Daily Archives: July 25, 2017

The National Security Agencys mass surveillance has greatly expanded in the years since September 11, 2001. Disclosures have shown that, until recently, the government regularly tracked the calls of hundreds of millions of Americans. Today, it continues to spy on a vast but unknown number of Americans international calls, text messages, web-browsing activities, and emails.

The governments surveillance programs have infiltrated most of the communications technologies we have come to rely on. They are largely enabled by a problematic law passed by Congress the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which is set to expire this year along with Executive Order 12,333, the primary authority invoked by the NSA to conduct surveillance outside of the United States. The Patriot Act has also made it easier for the government to spy on Americans right here at home over the past 15 years. Although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court oversees some of the governments surveillance activities, it operates in near-total secrecy through one-sided procedures that heavily favor the government.

Our Constitution and democratic system demand that government be transparent and accountable to the people, not the other way around. History has shown that powerful, secret surveillance tools will almost certainly be abused for political ends.

The ACLU has been at the forefront of the struggle to rein in the surveillance superstructure, which strikes at the core of our rights to privacy, free speech, and association.

The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) gives the NSA almost unchecked power to monitor Americans international phone calls, text messages, and emails under the guise of targeting foreigners abroad. The ACLU has long warned that one provision of the statute, Section 702, would be used to eavesdrop on Americans private communications. In June 2013, The Guardian published documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden confirming the massive scale of this international dragnet. Recent disclosures also show that an unknown number of purely domestic communications are monitored, that the rules that supposedly protect Americans' privacy are weak and riddled with exceptions, and that virtually every email that goes into or out of the United States is scanned for suspicious keywords.

In 2008, less than an hour after President Bush signed the FAA into law, the ACLU filed a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. The case, Amnesty v. Clapper, was filed on behalf of a broad coalition of attorneys and organizations whose work requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and email communications with individuals located abroad. But in a 54 ruling handed down in February 2013, the Supreme Court held that the ACLU plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because they could not prove their communications had actually been surveilled under the law.

In March 2015, the ACLU filed Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA, a lawsuit challenging Upstream surveillance under the FAA. Through Upstream surveillance, the U.S. government copies and searches the contents of almost all international and many domestic text-based internet communications. The suit was brought on behalf of nine educational, legal, human rights, and media organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, operator of one of the most-visited websites on the internet. Collectively, the plaintiffs engage in more than a trillion sensitive internet communications every year, and each has been profoundly harmed by NSA surveillance.

Executive Order 12,333, signed by President Reagan in 1981 and modified many times since, is the authority primarily relied upon by the intelligence agencies to gather foreign intelligence outside of the United States. Recent disclosures indicate that the U.S. government operates a host of large-scale programs under EO 12333, many of which appear to involve the collection of vast quantities of Americans information. These programs have included, for example, the NSAs collection of billions of cellphone location records each day; its recording of every single cellphone call into, out of, and within at least two countries; and its surreptitious interception of data from Google and Yahoo user accounts as that information travels between those companies data centers located abroad.

In December 2013, the ACLU, along with the Media Freedom Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School, filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit demanding that the government release information about its use of EO 12,333 to conduct surveillance of Americans communications.

For many years, the government claimed sweeping authority under the Patriot Act to collect a record of every single phone call made by every single American "on an ongoing daily basis." This program not only exceeded the authority given to the government by Congress, but it violated the right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the rights of free speech and association protected by the First Amendment. For this reason, the ACLU challenged the government's collection of our phone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act just days after the program was revealed in June 2013 by The Guardian. In May 2015, a court of appeals found that the phone records program violated Section 215, and Congress allowed the provision to expire in June of that year. The program was reformed by the USA Freedom Act, which passed days later.

To bring greater transparency to the NSA's surveillance under the Patriot Act, the ACLU filed two motions with the secretive FISC asking it to release to the public its opinions authorizing the bulk collection of Americans' data by the NSA.

Our earlier work to reform the Patriot Act includes a number of successful challenges to the government's use of and secrecy surrounding National Security Letters.

The ACLU has long fought to bring greater transparency and public access to the FISC the secretive court that oversees the governments surveillance programs. When the FISC was first established in 1978, it primarily assessed individual surveillance applications to determine whether there was probable cause to believe a specific surveillance target was an agent of a foreign power. In recent years, however, the FISCs responsibilities have changed dramatically, and the FISC today oversees sweeping surveillance programs and assesses their constitutionality all without any public participation or review.

