? Me and Greg went No it wouldnt be as funny. So the point was made, Dont write any more sketches like that so we didnt. Another thing is dirty Auld Betty. You couldnt have her on the telly now.

Last year censors slapped an offensiveness warning on classic 'Allo 'Allo episodes in case viewers are upset by characters taking the rise out of French and German accents.

The BBC comedy, which ran from 1982 to 1992, coined a multitude of catchphrases that proved popular for decades.

The BBC have also attached an 'offensive language' warning on iPlayer episodes of classic prison sitcom Porridge.

Follow this link:
'Gonnae no dae that': 'Woke' BBC responds to criticism for censoring Chewin' The Fat - HeraldScotland