{"id":209713,"date":"2017-08-03T23:57:02","date_gmt":"2017-08-04T03:57:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/the-curious-case-of-ex-nsa-inspector-general-george-ellard-cato-institute-blog\/"},"modified":"2017-08-03T23:57:02","modified_gmt":"2017-08-04T03:57:02","slug":"the-curious-case-of-ex-nsa-inspector-general-george-ellard-cato-institute-blog","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/nsa-2\/the-curious-case-of-ex-nsa-inspector-general-george-ellard-cato-institute-blog\/","title":{"rendered":"The Curious Case Of Ex-NSA Inspector General George Ellard &#8211; Cato Institute (blog)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    On August 3, The American    Conservative ran a lengthy piece of mine dealing with the    whistleblower protection nightmare that is the Department of    Defense. One of the subjects of that piece is now former NSA IG    George Ellard, and because I had even more on his case than I    could fit into the TAC piece, I wanted to share the rest of    what I knowand dont knowabout the allegations against    Ellard, the final disposition of the case, why the Obama    administrations whistleblower retaliation fix is itself    broken, and what might be done to actually provide meaningful    protections for would-be national security whistleblowers in    the Pentagon and elsewhere in the national security    establishment.  <\/p>\n<p>    Regarding what little we know about the    specifics of Ellards case, I had this to say in the TAC    piece:  <\/p>\n<p>      As the Project on Government Oversight      firstreportedin      December 2016, a three-member interagency Inspector General      External Review Panel concluded in May 2016 that the      then-Inspector General of the National Security Agency (NSA),      George Ellard, had, according to POGO, himself had      previously retaliated against an NSA whistleblower[.] This      apparently occurred during the very same period that Ellard      hadclaimedthatSnowden      could have come to me. The panel that reviewed Ellards case      recommended he be fired, a decision affirmed by NSA Director      Mike Rogers.    <\/p>\n<p>      But there was a catch: the Secretary of      Defense had the final word on Ellards fate. Outgoing Obama      administration Defense Secretary Ash Carter, apparently      indifferent to the magnitude of the Ellard case, left office      without making a decision.    <\/p>\n<p>      In the months after Donald Trump became      president, rumors swirled inside Washington that Ellard had,      in fact, escaped termination. One source, who requested      anonymity, reported that Ellard had been seen recently on the      NSA campus at Ft. Meade, Maryland. That report, it turns out,      was accurate.    <\/p>\n<p>      On July 21, in response to the authors      inquiry, the Pentagon public affairs office provided the      following statement:    <\/p>\n<p>      NSA followed the appropriate procedures      following a whistleblower retaliation claim against former      NSA Inspector General George Ellard. Following thorough      adjudication procedures, Mr. Ellard continues to be employed      by NSA.    <\/p>\n<p>    After Id finished the TAC piece, Ellards    attorney, Terrence ODonnell of the Washington mega law firm of    Williams & Connolly, sent me the following statement about    his client, George Ellard:  <\/p>\n<p>      The Office of the Assistant Secretary of      Defense (ASD) examined and rejected an allegation that former      NSA Inspector General, George Ellard, had retaliated against      an NSA employee by not selecting that employee to fill a      vacancy in the OIGs Office of Investigations.    <\/p>\n<p>      In a lengthy, detailed, and well-reasoned      memorandum, the ASD concluded that Dr. Ellard had not played      a role in that personnel decision or, in the terms of the      applicable laws and regulations the ASD cited, Dr. Ellard      did not take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to      take any action associated with the personnel      decision.    <\/p>\n<p>      This judgment echoes the conclusion      reached by the Department of Defenses Office of the      Inspector General. An External Review Panel (ERP) later      came to the opposite conclusion, leading to the ASD      review. The ASD concluded that the evidence cited in      the ERP report as reflective of [Dr. Ellards] alleged      retaliatory animus toward Complainant  is of a character so      circumstantial and speculative that it lacks probity.    <\/p>\n<p>      In assessing Dr. Ellards credibility and      in rendering its decision, the ASD also considered Dr.      Ellards distinguished career of public service, spanning      more than 21 years of service across the executive,      legislative, and judicial branches, culminating in almost 10      years of service as the NSA IG. Dr. Ellard, the ASD      noted, has been entrusted to address some of our nations      most challenging national security issues; successive NSA      Directors have consistently rated Dr. Ellards performance as      Exceptional Results and Outstanding; and he has been      commended by well-respected senior officials with whom      [he has] worked closely over the years for [his] ability and      integrity.    <\/p>\n<p>      Dr. Ellard is serving as the NSA Chair on      the faculty of the National War College, a position he held      prior to the ERP review.    <\/p>\n<p>    Quite a bit to unpack in that statement.    Lets start with the ASDs decision to overrule the External    Review Panel (ERP), a key component of the Obama-era PPD-19, the directive designed to prevent    in all government departments or agencies the very kind of    thing Ellard allegedly did. Here are the key paragraphs of    PPD-19 with respect to ERP recommendations:  <\/p>\n<p>        If the External Review Panel determines        that the individual was the subject of a Personnel Action        prohibited by Section A while an employee of a Covered        Agency or an action affecting his or her Eligibility for        Access to Classified Information prohibited by Section B,        the panel may recommend that the agency        head take corrective action to return the employee, as        nearly aspracticable and reasonable, to the position such        employee would have held had the reprisal not occurred and        that the agency head reconsider the employees Eligibility        for Access to Classified Information consistent with the        national security and with Executive Order 12968. (emphasis        added)      <\/p>\n<p>        An agency head shall carefully        consider the recommendation of the External Review        Panel pursuant to the above paragraph and within        90 days, inform the panel and the DNI of what action he or        she has taken. If the head of any agency fails to so inform        the DNI, the DNI shall notify the President. (emphasis        added)      <\/p>\n<p>    Taking the ERPs recommendations is strictly    optional.  <\/p>\n<p>    Whats so significant about the ERP    recommendation in Ellards case was that the ERP not only    apparently believed that the whistleblower in question should    be given a fair chance at getting the position he or she    originally applied for within the IG itself, but that Ellards    actions werein the view of three non-DoD IGs who examined the    caseso severe that they recommended he be    terminated.  <\/p>\n<p>    ODonnell quoted from a Pentagon memo    clearing Ellard that is not public. The ERPs findings, along    with their record of investigation, are not public. Nor do we    know how thoroughor cursorythe ASDs review of the Ellard    case was prior to the decision to clear Ellard. Given all of    that, who are we to believe?  <\/p>\n<p>    There are some key facts we do know that    lead me to believe that the ERPs recommendations were not only    likely soundly based, but that the whistleblower retaliation    problem inside the Pentagon is deeply entrenched.  <\/p>\n<p>    ODonnells statement also claimed that the    ASDs decision to reverse the ERP and clear Ellard of    wrongdoing echoes the conclusion reached by the Department of    Defenses Office of the Inspector General. But its the DoD IG    itself, as an institution, that is also under a major cloud    because of other whistleblower retaliation claims coming from    former NSA or DoD IG employeesspecifically former NSA senior    executive service member Thomas Drake and for DoD Assistant    Inspector General John Crane. As Ive noted previously, the    independent Office of Special Counsel found adequate evidence    of whistleblower retaliation and document destruction    to refer the matter to the Justice Departments own IG; Cranes    case is getting a look from the Government Accountability    Office (GAO), Congresss own executive branch watchdog.  <\/p>\n<p>    The DoD and NSA IGs have clear conflicts of    interest when employees from within their own ranks are    implicated in potential criminal wrongdoing. PPD-19 was    supposed to be the answer to such conflicts of interest, but    its lack of teeth from an enforcement standpoint renders it a    badly flawed remedy for an extremely serious integrity    problem.  <\/p>\n<p>    And what about Congress? PPD-19 speaks to    that as well:  <\/p>\n<p>              On an annual basis, the Inspector              General of the Intelligence Community shall report              the determinations and recommendations and department              and agency head responses to the DNI and, as              appropriate, to the relevant congressional              committees.            <\/p>\n<p>    But Congress doesnt need to wait for the IC    IG to tell it what is already publicly known about the Ellard,    Drake, and Crane cases. It has ample cause to not only    investigate these cases, but to take action to replace PPD-19    with a whistleblower protection system that actually protects    those reporting waste, fraud, abuse, or criminal conduct and    punishes those who attempt to block such reporting. Two options    that deserve consideration are 1) empowering OSC to examine    these kinds of cases and issue unreviewable summary judgments    itself or 2) revive the expired Independent Counsel statute,    rewritten with a focus on whistleblower reprisal case    investigations.  <\/p>\n<p>    One thing is beyond dispute. The PPD-19    process is not the answer for protecting whistleblower and    punishing those who retaliate against them. We need a credible    system that will do both. The only question now is whether    anybody in the House or Senate will step up to the task of    building a new one.  <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>Read more:<br \/>\n<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cato.org\/blog\/curious-case-ex-nsa-inspector-general-george-ellard\" title=\"The Curious Case Of Ex-NSA Inspector General George Ellard - Cato Institute (blog)\">The Curious Case Of Ex-NSA Inspector General George Ellard - Cato Institute (blog)<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> On August 3, The American Conservative ran a lengthy piece of mine dealing with the whistleblower protection nightmare that is the Department of Defense. One of the subjects of that piece is now former NSA IG George Ellard, and because I had even more on his case than I could fit into the TAC piece, I wanted to share the rest of what I knowand dont knowabout the allegations against Ellard, the final disposition of the case, why the Obama administrations whistleblower retaliation fix is itself broken, and what might be done to actually provide meaningful protections for would-be national security whistleblowers in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the national security establishment <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/nsa-2\/the-curious-case-of-ex-nsa-inspector-general-george-ellard-cato-institute-blog\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[94881],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-209713","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-nsa-2"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/209713"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=209713"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/209713\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=209713"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=209713"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=209713"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}