Daily Archives: July 28, 2017

On July 19, 2017, the Second Circuit vacated the convictions and dismissed the indictments of two individuals accused of playing a role in the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). United States v. Allen, No. 16-898-cr, Slip Op. at 3 (2d Cir. July 19, 2017). The ruling was based on the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which provides that [n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. US Const. amend. V. The Second Circuits decision clarifies that this protection against self-incrimination is an absolute trial right that applies to all criminal defendants in US courts (including non-citizens) and to all compelled testimony (including testimony given during a foreign governments investigation). United States v. Allen, No. 16-898-cr, Slip Op. at 55. The courts clarification of the Fifth Amendments scope has important implications for US antitrust enforcers prosecuting international cartels and for individuals ensnared in cross-border criminal investigations alike.

The charges against the defendants in United States v. Allen stemmed from government investigations by the United States, the United Kingdom and others, concerning allegations that several banks had manipulated the LIBOR, a benchmark interest rate for short-term inter-bank loans that is also used as a reference rate for a variety of globally traded financial instruments. The defendants were initially investigated by the United Kingdoms Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and made self-incriminating statements during compulsory interviews with FCA officials. The FCA provided transcripts of defendants compelled testimony to a third individual under investigation, Paul Robson, who reviewed the transcripts in detail. For reasons unknown, the FCA then dropped the charges against Robson, and his case was picked up by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). Robson pleaded guilty and then cooperated with the DOJ by providing information about the defendants that led to their indictment and by testifying against them at trial.

On appeal, the Second Circuit threw out both defendants convictions and dismissed their indictments, holding that the Fifth Amendments prohibition on the use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies even when a foreign sovereign has compelled the testimony. Slip Op. at 80. The Fifth Amendments protection against self-incrimination is an absolute trial right that applies in any American criminal proceeding, and so the defendants status as non-citizens did not alter the courts analysis. Id. at 37-38. In short, the court explained, compelled testimony cannot be used to secure a conviction in an American court. This is so even when the testimony was compelled by a foreign government in full accordance with its own law. Id. at 38.

Cross-border government investigations into price-fixing and other matters of international scope are becoming increasingly common, and United States v. Allen serves as an important reminder that many jurisdictions outside the United States do not have the procedural safeguards in place that the United States Constitution demands. A foreign investigation that does not satisfy these safeguards may produce evidence that does not hold up in court. Where criminal proceedings have a foreign origin, discovery should be taken to reveal potential evidentiary shortcomings, such as witnesses who are tainted by exposure to compelled testimony. Consideration should also be given to the effect of such shortcomings, if any, in potential follow-on civil suits, where standards can be less demanding.

2017 McDermott Will & Emery

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Second Circuit Clarifies Fifth Amendment Law, with Implications for US Prosecution of International Cartels - The National Law Review

This article first appeared on the Just Security site.

It emerged late last week that President Trump has reportedly queried his lawyers regarding the nature and scope of his authority to pardon individuals including himself.

Over the weekend, Trump tweeted a nothing to see here message while asserting his pardon power was complete, presumably meaning absolute.

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While not limitless, the authority of the President to pardon is undeniably substantial. The President cannot pardon for prospective crimes or violations of state criminal law. There is a strong argument that he cannot pardon himself and certainly cannot insulate himself or others from the conviction of impeachment, as expressly stated in the Constitution.

But other than these and perhaps other narrow limitations, a Presidents pardon powers is vast. Indeed, the Presidents power to pardon others including his family members for past federal crimes, even without evidence of specific criminal investigation or prosecution, is arguably plenary in nature.

Not surprisingly in the context of the investigation into Russian interference in our election, Trumps reported interest in pardons has generated an avalanche of commentary exploring the legal limits of presidential pardon authority.

Donald Trump walks along the West Wing colonnade with his daughter Ivanka Trump and his son-in-law and Senior Advisor to the President for Strategic Planning Jared Kushner, March 17, 2017 in Washington, DC. Chip Somodevilla/Getty

Less attention, however, has been paid to why President Trump has not exercised his pardon authority yet, especially with so many of his confidants caught in a web of a criminal inquiry. This is the issue I focus on here.

