 
Alex Linder Audio Books
Open Letters
Yggdrasil's Library
THE ORION PARTY
The Prometheus League
- Humanity Needs A World Government PDF
- Cosmos Theology Essay PDF
- Cosmos Theology Booklet PDF
- Europe Destiny Essays PDF
- Historical Parallels PDF
- Christianity Examined PDF
News Blogs
Euvolution
- Home Page
- Pierre Teilhard De Chardin
- Library of Eugenics
- Genetic Revolution News
- Science
- Philosophy
- Politics
- Nationalism
- Cosmic Heaven
- Eugenics
- Future Art Gallery
- NeoEugenics
- Contact Us
- About the Website
- Site Map
Transhumanism News
Partners
 
 
 
 
An Interview with the Author of The Bell Curve
 From Skeptic vol. 3, no. 2, 1995, pp. 34-41.
  
 The following article is copyright © 1994 by the Skeptics Society, P.O. 
  Box 338, Altadena, CA 91001, (818) 794-3119. Permission has been granted for 
  noncommercial electronic circulation of this article in its entirety, 
  including this notice. A special Internet introductory subscription rate to 
  Skeptic is available. For more information, contact Jim Lippard 
  (lippard@skeptic.com).
  
 FOR WHOM THE BELL CURVE TOLLS
  
 A Prelude to an Upcoming Special Issue of Skeptic (Volume 3, #3) 
  
An Interview with the Author of The Bell Curve
  
 CHARLES MURRAY
  
 Interview by Frank Miele
  
 Charles Murray has achieved the impossible, or at least the highly 
  improbable. He has co-authored an 845-page book, filled with figures, tables, 
  references, and appendices loaded with multiple regression analyses, that is 
  also the most controversial book in America. It has been panned by many 
  outside the intelligence testing community and by some within. Commentators 
  from the left, right, and middle have taken their best shots, and leaders of 
  both major political parties have rung in with scathing attacks, even while 
  admitting they had not read the book. Despite the brouhaha, or perhaps because 
  of it, The Bell Curve made it to the New York Times top-10 nonfiction best 
  seller list. As Ted Koppel put it on Nightline, The Bell Curve will be like 
  Clinton's health plan: no one will actually read it but everyone will form an 
  opinion of it.
  
 Charles Murray is no stranger to controversy. His previous book, Losing 
  Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980, argued that the Great Society 
  programs of the 1960s not only did not help the poor, they often made things 
  worse. Arguing that the welfare system should be abolished, the New York Times 
  called Losing Ground, "The [Reagan] Administration's new 'bible.'" Losing 
  Ground was but a prelude.
  
 In The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 
  (co-authored with the late Richard J. Herrnstein, author of the previously 
  controversial IQ in the Meritocracy, and co-author with James Q. Wilson of 
  Crime and Human Nature), Murray has pushed the envelope of public political 
  discourse to its breaking point. He has now been dubbed by the New York Times 
  Magazine "America's Most Dangerous Conservative." When editor Andrew Sullivan 
  ran an excerpt from The Bell Curve in The New Republic, its entire editorial 
  board rose in revolt. But a group of leading researchers in the field of human 
  intelligence published a statement in the Wall Street Journal agreeing with 
  the factual basis of The Bell Curve.
  
 Herrnstein and Murray argue that IQ is real; that it matters (ever so much 
  more as society becomes more equitable and technological); that it is 
  somewhere between 40% and 80% heritable; and that it relates to not only 
  school performance, but to jobs, income, crime, and illegitimacy; and that it 
  cannot be ignored in any meaningful look at America's future. But the most 
  explosive of The Bell Curve's arguments is that some of the difference in mean 
  IQ scores between the white European population of the United States and the 
  African-American population (one full standard deviation of 15 points) is 
  probably attributable to genetic factors. No one in the field disputes this 
  difference. The argument is over why the difference exists and, of course, 
  whether and how it can be reduced. (Read the now-infamous Chapter 13 of The 
  Bell Curve for yourself. It is a lot more tentative and nuanced than popular 
  denunciations of the book may have led you to believe.)
  
