\n<\/p>\n
Abstract <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
I am focusing here on the main counterarguments that were raised against a thesis I put forward in my article Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism (2009), namely that significant similarities can be found on a fundamental level between the concept of the posthuman, as put forward by some transhumanists, and Nietzsches concept of the overhuman. The articles with the counterarguments were published in the recent Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms issue of The Journal of Evolution and Technology (January-July 2010). As several commentators referred to identical issues, I decided that it would be appropriate not to respond to each of the articles individually, but to focus on the central arguments and to deal with the counterarguments mentioned in the various replies. I am concerned with each topic in a separate section. The sections are entitled as follows: 1. Technology and evolution; 2. Overcoming nihilism; 3. Politics and liberalism; 4. Utilitarianism or virtue ethics?; 5. The good Life; 6. Creativity and the will to power; 7. Immortality and longevity; 8. Logocentrism; 9. The Third Reich. When dealing with the various topics, I am not merely responding to counterarguments; I also raise questions concerning transhumanism and put forward my own views concerning some of the questions I am dealing with. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
I am very grateful for the provocative replies to my article Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism (2009), published in the recent Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms issue of The Journal of Evolution and Technologyy (January-July 2010). In the following nine sections, I will address the most relevant arguments that have been put forward against some of the points I was raising. As several commentators referred to identical issues, I decided that it would be appropriate not to respond to each of the articles individually, but to focus on the central arguments and to deal with the counterarguments mentioned in the various replies. I will be concerned with each topic in a separate section. The sections will be entitled as follows: 1. Technology and evolution; 2. Overcoming nihilism; 3. Politics and liberalism; 4. Utilitarianism or virtue ethics?; 5. The good life; 6. Creativity and the will to power; 7. Immortality and longevity; 8. Logocentrism; 9. The Third Reich. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1. Technology and evolution <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
One of the central issues that many commentators discussed was the appropriate understanding of who is the overhuman and how can he come about. In the final paragraphs of his article, Hauskeller attacks the idea that Nietzsches overhuman is to be understood in an evolutionary sense (2010, 7). However, I can confidently claim that he is wrong in this respect. Let me list the most important reasons for this. First, Nietzsche saw human beings as the link between animals and overhumans (KSA, Za, 4, 16). How is this to be understood, if not in the evolutionary sense? Second, Nietzsche valued Darwin immensely. Nietzsche readers frequently point out that Nietzsche was very critical of Darwin, and falsely conclude from this that he did not hold a theory of evolution. But the inference is false, as is their understanding of Nietzsches evaluation of Darwin. It is true that Nietzsches remarks concerning Darwin were critical. However, he criticized him for a specific reason: not for putting forward a theory of evolution, but for putting forward a theory of evolution based on the assumption that the fundamental goal of human beings is their struggle for survival (KSA, GD, 6, 120). According to Nietzsche, the world is will to power, and hence the fundamental goal of human beings is power, too (KSA, GD, 6, 120). Why, one might wonder, if Nietzsche was so close to Darwin, did he have to be so critical of him? Nietzsche stresses explicitly that he distances himself most vehemently from those to whom he feels closest. In order to give a clear shape to his philosophy, he deals most carefully and intensely with those who are closest to his way of thinking, which is the reason why he permanently argues against Socrates (KSA, NF, 8, 97). The same applies to all those thinkers, such as Darwin, with whom he shares many basic insights. Hence, Nietzsche is not arguing with Darwin over the plausibility of the theory of evolution but concerning the appropriate understanding of the theory and the fundamental theory of action that underlies it. Third, a simple way of showing that Nietzsche did hold a theory of evolution is by referring not only to the writings he published himself, but also to those of his writings that were published by others later on. Here one finds several clear attempts at developing a theory of evolution (KSA, NF, 13, 316-317). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Fourth, many of the commentators are correct in stressing that Nietzsche regarded education as the primary means for realizing the overhuman and the evolutionary changes that would enable the overhuman to come into existence. However, Nietzsche also talks about breeding in some passages of his notebooks. In my recent monograph on the concept of human dignity (2010, 226-232), I described in detail how the evolutionary process towards the overhuman is supposed to occur from Nietzsches perspective. In short, Nietzsche regards it as possible to achieve by means of education. Thereby, the more active human beings become stronger and turn into higher human beings, such that the gap between active and passive human beings widens itself. Eventually, it can occur that the group of the active and that of the passive human beings stand for two types of human beings which represent the outer limits of what the human type can be or what can be understood as belonging to the human species. If such a state is reached, then an evolutionary step towards a new species can occur and the overhuman can come into existence. Many transhumanists, by contrast, focus on various means of enhancement, in particular genetic enhancement, for such an event to occur. In both cases, the goal is to move from natural selection towards a type of human selection, even though the expression human selection sounds strange particularly, perhaps, for many contemporary Germans. Yet, I do not think that human selection must be a morally dubious procedure. If the selection is a liberal one, i.e. a type of selection undertaken within a liberal and democratic society, many problematic aspects vanish. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Even though transhumanist thinkers and Nietzsche appear to differ over the primary means of bringing about an evolutionary change, I think the appearance is deceptive. Classical education and genetic enhancement strike me as structurally analogous procedures, and in the following section I will offer some reasons for holding this position. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1 Technology <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Quite a few commentators have pointed out that that Nietzsche regarded education as the main means of bringing about the overhuman, whereas transhumanists focus on technological means of altering human beings to realize the posthuman. Blackford explicitly stresses this in the editorial of the Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms issue: It is unclear what Nietzsche would make of such a technologically-mediated form of evolution in human psychology, capacities, and (perhaps) morphology (2010, ii). Certainly, this is a correct estimation. Max More is also right when he stresses the following: From both the individual and the species perspective, the concept of self-overcoming resonates strongly with extropic transhumanist ideals and goals. Although Nietzsche had little to say about technology as a means of self-overcoming neither did he rule it out (2010, 2). Stambler, on the other hand, goes much further and declares confidently: in addition [...] his denial of scientific knowledge and disregard of technology [...] are elements that make it difficult to accept him as an ideological forerunner of transhumanism (2010, 19). Stambler supports his doubts about Nietzsches ancestry of transhumanism by stressing the point in a further passage: Nietzsche too placed a much greater stock in literary theory than in science and technology (2010, 22). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
I can understand Blackford and More who doubt whether Nietzsche would have been affirmative of technological means of enhancing human beings. However, Stamblers remarks concerning Nietzsche are rather dubious given the current state of the art in Nietzsche scholarship. Stambler writes that Nietzsche denies scientific knowledge. However, it needs to be stressed that Nietzsche rejected the possibility of gaining knowledge of the world, as that is understood within a correspondence theory of truth, by any method, whether the sciences, the arts, philosophy or any other means of enquiry, since he held that each perspective is already an interpretation. It is false to infer from this that Nietzsche had a disrespect for science. On the contrary, he was well aware that the future would be governed by the scientific spirit (Sorgner 2007, 140-158). As he found it implausible to hold that there is an absolute criterion of truth, what was important for a worldview to be regarded as superior and plausible was that it corresponds to the spirit of the times. Nietzsche himself put forward theories that he regarded as appealing for scientifically minded people so that his worldview might become plausible. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Indeed, Nietzsche's respect for the various sciences is immense. He upholds a theory of evolution which is based upon a naturalistic worldview that can be summarized by the term will to power (Sorgner 2007, 40-65). In addition, he puts forward the eternal recurrence of everything, which he tries to prove intellectually by reference to the scientific insights of his day. Unfortunately, he fails to put forward a valid argument, even though it would have been possible for him to have one. Elsewhere, I have reconstructed a possible argument and shown that the premises which must be true for the eternal recurrence to occur are such as correspond to contemporary scientific insights (Sorgner 2009b, vol. 2, 919-922). In addition to all this, Nietzsche wanted to transfer to Paris to study natural sciences in order to be able to prove the validity of the eternal recurrence (Andreas-Salome 1994, 172). Thus his high estimation of the sciences becomes clear. This does not mean, of course, that he disrespects the