Some may argue that if Trump were to pardon close confidants say his campaign manager Paul Manafort, the Trump-identified foreign policy advisor Carter Page, Senior Advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner or his National Security Advisor Michael Flynn the optics would be undesirable and the political fallout substantial.

This is undoubtedly true, President Gerald Ford arguably never recovered politically from the pardoning of President Richard Nixon. But given Trumps record, I am highly skeptical that these political concerns are a sufficient deterrent to exercise his authority.

Unpleasant optics because of his flagrant norm violations thus far have hardly served as significant inhibitions for this President.

He did not release his tax returns as every president has for half a century. He ignored anti-nepotism laws. He discussed on the campaign trail imprisoning his political opponent. He ignores the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.

The norm transgressions are so substantial that t he Just Security site has a section dedicated to it. There is an outcry. But that outcry and the optics simply do not seem to bother this President or his most ardent supporters. Nor do they seem sufficient to alienate him from almost all of the elected Republicans in Congress, at least so far.

It must be something else. Most likely the President has been informed of one important fact about his pardon power, anyone he pardons is no longer under criminal jeopardy for federal crimes and, accordingly, Fifth Amendment protection for self-incrimination evaporates.

Manafort, Page, Kushner, and Flynn at this point pre-pardon need not answer any questions from Robert Mueller, Congress or anybody. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Once pardoned, however, there is no legal jeopardy for past federal crimes. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment can no longer be a shield and permit Trumps pardoned associates from refusing to answer questions under penalty of perjury.

This creates a paradox for President Trump. When he pardons an individual, they are free from possible prosecution but they are also uncloaked of their most robust constitutional protection.

This may well be why President Trump has not pardoned Flynn, for example. Given the reported substantial contacts between Flynn and Russian government emissaries, given Flynns patent falsities including on federal forms completed under penalty of perjury, Flynns only protection presently from being compelled to testify including possibly against the President and others is the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause.

Imagine if that was no longer a shield. Grand Jury, FBI Agents, Congress all could drill Flynn under oath. Any material prevarication would be punishable as perjury. At that point Flynns personal interest will be to tell the truth, even if that truth incriminates the President who fired him.

So the pardon of presidential associates is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, he will ensure they are not prosecuted if they committed crimes in furtherance of the Presidents interest. On the other, once pardoned, the interest of the pardoned associates likely diverges from the President.

If crimes were committed that implicate the President and his family and I do not believe we have sufficient evidence to answer that conclusively at this time prior to being pardoned, a Trump associate is 100 percent within their rights to simply say nothing. But not afterwards.

One caveat worth noting is that because the Presidents pardon power is limited to federal crimes, the Fifth Amendment may offer protection if the pardoned individual is still under jeopardy for state crimes.

However, I do not see this as a substantial issue at this point because in the main, the possible criminal liability of which we are presently aware in the Russia probe seem distinctly federal in nature, e.g., the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, failure to complete federal disclosure forms truthfully, false statements to the FBI, or obstruction of justice in a federal case, for example.

It is true that we cannot be certain where the investigation will go and it could probe violations of state law. This seems most likely with financial crimes. Money laundering, for example, is illegal both under federal law and New York state law (the most likely state jurisdiction relevant here). And in such fairly circumscribed cases, the pardoned individual would still enjoy Fifth Amendment protection in discussing facts of relevance to those cases.

But I dont think this wrinkle should distract from the main point: The Presidents exercise of his pardon power is not a panacea. There are political costs to be sure. Many will ask, why do you need a pardon if no crime was committed similar to how President Trump discussed a grant of immunity: If youre not guilty of a crime, what do you need immunity for?

It will thereafter be a political cudgel and add to the narrative of a President hell-bent on covering up crimes he committed or that others committed on his behalf.

He fires Comey because of the Russia probe as President Trump himself made clear in the Lester Holt interview. He has confirmed his upset with Sessions because his recusal self-neutered the Attorney Generals ability to defend the President. He attacks Mueller in an attempt to discredit any future findings of wrongdoing. And if he pardons, the story will surely and understandably be that it is another attempt to evade accountability.

These political restraints, as in so many other areas, will not be sufficient to deter this President. However, the realization that anyone he pardons, unless also under jeopardy of state law prosecution, has lost the right against self-incrimination and can be compelled to testify truthfully under pain of contempt and perjury, may well explain this Presidents failure to pardon anyone thus far and may prove a continuing reason not to pardon associates in the future.

