Daily Archives: July 21, 2017

Euthanasia Reveals Atheism’s Moral Confusion – Discovery Institute

Posted: July 21, 2017 at 11:58 am

Jerry Coyne has responded to our criticisms (here, here, here and here) of his endorsement of euthanasia for handicapped children. Coyne seems a bit perplexed at the strong criticism he has received for his advocacy for killing babies with birth defects because they would suffer if allowed to live.

For example, he is surprised at the outrage that atheist ethicist Peter Singer has received for advocacy of infant euthanasia:

For these views Singer has been demonized by disability rights advocates, who have called for his firing and disrupted his talks (see my post about thathere). All for just raising a reasonable ethical question that should be considered and discussed!

Coynes message: Dont get all worked up about killing handicapped babies, even if youre one of the class of people he proposes to kill. Cant we discuss this dispassionately, like adults?

But Coynes equanimity has limits.

In 2013, Ball State University professor Eric Hedin taught a course on astronomy that included suggested readings on the possibility that the cosmos manifests evidence ofdesign. Coyne was fit to be tied. He threatened the president of Ball State with legal action:

Its religion taught as science in a public university, and its not only wrong but illegal. I have tried approaching the University administration, and have been rebuffed. This will now go to the lawyers.

Coyne enlisted the Freedom from Religion Foundation to issue a cease-and-desist letter to Ball State.

Coyne:

Hedins classes are not only unconstitutional, but an embarrassment to your university. Even if you disagree with the freedom-from-religion argument, Hedins courses are a discredit to BSU and he should be removed from them or forced to eliminate the religious indoctrination.

Note to others: it appears to be settled law that academic freedom cannot, in a public university, be an excuse to teach any damn thing you want.

As I mentioned earlier, I wrote to the chairman of Hedins department expressing some of the sentiments above, but he blew me off, arguing that his courses had been deemed satisfactory by University officials. Well see if they start singing a different tune now!

Coyne is enflamed not onlyby courses in public universities, but by signs in museums. Heobjected to a plaque in the Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History given by a donor that credited creation to God. Coyne wrote a threatening letter to the museum director:

A friend of mine who recently visited the new Nature Lab at your Museum forwarded me the attached sign, which ascribes the existence of animals to God.

As an evolutionary biologist, I object to the invocation of God the invocation of God in a public museum could be seen as be a violation of the First Amendment.

Regardless of what the donor wanted, I think it abrogates our scientific principles to celebrate all of Gods creatures when that statement is, by scientific lights, palpably wrong. Would you have taken the money from someone who insisted that the gift celebrates all of Wotans creatures, or all the creatures created by space aliens? Those signs are just as scientifically supportable as what appears on the sign now I neednt remind you that science is done by ignoring God, and has never given the slightest bit of evidence for the intercession of God in the origin, evolution, and diversification of life.

Consider the irony. When Peter Singer endorsed killing handicapped babies in the crib, at a public lecture in front of the very people he advocated killing, Coyne defended his academic freedom and pleaded: Cant we all just get along?

When a professor raisesthe question of design in an astronomy class, or a museum puts up a donors plaque crediting God for nature, Coyne erupts in rage and calls in the lawyers.

For Coyne, killing babies is a topic for reasoned discussion. Invoking God, or considering scientificevidence of design, is an outrage.

William Fleming had it right: Atheism is a disease of the soul, before it is an error of the understanding.

Photo: Peter Singer, by Mal Vickers via Flickr.

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NASA’s Hubble telescope captures tiny Martian moon Phobos – Bangladesh News 24 hours

Posted: at 11:56 am


Bangladesh News 24 hours
NASA's Hubble telescope captures tiny Martian moon Phobos
Bangladesh News 24 hours
... Hubble took 13 separate exposures, allowing astronomers to create a time-lapse video showing the diminutive moon's orbital path. The Hubble observations were intended to photograph Mars, and the moon's cameo appearance was a bonus, NASA said ...
Tiny moon Phobos zips by Mars in fun Hubble time-lapseCNET
Phobos photobombs Mars in Hubble viewGeekWire
NASA Hubble Telescope clicks stunning pics of Mars' moon Phobos; watch time-lapse video hereNews Nation
Sci-News.com -EarthSky -NASA
all 34 news articles »

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Trump Was Right: NATO Is Obsolete – Foreign Policy (blog)

Posted: at 11:56 am

The much-discussed requirement that NATO members spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense is a crude measure, often misunderstood or criticized. But there are clear benefits to such a benchmark. It focuses attention on the need for adequate military spending especially important in democracies, where votes are typically to be found in tax cuts and social care, not tanks and soldiers pensions. It is a tool that builds unity, enhances NATOs capacity to act, including in humanitarian operations abroad, and is a deterrent, offering no encouragement to adventurism from Moscow or anywhere else.

But all tools can get rusty or outdated, and the existing 2 percent benchmark is a perfect example. Now that war is as much about hacking, subversion, espionage, and fake news as it is about tanks, the West needs a minimal baseline requirement for spending on hybrid defense: police services, counterintelligence services, and the like.

