{"id":184786,"date":"2017-03-23T14:34:32","date_gmt":"2017-03-23T18:34:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/irans-war-on-drugs-holding-the-line-middle-east-institute\/"},"modified":"2017-03-23T14:34:32","modified_gmt":"2017-03-23T18:34:32","slug":"irans-war-on-drugs-holding-the-line-middle-east-institute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/war-on-drugs\/irans-war-on-drugs-holding-the-line-middle-east-institute\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran&#8217;s War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    Drugs and stimulants have influenced Iranian social, economic,    and political life for hundreds of years. Opium, specifically,    has long been used in Iran for medicinal and recreational    purposes. In the 18th and early 19th century, opium was    produced in Iran mainly for domestic consumption. The expansion    of the Far Eastern market in the late 1800s spurred an increase    in opium cultivation in Iran. As a result, opium became Irans    top export while domestic consumption also rose.  <\/p>\n<p>    Throughout the 20th century, Iran grappled, largely    unsuccessfully, with the problems of opium addiction and    trafficking. Government policies alternated between severe    punishment and regulation. The first law to control opium use    was enacted in 1911. A little over a decade later, the    government issued ration coupons to addicts and imposed levies    on opium exports. Contrary to expectations, however, opium use    did not slacken, and opium exports actually increased. In fact,    by the late 1920s, opium accounted for nearly a quarter of    Irans total export revenues.  <\/p>\n<p>    In 1928, international pressure led Irans government to claim    a monopoly on opium and to pledge to reduce poppy cultivation    and demand. Yet, in the subsequent 10-year period, the area    under poppy cultivation expanded, as did the volume of opium    exports. Similarly, the 1955 Law on Prohibition of Opium Poppy    Cultivation and Taking Opium had perverse effects     stimulating production in Afghanistan and Pakistan, making the    smuggling of heroin and morphine from there into Iran    profitable, and ultimately leading to an upsurge in the number    of Iranian addicts and incarcerated smugglers.  <\/p>\n<p>    These unwelcome developments prompted an eventual policy shift.    In the late 1960s, the Shahs government permitted the    resumption of opium cultivation in designated areas under state    supervision while at the same time making drug smuggling a    capital offense punishable by death. In addition, the    government instituted a system of opium rationing for addicts    50 years of age and older as well as for patients as prescribed    by physicians; and laid the groundwork for establishing a    nationwide system of health clinics and rehabilitation centers    for addicts. However, these latter plans went unfinished, as    Iran entered a period of revolutionary turmoil.  <\/p>\n<p>    The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)    coincided with the protracted conflict in Afghanistan    precipitated by the Soviet invasion. During this same period,    Afghanistan emerged as the worlds leading opium poppy producer    while Iranian consumption of opiates surged in spite of the    revolutionary governments imposition of harsh criminal    penalties (in August 1980) for all forms of substance abuse.    Throughout the 1990s, Afghan poppy production flourished;    meanwhile, in Iran, heroin use increased, as did heroin use by    means of injection. The ban on poppy cultivation by the Taliban    in 2000 resulted in shortages in the availability of opium,    which shifted the drug consumption pattern in Iran toward even    greater heroin use and addiction.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran is a key link in a complex transnational opiates supply    chain that is anchored in southwest Asia. Known as the Golden    Crescent, this production and trans-shipment zone encompasses    the isolated mountain valleys of Afghanistan, Iran, and    Pakistan. At the core of the Golden Crescent lies Afghanistan,    the source of about 92% of the worlds heroin. The 2006    Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey reported an all-time    record high harvest, with total cultivation up 59% and    production up 49% from the previous year. According to the 2007    Afghanistan Survey, production is 34% higher than in 2006.    Figure 1 shows Afghanistans share of opium poppy cultivation    in recent years.  <\/p>\n<p>    Two primary routes are used to smuggle heroin originating from    Afghanistan. The Balkan Route, which runs through southeastern    Europe, is the main supply line for Western Europe. The Silk    Route, which runs through Central Asia, feeds heroin into    Russia, the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic    and other parts of Europe. While in recent years the Silk Route    has become increasingly active, the lions share of Afghan    opiates continues to pass through Iran along the Balkan Route    as well as southward toward the Persian Gulf. The UNODC    estimates that 60% of the heroin and morphine from Afghanistan    moves through Iran to the external market, principally to    Europe. The Iranian passageway is attractive to drug    traffickers for the simple reason that they must cross just two    borders to get to the European market.  <\/p>\n<p>    Dotting Irans eastern borders  a 936-kilometer stretch shared    with Afghanistan and 909-kilometer segment shared with Pakistan     are numerous entry points for smuggled consignments of    opiates. Three main supply lines carry these shipments from    Irans eastern frontier into and across the country: Northern    (Khorasan), Southern (Sistan va Baluchistan), and Hormuzgan.    