Daily Archives: July 24, 2017

KIEV/SEVASTOPOL, Crimea (Reuters) - The career of Sergei Yeliseyev helps to explain why Ukraine's armed forces gave up Crimea almost without a fight - and why NATO now says it is alert to Russian attempts to undermine military loyalty in its eastern European members.

His rise to become number two in the Ukrainian navy long before Russia seized Crimea illustrates the divided loyalties that some personnel in countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union might still face.

Yeliseyev's roots were in Russia but he ended up serving Ukraine, a different ex-Soviet republic, only to defect when put to the test. NATO military planners now believe Moscow regards people with similarly ambiguous personal links as potentially valuable, should a new confrontation break out with the West.

In 2014, Yeliseyev was first deputy commander of the Ukrainian fleet, then largely based in Crimea, when Russian soldiers in unmarked uniforms took control of Kiev's ships and military bases on the peninsula.

Instead of resisting, Yeliseyev quit and subsequently got a new job: deputy chief of Russia's Baltic Fleet.

Yeliseyev, now aged 55, did not respond to Reuters questions sent to him via the Russian defense ministry.

In Kiev, however, there is no doubt where his loyalties lay. "When he took an oath to Ukraine, these were empty words for him. He has always been pro-Russian," said Ihor Voronchenko, now commander of the Ukrainian navy, who once served with Yeliseyev.

In fact, the Russian soldiers were pushing at an open door in late February 2014 - Yeliseyev was just one of many to defect and almost all Ukrainian forces in Crimea failed to resist.

Russia annexed Crimea the following month, prompting a major row with the West which deepened over Moscow's role in a rebellion in eastern Ukraine that lasts to this day.

At the time, Moscow and its allies in Crimea exploited weaknesses within Kiev's military to undermine its ability to put up a fight, according to interviews conducted by Reuters with about a dozen people on both sides of the conflict.

The Russian defense ministry did not respond to questions on their accounts of the events in 2014 submitted by Reuters.

One NATO commander told Reuters that, in a re-run of the tactics it deployed in Crimea, Russian intelligence was trying to recruit ethnic Russians serving in the militaries of countries on its borders.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the commander said the alliance was particularly sensitive to the risk in countries with high concentrations of ethnic Russians, notably the Baltic states.

NATO had to guard against this, said the commander, though the risk should not be overstated because having Russian roots did not necessarily mean that a person's loyalty is to Moscow.

Officials in the Baltic states, former Soviet republics which unlike Ukraine are NATO members, play down the danger.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg likewise said he trusted the armies of the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Still, he told Reuters: "We always have to be vigilant. We always have to develop our intelligence tools and to be able to see any attempts to try to undermine the loyalty of our forces."

Years before the Crimean annexation, a Ukrainian appointment panel appeared to drop its guard when it interviewed Yeliseyev for the deputy naval commander's post.

Yeliseyev was born near Moscow, graduated from a Soviet naval school in the Russian city of Kaliningrad in 1983 and served with the Russian Pacific fleet.

So the panel asked Yeliseyev what he would do if Russia and Ukraine went to war. He replied that he would file for early retirement, according to Myroslav Mamchak, a former Ukrainian naval captain who served with Yeliseyev. Despite this response, Yeliseyev got the job in 2006.

Mamchak did not disclose to Reuters how he knew what was said in the interview room but subsequent events bear out his account.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine dived as Kiev moved closer to NATO and eight years after his appointment, with the countries on the brink of conflict over Crimea, Yeliseyev stayed true to his word by quitting.

Russia's actions were not the only factor in the Crimean events. Ukraine's military had suffered years of neglect, there was a power vacuum in Kiev after the government was overthrown, and many Crimean residents felt more affinity with Moscow.

Still, Ukrainian service personnel with Russian ties switched sides when the annexation began and some officers pretended to put up resistance only to avoid court-martial. Moscow also intercepted orders from Kiev so they never reached the Crimean garrison.

"There was nothing spontaneous. Everything was organized and each fiddler played his role," said Mykhailo Koval, who at the time was deputy head of the Ukrainian border guard and is now deputy head of the Security Council in Kiev.

Voronchenko, who was another deputy commander of the navy at the time of the annexation, said he had received invitations to defect to Moscow's side soon after the Russian operation began.

These, he told Reuters, came from Sergei Aksyonov, who was then head of Crimea's self-proclaimed pro-Russian government, as well as from the commander of Russia's southern military district and a deputy Russian defense minister.

Asked what they offered in exchange, Voronchenko said: "Posts, an apartment ... Aksyonov offered to make me defense minister of Crimea." Neither Aksyonov nor the Russian defense ministry responded to Reuters questions about the contacts.

Voronchenko, in common with many other senior Ukrainian officers, had been in the Soviet military alongside people now serving in the Russian armed forces. He had spent years in Crimea, where Russia leased bases from Ukraine for its Black Sea fleet after the 1991 break up of the Soviet Union.

"Those generals who came to persuade me ... said that we belong to the same circle, we came from the Soviet army," he said. "But I told them I am different ... I am not yours."

