Monthly Archives: July 2017

As part of the National Constitution CentersInteractive Constitution project, leading scholars across the legal and philosophical spectrum find common ground on the Constitutions articles, amendments and provisions. In this essay, Brian C. KaltandDavid Pozen look at how the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to answer questions raised by the original Constitutions treatment of presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and presidential disability.

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to answer a series of questions raised by the original Constitutions treatment of presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and presidential disability.

First, what happens when a presidential vacancy arises? Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states that in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President. The line of succession from President to Vice President is clear, but what exactly devolves on the Vice President? Is it the office of President or just its powers and duties? When President William Henry Harrison died in 1841, Vice President John Tyler forcefully asserted that he had become President. Although Congress accepted this result, some disputed Tylers reading of the Presidential Succession Clause.

Second, what should happen when a vice-presidential vacancy arises? The original Constitution did not provide for filling such a vacancy. Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, one Vice President resigned, seven died in office, and eight took over for Presidents who died in office: all in all, the vice presidency was unoccupied more than 20 percent of the time. This was less of a problem when the office was held in low regard, which it mostly was until the mid-twentieth century. But as the vice presidency began to grow into its modern forma sort of deputy presidencyit became more worrisome for the office to be vacant. These worries were sharpened by Congresss design of the 1947 Presidential Succession Act, which places the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate immediately behind the Vice President in line for the presidency, even when they do not belong to the Presidents political party.

Third, what happens if the President becomes unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office? Several Presidents suffered debilitating illnesses and injuries. For weeks and months at a time, the country was left without effective or accountable presidential leadership. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 provided for the Vice President to step in when the President had an inability to discharge [his] powers and duties, but it provided no decision-maker, no procedures, and no definition of inability. Nor did it make clear whether the Vice President would act as President only until the President recovered, or instead would become President for the duration of the term. No Vice President wanted to seem like a usurper. In practice, power was never transferred and presidential inner circles typically concealed the Presidents condition. This pattern came to be seen as increasingly irresponsible with the advent of nuclear weapons during the Cold War; the nation needed a fully functioning presidency at all times. In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to break the pattern by being more open about his health and by entering into an agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon that provided for Nixon to serve as Acting President in the event of presidential inability.

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 brought renewed attention to these questions. Led by Senator Birch Bayh, Congress gave them focused consideration and, in July of 1965, sent the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the states for ratification. Less than two years later, the necessary thirty-eighth state legislature ratified it.

In response to the first question, regarding presidential vacancies, Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment formalizes the Tyler precedent. It confirms that when the President is removed from office, dies, or resigns, the Vice President becomes President. When President Nixon resigned in 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford became President under Section 1.

In response to the second question, regarding vice-presidential vacancies, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment requires the President to nominate a replacement Vice President when that office becomes vacant, subject to confirmation by a majority of both the House and Senate. In 1973, Gerald Ford became Vice President through Section 2 after Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned. When Ford took over the presidency the following year, he promptly invoked Section 2 to nominate Nelson Rockefeller to fill the resulting vice-presidential vacancy.

In response to the third question, regarding presidential inability, Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment establish two procedures for transferring authority to the Vice President as Acting President. Building on the Eisenhower-Nixon precedent, Section 3 allows the President to transfer authority temporarily, by submitting a written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. The President can reclaim those powers and duties later by submitting a second declaration to the contrary. President Ronald Reagan (once) and President George W. Bush (twice) transferred authority to their Vice Presidents under Section 3 for a matter of hours while they underwent planned surgeries.

Section 4 addresses the dramatic case of a President who may be unable to fulfill his constitutional role but who cannot or will not step aside. It provides both a decision-maker and a procedure. The initial deciding group is the Vice President and a majority of either the Cabinet or some other body that Congress may designate (though Congress has never done so). If this group declares a President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President immediately becomes Acting President. If and when the President pronounces himself able, the deciding group has four days to disagree. If it does not, the President retakes his powers. But if it does, the Vice President keeps control while Congress quickly meets and makes a decision. The voting rule in these contested cases favors the President; the Vice President continues acting as President only if two-thirds majorities of both chambers agree that the President is unable to serve.