The Northern and Southern lines are connected to the    traditional Balkan network. The Hormuzgan line flows to Bandar    Abbas, whose airport and ferry links to Dubai make it an easy    trans-shipment point for deliveries to Europe and the Gulf, as    well as incoming chemical precursors destined for heroin labs    in Afghanistan.  <\/p>\n<p>    Figure 1  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug    Report 2007, Figure 15, p. 41.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran and the neighbors on its eastern flank are classic weak    states. As such, their respective central authorities have    traditionally lacked the capacity and the legitimacy to extend    their writ to peripheral areas. Yet, these very areas are    critically important nodal points in the highly segmented    Iranian domestic and international opiates supply chain. It is    therefore not surprising that the territory of Baluchistan  a    predominantly Sunni-populated ethnic-Baluch region that    straddles the borders of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan  has    been a major opiates smuggling thoroughfare.  <\/p>\n<p>    Indeed, Zahedan, the capital of the Iranian province of Sistan    va Baluchistan, is a vital staging point for opiates    trafficking. The province  desolate and underdeveloped  is    notoriously lawless. In the 1970s, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi    reached an accommodation with Baluchi clan leaders whereby they    would abandon drug smuggling in exchange for government cash    benefits. But in the post-revolutionary period, this    arrangement broke down amid a general deterioration of the    relationship between Tehran and Baluchi clans.  <\/p>\n<p>    Major Trafficking Routes  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>    Opiates smuggling in Sistan va Baluchistan has lately coincided    with an escalation of violence there. In December 2005, an    insurgent group known as Jundullah (Gods Brigade) reportedly    abducted nine Iranian soldiers. In another incident three    months later, 22 Iranians were killed. In February 2007, 11    members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were    reported killed in an attack for which Jundullah claimed    credit. In a clash with drug smugglers in July 2007, 11 more    IRGC personnel lost their lives. It is difficult to discern    from the sparse media accounts of these and other incidents in    Sistan va Baluchistan to what extent drug trafficking and    insurgent activities might be linked.  <\/p>\n<p>    Ethnic and religious minorities form part of the drug    trafficking picture in other peripheral regions of Iran as    well. Khorasan province, for example, hosts a large number of    Afghan refugees. Drug traffickers along the Northern line,    usually organized in smaller groups of up to 10 people, are    mainly Afghans. The Southern and Northern Routes are maintained    from central Iran onwards by Azeri and Kurdish mafias.  <\/p>\n<p>    The Afghanistan-Iran drug connection is a complex phenomenon    whose burden on the state and devastating effects on society    flow in both directions. As previously mentioned, soaring    Afghanistan opium and heroin production is fuelling Iranian    opiate abuse and boosting Irans role as a drug transit    country. At the same time, opiates abuse has skyrocketed in    Afghanistan, with some reports stating that many addicts are    returning refugees who had developed their drug habits while    residing in Iran. The Report of the International Narcotics    Control Board for 2006 concurs with these accounts,  <\/p>\n<p>       not[ing] with concern the problem of drug abuse among      Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries, including Iran      (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan. Approximately 35 per cent      of male and 25 per cent of female drug abusers in Afghanistan      first abused opium as refugees outside of Afghanistan,      particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in refugee      camps in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The      Board also notes that evidence suggests a high risk of      transmission of HIV among persons who abuse drugs by      injection in Afghanistan, particularly among refugees      returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran who abuse drugs      by injection.    <\/p>\n<p>    Whereas Turkey has long been the principal exit point for drugs    transiting Iran, the porous border with Iraq has become a new    destination and passageway on Irans western flank. The    weakening of border controls and the breakdown of the security    infrastructure of Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein    from power in 2003 created a fertile environment for smuggling.    In the intervening years, Iraqs nascent security forces, faced    with a multitude of challenges, (understandably) have not made    counter-narcotics their top priority. The influx of drugs into    Iraq has contributed to a rising incidence of addiction among    Iraqis and has opened up an additional pathway to the European    market. According to Hamid Ghodse, president of the    International Narcotics Control Board, drug traffickers have    entered Iraq via Iran. Sometimes disguised as pilgrims, they    have set up operations in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala,    smuggling opiates into and through Jordan. Media in the United    Kingdom, drawing on accounts provided by British troops    stationed in the south, have reported drug smuggling operations    routed through Basra as well.  <\/p>\n<p>    As mentioned earlier, Iran is a major destination, not just a    corridor for illicit opiates. Nor, it should be mentioned, are    opiates Irans only problem drugs. Opium and heroin are    smuggled from the east, while hallucinogenic and chemical-based    designer drugs enter Iran from Turkey and Bandar Abbas. The    influx of narcotics into Iran, opiates in particular, has had a    profoundly adverse impact on public health and public security.  <\/p>\n<p>    The actual size of Irans drug user and drug addict populations    is difficult to pin down, given that reliable data is scarce,    Iranian official statistics tend to be more conservative than    figures presented by the UNODC, and Iranian authorities    restrict what the UNODC Tehran office may share publicly.    Compounding the difficulty of gaining definite estimates of    prevalence and incidence of substance abuse in Iran, as Mokri    points out, are [s]ocial stigmatization along with legal    restrictions on substance abuse [that] prevents drug users from    admitting their act, offering clear data and referring to    governmental sectors.  <\/p>\n<p>    Though estimates of drug abuse and addiction in Iran vary, the    statistics most often cited are nonetheless stunning. A Rapid    Situation Assessment (RSA) of 10 urban centers conducted in    1998 reported a sharp increase in the availability of heroin,    in heroin dependency, and in injecting drug use. The RSA 1998    estimated the total number of drug users as 2 million, with 1.2    million addicts and 800,000 recreational users. The first large    sample nationwide study (conducted in 2001 by Irans Ministry    of Health in cooperation with the UNODC) estimated the number    of users of opium and heroin at about 3.76 million, of whom    1.39 million were classified as cases of abuse and 1.16    million as cases of addiction or dependence. In 2003,    then-President Muhammad Khatami and State Welfare Minister    Muhammad Reza Rah-Chamani stated that Iran had approximately    1.2 million heroin addicts and another 800,000 recreational    heroin users. In April 2006, Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Gooya, the    chief of the Iranian Health Ministrys disease-management    center, put the figure at 2.5 million drug addicts and another    137,000 who inject drugs occasionally. According to Muhammad    Reza Jahani, deputy head of Irans anti-narcotics organization,    the number of drug addicts in Iran is increasing at a rate of    8% annually.  <\/p>\n<p>    The spike in intravenous heroin use in Iran, as in many other    countries, has been accompanied by a rise in HIV\/AIDS infection    rates among injecting drug users (IDUs). According to the    UNAIDS\/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006, high HIV    infection levels in intravenous drug users are a major concern    in Iran. The report states, Almost one in four [23%] injecting    drug users participating in a recent study in the Iranian    capital, Tehran, [was] found to be HIV-infected. The report    also states that risk behavior is widespread among IDUs     unprotected sex and non-sterile syringes were the main causes    of infection. Another study has shown that, The recent rise of    heroin injection in Iran is strongly associated with HIV risk.    The statistics are particularly alarming in the Iranian prison    system, where in Tehran, for example, incarceration-related    exposures [have been] revealed to be the main correlates of    HIV-1 infection.  <\/p>\n<p>    But the IDU-HIV nexus extends beyond the prison population.    Studies describing HIV risk in Iran, though relatively few in    number, all point to injecting drug use as the main    transmission mode for contracting the disease; moreover, they    indicate that the number of injecting drug users appears to be    climbing. Emran Razzighi et al., for example, state that,    Regardless of the actual number of IDUs, worrying trends    suggest that, compared to non-injecting drug use, the    prevalence of injecting drug use has increased more rapidly    during the past decade and will continue to rise in Iran.  <\/p>\n<p>    Irans drug problem has also contributed to an upsurge in    violent criminality and corruption. Criminal violence (e.g.,    kidnapping and murder) has become particularly acute in the    province of Khorasan, where drug lords reportedly resort to    these crimes to ensure that local residents provide logistical    support for their operations. In addition, over 3,500 Iranian    law enforcement and security personnel have died in clashes    with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades    in what former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi once referred to    as a full-scale war along Irans eastern border.  <\/p>\n<p>    The drug problem has placed a massive burden on Irans criminal    justice system as well. Irans prison population has swelled.    In the first nine months of 2006 Iranian officials made public    the dubious accomplishment of 314,268 drug-related arrests.    According to Ali Akbar Yesaqi, the head of Irans Prisons,    Security, and Corrections Organization, a large proportion of    those incarcerated are drug offenders, and many of those are    either drug users or addicts. In June 2006, Mohammad Ali    Zanjirei, an Iranian prison official, stated that drug-related    crimes are the most common in 19 of Irans 30 provinces.    