 Charles Murray is a graduate of Harvard with a Ph.D. in Political Science 
  from MIT, and currently is a Bradley Fellow at the American Enterprise 
  Institute in Washington, D.C. The late Richard J. Herrnstein received a Ph.D. 
  in psychology from Harvard, where he taught from 1958 until his death last 
  autumn. He held the Edgar Pierce Chair in Psychology (the oldest such chair in 
  America).
  
 Skeptic interviewed Charles Murray and found him to be as calm in 
  explaining his positions as some of his critics have been apoplectic. If there 
  was any trace of anger in Murray it was not for the underclass but for former 
  colleagues who have, as he put it, "ran for the high hills," and for the 
  Cognitive Elite, whom he feels have undermined the country that provided them 
  the chance to rise to the top in the first place.
  
 The next issue of Skeptic will be a Special Issue on intelligence, I.Q., 
  race, and class, and will feature in-depth reviews of The Bell Curve by 
  leaders in the field, moving past the rhetoric and getting to the heart of the 
  science behind the claims. In the first of what promises to be a regular 
  interview feature in Skeptic, Contributing Editor Frank Miele was more than 
  prepared for the Murray interview, having been published himself on the 
  subject in Intelligence, the leading journal in the field.
  
 Here then is what "America's Most Dangerous Conservative" had to say to 
  Skeptic.
  
 Skeptic: In your book you present a summary of the current evidence on 
  I.Q. on pages 22 and 23. Snyderman and Rothman's on The I.Q. Controversy in 
  1991 surveyed expert in the field, and just yesterday the Wall Street Journal 
  contained a 25-point statement by experts in intelligence. Based on those it 
  seems your summary represents the consensus of experts in this field, even on 
  the controversial issue of the involvement of genetics and the black-white 
  difference in intelligence. As skeptics, we are skeptics of everything, 
  including psychology. If we get this great a controversy over what looks like 
  consensus, is psychology really a science in the same sense as physics?
  
 Murray: I'm not comfortable with a blanket statement saying yes or no. But 
  I think we can talk specifically about the basis for those statements in the 
  Wall Street Journal and the book, which is certainly based on the kinds of 
  methods that fall under the scientific method-- falsifiable hypotheses, the 
  use of predictions, etc. A test is valid in so far as it predicts something of 
  interest, or criteria measure, to use the jargon of the trade. More than most 
  of the other social sciences, psychologists and psychometricians are prepared 
  to have their results tested against classical statistical criterion of 
  validity, reliability, and reproduceability. 
  
Skeptic: One of the arguments would be that most of the analyses you and 
  psychometricians have done is correlation, as opposed to causal analysis that 
  we do in physics. Does that mitigate against the strength of the scientific 
  conclusions? 
  
Murray: We do not have accessible to us the same kind of control over our 
  phenomena that physicists often have. However, having said that, their remains 
  a black box where the cause hides that we cannot open up and look at. But one 
  can eliminate a number of alternative hypotheses and transform correlational 
  statements into ones which certainly have some causal persuasiveness. Example: 
  the use of regression analysis, which is the all-purpose tool of the 
  behavioral and social sciences these days. Let's take an example from The Bell 
  Curve. The dependent variable is whether a person is below the official 
  poverty line. And you introduce as independent variables a variety of 
  candidate causes. Chief among these being socio-economic background, 
  education, race, occupation, and then you throw I.Q. into that. If after 
  looking at a variety of these other things which both theory and common sense 
  say should have some bering on whether a person ends up in poverty, but one 
  ends up with a large, statistically independent role for I.Q., it seems to me 
  to make a causal statement that I.Q. looks like its a cause of poverty, it is 
  a reasonable thing to do.
  
 By the way, when you actually read the book you will see that we typically 
  word things in this cautious kind of way.
  
 Skeptic: But could not someone say that in correlational analysis it is 
  not really proper that you are not randomly assigning people to socio-economic 
  status groups, or racial background, or whatever; are you and Herrnstein doing 
  anything different than what is the common procedure used in regression 
  analysis in, say, voting behavior, or anything of this sort?
  