Much of this may sound as if it shouldnt be NATOs business; this is a military alliance, after all, and it should be no more responsible for parachuting forensic accountants in to check whether British banks are laundering dirty Russian cash than it should be hunting spies in the Balkans. But it should matter just as much to members of the alliance when their fellow members underspend on hybrid defense measures as it does when they underspend on the military. Given that NATO now recognizes cyberattacks as possible grounds for invoking Article 5, the alliances mutual defense clause, weak national cyberdefenses are a potential invitation to a wider conflict. More broadly, a failure to address nonkinetic defense undermines the solidarity and common confidence building at NATOs heart.

After all, NATO membership is a powerful but only partial guarantee. Take Montenegro for example (which spends about 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense). The latest country to join the NATO club, the tiny Balkan nation was welcomed under the alliance umbrella in early June, as part of an effort to push for further integration with the West and to secure greater NATO commitment to the Balkan region. Montenegro is now likely safe from overt Russian military action, but what about covert measures? Shortly after joining, the country came under serious cyberattack likely as a consequence of its new membership. The attacks came a few months after 20 Montenegrins and Serbians were arrested and, along with two Russians, charged with planning a coup. Montenegro claimed Moscow was behind the operation, and Russias ritual denials lacked conviction.

Had the coup succeeded, it would have left NATOs newest member in severe disarray, vulnerable to further political subversion. It would have been an ominous warning to the rest of the Balkans: Mess with Moscow, put your faith in the West, and who knows what kind of underhanded dangers youll face. And had Montenegro successfully been destabilized, the chaos likely would have encouraged yet more aggressive Russian adventurism and not just in the Balkans.

With the West, and Europe especially, engaged like it or not in a political war, we ought to pay as much attention to ensuring common minimal standards of hybrid defense as we do to outright military spending. My own preliminary investigation with an assist from Jakub Maco, a research assistant at the Institute of International Relations Prague indicates that spending on the sorts of things that constitute hybrid defense indeed varies widely across the alliance.

Graphic by C.K. Hickey.GDP figures are from Eurostat for 2016. Police figures are from Eurostat (2015) except for Albania, Spain and Turkey. Intelligence budget figures are from various sources, but comparable ones for Greece, Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg were not available. New member Montenegro was not included.

Policing, for example, contributes directly to hybrid security. Not only is organized crime sometimes an instrument of Russian covert activity, but a sense of public insecurity can be mobilized by malign propaganda to generate social tensions and support divisive extremist political agendas. A capable, well-trained, and resourced police force also provides the state with more scalable responses in times of crisis. Deploying soldiers against rioters, for example, is not just bad optics; it increases the risk of escalation. Yet the available data suggest that some countries take adequate funding for policing more seriously than others. While allowing for some discrepancies in the quality of this early and still partial information police spending is often hard to compare across countries because of the variety of local and national forces we still found significant variation. Police spending averages 0.93 percent of GDP, with ranges from Bulgarias and Greeces 1.4 percent to the 0.5 percent of Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Spain.

Security and counterintelligence services are also a critical aspect of hybrid defense. They are necessary to help monitor and close down foreign espionage and subversion operations and the secret black account funding used to support destabilizing groups and activities. When comparing spending here, the quality of data is again worth noting: Frances anomalously low security service figure and Romanias unexpectedly high one are likely artifacts of inconsistent definitions of what qualifies as a security agency. But its possible to draw a broad conclusion namely that such spending varies enormously across the continent. Counterintelligence and security spending among European countries averages 0.07 percent of GDP but (absent France and Romania) ranges from the United Kingdoms 0.15 percent down to Belgiums 0.01 percent. These disparities risk creating vulnerabilities for everyone. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the Czech Republic (below average on counterintelligence spending) is a hub for Russian intelligence operations across Central Europe and NATO, and the EU headquarters in Belgium (lower yet) is a playground for Moscows spooks. One can certainly question the details here. This was a quick-and-dirty exploratory exercise, aimed less at providing answers than investigating whether there might be grounds for future, more serious analysis. But, nonetheless, it throws up interesting evidence of European priorities and concerns. Countries such as Bulgaria and Estonia, for example, which acknowledge a serious and sustained effort by Moscow to penetrate and subvert them, have above-average counterintelligence spending to match. However, others appear to be neglecting this element of their security, focusing perhaps too much on policing, the regular military, or neither.

Simply having a common benchmark for hybrid defense will inevitably improve the quality of the data. It will also force European countries to do something new to most of them: to consider the whole gamut of nonkinetic defensive measures available, from counterintelligence to media awareness, as part of a single, unified security concept.

So it is time to have this conversation. Nonkinetic security spending, just like defense budgets, buys protection on a variety of levels. It blocks malign foreign activities, provides wider ranges of capability and response, and acts as a deterrent. In an age of hybrid war, minimum common standards of hybrid defense are a must.

Photo credit:Getty Images/Foreign Policy illustration

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Putting the North Atlantic Back on NATO’s Agenda – Carnegie Europe

Posted: at 11:56 am

NATOs political intent in the North Atlantic was clearly spelled out in the communiqu of the alliances July 2016 summit in Warsaw: In the North Atlantic, as elsewhere, the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory. We will further strengthen our maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness.

