Monthly Archives: July 2017

The much-discussed requirement that NATO members spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense is a crude measure, often misunderstood or criticized. But there are clear benefits to such a benchmark. It focuses attention on the need for adequate military spending especially important in democracies, where votes are typically to be found in tax cuts and social care, not tanks and soldiers pensions. It is a tool that builds unity, enhances NATOs capacity to act, including in humanitarian operations abroad, and is a deterrent, offering no encouragement to adventurism from Moscow or anywhere else.

But all tools can get rusty or outdated, and the existing 2 percent benchmark is a perfect example. Now that war is as much about hacking, subversion, espionage, and fake news as it is about tanks, the West needs a minimal baseline requirement for spending on hybrid defense: police services, counterintelligence services, and the like.

Much of this may sound as if it shouldnt be NATOs business; this is a military alliance, after all, and it should be no more responsible for parachuting forensic accountants in to check whether British banks are laundering dirty Russian cash than it should be hunting spies in the Balkans. But it should matter just as much to members of the alliance when their fellow members underspend on hybrid defense measures as it does when they underspend on the military. Given that NATO now recognizes cyberattacks as possible grounds for invoking Article 5, the alliances mutual defense clause, weak national cyberdefenses are a potential invitation to a wider conflict. More broadly, a failure to address nonkinetic defense undermines the solidarity and common confidence building at NATOs heart.

After all, NATO membership is a powerful but only partial guarantee. Take Montenegro for example (which spends about 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense). The latest country to join the NATO club, the tiny Balkan nation was welcomed under the alliance umbrella in early June, as part of an effort to push for further integration with the West and to secure greater NATO commitment to the Balkan region. Montenegro is now likely safe from overt Russian military action, but what about covert measures? Shortly after joining, the country came under serious cyberattack likely as a consequence of its new membership. The attacks came a few months after 20 Montenegrins and Serbians were arrested and, along with two Russians, charged with planning a coup. Montenegro claimed Moscow was behind the operation, and Russias ritual denials lacked conviction.

Had the coup succeeded, it would have left NATOs newest member in severe disarray, vulnerable to further political subversion. It would have been an ominous warning to the rest of the Balkans: Mess with Moscow, put your faith in the West, and who knows what kind of underhanded dangers youll face. And had Montenegro successfully been destabilized, the chaos likely would have encouraged yet more aggressive Russian adventurism and not just in the Balkans.

With the West, and Europe especially, engaged like it or not in a political war, we ought to pay as much attention to ensuring common minimal standards of hybrid defense as we do to outright military spending. My own preliminary investigation with an assist from Jakub Maco, a research assistant at the Institute of International Relations Prague indicates that spending on the sorts of things that constitute hybrid defense indeed varies widely across the alliance.

Graphic by C.K. Hickey.GDP figures are from Eurostat for 2016. Police figures are from Eurostat (2015) except for Albania, Spain and Turkey. Intelligence budget figures are from various sources, but comparable ones for Greece, Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg were not available. New member Montenegro was not included.

Policing, for example, contributes directly to hybrid security. Not only is organized crime sometimes an instrument of Russian covert activity, but a sense of public insecurity can be mobilized by malign propaganda to generate social tensions and support divisive extremist political agendas. A capable, well-trained, and resourced police force also provides the state with more scalable responses in times of crisis. Deploying soldiers against rioters, for example, is not just bad optics; it increases the risk of escalation. Yet the available data suggest that some countries take adequate funding for policing more seriously than others. While allowing for some discrepancies in the quality of this early and still partial information police spending is often hard to compare across countries because of the variety of local and national forces we still found significant variation. Police spending averages 0.93 percent of GDP, with ranges from Bulgarias and Greeces 1.4 percent to the 0.5 percent of Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Spain.