 Murray: The analyses we conduct in the book are garden-variety regression 
  analyses. There is, however, also a body of work which does use randomly 
  assigned experimental and control groups that reflects on a lot of the issues 
  we talk about in the book, which then begins to look more like experiments 
  done in the hard sciences. 
  
Skeptic: Can you be more specific?
  
 Murray: Art Jensen's work with regard to reaction time. This is a matter 
  of eliminating a lot of alternatives and trying to understand what's going on 
  with I.Q. scores. This is where you have a situation with an apparatus with 
  six buttons, and you have your finger on a button, and when a light goes on 
  one of the other buttons you move to that button and push it. The reason why 
  this kind of experiment is useful is (A) it gives us insight into something 
  that has no known relationship to I.Q., in so far as you are simply asking 
  someone to move his or her thumb to push a button. But it turns out that this 
  reaction time is not only correlated with I.Q. scores, it is correlated with 
  the general intelligence factor, g.
  
 The main point is this. You have now made some headway into trying to 
  understand what is going on with this thing called an I.Q. score--does it have 
  a physiological basis, etc. 
  
I'm not going to apologize for our use of regression analysis in the book. 
  Everyone uses regression in the social sciences. If you want to say that 
  social scientists are the astrologers of the 20th century and that they don't 
  have the methods of science open to them and we thus can't take them 
  seriously, fine, but unless you are prepared to make that argument the science 
  in The Bell Curve using regression analysis is very much in the middle of the 
  mainstream.
  
 Skeptic: Stephen Jay Gould, in his New Yorker review, gives a four-point 
  summary of your argument about intelligence: (1) it is a single number; (2) it 
  is capable of ranking people in a linear order; (3) it is genetically based; 
  (4) it is effectively immutable. Gould goes on to say that if any of these 
  premises is false, the entire argument of The Bell Curve collapses, and he 
  concludes that: "The central premise is false and most of the foundations 
  are." Now, how do you square what Gould has said about this with your own 
  summary of the book on pages 22- 23. One of you has got to be wrong. 
  
Murray: Stephen Jay Gould is recycling the same argument that appeared in 
  The Mismeasure of Man in 1981. It was a very influential book in terms of the 
  lay population and lots of people out there have their opinions formed about 
  intelligence by The Mismeasure of Man, which included two types of 
  information, one considerably more useful than the other. The first type was a 
  history of intelligence measurements in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in 
  which people made mistakes. (I seem to recall that physicists used to believe 
  in something called aether.) There were phrenologists and others to whom we 
  can now look back at and poke fun at. Fine, the problem is that in the same 
  way that physicists are not criticized now for something other physicists did 
  in 1910, so also has psychometrics made some strides since 1910 and 1900 and 
  1890. 
  
The second thing is that Gould tried to make the same arguments for modern 
  psychometrics, a lot of which were based on trying to demonstrate that the 
  general mental factor g is a statistical artifact. The contrast I want to draw 
  is between the attention that Gould's book got in the media and what happened 
  in the scientific literature. Basically, there were a few perfunctory and 
  rather derisive mentions of his treatment of factor analysis, and work went on 
  without a break. 
  
To put it more specifically, factor analysis is subject to a variety of 
  kinds of problems because you can make different assumptions about how to 
  create the factors. One can even, for example, demand of the algorithm that it 
  produce factors which do not load on a single dominent factor. The problem 
  with this is, as Dick Herrnstein use to say, you can make g hide but you 
  cannot make it go away.
  
 Skeptic: Sounds rather like Joe Louis. Let me go back to Gould's four 
  points. Is there any one of those that you think is not a fair and accurate 
  statement of what you said?
  
 Murray: All four of them. 
  
Skeptic: So you are not saying intelligence is a single number? 
  
Murray: No. In The Bell Curve, we say of the I.Q. score, first, there have 
  been a variety of ways to try to come up with independent mental factors. That 
  has been a failure. On the other hand, there have been a variety of ways in 
  which there are distinctions among different types of intelligence that are 
  useful, such as the distinction between verbal, visual and spacial 
  intelligence. And we talk about the different ways these different skills lead 
  to success in occupations. And we talk, somewhat sympathetically, about the 
  notion that there are, in Howard Gardner's words, multiple intelligences. We 
  are a little dubious about applying the word "intelligence" to them, but we 
  are very sympathetic that there are large domains of human talent that are not 
  encompassed in the word "intelligence." 
  