Now is the time to translate that intent into tangible action. The North Atlantic Ocean, a top strategic priority for NATO and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, has not been a major strategic concern for the alliance in the past two decades. But today, as Russia builds up its maritime capabilities and increases its naval activities in the area, there are reasons for NATO allies to be concerned. The alliance should take concrete and visible steps to enhance its focus on, and presence in, the North Atlantic.

For the Russians, the North Atlantic hasnt gone off the radar screen. Quite the contrary. Russias development of high-end maritime capabilities and its increased presence in the North Atlantic are reflections of the vital importance of this region for the Kremlin.

Russias 2014 military doctrine and 2015 maritime doctrine identified the North Atlantic and Arctic regions as being of prime interest, for two military-strategic reasons. The first is to protect Russias nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea. To do so, Moscow is keen to exert control over and deny access to its Northern flankfrom both the North Atlantic and the North Pacific into the Arctic.

The second reason is to project power and fulfill Moscows global ambitions. The North Atlantic is Russias main maritime gateway to the rest of the worldnot least to the Mediterranean Sea, where in November 2016 Russia demonstratively sailed its aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, which had come all the way from Severomorsk in the Arctic.

Acknowledging the importance Russia attaches to the North Atlantic, and in light of the growing Russian naval posture in the region, the NATO allies are paying greater attention to current and potential future security developments in this maritime space. In recent years, Russia has demonstrated that it has the maritime capabilitiesnuclear, conventional, and nonconventional, including hybridto probe the allies and even challenge NATOs control of the high seas in the North Atlantic. Russian submarines operating close to the UKs submarine base in Scotland in early 2015 and skirting close to vital undersea communications cables are just some examples of Russias more assertive moves in this space.

Looking ahead, Russia may well be in a position where it could, in times of crisis, disrupt critical allied sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic that are needed to deploy and reinforce U.S. forces and supplies in Europe. The credibility of NATOs collective defense and Europes overall stability are at stake.

With this in mind, there are three important steps that the alliance could take to start restoring NATOs presence in the North Atlantic.

To begin with, NATO should conduct an ongoing political-military assessment of the maritime security dynamics in the North Atlantic. This assessment could be an opportunity to bring NATO partner countries Finland and Sweden, as well as the EU, to the table. A more inclusive discussion would help all stakeholders gain better maritime situational awareness in an area of common concern.

Second, allies should ensure that NATOs deterrence and defense posture, including its maritime posture, is adequately strengthened in the North, alongside the East and the South. In recent years, the alliance has largely focused on the Baltic and Black Sea regions, as well as on the Mediterranean. The North Atlanticthe backbone of transatlantic relationsequally deserves to be in the limelight. At the same time as NATO seeks to strengthen its maritime deterrence and defense posture, the alliance could extend its current dialogue with Russia on transparency and risk reduction in the maritime domain to the North Atlantic.

Third, NATO should recognize more visibly that its effectiveness as an alliance depends as much on maritime power as on land and air power. Over the years, NATOs maritime missions have received insufficient attention, and its maritime capabilities have shrunk. It is time to reverse this trend. Aside from updating the alliances maritime strategy (the latest version of which dates from 2011) and beefing up NATOs Maritime Command in Northwood, UK, as several experts have recently argued, the alliance needs a group of allies to lead a maritime initiative and a high-level champion of maritime issues embedded in NATOs headquarters in Brussels. Without a maritime push at a high political level, there is less chance for a discussion on maritime questions to go beyond the immediate operational approach that the alliance has taken in recent years.

All of the above is not to say that NATO is unprepared for potential military challenges at sea in the North Atlantic. Much work is already under way when it comes to strengthening NATOs deterrence and defense posture. Importantly, several NATO allies have the required capabilities, which could be used today, to deal with a resurgent Russia in this space. NATO allied military exercises in the area are another demonstration of NATOs preparedness. Trident Juncture, NATOs largest military exercise, which will be held in Norway in 2018, is a welcome opportunity to get all allied militaries to look North.

Threats in the North may be considered less imminent, but some are critical for the alliance and require NATO and allies to act now. In the words of former NATO supreme allied commander for Europe U.S. General Philip Breedlove, NATO must put the North Atlantic back on its agenda.

Claire Craanen works in the Strategic Analysis Capability at NATO Headquarters and is the secretary general of Women in International Security (WIIS) Brussels. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of NATO.

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US general says allies worry Russian war game may be ‘Trojan horse’ – Reuters

Posted: at 11:56 am

BERLIN (Reuters) - U.S. allies in eastern Europe and Ukraine are worried that Russia's planned war games in September could be a "Trojan horse" aimed at leaving behind military equipment brought into Belarus, the U.S. Army's top general in Europe said on Thursday.

Russia has sought to reassure NATO that the military exercises will respect international limits on size, but NATO and U.S. official remain wary about their scale and scope.

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who heads U.S. Army forces in Europe, told Reuters in an interview that allied officials would keep a close eye on military equipment brought in to Belarus for the Zapad 2017 exercise, and whether it was removed later.

"People are worried, this is a Trojan horse. They say, 'We're just doing an exercise,' and then all of a sudden they've moved all these people and capabilities somewhere," he said.

Hodges said he had no indications that Russia had any such plans, but said greater openness by Moscow about the extent of its war games would help reassure countries in eastern Europe.

A senior Russian diplomat strongly rejected allegations that Moscow could leave military equipment in Belarus.