According to the 2007 US International Narcotics Control    Strategy Report (INCSR), More than 60 percent of the inmates    in Iranian prisons are incarcerated for drug offenses, ranging    from use to trafficking. Narcotics-related arrests in Iran    during the first nine months of 2006 were running at an annual    rate of almost 400,000, which is a typical level for the last    several years. Twice as many drug abusers were detained as drug    traffickers. Iran has executed more than 10,000 narcotics    traffickers in the last two decades.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran has been at the forefront of efforts by the international    community to combat the Afghan drug trade. In 1998, the United    States removed Iran from its list of drug-producing countries.    As early as 2003, the US State Department Bureau for    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)    declared: There is overwhelming evidence of Irans strong    commitment to keep drugs moving out of Afghanistan from    reaching its citizens. As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it    certainly also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the    West. Similarly, the 2007 INSCR strategy report states that,    Irans actions support the global effort against international    drug trafficking.  <\/p>\n<p>    At the national level, the main policymaking body responsible    for planning and monitoring different aspects of the    counter-narcotics campaign is the Drug Control Headquarters    (DCH), which was established in 1988. The DCH coordinates the    drug-related activities of the police (the leading enforcement    unit in terms of drug seizures), the customs officers, the IRGC    contingent, and the Ministries of Intelligence, Security,    Islamic Guidance and Education, and Health.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran has also put in place a rudimentary counter-drug    institutional network at the provincial and local levels. In    1989, acting on an order by the Expediency Council, the    Mohammad Rasulollah Central Headquarters and three tactical    headquarters of Salman, Meqdad, and Abuzar were established in    the eastern part of the country. In 1991, the IRGC Qods    headquarters was established. Shortly thereafter, the Islamic    Revolution Committee was merged with the Law Enforcement Force,    and the Mersad Headquarters was established. Much of this    machinery is geared toward strengthening the states capacity    to track and curb smuggling.  <\/p>\n<p>    Since the founding of the Islamic Republic, drug-supply    reduction has been the mainstay of Tehrans approach to    combating the narcotics problem. As in other countries, Irans    counter-drug efforts have traditionally rested on two pillars:    the criminalization of drug possession and use, and the    apprehension of smugglers and the interdiction of supplies. In    the first few years of the Islamic Republic, this approach was    rooted in the post-revolutionary leaderships ideology and    efforts to consolidate power. The hard line against narcotics    users and smugglers was part of the jihad against sin.  <\/p>\n<p>    As previously mentioned, upon taking power, the revolutionary    leadership declared the use of all intoxicants to be illegal.    In keeping with the anti-Western tenor of the revolution,    Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared that the distribution of    heroin was a US-inspired conspiracy. The first    post-revolutionary executive director and spokesman for Irans    anti-narcotics task force Mokhtar Kalantari likewise explained    the upsurge in drug use and addiction in Iran as part of the    Wests war on Islam. And the crackdown against drug smuggling    in Sistan va Baluchistan was portrayed as part of the struggle    against seditionists. To be sure, Islamic ideology is still    used to legitimate and reinforce the Iranian governments    counter-drug policies. But, as will be shown, both the    interpretation and the application of drug-related laws in Iran    have changed.  <\/p>\n<p>    Over the years, Iran has taken a number of steps to staunch the    inflow of drugs from the east. The Iranian government has    deployed more firepower to the periphery in order to reinforce    local and provincial law enforcement officers. Beginning in the    mid-1990s, Iranian security forces stationed an estimated    30,000 men along the eastern border. In 2000, Iran also created    village-level Basij units, whose activities since then have    broadened from defending villages to conducting offensive    counter-narcotics operations. In an attempt to seal off the    joint boundary with Afghanistan, Iranian authorities have    sought to enhance border security by, among other things,    installing barbed wire fencing, ground fortifications, and    canals.  <\/p>\n<p>    According to Iranian officials, security forces confiscated    nearly 300 tons of drugs and arrested more than 370 traffickers    between March 2005 and March 2006. The International Narcotics    Control Board credits Iran with a considerable increase in    seizures of opiates in 2005, putting the figure at 350 tons.    (See Figure 2.) In the first nine months of 2006, by Iranian    officials own calculations, interdiction efforts yielded 7.261    kilograms of heroin, 6.133 kilograms of morphine and 231,778    kilograms of opium. The UNODC confirms what Iranian officials    have claimed about their vigorous interdiction efforts  that    substantial quantities of opiates have been intercepted.  <\/p>\n<p>    Figure 2  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug    Report 2007, Figure 24 , p. 48.  <\/p>\n<p>    But despite these achievements, international experts    acknowledge that over 60% of Afghan heroin, for example,    continues to be smuggled through Iran  the possible    explanations for which are explored later in this study.  <\/p>\n<p>    Over the past decade, a paradigm shift in Iranian counter-drug    policies has been under way, marked by greater official    acceptance of, and support for, demand and harm reduction    interventions. Demand reduction encompasses a variety of    measures that range from advocating the non-use of drugs, to    treating individuals with problematic drug use and facilitating    their reintegration in the community. Harm reduction aims at    preventing the transmission of HIV\/AIDS and other infectious    diseases as well as death through overdose from drug injection.  <\/p>\n<p>    By the late 1990s, Iranian authorities had begun to recognize    the gravity of the HIV threat to the country. Springing from    this realization were efforts, relatively uncoordinated at    first, to raise public awareness about HIV. In 2001, in an    attempt to develop more comprehensive and coordinated programs    to combat HIV\/AIDS, they established the National AIDS    Committee. The following summer, they formed a sub-committee    known as the National Harm Reduction Committee, tasked with    developing ways to reduce the harm related to injecting drug    use and curb the spread of HIV\/AIDS among IDUs. Importantly,    the members of these bodies encompassed official and    non-governmental organizations  ranging from the Ministry of    Health, the Drug Control Headquarters, the national police,    Iranian television, and the prison and welfare authorities to    the research and academic institutions.  <\/p>\n<p>    In an October 12, 2004 statement before the Third Committee of    the United Nations, Irans Special Advisor to the UN Ms.    Paimaneh Hastaei declared:  <\/p>\n<p>    In an attempt to strike a balance between prevention, treatment    and law enforcement activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran    has assumed that demand reduction is as important as supply    reduction; special attention is paid to the creation of    effective prevention programs targeted at youth and high-risk    groups.  <\/p>\n<p>    Support for demand and harm reduction interventions among    senior Iranian officials has been building, albeit very    gradually. Beginning in the early 1990s, Iranian authorities    introduced treatment regimes that range from abstinence-only to    detoxification. In 1994, medical intervention for drug abuse    became legal and explicit. Opioid agonists were used furtively    in private clinics at first, and made officially available for    detoxification programs only in 2001. Subsequent attempts have    been made to improve pharmacological treatment and to introduce    psychotherapeutic interventions for drug dependent persons.  <\/p>\n<p>    The rise in the HIV infection rate, especially among    intravenous drug users, catalyzed the shift in official    attitudes towards a more favorable view of demand and harm    reduction approaches. Razzaghi et al. write that there was a    convergence of drug demand-reduction and HIV-prevention    approaches. The prison population was the initial primary    focal point of Irans more progressive interventions, gradually    migrating from there into the general population. In fact,    Irans burgeoning prison population is home to a large and    growing number of drug injection users. Iran is one of just 22    countries that provide harm reduction services to incarcerated    drug injection users (DIUs). The government sponsors peer    counseling, the dissemination of information to and hotlines    for prisoners. Bleach is made available to them for    disinfecting needles. Inmates receiving methadone maintenance    treatment (MMT) or ARV care are referred upon release to needle    exchange programs and other health services. The majority of    Irans 28 provinces have an after-care center for prisoners    returning to the community.  <\/p>\n<p>    With respect to the general population, under the reformist    government of former president Muhammad Khatami, Iran adopted a    more relaxed attitude, regarding users as criminals who need    to be healed instead of locked up. The reformists stimulated    awareness of and a lively debate about the sources as well as    the most effective methods to respond to the narcotics problem.    In 1997, the government passed a law stipulating that a drug    user who voluntarily seeks treatment will be exempted from    punishment.  <\/p>\n<p>    The ascendancy of the reformists in Iranian politics thus    fostered a climate conducive to generating progressive ideas    regarding drug use. The work of Iranian non-governmental    organizations (NGOs), the close cooperation of the Ministry of    Health and other stakeholders in the government, and informed    advocacy among senior policymakers converted this new thinking    into concrete action. Their combined efforts spawned three    types of treatment responses to drug abuse in the general    population: (1) the establishment of government-supported    residential therapeutic centers, (2) the founding (in 1995) of    a branch of Narcotics Anonymous (NA Iran) and NA support    groups, and (3) the revival of outpatient clinics.  <\/p>\n<p>    It is generally agreed that demand and harm reduction as    concepts and as components of Irans counter-narcotics efforts    took root during the Reform period. Some analysts suggest that    since the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to office in August    2005, there has been a return to a primarily supply-side    approach. Others, however, assert that the emphasis on harm    reduction has continued. Kamin Mohammadi, for example, reports    that, as of mid-2007, there were 51 government facilities, 457    private outpatient centers and an additional 26 transition    centers. Indeed, demand and harm reduction interventions span    the Reform and post-Reform periods:  <\/p>\n<p>    The International Narcotics Control Board Report for 2006,    attesting to Tehrans efforts to implement harm reduction    measures, states:  <\/p>\n<p>    In early 2006, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran    announced an emergency plan to provide 3,000 people abusing    drugs by injection in Tehran with a three-month treatment    course. The Government also implemented a nationwide plan for    the rehabilitation of drug addicts from November 2005 to March    2006. The Government is also taking various measures to deal    with serious problems involving drug abuse in prisons.  <\/p>\n<p>    Support for these efforts has come from seemingly unlikely    sources. In January 2005, the judicial branch of the Islamic    Republic of Iran issued a decree supporting needle exchange and    warning against interference with these needed and fruitful    public health interventions. That same year, Justice Minister    Ayatollah Mohammad Esmail Shoshtari submitted a letter to    prosecutors directing them to defer to the Health Ministry in    order to counter the spread of HIV\/AIDS and hepatitis. Upon    close examination, this was no mere coincidence. Prominent    members of the NGO community deliberately targeted key    religious figures and government officials, presenting them    with data and analysis in efforts to enlist their support. Over    the years, a critical mass of practitioners-advocates has    coalesced around the need to sustain and scale up demand and    harm reduction measures.  <\/p>\n<p>    The importance of grassroots organizations in building this    policy network and in conceptualizing as well as conducting    demand and harm reduction programs cannot be overstated. The    work of two Iranian NGOs  the Aftab Society and Persepolis     is indicative of the key roles and contributions of grassroots    organizations, the rich diversity of programs they administer,    and their symbiotic relationship with state institutions. The    Aftab Society, founded in 1998, claims to be Irans largest NGO    (with offices in 13 provinces) and focuses its activities on    education and prevention as well as on providing support for    the families of drug addicts. The organization holds workshops    in minority communities and, with support from the Ministry of    Labor, conducts education workshops in factories across the    country. Persepolis, founded in 1999, employs a peer-driven    model and a public health approach to drug use. Among other    things, this organization operates the largest methadone    maintenance treatment (MMT) center in Iran. This work is    conducted with support from the Ministry of Health as well as    from the UNODC. Thus, beyond the actual work they do in the    field, these organizations and others can be credited with    helping to develop awareness and build capacity.  <\/p>\n<p>    To be sure, Iranian officials remarks are often freighted with    conflicting attitudes about the drug policies of Western    countries. Their statements are laced with complaints that Iran    has shouldered a great burden largely without the material    assistance and credit it deserves. Some have charged that    Western depravity is essentially responsible for unleashing the    scourge of drugs on Muslim countries. Others have decried what    they perceive as the international communitys shift in    orientation from counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism. And in    more intemperate moments, there are a few who have threatened    to allow smugglers freedom to operate unless the international    community is more forthcoming with assistance.  <\/p>\n<p>    Yet, at the same time, Iranian officials at the highest levels    have endorsed working in concert with others to address the    narcotics problem. In a July 2007 meeting with the EC anti-drug    commission, for example, Secretary of the Expediency Council    Mohsen Rezai called for a comparative study of the methods and    experiences of other countries in the fight against drugs.  <\/p>\n<p>    The current global system for drug control rests on three    international conventions  the Single Convention on Narcotic    Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971),    and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs    and Psychotropic Substances (1988). Iran is a party to all    three. In 2001, the government of Iran ratified the 1972    Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention. Iran, which is a    signatory of the Paris Pact of 2003, is a strong proponent of    an integrated regional approach to counter-narcotics.  <\/p>\n<p>    For the past six years, the US State Department INL annual    strategy reports have consistently stated that the government    of Iran has demonstrated sustained national political will and    has taken strong measures against illicit narcotics, including    cooperation with the international community in support of the    global effort against international drug trafficking. Indeed,    Iran has established multiple points of contact and cooperation    with regional and international partners to combat drug    trafficking and, more recently, to develop effective demand and    harm reduction interventions.  <\/p>\n<p>    By 2000, Iran had held counter-narcotics discussions and\/or    signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Armenia,    Australia, France, Georgia, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,    Norway, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. The May    1999 exchange of British and Iranian ambassadors, after a    20-year hiatus, helped pave the way for Anglo-Iranian    cooperation in the counter-narcotics field. During a visit to    Iran in February 2001, British Cabinet Minister Mo Mowlam    pledged support for Irans counter-narcotics efforts. Since    that time, Britain (and France) has contributed drug    enforcement liaison officers and equipment, including sniffer    dogs, bulletproof vests and night-vision goggles. In October    2004, Iran and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to    cooperate on counter-narcotics. The agreement provided for the    mutual access to data banks and cooperation between Iranian and    Italian police.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran has been a beneficiary of assistance from the European    Union (EU) as well. In 2005, the European Commission allocated    1.2 million euros to support demand reduction initiatives in    Iran. This assistance was geared mainly towards helping local    NGO networks to make progress in the area of demand control for    narcotics and harm reduction.  <\/p>\n<p>    At the regional level, in May 2005 Iran entered agreement with    UAE to combat drug trafficking. In June of the following year,    Iran signed a MoU pledging to help train Afghan border police,    and calling upon Afghan leaders and the international community    to establish a security belt and to destroy all opium    processing labs. In July 2007, Secretary General of the Drugs    Campaign headquarters Brigadier General Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moqaddam    called for expansion of Iran-Saudi Arabia joint efforts to    fight drug smuggling.  <\/p>\n<p>    As early as 1990, Iranian officials approached the United    Nations for assistance. Ghodratollah Asadi of the Health    Ministry participated in discussions with officials from the    UNODC in November of that year. The following May, a    five-member observer team from Iran met with then UNODC    director Giorgio Giacomelli to discuss coordinating activities    against the illicit trafficking of drugs. This was bolstered by    Irans appeal for support for its counter-narcotics programs    from the United Nations.  <\/p>\n<p>    In 1999, the UNODC opened an office in Tehran. The offices    work covers drug supply reduction\/law enforcement, drug demand    reduction, and rule of law. Since beginning its work, this    office has been engaged in the implementation of the NOROUZ    Program, an umbrella of four major programs that deal with    various aspects of the drug problem:  <\/p>\n<p>    The Darius (Drug Abuse Research and Intervention Unified    Strategy) Project, established in 2002, was (like the other    projects) jointly designed and agreed upon by The Islamic    Republic of Irans Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) and the    UNODC. The Darius institute, part of the project, serves the    aim of strengthening the national response to drug addiction by    focusing on demand reduction. Accordingly, the Institute    organizes, monitors, and evaluates research and education    projects as well as provides guidance to researchers.The    institute spends 60% of its budget on drug abuse prevention,    30% on treatment and rehabilitation, and 10% on harm reduction    programs.  <\/p>\n<p>    In partnership with the UNODC, Iran has explored ways to    develop more effective joint efforts at the regional level to    staunch drug smuggling. Iranian officials, who have long    insisted that the drug issue is a regional problem, have    sought the assistance of the UNODC to help formulate an    integrated approach that involves all three countries of the    Golden Crescent. Iranian officials have participated in    meetings facilitated by the UNODC and aimed at fostering    trilateral cooperation. As a result, in December 2005, senior    drug law enforcement officers agreed to joint patrolling on the    border and to establish direct telecommunication links so as to    share intelligence of an immediate nature related to drug    smuggling activities. In June 2007, senior delegates from the    three countries agreed to take action to improve border    management, including constructing more physical barriers,    boosting law enforcement capacity, launching joint    counter-narcotic operations, better communication, and    increased intelligence-sharing; to focus on all aspects of the    drug economy (e.g., locating and destroying drug labs); and to    hold policy-level coordination meetings twice yearly and to    conduct technical-level exchanges every three months.  <\/p>\n<p>    Interdiction: how successful? As discussed earlier, Iranian    efforts to intercept drug shipments entering the country from    the east have borne fruit. There are several reasons as to why    Iran is nonetheless awash in heroin. The first reason is the    sheer volume of supplies originating in Afghanistan. The second    is the smaller-scale shipments and alternative routes and forms    of transport utilized by traffickers, who continue to adapt to    Iranian counter-drug methods. The third reason is the pull of    the market. At the receiving end of the supply chain are the    new and expanding markets for heroin in the Middle East and    Africa. And then there is the pattern of drug consumption in    Iran itself  a burgeoning market that traffickers are eager    and able to serve.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran: how committed? There are questions about whether Iran is    applying counter-narcotics tools selectively. For example, have    Iranian authorities tolerated some smugglers  as in the PKK    base reportedly set up on Iranian territory after the capture    of Abdullah Ocalan  in exchange for intelligence? There have    been other unconfirmed reports that Iran has diverted some of    the equipment provided to assist in its anti-narcotics efforts.    