Skeptic: One of the complaints about the Snyderman and Rothman survey, the 
  Wall Street Journal survey, and your own survey of the literature, is that you 
  are working in that standard psychometric paradigm, but that is yesterday's 
  news. The real forefront is Sternberg's approach to practical intelligence and 
  Gardner's seven intelligences. You are sticking with something that is a very 
  small portion of the discussion, so naturally you are going to get concensus.
  
 Murray: Let me make a couple of other points about intelligence. One, the 
  general mental factor, g, is very robust. You can take all kinds of different 
  ways of creating your factors, and you will always get g. It doesn't matter 
  whether rotate the matrix orthogonally, or obliquely, or whatever else, you 
  always get the same thing. The second major point is that when you try with 
  factor analysis to produce a situation where you do not have a general mental 
  factor g, guess what? All the factors are correlated. Which goes back to 
  Spearman's initial insight, which is why are the different measures of mental 
  ability so consistently correlated with each other? What's going on here? The 
  answer is: there is an underlying general factor. That does not mean that it 
  blocks out a whole territory of human talents or intelligence, and we say so 
  in the book. 
  
Gardner has made a variety of assertions about intelligence which, if true, 
  are falsifiable. He is not only saying there are different talents, which Dick 
  Herrnstein and I would agree with, he is also saying they are independent. 
  With something like kinesthetic talent, which is quite physical, this is easy 
  to say. It gets harder to say when he talks about interpersonal skills, versus 
  verbal skills. If you are going to make that kind of statement, the next 
  logical step is to come up with measures of these different talents and 
  demonstrate that they are, in fact, independent.
  
 Skeptic: So you are saying that some of these disagreements are 
  empirically testable?
  
 Murray: Yes, and Gardner has consistently been unwilling to subject his 
  own work to that kind of empirical defense. He has stood apart from 
  quantitative attempts to describe what he is doing and to enable other 
  researchers to replicate it. Of all the different types of intelligence that 
  Gardner wants to treat as co-equals, there is only one kind that will put you 
  in the retarded class--namely the plain old fashion general mental ability. If 
  you are kinesthetically challenged, teachers and guidance counselors do not 
  get real worried about you. If you are kinesthetically challenged you may be 
  the last person chosen for the baseball team, but you can go out and make a 
  success of yourself in any number of ways. If you are intellectually 
  challenged, however, you have a general disability that is pervasive over all 
  kinds of ways. 
  
Skeptic: I read in a biography of Muhammad Ali that when he took his draft 
  tests he had an I.Q. below 80. Now, if I make a mistake writing my 
  spell-checker will fix it for me. If you make a mistake Stephen Jay Gould may 
  beat you up in the press. If Muhammad Ali made a mistake he was flat on his 
  back. This man was making split-second decisions of the first magnitude. 
  
Murray: If you are five standard deviations out on the edge of the curve in 
  kinesthetic ability to the right hand side, then certain possibilities open up 
  to you. But if you are low in kinesthetic ability, it doesn't make much 
  difference to you in life. If you are a Muhammad Ali and you possess 
  extraordinary physical talent, you have other avenues that will open up to 
  you. But this example illustrates another important point, which is that 
  Muhammad Ali is not a blithering idiot. Yet there is nothing in his public 
  utterances, his charm, his presence, his carisma, and all the rest of that, 
  that is inconsistent with a measured I.Q. in the high 70s.
  
 Skeptic: One of the things that Gould takes you to task for is that you do 
  not report the scatter on your regression lines, and that the r squared values 
  do not appear in the body of the book, but in the appendix. Can you tell us 
  what those terms mean and why he thinks they are so important? And what is the 
  usual practice here--have you and Herrnstein done something different than 
  what would be done in a book on, say, political voting behavior. 
  
Murray: Correlation is denoted by r, and in ordinary regression analysis 
  r-square--the square of the correlation--reflects the proportion of the 
  variation in the data that is explained by the set of independent variables 
  that are in the regression analysis. 
  