Section 3 and (especially) Section 4 are long and complicated by constitutional standards. Nevertheless, they leave a number of issues unsettledmost significantly, what counts as presidential inability. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, delegate John Dickinson asked, What is the extent of the term disability in the proposed presidential succession clause, and who is to be the judge of it? No response is recorded. By giving the President, Vice President, and Congress important and distinct roles, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment went a long way toward answering the second part of Dickinsons question, rather than try to resolve the first part.

Brian C. Kalt is Professor of Law and The Harold Norris Faculty Scholar at Michigan State University College Of Law. David Pozen is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.

For further discussion between Kaltand Pozenon the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, read the following Matters Of Debate:

The Unusual, Imperfect, Excellent Twenty-Fifth Amendment By Brian C. Kalt

The Deceptively Clear Twenty-Fifth Amendment By David Pozen

Filed Under: 25th Amendment

Here is the original post:
Interactive Constitution: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment - Constitution Daily (blog)

The Second Circuit yesterday became the first court of appeals to address a criminal appeal regarding the governments investigation into the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Its decision in United States v. Allen reversed the convictions of two former Rabobank employees accused of using their roles in the banks LIBOR submission process to rig the global interest benchmark, and not only reversed the convictions but dismissed the operative grand jury indictment. The court concluded that the government had improperly used the defendants compelled testimony against them, holding that the Fifth Amendments prohibition on the use of compelled testimony applies even when the testimony was compelled by a foreign sovereign. The decision may well have a significant impact on the increasing number of extra-territorial investigations conducted by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), in which it partners with foreign agencies to investigate and prosecute cross-border activity.

The pair Anthony Allen and Anthony Conti were initially investigated by the United Kingdoms Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). During the investigation Allen, Conti, and other Rabobank employees were interviewed by the FCA; Allens and Contis interviews were compelled by threat of imprisonment, though they were granted direct use immunity. The FCA later brought an enforcement action against one of their co-workers, Paul Robson, disclosing relevant evidence against him, including Allens and Contis compelled testimony. During this exchange, Robson reviewed the materials over the course of two or three successive or nearly successive days, admitting to having underlined, annotated, and circled certain passages of both Allens and Contis testimony. But, in short order, the FCA then dropped the case and the DOJ stepped in.

A grand jury returned indictments against Allen and Conti in 2014, charging both with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, and several counts of wire fraud. Robson was the sole source of certain material information for the indictment, including the source of testimony provided by FBI agent to the grand jury that Allen and Conti had participated in rigging LIBOR.

Before trial, the defendants moved under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), to dismiss the indictment or suppress Robsons testimony. The Supreme Courts decision in Kastigar held that the government may compel testimony from witnesses, in spite of their invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, where it confers immunity from use of that testimony and evidence derived therefrom in a subsequent criminal case. The upshot is that the government must show in cases where such testimony is at issue that its proof rests on evidence other than the compelled statements and the fruits thereof. The district court in this case resolved that it would instead address any Kastigar concerns i.e., issues regarding the use of compelled testimony under Fifth Amendments Self-Incrimination Clause at trial.

The pair were convicted. After a post-trial Kastigar hearing, the district court held that Robsons reading, marking up, and annotating the compelled testimony, and the fact that material parts of the FBI agents grand jury hearsay testimony had been derived solely from Robson, were not enough to taint the evidence Robson provided because the government had shown an independent source for such evidence, to wit, [Robsons] personal experience.

The Second Circuit disagreed. It held first that the Fifth Amendments prohibition on government use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies, even when a foreign sovereign is the actor that compelled the testimony, noting that Amendment protects against the use and derivative use of compelled testimony against an accused in such a proceeding.