"This artificial buffoonery over the routine Zapad-2017 exercises is aimed at justifying the sharp intensification of the NATO bloc (activities) along the perimeter of Russian territory," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin told the Interfax news agency on Friday.

NATO allies are nervous because previous large-scale Russian exercises employed special forces training, longer-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Such tactics were later used in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine and in its intervention in Syria, NATO diplomats say.

Hodges said the United States and its allies had been very open about a number of military exercises taking place across eastern Europe this summer involving up to 40,000 troops, but it remained unclear if Moscow would adhere to a Cold War-era treaty known as the Vienna document, which requires observers for large-scale exercises involving more than 13,000 troops.

Some NATO allies believe the Russian exercise could number more than 100,000 troops and involve nuclear weapons training, the biggest such exercise since 2013.

Russia has said it would invite observers if the exercise exceeded 13,000 forces.

Hodges said NATO would maintain normal rotations during the Russian war game, while carrying out previously scheduled exercises in Sweden, Poland and Ukraine.

The only additional action planned during that period was a six-week deployment of three companies of 120 paratroopers each to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for "low-level" exercises, Hodges said.

"We want to avoid anything that looks like a provocation. This is not going to be the 'Sharks' and the 'Jets' out on the streets," Hodges said in a reference to the gang fights shown in the 1961 film "West Side Story" set in New York City.

Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Additional reporting by Dmitry Solovyov in Moscow; Editing by Hugh Lawson

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NATO, Russian Troops Rattle Swords Along Hundreds of Miles of Borderland – Foreign Policy (blog)

Posted: at 11:56 am

Tens of thousands of troops are on the move from the Baltic to the Black Sea, as NATO and Russia open up a series of massive military exercises the size of which the continent hasnt seen since the Cold War.

Both sides claim the drills, which involve aircraft, warships, tanks and artillery, are purely defensive in nature. But it is clear the exercises are also meant to show off new capabilities and technologies, and display not only the strength of alliances, but how swiftly troops and heavy equipment can move to squash a threat at the frontier.

The most ambitious undertaking on the NATO side is Saber Guardian 17, a series of over a dozen distinct battle drills being carried out by 25,000 troops from 20 countries moving across Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

The scenario presented to ground commanders is that a technologically advanced land force has pushed into NATO territory and is threatening the alliance as a whole. The drills include air defense tests, live fire tank engagements, long advances by armored columns, fighter planes and helicopters supporting ground movements, electronic warfare, and airdrops.

Deterrence is about capability, its about making sure that any potential adversary knows that we are prepared to do whatever is necessary, U.S. Army Europe commander Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told reporters during the exercise. What escalates tensions is when we look weak, not connected, not prepared, that is what invites aggression.

But increasing military capability doesnt have to mean war, he added. The Russians only respect strength, so if we demonstrate cohesion, if we demonstrate that we are together, that we are prepared, then I think we dont have to worry.

The generals blunt comments underscore the planning for Saber Guardian, which doesnt name Russia as the adversary, but clearly has the Kremlin in mind.

The scenario revolves around an incursion into NATO territory by a militarily advanced enemy intent on seizing the economic assets of Black Sea countries. A battle featuring 5,000 NATO troops at the Cincu training range in Romania saw U.S. Apache and Romanian helicopters coordinate with artillery on the ground, U.S. Abrams tanks, and 650 vehicles in support of a large infantry movement to halt the advance.

The U.S. is planning to spend about $23 million on the sprawling Romanian base in order to conduct even larger, more complex battle drills there in the future.

On the other side of the deterrent fence stands Russia, which is preparing to surge as many as 100,000 troops into the field in a series of drills dubbed Zapad, or West in the coming weeks.

The Kremlin claims about 12,700 troops will be active in Belarus and Russia for Zapad. But experts and NATO officials say Moscow is more likely to conduct a series of engagements that will swell those ranks by tens of thousands. Under the Vienna Document agreement of 2011, foreign observers must be present for any exercise that exceeds 13,000 troops.

By coming in under that number while conducting several other large drills at the same time, Moscow can avoid the presence of observers and control the narrative of how its troops performed.

But NATO is wary.

Given that Russia used a massive military exercise in 2014 to obscure its incursion into Crimea, and invaded South Ossetia in Georgia in 2008 during another exercise that covered troop movements, the alliance is keeping a close eye on Zapad.

From previous experiences related to previous exercises, we have every reason to believe there may be substantially more troops participating than the official quoted numbers, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said recently when asked about Zapad.

We dont consider this years Zapad exercise in itself to be a direct threat to [NATO] or a cover for an attack, added Kristjan Prikk, undersecretary for defense policy at Estonias Ministry of Defense during a conference in Washington on July 11. But we have to keep in mind that the Russians have the nasty habit of hiding their actual military endeavors behind exercises.

The last Zapad, in 2014, focused on displaying how quickly Russia could move forces from one part of the country to another, and illustrated how the Kremlin underplays the number of troops involved in its intertwined military drills.

Moscow claimed about 22,000 troops took part in 2014, but outside observers later concluded that up to 70,000 were involved, once all of the smaller but related exercises were added up.