Two points. First, the book is exemplary in opening up the section in which 
  we present these regression analyses by explicitly pointing out in the body of 
  the book that the r-square is small. That is in the very first pages of the 
  whole presentation. It is also exemplary in a book aimed at a general audience 
  that we specifically include an appendix with a print-out of every single 
  analysis presented in a graph in the body of the book. This is something you 
  will not find in most books aimed at a general audience, including The 
  Mismeasure of Man. Dick and I presented far more statistical information than 
  is ordinarly presented in a book such as this.
  
 Second, I don't know how much Gould knows about regression analysis. When 
  you are using logistic regression analysis--in which the dependent variable is 
  a nominal variable, in our case a dichotomous yes-no: Is the person below the 
  poverty line, yes or no? Whenever you have a dichotomous dependent variable 
  r-square becomes very difficult to interpret. Particularly with rare 
  phenomena. For example, if you have a situation, as in the case of poverty 
  where 87% of the population is not impoverished, you only permit two values in 
  your dependent variable, you are going to get a lot of noise in the data, 
  which means r-square becomes very difficult to interpret for technical 
  reasons.
  
 Skeptic: One of the criticisms, then, would be that the I.Q. isn't that 
  effective. There is a lot of noise, so why are you saying it is so important?
  
 Murray: Let's use poverty as an example. For poverty the r-square is .10. 
  So we can explain only 10% of the poverty, so obviously I.Q. cannot be very 
  important, can it? Well, if you then go back and take a look at the chapter on 
  poverty, and then you take the probability that a person is going to be in 
  poverty if he has low I.Q., you find out that among whites, the probability of 
  being in poverty if you are in the bottom 5% of I.Q. is 30%. The probability 
  of being in poverty if you are in the top 5% of I.Q. is 2%. Furthermore, when 
  you take into account education and socio-economic status, the magnitude of 
  the difference in probability of being in poverty is not much attenuated. How 
  can this be if you can only explain 10% of the variance? It goes back to the 
  ways in which logistic regression equations in which r-squared is not nearly 
  as interesting as the magnitude of the effect that I.Q. has on the probability 
  of being in poverty. And this applies across the range of the analyses we 
  report. 
  
Skeptic: Let's try to cut this another way. If you get so much predictive 
  value from using intelligence just in I.Q. score, how much do you add by 
  getting these other measures of socio-economic status or whatever. I.e., 
  what's the sequence? What's the biggest predictor, and how much do you add by 
  cranking in the others?
  
 Murray: It depends on the phenomenon you are looking at. Once you 
  introduce I.Q. the importance of socio-economic background is much attenuated. 
  Often times the role of socio-economic background disappears altogether when 
  I.Q. is in the equation. Conversely, introducing socio- economic background 
  into the equation often times attenuates the role of I.Q. by only a very small 
  amount.
  
 Skeptic: Let's talk about cognitive stratification you discuss in Part I 
  of your book. Secretary of Labor Robert Reisch gave a speech on the "Anxious 
  Class," where he says: "Contrary to some theorists our destinies do not reside 
  in our genes. Study after study show that skills can be learned. Every year of 
  education or job training beyond high school, whenever it occurs in life, 
  increases average future earnings by 6% to 12%. GNP is not simply a matter of 
  DNA. Most Americans are on a downward slide not because of genetic 
  deficiencies but because they lack the learnable skills to prosper in an 
  economy convulsant with change."
  
 But the picture Reisch paints is actually very similar to your own: a 
  high-end cognitive class that is doing great, a bunch of worried people in the 
  middle saying "where's that job my father had," and an underclass at the 
  bottom that is falling downward in freefall.
  
 Murray: Yes, and we make a reference to Reisch's work and we point out 
  that he is more optimistic about the role of education than we are, but there 
  is great similarities.
  
 Skeptic: And on this subject of what society can do to bring up this 
  underclass, you have been something of a godfather of the get-rid- of-welfare 
  movement before you got into talking about I.Q. Conservatives like Newt 
  Gingrich, Buchannon, Kemp, and Bennett, have also talked about getting 
  welfare, but they have rejected The Bell Curve's analysis of I.Q. Does one of 
  these follow from the other?
  