Second, it held that when the government attempts to use a witness like Robson, who has been substantially exposed to a defendants compelled testimony, it is the governments burden under Kastigar to show, at a minimum, that the witnesss review of the compelled testimony did not shape, alter, or affect the evidence used by the government.

It third held that a witnesss bare, generalized incantations that reviewing those materials did not taint his or her testimony (as was the case here via leading questions of Robson at the Kastigar hearing, which produced nothing more than bare, self-serving denials from Robson) are insufficient to meet this burden of proof.

And it lastly it had no trouble concluding that introducing testimony provided by Robson a key cooperator and prominent witness before the trial and grand jury (via a hearsay presentation) was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Robsons had been the only testimony refuting Allens and Contis central argument that they had not actually engaged in rigging the LIBOR benchmark. This finding as to testimony both at trial and before the grand jury resulted in the dismissal of the indictments against Allen and Conti.

The Court rejected the governments counterarguments, including that prohibiting the use in United States Courts of testimony compelled by a foreign authority could seriously hamper the prosecution of criminal conduct that crosses international borders, by among other things, inadvertently or negligently obstructing federal prosecutions. The court noted that this risk already exists within our own constitutional structure, and that the practical outcome of our holding today is that the risk of error in coordination falls on the U.S. Government (should it seek to prosecute foreign individuals), rather than on the subjects and targets of cross-border investigations.

Read the rest here:
Fifth Amendment Concerns Result in Overturned Convictions in First Criminal LIBOR Appeal - Lexology (registration)

Originally published on Just Security.

Over the weekend, one of President Donald Trumps personal lawyers, Jay Sekulow, refused to rule out the possibility that the president would pardon his associates, or even himself, in the Russia investigation. SekulowtoldABCsThis Week: He can pardon individuals, of course. Thats because the founders of our country put that in the United States Constitution: the power to pardon. But I have not had those conversations, so I couldnt speculate on that.

The issue of whether Trump could use his pardon power returns us to thedebateover whether a sitting president may be indicted or whether the Constitution requires impeachment and removal prior to indictment. Assomehave noted, that is almost a purely academic question because it is highly unlikely that Special Counsel Robert Mueller would indict Trump while still in office. In any event, there is the potential for post-presidency criminal exposure. In addition, Trumps family members and close associates could also be under investigation. This means Trump could be tempted to insulate them by granting pardons before theyre convicted of anything.

Presidents tend to save their most controversial grants of clemency for the end of their term in order to avoid the ensuing political firestorm while in office. But a Russia-related pardon would be particularly incendiary politically. That may not mean much to Trump given that a defining element of his rise has been his willingness to disregard longstanding norms and upend convention. He has mocked the disabled, attacked a Gold Star family, joked about sexual assault, savaged the free press, and fired the FBI director investigating Russian interference.

Aside from the political dynamics, granting a pardon in the context of the Russia investigation also raises fundamental questions of constitutional law.

Presidential pardon power derives from a specific grant in theConstitution. Article II, Section 2 vests the president with the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The Presidents pardon power is limited to federal offenses, which include federal prosecutions in U.S. territories like the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Clemency requests, which include both requests for a pardon and requests that a sentence be commuted, typically flow through the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice (see the Justice DepartmentsFAQs). The Justice Department evaluates clemency requests pursuant tostandardsset forth in the U.S. Attorneys Manual. However, the president may bypass that process given that it is a power expressly reserved for the president.

A president can prospectively pardon individuals for crimes that have occurred but have not been charged. In the most famous example, President Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon even though he was not under indictment. President Fordsproclamationincluded a full, free and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during his presidency. Similarly, President George H.W. Bush issued full pardons to six people implicated in the Iran-Contra Affair,some of whom still faced trial.