Whatever number of troops ultimately take part, Moscow is going to very actively signal what they can and cannot do militarily, said Olga Oliker of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And the fact that Russia often conducts nuclear exercises in conjunction with conventional movements adds an extra element of uncertainty for NATO and the West.

This year, Im looking to see what Kaliningrads role is in the exercise, and what supporting and concurrent exercises are being held in Belarus and Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, Oliker said.

Three Chinese warships are slated to arrive in Kaliningrad in July 21 to take part in a series of drills with the Russian navy and air force.

The upcoming weeks worth of activities will include anti-submarine and anti-ship operations, and practice between the two nations communicating and coordinating while fighting. The main aims of the exercise are to increase the efficiency in cooperation of the two fleets to counter threats to security at sea, [and] train compatibility of the crews of Russian and Chinese combat ships, the Russian Defense Ministry said.

The naval activity in the Baltic comes months after NATO established new brigades in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, beefed up by prepositioned American tanks and heavy armored vehicles.

In June, the U.S. Air Force also sent B-1 and B-52 bombers to Europe to participate in the massive BALTOPs exercise with Baltic allies, which included 50 allied ships running through a series of defensive maneuvers to protect NATOs northern flanks.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Army deployed a Patriot anti-aircraft missile system in Lithuania for use in yet another NATO wargame, marking the first time the system has been brought to the Baltic region where Russia enjoys a robust air and missile defense capability. The deployment is temporary, U.S. officials cautioned, but officials in Lithuania are looking at purchasing the system. Romania recently committed to a $3.9 billion deal for seven Patriot missile defense systems in July.

Closer to Russias borders and Crimea is another NATO exercise related to Saber Guardian, dubbed Sea Breeze 2017. The 12-day naval exercise currently underway in the Black Sea is co-hosted by the U.S. and Ukraine, and features the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Hue City and the destroyer USS Carney, which join 16 other countries in the Odessa-based undertaking. American surveillance plans and a team of Navy SEALs are also participating.

The naval exercises will be closely watched by Russian forces, who are active in the Black Sea, and have vastly improved their surveillance capabilities in Crimea. Over the past year, Russian aircraft have repeatedly buzzed American warships and aircraft in international waters in the Black Sea, drawing protests from Washington.

In February, an armed Russian aircraft buzzed the USS Porter, and in May armed Russian jets came within feet of U.S. surveillance planes operating over the waterway.

Photo Credit: DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP/Getty Images

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NATO alliance helping dictators – Washington Times

Posted: at 11:56 am

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

President Trump found NATO wanting. Then true to form, he acted like a CEO, not a president, serving notice that things had to change, or else. The or else he left undefined, creating angst among politicians and policy elites who, sensing their own failures, chose to focus on his manners not his message. Mr. Trumps poor political decorum notwithstanding, his policy judgment is right. NATO has to change.

NATO is at risk, not from without, but from within. Vladimir Putins geopolitical maneuvering is cause for concern to be sure, but the real danger comes from the erosion of NATOs core values, and the rise of a dictator within its ranks. They pose a far greater risk than Russias current meddling.

The North Atlantic Treaty commits every NATO member to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, but a growing number of NATO autocrats ignore these core values. Political expression in particular has taken a beating. Every European country but two is less tolerant of opposing viewpoints today than it was in 2013.

Autocrats shut down public debate, and bureaucrats harass anyone who disagrees. Its happened in Romania, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and the U.S., where the IRS subjected conservative NGOs to questionable tactics. Political and media ideologues use identity politics and political correctness to facilitate the crackdowns by condemning as hateful any views with which they disagree.

Weve forgotten the Helsinki Accords, and their making respect for individual liberty a requirement for international legitimacy. Dictators still arrest, and imprison, and torture, to be sure, but today they must have a whiff of freedom about them to avoid the worlds condemnation. Helsinkis effect helped defeat the Soviet Union. It is why the world condemns ISIS. And it is why Ankara is pushing back against reports of Turkeys gulag.

Every members protection under Article V should depend on its commitment to NATOs core values, but the alliance is giving everyone a pass, honoring its reason to exist more in the breach. If the trend continues, then NATO will become a mutual defense pact for dictators posing as democrats.

No NATO member has spurned its values and security interests more flagrantly than Turkey. President Erdogan used Vladimir Putins playbook to establish himself as an equally dominant and despotic ruler in Turkey. Democracy is staggering under government oppression, oligarchs rule the economy, and Erdogan sycophants maintain a cult of personality around him. Turkish media calls him the Great Master,and he lives sultan-like in a 1,100 room White Palace he built for himself as president.

Turkeys drift from freedom accelerated after the failed military coup in July 2016. Mr. Erdogan launched a continuing purge that has so far snared about 118,000 Turks, at least 50,000 jailed, and the rest suppressed with various state sanctions. The stories coming out of Turkey are horrific; people disappearing, children and spouses arrested to punish political opponents, mass arrest of journalists, criminal charges based on spurious allegations that remind one of the Soviet Unions darkest days. While Mr. Erdogan Putinized his countrys democracy, NATO remained silent.

Turkey ignores NATOs security interests as well. For years, aid, weapons, and volunteers flowed across Turkeys southern border to ISIS, and ISIS oil flowed out. A train of Hezbollah-bound, Iranian-supplied rockets derailed in southeast Turkey in 2007. Police stopped Turkish intelligence service trucks carrying mortars, artillery shells, and ammunition to al Qaeda near the Syrian border in 2014. Mr. Erdogans response? Arrest the police and claim it was humanitarian aid. When newspaper editors published photos disproving his claim, they were also arrested.

