{"id":194412,"date":"2017-05-23T22:30:02","date_gmt":"2017-05-24T02:30:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/speaking-of-the-first-amendment-lexology-registration\/"},"modified":"2017-05-23T22:30:02","modified_gmt":"2017-05-24T02:30:02","slug":"speaking-of-the-first-amendment-lexology-registration","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/first-amendment-2\/speaking-of-the-first-amendment-lexology-registration\/","title":{"rendered":"Speaking of the First Amendment. . . . &#8211; Lexology (registration)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    Now that Dr. Scott Gottlieb is safely installed as FDA    Commissioner, we at DDLaw can end our moratorium on blogposts    about First Amendment issues. There was no way we wanted to    give his opponents any ammunition by saying nice things about    Dr. Gottlieb before his confirmation.  <\/p>\n<p>    Not so now.  <\/p>\n<p>    Given what Dr. Gottlieb has said  and is saying  we doubt    that the FDAs absolutist ban on truthful industry speech about    off-label uses (pejoratively called promotion) will continue    much longer in its current form. For instance, on the FDAs    website, Dr. Gottlieb is quoted    here as giving a speech saying:  <\/p>\n<p>      The question we need to ask ourselves is this: Should a      patient receive one or even two-year-old care just because      the wheels of my government institution and its meticulous      work may take longer to turn than the wheels of clinical      science? Some people believe that patients should be treated      only according to the clinical evidence included in a drugs      approved indications. Yet this evidence may be two or maybe      three years old, especially in a fast-changing field like      cancer, where off label use of medicines provide important      opportunities for patients to get access to the latest      clinical practice and for doctors to tailor their patients      treatment plans based on medical need and personal      preferences.    <\/p>\n<p>      Efforts to limit prescription and scientific      exchange to indications only specified on a label could      retard the most important advances in 21st century      medicine. The development and deployment of      drugs is becoming more and more closely linked to      understanding of mechanism of action, which means that      physicians can use drugs in more sophisticated ways that      cannot all be anticipated on a label, or easily or quickly      studied in prospective studies. . . . More important,      medicine is becoming more personalized as tools like genomics      make it possible to tailor treatments on an individual basis.      Physicians will not be able to always wait for FDA      to approve a new label for every one of their patients, and      drug companies will not be able to conduct a trial to explore      every possible contingency. In the future,      personalization of care could mean that we will have much      more off-label use of new medicines, guided by the latest      literature, at least until our regulatory      approaches are able to fully adapt to a different paradigm      where treatment is highly specific to individual patients.      Yet policy forces are tugging in exactly the opposite      direction by placing restrictions on the exchange of some of      the most pertinent information.    <\/p>\n<p>    (Emphasis added). Defendants in cases involving    off-label-use-related allegations should consider having their    FDA experts review and, if appropriate, rely upon the current    FDA Commissioners positions  particularly to rebut contrary    views offered by former FDA officials.  <\/p>\n<p>    Dr. Gottliebs non-FDA writings show similar solicitude for    scientific speech  whether or not that speech originates with    FDA-regulated manufacturers. In an     article for the American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Gottlieb    criticized FDA policies that prohibited a manufacturer with a    drug undergoing supplemental FDA approval for a new use from    distributing the findings or educating doctors on the new use    through sponsored medical education. [A] more measured    approach to the regulation of promotion would allow sharing    of useful information that falls within the bounds of    appropriate clinical care.  <\/p>\n<p>      Those who pursue a rigid adherence to restrictions on the      exchange of off-label information, and who fail to recognize      that the sharing of scientific evidence can sometimes have      important public health benefits, are guilty of pursuing a      rigid standard that does not take measure of the      consequences. . . . [E]stablishing the FDA label as the only      determinant for acceptable scientific speech loses sight of      the fact that these labels are slow to incorporate important      medical results about the effectiveness of medical products.      They are not the sole basis for medical practice.    <\/p>\n<p>    In     another AEI article a few years later  shortly after the    government lost United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149    (2d Cir. 2012)  Dr. Gottliebs criticism of the FDAs    prohibition of truthful speech about off-label uses was even    more pointed.  <\/p>\n<p>      When this [off-label] speech is truthful, nonmisleading, and      promulgated in an educational context, it is quite possible      that the speech would be deemed constitutionally protected by      the courts under doctrines that recognize commercial speech      as being subject to First Amendment considerations.    <\/p>\n<p>    (Footnote omitted). Basically, Dr. Gottlieb took issue with    whether scientific speech concerning off-label uses could ever    be considered illegal promotion:  <\/p>\n<p>      A core principle of Americas constitutional speech      protections is that the government should not establish what      is orthodox, especially when it comes to politics, the arts,      religion, and science. The founders recognized that these      matters are by their nature iterative, and that it would be      dangerous in a democratic society for the government to use      its resources to pick a side in these debates. Matters that      are subject to their own evolution  a core feature of how      new science unfolds  are better addressed by adding voices      to the debate, not suppressing them.    <\/p>\n<p>    Dr. Gottlieb even urged FDA regulated manufacturers to stand up    and challenge the constitutionality of off-label informational    restrictions promulgated by the FDA  the agency he now leads:  <\/p>\n<p>    [T]he drug industry needs to be willing to take the prerogative    to challenge the facts in some of these cases and have that day    in court. When investigations turn on the sharing of truthful,    nonmisleading information about widely accepted uses of drugs,    in fast moving fields like cancer, there is a legitimate    question about whether public health is being served by    suppressing this sort of information. However, until    these cases are challenged in court, there will remain    ambiguity around where the appropriate lines rest, what speech    is constitutionally protected commercial speech or clearly    violative, and how public health is best served.  <\/p>\n<p>    (Emphasis added). Not long after that, a company took up Dr.    Gottliebs challenge, and the result was Amarin Pharma, Inc.    v. FDA, 119 F. Supp.3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  <\/p>\n<p>    To some extent, where one stands depends upon where one sits,    but Dr. Gottlieb has enough of a track record on truthful    manufacturer speech about off-label uses of drugs and medical    devices, and the constitutional and medical implications of    suppressing it, that we are more hopeful now than we have ever    been that the FDA will see reason, respect the First Amendment,    trust physicians, and change its science-suppressing ways.  <\/p>\n<p>    With that in mind, we examine the newest First Amendment    precedent rejecting governmental prohibition of a    manufacturers truthful speech about its product, Ocheesee    Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2017).    Ocheesee is a food (skim milk) case, but doesnt involve    the FDA  it doesnt even involve the federal government.    Instead, Ocheesee is a demonstration that, when given    the chance, state regulators are still equally capable of    behaving just as badly towards the First Amendment as the feds,    albeit on a smaller scale.  <\/p>\n<p>    It may be that Ocheesee doesnt involve interstate    commerce, see 851 F.3d at 1231 n.1, or it may be that    there is something peculiar about milk regulation that we dont    know, but the State of Florida (not the FDA or any other    federal entity) came down on the plaintiff, described as a    small dairy creamery located on its owners farm that sells    all-natural dairy items, like a ton of bricks. Id.    Apparently, the process of skimming the cream from whole milk    depletes almost all the vitamin A naturally present in whole    milk because vitamin A is fat-soluble and is thus removed with    the cream. Id. Thus Florida agricultural regulations    require vitamin A to be added to skim milk before it can be    sold as skim milk. Id.  <\/p>\n<p>    That was a problem for the plaintiff because, as a matter of    philosophy, this business prides itself on selling only    all-natural, additive-free products. Id. It therefore    refuse[d] to replace the lost vitamin A in its skim milk with    a vitamin A additive as Florida law required. Id. The    State of Florida thus prevented the plaintiff from calling its    product skim milk, even though that product contains no    ingredients other than skim milk. Id. Instead (and    ironically) the state sought to require the plaintiff to call    its product imitation milk. Id. at 1232. Not    surprisingly, the plaintiff refused and sued instead.  <\/p>\n<p>    Readers attuned to the First Amendment no doubt see the problem    already. Calling such a product skim milk is truthful. The    State of Florida  like the FDA with truthful off-label speech     sought to suppress the plaintiffs truthful speech in a    commercial context, using the public health (vitamin A is not    just good for you, but essential to health) as its reason for    doing so. Who wins  the First Amendment right to engage in    truthful commercial speech, or the states public-health-based    rationale for suppressing such speech?  <\/p>\n<p>    In Ocheesee, freedom of speech prevailed. 851 F.3d at    1233 (The sole issue on appeal is whether the States actions    prohibiting . . . truthful use of the term skim milk violate    the First Amendment. We hold that they do.).  <\/p>\n<p>    First, the lay of the constitutional land. Ocheesee    applied the now-venerable Central Hudson intermediate    scrutiny test for constitutionality of governmental    restrictions of commercial speech. 