literary arts. However, it shows that he does not regard scientific enquiry and literary theory as two antagonistic approaches to philosophy, as Stambler claims. Nietzsche accepts the value of both approaches and stresses the great importance of scientific approaches for the future, and he is right in doing so. In this regard, his approach is very similar to that put forward by Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Is it possible to infer from Nietzsches high estimation of the sciences that he would have been in favor of enhancement procedures by means of technology? Not necessarily. However, there are good reasons for holding that the procedures of classical education and genetic enhancement are structurally analogous. Given that Nietzsche was in favor of education to bring about the overhuman, and assuming that classical education and genetic enhancement are structurally analogous procedures, there are good reasons for concluding that Nietzsche would have been affirmative of technological means for bringing about the overhuman. I am currently working on a monograph on the relationship between genetic enhancement and classical education, and in the following sections I will summarize some of its important points. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1.1 Education and enhancement as structurally analogous procedures <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Habermas (2001, 91) has criticized the position that educational and genetic enhancements are parallel events, a position held by Robertson (1994, 167). I, on the other hand, wish to show that there is a structural analogy between educational and genetic enhancement such that their moral evaluation ought also to be analogous (Habermas 2001, 87). Both procedures have in common that decisions are being made by parents concerning the development of their child, at a stage where the child cannot yet decide for himself what it should do. In the case of genetic enhancement, we are faced with the choice between genetic roulette vs genetic enhancement. In the case of educational enhancement, we face the options of a Kasper Hauser lifestyle vs parental guidance. First, I will address two fundamental, but related, claims that Habermas puts forward against the parallel between genetic and educative enhancement: that genetic enhancement is irreversible, and that educative enhancement is reversible. Afterwards, I will add a further insight concerning the potential of education and enhancement for evolution given the latest findings of epigenetic research. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1.1.1 Irreversibility of genetic enhancement <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
According to Habermas, one claim against the parallel between genetic and educative enhancement is that genetic enhancement is irreversible. However, as recent research has shown, this claim is implausible, if not plain false. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Let us consider the lesbian couple discussed by Agar (2004, 12-14) who were both deaf and who chose a deaf sperm donor in order to have a deaf child (Agar 2004, 12-14). Actually, the child can hear a bit in one ear, but this is unimportant for my current purpose. According to the couple, deafness is not a defect, but merely represents a being different. The couple was able to realize their wish and in this way managed to have a mostly deaf child. If germ-line gene therapy worked, then they could have had a non-deaf donor, changed the appropriate genes, and still brought about a deaf child. However, given that the deafness in question is one of the inner ear, it would then be possible for the person in question to go to a doctor later on and ask for surgery in which he receives an implant that enables him to hear. It is already possible to perform such an operation with such an implant. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Of course, it can be argued in such a case that the genotype was not reversed, but merely the phenotype. This is correct. However, the example also shows that qualities which come about due to a genetic setting are not necessarily irreversible. They can be changed by such means as surgery. Deaf people can sometimes undergo a surgical procedure so they can hear again, depending on the type of deafness they have and when the surgery takes place. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
One could object that the consequences of educational enhancement can be reversed autonomously whereas in the case of genetic alterations one needs a surgeon, or other external help, to bring about a reversal. This is incorrect again, as I will show later. It is not true that all consequences of educational enhancement can be reversed. In addition one can reply that by means of somatic gene therapy, it is even possible to change the genetic set up of a person. One of the most striking examples in this context is siRNA therapy. By means of siRNA therapy, genes can get silenced. In the following paragraph, I state a brief summary of what siRNA therapy has achieved so far. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In 2002, the journal Science referred to RNAi as the Technology of the Year, and McCaffrey et al. published a paper in Nature in which they specified that siRNA functions in mice and rats (2002, 38-9). That siRNAs can be used therapeutically in animals was demonstrated by Song et al. in 2003. By means of this type of therapy (RNA interference targeting Fas), mice can be protected from fulminant hepatitis (Song et al. 2003, 347-51). A year later, it was shown that genes at transcriptional level can be silenced by means of siRNA (Morris 2004, 1289-1292). Due to the enormous potential of siRNA, Andrew Fire and Craig Mello were awarded the Nobel prize in medicine for discovering RNAi mechanism in 2006. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given the empirical data concerning siRNA, it is plausible to claim that the following process is theoretically possible, and hence that genetic states do not have to be fixed: 1. An embryo with brown eyes can be selected by means of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD); 2. The adult does not like his eye color; 3. Accordingly, he asks medics to provide him with siRNA therapy to change the gene related to his eye colour; 4. The altered genes bring it about that the eye color changes. Another option would be available if germ line gene-therapy became effective. In that case, we could change a gene using germ-line gene therapy to bring about a quality x. Imagine that the quality x is disapproved of by the later adult. Hence, he decides to undergo siRNA therapy to silence the altered gene again. Such a procedure is theoretically possible. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
However, we do not have to use fictional examples to show that alterations brought about by genetic enhancement are reversible; we may simply look at the latest developments in gene therapy. A 23-year-old British male, Robert Johnson, suffered from Lebers congenital amaurosis, which is an inherited blinding disease. Early in 2007, he underwent surgery at Moorfields Eye Hospital and University College Londons Institute of Ophthalmology. This represented the worlds first gene therapy trial for an inherited retinal disease. In April 2008, The New England Journal of Medicine published the results of this operation, which revealed its success, as the patient had obtained a modest increase in vision with no apparent side-effects (Maguire et al. 2008, 2240-2248). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In this case, it was a therapeutic use of genetic modification. As genes can be altered for therapeutic purposes, they can also be altered for non-therapeutic ends (assuming one wishes to uphold the problematic distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic ends). The examples mentioned here clearly show that qualities brought about by means of genetic enhancement do not have to be irreversible. However, the parallels between genetic and educative enhancement go even further. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1.1.2 Reversibility of educative enhancement <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
According to Habermas, character traits brought about by educative means are reversible. Because of this crucial assumption, he rejects the proposition that educative and genetic enhancement are parallel processes. Aristotle disagrees, and he is right in doing so. According to Aristotle, a hexis, a basic stable attitude, gets established by means of repetition (EN 1103a). You become brave, if you continuously act in a brave manner. By playing a guitar, you turn into a guitar player. By acting with moderation, you become moderate. Aristotle makes clear that by means of repeating a certain type of action, you establish the type in your character, you form a basic stable attitude, a hexis. In The Categories, he makes clear that the hexis is extremely stable (Cat. 8, 8b27-35). In the Nichomachean Ethics, he goes even further and claims that once one has established a basic stable attitude it is impossible to get rid of it again (EN III 7, 1114a19-21). Buddensiek (2002, 190) has correctly interpreted this passage as claiming that once a hexis, a basic stable attitude, has been formed or established, it is an irreversible part of the person's character. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Aristotles position gets support from Freud, who made the following claim: It follows from what I have said that the neuroses can be completely prevented but are completely incurable (cited in Malcolm 1984, 24). According to Freud, Angstneurosen were a particularly striking example (Rabelhofer 2006, 38). Much time has passed since Freud, and much research has taken place. However, in recent publications concerning psychiatric and psychotherapeutic findings, it is still clear that psychological diseases can be incurable (Beese 2004, 20). Psychological disorders are not intentionally brought about by educative means. However, much empirical research has been done in the field of illnesses and their origin in early childhood. Since irreversible states of psychological disorders can come about from events or actions in childhood, it is clear that other irreversible effects can happen through proper educative measures. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Medical research has shown, and most physicians agree, that Post Traumatic Stress Disorders can not only become chronic, but also lead to a permanent personality disturbance (Rentrop et al. 2009, 373). They come about because of exceptional events that represent an enormous burden and change within someones life. Obsessional neuroses are another such case. According to the latest numbers, only 10 to 15 % of patients get cured, and in most cases the neurosis turns into a chronic disease (Rentrop et al. 2009, 368). Another disturbance which one could refer to is the borderline syndrome, which is a type of personality disorder. It can be related to events or actions in early childhood, such as violence or child abuse. In most cases, this is a chronic disease (Rentrop et al. 2009, 459). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given the examples mentioned, it is clear that actions and events during ones lifetime can produce permanent and irreversible states. In the above cases, it is disadvantageous to the person in question. In the case of an Aristotelian hexis, however, it is an advantage for the person in question if he or she establishes a virtue in this manner. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
To provide further intuitive support for the position that qualities established by educational enhancement can be irreversible, one can simply think about learning to ride a bike, tie ones shoe laces, play the piano or speak ones mother tongue. Children get educated for years and years to undertake these tasks. Even when one moves into a different country, or if one does not ride the bike for many years, it is difficult, if not impossible, to completely eliminate the acquired skill. Hence, it is very plausible that educative enhancement can have irreversible consequences, and that Habermas is doubly wrong: genetic enhancement can have consequences that are reversible, and educative enhancement can have consequences that are irreversible. Given these insights, the parallel between genetic and educative enhancement gains additional support. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1.1.3 Education, enhancement and evolution <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Can education bring about changes that have an influence on the potential offspring of the person who gets educated? As inheritance depends upon genes, and genes do not get altered by means of education, it has seemed that education cannot be relevant for the process of evolution. Hence, Lamarckism, the heritability of acquired characteristics, has not been very fashionable for some time. However, in recent decades doubts have been raised concerning this position, based on research on epigenetics. Together with Japlonka and Lamb (2005, 248), I can stress that the study of epigenetics and epigenetic inheritance systems (EISs) is young and hard evidence is sparse, but there are some very telling indications that it may be very important. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Besides the genetic code, the epigenetic code, too, is relevant for creating phenotypes, and it can get altered by environmental influences. The epigenetic inheritance systems belong to three supragenetic inheritance systems that Japlonka and Lamb distinguish. These authors also stress that through the supragenetic inheritance systems, complex organisms can pass on some acquired characteristics. So Lamarckian evolution is certainly possible for them (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 107).1 <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given recent work in this field, it is likely that stress,2 education,3 drugs, medicine or diet can bring about epigenetic alterations that, again, can be responsible for an alteration of cell structures (Japlonka\/Lamb 2005, 121) and the activation or silencing of genes (2005, 117).4 In some cases, the possibility cannot be excluded that such alterations might lead to an enhanced version of evolution. Japlonka and Lamb stress the following: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The point is that epigenetic variants exist, and are known to show typical Mendelian patterns of inheritance. They therefore need to be studied. If there is heredity in the epigenetic dimension, then there is evolution, too. (2005, 359) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
They also point out that the transfer of epigenetic information from one generation to the next has been found, and that in theory it can lead to evolutionary change (2005, 153). Their reason for holding this position is partly that new epigenetic marks might be induced in both somatic and germ-line cells (2005, 145). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
A mothers diet can also bring about such alterations, according to Japlonka and Lamb (2005, 144), hence the same potential as the ones stated before applies equally to the next method of bringing about a posthuman, i.e. it is possible that the posthuman can come about by means of educational as well as genetics enhancement procedures. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.1.1.4 Nietzsche and Technology <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given the above analysis, I conclude that Habermas is wrong concerning fundamental issues when he denies that educational and genetic enhancements are parallel events. Even if the parallel between educational and genetic enhancement is accepted, however, it does not solve the elementary challenges connected to it, such as questions concerning the appropriate good that motivates efforts at enhancement. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Even though I am unable to discuss that issue further here, this analysis provides me with a reason to think that Nietzsche would have been in favor of technological means for bringing about the overhuman. Nietzsche held that the overhuman comes into existence primarily by means of educational procedures. I have shown that the procedures of education and genetic enhancement are structurally analogous. Hence, it seems plausible to hold that Nietzsche would also have been positive about technological means for realizing the overhuman. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