Naval chief Denis Berezovsky did defect, along with several of his commanders, and was later made deputy chief of the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Many in the ranks followed suit. At one Ukrainian signals unit, service personnel were watching Russian television when President Vladimir Putin appeared on the screen.

"To my surprise, they all stood up," said Svyatoslav Veltynsky, an engineer at the unit. "They had been waiting for this." The majority of the unit defected to the Russian side.

Even those willing to resist found themselves in a hopeless position. One member of the Ukrainian border guards told Reuters how his commander had despatched their unit's ships to stop them falling into Russian hands, and ordered his men to train their rifles on anyone trying to enter their base.

However, the base's military communications were not working, having been either jammed or cut by the Russians. Isolated from his own side, and outnumbered and outgunned by Russian troops outside, the commander struck a deal with the head of a Russian special forces unit.

Pro-Russian civilians were allowed to force the base's gate without reprisals. The Ukrainians "supposedly could not do anything; you cannot shoot civilians", the member of the unit said on condition of anonymity because he is still living in Crimea and feared repercussions.

Russian troops then followed the civilians in, taking over the base and offering the unit a chance to switch allegiance to Russia. About half agreed, although the base's chief refused and was allowed to leave Crimea.

"The commander did not resist," said the unit member. "On the other hand, he did what he could under the circumstances."

Two other people involved in the annexation - a former Ukrainian serviceman now on a Russian base in Crimea, and a source close to the Russian military who was there at the time - also described witnessing similar faked confrontations.

"You have to understand that the seizure of Ukrainian military units in Crimea was just a show," said the source close to the Russian military.

NATO's Baltic members differ significantly from Ukraine. Soviet-era commanders, for instance, largely left their armed forces after the countries joined the Western alliance in 2004.

Officials also point out that Russian speakers were among the seven members of Latvia's forces to die during international deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nevertheless, lessons have been learned from Crimea. "We learned, of course, that there was not only the issue of loyalty, but also false orders were submitted and there was a blockage ofcommunication during the Crimea operation," said Janis Garisons, State Secretary in the Latvian defense ministry.

Latvia has changed the law so that unit commanders are obliged to resist by default. But Garisons said the simplest step was taken long before the annexation, with the introduction in 2008 of vetting by the security services for "everybody who joins the armed forces, from private to general".

Additional reporting by Margaryta Chornokondratenko in KIEV, Andrius Sytas in VILNIUS, Gederts Gelzis in RIGA, David Mardiste in TALLINN, and Robin Emmott in BRUSSELS; editing by David Stamp

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Why Ukrainian forces gave up Crimea without a fight - and NATO is alert - Reuters

Last month, a Russian jet flew within five feet of a U.S. reconnaissance plane near the Baltic Sea. According to U.S. officials, the Russian Su-27 rapidly approached the U.S. RC-135 plane and acted provocatively by performing unsafe maneuvers. Russias Defense Ministry, for its part, blamed the U.S. plane for making a provocative turn towards the Su-27 while being escorted away from Russias borders. Whatever the truth about this incident, it serves as a reminder of Moscows ceaseless belligerence toward NATO.

Earlier this year, NATO reported an increase in European Quick Reaction Alert aircraft Alpha (Air Policing) launches in response to Russian military aircraft from 400 (of a total of 480) in 2014 to 780 (of a total of 807) in 2016. Admittedly, a change in the way that NATO records such events accounts for some of this increase. But there was, nevertheless, a marked increase in Russian military air activity being monitored and responded to across NATOs two Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs) in Europeat Uedem in Germany, which covers northern Europe north of the Alps, and at Torrejon in Spain, which covers southern Europe south of the Alps.

It is not just in Europe that Russian jets are buzzing the airspaces of NATO members. In April, two nuclear-capable Tu-95 Bear bombers were intercepted by two CF-18 fighter jets as they approached Canadian airspace. The following month, Russias Defense Ministry confirmed that two Tu-95 Bear bombers, flanked by two multirole Su-35 fighter jets, had been intercepted by U.S. aircraft flying over the Alaska Air Defense Zone. This was not a one-off incident. In 2014, the U.S. intercepted Russian aircraft on fifteen occasions; and since then it has averaged around ten intercepts each year.

During the Cold War, Soviet military activity in the vicinity of NATO members air space was commonplace. The point was to test out the defense systems of NATO members in the case of war. Today, the idea of war between Russia and NATO seems farfetched. So why does Russia rehearse such a scenario?

Russias military activities serve a propaganda purpose. By demonstrating that its military can come so close to the air spaces of NATO members states, with little (if any) consequence, Moscow is able to showcase its apparent strength and the alliances apparent weakness. Such activities are one of few things that allows the Kremlin to look strong at home as well as abroad.

They also serve a military purpose. Through them, Russia has been able to gain valuable information about the chain of command within the defense systems of NATO member states; the reaction times of various countries air forces and the capabilities of their pilots; and, the levels of cooperation between NATO members. Such intelligence-gathering is supplemented by the work of Russias human intelligence assets who recruit and run sources in the defense establishments of NATO countries.