 Murray: You know, in all 845 pages of The Bell Curve, we talk about 
  getting rid of welfare in one sentence. We have a single sentence in Chapter 
  22 in which we talk about the ways government should get out of the business 
  of encouraging any group of women to have babies, whether they be smart or 
  dumb. And we generally urge that policies that subsidize birth be ended. It is 
  one sentence. A single sentence. And one does not follow from the other.
  
 Skeptic: Even if there was no inheritability to intelligence, no racial 
  difference in any of these things, you would still be in favor of getting rid 
  of welfare.
  
 Murray: Yes, absolutely.
  
 Skeptic: One question we might ask about your book is: why this book now, 
  and why the controversy that surrounds it? Is this a case of a bad economy, an 
  anxious public, and so we are blaming the victims and scapegoating those least 
  capable of defending themselves?
  
 Murray: Why is it published now? A better question is: why was it not 
  published in the last 30 years? There has been a collective intellectual 
  cowardice about understanding the role of intelligence in understanding social 
  problems. Let's take one example. Child neglect is one of the most rapidly 
  growing social problems we have. How many thousands of people make their 
  living either writing about problems of child neglect and abuse, and so are 
  advocating for new laws, etc.? Well, as every parent knows without reading 
  anything about I.Q., there is a plausible relationship between intelligence 
  and child abuse. Which is to say, any parent knows if a child has had a fever 
  for 24 hours and hasn't been taking in liquids, you make a calculation that 
  this has gone on too long and we've got to get this kid to a doctor, etc. Any 
  parent knows that child-proofing a home takes foresight and thoughtfulness--it 
  takes a certain amount of I.Q. With that plausible relationship in mind, the 
  failure of social science and politicians alike to confront the possibility 
  that low I.Q. is an important risk factor in child neglect is scandalous. 
  Every single bit of evidence that does bare on this says that I.Q. is a great 
  big factor in child neglect. 
  
Skeptic: Couldn't someone take your arguments and say "we need more 
  redistribution programs, not less, because these people cannot help 
  themselves"? Haven't you knocked the bottom out from the conservative 
  pull-yourself-up-by-your-own-bootstraps ideology? 
  
Murray: You put your finger on something that Dick Herrnstein and I also 
  thought about from the time we began working on the book. It is something that 
  my friends on the right were concerned about. They said, "look, this type of 
  material lends itself to all sorts of reasons to have a more interventionist 
  state, and more welfare, and more redistribution, not less." We knew that. 
  That is one of the major reasons for saying that it doesn't really hang 
  together that this book was designed to foster a political agenda. It can be 
  used by both sides. 
  
The other point is that you have just described why Dick and I open up 
  Chapter 22 with seven or eight pages of political philosophy. We say to the 
  reader very explicitly "what we have just described for you could play out in 
  any number of ways politically. Therefore what we are going to do is describe 
  to you our own political predispositions, which have nothing to do with I.Q., 
  why we hold them, and having told you those predispositions, then we will tell 
  you our strategic view of what ought to be done."
  
 Frank, I challenge readers of Skeptic magazine to go to any other book 
  with policy recommendations by liberals which contain such an explicit, open, 
  candid description of the author's political bias. 
  
Skeptic: I'd like to go further on that limb. One might argue that The Bell 
  Curve challenges the whole tradition that many people identify as 
  American--namely equality. Do you find that your conclusions better fit a 
  pagen vision of the universe that sees humanity as continuous with the rest of 
  existence rather than as created in the image of God, and the Goddess fortuna 
  working her wiles through DNA?
  
 Murray: Our vision is Jeffersonian. Up until 30 years ago, in the early 
  1960s, Dick and I would have been describing a vision of America that everyone 
  would have said, "of course." It is a vision in which we say that people bring 
  different things to the table. The important thing is that everyone be given 
  the opportunity to go as far as their own tempermanent, energy, 
  characteristics, and intelligence will take them. The crucial factor in coming 
  up with a harmonious society is not equal outcomes, it is abundance of 
  opportunity. We are talking straight out of a tradition that until 30 years 
  ago had virtually no intellectual challenge. It is only in the last 30 years 
  that people have lost sight of those fundamental tenets of the American idea. 
  And Thomas Jefferson would read The Bell Curve and, I like to think, nodding 
  his head in approval. He believed there was a natural aristocracy that would 
  make the republican experiment work. Personally I don't like the term "natural 
  aristocracy" because I don't think the cognitive elite that we have now is all 
  that great. 
  