2. Overcoming nihilism <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The next topic I wish to address is that of nihilism. More mentioned it, and I think that some further remarks should be added to what he said. I think that More is right in pointing out that Nietzsche stresses the necessity to overcome nihilism. Nietzsche is in favor of a move towards a positive (but continually evolving) value-perspective (2010, 2). More agrees with Nietzsche in this respect, and holds that nihilism has to be overcome. However, before talking critically about nihilism one has to distinguish its various forms. It is important not to mix up aletheic and ethical nihilism, because different dangers are related to each of the concepts. Aletheic nihilism stands for the view that it is currently impossible to obtain knowledge of the world, as that is understood in a correspondence theory of truth. Ethical nihilism, on the other hand, represents the judgment that universal ethical guidelines that apply to a certain culture are currently absent. To move beyond ethical nihilism does not imply that one reestablishes ethical principles with an ultimate foundation, but it merely means that ethical guideline which apply universally within a community get reestablished (Sorgner 2010, 134-135). Nietzsches perspectivism, according to which every perspective is an interpretation, implies his affirmation of aletheic nihilism (Sorgner 2010, 113-117). I think Nietzsches position is correct in this respect. Ethical nihilism, on the other hand, can imply that the basis of human acts is a hedonistic calculation, and Nietzsche is very critical of hedonism (KSA, JGB, 5, 160). He definitely favored going beyond ethical nihilism, but I doubt that his vision concerning the beyond is an appealing one. In general, I find it highly problematic to go beyond ethical nihilism, because of the potentially paternalistic structures that must accompany such a move. I will make some further remarks concerning this point in the next section. From my remarks here, it becomes clear that there are good reasons for affirming both types of nihilism in contrast to Nietzsche, who hopes that it will be possible to go beyond the currently dominant ethical nihilism which he sees embodied in the last man whom he characterizes so clearly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Coming back to aletheic nihilism, I wish to stress that, like Nietzsche, I regard this type of nihilism as a valuable achievement and I regard it as the only epistemic position that I can truthfully affirm. Why is it valuable? Aletheic nihilism helps to avoid the coming about of violent and paternalistic structures. Religious fundamentalists claim that homosexual marriages ought to be forbidden because they are unnatural. What the concept unnatural implies is that the correspondence theory represents a correct insight into the true nature of the world. Political defenders of a concept of nature act like a good father who wishes to institutionalize his insight to stop others from committing evil acts. The concept natural implies the epistemic superiority of the judgment to which it applies. Aletheic nihilism, on the other hand, implies that any judgment and all concepts of the natural are based on personal prejudices and that each represents a specific perspective not necessarily anything more. Religious fundamentalists commit an act of violence by claiming that x is an unnatural act, which then implies that those (a, b, & c) who commit act x do some evil, and thereby these fundamentalists look down upon a, b, and c who suffer from being humiliated. If we realize that all judgments are interpretations based upon personal prejudices, it is easier to refrain from universalizing ones own values and norms and to accept that other human beings uphold different values and norms. Hence, it becomes a matter of negotiation and a fight between various interest groups which norms get established in a political system. If we affirm aletheic nihilism, no norm is a priori false or true and the argument that a value is evil or false cannot get further support by means of reference to God or nature. Instead, one needs to appeal to more pragmatic and this-worldly aspects, such as the consequences of a rule or the attitude of someone who commits the corresponding acts. I regard these lines of argument as valuable and appropriate for our times, and I am not claiming that there is just one pragmatic way of arriving at an appropriate decision. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