851 F.3d at 1233 (citing    Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service    Commn, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)). Thus, Ocheesee    did not apply the more speech protective tests enunciated in    Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)    (heightened scrutiny) (see our     discussions     here,     here,     here, and     here); and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218    (2015) (strict scrutiny) (see our     discussion here). That doesnt mean that the Eleventh    Circuit was unaware of these cases  quite the contrary:  <\/p>\n<p>      There is some question as to whether under the Supreme      Courts decisions in Sorrell and Reed an      analysis to determine if the restriction is content based or      speaker focused must precede any evaluation of the regulation      based on traditional commercial speech jurisprudence, and if      so, whether this would alter the Central Hudson      framework. In Sorrell, the Supreme Court found the      restriction at issue to be content based but nevertheless      cited, articulated, and applied the Central Hudson      test. And in Reed, the Court arguably broadened the      test for determining whether a law is content based. . . . We      need not wade into these troubled waters, however, because      the State cannot survive Central Hudson scrutiny, and      in any event the [plaintiff] does not argue the States      restriction was content based or speaker focused.    <\/p>\n<p>    851 F.3d at 1235 n.7. Thus, the favorable First Amendment    decision in Ocheesee sets a floor for the protection of    truthful commercial speech in the Eleventh Circuit that parties    arguing Sorrell and Reed may exceed.  <\/p>\n<p>    Under the Central Hudson criteria, as a threshold    question, the government (which always has the burden of    proof) had to establish that the suppressed speech either    concerned unlawful conduct or was false or inherently    misleading. 851 F.3d at 1235-36. It failed because selling the    plaintiffs product was not unlawful  the state would have    allowed its sale under the imitation description. Id.    at 1237. Note the parallel to off-label speech  doctors are    free to engage in off-label use, and products so used may be    lawfully sold. [T]he only difference between the two courses    of conduct is the speech. Id.  <\/p>\n<p>    Nor could the speech be considered false or misleading. The    state could not simply define a product in whatever way it    chose, and declare anything not meeting that definition    misleading. The court rejected such self-evidently circular    reasoning:  <\/p>\n<p>      Such a per se rule would eviscerate Central Hudson,      rendering all but the threshold question superfluous. All a      state would need to do in order to regulate speech would be      to redefine the pertinent language in accordance with its      regulatory goals.    <\/p>\n<p>    Id. at 1238. Again, any resemblence to the FDAs salami    slicing of intended uses is entirely intentional. Consumer    unfamiliarity is not synonymous with misinformation.    Id. at 1239 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  <\/p>\n<p>    Next up in Ocheesee was the three-pronged intermediate    scrutiny Central Hudson test: (1) was the asserted    governmental interest substantial? (2) did the regulation    directly advance the that substantial governmental interest?    And (3) was the restriction on speech more extensive than is    necessary to serve that interest? 851 F.3d at 1235-36.  <\/p>\n<p>    As in off-label promotion cases, the substantiality of the    governments interest in combating deception and in    establishing nutritional  that is to say product safety and    effectiveness  standards was concededly substantial.    Id. at 1240. Ocheesee jumped over the second    prong and went right to the third, because the measure is    clearly more extensive than necessary to achieve its goals.    Id.  <\/p>\n<p>    In all commercial speech cases, the preferred remedy is more    disclosure, rather than less. Id. (Supreme Court    citation omitted). Floridas flat ban on use of the term skim    milk failed because a disclaimer would serve the same purpose    in a less restrictive and more precise way. Id.    [A]llowing skim milk to be called what it is and merely    requiring a disclosure that it lacks vitamin A was sufficient    to serve [the state] interest in preventing deception and    ensuring adequate nutritional standards. Id.  <\/p>\n<p>    The First Amendment thus prevailed where the speech is truthful     without the court going even having to go to the trouble of    relying on heightened (Sorrell) or strict (Reed)    scrutiny, both of which would be argued in truthful off-label    speech cases. Visions of shattered    backboards    come to mind. We dont think Dr. Gottlieb wants the FDA to end    up like Bill    Robinzine, so were looking for a more reasonable off-label    speech policy to emerge from the FDA, before a court has to do    so for the agency.  <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>Read the original:<br \/>\n<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.lexology.com\/library\/detail.aspx?g=17db9c79-6695-4cdb-a927-83049266ed5f\" title=\"Speaking of the First Amendment. . . . - Lexology (registration)\">Speaking of the First Amendment. . . . - Lexology (registration)<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> Now that Dr.  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/first-amendment-2\/speaking-of-the-first-amendment-lexology-registration\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[94877],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-194412","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-first-amendment-2"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/194412"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=194412"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/194412\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=194412"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=194412"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=194412"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}