The ACLU has been advocating and petitioning for access to the FISC for more than a decade, working with Congress and the executive branch, and appearing before the court itself to push for greater transparency. Days after the courts Section 215 order was published in the press in June 2013, we filed a motion seeking access to the secret judicial opinions underlying the NSA's mass call tracking program. We have since filed two other access motions in the FISC, seeking significant legal opinions authorizing bulk collection and those interpreting the governments secret surveillance powers in the years after 9/11. We also signed a brief filed in the FISC in support of the First Amendment rights of the recipients of FISC orders, such as telephone and internet companies, to release information about the type and volume of national security requests they receive from the NSA and the FBI.

Secret law has no place in a democracy. Under the First Amendment, the public has a qualified right of access to FISC opinions concerning the scope, meaning, or constitutionality of the surveillance laws, and that right clearly applies to legal opinions interpreting Americans' bedrock constitutional rights. We all have a right to know, at least in general terms, what kinds of information the government is collecting about innocent Americans, on what scale, and based on what legal theory.

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NSA Surveillance | American Civil Liberties Union

In light of Michael Sulmeyers excellent recent piece on splitting NSA and CYBERCOM, which ran at War on the Rocks last week, I want to pull together some of the key legal and policy developments of the past year in a single narrative. My aim is to put them in context with each other in a way that will provide useful background for those new to this issue, while also putting a spotlight on the deconfliction-of-equities issue that the split proposal raises. My apologies that this is a longer-than-normal post (I did not have time to be shorter!).

1. July 2016 Reports of DOD frustration over pace of anti-ISIS cyber operations

In July 2016, the Washington Post (Ellen Nakashima & Missy Ryan) reported on CYBERCOMs efforts to disrupt the Islamic States online activities (internal communications, external propaganda, financing, etc.), emphasizing the view of DOD leadership that CYBERCOM was underperforming:

An unprecedented Pentagon cyber-offensive against the Islamic State has gotten off to a slow start, officials said, frustrating Pentagon leaders and threatening to undermine efforts to counter the militant groups sophisticated use of technology for recruiting, operations and propaganda.

But defense officials said the command is still working to put the right staff in place and has not yet developed a full suite of malware and other tools tailored to attack an adversary dramatically different from the nation-states Cybercom was created to fight.

Although officials declined to detail current operations, they said that cyberattacks occurring under the new task force might, for instance, disrupt a payment system, identify a communications platform used by Islamic State members and knock it out, or bring down Dabiq, the Islamic States online magazine.

The report is an excellent snapshot of several distinct challenges the military use of computer network operations can pose.

One such challenge is operational capacity. The story suggests that CYBERCOM simply did not have the right personnel and the right exploits on hand for this particular mission, at least at the start. Thats a problem that can be fixed, and the report details the steps DOD began taking in 2016 to do just that.

Another challenge is the need to have an effective process for deconfliction between intelligence-collection and operational-effect equities. As the article summarized the issue:

Whenever the military undertakes a cyber-operation to disrupt a network, the intelligence community may risk losing an opportunity to monitor communications on that network. So military cybersecurity officials have worked to better coordinate their target selection and operations with intelligence officials.

This is not a novel tension, in the abstract. For as long as there has been signals intelligence, there have been tensions of this kind. When one side has access to the others communications, there will always be tension between the temptation to exploit that access for operational effect (with the opportunity cost of risking loss of that access going forward as the enemy realizes it has been monitored) and the temptation to instead exploit it for indirect intelligence advantage (with the opportunity cost of forgoing direct operational advantage in at least some cases). World War II provides famous examples. And so one might fairly ask: is there anything really different about computer network operations, warranting special attention to the topic in this setting?

Perhaps. In this domain there is much more overlap between the means of collection and the means of carrying out a disruptive operations. Indeed, those means often will be the exact same: a particular exploit providing access to an enemy device, network, etc. It seems to me that this ensures that the tension between collection and operational equities will arise with greater frequency, and less room for workarounds, than in more familiar settings.

