{"id":49399,"date":"2014-12-17T15:46:49","date_gmt":"2014-12-17T20:46:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/feds-used-adobe-flash-to-identify-tor-users-visiting-child-porn-sites\/"},"modified":"2014-12-17T15:46:49","modified_gmt":"2014-12-17T20:46:49","slug":"feds-used-adobe-flash-to-identify-tor-users-visiting-child-porn-sites","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/tor-browser\/feds-used-adobe-flash-to-identify-tor-users-visiting-child-porn-sites\/","title":{"rendered":"Feds used Adobe Flash to identify Tor users visiting child porn sites"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    A little more than 16 months ago, word emerged that the        FBI exploited a recently patched Firefox vulnerability to    unmask Tor users visiting a notorious child pornography    site. It turns out that the feds had waged an even broader    uncloaking campaign a year earlier by using a long-abandoned    part of the open source Metasploit exploit framework to    identify Tor-using suspects.  <\/p>\n<p>    The Decloaking Engine went live in 2006 and used five separate    methods to break anonymization systems. One method was an Adobe    Flash application that initiated a direct connection with the    end user, bypassing Tor protections and giving up the user's IP    address. Tor Project officials have long been aware of the    vulnerability and strenuously advise against installing Flash.    According to Wired:  <\/p>\n<p>      The decloaking demonstration eventually was rendered obsolete      by a nearly idiot-proof version of the Tor client called the      Tor Browser Bundle, which made security blunders more      difficult. By 2011, Moore says virtually everyone visiting      the Metasploit decloaking site was passing the anonymity      test, so he retired the service. But when the bureau obtained      its Operation Torpedo warrants the following year, it chose      Moores Flash code as its network investigative      techniquethe FBIs lingo for a court-approved spyware      deployment.    <\/p>\n<p>      Torpedo unfolded when the FBI seized control of a trio of      Dark Net child porn sites based in Nebraska. Armed with a      special search warrant crafted by Justice Department lawyers      in Washington DC, the FBI used the sites to deliver the Flash      application to visitors browsers, tricking some of them into      identifying their real IP address to an FBI server. The      operation identified 25 users in the US and an unknown number      abroad.    <\/p>\n<p>      Gross learned from prosecutors that the FBI used the      Decloaking Engine for the attack  they even provided a link      to the code on Archive.org. Compared to other FBI spyware      deployments, the Decloaking Engine was pretty mild. In other      cases, the FBI has, with court approval, used malware to      covertly access a targets files, location, web history and      webcam. But Operation Torpedo is notable in one way.      Its the first timethat we know ofthat the FBI      deployed such code broadly against every visitor to a      website, instead of targeting a particular suspect.    <\/p>\n<p>      The tactic is a direct response to the growing popularity of      Tor and, in particular, an explosion in so-called hidden      servicesspecial websites, with addresses ending in .onion,      that can be reached only over the Tor network.    <\/p>\n<p>      Hidden services are a mainstay of the nefarious activities      carried out on the so-called Dark Net, the home of drug      markets, child porn, and other criminal activity. But theyre      also used by organizations that want to evade surveillance or      censorship for legitimate reasons, like human rights groups,      journalists, and, as of October, even Facebook.    <\/p>\n<p>      A big problem with hidden service, from a law enforcement      perspective, is that when the feds track down and seize the      servers, they find that the web server logs are useless to      them. With a conventional crime site, those logs typically      provide a handy list of Internet IP addresses for everyone      using the site  quickly leveraging one bust into a cascade      of dozens, or even hundreds. But over Tor, every incoming      connection traces back only as far as the nearest Tor nodea      dead end.    <\/p>\n<p>    Taken together, Operation Torpedo and the campaign used last    year to identify Tor-using child porn suspects demonstrate the    determination feds show in bypassing Tor protections. They also    underscore the feds' rapidly growing skill. Whereas Operation    Torpedo abused a six-year-old weakness that ensnared only    people who ignored strenuously repeated advice, the latter    operation exploited a vulnerability that had only recently been    patched in Firefox.  <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>Read the original here:<br \/>\n<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/arstechnica.com\/security\/2014\/12\/feds-used-adobe-flash-to-identify-tor-users-visiting-child-porn-sites\" title=\"Feds used Adobe Flash to identify Tor users visiting child porn sites\">Feds used Adobe Flash to identify Tor users visiting child porn sites<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> A little more than 16 months ago, word emerged that the FBI exploited a recently patched Firefox vulnerability to unmask Tor users visiting a notorious child pornography site. It turns out that the feds had waged an even broader uncloaking campaign a year earlier by using a long-abandoned part of the open source Metasploit exploit framework to identify Tor-using suspects. The Decloaking Engine went live in 2006 and used five separate methods to break anonymization systems <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/tor-browser\/feds-used-adobe-flash-to-identify-tor-users-visiting-child-porn-sites\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[94875],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-49399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-tor-browser"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49399"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49399"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49399\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}