Knowing how NATO members react in an emergency gives Russia crucial insights into how they will behave in war. But Russias activities are not only a test of the Wests military readiness and preparedness; they are also a test of its own abilities to meet the various threats identified by the Kremlin. The modernization of Russias military, which began in 2008, includes not only a substantial investment in arms procurement, but also an improvement of the command-and-control systems, enhanced coordination between ministries and an intense program of exercises.

There are, of course, important differences between Russias activities in North America and those in Europe. In Europe, Russian aircraft have carried ordnance and often fly with their transponders switched off or without flight plans. None of this has been reported in North America. But the type of planes involved informs some of this difference in behavior: a Su-27 fighter jet is, for example, a more effective tool to probe reactions and adopt an aggressive behavior than a slow and defenseless Tu-95 bomber.

There is little that individual NATO members can do to deter Russias aggression in the skies per se. Both Canada and the United States have a bilateral Agreement on Preventing Dangerous Military Activities with Russia, which establishes procedures to prevent the use of force in response to accidental military contacts, incidents and accidents. Other member states could pursue similar agreements with Moscow.

But Russias military activities near NATO skies should not be seen in isolation. They are part of a wider pattern of military assertiveness in the Euro-Atlantic region. So what can NATO do?

NATOs recent reassurance measures are necessary to enhance deterrence of Russian military adventurism in eastern Europe, but they should be supplemented with robust measures to mitigate the risks should an incident occur as a result of Russias aggressions near the alliances skies. These measures could include increased military-to-military communication and greater public and private messaging, as well additional diplomatic and economic incentives.

Andrew Foxall is Director of the Russia Studies Centre at The Henry Jackson Society, a London-based international affairs think-tank.

See the article here:
Russia Is Testing NATO in the Skies | The National Interest - The National Interest Online

Last month Sweden and Finlandthe two neighbors and long-time proponents of neutralityjoined a military formation. On June 30, their defense ministers and UK defense secretary Michael Fallon signed the accession of Sweden and Finland to the Joint Expeditionary Force, a British-led outfit that also includes Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway. The JEF, as its known, is one of several military mini-alliances now operating in Europe. And thats good news for NATO.

The JEF is a high-readiness force tasked with quickly responding to emergencies around the world. Its also a very recent multinational formation. It was launched only two years ago and JEFs members are still adding to its capabilities. Also, it is scheduled to become fully operational next year, which means that it could deploy ten thousand troops to military or humanitarian crises.

Britain uses its expeditionary troops for another joint force, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which it operates with France. The CJEF, part of the so-called Lancaster House military cooperation treaty signed by the two countries seven years ago, likewise deploys troops to crises; a recent exercise involved more than five thousand troops.

In fact, these days Europe has a host of military mini-formations. The EU operates battle groups with the same task as the JEF and CJEF forces, though those EU forces are smaller. On the day before they signed the JEF agreement, Sweden and Finlands defense ministers signed a military cooperation treaty with Germany. Germany and France, in turn, operate a joint brigade, while EU member states operate the twenty-five-year-old Eurocorps. Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania, in turn, have a joint brigade with the somewhat clunky name LITPOLUKRBRIG. Taking armed forces cooperation to a new level, Germany is integrating units from three other countriesNetherlands, Romania and the Czech Republicinto the Bundeswehr. According to Dick Zandee, a senior research fellow at Clingendael (the Netherlands Institute of International Relations) and a former head of the Planning and Policy Unit at the European Defence Agency, such smaller military groupings makes perfect sense. Clusters optimize the military cooperation between countries armed forces, he said. In terms of optimization, clusters are the only thing that works. The more member states you have, the more complicated it becomes.

But most of the countries involved in these European mini-formations are also members of NATO. That raises the question: with NATO available to defend Europe, why does the continent need more military formations? Specifically, does Europe need military formations whose capabilities are dwarfed by those of NATO? The United States armed forces alone feature some 1.3 million men and women; at the recent Saber Strike Seventeen exercise some eleven thousand troops trained in the Baltic states and Poland.

Indeed, in case of a real emergency NATO members would rely on that alliance, not on the JEF or another mini-formation. And while the JEF has supported Ebola efforts, the EUs battle groups have never been deployed despite having been fully operational for ten years. Indeed, chances are they will never be deployed because the EUs members would have to agree to deploy themand most crises are either too small or too large to be effectively addressed by 1,5002,500 soldiers. And nobody would expect the JEF or the EU battle groups to perform the same massive effort as NATOthats not their mission.

Even so, the mini-formations are extremely useful. Thats because they have two things that NATO lacks: permanent forces and a small number of members, whose armed forces are very similar in training and equipment. Additionally, the regular exercises conducted by mini-formations have a benefit in themselves: they help European armed forces integrate. The EUs battle groups may only consist of some two thousand soldiers, but constant exercises with troops from other countries they learn to operate effectively together.

Read more here:
Mini-Battlegroups: How NATO Can Take On the Threats of the Future - The National Interest Online