Having mentioned both the operational capacity concern and the competing-equities concern, now is a good time to emphasize the significance of the status-quo for NSA and CYBERCOM: the dual-hatted commander. Whereas more familiar, traditional scenarios involving tension between collection and operational equities usually involve distinct underlying institutions and commanders, the status quo with respect to computer network operations has always (well, the past seven years) involved the dual-hatting of NSAs director and CYBERCOMs commander.

This model in theory ensures that neither institution has a home-field advantage, and maximizes the chance that the key decisionmaker (yes, there can be important decisions both below and above the dual-hat, but the dual-hat is obviously in the key position) fully buys into and fully grasps the importance of each institutions mission.

Of course, it is possible that the dual-hat might tilt one direction to an unfair or undesirable degree. And it is possible that some might perceive such a tilt even when there isnt one. As 2016 wore on, questions of this kind began to appear in public, and by September the media was reporting that DNI Clapper and SecDef Carter both were in favor of splitting up the dual-hat. It was not the first time this topic had come up, to be sure; President Obama had considered ordering a split in 2013 (during the aftermath of the Snowden controversy), but had not taken that step at least in part out of concern about CYBERCOMs independent operational capacity. Now the idea appeared to have momentum.

A report from Ellen Nakashima in the Washington Post that same month suggested that this momentum was in part a product of CYBERCOMs operational maturation, but also in significant part driven by the perception that Admiral Rogers, the current dual-hat, favored collection equities to an undue extent:

Whether or not its true, the perception with Secretary Carter and [top aides] has become that the intelligence agency has been winning out at the expense of [cyber] war efforts, said one senior military official.

(See also this report by the New York Times, stating that frustration along these same lines contributed to the effort to get President Obama to remove Admiral Rogers in late 2016.)

The Washington Post report also highlighted concerns that splitting NSA and CYBERCOM at the leadership level might actually weaken rather than empower CYBERCOM, as NSA inevitably would become free to withhold from CYBERCOM at least some exploits or other forms of access so that sources would not be lost:

Cyber Commands mission, their primary focus, is to degrade or destroy, the former official said. NSAs is exploit [to gather intelligence] only. So without having one person as the leader for both, the bureaucratic walls will go up and youll find NSA not cooperating with Cyber Command to give them the information theyll need to be successful.

2. December 2016 Congress puts on the brakes

Against this backdrop, Congress intervened in late 2016 to slow down the Obama administrations move to split the dual-hat. Section 1642 of the NDAA FY17, enacted in late December, provides that NSA and CYBERCOM must continue to share a dual-hatted director/commander unless and until the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly certify to certain Congressional committees (SASC & HASC; SSCI & HPSCI; and the Appropriations Committees) that separation will not pose unacceptable risks to CYBERCOMs effectiveness, and that the following six conditions are met:

(i) Robust operational infrastructure has been deployed that is sufficient to meet the unique cyber mission needs of the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, respectively.

(ii) Robust command and control systems and processes have been established for planning, deconflicting, and executing military cyber operations.

(iii) The tools and weapons used in cyber operations are sufficient for achieving required effects.

(iv) Capabilities have been established to enable intelligence collection and operational preparation of the environment for cyber operations.

(v) Capabilities have been established to train cyber operations personnel, test cyber capabilities, and rehearse cyber missions.

(vi) The cyber mission force has achieved full operational capability.

Section 1642(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). President Obamas signing statement criticized Congress for imposing this requirement, but did not include a claim that it was unconstitutional. It remains the law at this time.

3. Early 2017 Complications in the War Against the Islamic State

While lawmakers and policymakers wrestled with the pros and cons of splitting NSA and CYBERCOM, computer network operations against the Islamic State continued to accelerate.

Along the way, however, new problems emerged.

As Ellen Nakashima of the Washington Post reported in May 2017, CYBERCOM by late 2016 had encountered a new set of challenges in its enhanced effort to shut down ISIS sites and platforms: third-country effects.