Skeptic: Along the these political lines, with your previous work in many 
  circles you have been the intellectual darling of the conservative 
  anti-welfare crowd. But now that your book has stirred things up, do you feel 
  that your former allies and friends are now running away from you, and how do 
  you feel about that behavior?
  
 Murray: I assumed that when the book came out that a lot of people that 
  used to think I was really neat would now say, "Charles Who?"
  
 Skeptic: Has that happened?
  
 Murray: I'm surprised at the extent that it has not. I thought that my 
  political life would end. There seems to be a reflexive, almost deep inner 
  panic, in an awful lot of people to be on the right side of The Bell Curve 
  issue. And the right side is being perceived publically that you are shocked 
  that these authors would suggest that intelligence has an important role in 
  social problems; shock to think that anyone would still suggest there are 
  differences among the races in intelligence. I've seen people, who I thought 
  were both smart and honest, lie when it comes to the book. 
  
Skeptic: Can you still be friends with these people?
  
 Murray: No.
  
 Skeptic: As I've said, at Skeptic were are skeptical of everything. Given 
  your experience do you think that the American political process can deal with 
  the fact that Homo sapiens is a biological species, subject to the same laws 
  of evolution and genetics as other animals? Can a democracy deal with the 
  information in The Bell Curve? 
  
Murray: Actually, I'm optimistic on this score. This book has created in 
  the news media a type of hysteria, where it has been denounced not just as 
  wrong, but as evil and misguided. But there are now over 400,000 copies of the 
  book in print, and as my wife points out, correctly I think, people do not 
  plunk down $30.00 to buy a pseudoscience, racist track. They just don't do 
  that. They are reading the book and talking about it.
  
 I think what has happened to American intellectual life is that we have 
  undergone a temporary aberation--30 years, short as these things go- -whereby 
  we have tried to deny all sorts of realities about human biological 
  characteristics. The best thing about this book is that these issues have been 
  taken away from the ??chattering?? classes. They are now out there in public 
  discourse in a way that is going to provide cover for a lot of good scholars 
  who want to talk more openly about these issues but have been reluctant to. 
  I'm Panglossian in my optimism. 
  
Skeptic: What happened the last 30 years? 
  
Murray: What happened in the 1960s, and now I'm citing from Losing Ground, 
  was a fundamental change in the view of how society works and what individual 
  responsiblity is, and this includes everything from education to law 
  enforcement to the use of lawsuits, etc. It was a very widespread, but I think 
  temporary, change that we are just now beginning to recover from and I think 
  one of the lessons of this most recent election has nothing to do with people 
  wanting a middle-class tax cut. It has to do with people wanting to return to 
  a much more original view of how America is suppose to work.
  
 Skeptic: Let me follow up on that. Hillary Rodham Clinton was in charge of 
  the President's attempt to get a welfare reform, but it didn't go through. No 
  one would say that was because she didn't have sufficient intelligence, 
  energy, knowledge, whatever. When I see your idealistic vision of what you 
  would like to have in America it doesn't seem realistic. You are being 
  Panglossian.
  
 Murray: I was Panglossian about these issues getting into the public 
  dialogue. Now let me shift to being the pessimistic curmudgeon, of which I'm 
  much more comfortable being! And that has to do with looking ahead to the long 
  term. Hillary Rodham Clinton is the personification of what worried Dick 
  Herrnstein and I about the cognitive elite. I'm sure she has a high I.Q. 
  score. She, and for that matter her husband Bill, are both examples of people 
  who by the age of 18 had been siphoned off into elite colleges and have spent 
  the rest of their lives interacting with other people very much like them--the 
  cognitive elite. And what happened in the Helm's bill [Frank: explain what 
  this is] is a classic example of what happens when the cognitive elite has 
  been talking to itself too long, and thinks it knows what's best for everyone. 
  In this case, fortunately, they were derailled.
  
