Last year, I was endlessly ringing the alarm bells about Japanese financials, particularly the impact of negative rates on profitability (e.g. net interest margin) and of money market reform and dollar strength on offshore funding, i.e. funding for overseas operations. (See here, here, and here.) <\/p>\n
With all of the 'happenings' going on in the U.S. currently as it relates to politics and financials, it's been easy to forget about the global reality... that is, that a third of the world's credit assets are still negative-yielding, that deflationary pressures are still alive and well despite the positive trend shift in the U.S. and other key areas (e.g. PPI in China), and that the Japanese financial sector is still under significant stress. <\/p>\n
So, returning to the topic of Japanese financials, in its CLSA Japan Investors Forum presentation this year, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (NYSE:MTU), one of the \"Big 4\" of the Japanese financial institutions, sought to lay out how it is addressing these ongoing situations and how it plans to achieve growth in the future. Of particular note was the focus on negative rate impact and non-JPY (i.e. offshore) funding for its foreign operations; if MUFG felt it necessary to address these issues in front of its large institutional investor clients, it must be of ongoing concern. <\/p>\n
Negative Rate Impact and Offshore Funding <\/p>\n
On negative rate impact, MUFG states its impact on lending has generally been in line with expectations. If you've been a follower of mine, you're probably well aware of the \"in-line expectations\" of the effects of NIRP in Japan, but to review, the effects have been namely: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
What is most concerning is MUFG's \"initiatives\" to counter the effects of NIRP. MUFG offers little substance on how it is trying to counter its declining profits as a result of NIRP; the details it does present amount to mere sales promotion, pushing customers into alternative investment products and other strategies. That's all well and good, but where is the concrete guidance? No mention of the impact of NIRP as it relates to exposure to synthetic derivatives, e.g. IRSs or CDSs, (not that any bank provides proper info on derivatives exposure anyway) or MUFG's high exposure to variable rate products on the asset side of the BS leaves me with more questions and concerns than before. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
As for offshore funding crunch concerns, MUFG does seek to allay fears of any such contagion occurring. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
By relative comparison, MUFG's exposure to the commercial paper (CD\/CP) market - where most of this contagion related to dollar strength and money market reform has taken place - is smaller than that of other institutions. And that 70% of its offshore funding is backed by customer deposits is reassuring. However, regardless, overseas business will continue to suffer the effects of a stronger dollar, as we've already seen, from H1'15 to H1'16, the impact from exchange rate losses for overseas business with Japanese corporates depressed gross profits to the tune of ~20 billion. <\/p>\n
Light Natural Gas Exposure <\/p>\n
Now, losses from money markets or forex are negative but are small enough to be mitigated. What is most concerning to me is recent events regarding the LNG (light natural gas) sector. Japan is the world's largest importer of LNG, mainly from the U.S. and Canada. For much of the past several years, natural gas prices have remained depressed along with crude and other energy products. However, as recently as this Tuesday, futures plunged by nearly 10% as the possibility of an El Nio event, i.e. warmer climate, in the U.S. increased; natural gas prices are down over 30% year-to-date and it's only been two and a half months. (See here, here, and here.) <\/p>\n
From a macroeconomic perspective, this may sound great as Japan now gets to import energy on the cheap, however, from the perspective of a financial institution underwriting the finances of an LNG E&P or shipping company, this could spell big trouble. <\/p>\n
The question we need to ask is: How much exposure does MUFG actually have to energy price volatility, specifically the latest LNG volatility? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Total and net exposure to the energy\/mining sectors has been decreasing over time and now sits at ~9.1 trillion, or $80 billion; most large-scale financial institutions have pretty sizeable exposure to energy and commodities so this is not inherently unusual or negative. However, let's take a closer look. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Most of that exposure is concentrated in midstream (pipelines\/vessels) and upstream (E&Ps) corporate credit in the Americas (mainly U.S. and Canada producers) and Japan (LNG ships\/transport). If prices are plunging (in an environment of already depressed prices), this could disrupt the entire \"LNG Revolution\" which had promised to be Japan's cheap energy alternative to nuclear. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
MUFG states that exposure to commodity price risk is limited in that only 38% of MUFG's project finance credit exposure contains such risk, however it bases such a definition on the notion that \"...projects whose revenues are determined based on oil\/gas process volume or facility operational days [is not exposed to commodity price risk].\" This is questionable. If the natural gas market is in severe stress, that will affect volumes and whether or not those facilities remain operational, no? Thus, I am skeptical at how MUFG determines projects are completely free from commodity price risk for a commodity company. <\/p>\n
Conclusion <\/p>\n
MUFG is by no means in crisis mode. In fact, as detailed in its presentation, there are many reasons to invest in potential growth for the future, such as Bitcoin participation, RegTech, and AI-driven investing. (However, these are highly competitive fields with players that have a lot more capital to expend, so some caution is warranted.) But, the potential short-term impact from negative rates, dollar strength, offshore funding concerns, and LNG volatility could be acute and severe. And MUFG's response to these possible contingencies leaves me with more questions than answers. <\/p>\n
Disclosure: I\/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. <\/p>\n
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. <\/p>\n
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Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group: More Questions Than Answers (Negative Rates, Offshore Funding, And LNG Exposure) - Seeking Alpha<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Last year, I was endlessly ringing the alarm bells about Japanese financials, particularly the impact of negative rates on profitability (e.g. Continue reading