3. Politics and liberalism <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given the argument of the previous section, it is not surprising that I was slightly worried when I read that Roden affirms the move away from bio-political organizations such as liberalism or capitalism (2010, 34). I wonder what is the alternative, because I think we have done pretty well recently in Western industrial countries with liberal and social versions of democracy. I do not think that there is nothing which can get improved or criticized, but generally speaking I am very happy living in a Western liberal democracy with a well developed health system and permanently new technological innovations that help us in improving our lives as long as we do not let ourselves get dominated by these developments. Most other types of political organization so far have led to paternalistic systems in which the leaders exploited the citizens in the name of the common good. Any system that does not sufficiently stress the norm of negative freedom brings about structures which are strongly paternalistic. I do not think that social liberal democracies are the final answer to all questions or that they are metaphysically superior to other types of political organization, but I think that pragmatically they seem to work pretty well. In addition, I am afraid of the violence and cruelties related to political structures that are based upon stronger notions of the public good. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
An apparent difference between transhumanism and Nietzsches philosophy in this respect is pointed out by Hauskeller, who stresses that transhumanists aim at making the world a better place, whereas Nietzsche does not because he supposedly holds that there is no truly better or worse, and so does not aim at bettering humanity (2010, 5). There is some truth in what Hauskeller says. However, Nietzsche did have a political vision, even though he also claimed to be a non-political thinker. I think that his political vision, which I described in detail in my recent monograph (2010, 218-32), is not very appealing, because it leads to a two-class society in which a small class of people can dedicate themselves to the creation of culture, while the rest of humanity has to care for the pragmatic background so that the small group of artists can dedicate themselves to such a life style. This is Nietzsches suggestion of how ethical nihilism ought to get transcended. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Given this vision, it seems that there is a clear difference between Nietzsches view and that of transhumanists. However, I do not think that this is necessarily the case. The danger of a two-class society also applies to many visions of transhumanists, especially if an overly libertarian version gets adopted. Transhumanism can lead to a genetic divide and a two-class society, as has been shown convincingly in the Gattaca argument. In particular, a solely libertarian type of transhumanism implies the danger of a genetic divide that would not be too different from Nietzsches vision. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Again, I agree with Mores judgment that the goals of transhumanists and Nietzsche do not have to imply any kind of illiberal social or political system (2010, 4). However, in the case of Nietzsche it is more plausible to interpret his political vision such that it is not a very appealing one, because it leads towards a two-class society. This danger can also arise from an overly libertarian type of transhumanism. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
James Hughes (2004) has put forward some plausible arguments why a social democratic version of transhumanism might be more appropriate. I have some reservations about both social-democratic and libertarian positions, even though I share many basic premises of both. I share Hughes fear that a libertarian type of transhumanism leads to a genetic divide. However, I also fear that a social democratic version of transhumanism might not sufficiently consider the wonderful norm of negative freedom for which several interest groups have been fighting since the Enlightenment so that we nowadays can benefit from the results of these struggles. I regard a dialectic solution as more plausible; this implies that there is no ideal political system which can serve as the final goal towards which all systems ought to strive. Any system brings about challenges that cannot get solved within the system, but they can be resolved by altering the system. As this insight applies both to libertarian and social democratic systems, a pragmatic pendulum between those extremes might be the best we can achieve, which also implies that we permanently have to adapt ourselves dynamically to the new demands of social institutions and scientific developments. Dynamic adaptation works best in the process of evolution and might be the best we can achieve on a cultural level, which includes our political systems, too. Hence, not sticking dogmatically to ones former evaluations might not be a sign of weakness, but of dynamic integrity (Birx 2006). <\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
See the rest here:<\/p>\n
Beyond Humanism: Reflections on Trans- and Posthumanism<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Abstract I am focusing here on the main counterarguments that were raised against a thesis I put forward in my article Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism (2009), namely that significant similarities can be found on a fundamental level between the concept of the posthuman, as put forward by some transhumanists, and Nietzsches concept of the overhuman. The articles with the counterarguments were published in the recent Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms issue of The Journal of Evolution and Technology (January-July 2010). Continue reading