Monthly Archives: October 2014

Today the Supreme Court granted cert in Rodriguez v. United States, a case on the duration of traffic stops. Heres the Question Presented from the cert petition:

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are de minimis intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

I wrote a post on Rodriguez back in February that Ill reprint below in light of the grant:

Imagine a police officer pulls over a car for a routine traffic violation, such as speeding or driving with a broken taillight. During the stop, the officer develops a hunch that there may be drugs in the car. He contacts a local K-9 unit and requests a trained drug-sniffing dog; when the unit arrives, another officer will walk the dog around the car to see if it alerts to drugs inside. Although the Supreme Court has held that the use of the dog is not a search, the length of a warrantless stop must be reasonable. The officer cant delay the driver forever.

This raises a question of Fourth Amendment law that has led to a lot of lower court litigation: If the officer has no reasonable suspicion that drugs are in the car that is, he only has a hunch how long can the traffic stop be delayed before the dog arrives and checks out the car?

This might seem like a really technical question. But its actually pretty important. If courts say that the police cant extend the stop even one second to bring over the dogs, then the dogs will only be used when they happen to be right there or some reasonable suspicion exists specifically justifying their use. On the other hand, if the courts say that the police can extend the stop for a long time, then the police will be free to bring out the dogs at routine traffic stops whenever they like.

Lower courts have generally answered the question by adopting a de minimis doctrine. Officers can extend the stop and wait for the dogs for a de minimis amount of time. But exactly how long is that?

Just yesterday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Rodriguez that seven to eight minutes is de minimis. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Nevada held a few months ago in State v. Beckman that nine minutes is too long.

These are just lower-court decisions, of course, and there is room to argue that duration alone isnt the only criteria for whether a stop was too long.

Plus, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to announce arbitrary-sounding time limits on Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. Off the top of my head, the only time it has suggested such limits is County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, and even then it did so only because an earlier decision that did not suggest a specific time limit had caused significant chaos in the lower courts in that specific context.

Read more here:
Volokh Conspiracy: Supreme Court takes case on duration of traffic stops

Ive blogged a few times about the Third Circuits litigation in United States v. Katzin, a case on the Fourth Amendment implications of installing a GPS device. Initially, a panel of the court held that installing a GPS device on a car requires a warrant and that the exclusionary rule applied because there was no binding precedent allowing the government to install the device. Next, DOJ moved for en banc rehearing of just the exclusionary rule holding, which the Third Circuit granted. That brings us to the new development: On Wednesday, the en banc Third Circuit ruled that the exclusionary rule does not apply.

Here are three thoughts on the new case.

1) The Third Circuit focuses on the overall culpability of the officer who conducted the search, relying on the broad reading of Davis and Herring. The key passage seems to be this:

The constellation of circumstances that appeared to authorize their conduct included well settled principles of Fourth Amendment law as articulated by the Supreme Court, a near-unanimity of circuit courts applying these principles to the same conduct, and the advice of an AUSA pursuant to a DOJ-wide policy. Given this panoply of authority, we cannot say that a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal, id., nor that the agents acted with deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for [Appellees] Fourth Amendment rights, Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, suppression is inappropriate because it would not result in deterrence appreciable enough to outweigh the significant social costs of suppressing reliable, probative evidence, upon which the Governments entire case against Appellees turns.

Ive been assuming that the debate over the broad vs. narrow reading of Davis was destined to be decided by the Supreme Court eventually. With that said, its interesting that all the circuits so far are reading the case so broadly so that no clear split has yet emerged. [But see update below] I personally find the broad reading of Davis to be very problematic, but I would guess that there are five votes on the current Court that would agree with that broad reading.

2) In this case, defense counsel conceded the relevance of the agent consulting with a prosecutor about the legality of the practice as part of the exclusionary rule calculus. See Slip Op at 34, n.13. Theres some precedential support for that, I recognize. At the same time, it strikes me as a really problematic rule. Think of the incentives it creates. First, agents have an incentive to ask the most aggressive prosecutor they know. Agents wont ask for legal advice from Cautious Cathy; instead theyll run it by Aggressive Andy. Second, the rule gives prosecutors an incentive to give out aggressive advice. If youre a prosecutor and agents ask for your legal advice, you will know that by approving a questionable practice, the mere fact of your approval becomes an argument against the exclusionary rule applying if you turn out to be wrong. The exclusionary rule becomes narrower as the prosecutors become more aggressive.

3) Notably, the court vacated the merits ruling that a warrant was required even though DOJ did not ask the court to revisit that issue.

UPDATE: Andrew Pincus points out his recently-filed reply brief in Aguiar v. United States alleging a split with state high-court cases. So perhaps the Court will step in soon after all.

Orin Kerr is the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at The George Washington University Law School, where he has taught since 2001. He teaches and writes in the area of criminal procedure and computer crime law.

View original post here:
Volokh Conspiracy: Third Circuit gives narrow reading to exclusionary rule