In the longer term what scares me is that the cognitive elite is, indeed, a 
  powerful enough force to continue to rig the rules of the game. We are in 
  favor of deregulation and decentralization, but I'm afraid the cognitive elite 
  are going to make these things very difficult to carry out.
  
 Skeptic: This bewilders me. You seem to say two different and possibly 
  contradictory things. One, The Bell Curve finds the tremendous advantages that 
  high I.Q. people have and which can be interpreted in a very elitist manner. 
  Then, the libertarian Charles Murray emerges and says, well, the average Joe 
  can run his life better than anyone else. How do you have it both ways? 
  
Murray: Because running one's life is a matter of making all sorts of 
  choices, and the satisfactions one achieves from running one's own life is 
  inextricably linked with having been the person to make those choices. Someone 
  with an income of $30,000 a year who made it himself I submit to you is a 
  happier man than someone who got that same $30,000 unearned, whether it comes 
  from welfare or trust funds. People running their own lives, taking 
  responsibility for their own actions, that's the way human beings are wired to 
  live satisfying lives.
  
 Skeptic: So you really are a volunteerist on this. You are not a 
  determinist. You are not saying everything is in the genes. You think free 
  will is a meaningful concept.
  
 Murray: Yes, and so did Dick Herrnstein, who was a student of B.F. 
  Skinner.
  
 Skeptic: Who didn't!
  
 Murray: Yes, and Dick evolved a lot from his days as a behaviorist. One of 
  the most difficult things to get across to people is that one may talk about 
  genes playing an important role without being forced into anything resembling 
  a determinist view of the world. But it is a contradiction only in this sense. 
  The people who run their own lives are not necessarily going to make decisions 
  that maximize anything in terms of some external source of comparison. In the 
  Hillary Rodham Clinton world they might look at the things you have done or 
  the choice you have made, and say, "no, no, if you would have done this other 
  thing you would have had more money, you would have had more security, etc." 
  I'm saying that a lot of the basis for deciding whether the decisions one 
  makes in running one's life are right or wrong has nothing to do with these 
  types of external criteria. 
  
You've asked very difficult questions that are hard to answer in a few 
  sentences . . . but they are good questions.
  
 Skeptic: Well, that's what we tend to do at Skeptic. Is there anything you 
  would like to add in conclusion? 
  
Murray: I've enjoyed the interview. The only thing I would add is my own 
  unhappiness at the way that Dick Herrnstein's name has been eclipsed. As I've 
  said to Susan Herrnstein, she would not be pleased to have Dick being called 
  all the names I have been called over this issue. 
  
Skeptic: Yes, but he seemed to give more than he got in his lifetime.
  
 Murray: I have confidence that in five years from now, and thereafter, 
  this book will be seen as a major accomplishment. I also want it to be known 
  that this collaboration between a political scientist and a psychologist is 
  something I'm immensly proud of. Working with Dick was this wonderful 
  experience of dealing with a man who loved and respected data, and respected 
  the scholarly ideal of getting it right, absolutely right. And we think we 
  did. 
  
Bibliography 
  
Gardner, Howard. 1993. Multiple Intelligences. New York: Basic Books. 
  
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1981. The Mismeasure of Man. New York: Norton. 
  
Herrnstein, Richard J. and Murray, Charles. The Bell Curve. New York: Free 
  Press.
  
 Kaus, Mickey. 1992. The End of Equality. New York: Basic Books. 
  
Murray, Charles. 1984. Losing Ground. New York: Basic Books. 
  
Reich, Robert. 1991. The Work of Nations. New York: Knopf. 
  
Snyderman, Mark and Rothman, Stanley. 1990. The IQ Controversy. New 
  Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 
  
Sternberg, Robert. 1988. The Triarchic Mind. New York: Viking. 
  
The Wall Street Journal. December 13, 1994. "Mainstream Science on 
  Intelligence." P. A-17. 
  
Transtopia
- Main
- Pierre Teilhard De Chardin
- Introduction
- Principles
- Symbolism
- FAQ
- Transhumanism
- Cryonics
- Island Project
- PC-Free Zone
 
 
 
 
 
Prometheism News


 