Security and counterintelligence services are also a critical aspect of hybrid defense. They are necessary to help monitor and close down foreign espionage and subversion operations and the secret black account funding used to support destabilizing groups and activities. When comparing spending here, the quality of data is again worth noting: Frances anomalously low security service figure and Romanias unexpectedly high one are likely artifacts of inconsistent definitions of what qualifies as a security agency. But its possible to draw a broad conclusion namely that such spending varies enormously across the continent. Counterintelligence and security spending among European countries averages 0.07 percent of GDP but (absent France and Romania) ranges from the United Kingdoms 0.15 percent down to Belgiums 0.01 percent. These disparities risk creating vulnerabilities for everyone. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the Czech Republic (below average on counterintelligence spending) is a hub for Russian intelligence operations across Central Europe and NATO, and the EU headquarters in Belgium (lower yet) is a playground for Moscows spooks. One can certainly question the details here. This was a quick-and-dirty exploratory exercise, aimed less at providing answers than investigating whether there might be grounds for future, more serious analysis. But, nonetheless, it throws up interesting evidence of European priorities and concerns. Countries such as Bulgaria and Estonia, for example, which acknowledge a serious and sustained effort by Moscow to penetrate and subvert them, have above-average counterintelligence spending to match. However, others appear to be neglecting this element of their security, focusing perhaps too much on policing, the regular military, or neither.

Simply having a common benchmark for hybrid defense will inevitably improve the quality of the data. It will also force European countries to do something new to most of them: to consider the whole gamut of nonkinetic defensive measures available, from counterintelligence to media awareness, as part of a single, unified security concept.

So it is time to have this conversation. Nonkinetic security spending, just like defense budgets, buys protection on a variety of levels. It blocks malign foreign activities, provides wider ranges of capability and response, and acts as a deterrent. In an age of hybrid war, minimum common standards of hybrid defense are a must.

Photo credit:Getty Images/Foreign Policy illustration

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Trump Was Right: NATO Is Obsolete - Foreign Policy (blog)

NATOs political intent in the North Atlantic was clearly spelled out in the communiqu of the alliances July 2016 summit in Warsaw: In the North Atlantic, as elsewhere, the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory. We will further strengthen our maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness.

Now is the time to translate that intent into tangible action. The North Atlantic Ocean, a top strategic priority for NATO and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, has not been a major strategic concern for the alliance in the past two decades. But today, as Russia builds up its maritime capabilities and increases its naval activities in the area, there are reasons for NATO allies to be concerned. The alliance should take concrete and visible steps to enhance its focus on, and presence in, the North Atlantic.

For the Russians, the North Atlantic hasnt gone off the radar screen. Quite the contrary. Russias development of high-end maritime capabilities and its increased presence in the North Atlantic are reflections of the vital importance of this region for the Kremlin.

Russias 2014 military doctrine and 2015 maritime doctrine identified the North Atlantic and Arctic regions as being of prime interest, for two military-strategic reasons. The first is to protect Russias nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea. To do so, Moscow is keen to exert control over and deny access to its Northern flankfrom both the North Atlantic and the North Pacific into the Arctic.

The second reason is to project power and fulfill Moscows global ambitions. The North Atlantic is Russias main maritime gateway to the rest of the worldnot least to the Mediterranean Sea, where in November 2016 Russia demonstratively sailed its aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, which had come all the way from Severomorsk in the Arctic.

Acknowledging the importance Russia attaches to the North Atlantic, and in light of the growing Russian naval posture in the region, the NATO allies are paying greater attention to current and potential future security developments in this maritime space. In recent years, Russia has demonstrated that it has the maritime capabilitiesnuclear, conventional, and nonconventional, including hybridto probe the allies and even challenge NATOs control of the high seas in the North Atlantic. Russian submarines operating close to the UKs submarine base in Scotland in early 2015 and skirting close to vital undersea communications cables are just some examples of Russias more assertive moves in this space.

Looking ahead, Russia may well be in a position where it could, in times of crisis, disrupt critical allied sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic that are needed to deploy and reinforce U.S. forces and supplies in Europe. The credibility of NATOs collective defense and Europes overall stability are at stake.

With this in mind, there are three important steps that the alliance could take to start restoring NATOs presence in the North Atlantic.

To begin with, NATO should conduct an ongoing political-military assessment of the maritime security dynamics in the North Atlantic. This assessment could be an opportunity to bring NATO partner countries Finland and Sweden, as well as the EU, to the table. A more inclusive discussion would help all stakeholders gain better maritime situational awareness in an area of common concern.

Second, allies should ensure that NATOs deterrence and defense posture, including its maritime posture, is adequately strengthened in the North, alongside the East and the South. In recent years, the alliance has largely focused on the Baltic and Black Sea regions, as well as on the Mediterranean. The North Atlanticthe backbone of transatlantic relationsequally deserves to be in the limelight. At the same time as NATO seeks to strengthen its maritime deterrence and defense posture, the alliance could extend its current dialogue with Russia on transparency and risk reduction in the maritime domain to the North Atlantic.