The Turkey that protected NATOs flank for 50 years is gone, replaced by a replica of Vladimir Putins Russia. Mr. Erdogans silent supervision of peaceful protesters beaten on Washingtons streets by his armed security thugs speaks volumes about his respect for NATOs values. The alliance should not accept the risk of war for an ally with such values, nor should the U.S. sell Turkey sophisticated F35A fighter aircraft for him to use against our Kurdish allies.

Bruce M. Lawlor, a retired U.S. Army major general, is a former member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council and chief of staff of the Department of Homeland Security.

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Much Ado About Nothing? Cyber Command and the NSA – War on the Rocks

Posted: at 11:55 am

Last week, word began to spread that the Trump administration was considering granting new powers to U.S. Cyber Command. Lolita Baldor of the Associated Press had the scoop, discussing two related but separate steps under consideration: first, to elevate U.S. Cyber Command to the status of a unified command and second, to break the current dual-hat arrangement with the National Security Agency (NSA), whereby the commander of U.S. Cyber Command is the same individual as the director of the NSA.

It is worth noting, however, four things: First, these two steps (elevation and separation) have been under consideration for years. Second, there were good reasons at the time why the Obama administration didnt act on them. Third, elevation and separation should, in theory, operationally empower U.S. Cyber Command, but in practice Cyber Command may ironically find itself with less capability to offer. And finally, Cyber Command has already quietly amassed non-operational power and authority within the Department of Defense, making it one of the most independent commands, second only to the U.S. Special Operations Command. As such, while this weekends news is a good sign of the continued maturation of Cyber Command (and the acknowledgment of that maturation by the White House), theres less here than meets the eye.

Lets review Cyber Commands origins and its assigned missions before tackling the news. (Please accept my apologies in advance for some acronym salad.) For the short-story long, see chapter 8 of Playing to the Edge by Michael Hayden and the early parts of Jay Healeys Fierce Domain. Long-story short, the NSA had been the nations leading signals intelligence agency for decades. But after 9/11, as new opportunities emerged to create effects against adversaries during declared hostilities, Pentagon leadership became uncomfortable with the notion that the intelligence missions of collection and analysis would be conducted by the same organization that would disrupt or degrade, even destroy, targets through cyber-attacks during an armed conflict. In 2002, U.S. Strategic Command was given responsibility for cyberspace, and two little-known subordinate organizations emerged to manage it: Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) would handle guarding the Defense Departments networks while Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) would be responsible for missions wed think of as offense. Because there was so much overlap between the NSA and the emerging JFCC-NW, the Department of Defense created the dual-hat by making the NSA director (then Hayden) the commander of JFCC-NW. As the threats to the Department of Defense in cyberspace increased throughout the 2000s, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates consolidated JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW under a new U.S. Cyber Command in 2010, but it was still subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command and still dual-hatted with the NSA director. Thats more or less where we find ourselves today.

Since then, U.S. Cyber Command has been charged with three missions: defend the Defense Departments networks and systems, provide offensive support to other commands in the event of a contingency, and defend the nation from a cyber-attack of significant consequence (less than two percent of incidents would qualify as significant).

Advocates of more autonomy and authority for U.S. Cyber Command have often bemoaned its subordinate status to U.S. Strategic Command. The theory is that having to work through Strategic Command slows down operational approval, coordination, or whatever else needs to happen. Based on my experience in the Cyber Policy office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I am of the view that a stove-piped Joint Staff had more to do with delays and miscommunication than anything else; nor could I ever find a function Cyber Command might be asked to execute that could only be performed by a full, unified command (like Strategic Command) but not by a sub-unified command (like Cyber Command). We looked at this several times during the last administration: If the secretary of defense wanted the sub-unified command to execute, they could and would. It wasnt a problem, so elevating the command wasnt necessary. So, while I dont think there are any big wins to be had by the recent news about the Trump administration wanting to elevate Cyber Command, I dont think it hurts to do it either. And it might not ultimately be up to the White House: The 2017 NDAA requires the administration to elevate Cyber Command.

Breaking the dual-hatted relationship with the NSA is more complicated. There are very good reasons why JFCC-NW was born with the NSA as its commander, as there is a lot of overlap between the organizations. This overlap is intuitive to those whove worked in the business, but hard to explain in brief here. Ill just quote Hayden on this point: [I]n the cyber domain the technical and operational aspects of defense, espionage, and cyberattack are frankly indistinguishable they are all the same thing. Its obviously more complicated than this, but at a high level, I think this was the rationale.

There were studies undertaken about the implications of breaking the dual-hat before the Snowden affair, but his disclosures forced policymakers to confront the issue head-on. At that time, it was thought that breaking the dual-hat could improve perceptions about privacy and civil liberties at the NSA, but in December 2013 the Obama administration decided to maintain the arrangement. Senior leaders felt it was too soon to separate Cyber Command. Its readiness and resources were growing but insufficient, and it was still too reliant on NSA talent and services for its missions.

