The exercise of police discretion to stop people on the street is front and center in todays headlines. In this case, a North Carolina policeman stopped Heiens car because it had a brake light that did not work. During the stop, Heien consented to a search of the car, which yielded cocaine in a duffle bag and Heiens ultimate conviction for attempted drug trafficking. On appeal, the North Carolina appellate courts surprisingly ruled that the outdated state vehicle code required only one working brake light (a stop lamp, in the words of the statute); therefore, there had been no violation of law that would permit the stop. The officer made no error about the facts; but he had been mistaken about the meaning of the law. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled, the officers mistake about this law was reasonable, and for that reason the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable seizures was not violated. This mornings opinion in Heien v. North Carolina affirms that holding. <\/p>\n
Chief Justice Roberts announcing the opinion. (Art Lien) <\/p>\n
The constitutional law of reasonableness The vague word unreasonable in the Fourth Amendment is a lawyers playground, and questions about what sort of circumstances constitutionally permit law enforcement seizures have thus plagued the federal courts since the Fourth Amendment was adopted. In 1813, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the constitutional standard is circumstances which warrant suspicion a relatively unspecific and therefore unhelpful standard. But its unhelpfulness flows from the generality of the amendment itself. It is not judge-made policy; it is constitutional text. <\/p>\n
Over the years the Court has honed its thinking about what constitutes probable cause to stop or search (for example, Illinois v. Gates in 1983), and in Terry v. Ohio in 1968 the Court famously ruled that even brief stops on the street require at least specific and articulable reasonable suspicion, not just hunches. The Court has subsequently made clear that even when police are mistaken about facts, their stops do not violate the Constitution if their mistakes are reasonable. <\/p>\n
Todays opinion <\/p>\n
Today, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, a majority of eight Justices affirmed that there is no reason why this same result should not apply when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law. The Court conceded and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the lone dissenter, agreed that no precedent of the Court has expressly answered this reasonable mistake of law question (scarcely a peep). The Court noted, however, that as early as 1809, the Supreme Court ruled that a reasonable mistake of law about probable cause permitted a customs seizure under a federal statute. By 1860, this general principle had been adopted in numerous [lower court] cases. While acknowledging that the statutory customs cases were not directly on point for the constitutional question, the Court also explained that no decision of this Court in the two centuries since has undermined that understanding that reasonable mistakes of law can excuse governmental action. In fact, the Court explained that in more recent cases, such as Michigan v. DeFillippo, it had found no Fourth Amendment violation even when governmental searches were based on state statutes later declared unconstitutional. (Justice Sotomayor strongly disagreed with this reading.) <\/p>\n
Arguing for Heien, attorney Jeffrey Fisher had struggle[d] to limit the Courts ruling solely [to] the exclusionary rule that is, the remedy in lieu of a more general ruling about the right (that is, whether the officers stop was an unreasonable violation of the amendment). This was likely an attempt to preserve some relief for Heien on remand, because North Carolina purportedly has not adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. But there will be no remand for further proceedings under todays ruling, which flatly affirmed the state courts ruling. The Court said that DeFillippo was plainly a decision about the meaning of probable cause, and thus its holding regarding a reasonable mistake of law cannot be transform[ed] into an exclusionary rule decision. So in this case, because the officers mistake about the meaning of North Carolinas vehicle code was reasonable, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first place. <\/p>\n
(By contrast, the Court also noted that an individual officers mistaken view, no matter how reasonable, that he has complied with the Fourth Amendment, does not undermine a reviewing courts ultimate conclusion that governmental actions have violated the Fourth Amendment even though it might affect the remedy. This significant reservation regarding the scope of the Courts ruling is emphasized in footnote 1 of Justice Elena Kagans concurring opinion, and should not be overlooked.) <\/p>\n
The majoritys limitations, and two separate opinions <\/p>\n
Importantly, particularly in light of recent controversies, the Court observed that the standard of reasonableness for mistakes of law is not as forgiving as some might have it. An officers legal error must be objectively reasonable, and not based on a particular officers subjective understanding or on a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce. Thus, the Court suggested, an officer must learn[] the law, and I would expect that the familiar standard of a reasonably well-trained officer will be rigorously applied by lower courts when confronted with Heien errors in the future. <\/p>\n
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Go here to see the original: The exercise of police discretion to stop people on the street is front and center in todays headlines. In this case, a North Carolina policeman stopped Heiens car because it had a brake light that did not work Continue reading
\nOpinion analysis: Reasonable mistakes of law by police do not violate the Fourth Amendment<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"