According to several press accounts, Iran might have provided    to Hezbollah about 250 sets of night-vision goggles that    Britain had supplied for counter-narcotics purposes.  <\/p>\n<p>    Iran: how capable? Hindering the effectiveness of Irans    counter-narcotics efforts are factors very familiar to    Americans: bureaucratic battles over funding, deep differences    of opinion about the right balance between treatment and law    and order; the firepower of traffickers; drug-related    corruption. A. William Samii has reported on the ongoing    conflict between the Drug Control Headquarters (DHCQ) and    police, with the latter complaining DHCQ officials who do not    have any practical experience come up with impractical theories    and undermine the drug-control campaign.  <\/p>\n<p>    But Iran-specific factors have also hampered the effort: the    ethnic mix of the country coupled with center-periphery    tension, which sometimes results in non-cooperation of locals    with law enforcement authorities; and the backwardness of some    provinces such as Sistan va Baluchistan, where smuggling is a    coping strategy for some and a tool for supporting insurgency    for others.  <\/p>\n<p>    In addition, discussing the subjects of drug abuse and    addiction may no longer be taboo in Iran. However, shame and    stigma still attach to this behavior.  <\/p>\n<p>    Irans Partners: how helpful? But there are also questions    about how responsive and supportive others have been to Iran.    Ambassador Mohammad Mehdi Akhundzadeh, the Iranian delegate to    the UNODC in Vienna, complained that international aid to Iran    is insufficient and trivial, IRNA reported.  <\/p>\n<p>    European and other external assistance is undoubtedly limited.    A number of national bans on dealing with and supporting Iran    have contributed to this. The United States has applauded    Iranian counter-narcotics efforts, encouraged regional    cooperation and has not stood in the way of UNODC assistance.    Nevertheless, Washington remains reluctant to establish a    bilateral dialogue on narcotics while other issues, deemed of    higher priority (e.g., the status of the Iranian nuclear    program and Iranian involvement in Iraq), are unresolved.  <\/p>\n<p>    At the regional level, Iranian officials have long voiced    frustration that Afghanistan and Pakistan are not doing enough    to staunch the production and flow of narcotics. UNODC    officials and other international experts appear to agree.    Commenting on Pakistans negligence, UNODC chief Maria Costa    stated: Unfortunately, contrary to Iran, which has respected    all its responsibilities in the campaign against drugs,    Pakistan has been very negligent.  <\/p>\n<p>    Apart from the issues of lagging support for and cooperation    with Iran on counter-narcotics is the international communitys    lack of urgency in tackling the skyrocketing opium poppy    cultivation and production operations in Afghanistan. The    recently declared US priority on disrupting the Taliban and Al    Qaedas money stream by zeroing in on the Afghan narcotics    problem represents a welcome, though belated development.  <\/p>\n<p>    There are some bright spots in this otherwise gloomy picture.    Harm reduction programs have not been the norm in Middle    Eastern countries, but the recent remarkable growth of such    programs in Iran could serve as a model for the whole region.    In fact, Iranian NGOs are already leading the way. The Middle    Eastern Harm Reduction Network was launched by Iranian civil    society.  <\/p>\n<p>    There are also some looming uncertainties. The factors driving    ever-larger numbers of Iranians into drug abuse and addiction    are poorly understood. Clearly, the draconian policies of the    past had not curbed risk behaviors  far from it. What remains    unclear, however, is whether the incipient network of civil    society and official supporters of demand and harm reduction    interventions will be able to generate the momentum needed to    implement an integrated approach to the opiates epidemic and    scale up programs that are necessary to contain the    multifaceted threat it poses to the country.      <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>More here:<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"http:\/\/www.mei.edu\/content\/irans-war-drugs-holding-line\" title=\"Iran's War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute\">Iran's War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> Drugs and stimulants have influenced Iranian social, economic, and political life for hundreds of years. Opium, specifically, has long been used in Iran for medicinal and recreational purposes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/war-on-drugs\/irans-war-on-drugs-holding-the-line-middle-east-institute\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[187832],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-184786","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-war-on-drugs"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184786"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=184786"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184786\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=184786"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=184786"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=184786"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}