In this way, if the President exercises his pardon power down the road, it may signal a certain desperation. It may mean that the investigation is getting close. It will mean he has calculated that whatever the pardoned individual is compelled to testify under oath is less damaging to him and his interests than if the individual was not pardoned but squeezed by prosecutors. It will mean that the political weight of nothing to see here has been overcome by the legal weight of personal and family legal jeopardy.

Keith Harper is a Partner at Kilpatrick, Townsend & Stockton LLP. From 2014 to 2017, he served as United States Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Council.

More:
Why Hasn't Trump Already Pardoned Kushner, Flynn, Page and Manafort? - Newsweek

On July 19, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the convictions of two former London-based traders for conspiracy and wire fraud in connection with the manipulation of the interest rate benchmark known as LIBOR. The Second Circuit ruled that the use of compelled testimony in a U.S. criminal proceeding even when a foreign government has compelled the testimony constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment. This decision has potentially significant consequences for U.S. criminal cases that involve related investigations or prosecutions in foreign countries.

Facts and Procedural History

According to the charges, the two defendants were cash traders at the Dutch bank Rabobank and were directly involved in the bank's submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a reference interest rate for the interbank borrowing market. In 2013, the U.K.'s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) compelled the two defendants to testify about their involvement in the LIBOR submissions. Both individuals were given direct use immunity meaning their statements could not be used directly against them but not derivative use immunity meaning their statements could be used to derive other evidence that could be used against them in exchange for their testimony. Under U.K. law, they faced imprisonment if they refused to testify under such circumstances, whereas in the U.S., the government can only compel testimony by providing the witness with both direct and derivative use immunity.

Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Justice began its own criminal prosecution. In October 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendants with wire fraud and conspiracy. The defendants' compelled U.K testimony was utilized against them at trial, and both were convicted on all counts.

Second Circuit's Decision

The defendants appealed, arguing that the government "violated their Fifth Amendment rights when it usedtheir own compelled testimony against them." The Second Circuit agreed and held that "the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on the use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies even when a foreign sovereign has compelled the testimony."

The Second Circuit adopted the defendants' position that, to be admissible in a criminal case, a witness's statements including those made to foreign law enforcement must have been made voluntarily. The court emphasized that this requirement stems directly from the text of the Constitution; voluntariness is assessed under both the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected the government's argument that foreign governments are analogous to private employers, which may question employees under threat of termination without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. The court also rebuffed the government's assertion that the Fifth Amendment applies only if the same sovereign is both compelling and using the testimony against the defendant, also known as the "same sovereign" rule.

In addition to rejecting the government's arguments, the Second Circuit focused on the consequences of the government's position, namely that a defendant's compelled testimony might be introduced directly against the defendant in a criminal prosecution, in effect an end-run around the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The court hypothesized that the government's argument could lead to a situation in which the government proffers, "Your honor, we offer Government Exhibit 1, the defendant's compelled testimony." Notably, the government did not dispute this potential result.

The Second Circuit also rejected the government's concern that ruling for the defendants would allow foreign powers to inadvertently or negligently interfere with U.S. criminal prosecutions, noting that that "the risk of error in coordination falls on the U.S. governmentrather than on subjects and targets of cross-border investigations."

Ultimately, the Second Circuit reversed both convictions, holding, inter alia, that the use of compelled testimony was not harmless error.

Impacts/Conclusion

This decision reinforces Fifth Amendment protections against the use of compelled testimony. Moreover, the Second Circuit now joins the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that "inculpatory statements obtained overseas by foreign officials must have been made voluntarily" in order to be admissible in U.S. courts.

Barring an appeal, DOJ will have to proceed with caution in its cross-border prosecutions where overseas testimony has been compelled by foreign governments. Mere compliance with the foreign sovereign's laws may not be sufficient to guarantee the admissibility of the evidence in U.S. criminal proceedings. Across the table, defense attorneys should continue to analyze the circumstances of foreign testimony, and in doing so, pay particular attention to any evidence of compulsion that might limit further use of that testimony against their clients.

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Convictions Overturned: Fifth Amendment Prohibits Use of Testimony Compelled by Foreign Governments - Lexology (registration)