The Nixon pardon was a political disaster that ended Fords presidential honeymoon, but it also sparked a debate among legal commentators about whether it was constitutional. Mark Rozell gives a brief and interestingtreatmentof the debate. Some argued it was beyond the power of the president to relieve a person of criminal liability for hypothetical offenses (see Edwin Brown Firmage and R. Collin Magnumhere). However most sources suggest a prospective pardon is within the presidents constitutional authority. InEx Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1867), the Supreme Court described the power in broad temporal terms:

The [pardon] power extends to every offense known to the law, andmay be exercised at any time after its commission, eitherbefore legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. (emphasis added).

A 1995 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinionnotesthat presidents throughout U.S. history have asserted the power to issue pardons prior to conviction, and the consistent view of the Attorneys General has been that such pardons have as full an effect as pardons issued after conviction. It cites an Attorney General opinion from the 1850s, which defends the presidents preemptive power on the grounds that the act of clemency and grace is applied to the crime itself, not to the mere formal proof of the crime. Members of Congress have occasionally contemplated a constitutional amendment to preclude a future pardon like Nixon received, which itself suggests Congress acquiesces to the Executive Branchs view. Most legal authorities indicate President Trump has the power to grant prospective pardons for criminal acts not subject to formal charge.

Three days before Nixon resigned, OLC issued anopinionthat [u]nder the fundamental rule that no one may be a judge in his own case, the President cannot pardon himself. Most legal experts supported that view, although the arguments as to why vary from natural law (first principles such as no man can be a judge in his own case) to constitutional structure (a self-pardon would defeat the purposes of Article I, Section 4, which expressly allows officeholders removed by impeachment to be subject to criminal prosecution). A handful of Republican members of Congress cited the possibility of self-pardon as a justification for their votes to impeach President Bill Clinton, which is discussed in the introduction to this Oklahoma Law Reviewarticle. While some doubt remains about whether the president has the authority to pardon himself, a self-pardon is most likely legally ineffective from shielding a president from future federal prosecution.

In its Watergate opinion, OLC also suggested that the president could invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to allow the vice president, in his role as acting president, to pardon the president. If the President declared that he was temporarily unable to perform the duties of his office, the Vice President would become Acting President and as such he could pardon the President. Thereafter the President could either resign or resume the duties of his office, the opinion stated. However, if the president and vice president conspired to launder away the presidents criminal liability, it would trigger a seismic political event. It would also tarnish the vice presidents standing as a politically viable successor in the event of impeachment. However, I have not yet seen a legal obstacle to that kind of scheme.

As for the special counsel, a prospective pardon would have a narrowing effect on his authority, as it would end any criminal jeopardy arising from his investigation. However, provided there are still active leads and targets, the special counsel mandate would continue. It would raise interesting legal questions. For example, a pardoned individual could still potentially serve as an unindicted coconspirator, which triggers benefits to a prosecution such as a hearsayexceptionfor co-conspirator statements.

Congressional investigations serve legislative policy and oversight goals rather than criminal enforcement goals, so a pardon does not end an Article I inquiry. But there could be other counterintuitive effects of a pardon on the ongoing congressional investigations into Russias interference in the 2016 election and whether there was any coordination with the Trump campaign. For example, it could potentially remove federal legal jeopardy in a manner that may defeat an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Were Trump to pardon his former national security adviser, Michael Flynn, tomorrow, Congress might be able to get a court order requiring Flynn to testify before the committees because he no longer faces federal criminal prosecution. That court order or resulting congressional contempt finding, in turn, could theoretically be enforced by coercive contempt (i.e., jailing until such time as the witness provides ordered testimony). Because coercion serves process integrity goals rather than criminal goals, that enforcement power probably could not be defeated by another presidential pardon.

The criminal and congressional Russian investigations should proceed with integrity and without interference. With Trump at the helm and his family under scrutiny, pardon power hangs over the investigations like a sword of Damocles. The pardon sword is largely held overhead by a thread made of political, rather than legal, fiber.

Read more:
Are There Limits To Trump's Pardon Power? - HuffPost