Third, NATO should recognize more visibly that its effectiveness as an alliance depends as much on maritime power as on land and air power. Over the years, NATOs maritime missions have received insufficient attention, and its maritime capabilities have shrunk. It is time to reverse this trend. Aside from updating the alliances maritime strategy (the latest version of which dates from 2011) and beefing up NATOs Maritime Command in Northwood, UK, as several experts have recently argued, the alliance needs a group of allies to lead a maritime initiative and a high-level champion of maritime issues embedded in NATOs headquarters in Brussels. Without a maritime push at a high political level, there is less chance for a discussion on maritime questions to go beyond the immediate operational approach that the alliance has taken in recent years.

All of the above is not to say that NATO is unprepared for potential military challenges at sea in the North Atlantic. Much work is already under way when it comes to strengthening NATOs deterrence and defense posture. Importantly, several NATO allies have the required capabilities, which could be used today, to deal with a resurgent Russia in this space. NATO allied military exercises in the area are another demonstration of NATOs preparedness. Trident Juncture, NATOs largest military exercise, which will be held in Norway in 2018, is a welcome opportunity to get all allied militaries to look North.

Threats in the North may be considered less imminent, but some are critical for the alliance and require NATO and allies to act now. In the words of former NATO supreme allied commander for Europe U.S. General Philip Breedlove, NATO must put the North Atlantic back on its agenda.

Claire Craanen works in the Strategic Analysis Capability at NATO Headquarters and is the secretary general of Women in International Security (WIIS) Brussels. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of NATO.

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Putting the North Atlantic Back on NATO's Agenda - Carnegie Europe

BERLIN (Reuters) - U.S. allies in eastern Europe and Ukraine are worried that Russia's planned war games in September could be a "Trojan horse" aimed at leaving behind military equipment brought into Belarus, the U.S. Army's top general in Europe said on Thursday.

Russia has sought to reassure NATO that the military exercises will respect international limits on size, but NATO and U.S. official remain wary about their scale and scope.

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who heads U.S. Army forces in Europe, told Reuters in an interview that allied officials would keep a close eye on military equipment brought in to Belarus for the Zapad 2017 exercise, and whether it was removed later.

"People are worried, this is a Trojan horse. They say, 'We're just doing an exercise,' and then all of a sudden they've moved all these people and capabilities somewhere," he said.

Hodges said he had no indications that Russia had any such plans, but said greater openness by Moscow about the extent of its war games would help reassure countries in eastern Europe.

A senior Russian diplomat strongly rejected allegations that Moscow could leave military equipment in Belarus.

"This artificial buffoonery over the routine Zapad-2017 exercises is aimed at justifying the sharp intensification of the NATO bloc (activities) along the perimeter of Russian territory," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin told the Interfax news agency on Friday.

NATO allies are nervous because previous large-scale Russian exercises employed special forces training, longer-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Such tactics were later used in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine and in its intervention in Syria, NATO diplomats say.

Hodges said the United States and its allies had been very open about a number of military exercises taking place across eastern Europe this summer involving up to 40,000 troops, but it remained unclear if Moscow would adhere to a Cold War-era treaty known as the Vienna document, which requires observers for large-scale exercises involving more than 13,000 troops.

Some NATO allies believe the Russian exercise could number more than 100,000 troops and involve nuclear weapons training, the biggest such exercise since 2013.

Russia has said it would invite observers if the exercise exceeded 13,000 forces.

Hodges said NATO would maintain normal rotations during the Russian war game, while carrying out previously scheduled exercises in Sweden, Poland and Ukraine.

The only additional action planned during that period was a six-week deployment of three companies of 120 paratroopers each to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for "low-level" exercises, Hodges said.

"We want to avoid anything that looks like a provocation. This is not going to be the 'Sharks' and the 'Jets' out on the streets," Hodges said in a reference to the gang fights shown in the 1961 film "West Side Story" set in New York City.

Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Additional reporting by Dmitry Solovyov in Moscow; Editing by Hugh Lawson

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US general says allies worry Russian war game may be 'Trojan horse' - Reuters