Working with the two organizations, I found that the relationship between the two was akin to a mix between hostage-taking and Stockholm syndrome except each organization kept mixing up which was the hostage and which was the hostage-taker. One day, U.S. Cyber Command would demand NSA support due to the latters responsibility as a combat support agency. The next day, the command would cave and say that NSA had other, more important priorities. And NSA too would resist a request from Cyber Command, then embrace it, and then fight it. The overlap and dependence was that tight.

For that reason, among others, I understand the argument about needing to separate Cyber Command from NSA so that the former can pursue its missions (especially to defend the nation and to support other commands) with greater independence from signals intelligence. But theres a risk here that would be dangerous to miss: When Cyber Command needs NSA support, the fact that its the same person in charge of both organization can break what might otherwise be a log-jam. Splitting the dual-hat could result in the NSA isolating itself and refocusing on its own core missions (the collection of signals intelligence and providing information assurance) while minimizing its support to Cyber Command.

Just because there are risks does not mean the Trump administration should leave the current arrangement in place. The question is not whether, but when and how, to break the dual-hat. One priority for the White House and Secretary Mattis will be to have a clear understanding with the new NSA director (who may well be a civilian for the first time) about how he or she sees the relationship with Cyber Command, and then how the administration monitors the relationship to ensure the NSA doesnt abandon Cyber Command outright.

The selection of who will next lead Cyber Command will also be a priority. Someone like the current commander of Army Cyber Command, Lt. Gen. Paul Nakasone, is an ideal candidate: He has years of experience in the cyber effects business, time in the Pentagon and the field, and he understands the roles of civilians, fellow military officers, and senior political types. Another name thats been floated is Lt. Gen. William Mayville, currently the Director of the Joint Staff. His time as the Joint Staffs chief information officer and with Joint Special Operations Command would make him a strong leader for Cyber Command as well.

The good news for the future of the U.S. militarys cyber operations is that, regardless of whether or not Cyber Command is elevated as a unified command or separated from the NSA, Congress has quietly been empowering Cyber Command with greater authorities and independence through legislation. My colleague Charley Snyder and I assessed all the additional powers conferred in the 2017 NDAA over at Lawfare, but Id like to single out the authority related to requirements: Being able to set its own requirements for the conduct of cyber operations, as well as validating the requirements of other defense components, matters more than this bland bureaucratic language might suggest. With the independent acquisition authority Congress gave it in a previous NDAA, Cyber Command can now accelerate acquisition and procurement to keep up with new requirements without the usual deliberations chaired by the Joint Staff. Special Operations Command is the only other military outfit with that kind of freedom, and it makes a big difference.

But the big question will be this: Regardless of these crucial authorities and any new command arrangements, what will Cyber Commands role be in protecting the country from threats like Russian information operations? Maybe its time we get away from using cyber as the description of what needs to be done, and instead think about what an Information Warfare Command would look like. How should the United States wage such a fight, and how should it protect itself? I am pleased the Trump administration is considering organizational changes to support a higher profile for cyber operations, but we really need answers to these bigger policy questions.

Michael Sulmeyer is the Director of the Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cyber Policy, from 2012-2015. Follow him on Twitter @SultanOfCyber.

Image:Airman 1st Class Christopher Maldonado/Shaw Air Force Base

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Much Ado About Nothing? Cyber Command and the NSA - War on the Rocks

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Defense in accused NSA leaker case opposes prosecutors proposed order of protection – The Augusta Chronicle

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The attorneys for the Fort Gordon contractor accused of leaking national defense information have filed their own proposed order regarding how classified documents are handled in her espionage case.

Reality Leigh Winner, 25, has pleaded not guilty in U.S. District Court to a single count of willful retention and transmission of national defense information.

While the federal prosecutors have proposed an order of protection that prohibits the defense from revealing any classified information, even if it had been included in published reports, Winners attorneys propose not treating any document as classified if it has been the subject of media reports. Violation of the final order of protection can result in sanctions and even criminal prosecution.

The case against Winner, which is tentatively set for trial the week of Oct. 23, is to proceed under the Classified Information Security Act, a law enacted to protect a defendants right to a fair trial while allowing the government to protect classified information on matters of national security.

The federal prosecutors contend it is the executive branch of government that determines what is a classified document.

In Winners case, the document suspected as being the one sent anonymously to the online news publication The Intercept was the subject of an June 5 article. It was an analysis of the Russian governments meddling in the presidential election. Since Winners arrest, the subject has been reported on extensively, especially in light of the investigations by the independent special counsel, and the Senate and House intelligence committees.

Winners defense attorneys also seek a provision in the order of protection that allows her to review the discovery material, confer with attorneys about it and to assist in her defense.

The defense team also wants the proposed order to allow defense experts with the prosecutors security clearance to review the discovery material without any pre-clearance by the prosecution.

U.S. Magistrate Court Judge Brian K. Epps will determine what the final order of protection will contain. The government, however, has the right to appeal, under the Classified Information Security Act.

Winner has had a top security clearance since serving for six years in the Air Force. In February, she began working for the National Security Agency contractor, Pluribus International Corp. at Fort Gordon.

She is accused of taking a classified document in May and mailing it to The Intercept.

Federal agents allegedly followed clues to Augusta and to Winner after an Intercept reporter showed an intelligence source the document to determine its authenticity.