A secret global operation by the Pentagon late last year to sabotage the Islamic States online videos and propaganda sparked fierce debate inside the government over whether it was necessary to notify countries that are home to computer hosting services used by the extremist group, including U.S. allies in Europe. Cybercom developed the campaign under pressure from then-Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter, who wanted the command to raise its game against the Islamic State. But when the CIA, State Department and FBI got wind of the plan to conduct operations inside the borders of other countries without telling them, officials at the agencies immediately became concerned that the campaign could undermine cooperation with those countries on law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism. The issue took the Obama National Security Council weeks to address

This article highlights a third significant challenge associated with computer network operations: attacking the enemys online presence often requires, or at least risks, some degree of impact on servers located in other countries. Third-country impact involves both legal and policy challenges, and as the quote above illustrates it also brings into play otherwise-unrelated equities of other agencies. Thus, the competing-equities tension is not just a clash between collection and operational equities, but in some cases many others as well. The dual-hat command structure is primarily an answer only to the former, not the latter.

Meanwhile, a sobering reality about the utility of cyberattacks on Islamic State communications began to become clear: the effects often did not last. This was the thrust of an important piece by David Sanger and Eric Schmitt in the New York Times in June 2017:

[S]ince they began training their arsenal of cyberweapons on internet use by the Islamic State, the results have been a consistent disappointment, American officials say. [It] has become clear that recruitment efforts and communications hubs reappear almost as quickly as they are torn down. In general, there was some sense of disappointment in the overall ability for cyberoperations to land a major blow against ISIS," or the Islamic State, said Joshua Geltzer, who was the senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council until March. "This is just much harder in practice than people think..."

This suggested that the military equities that some felt had been undervalued by Admiral Rogers in the past were less weighty than proponents had assumed. Nonetheless, momentum towards separationand concern that the dual-hat unduly favors collection equitiescontinues.

In mid-July, reports emerged that the Pentagon had submitted to the Trump administration a plan for effectuating the split, with some of the accompanying commentary continuing to advance the argument that NSA holds CYBERCOM back to an improper extent:

The goal, [unnamed U.S. officials] said, is to give U.S. Cyber Command more autonomy, freeing it from any constraints that stem from working alongside the NSA, which is responsible for monitoring and collecting telephone, internet and other intelligence data from around the world a responsibility that can sometimes clash with military operations against enemy forces.

Meanwhile, however, Congress is in the midst of producing the next NDAA, and it may impose a further hurdleone that wont prevent the split, but may well slow it down considerably.

4. Congress reengages

In mid-July, the House passed H.R. 2810, which includes a section addressing the potential NSA/CYBERCOM split. Section 1655 requires the SecDef to provide SASC, HASC, SSCI, and HPSCI with a report on DODs progress in addressing the issues that must be certified to Congress before NSA and CYBERCOM may be split (under the terms of section 1642 of NDAA FY17). That report must address:

(1) Metrics and milestones for meeting the conditions described in subsection (b)(2)(C) of such section 1642.

(2) Identification of any challenges to meeting such conditions.

(3) Identification of entities or persons requiring additional resources as a result of any decision to terminate the dual-hat arrangement.

(4) Identification of any updates to statutory authorities needed as a result of any decision to terminate the dual-hat arrangement.

Meanwhile, the Senates NDAAFY18 draft (S.1519) has begun its trek through that chamber, and it includes a requirement (section 1627) that the commander of CYBERCOM report to SASC and HASC on the costs associated with meeting the conditions needed to enable NSA and CYBERCOM to split. As the SASC Committee Report accompanying the bill explains:

The committee believes any decision to separate Cyber Command and the National Security Agency should be conditions-based. The committee also believes that the funding associated with separating the dual-hat arrangement will be a multiyear sustained effort. The committee notes that the fiscal year 2018 budget request failed to include the funding necessary to resource the separation of the dual-hat arrangement. The committee looks to Cyber Command to estimate the funding required to meet the conditions identified in section 1642(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114328) and intends to closely monitor future budget submissions and the cost, schedule, and performance of key cyber programs to ensure that Cyber Command is appropriately resourced prior to any decision to end the dual-hat arrangement.

5. What is the bottom line in light of all this?

* The statutory obstacles to a split of the dual-hat, from the current NDAA, are not onerous. The certifications required by section 1642 of NDAA FY17 can be dealt with easily enough given the high level of generality with which they are framed, once the political will is there to carry out the separation. It sounds as if the will is there, and that the only real hurdle is specifying something realistic in terms of the requirement that the cyber mission force reach full operational capacity.

