The Sixth Circuit Appeals Court is the latest to weigh in on cell site location info. It joins every other circuit that has handled the issue in deciding the gathering of cellphone GPS data by law enforcement is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. <\/p>\n
This decision [PDF] isn't too surprising considering the court reached the same conclusion last year in a similar case. The difference between the two is the latest case deals with real-time collection of GPS data, rather than historical GPS records. But that's the only difference. The Appeals Court believes the same holds true for real-time location info, although it cites something other than 1979's Smith v. Maryland in its analysis. <\/p>\n
[T]he district court heldand we affirm, holding that the governments detection of Montai Rileys whereabouts in this case, which included tracking Rileys real-time GPS location data for approximately seven hours preceding his arrest, did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search under our precedent in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012). The government used Rileys GPS location data to learn that Riley was hiding out at the Airport Inn in Memphis, Tennesseebut only after inquiring of the front-desk clerk did the government ascertain Rileys specific room number in order to arrest him. The GPS tracking thus provided no greater insight into Rileys whereabouts than what Riley exposed to public view as he traveled along public thoroughfares, id. at 774, to the hotel lobby. Therefore, under Skinner, Riley has no reasonable expectation of privacy against such tracking, and the district court properly denied Rileys motion to suppress evidence found upon Rileys arrest. <\/p>\n
While tracking a robbery suspect, law enforcement obtained an order demanding AT&T hand over location data as soon as it was collected. <\/p>\n
The court order compelled disclosure of call metadata such as inbound and outbound phone numbers and cell-site location (CSL) data, as well as real-time tracking or pinging of the latitude and longitude coordinates of Rileys phone. Specifically, the order required AT&T to disclose the following, potentially for two months, until August 26, 2015: <\/p>\n
16. Precision location of mobile device (GPS Location) such that service provider shall initiate a signal to determine the location of the subjects mobile device on the service providers network or with such other reference points as may be reasonable [sic] available and a [sic] such intervals and times as directed by State Task Force Investigators and Deputy Marshals of the United States Marshal Service. <\/p>\n
The court goes on to note that the location records submitted as evidence do not show whether this collection of info was triggered by AT&T or by the cellphone's owner. <\/p>\n
No evidence of record indicates whether Rileys phone automatically transmitted its GPS coordinates to AT&T (and if so, whether on a continuous basis or otherwise) or whether AT&T affirmatively sent a signal to Rileys phone to cause it to send AT&T its GPS coordinates. <\/p>\n
This should have been a warning flag. It's one thing to collect this info as it comes in. If AT&T is pinging the phone to generate GPS coordinates, AT&T is essentially performing a search on behalf of the government. That should make a difference in this case, as it shifts it from being about a collection of third-party records to an affirmative gathering of records by the government, using AT&T as a third-party stand-in to work around warrant requirements. (Not that case law is settled for GPS tracking, but still) <\/p>\n
But it doesn't. The court goes on to say it doesn't matter because the records were gathered by a third party and they all dealt with the movement of an individual in a public area (the motel where he was arrested). That's why the court cites the Skinner decision, rather than relying exclusively on Smith v. Maryland. <\/p>\n
In Skinner, we held that location data emitted by a voluntarily procured cell phone could not be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the cell-phone user had no reason to expect that the government would compel the service provider to disclose those data. Id. at 779. There, because the defendants movements could have been observed by any member of the public, ibid., we held that it could not possibly be a Fourth Amendment violation for law-enforcement officers to monitor those movements by using cell-phone location data just because such electronic monitoring was more efficient than relying on visual surveillance alone. <\/p>\n
But it then goes on to reach a conclusion which seems to contradict the evidence provided. <\/p>\n
Using seven hours of GPS location data to determine an individuals location (or a cell phones location), so long as the tracking does not reveal movements within the home (or hotel room), does not cross the sacred threshold of the home, and thus cannot amount to a Fourth Amendment search. After all, the tracking in Knotts revealed the location of the cabin to which the criminal suspects had traveledbut the tracking in Knotts was not a search because it revealed no information about the interior of the cabin itself. Likewise here, the tracking revealed only that Riley had traveled to the Airport Inn, not which room (if any) the phone was in at the time of the tracking. <\/p>\n
The lack of location info particularity should have worked against the government's argument. The court even admits in a footnote the government had no idea where exactly the suspect was located -- only a general idea that he was likely in a publicly-accessible building. <\/p>\n
When viewed on a map, the majority of these coordinates are scattered within the perimeter of the Airport Inn, but with insufficient precisioneven if the Airport Inn were only one story tallto reveal which room, if any, the phone was in at the time of each ping. <\/p>\n
So, it could be argued the government did track the suspect's \"movements within a hotel room,\" which would put this back in Fourth Amendment territory. But the court never attempts to reconcile these contradictory statements and instead continues to use both the motel's accessibility and the coarse location info as an argument against potential Fourth Amendment violations. <\/p>\n
That Riley was arrested in a motel is of no moment, for the government learned no more about Rileys whereabouts from tracking his cell-phone GPS data than what Riley exposed to public view by traveling to the motel lobby along public thoroughfares, Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774even if Riley meant to keep his location a secret, one cannot expect privacy in ones public movements. <\/p>\n
Certainly the arrest was \"no moment,\" but the tracking that occurred once he was inside the building should have been given more consideration. The fact that law enforcement can obtain real-time location tracking information definitely needs to be examined more closely, especially when there's ample evidence law enforcement has effectively backdated orders like these to cover up use of more intrusive technology like Stingray devices. <\/p>\n
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See the article here: The Sixth Circuit Appeals Court is the latest to weigh in on cell site location info. It joins every other circuit that has handled the issue in deciding the gathering of cellphone GPS data by law enforcement is not a search under the Fourth Amendment Continue reading
\nSixth Circuit Appeals Court Latest To Say Real-Time Cellphone Location Tracking Not A Fourth Amendment Issue - Techdirt<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"