Reach Sandy Hodson at (706) 823-3226 or sandy.hodson@augustachronicle.com.

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Interactive Constitution: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment – Constitution Daily (blog)

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As part of the National Constitution CentersInteractive Constitution project, leading scholars across the legal and philosophical spectrum find common ground on the Constitutions articles, amendments and provisions. In this essay, Brian C. KaltandDavid Pozen look at how the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to answer questions raised by the original Constitutions treatment of presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and presidential disability.

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment seeks to answer a series of questions raised by the original Constitutions treatment of presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and presidential disability.

First, what happens when a presidential vacancy arises? Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states that in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President. The line of succession from President to Vice President is clear, but what exactly devolves on the Vice President? Is it the office of President or just its powers and duties? When President William Henry Harrison died in 1841, Vice President John Tyler forcefully asserted that he had become President. Although Congress accepted this result, some disputed Tylers reading of the Presidential Succession Clause.

Second, what should happen when a vice-presidential vacancy arises? The original Constitution did not provide for filling such a vacancy. Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, one Vice President resigned, seven died in office, and eight took over for Presidents who died in office: all in all, the vice presidency was unoccupied more than 20 percent of the time. This was less of a problem when the office was held in low regard, which it mostly was until the mid-twentieth century. But as the vice presidency began to grow into its modern forma sort of deputy presidencyit became more worrisome for the office to be vacant. These worries were sharpened by Congresss design of the 1947 Presidential Succession Act, which places the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate immediately behind the Vice President in line for the presidency, even when they do not belong to the Presidents political party.

Third, what happens if the President becomes unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office? Several Presidents suffered debilitating illnesses and injuries. For weeks and months at a time, the country was left without effective or accountable presidential leadership. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 provided for the Vice President to step in when the President had an inability to discharge [his] powers and duties, but it provided no decision-maker, no procedures, and no definition of inability. Nor did it make clear whether the Vice President would act as President only until the President recovered, or instead would become President for the duration of the term. No Vice President wanted to seem like a usurper. In practice, power was never transferred and presidential inner circles typically concealed the Presidents condition. This pattern came to be seen as increasingly irresponsible with the advent of nuclear weapons during the Cold War; the nation needed a fully functioning presidency at all times. In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to break the pattern by being more open about his health and by entering into an agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon that provided for Nixon to serve as Acting President in the event of presidential inability.

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 brought renewed attention to these questions. Led by Senator Birch Bayh, Congress gave them focused consideration and, in July of 1965, sent the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the states for ratification. Less than two years later, the necessary thirty-eighth state legislature ratified it.

In response to the first question, regarding presidential vacancies, Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment formalizes the Tyler precedent. It confirms that when the President is removed from office, dies, or resigns, the Vice President becomes President. When President Nixon resigned in 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford became President under Section 1.

In response to the second question, regarding vice-presidential vacancies, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment requires the President to nominate a replacement Vice President when that office becomes vacant, subject to confirmation by a majority of both the House and Senate. In 1973, Gerald Ford became Vice President through Section 2 after Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned. When Ford took over the presidency the following year, he promptly invoked Section 2 to nominate Nelson Rockefeller to fill the resulting vice-presidential vacancy.

In response to the third question, regarding presidential inability, Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment establish two procedures for transferring authority to the Vice President as Acting President. Building on the Eisenhower-Nixon precedent, Section 3 allows the President to transfer authority temporarily, by submitting a written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. The President can reclaim those powers and duties later by submitting a second declaration to the contrary. President Ronald Reagan (once) and President George W. Bush (twice) transferred authority to their Vice Presidents under Section 3 for a matter of hours while they underwent planned surgeries.

Section 4 addresses the dramatic case of a President who may be unable to fulfill his constitutional role but who cannot or will not step aside. It provides both a decision-maker and a procedure. The initial deciding group is the Vice President and a majority of either the Cabinet or some other body that Congress may designate (though Congress has never done so). If this group declares a President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President immediately becomes Acting President. If and when the President pronounces himself able, the deciding group has four days to disagree. If it does not, the President retakes his powers. But if it does, the Vice President keeps control while Congress quickly meets and makes a decision. The voting rule in these contested cases favors the President; the Vice President continues acting as President only if two-thirds majorities of both chambers agree that the President is unable to serve.

Section 3 and (especially) Section 4 are long and complicated by constitutional standards. Nevertheless, they leave a number of issues unsettledmost significantly, what counts as presidential inability. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, delegate John Dickinson asked, What is the extent of the term disability in the proposed presidential succession clause, and who is to be the judge of it? No response is recorded. By giving the President, Vice President, and Congress important and distinct roles, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment went a long way toward answering the second part of Dickinsons question, rather than try to resolve the first part.

Brian C. Kalt is Professor of Law and The Harold Norris Faculty Scholar at Michigan State University College Of Law. David Pozen is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.

For further discussion between Kaltand Pozenon the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, read the following Matters Of Debate:

The Unusual, Imperfect, Excellent Twenty-Fifth Amendment By Brian C. Kalt

The Deceptively Clear Twenty-Fifth Amendment By David Pozen

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Interactive Constitution: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment - Constitution Daily (blog)

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