* Deconfliction and Competing-Equities Tensions remain a significant issue that needs to be addressed very carefully. Yes, section 1642 of NDAA FY17 requires a certification on deconfliction, but as just noted the requirement is framed at a high-level of generality. People need to focus on the fact that a main driver of the effort to split NSA and CYBERCOM has been the perception that Admiral Rogers gives collection equities too much weightbut that he may well have been quite right to do so. And people also need to focus on the converse risk: that NSA might pull back on cooperation with CYBERCOM to an undesirable degree, post-split, in order to preserve the means of its collection. All of this can be managed, and its not obvious that the current dual-hat solution is the only way to do it. But there needs to be a credible process of some kind, if not the dual-hat. Its not clear that the certification requirement under section 1642 actually will compel sufficient consideration of this issue.

* Section 1627 of NDAA FY18, if it is enacted as SASC has proposed, will be a more serious hurdle. Budgets matter, and it is likely that the correct answer to the budget question posed by that section will involve a substantial need. That money then needs to be found and appropriated. Probably it should be and no doubt it will be. But it will take time for all this to grind out. Possibly this delay would track the time needed in any event to produce a credible claim that the cyber mission force has reached full operational capacity.

Read the rest here:
Should NSA and CYBERCOM Split? The Legal and Policy Hurdles as They Developed Over the Past Year - Lawfare (blog)

A former top U.S. Justice Department official and a former federal prosecutor have joined Reality Winners legal defense team in the National Security Agency leak investigation.

Joe Whitley, who served as the acting associate U.S. attorney general during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, is a partner with the Atlanta law firm of Baker Donelson. He also worked as the U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys general counsel and served as a federal prosecutor in Georgia. Joining Whitley is Matthew Chester, a former assistant U.S. attorney who works for the same law firm in New Orleans.

They are teaming up with John Bell and Titus Nichols of Bell & Brigham in Augusta. The attorneys joined the case after First Look Media, the parent company of The Intercept online news outlet, announced this month that it would help Winners legal defense. First Look said its Press Freedom Defense Fund would provide $50,000 in matching funds to Stand With Reality, a nonprofit campaign to support Winners case through advocacy and fundraising.

RELATED:Owner of The Intercept assisting accused NSA leakers legal defense

The U.S. Justice Department has accused Winner of leaking to The Intercept a top-secret NSA report about Russias meddling in the 2016 presidential election. The Intercept published the report, which says Russian military intelligence officials tried to hack into the U.S. voting system just before last Novembers election.

A federal grand jury has indicted Winner, 25, on a single count of "willful retention and transmission of national defense information. She faces up to 10 years in prison and $250,000 in fines. Winner, who is being held in the Lincoln County Jail, has pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Winners mother, Billie Winner-Davis, released a statement to Stand With Reality about the new attorneys joining her daughters defense team.

I am very excited about Mr. Whitley joining Realitys defense team, she said, as he appears to have extensive experience. His background with homeland security should be helpful.

Read more from the original source:
Former prosecutors join accused NSA leaker's legal defense team - MyAJC

Two additional attorneys have joined Reality Leigh Winners defense team in the espionage prosecution in U.S. District Court in Augusta.

U.S. Magistrate Court Judge Brian K. Epps granted Joe Dally Whitley and Matthew Scott Chester permission to to be admitted to practice in the Southern District of Georgia to help defend Winner, 25.

Winner has pleaded not guilty to a single count of willful retention and transmission of national defense information. She is accused of copying a secret document while at work for National Security Agency contractor Pluribus at Fort Gordon and sending it anonymously to online news publication The Intercept. She has been held without bond since her arrest June 3.

Two days later, The Intercept published an in-depth article about a NSA analysis of Russias attempts to meddle in the presidential election, a subject now under scrutiny by the Senate and House intelligence committees and a special prosecutor investigating possible collusion between Russia and people supportive of Trumps campaign.

A tentative trial date for Winner is the week of Oct. 23.

The newest members of the defense team are both former federal prosecutors with the national law firm Baker Donelson.

Whitley of Atlanta served in the Department of Justice under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, serving as the acting associate attorney general, the number three position at the DOJ for a time. After 9/11, George W. Bush selected Whitley to serve as the first general counsel for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Whitley also previously served as the U.S. Attorney in the Northern District of Georgia. At Baker Donelson, Whitley specializes in complex civil and criminal cases, according to the firms website.

Chester works in the Baker Donelson office in New Orleans. He previously served as an assistant U.S. attorney in the New Orleans office where he prosecuted white collar crimes and public corruption cases.

In 2015, he was awarded the Department of Justices Superior Performance in Litigation award for his work on the prosecution team that helped convict New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin of charges that included bribery, wire fraud and tax evasion. Nagin is serving a 10-year prison term. Chester now also serves as an adjunct faculty member at Tulane University School of Law where he graduated cum laude in 2004.

Reach Sandy Hodson at (706) 823-3226 or sandy.hodson@augustachronicle.com.

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Two new attorneys join accused NSA leaker's defense team | The ... - The Augusta Chronicle

BEIJING: Ahead of NSA Ajit Doval's visit, China's state media struck two different notes with the China Daily hopeful of a peaceful resolution to the deadlock with India while the Global Times said the "main schemer's" trip wouldn't sway Beijing.

In its editorial, 'It's never too late for India to mend its way', China Daily pressed for exploring ways to avoid confrontation.

The Global Times editorial, 'Doval visit won't sway China over border standoff', said Beijing would not talk until Indian troops were withdrawn.

Doval is to visit China for a meeting of NSAs from BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - on July 27-28. He is expected to discuss the standoff with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi.

Both officials are also the Special Representatives of their countries for the boundary talks.

The military standoff began on June 16 after the Chinese army tried to build a road near the Bhutan trijunction. India has protested the construction of the road, fearing it would allow China to cut India's access to its northeastern states.

"There are still hopes that the deadlock can be resolved peacefully, which serves both countries' best interests," the China Daily said. Doval's visit is "hoped" to "carry on that slight shift in India's previously bellicose stance", it said, referring to Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar's recent comments that both the countries should not let their "differences become disputes".

"The two sides need to explore ways to avoid confrontation. It would be damaging to both countries and regional stability if India cannot use its reason and wisdom to avoid the military collision both countries are currently on course for," it said.

But The Global Times, part of the Communist Party's publication group, said in its editorial that Beijing will not "talk" until Indian troops were withdrawn.

"As Doval is believed to be one of the main schemers behind the current border standoff between Chinese and Indian troops, the Indian media is pinning high hopes on the trip to settle the ongoing dispute," the daily said.

"New Delhi should give up its illusions, and Doval's Beijing visit is most certainly not an opportunity to settle the standoff in accordance with India's will," it said. It added that India should not take lightly yesterday's comments by the Chinese Defence ministry that New Delhi should not "harbour any illusions" and withdraw troops.

The two editorials come a day after the Chinese Foreign Ministry hinted that a bilateral meeting between Doval and Yang could happen on the sidelines of a BRICS NSAs' meet.

India has maintained that both the countries withdraw troops from the disputed area and resolve the issue through talks.

Continue reading here:
Chinese media now trains gun on NSA Ajit Doval, calls him 'main schemer' - Economic Times

Vermont Business Magazine The Vermont Department of Labor has partnered with NSA Industries, LLC in St. Johnsbury in an effort to fill the companys available positions with skilled, available talent. On Wednesday, July 26, 2017, NSA will open its doors from 4 pm 7 pm for an onsite recruitment event for the general public. NSAs facility is located at 210 Pierce Road, St Johnsbury.

Founded in 1982, NSA specializes in machining, sheet metal fabrication, engineering and logistics. The company currently employs over 200 individuals and is looking to hire machine operators, assemblers, testers/inspectors and welders, as well as a variety of other positions.

This event displays our desire to actively work with employers to assist them in finding the talent they need to be competitive in todays economy. Additionally, this job fair provides another opportunity for the displaced workers in the Northeast Kingdom to find meaningful employment, said Michael Harrington, Deputy Commissioner for the Vermont Department of Labor.

Wednesdays job fair is open to all interested individuals, and the Vermont Department of Labor will be onsite to provide support services, including application assistance.

For a complete list of jobs available at NSA or across the State, visit: http://www.nsaindustries.com or http://www.vermontjoblink.com.

Source: Vermont Department of Labor 7.24.2017

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Labor Dept partners with NSA in St Johnsbury to find workers - Vermont Biz